THE
FOUNDATIONS
OF
THE
ARTICLES OF FAITH
Translation
With Notes
OF
The
Kitab Qawa‘id al-Aqa‘id
OF
Al-Ghazzali’s “Ihya’ ’Ulum al-Din”
By
NABIH AMIN FARIS
American University of Beirut
Beirut, Lebanon
SH. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
Publishers,
Booksellers & Exporters Lahore - Pakistan.
ISBN: 969-432-138-7
REPRINTED.............................................. 1999
Published by
SH. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
Publishers. Booksellers & Exporters 7-Aibak
Road. (Nee, Anarkali) Lahore - Pakistan
Printed at
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Online version
Islamic Philosophy online for al-Ghazali.org
In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the
Compassionate
Praise be to Allah who distinguished the community of the faithful with the lights of certainty and favored the people of truth by guiding them to the foundation of faith; who saved them from the errors of the unrighteous and the wickedness of the unbelievers, and with His grace led them to follow the example of the chief Apostle; who directed their footsteps in the way of the honored Companions of the Apostle and enabled them to emulate the righteous predecessors, so that they protected themselves against the dictates of sheer reason with the rope of Allah, and against the lives and beliefs of the early generation with the clear beaten track, combining thereby the products of reason and the ordinances of the traditional Law.
We are honored to present to the general public
at large a translation of the second book of Imam Ghazali’s monumental work the
Ihya’ ’Ulum al-Din (Revival of Religious Sciences). These translation
were published by Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf of Lahore, Pakistan. This particular
book was translated by the late Prof. Nabih A. Faris. Although we can not agree
with every instance of his translation we attempted wherever possible to make
some emendation that we deemed necessary for a new generation of audience. We
have left the book intact and whenever a change was introduced we have clearly
stated it. Also we have decidedly made some changes. First and foremost is the
mention of the source of the Qur’anic verses in translation, we removed them
from the footnotes and introduced directly into the text. Second whenever we
found a choice of word offensive or incorrect in our humble opinion we have
changed the text and made a note of it the footnotes. Whenever we deemed it
necessary to add footnotes we have done so and ended the footnotes with “ed.”
Whenever we added information to existing footnotes we inserted the new
information in square brackets and added “ed.” to it. Also we
have changed the word “God” to “Allah” and changed the spelling of “Muhammed”
to “Muhammad” without notice.
Prof. Faris was fortunate enough to make use of a
complete manuscript copy of the Ihya from Princeton University. He mentions the
changes as outlined in his preface. It is worthwhile noting that he worked on
cataloging the collection of manuscripts at Princeton University the fruits of
which are apparent in this translation.
We took the liberty of adding a table of contents
which does not exist in the original work. Also we have eliminated the indexes
as they become unnecessary in an electronic text. We added our own definition
to some of the terms that were left in Arabic. We do not claim that we have the
perfect copy of the work and we ask the reader to be kind to us and provide us
with comments and any advice that is deemed necessary.
We at this juncture like to remind the reader to
take advantage of this and other resources available on our website that is
dedicated to Imam Ghazali. Also
included in the site is a complete copy of the work in the original Arabic. We
are also always looking for translations as well as works of Imam Ghazali to be
offered to be placed on the site. If you have any of that information please
contact us in order to place them online. Since this site is the work of
volunteers we ask that you contribute as much as you can of resources. It is
our hope that you not only benefit from the site but to pass on this benefit to
others.
The editor
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
The
Meaning of the Second Word of the Witness (al-shahadah)
Section II: On the
Introduction to Religious Instruction and the Stages of Belief.
Section III: On the
Obvious Proofs for the Creed Written In Jerusalem.
The first
Pillar: is the knowledge of the essence of Allah and it Involves Ten
Principles.
The
second Pillar: Concerning the Attributes of Allah, Involving Ten Principles
The Third
Pillar: Concerning the Knowledge of the Works of Allah, Involving Ten
Principles.
The first
Problem: Concerning whether Islam was identical to Iman.
The
Second Problem: Concerning the disagreement whether Iman increases or
decreases.
The Third
Problem: Concerning the saying “I am a believer Inshallah?”
TO
the
Memory of my father
AMIN FARIS
In Gratitude and Reverence
The Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din of al-Ghazzali is divided into four
quarters (sing. Rub‘ ).
The first deals with the acts of worship (al-'ibadat), the second
with the usages of life (al-mu'amalat), the third with the destructive
matters of life (al-muhlikat),and the fourth with the saving matters of
life (al-munajjiyat). Each of these
four quarters comprises ten books (sing. kitab). The present work
represents the second book in the first quarter. It deals with the foundations
of the articles of faith and is, perhaps, the most important part of the first
quarter.
The texts utilized in the preparation of
the present translation were the following: The first is the text printed at
Kafr al-Zaghari in A.H. 1352 from the older Cairo edition of A.H. 1289. It is
referred to in the notes as ‘C’. The second is that contained in the text of
al-Sayyid al-Murtada al-Zabidi's commentary on the Ihya', known as the Ithaf
al-Sadah al-Muttaqin bi-Sharh Ihya’
‘Ulum al-Din, printed in ten volumes in Cairo A.H. 1311; it is referred to
in the notes as SM (text). The third is the text which is reproduced in the
margin of the same Ithaf al-Sadah; it
is referred to in the notes as SM (margin). The fourth and, perhaps, the most
important is the text contained in a. four volume manuscript at the Princeton
University Library (Philip K. Hitti,
Nabih Amin Faris, and Butrus Abd-al-Malik, Descriptive Catalogue of the Garrett Collection of Arabic Manuscripts
in the Princeton University Library, Princeton, 1938, No. 1481). It
probably dates from the late fifteenth century. This text, called ‘B’ in the
notes, corresponds to SM (text), while ‘C’ corresponds to SM (margin).
The first book of the first quarter, the
well-known Kitab al-‘Ilm, was
published, under the title of The Book of
Knowledge, by Sh. Muhammad Ashraf of Lahore 1962. Once again I am grateful
to Sh. M. Ashraf for his continued interest in seeing as many of the books of
the Ihya, appear in English. And once again I wish to acknowledge my
indebtedness to the three Princeton scholars: the late Edwin B. Conklin, the
late Harold H. Bender, and Philip K. Hitti, and to the American Philosophical
Society for the Promotion of Useful Knowledge in Philadelphia, without whose
imaginative help neither The Book
of Knowledge nor the present work would have been done. May I also express
my thanks to my students: Mr. Robert Hazo, Mr. John Dudley Woodberry, and Major
Angus M. Mundy who read the manuscript and made several useful observations,
and to Dr. John H. Patton, Professor of Religion, Park College, Parksville,
Mo., for his careful examination of the manuscript and his valuable
suggestions.
Nabih Amin Faris
American University of Beirut
October 31, 1962.
“In the Name of Allah the Merciful, the
Compassionate”.
The Foundations of the
Articles of Faith,
Containing
Four Sections.
On the Exposition of the Creed of the Orthodox Community as
Embodied in the Two Words of the Shahadah which form One
of the Pillars of Islam.
We say-and our trust is in Allah-praise be
to Allah the Creator, the Restorer, the Doer of whatever He wills, He Whose
throne is glorious and Whose power, mighty, Who guides the elect to the
orthodox path and the right way, Who grants them benefits once they affirm His
unity by guarding the articles of faith from the obscurities of doubt and
hesitation, Who leads them to imitate the way of His chosen Apostle and to
follow the example of his most honoured Companions by directing their footsteps
to the way of truth, Who reveals Himself to them In His Essence and in His
works by His beautiful attributes which none perceive except he who inclines
his ear in contemplation, Who makes known to them that He is one in His
Essence without any associate, single (fard)
without any compeer, eternal (samad) without
any opposite, separate (munfarid) without
any like. He is one, ancient (qadim)with nothing
preceding Him, eternal (azali) without
any. beginning, abiding in existence with none after Him, everlasting (abadi) without any end, subsisting
without cessation, abiding without termination. He has not ceased and. He will
not cease to be described by the epithets of majesty. At the end of time He
will not be subject to dissolution and decay, but He is the first and the
last, the external and the internal, and He knows all.
1. Transcendence (tanzih). We
attest that He is not a body possessing form, nor a substance restricted and
limited : He does not resemble other bodies either in limitation or in
accepting division. He is not a substance and substances do not exist in Him;
He is not an accident and accidents do not exist in Him. No, He resembles no
entity and no entity resembles Him ; nothing is like Him and He is not like
anything; measure does not bound Him and boundaries do not contain Him;
directions do not surround Him and neither the earths nor the Heavens are on
different sides of Him. Truly, He is seated on the throne after the manner in
which He said and in the sense in which He willed -in a state of equilibrium
removed from contact, fixity of location, stability, envelopment, and change.
The throne does not support Him, but the throne and those who carry it are
supported by the grace of Him power and are constrained by His hand. He is
above the throne and above the Heavens and above everything to the limits of
the earth with an aboveness which does not bring Him nearer to the throne and
the Heavens, just as it does not make Him farther from the earth. No, He is
highly exalted above the throne and the Heavens, just as He is highly exalted
above the earth. Nevertheless, He is near to every entity and is “nearer to a
creature than his jugular vein”; (Surah 50:15) and He witnesses everything
since His nearness does not resemble the nearness off bodies, just as His essence
does not resemble the essence of bodies. He does not exist in anything, just as
nothing exists in, Him: He has too much exalted Himself that any place should
contain Him, just as He has too much sanctified Himself that time should limit
Him. No, He was before He had created time and place, and just as He was, He
now is. He is distinct from His creatures through His attributes. There is not
in His essence any other besides Him, nor in any other besides Him, His
essence. He is far removed from change of state or of location. Events have no
place in Him and mishaps do not befall Him. No, He does not cease in the epithets of His Majesty, to be far removed from
decay, and in the attributes of His perfection He has no need of an increase in
perfection. In His essence His existence is known by reason; His essence is
seen with the eyes, a blessing from Him and a grace to the righteous in the
life everlasting and a completion of bliss from Him through beholding His
gracious face.
2. Life and Power. We
witness that He is living, powerful, almighty and all-subduing; inadequacy and
weakness befall Him not; slumber overtakes Him not nor sleep; dissolution does
not prevail over Him nor death. He is Lord of the visible world and the invisible
[80], and of power and might; His are dominion, subjugation, creation, and
command ; the Heavens are rolled in His right hand and created things are
subjugated in His hand. He is separate in creating and inventing; He is alone
in bringing into existence and innovating. He created all creatures and their
works, and decreed their sustenance and their lives; nothing decreed escapes
His hand and the mutations of things are not beyond His power. The things which
He decreed cannot be numbered and the things which He knows have no end.
3. Knowledge. We
attest that He knows all things which can be known, grasping all that happens
from the limits of earth to the highest heaven; not an atom's weight in the
earth or in Heaven is beyond His knowledge. Yes, He knows the creeping of the
black ant upon the solid rock in the darkest night, and He perceives the
movement of the mote in the midst of the air. He knows the secrets and that
which is more shrouded in secrecy than secrets; He has knowledge of the
suggestions of the mind, of the movements of the thoughts, and of the concealed
things of the inmost parts by a knowledge which is ancient from eternity and by
which He has, not ceased to be described through the ages, not by a knowledge
which renews itself and arises in His essence through experience.[1]
4. Will. We
attest that He is the willer of all things that are, the ruler of all
originated phenomena; there does not come into the visible or invisible world
anything meagre or plenteous, small or great, good or evil, or any advantage or
disadvantage, belief or unbelief, knowledge or ignorance, success or failure,
increase or decrease, obedience or disobedience, except by His Will. What He
wills is and what He does not will is not; there is not a glance of the eye nor
a stray thought of the heart that is not subject to His will. He is the
Creator, the Restorer, the Doer of whatsoever He wills. There is none that
rescinds His command, none that supplements His decrees, none that dissuades a
servant from disobeying Him, except by His help and mercy, and none has power
to obey Him except by His Will. Even though mankind, jinn, angels, and devils
were to unite to move the weight of a single atom in the world or to render it
still, without His will they would fail. His will subsists in His essence as one
of His attributes. He has not ceased to be described by it from eternity,
willing, in His infinity, the existence of things at their appointed time which
He has decreed. So they come into existence at their appointed times even as He
has willed in His infinity without precedence of subsequence. They come to
pass in accordance with His knowledge and will without variation or change. He
does not direct things through arrangement of thought and awaiting the passage
of lime, and therefore one thing does not distract Him from another.
5. Hearing and Sight. We
attest that He is a hearer and a see-er. He hears and sees and no audible
thing, however faint, is beyond His hearing, and no visible thing, however
minute, is bidden from His sight. Distance does not prevent His hearing and
darkness does not obstruct His seeing. He sees without eyes and hears without
ears; just as He perceives without a brain, and seizes without a hand, and
creates without an instrument, since His attributes do not resemble the
attributes of created things, just as His essence does not resemble the essence
of created things.
6. Speech. And we attest that He speaks,, commanding, forbidding, promising, and threatening, with a speech from eternity, ancient, and self-existing. .Unlike the speech of created things, it is not a sound which is caused through the passage of air or the friction of bodies; nor is it a letter which is enunciated through the movement of the lips and tongue. We, also attest that the Qur’an, the Bible, the Gospel, and the Psalms are His books revealed to His apostles; that the Qur’an is repeated by the tongue, written down in copies, and preserved in the heart, yet it is, nevertheless ancient, subsisting in the essence of Allah, not subject to division and separation through its transmission to the heart and (transcription on) leaves. We further attest that Moses heard the speech of Allah without sound and without word, just as the righteous see the essence of Allah in the hereafter, without substance or accident.
And
since He has these qualities, He is living, knowing, willing, hearing, seeing
and speaking through life, power, knowledge, will, hearing, sight, and speech,
not solely through His essence.
7. Works. And we
attest that there is no entity besides Him, except what originates by His
action and proceeds from His justice, after the most beautiful and perfect and
complete and just of ways. We attest that He is wise in His actions, just in
f;is judgments; -His justice is not comparable with that of men, since tyranny
is conceivable' in the case of the latter when he deals with the property of
others than himself; but tyranny is inconceivable in the case of Allah, for He
does not encounter any property of another besides Himself, so that his
dealing with it might be tyrannous. Everything besides. Him, men and jinn,
angels and devils, Heaven and earth, animals, plants, and inanimates, substance
and accident, as well as things perceived and things felt, are all originated
things which He created by His power from nothing and made from nought, since
He existed in eternity by Himself and there was not along with Him any other.
So He originated creation thereafter as a manifestation of his power and a
realisation of that which had preceded of His will and that which existed in
eternity of His word, not because He had any need or necessity for it.
We also
attest that He is Magnanimous in creating and inventing and in imposing
obligations(taklif), not doing it through necessity. We attest that He
is gracious in beneficence and reform, though not through any need. Munificence
and kindness, beneficence and grace are His, since He is able to bring upon
His creatures all manner of torture and to shower upon them all kinds of pain
and affliction. Even if He should do
this, it would be justice on His part, it would not be vile, it would not be
tyrannous. He rewards His believing servants for their acts of obedience in the
spirit of generosity and encouragement rather than according to their merit
and desert. For He is under obligation to none and tyranny is inconceivable in
Him. None possesses any claim against Him. His claim to obedience is obligatory
and binding upon all creatures [81] because He made it obligatory upon them
through the words of His prophets and not by reason alone. But He sent His
apostles and showed their veracity through explicit miracles; and they conveyed
His commands and prohibitions as well as His promises and threats. So it
became obligatory upon all creatures to believe in what they brought.
The Meaning of the Second Word of
the
Witness (al-shahadah)
The
second word of the witness is that which testifies that the apostleship belongs
to the Apostle, and that Allah sent the unlettered (ummi) Qurashite Prophet Muhammad, as an apostle to all the Arabs and
the non-Arabs, to the jinn and men. And by his law He abrogated the other laws,
except such of them as He confirmed. And He gave him precedence over all other
prophets and made Him Lord of mankind, and declared incomplete any profession
of faith which attests to unity, i.e. “There is no god but Allah,” unless it is
followed by the witness to the Apostle, namely, “Muhammad is the Apostle of
Allah,” And he made belief in him, in all the things which he narrated
concerning the affairs of this world and the hereafter, obligatory upon all
creation. And He will not accept the belief of any creature until he believes
in that which the Prophet narrated concerning the things after-
death, of which the first is the question of Munkar and Nakir. These are two
awful and terrible beings who will make the dead one sit up in the grave, both
soul and body; they will ask him about the unity of Allah and about the
apostleship, saying, “Who is the Lord, and what is the religion, and who is thy
prophet?”[2] They are the two inquisitors of the
grave and their. questions comprise the first examination after death.
Again,
man should believe that the punishment of the grave is real and that His
judgment of the body and soul is just and in accordance with His will. And he
should believe in the balance with the two scales and the tongue-the magnitude
of which is like the stages of the Heavens and the earth; in it the deeds are
weighed by the power of Allah, even to the weight of the mote and the mustard
seed, in order to establish exact justice. The records of the good deeds will
be placed in a good manner in the scale of light, and then the balance will be
weighed down by them according to the measure of their favour in the sight of
Allah and by His grace, while the records of the evil deeds will be cast in a
vile manner in the scale of darkness, and they will be light in the balance
through the justice of Allah. He should believe also that the bridge (al-sirat,) is real; it is a bridge
stretched over Hell, sharper than the edge of the sword and finer than a hair.
The feet of the unbelievers slip on it, according to the decree of Allah, and
they fall into the Fire; but the feet of the believers stand firm upon it, by
the grace of Allah, and so they pass into everlasting life. And he should
believe in the frequented tank (hawd) the tank of Muhammad, from which
the believers will drink before entering Paradise and after [821 crossing the
bridge. Whoever drinks a single draught from it will never thirst again. Its
width is the distance of one month’s journey; its waters are whiter than milk
and sweeter than honey. Around it are ewers in number like the stars of heaven,[3] and
into it flow two canals from al-Kawthar.[4] And ht should believe in the
judgment and the distinction. Between men in it, that some will be closely
questioned that some will be treated with leniency and that other; will enter
Paradise without questioning-these arc. Allah's favourites (al-muqarrabun). Allah will ash whomsoever He will of the prophets
concerning the carrying of His message, and whomsoever of the unbelievers
concerning their rejection of the apostles;[5] and He
will ask the innovators concerning the law and the Muslims concerning their
works. And he, should believe that the monotheists will be released
from Hell-fire after vengeance has been taken on them; so that there will not
remain in Hell a single monotheist. And he should believe in the intercession
of the prophets, of the learned, and of the martyrs-each according to his
dignity and rank before Allah. And he who remains of the believers and has no
intercession will be released through the grace of Allah. Therefore not a
single believer will abide in Hell forever; whosoever has in his heart the
weight of an atom of belief will be brought out from there. And he should
acknowledge the excellence of the Companions [83] and their different ranks,
and that the most excellent of mankind, after the Prophet, is Abu-Bakr, and
then ‘Umar, and then ‘Uthman, and then ‘Ali. And he should think well of all
the Companions and praise them, just as Allah and His Apostle praised them.
All
this was handed down in traditions from the Prophet and from his Companions.
Therefore he who subscribes to all this and believes in it without doubting
will be of the people of truth and the Law, thus separating himself from the
followers of error and heresy.
So we
ask Allah to perfect our faith and make us steadfast in it. We ask this,
through His mercy, for ourselves and for all the Muslims throughout the world.
Truly 'He is the most merciful. And may the blessing of Allah be upon our
master[6]
Muhammad and upon very chosen servant.
On the Introduction to Religious Instruction and the
Stages of Belief.
You
should know that what we have already stated under the Exposition of the Creed[7] should
be presented to the child in his early years in order that he may commit it to
memory; its meaning will continue to be unfolded to him little by little as he
grows older. The first step is to commit it to memory, after which comes
understanding, then belief, then certainty and acceptance, all of which obtain
in the child without proof. For Allah showed His grace to man by preparing his
heart from the beginning for belief without the necessity of any argument or
proof. How can this be denied when all the articles of faith of the common folk
are based on pure instruction (talqin) and
simple acceptance on authority (taqlid)? True,
a belief which results from simple acceptance of authority may not be free of
some weakness at the beginning, in that it can be shaken and impaired by its
opposite whenever that is mentioned. It should, therefore, be strengthened and
confirmed in the heart of the child and the layman until it becomes well
established and unshakeable: But the way to strengthen and confirm it does not
lie in learning the art of argumentation and speculation. It is found in the
reading and exposition of the Qur’an, in the study of the traditions and their
meaning, and in the performance of religious duties and acts of worship. Consequently
a child's belief continues to increase in strength through what falls on his
ears of the proofs and arguments of the Qur’an, through what reaches him of the
illustrations of tradition and their merits, through what shines on him of the
lights of the acts of Worship and the fulfillment of the duties thereof, and
finally by means of what comes to him from watching the righteous, sitting in
their company, and listening to their words, as well as from observing their
mark and manner in obeying Allah, fearing Him, and humbling themselves before
Him. Instruction will then be like the sowing of the seed in the heart, while
these actions will serve to water and tend the seed until it grows up and
becomes strong and develops into a good and strong tree the roots of which are
well grounded in the earth, while the branches reach up into the sky.
The
child should also be guarded with utmost care against argumentation and
speculation, because what argumentation impairs is greater than what it
repairs, and what it corrupts is great than what it sets aright. In fact, the
practice of strengthening the belief of the child through argumentation is like
striking a tree with an iron mallet in the hope of strengthening it. Breaking
its limbs in this way, however, will destroy it or, more likely, impair its
growth. Seeing should, in this case, suffice. Compare then the creed of the
righteous and pious among the common folk with that of the speculators and
those given to argumentation and you will find that the belief of the commoner is
as firm as the lofty mountain which is moved neither by storm nor; lightning,
while the creed of the speculator who guards his belief with the syllogisms of
controversy is like a thread hanging in the air, blown to and fro by the winds.
This is true of all except those who have heard the proof of belief and have
accepted it on authority, just as they have taken hold of belief itself and
accepted it on authority, since there is no difference in accepting things on
authority between the proof and the thing proved. Thus learning the proof is
one thing; arriving at it through independent thinking is another.
But if
the child were brought up on this doctrine And should then pursue a worldly
activity in order to earn his livelihood, he might not go any farther, though
he would, in the opinion of the people of the truth, be saved in the hereafter,
since the Law did not require of the barbarous Arabs anything more than a
verbal acceptance of the literal meaning of these articles of faith. But study
and inquiry, as well as undertaking the working out of proofs, were not
required of them at all [84]. But if he should wish to be one of the travelers
along the path of the hereafter and be fortunate therein, so that he could
continue to act (according to his knowledge), holding fast to piety,
“restraining his soul from lust,” (Qur’an; 79:40) and practising
self-discipline and self mortification, there would be opened for him avenues
of guidance which would reveal to him the realities of this doctrine throught a
divine light cast into his heart by self-mortification (mujahadah), in
fulfillment of the promise of Allah whom He said, “And whoso striveth for us,
in Our ways We will guide them; for Allah is assuredly with those who do
right.” (Qur’an; 29:69) This is, in truth, the precious pearl which is
the ultimate goal of the belief of the saints and the favourites of Allah. The
secret which rested in the bosom of Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq and by which he excelled
all others referred to this pearl. The revelation of this secret (sirr), nay, these secrets,
has different stages, depending upon the degree of self-mortification and upon
the degree in which the inner self (al-batin) is clean and free of things other than Allah, as well as upon
the obtaining of guidance by means of the light of faith (yaqin).This is
just like the differences which exist among men in the comprehension of the
mysteries of medicine, jurisprudence and the other sciences, since their
differences vary with their diligence and with their native endowment (fitrah) in brilliance and prudence. Just as
the former variations are not limited, so are the latter not limited.
(A
case). If you say that the study of argumentation and scholastic theology (kalam) is blameworthy, like astrology,
or that it is permissible (mubah) or commendable
(mandub), then, you should know that
in this particular respect men go to excess and exaggeration on both sides:
some say that it is an innovation and therefore unlawful and that, excluding
the sin of polytheism (shirk), it is.
better for the servant to face his Allah guilty of every offence except that of
scholasticism; others say that it is an obligation and an ordinance either of
the kifayah or the ‘ayn type, that it is the best form of
work and the highest kind of oblation, and that it is the verification of
theology and the safeguard of the religion of Allah. Among those who hold it
unlawful are Shafi`i, Malik, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Sufyan [al-Thawri] and all the
traditionists among the Fathers.
Ibn-`Abd-al-A`la[8] once
said, “On the day al-Shafi‘i was debating with Hafs al-Fard,[9] who
was one of the Mu‘tazilite theologians, I heard him say, ‘Excluding the sin of
polytheism it is better for the slave to face his Allah guilty of every offence
than to stand before Him with [even a] little scholasticism.’ I have also heard
Hafs say things which I cannot repeat.” Ibn-`Abd-al-A`la reported also that
al-Shafi‘i said, “I have discovered among the scholastic theologians things
which I never expected to find. Excepting the sin of polytheism, it is better
for the servant to disobey all the commandments of Allah than to address
himself to scholastic theology.”
Al-Karabisi
related that al-Shafi‘i was once asked about something scholastic and was
consequently infuriated and said, “Ask Hafs al-Fard and his cohorts about
this-may Allah dishonour them.” When al-Shafi‘i was taken sick, Hafs came in
to him and said, “Who am I ?” Al-Shafi‘i replied, “You are Hafs al-Fard-may
Allah neither keep nor prosper you until you repent of your sins.” Said
al-Shafi‘i again, “If men but knew what predilections lurk in scholastic
theology they would have run away from it as they would run away from a lion.”
And again, “Whenever I hear a man say that the name is the thing named, I
testify that he is a scholastic theologian and has no religion.”
Al-Za'farani[10]
related that al-Shafi'i once said, “My judgment concerning the scholastic
theologians is that they should be beaten with palm branches and carried in
that condition round among the tribes and clans.” This, it is said, is the
penalty of those who discard the Qur’an and the traditions and address
themselves to scholastic theology.
Ahmad
ibn-Hanbal said, “A scholastic theologian never succeeds. You can hardly find
anyone who, having dabbled in scholastic theology, is without unsoundness in
his heart.” He was so strong in its condemnation that he ostracised al-Harith
al-Muhasibi,[11] in
spite of the latter’s asceticism and godliness, because he composed a work on
the refutation of heresy,[12]
telling him, “Woe unto you. Do you not first state their heretical beliefs and
then answer them, thereby compelling men to study these heresies and to ponder
over these dubiosities, all of which will draw them into speculation and
controversy.” Ahmad ibn-Hanbal also said, “The scholastic theologians are
heretics (sing. zindiq).”
(Speaking
of the scholastic theologian) Malik said “Have you seen how, when one of
stronger argument confronts him he will discard his religion for a new one
every day?” In other words, the position of the debaters is (constantly)
changing. Malik also said, “The testimony of sectarians and heretics is not
permissible.” In interpreting this, some of his friends said that he meant by
sectarians (ahl al-ahwa') the
scholastic theologians, no matter to what school of thought they might belong.
Abu-Yusuf
said, “He who seeks knowledge through speculation will become a heretic (zindiq).” Al-Hasan [al-Basri] said,
“Argue not with sectarians and associate with them not, nor hearken unto them.”
Thus
the traditionists among the Fathers have been unanimous (in their condemnation
of scholastic theology). The many strictures which came down to us from them
are innumerable, They have said that the companions refrained from scholastic
theology only because of their knowledge of the evils it would breed, although
they were better informed and more eloquent phrase-makers than anyone else. For
this reason the Prophet said, “The hairsplitters -are doomed ; they
are doomed to destruction.” By this he meant those who are extravagant in
investigation and research. [The traditionists among the Fathers] also
protested that if [scholastic theology] were an integral part of religion the
Apostle of Allah would have commanded [his Companions to address themselves
to] it, and would have taught [them] its ways. He also would have praised it
and commended its protagonists [85]. He thus taught them abstersion (istinja')[13] and urged them to study the law of
inheritance ('ilm al fara'id)[14] and commended [its teachers]. On the other
hand he forbade them to speculate on divine decrees saying, “Refrain from
speculation on the decrees of Allah,” and the Companions continued to refrain
from such speculations. To add to what the teacher set forth is disloyal and
unfair; the Companions are our teachers and our example, and we are their
followers and disciples.
The
other group protested that the dangers in speculation are such terms as essence
(jawhar) and accident ('arad) and the other strange terms with
which the Companions were not familiar. But the matter is not difficult to
explain, because there is not a single branch of knowledge in which new terms
have not been introduced for the sake of conveying meanings, as for example,
the science of tradition, the science of interpretation, and the science of
jurisprudence. Were these people to encounter terms such as refutation (naqd), invalidation (kasr), composition (tarkib), deduction(ta‘diyah), and false collocation (fasadal-wad'), as well as the other questions
which are adduced by analogy (qiyas), they
would not comprehend them. Therefore the introduction of new terms to signify a
definite meaning is just as legitimate as inventing vessels of new shape and
form for use in permissible things. If it is the meaning of these terms which
is dangerous, we do not mean to attain through them anything except the
knowledge of the proofs for the creation of the universe, the unity of the
Creator, and (the nature of) His attributes as they have come down to us in the
Law. Since when, then, has the knowledge of Allah by proof been unlawful ? But
if it is sectarianism, fanaticism, enmity, hatred, and all that speculation and
controversy breed which are meant and intended, then these are unlawful and
should be guarded against and avoided, just as pride, conceit, hypocrisy, and
the desire for power which the sciences of tradition, interpretation, and
jurisprudence breed are unlawful and should be guarded against and avoided.
Nevertheless, the fact that a branch of knowledge may lead to [these evils]
should not prevent one from seeking that knowledge. For how could the mention
of a piece of evidence and the desire to learn and investigate it be forbidden
when Allah said, “Say : Give your proof if ye speak the truth.” (2:105)[15] And
again “...that he who would perish might perish by clear proof, and he who
would live might live by clear proof.” (8:44) And again, “Have ye any authority
for this?” (cf. 10:69) in other words [“Have ye any] evidence or proof
[for this?”]. And again, “Say: Peremptory evidence is Allah's.” (10:110) And
again, “Hast thou not considered him who disputed with Abraham about his Lord,
because Allah had given him the kingdom? When Abraham said, ‘My Lord is He who
giveth life and death,’ he said, ‘It is I who give life and death,’ Abraham
said, ‘Since Allah bringeth the sun from the East, do thou then bring it from
the West. The infidel was confounded, for Allah guideth not the evildoers.”
(2:60) In this instance Allah mentioned with commendation the controversy
between Abraham and his adversary and how Abraham debated with the adversary
and silenced him. Allah also said, “This is our argument with which we
furnished Abraham against his people.” (6:83) And again, “They said, 'O Noah!
Already hast thou disputed with us, and increased our disputation.” (11:34)
Again, in the story of Pharaoh, Allah said, “Said Pharaoh, ‘Who then is the
Lord of the Worlds?’ to the words ‘What if I show thee
that which shall be a proof [of my mission]?” (26: 22-29)[16] In
short the Qur’an, from beginning to end, is an argument with the unbelievers.
The greatest proof of theologians for the unity of Allah is the word of Allah
when He said, “Had there been in either [Heaven or earth] gods besides Allah,
both would have surely gone to ruin,” (21:22) Their greatest proof for the
prophecy is, “And if ye be in doubt as to that which we have sent down to our
servant, then produce a surah like it.”(2:21) Their greatest proof for the
resurrection is, “Say: He shall give life to them who first gave them being.”
(36:79)
Thus
the apostle did not cease to debate with the unbelievers and dispute with them.
Allah said, “Dispute with them in the kindest manner.” (16:126) The Companions,
too, used to debate and dispute with the unbelievers, but only in the time of
need. At the time of the Companions the need for disputation was small. The
first to establish the precedence of summoning innovators back to truth, by
means of debate and argument was 'Ali ibn-abi-Talib when he dispatched ibn-'
Abbas to the Kharijites. Ibn-`Abbas argued with them saying, “Would you rebel
against your imam?” But they replied, “He has fought, but did not capture any
prisoners or booty.” Ibn-`Abbas explained to them that prisoners and booty are
taken only in war against unbelievers, adding, “Would any of you, if ‘A’isha had been taken captive on the
Day of the Camel[17] and
had fallen to his lot, have deemed it lawful to deal with her as he would have dealt with his own property [and
forgot] that she was, according to the express word of the Qur’an, your
mother?”[18] They
answered “No,” and- consequently two thousand of them surrendered.[19]
It was also related that al-Hasan
(al-Basari) once debated with a Qadarite[20]
with the result that the latter renounced his error. Similarly, `Ali
ibn-abi-Talib once debated with a Qadarite. It is also related that 'Abdullah
ibn-Mas`ud debated with Yazid ibn 'Amirah[21]
on the subject of belief. Said 'AbdullAh [ibn Mas'ud], “If I say that I am a
believer it will be like saying that I am in Paradise.” Thereupon Yazid ibn
'Amirah said to him, “O Companion of the Apostle of Allah, what is belief
except to believe in Allah, His
angels, books and aspostles, as well as in resurrection and the balance [of the
day of the Judgement], and to perform prayer, observe the fast, and pay alms.
Yet we have trespasses which, if we but knew that they will be forgiven us, we
would know that we will be of the people of Paradise. For this reason we say
that we are believers,but we do not say that we are of the people of Paradise.”
Ibn-Mas`ud replied, “By Allah, you have said the truth ; this is a . mistake on
my part.” Thus it should be said that [the Companions] addressed themselves
little to [speculation], and this they did briefly and only in time of need.
They did not go into it [as a subject] to be written about or taught, nor did
they take it up as a vocation. It is then said that they addressed themselves
to it little because the need was small, since no heresy had appeared at that
time. They addressed themselves to it briefly because their only purpose was to
silence the adversary and compel him to admit his error; they aimed at
revealing the truth and removing dubiosities. Yet whenever the confusion of
the adversary persisted or his insistence on error continued, they had to
prolong their argument, never reckoning, as it were, the need with weight or
[86] measure once they had embarked on their [argument]. Their not applying
themselves to teaching and writing about it is not unlike their custom with
regard to jurisprudence, interpretation, and tradition. Therefore, if it is
permissible to compose books on jurisprudence and to work out rare hypothetical
cases (suwar) which seldom arise,
either as a preparation for the time of need, or simply to sharpen the wits, it
is also permissible for us to classify the methods of disputation in preparation
for the time with dubiosities flare up or an innovator runs loose ; or simply
to sharpen the wits or have the argument ready so that when needed it will be
within reach of all just as the preparation of armaments for war before the day
of battle.
This is
practically all that can be said on behalf of the two groups, [the proponents
and the opponents of speculation]. If you ask me what I think of this, I will
say that the truth of the matter is that those who condemn it absolutely and
under all circumstances as well as those who praise it absolutely and
unreservedly are wrong. The question should be more carefully analysed.
You should know, then,
that first of all a thing, such as wine or carrion, may be pronounced unlawful
from its very nature. What I mean by `its very nature' is that the cause of its
being pronounced unlawful is a quality inherent in it : intoxication [in the
case of wine] and putrefaction [in the case of carrion]. If we were asked
concerning these two things, we would not hesitate to say that they were
absolutely unlawful, and would in no way think of allowing carrion to be eaten
in time of need, nor ever think off permitting the drinking of wine when a
person chokes over a mouthful of food and finds nothing with which to swallow
it besides wine.
In the second place a thing may be pronounced unlawful for some other reason, such as underselling your Muslim brother during the period of option (khiyar),[22] trading during the call to prayer, or eating earth which is pronounced unlawful because of its harmful effect. Such things are divided into those which are harmful both in small and large quantities and are therefore pronounced unlawful, like, for example, poison which is fatal whether in small or large quantity ; and those which are harmful only when taken in excess like, for example, honey, which when taken in excess is harmful to the feverish patient. The same is true of eating earth. Therefore, in pronouncing wine absolutely unlawful, only the most general cases were taken into consideration. In the event that something new arises, it will be well to consider the attending circumstances. Consequently it is better and safer to analyse each case [and treat it on its own merits].
Were turn now to the
science of scholastic theology (`ilm
al-kalam) to say that it has advantages and disadvantages, usefulness and
harm. With regard to its usefulness,
whenever it is useful it is either lawful, or commendable, or obligatory, as
the occasion demands. As to its harm, whenever it is harmful it is unlawful.
Its harm lies in raising doubts and undermining the articles of faith by moving
them out from the realm of certitude and determination. These things are lost
at the beginning and their restoration by means of proof is doubtful;
furthermore it varies with the individual.
Such
then is ,its harm in the orthodox faith. Yet it has another harmful influence
which manifests itself in confirming the belief of the heretics in their
heresies and establishing them in their hearts so that their claims increase
and their insistence on them becomes more stubborn. The kind of them, however,
results from the fanaticism which disputation enkindles. For this reason you
find that the lay heretic can, through kindness, be easily dissuaded from his
error in no: time. But if he were brought up in a town where disputation and
fanaticism abound it will be impossible for both the ancients and the moderns
to remove the heresy from his heart, their combined efforts, notwithstanding.
On the contrary, passion, fanaticism, hatred of the adversaries of disputation
and non-conformist groups prevail over his heart and prevent him from
comprehending the truth so that even if he were told, “Do you want Allah to
remove for you the veil and to reveal to you through personal observation that
the truth is on the side of your adversary?” he would dislike it for fear that
his adversary would be gladdened by it. This, then, is the chronic disease
which has spread among men all over the land. It is a kind of corruption which
is set in motion by the disputants through their fanaticism. This much for its
harm.
As to its benefits [some] think that it is useful in revealing realities and knowing them as they really are. But how far from the truth this is, because the fulfilment of noble desire is not found in disputation. In fact the perplexity and confusion consequent on disputation surpass anything which it may reveal or unfold. If you were to hear that from a traditionist or a half scholar you might think that they have been moved to that by their ignorance, for men are the enemies of that of which they are ignorant. Take it, then, from one who has familiarised himself with disputation and, after a careful study and a thorough investigation of it in which he surpassed the extreme limits of its masters and went even further to study in great detail other cognate subjects, has come to dislike it, and has ascertained that the road to the realities of knowledge is closed from this direction. Disputation, as a matter of fact, will inevitably reveal, unfold, and clarify a few things, but this is very rare and only occurs in simple and clear matters which are readily understood even before any thorough study of the art of disputation. It has only one benefit : it preserves the creed for the common folk and safeguards it against the confusion of innovators by different kinds of argumentation. For the layman is swayed by the argument of the innovator although the argument may be false; and to confront a false position with another refutes it. People are expected to follow this creed which we have already mentioned because the Law has ordained it for the good of their temporal and spiritual lives and because the righteous Fathers agreed on it. The learned men are expected to watch over it for the common folk against the ambiguities of the innovators, just as the magistrates are expected to safeguard their property against the attacks of the oppressors and ravishers.
When
both its harm and benefit are fully understood by man, he should be like the
physician who is adept in the use of dangerous drugs, which he does not apply
except to the right place and only at the time of need.
To
explain further, the laymen and the common folk who are engaged in crafts and
trades should be left alone in the integrity of their beliefs which [87] they
have accepted when they have been instructed in the orthodox faith which we
have already stated. To teach them disputation is decidedly harmful to them as
it will perhaps arouse doubts in their minds which will shake their belief.
Once these doubts are aroused it will not be possible to remedy their shaken
belief.
As to
the layman who believes in a certain innovation, he should be called back to
the truth with kindness and tact and not with fanaticism : with soft words which
are convincing to the soul and effective in the heart, words similar to those
of the arguments of the Qur’an and the tradition, mixed with a little
admonition and warning. This is much better than debate along the line set down
by the scholastic theologians, since the layman, when he hears such arguments,
thinks that they are a kind of technique in disputation which the disputant has
learned in order to draw men to his belief. Consequently, if the layman fails
to reply to these arguments he will assume that the scholastic theologians of
his school are capable of refuting them. Disputation with both this man and the
former is unlawful. Likewise it is unlawful to argue with one who has fallen
victim to doubt, since doubt should be removed with kindness by admonition and
understandable proofs free of excessive speculation and endless debate. In
fact disputation is useful in only one case, namely, when the layman has been
persuaded to believe in an innovation through one kind of argument, in which
case it should be countered by the same kind of argument in order to recall
the man to the truth. This, however, applies to him who, because of his
fondness of disputation, is no longer satisfied with the ordinary admonitions
and warnings, but has reached a stage where nothing will cure him except
debate. Consequently it is permissible to argue with him. But in a country
where heresy is rare and one rite (madhhab)[23] prevails, it should be sufficient to state
the articles of faith which we have already mentioned, without any attempt to
take up the question of proofs. The person should wait until something
questionable arises before he takes up the question of proofs which he should
present according to the need. If the heresy were a common one and a fear .
existed that the children might be beguild with it, then there would be no harm
in teaching them the equivalent of what we have included in the book entitled al-Risalah al-Qudisyah,[24] as a means for overcoming the influence of
the. disputations of innovators if that influence should confront the children.
This is a brief thing which we included in this book because of its brevity. If
[the child] were bright and therefore became aware of a certain question or
grew skeptical of something in his mind, then the feared disease has appeared
and the malady has become visible. There will be no harm, then, to promote [the
child] to the equivalent of that which we have included in the book entitled al-Iqtisad fi al-l`tiqad,[25]
equalling about fifty folios and free from any departures from a discussion of
the foundations of the articles of faith to the other investigations of the
scholastic theologians. If this should convince [the child] then he might be
let alone; but if this 'should fail to convince him, then the disease has become
chronic, the malady rooted, and the epidemic widespread. Let, then, the
physician be as kind and tactful as possible, and let him await the will of
Allah until, through His grace, the truth shall be revealed to the child.
Otherwise he will persist in his doubt and skepticism as long as it is so
ordained.
The
amount contained in that book and others of the same kind is that from which
benefit can be expected. Books not confined to the same subject are of two
kinds. The first comprises books which deal with subject other than the
foundations of the articles of faith, such as those which discuss propensities
(i`tima'dat),[26] transmutations (akwan),[27] and [the different kinds of] perceptions (idrakat),[28] or discoursing on sight (ru'yah) : whether or not it has an
opposite which is called obstruction (man‘) or blindness, and that if this
obstruction does exist, then it will be an obstruction [which prevents the eye]
from [seeing] all invisible things, or [a proof which] verifies every visible
thing that can be seen, as well as other misleading trivialities.
The
second kind of these books contains a further expansion of the same arguments
as applied to other subjects, together with several questions and answers
-details which add nothing but confusion and perplexity to him who has not
already been convinced by the previous amount. For there are certain things
which become more obscure with dilation and expansion. Were one to say that the
investigation into the rules of perceptions and propensities is useful for sharpening
the mind which is the instrument of religion just as the sword is the
instrument of war (jihad),[29] hence there is no harm in sharpening it, it
will be like saying that playing chess, because it sharpens the mind, is a part
of religion. This, however, is insane because the mind may be sharpened through
the other sciences of that Law in which there is no fear of harm or injury.
By this
you see how much of scholastic theology
(kalam) is blameworthy and how much is praise worthy, the conditions
wherein it is condemned and these wherein it is praised, as well as the persons
who are benefited by it and the persons who are harmed. If you should then say
that, since you acknowledge the need for it in refuting [the arguments of] the
innovators, and since innovations have now risen and calamities spread, the
need for it has become urgent, it is inevitable that undertaking this science
should become a fard kifayah,[30] just as undertaking to safe guard
property and other rights and fulfilling the duties of justice and government
and the rest. And unless the learned men engage in spreading and teaching this
science and in doing researches in it, it will not endure; and if it were
completely abandoned, it would surely disappear; nor is there in human nature
by itself a sufficient ability to cut through the dubiosities of innovators
unless this subject be learnt and studied. Therefore there should be
instruction in it, and its investigation is now one of the furud al kifayat,[31] contrary to what it was at the time of the
Companions when the need for it was not urgent.
If you
should say this, then know that the truth of the matter is that undoubtedly
there should be, in every town, someone who would undertake to engage in this
science and take it upon himself to refute the dubiosities of the innovators
which have spread in that particular town. This undertaking is performed
through education, but it is not wise 'to instruct the laity in it just as they
are instructed in jurisprudence and interpretation. For this is like. drugs,
and jurisprudence is like food : the harm of food is not dangerous but the harm
of drugs is dangerous as we have already mentioned.
The
learned men of this science should confine their instruction to men who have
the three following traits : The first is devotion to knowledge and passion for
it; for the- working man is prevented by his work from mastering the subject
completely and from dispelling the doubts when they arise. [88] The second
trait is sagacity, intelligence, and eloquence, because the stupid one does not
benefit by his understanding and the dull one does not gain by his argument. On
the contrary such a man is injured by disputation and should not expect any
good from it. The third trait is that the man should by nature be good,
religious, and pious; he should not be dominated by passions, because the
sinful man would stray from religion at the least provocation. Passions would
do away with all deterrents and remove the barrier which stands between him and
worldly pleasures. He would not be keen on dispelling anything questionable,
but rather would seize upon it to free himself from any obligation (taklif). The things which such a
student will spoil would be greater than those which he would reform. When you
know these divisions you would realize that, in disputation the praiseworthy
argument is of the same kind as the arguments of the Qur’an : kind words which
influence the hearts and convince the minds without going deeply into
syllogisms and analyses which most people do not understand ; and whenever they
understand them they consider them trickeries and artifices which their
proponent has learnt in order to make things ambiguous. Should he be confronted
by one of his professional colleagues he would resist him.
You
will also know that al-Shafi`i and all the Imams[32] were
forbidden from engaging in disputation and devoting themselves exclusively to
it, because of the harm inherent in it which we have already pointed out. The
reports of ibn-`Abbas' debate with the Kharijites and `Ali's debate concerning
free will (qadar) [show that their
disputation] was of the clear and intelligent kind, carried out at the time of
need. Such disputation is praiseworthy under all conditions. Undoubtedly the
need for disputation differs with the time ; therefore it is not unlikely that
the rule which governs it should also differ. This then is the rule of the
creed which Allah imposed on man and the method of defending and preserving it.
As to
dispelling doubts, revealing truths, knowing things as they really are, and
comprehending the mysteries (asrar) which
the words of this creed signify, there is no way to attain any of them except
through self mortification (mujahadah)[33] and
the subduing of passions, through, seeking Allah wholeheartedly and persisting
in thoughts which are free from the blemishes of disputation. They are a mercy
from Allah which comes to those who expose themselves to its beneficence
according to what Allah ordained to them and the extent to which they had
exposed themselves to it as well as the capacity of their hearts and the degree
of their purity. This is the sea the depth of which cannot be sounded and the
waters of which cannot be traversed.
If you
should say that this discourse implies that these sciences have external as
well as internal meanings, that some of them are obvious and readily
understood, while others are hidden and become evident through
self-mortification, discipline, earnest desire, pure thinking and a heart (sirr) free from all worldly activities
except those which are required, and conclude that such discourse is almost
contrary to the Law since the Law does not have external and internal meanings,
secret and manifest, but the external and the internal, the secret and the
manifest, are in it all the same, then you should know that the division of
these sciences into hidden and obvious is not denied by anyone of any insight
but is denied by the ignorant who, having acquired some knowledge in their
youth, did not advance any further and consequently failed to.. gain promotion
to the lofty heights where lie the stations (maqamat)
of the learned men and the saints.
This is
evident from the testimony of the Law as the Prophet said,'.' Verily there is
to the Qur’an an external meaning and an internal meaning, a scope and a point.”
'Ali, pointing to his, breast, said, “Verily herein lies abundant knowledge ;
would that there were. some to [comprehend and] transmit it.” The Prophet also
said, “We prophets were ordered to communicate with everyone according to his
ability to understand.” And again, “No one has ever recited a tradition to a
people which their minds have failed to grasp without being a temptation for
them.” Allah said, “These similitudes do We set forth to men: and none
understands them except those who know.” (29:42) The Prophet said, “Verily of
knowledge is a branch which resembles a hidden thing; no one grasps it save
those who know Allah.” And again, “If you only know what I know, you would
laugh little and weep much.”[34] If
this had not been a secret which he was forbidden to divulge because of the
inability of the minds to comprehend it, why then did he not explain it to
them, especially since they would have certainly believed him if he had done
so? In connexion with the interpretation of the words of Allah, “It is Allah
who hath created seven heavens and as many earths; the [divine] command cometh
down among them.” (65:12) ibn-'Abbas said, “Were I to relate its
interpretation, you would stone me”-and according to another version,”you would
have said, 'He is an unbeliever”“ Abu-Hurayrah said, “I have received from the
Apostle of Allah two things, one of which I have made public. Were I to divulge the other, this
throat would be cut.” The Prophet said, “Abu-Bakr has excelled you not by excessive fasting and much prayer, but by a
secret (sirr) which rested in his
bosom.” [89] No doubt this secret was connected with the foundations of
religion and not removed from it. And whatever belonged to the foundations of
religion could not have been hid from the other Companions through its outward
form. Sahl al-Tustari[35] said,
“The learned man possesses three kinds of knowledge : exoteric (zahir) which he imparts to the
followers of exoteric knowledge ; esoteric (batin)
which he cannot reveal except to its own people ; and finally a knowledge
which lies between him and His Allah and which he cannot reveal to anyone.” One
of the gnostics (sing. 'arif) said,
“To divulge the secret of Lordship (rububiyah)
is [equivalent to] unbelief.” Some one also said, “Lordship has a secret,
if revealed, prophecy will become obsolete ; prophecy has a secret, if divulged,
knowledge will become useless; and the learned men of Allah have a secret, if
disclosed, the law will become of no force.” If he who had said this did not
thereby mean the futility of prophecy as far as the feeble minded are concerned
because of their inability to understand, then what he said is not true.
Rather, that which is. true is free of contradiction. The perfect man is he
whose knowledge does not destroy his piety, and the road to piety is through
prophecy.
You may
say, “These verses and traditions may be subject to several interpretations.
Show us, then, how their exoteric meaning differs from the esoteric. For if the
exoteric is contradictory to the esoteric, it will destroy the Law, which is
exactly the position of those who say that reality is contrary of the Law. This
is sheer unbelief because the Law represents the exoteric and reality
represents the esoteric. If the one is neither contradictory to, nor in
disagreement with, the other, then both are identical. Therefore the division
[of knowledge into obvious and hidden, exoteric and esoteric] is hereby
destroyed and the Law will have no secret [meaning] which should not be
divulged. Rather both the hidden and the obvious will be the same.” If you
should so inquire, then you should know that this question raises a grave issue
and leads into the science of revelation (al-mukashafah) departing from
the intent of the science of practical religion (al-mu‘amalah) which is
the purpose of these books. For the articles of faith which we have already
mentioned come under the works of the heart which we are required to receive
with acceptance and consent, by fixing the heart on them and adhering to them,
not by endeavouring to comprehend their realities, since this was not required
of all people. Were it not a part of practical religion we would not have
mentioned it in this book, and were is not one of the outward works of the
heart we would not have mentioned it in the first half of the book. Real [and
complete] revelation is an attribute of the essence of the heart and its inward
part. But if the discussion leads to the stirring up of doubt or the shadow of
doubt concerning the contradiction of the exoteric to the
esoteric, a brief word of explanation becomes necessary. For he who says that
reality disagrees with the Law and the esoteric contradicts the exoteric is
closer to unbelief than to belief. In fact, the secrets whose comprehension is
peculiar to the favourites of Allah (al-muqarrabun) and the practice of which is limited to them and which they do not divulge
to the masses may be divided into five categories:
The
first is that the thing in itself is subtle and beyond the comprehension of
most minds. Consequently its, comprehension is restricted to the elite who
should not divulge it to those who are unable to grasp it lest, whenever their
minds fail to comprehend it or to understand the concealed secrets of the
spirit, it becomes a calamity to them. The Apostle himself refrained from
explaining this part.[36] The
minds fail to comprehend its reality and the imaginations to imagine its
truth. But do dot think that this was not revealed to the Apostle of Allah, for
he who does not know the spirit does not know himself, and he who does not know
himself does not know his Allah. It is not unlikely that this was revealed to
some of the saints and the learned men although they were not prophets; but
they disciplined themselves in the etiquette of the Law and held their peace in
the matters where the Apostle himself was silent. In fact there are in the
attributes of Allah many a hidden thing which are beyond the comprehension and
understanding of the crowds. Of these, the Apostle of Allah did not mention
anything except those that are obvious to the minds, such as. knowledge and
power and the like, which men understand in terms of something akin to them and
then suppose that they performed the feat through their own knowledge and
power, especially since they possess certain qualities which are called
knowledge and power. Consequently they arrive at that by some manner of
analogy. But if the Apostle mentioned some of the attributes of Allah to which
men have nothing akin and which no not resemble, even remotely, anything they
possess, they would not have understood them. Thus, the pleasure of coition, if
mentioned to the child or to the impotent, will not be understood by them
except in relation to the pleasure of eating which they comprehend. This
understanding, however, will not be one of actual experience. Furthermore, the
difference between Allah's knowledge and. power and human knowledge and power
is greater than the difference between the pleasure of coition and the pleasure
of eating. In short, man does not comprehend except himself and his own
attributes which are present with him or were with him in the past. By
comparison and analogy with these he understands the attributes of others. He
will also realize that there is a difference between his attributes and those
of Allah in nobleness and perfection. Therefore it is not within the power of
men but to declare as belonging to Allah what has been declared as belonging to
himself, such as action, knowledge, and power as well as other attributes, and
to acknowledge that in the case of Allah they are more perfect and more noble.
Most of his emphasis would, therefore, be [90] on his own attributes rather
than on those of majesty which belong exclusively to Allah. For this reason
the Prophet said, “I shall not praise Thee as Thou hast praised Thyself.” This
does not mean the inability to express what I comprehend but rather an
admission of the inability to comprehend the essence of the majesty of Allah.
For this reason again someone said “No one has truly known Allah except Allah
Himself.” Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq said, “Praise be to Allah who bath not given men a
way to know Him except through their inability to know Him.”
Let us
now, however, stop this kind of discussion and go back to the main purpose,
namely that one of these categories comprises that which the minds fail to
comprehend, such as the spirit (al-rah) and
some of the attributes of Allah. Perhaps the Prophet-referred to
something of the same nature when be said, “Verily Allah hath seventy veils of
light. If He would remove them, the majesty,. of His face would consume every
one whose eyes might happen to behold His glory.”[37]
The
second category of the hidden things which the prophets and the saints decline
to mention or divulge comprises those things which are intelligible in themselves
and the minds do not fail to grasp, but their mention is harmful to most
hearers although it is no., harmful to the prophets and the saints. The secret
of the decrees of Allah which the learned men were forbidden to divulge belongs
to this part. Consequently it is not unlikely that certain truths may be
harmful to some people just as the light of the sun is harmful to the eyes of
bats and the rose perfume is harmful to black beetles. And how could this be
deemed unlikely when we know that our saying that unbelief, adultery, sin, and
evil exist all by the will of Allah, which in itself is true, but,
nevertheless, has been
harmful to many because it was taken by them as an evidence for folly, lack of
wisdom, and approval of evil and wickedness ? Thus has al-Rawandi,[38] as well as several separatists,
deviated from the right path by following such heresies.
Similarly, if the secret of the decrees of Allah were divulged most people would fancy that Allah is lacking in power, because their minds are incapable of comprehending anything which will remove that fancy. Furthermore, if someone should discuss the day, of resurrection and should say that it will fall after a thousand years, or a few years after or a few years before, his words would be understood. Nevertheless the appointed time of the day of resurrection was not foretold for the welfare of men and for fear of the harm which might ensue. The [intervening] period may be long and the appointed time very distant, with the result that people, thinking that the day of retribution is remote, would cease to mind or care. On the other hand it may be, in the knowledge of Allah, close at hand. If then, the appointed time should be foretold, people would be greatly frightened with the result that they would neglect their [daily] work and transactions and havoc would overtake the world. Were this to occur and come true, it would be an example of this category.
The
third category is where the thing is such as will be understood and cause no
harm when mentioned clearly, although it is' usually expressed through
metaphor or allegory so that its impression on the heart of the listener may be
deeper. Its value is that it leaves a greater impression on the heart. Thus if
a person had said that he had seen a man place pearls around the necks of swine
and his words were taken metaphorically to express the imparting of knowledge
to, and the spread of learning among those who are unworthy, the [ordinary]
listener would readily understand its literal meaning while the thorough and
careful listener, when he examines and finds that the man had no pearls and
wasn of surround ed by swine, would see through and comprehend the inner and
esoteric meaning. Consequently men differ in this respect. An example of this
kind of speech is the following
A
weaver and a tailor toil
On
either side of Spica Virginis;
The one
is weaving shrouds for the dead,
The
other fashions swaddling clothes.
The poet expressed the celestial
phenomena of the rising (iqbal) of
the stars and their setting (idbar) metaphorically
through the parable of two artisans. This kind of [metaphor] belongs to the
principle of expressing a certain meaning through a picture which contains the
same meaning or a similar meaning. Belonging to the same kind are the words of
the Prophet when he said, “Verily the mosque will shrink when people spit on
its courtyard just as the piece of skin will shrink when it is placed over. the
fire.” You can readily understand that the courtyard of the mosque does not
actually shrink when people spit on it. What the words of the Prophet really
mean is that the atmosphere of the mosque, being honoured and exalted, has been
dishonoured and belittled by spitting, [91] which is as opposed to the idea of
the mosque as fire is to the integrity of the particles of skin. Belonging to
the same kind are the words of the Prophet when he said, “Is he who raises his
head from prostration before the imam not afraid that Allah will transform his
head into that of a donkey ?”[39] I
This, however, will never take place literally but only metaphorically since
the head of the donkey is proverbial, not for its form and shape, but for its
characteristic stupidity and foolishness. Thus, whoever would raise his head
from prostration before the imam, his head would become like that of a donkey
in stupidity and foolishness. It is this which is meant and not the shape
which the literal meaning (of the words] indicates. For it is utterly foolish
to place following [the imam] and preceding [him] together because they are
contradictory. The knowledge that, in such cases, there are inner meanings
which differ from the outward significations, can only be determined by either
rational or legal evidence. The rational is when any interpretation according
to the outward meaning is impossible, as in the words of the Prophet when he
said, “The heart of the believer lies between two of the fingers of the
Merciful [Allah].” When we examine the
hearts of the believers we shall not find them surrounded with fingers, and
consequently we shall know that the words are used metaphorically for power
which is inherent in figures and constitutes their hidden life. Furthermore,
power was metaphorically represented by the fingers because such a metaphor
conveys the idea of power more completely. Of the same kind is the instance
where Allah expresses the idea of His power metaphorically by saying, “Our
words to a thing when We will it is but to say, ‘Be,’ and it is” (16:42) The
outward meaning of this verse is not possible because if the saying of Allah
‘Be’ was addressed to the thing before that thing came into existence, then it
would simply be an impossibility since the non-existent does not understand address
and, therefore, cannot obey. And if it was addressed to the thing after the
thing has come into existence, then it would be superfluous, since the thing is
already in existence and does not need to be brought into being. But whereas
this metaphor has been more impressive upon the minds in conveying the idea of
the greatest power, recourse has been made to it.
Those
cases where the inner meaning is determined by means of legal evidence are the
cases which can be interpreted according to their literal and outward
signification, but, on the authority of tradition, a meaning other than the outward
was intended, as is the case in the interpretation of the words of Allah when
he said, “He sendeth down the water from Heaven : then flow the torrents in
their due measure, and the flood beareth along a swelling foam.” (13:18) Here
the word water stands for the Qur’an which the torrents represent the hearts.
Some of the hearts receive and hold much ; others receive much and hold little
; while others still receive much and hold nothing at all. The foam represents
unbelief and hypocrisy, which, although it rises to and floats upon the
surface of the water, does not last; but guidance which benefits men, endures.
Into this part a group of men went deeply and interpreted the things which were
mentioned in connexion with the hereafter, such as the balance (al-mizan), the bridge (al-sirat), and the
like. All this, however, is innovation because it was not handed down by
tradition, especially since its literal and outward interpretation is not impossible.
Therefore it should be interpreted literally.
The fourth
category is where man comprehends the thing in a general way and then through
further investigation and experimentation, he understands its particulars so
that it becomes a part of him. Thus the two kinds of knowledge differ. The
first, (i.e. the general) resembles the husks, while the second (i.e. the
particular), resembles the pith. The first is the exoteric or outward, the
second is the esoteric or inward. This is just like the example of the man who
sees a person in the dark or from a distance and acquires a certain picture of
that person. But when he sees him from a close range or after the darkness is
gone, he realizes certain differences [between this second picture and the
first]. This last picture, however, is not opposed to the first, but complementary
to it. The same is true if knowledge, faith, and belief. For a man may believe
in the existence of love, sickness, and death even before any of them occur.
But to believe in their existence after they have taken place is more complete
than believing in their existence before they take place. In fact man has, with
regard to passion and love as well as the other conditions, three different
stages and three distinct degrees of comprehension. The first is to believe in
the existence of the thing before it takes place; the second is to believe in
its existence at the time of its occurrence; and third is to believe in its
existence after it has taken place. To recognize the existence of hunger after
it is gone is different from recognizing its existence before it is gone.
Similarly, there are some of the sciences of religion which mature by
experience and their mature state as compared with their premature state is
like the esoteric as compared to the exoteric. Hence there is a difference
between the sick man's knowledge of health and the healthy man's knowledge of
it. In short, men differ in these four parts; yet in none of them is there an
esoteric meaning which contradicts the exoteric. Rather the exoteric meaning
completes and perfects the exoteric just as the pith completes the husk.
The
fifth category is where concrete words are used figuratively. The feeble-minded
will regard the literal and exoteric meaning sensible and will not go beyond
it; but the man who has an insight for realities will comprehend the secret it
contains. This is like the words of him who said, “The wall said to the peg,
`why do you split me ?' The peg replied, ['How do I know?]. Ask him who is
hitting me and does not let me go. Go see the mallet which is behind me’.” This
is, undoubtedly, figurative. Of the same kind are the following words of Allah,
“Then He applied Himself to the Heaven, which was then but smoke : and to it
and to the Earth He said, ‘Come ye, whether in obedience or against your will?
And they both said, ‘We come obedient’.” (41:10) The stupid one, because of his
lack of understanding, would assume that both the Heaven and the earth possess
life, intellect, and the ability to understand speech. He would also assume
that they were addressed by a speech of actually enunciated words which both
could heart and reply to with enunciated words saying, “We come obedient.” But
he who has insight would realise that this was. a figurative [use of
language], and that Allah only expressed the idea that the Heaven and earth are
subject to His will. Of the same kind, too, are the words of Allah when He
said, “Neither is there aught which does not celebrate His praise.”(17:46) The
stupid one, because of his lack of understanding, would assume that the
inanimate things possess life, intellect, and the ability to speak and
enunciate words, so that they would have to say, “Praise be to Allah” in order
that His praise might be established. [92] But he who has insight would know
that no actual utterance with the tongue was meant by that, but merely that
everything, through his own existence, praises Allah, and in. its own essence
sanctifies Him and attests to His unity. As has been said:
In
everything He has a song
Which declares that He is one.[40]
In the
same way it is said, “This masterpiece testifies that its maker possesses fair
ability and perfect knowledge.” This does not mean that the masterpiece
actually utters the words, “I testify ...” etc. but merely that, through its
form and state, [it testifies to the ability and knowledge of its maker].
Similarly everything does, in itself, stand in need of a creator to create and
sustain it, to maintain its attributes and to move it to and fro in its
different states. And through its need it testifies to its Maker by hallowing
Him. Such a witness is comprehended by those who have insight, not those who
stand still and venture not beyond externals. For this reason Allah said, “But
their utterances of praise ye understand not.” (17:46) The feeble minded do not
understand this at all, while the favourites of Allah and the versatile learned
men do not understand it perfectly because everything hallows Allah and
praises Him in many ways and each comprehends according to his intellect and
insight. The enumeration of these witnesses is not becoming under the science
of practical religion. In this part too those who cling to externals differ
from those who have insight, and in it the disagreement between the esoteric
and the exoteric becomes evident. In this connexion people are either extremists
or followers of the middle-road. As extremists, some have gone so far in the
[allegorical] interpretation of words that they have explained away all or most
of their outward and literal meaning. They, have taken the words of Allah; “Yet
shall their hands speak unto us and their feet shall bear witness;”(36:65) as
well as, “And they shall say to their skin, ‘Why witness ye against us?’ They
shall say, ‘Allah who giveth a voice to all things, hath given us voice’,”
(41:20) and the conversation which takes place between Munkar and Nakir, and in
the balance (al-mizan), the bridge (al-sirat), and the judgment
day -together with the debate between the people of Hell and the people of
Heaven when [the former] said, “Pour upon us some water, or of the refreshments
Allah hath given you,” and claimed that all this was figurative. On the other
hand some went to the opposite extreme and forbade [any but the literal
interpretation]. Among those was Ahmad ibn Hanbal who went as far as to forbid
the, allegorical interpretation of the words of Allah “Be’, and it
is.” (16:42) [His followers] have claimed that these words were words of actual
speech with enunciated letters and sounds brought into existence by Allah every
moment He created a created thing. I have even heard one of his followers say
that [Ahmad ibn Hanbal] forbade the allegorical interpretation of all but
three traditions, namely the words of the Prophet when he said, “The Black
Stone (al-Hajar al-Aswad) is the
right hand of Allah in the earth;” and, “The heart of the believer lies between
two of the fingers of the Merciful [Allah];” and “Verily I shall find the soul
of the Merciful [Allah coming] from the direction of al-Yaman.” [Even here] the
literalists have been inclined to forbid any allegorical interpretation. It is
assumed, however, that Ahmad ibn-Hanbal knew that ascending (istiwa‘) is
not fixity of location (istiqrar), and
descending (nuznl) is not change of
location (intiqal); nevertheless he
forbade allegorical interpretation for the good and' welfare of people, since
whenever it is allowed matters become worse and go out of control, overstepping
the limits of moderation. Things which go beyond the limits of moderation are
beyond control. Therefore there is no harm done by such a prohibition which is
also attested by the lives of the Fathers who used to say, [when discussing
verses and traditions], “Take them literally as they have been .[revealed and)
handed down.” Thus Malik, on being asked about ascending (istiwa‘), went
so far as to say, “The fact of ascending (istiwa‘) is known but its
manner is not; to believe in it is an obligation, to inquire about its manner:
is a heresy.”
Another
group advocated the middle of the road position and permitted allegorical
interpretation in everything which relates to the attributes of Allah but have
taken the things which pertain to the hereafter in a literal sense and forbade
their allegorical interpretation. The advocates of this position are the.
Ash’arites.[41] The
Mu‘tazilites go further[42] They.
explain away the possibility of seeing Allah and His being possessed of
hearing and sight. They also explain away the ascension (al-mi’raj)[43] of the Prophet and claim that it had not
taken place bodily, the punishment of the grave, the balance, the bridge, and
other escatological representations. Nevertheless they confess the
resurrection of the body, Paradise with its food, perfume, and sex as well as
other sensual pleasures, and Hell with burning first which scorch the skin and
melt the fat.
The
philosophers[44] go still
further. They interpret all eschatological representations as allegories
denoting mental and spiritual pain, and mental and spiritual delight. They deny
the resurrection of the body but believe in the immortality of the soul and
that it will be punished or made happy by punishment and delight of
non-sensual nature. They are extremists.
The
true middle-road between. this complete allegorism and the rigidity of the
Hanbalites is subtle and obscure. It is found only by those who enjoy divine
guidance and comprehend things by the aid of divine light, not by hearsay. Then
when the mysteries of things are revealed to them, so that they see them as
they are, they go back to [the Qur’an] and traditions and their wording;
whatever agrees with what they see with the light of certainty they affirm, and
whatever disagrees with it they interpret allegorically.
But he
who bases his knowledge of these things on mere hearsay will thereby fail to
secure a firm foothold or gain a well-defined position therein. Such a man who
confines himself to mere hearsay would do better to follow the position of
Ahmad ibn-Hanbal. But a closer examination and definition of the middle-road
position in these things belongs to the vast subject of revelation which we
must leave aside. Our aim [93] was only to make clear that the esoteric and
exoteric may be in harmony with one another and that no disagreement exists
between them. At any rate many things have been unfolded through [our
discussion] of these five parts. It is our opinion that for the common people
the explanation of the creed which we have already given is sufficient for them
and that nothing further will be required of them in the first degree [where
they stand]. But if any fear of disturbances arises on account of the spread of
heresies, then, in the second degree, recourse may be had to a [statement of
the] creed wherein a brief and undetailed outline of the obvious proofs is
presented. We shall, therefore, present these obvious proofs in this book and
shall confine ourselves therein to what we have issued to the people of
Jerusalem, entitled al-Risalah
al-Qudsiyah fi Qawa‘id al-‘Aqa’id (The Jerusalem Epistle on the Foundations of
the Articles of Faith) and contained in the third section of this book.
The Third Section of the Book on the
Foundations of the Articles of Faith:
We
say-In the name of Allah the Merciful, the Compassionate. Praise be to Allah
who distinguished the community of the faithful with the lights of certainty
and favoured the people of truth by guiding them to the bulwarks of faith; who
saved them from the errors of the unrighteous and the wickedness of the
unbelievers, and with His grace led them to follow the example of the chief Apostle;
who directed their footsteps in the way of the honoured Companions of the
Apostle and enabled them to emulate the righteous predecessors[45], so
that they protected themselves against the dictates of [sheer] reason with the
strong cord [of Allah], and against the lives and beliefs of the ancients with
the clear beaten track [of the Fathers], combining thereby the products of
reason and the ordinances of the traditional Law. Furthermore they found out
that mere verbal repetition of the words “There is no god but Allah; Muhammad
the Apostle of Allah” is of no avail unless they completely understand what
fundamental principles the words of the witness involve. They also have known
that the two words of the witness, despite their brevity, contain an affirmation
of the existence of Allah Himself, His attributes, and His works, as well as an
affirmation of the truthfulness of the Apostle. They have also known that faith
is founded upon four pillars (sing. rukn)
each of which involves ten principles (sing. asl).
The first pillar (rukn)
is the knowledge of the essence of Allah and involves ten principles (sing.
asl). They are the knowledge that
Allah exists and that He is ancient and subsisting; that He is neither substance
nor body nor accident; that He is not limited by direction (jihah) nor fixed in location ; that He is seen and that He is one.
The second pillar treats of the attributes of Allah and comprises ten principles. They are the knowledge that He is living, knowing, powerful, willing, possessed of hearing, seeing, and speaking; that He is removed from being a substratum for originated properties or a locus of phenomena; and that His words, knowledge and will are ancient and eternal.
The third pillar pertains to the works of Allah and
involves ten principles. They are : that men's actions are created and willed
by Allah and acquired by men; that Allah has been gracious to create and to
invent; that He is free to impose unbearable obligations and to punish the
innocent, while taking into consideration that which is salutary (al-aslah) is not obligatory upon Him;
that there is nothing obligatory except by Law ; that the sending of prophets
is possible and the prophecy of our Prophet Muhammad is true, being confirmed
by miracles.
The. fourth pillar is on the things accepted on
authority (sam‘iyat) and involves ten principles. They are the
affirmation of the day of resurrection and the day of judgment, the inquisition
[of the dead by] Munkar and Nakir, the torment of the grave, the balance, the
bridge, the creation of Paradise and Hell, the nature of the imamate, that the
excellence of the Companions is in accordance with the chronological order, the
qualifications of the imamate, and that even though piety and knowledge are not
possible to obtain [in the incumbent], his imamate is considered legitimate and
binding.
The first among the pillars of
belief is the knowledge of the essence of Allah and that He is one and it
involves ten principles.
The first principle is the knowledge of the existence of Allah.
The first light which should be used for illumination and the first thing to be
followed on the road of admonition are the instructions of the Qur’an, since no
explanation is better than that of Allah. Thus He said, “Have We not made the
Earth a couch? And the Mountains its tent-stakes? We have created you of two
sexes, and ordained you sleep for rest, the night as a mantle, and the day for
gaining livelihood. We built above you seven solid heavens, and placed therein
a burning lamp; and we sent down waters in abundance from the rain-clouds, that
we might bring forth by it corn and herbs, and gardens thick with trees.”
(78:6-16) And again, “Assuredly in the creation of the Heaven and of the Earth;
and in the alternation of night and day; and in the ships which pass through
the sea with what is useful to man; and in the rain which Allah sendeth down
from Heaven, giving life by it to the earth after its death, and by scattering
over it all kinds of cattle; and in the change of the winds, and in the clouds that
are made to do service between the Heaven and the Earth; are signs for those
who understand.” ( :59) He also said, “See ye not how Allah bath created the
seven heavens one over the other? And he bath placed therein the moon as a
light, and bath placed there the sun as a torch; and Allah bath caused you to
spring forth from the earth like a plant; hereafter He will turn you back into
it again, and will bring you forth anew.” (71:14-17) And again, “What think ye
? The germ of life-is it ye who created them? or we their creator? Is it we who
have decreed that death should be among you; yet are we not thereby hindered
from replacing you with others, your likes, or from producing you again in a
form which ye know not. Ye have known the first creation: will ye not then
reflect ? What think ye ? That which ye saw-. Is it ye who cause its upgrowth,
or do we cause it. to spring forth? If we pleased we could so make your harvest
dry and brittle that ye would ever marvel (and say), `Truly we have been at
cost, yet we are forbidden harvest.' What think ye of the water ye drink? Is it
ye who send it down from the clouds, or send we it down? Brackish could we make
is, if we pleased : Will ye not then be thankful? What think ye? The fire which
ye obtain by friction-is it ye who rear its tree, or do we rear it? It is we
who have made it a memorial and a benefit to the wayfarers of the destitute .”
(51:58-72) Anyone with the least traces of brain in his head will, upon reflecting upon the import
of these verses and examining the wonders of Allah's handiwork, in Heaven and
on earth as well as the beauties of nature in animal and plant, realizes that.
this wonderful [universe] with its consummate order requires a creator to
direct it and a maker to govern it and watch it over. Human nature, in tact,
testifies that it is subject to the will of Allah and governed in accordance
with His law. For this reason Allah said, “Is there any doubt concerning Allah,
maker of the Heavens and of the Earth? (14:11) [94] [The prophets were, therefore,
sent in order to call men to monotheism, that they may say, “There is no god
but Allah.” They were not, however, commanded to say, We have a god and the
world has -another,” because such a thing is inborn in their minds from the
time of their birth. For this reason Allah said, “If thou ask them who hath
created the heavens and the earth, they will certainly reply 'Allah'.” (31:24) And again, “Set thou thy face
then, as a true convert (Hanif), towards the faith which Allah bath
made, the native [religion] whereon Allah constituted man.” (30:29) Therefore
there is inhuman nature and the testimonies of the Qur’an what will render the
task of citing proofs unnecessary. Nevertheless, by way of preparation and
following the example of the learned theologians, we say:
One of
the accepted axioms of the mind is that an originated phenomenon cannot come
into existence without a cause. Since the world is an originated phenomenon, it
cannot, come into existence without a cause. That originated phenomena cannot
come into existence without a cause, is obvious. For every originated
phenomenon belongs to a certain definite time the precedence or the subsequence
of which may be assumed. Its being definite in time and distinct from what
preceded it and what succeeded it, will naturally require Qne who renders
things definite [in time]. As to one saying that the world is an originated
phenomenon, its proof is found is the fact that bodies are not independent of
motion and rest. Both states are originated phenomena; and whatever is not
independent of originated things is itself originated. The proof comprises
three assertions of claims.
The first is that bodies are not independent of motion and rest. This is readily understood and requires neither meditation nor thinking, for he who conceives of a body in neither the kinetic state nor iii the static state is both ignorant and foolish.
The
second assertion is our saying that both motion and rest are originated
phenomena, the proof of which is found in the alternation and in the appearance
of the one after the other is gone. This is true of all bodies, those that have
been seen as well as those that have not been seen. For there is not a static
object the potential motion of which is not required by the mind, and there is
no moving object the potential rest of which is not required by the mind. The
novel (tari’) is originated because of its emergence and the anterior (sabiq), because of its extinction (‘adam),
since if its eternity (qidam) were
established its extinction would have become impossible, as we shall show and
prove in establishing the subsistence (baqa’) of the Maker.
The third assertion is our statement that whatever is not independent of originated things is itself originated. Its proof lies in the fact that if it were not so, then there would be, before every originated phenomenon, other originated phenomena which have no beginning; and unless these originated phenomena come to nought in their entirety, the turn for the present originated phenomena to come into being immediately would never arrive. But it is impossible for that which has no end to come to nought. Furthermore if the celestial spheres have revolutions, the numbers of which have no end, it is inevitable .that their numbers be either odd or even, or both odd and even, or neither odd nor even. But it is impossible that their numbers be both odd and even at the same time, or neither odd nor even for this would be a combination of both the negative and the affirmative, since in the affirmation of the one is the negation of the other, and in the negation of the one is the affirmation of the other.
Furthermore
they cannot possibly be even because the even number becomes odd with the
addition of one; and how could that which has no end be wanting one? Nor can
they possibly be odd because the odd number becomes even with the addition of
one ; and how could it be wanting one when its number has no end ? (Again they
cannot possibly be neither odd nor even for this will mean that they have an
end).[46]
Therefore the conclusion is that the world is not independent of originated
phenomena, and that which is not independent of originated phenomena is itself
originated. And when its being an originated phenomena has been established,
its need for an originator becomes axiomatic.
The second principle is the knowledge that Allah is ancient (qadim) from eternity (azali). He has no beginning, but He is
the beginning of everything and before anything living or dead. The proof of
this is found in supposing that if Allah were originated and not ancient, He
would have been in need of an originator Himself. In turn His originator would
also need an originator and so on to infinity. And that which goes on and on
endlessly will never reach an ancient originator which is. the first cause.
This is the required thing which we have called the Maker of the world and its
Creator and Fashioner.
The third principle is the knowledge that Allah, besides being
without beginning, is also everlasting without end. He is the first and the
last, the visible and the invisible, since that of which the eternity is
established its coming to an end is impossible. Its proof lies in the
realization that if it came to nought it is inevitable that it should come to
nought either by itself or through an opposing annihilating agency. And if it
were possible for a thing, which is conceived of as self subsisting, to come to
nought, it will- be possible for a,thing, which is conceived of as
self annihilating, to come into being. And just as the sudden emergence (tarayan) of existence requires a cause (sabab). so does the emergence of
extinction require a cause. That it will come to nought through an opposing
annihilating agency is false, because if that annihilating agency were ancient
(qadim), existence side by side with it would be inconceivable. But we
have learnt in the two previous principles of the existence and eternity of
Allah. How then did He exist in eternity with His opposite? If, however, the
opposing annihilating agency were an originated phenomenon, its existence
from eternity would be impossible because for the originated phenomenon to
oppose the ancient and destroy its existence is less likely than the ancient to
oppose the originated and prevent its existence. In fact prevention. (daf `) is easier than destruction while
the ancient is stronger and more pre-eminent than the originated.
The fourth principle is that Allah is not a
substance which can be isolated. Rather He transcends everything which
resembles isolation. The proof of this lies . in the fact that every substance
which is definite (mutahayyiz), is limited by its own place and is
inevitably either quiescent in it or moving away from it. Therefore it is not
independent of motion or quiescence. But both these are originated, and that
which is not independent of originated phenomena is itself originated.
If an
ancient definite substance were conceivable the eternity of the substances of
the world would have been reasonable. And if a person should use the term
substance [for Allah] and not mean thereby a definite substance, he would be
mistaken [95] as far as the use of the term is concerned, not as far as the
meaning for which he had used it.
The fifth principle is that Allah is not a body (jism) composed of different substances,
since the. body is that which is composed of substances. When His being a
substance limited by place is refuted, His being a body is also refuted,
because every body is limited by place and is composed of substances. But it is
impossible for the substance to be free from division, composition, motion,
quiescence, form, and quantity, all of which are characteristic of originated
phenomena. And if it were possible to believe that the Maker of the world is a
body, it would also be possible to believe in the Divinity of the sun and the
moon as well as other heavenly bodies. If, therefore, one should dare and call
Allah a body but not mean thereby a composition of substances, he would be
wrong as far as the name is concerned, but not in negating the idea of body.
The sixth principle is the knowledge that
Allah is not an accident (`arad) subsisting
in a body or existing in a substratum; because an accident is that which exists
in a body. But every body is inevitably originated and as such its originator
exists before it. How then could [Allah} exist in a body when He has existent
in eternity alone, with no other besides Himself, and then originated the
bodies and the accidents after Himself. [Again how could He exist in a body]
when He is a knowing, and able, and willing Creator as shall be discussed
later. It is impossible for these attributes to exist in accidents. On the
contrary they are impossible except in a self-existing and self-sufficient
being. The conclusion derived from these principles is that [Allah] is a self-existing
being, neither substance, nor body, nor accident; that the whole world is made
of substances, accidents, and bodies, and consequently He resembles nothing and
nothing resembles Him. He is the living, the subsisting, there is none like
unto Him. For how could the created resemble its creator, the ordained he who
ordained it, and the fashioned, he who fashioned it. All bodies and accidents
were created and made by Him; hence it is impossible that they be like unto Him
or [in any way] resemble Him.
The seventh principle is the knowledge that Allah is removed
from being limited by any direction because a direction is either above or
below, right or left, before or behind. All these He had created and originated
through the creation of man whom he made with two extremities, the one rests on
the earth and comprises his feet, while the opposite extremity is his head.
Consequently the term above was originated to indicate the direction of the
head and the term below, the direction of the feet. This is true even of the
ant which creeps on the ceiling with the result that the directions, in
relation to it, are reversed-what we consider above is to it below, and what we
consider below is to it above. Similarly man was created with two hands, the
one usually stronger than the other. The term right was therefore originated
to indicate the direction of the stronger hand and the term left to indicate
the opposite direction. Consequently the right hand side is called the right
and the opposite direction thereof is called the left. Man was also created
with two [other] directions from one of which he sees and toward which he
moves. Consequently the term before was originated to designate the direction
toward which he moves, while the term behind was originated to designate. the
opposition.
Therefore
the directions are originated through the creation of man; and had he not been
created along these lines, but rather created round like a sphere, these
directions would never have existed. How then could Allah have been limited by
any direction in eternity when every direction is originated. Or how could He
have become limited by any direction when He never had any direction above Him
when He. created man; for that will mean that He has a head, since above
designates the direction above the head. But Allah is too exalted [above His.
creatures] to have a head [like their heads]. Again how could He have become
limited by any direction when He never had any direction below Him when he
created man; for that will mean that He has feet, since below designates the
direction below the feet. But Allah is too exalted [above His creatures] to
have feet [like their feet]. All this is impossible [to imagine] in the mind.
For whatever the mind conceives- is definite is so far as it is limited by
place, in the same way as substances are limited, or by substances, in the same
way as accidents are. But the impossibility of His being a substance or an
accident has been established; consequently His being limited by direction
becomes impossible.
If
therefore anything else is meant by the term direction other than these two
meanings then the usage will be wrong in terminology and signification; because
if Allah were above the world He would be opposite to it, and everything which
is opposite to a body is either equal to it in size, or smaller or larger. All
this implies measurement which necessarily requires an object or measurement.
But Allah the One Creator and Ruler of the world is too exalted above such
things.
As to
the raising of hands heavenward at the time of petition it is because Heaven is
the direction of supplication and implies a description of the one to whom the
supplications are offered, such as majesty and grandeur, employing thereby the
direction of height to represent the quality of glory and exaltation. For Allah
is above in all dominion and power.
The eighth principle is that Allah is seated upon the throne in
the sense which He willed by that state of equilibrium-a state which is not
inconsistent with the quality of grandeur and to which the symptoms of
origination and annihilation do not permeate. It is exactly what has been mean
by the ascension to Heaven in the Qur’an when Allah said, “Then He ascended to
Heaven and it was but smoke.” (41:10) This is only through dominion and power,
as the poet[47] said,
“Bishr[48] has
gained dominion over al-‘Iraq,
With
neither sword nor shedding of blood.”[49]
Thus
were the people of truth (ahl al-haqq) compelled
to pursue such a figurative and allegorical interpretation just as the
esoterics (ahl al batin) were
compelled to interpret the words of Allah, “And wherever ye are, He is with
you.” (57 :4 ) This has been taken, [96] by agreement, to mean thorough
comprehension and knowledge just as the words of the Prophet, “The heart of the
believer lies between two of the fingers of this Merciful [Allah]”, have been
taken to mean might and power, while his words, “The Black Stone is the right
hand of Allah in the earth,” have been taken to mean veneration and honour,
because if they were taken literally, the result would have been impossible.
Similarly the sitting of Allah upon the throne, if it were left to mean fixity
of location and stability, would necessitate that He who is seated upon the
throne be a body in contact with the throne, and be either equal to it in size,
or larger or smaller. But all this is impossible, and what leads to the
impossible is itself impossible.
The ninth principle is that Allah, although removed from form
and quantity and unlimited by directions and climes, is nevertheless seen with
the eyes in the hereafter, the everlasting abode. For He said, “On that day
shall faces beam with light, outlooking towards their Lord.” (75:22-33 ) But He
cannot be seen in this world according to His words, “No vision taketh Him, but
He taketh in all vision”, (6:103) and according to His words in His
conversation with Moses saying, “Thou shalt not see Me.” (7:139) Would that I
knew how the Mu‘tazilites knew the attributes of Allah that Moses himself did
not know; or how Moses asked to see Allah (7:139) when seeing Him was
impossible. Ignorance is more likely to be rampant among heretics and sectarians
than among the prophets.
The
acceptance of the verse [which speaks] of seeing [Allah] (75:22-33)literally
[is justified] because it does not lead to anything impossible. For sight (ru'yah) is a kind of revelation and knowledge, although it is more
complete and clearer than knowledge. And if it is possible to know Allah
without reference to distance or direction (jihah)
is also possible to see Him with reference to distance or direction. And
just as it is possible for Allah to see men without confrontation, it is
possible for men to see Him without confrontation; and just as it is possible
to know Him without modality or form, it is possible to see Him likewise.
The tenth principle is the knowledge that Allah is one without
any associate, single without any like. He is separate in creating and
innovating ; He is alone in bringing into existence and inventing. There are
none like Him to rival or equal Him, and none opposite Him to contest or
contend with Him. The proof of this is found in the words of Allah when He
said, “Had there been in either [Heaven or earth] gods besides Allah both
surely would have gone to ruin.” (21:22) This will be readily illustrated [by
the fact] that had there been two gods and the first of them willed a certain
thing, the second, if he were under compulsion to aid the first, would be a
subordinate and impotent being rather than an almighty god; and if the second
were able to contradict and oppose the first, he would be a powerful and
dominating being while the first would be weak and impotent rather than an
almighty god.
The Second Pillar Concerning the Attributes
of Allah, Involving Ten Principles.
The first principle is the knowledge that the Maker of the world is almighty and that, in His words, “He hath power over all things,” (5:120) He is truthful, because the world, is perfect in its making and orderly in its composition. For he who would see a garment of silk, fine in its weave and texture, symmetrical in its embroidery and ornamentation, and would imagine that it was woven by a dead man that has no life, or by a helpless man that has no power, would be completely lacking in intellect and utterly foolish and ignorant.
The second principle is the knowledge that Allah is omniscient
knowing all things and comprehending all things ; nothing in Heaven or on earth
is ever hid from His knowledge. He is truthful when He says, “And He knoweth
all things.” (2:27) Furthermore evidence of His truthfulness.
is found in His words when He said, “What l Shall He not. know who hath
created? For He is the Subtle, the Cognizant.” (77:14) He has led you, through'
His creation, to arrive at the knowledge that you cannot doubt the evidence
which this intricate and orderly creation, even in insignificant and meagre
things, offers to the knowledge of the Maker of how to bring order and how to
arrange. And what Allah Himself 'said is the last word in guidance and in
revealing knowledge.
The third principle is the knowledge that Allah is living,
because he whose knowledge and power are established, his being possessed of
life will, of necessity, become established. If it is possible to conceive of
the existence of an able, knowing, doing and ruling being yet lifeless, it will
be possible to doubt the life of animals, despite their movements, as well as
the life of all craftsmen and artisans, all of which is utter ignorance and
error.
The fourth principle is the knowledge that Allah is willing. He
wills all His works and nothing exists which does not depend upon, and proceed
from His will. He is the Creator, the Restorer, the Doer of whatsoever He
wills. And how could He not be a willer when, in everything which has proceeded
from Him, He could have willed its opposite ; and wherever there is no
opposite He could have caused the same thing to proceed from Himself before or
after the time in which it has proceeded. His power is equal to coping with
both opposites and both times in the same way. Therefore, it is necessary that
there should be a will which directs His power to one or the other possible
thing. And if knowledge would, in specifying the thing known, render the will
needless, so that it could be said that a thing has come into being at a time
when its existence had already been known, it would be possible for knowledge
to render power needless, so that it could be said that a thing has come into
being without [ the instrumentality of] power, but simply because its existence
had already been known.
The fifth principle is the knowledge that Allah is hearing and
seeing. Neither the cogitations of the innermost heart nor the secret thoughts
and reflections are hid from His sight ; the sound of the creeping of the black
ant upon the solid rock in the darkest night is not beyond His hearing. And how
could He not see and hear when seeing and hearing are [attributes of]
perfection not of defect ? Could the created be more perfect than the creator,
the thing made more magnificent and more complete than the maker? [97] Or how
could they ever be equal, no matter how much He might diminish in perfection
while His creation and handiwork increase therein ? And again how could the
argument of Abraham against his father, who ignorantly and erroneously worshipped
idols, be sound ? Abraham addressed his father saying, “Why dost thou worship
that which neither seeth nor heareth nor availeth thee aught?” (19:42) But if
these defects which characterized the idols of his father characterized his god
as well, his argument would have been invalid and his evidence worthless, and
the words of Allah, “This is Our argument which We furnished Abraham against
His people,” (11:83) would have been false. And just at is has been possible
for the mind to conceive of His being a doer, although He has none of the
physical senses, and knowing, although He has neither heart nor brain, so it is
possible to conceive of Him as seeing, although He has no eyeballs, and
hearing, although He has no ears, for all cases are the same.
The sixth principle is that Allah speaks with a speech which
is a self-existing attribute. It is neither a sound nor a letter; it does not
resemble the speech of other beings, just as His existence does not resemble
theirs. In reality genuine speech is the speech of the soul although sounds
were built into words merely as symbols, just as gestures and signals are often
used to represent the same thing. How then has this fact not been known by a
group of ignorant people while it has been known by ignorant poets. Said their
spokesman :
“Genuine speech is that of the
heart
Our words are its outward
expression.”
As to
him whose intellect does neither deter nor restrain him from saying that his
tongue is an originated thing, but what originates in it by means of his originated
power is ancient, [you have no reason to expect that he will ever be sane
again, and, therefore, shun all discussion with him. Similarly pay no attention
to him who does. not understand that the ancient (qadim) is that thing before which nothing existed. (Thus in the words “bism-Allah'.”
the b precedes the s and consequently the s cannot be ancient). For Allah
has a secret [reason] for leading some men astray; “And whom Allah causeth to
err, none shall guide.” (13:33) As to him who deems it improbable that Moses
could have, in this world, heard a speech which was neither sound nor phone,
let him deny that in the hereafter he could see a being who has neither body
nor colour. But if it has been possible to conceive of seeing that which has no
colour, or body, or size or quantity, while until now nothing else has been
seen, the same thing would be possible in the case of hearing, just as it has
been in the case of seeing.
And if
it has been possible to conceive of Allah as having one knowledge, which is the
knowledge of all existent things, it would also be possible to conceive of Him
as having one attribute, which is a speech comprising all that He has
represented with words. And if it has been possible to conceive of the
existence of the Seven Heavens, and Paradise and Hell, written all on a small
piece of paper and preserved in a minute part of the heart, and seen with a
part of the eyeball not exceeding the size of a lentil seed, without the
Heavens and Earth, Paradise and Hell actually existing in the eyeball, or the
heart, or the paper, it would also be possible to conceive of the speech of
Allah as being read with tongues, preserved in the hearts, and written in
books, without the actual existence of that speech in these things. For if the
very speech [ of Allah ] should actually exist on the leaves of a book, Allah
Himself, through the writing of His name on these leaves, would exist actually
thereon. Similarly the very fire of Hell, through the writing of its name on
the leaves, would exist actually thereon and [ the leaves ] would be consumed.
The seventh principle is that the self existing speech [of
Allah], as well as His other attributes, is ancient from eternity, since it is
impossible that He be a substratum for originated phenomena and subject to
change. On the contrary His attributes demand the same external nature which
His essence demands. Change does not overtake Him and mishaps do not befall
Him. Nay, He does not cease, in His eternal nature, to be described with the
commendable attributes, and in His everlasting nature, to be far removed from
change. For whatever is a substratum for originated phenomena is not free there
from, and whatever is not free from originated phenomena is itself originated.
The description of bodies with the epithet of origination was established
because of the fact that they are subject to change and variation in
properties. How, then, could their Creator share with them [ the property of ]
accepting change.
We
conclude from this that the speech of Allah is ancient from eternity and
self-existing. Only the sounds which represent it are originated.. For just as
it is possible to conceive that a child's desire for learning and his wish for
it are existent in the personality of the father before the child is born-so
that when he is born and attains maturity, having been given by Allah [a
predilection for that] knowledge which is related to the father's desire, he
becomes bound by that same desire which existed in the personality of his
father .and persisted until he has acquired the knowledge, related to it-it is
likewise possible to conceive that the divine command, which the words “Take
off thy shoes” (20:12) represent, has existed in the personality of Allah [from
the beginning], and that these words were addressed to Moses after he was born,
having been given by Allah [the predilection for] their knowledge and an
ability to hear that ancient speech [of Allah].
The eighth principle is that His knowledge is ancient. He has
not ceased to know Himself and His attributes, as well as everything
which He creates. Everything which He creates is not novel to Him, rather it
comes into being with His eternal knowledge. Thus if we were given foreknowledge of the coming of Zayd
at sunrise, and that foreknowledge persisted until the sun had risen, then the
coming of Zayd at sunrise would have been known to us through that
foreknowledge without any necessity for its renewal. This is, then, how the
eternal nature-of the knowledge of Allah should be understood.
The ninth principle is that His will is ancient. In its eternal nature it governs the origination of phenomena in their appointed times in accordance with the eternal foreknowledge [of Allah]. For if His will were originated [and not ancient], it would have become a substratum for originated phenomena. Furthermore if the will of Allah should happen in other than Himself, He would not be the willer of it, just as you would not yourself execute an action which is not in yourself No matter what hypothesis you may assume, its presence requires another will, and likewise [98] the other will requires a third, and so on to infinity. And if it were possible for a will to come into being without [another] will, it would be possible for the world to come into being without a will.
The tenth principle is that Allah is living possessing life,
powerful possessing might, willing possessing a will, a speaker with the
ability to speak, a bearer who can hear, and seeing possessing sight. He has
the qualities of these ancient attributes. To speak of a knower but without
knowledge is like speaking of one who is wealthy but without wealth, or of
knowledge without a knower, or a knower without something known. For knowledge,
the knower, and that which is known are inseparable just as murder, the
murdered, and the murderer are inseparable. And just as it is impossible to
conceive of a murderer without murder and one murdered, or of one murdered
without a murderer and murder, it is impossible to conceive of a knower without
knowledge, and of knowledge without something known, and of something known
without a knower. These three are inseparable and the one is inconceivable
without the other. Whoever would deem it possible that a knower should exist
independently of knowledge, he would have to deem it possible that a knower
could exist independently of that which is known, and that knowledge could
exist in dependently of a knower, since there is no difference between these
qualities.
The Third Pillar Concerning the Knowledge of
the Works of Allah, Involving Ten Principles.
The first principle is the
knowledge that every originated phenomenon in the world is of His make,
creation, and invention. There is no other creator of it besides Him, and there
is no innovator of it except Him. He created men and made them, and He brought
into being their freedom (qudrah) and
actions (sing. harakah). All the
works of His servants are created [by Him] and for Him, and are connected with
His power, confirming thereby His words when He said, “[There is no Allah but
He], the creator of all things,” (11:102) and “When Allah hath created you, and
what ye make.” (37:94) and, `Be your converse hidden or open, He truly
knoweth the inmost recesses of your hearts. What! Shall He not know whom He
hath created, when He is the subtle, the cognizant ?” (67:13-14) He commanded
His servants to be careful in their words, works and secret thoughts and
intentions, because He knows the orientation of their works, having arrived at
this knowledge through [the act of] creation. And how could He not be a creator
of the works of man when His power is complete and free of any impotence.
Futhermore His power -is .connected with the actions of the bodies,
of men. These actions are similar to one another and the connexion of the power
of. Allah with them is essential. What then would prevent its connexion in the
case of some .actions and would not prevent it in the case of others, when all
are similar ? For how could the animal be capable of invention by itself? The
spider and the bee as well as the other animals product fine works which amaze
the minds. . But how could they have invented these things alone without the
Lord of Lords, when actually they are not aware of the benefits they produce?
Let all creatures be abased, for Allah, the Lord of Heaven and Earth, is the
sole ruler of the visible and the invisible worlds.
The second principle is the fact that Allah, being the sole
inventor of the actions of His servants, does not prevent them from doing
voluntary (magdurah) actions by way
of acquisition, for Allah has created will
(qudrah) as well as the willed
(magdur), choice as 'veil as the chosen. Will is
a quality. with regards to man and a creation of Allah rather than an acquisition (kasb); whereas actions are a creation of
Allah and an acquired quality of man. They were created voluntary through His
will which is one of His attributes. Furthermore they are related to another
quality which is called freedom (qudrah).
Consequently in this relation, they are called an acquisition. And how
could they be the result of complete compulsion (jabr) when the
difference between the voluntary actions and the involuntary (daruri) reflexes is instinctively
comprehended by man? Or how could they be a creation of man when he does not
know the different parts of acquired (muktasabah)
actions and their numbers? Thus when the two extreme positions are
disproved, [namely the position that actions are the result of compulsion and
the position that they are the result of volition], there remains nothing
except the middle-road position which asserts that they are voluntary through
the will of Allah by invention and through the will of the servant by another
connexion which is expressed by the term acquisition (iktisab). The connexion between the will and the willed need not
necessarily be one of invention only, since the. will of Allah in eternity was
connected with the world although the world was not yet invented, and at the
time of invention the connexion is of a different nature. Hence it is evident that
the will is not limited by the necessity that the willed should obtain.
The third principle is that the works of the servant, although
they are his acquisition (kasb), are
nevertheless willed by Allah. Neither a twinkling of an eye nor a stray thought
of a heart ever occur, either in the visible or the invisible world except
through His decree and will. He is the source of good and evil, benefit and
harm, belief [Islam] and unbelief, knowledge and ignorance, success and
failure, orthodoxy, and heresy, obedience and disobedience, monotheism and
polytheism. There is none that rescinds His commands, none that supplements
His decrees. He leads astray whom He wishes and guides whom He wishes. “He
shall not be asked for his doing, but they shall be asked.” (21:23) This is
attested in tradition by the words which enjoy the catholic consent of all the
faithful, namely, “What He wills is and what He wills not is not,” as well as
the words of Allah, “That had He pleased, Allah would have certainly guided all
men aright;” (13:30) and again, “Had we pleased we had certainly given to every
soul its guidance.” (32:13) As to the evidence for it from reason [ we know ]
that if Allah does neither like nor will sins and crimes, they must be in
accordance with the will of the enemy, the devil (Iblis), who is the
enemy of Allah, and consequently what takes place in accordance with the will
of the enemy will be greater than what takes place in accordance with the will
of Allah. How on earth would a Muslim deem it possible that the authority of
the -most powerful Allah, He of the majesty and honour, be reduced to a state [
so weak ] that if the authority of a village chieftain were reduced to it, he
would scorn and adjure it, since if the enemy of the village chieftain can achieve
[99] in the village itself more than the chieftain himself, the latter would
abjure his rank and resign his office? But his prevails among men, and
according to the innovators, its prevalence is contrary to the will of Allah.
This would be the limit in weakness and impotence. Allah, the Lord of Lords is
high exalted above the blasphemous words of 'the transgressors.
Furthermore
when it becomes evident that the works of men are, in relation to Allah,
created, it follows that they are also, in the same way, willed by Him. If it
should then be asked, “How does Allah forbid what He has willed and enjoin what
He does not will ?” we would say that the question is not that of will (iradah). Therefore if a master strikes
his slave and is reprimanded by the sultan, he justifies his action by the
rebellion of the slave against him. But the sultan disbelieves him. So he
attempts to prove his contention by ordering the slave to do something which
the slave would refuse in the presence of the sultan. Therefore he tells the
slave to saddle a mount. Now the master ordere4 the slave to do something the
fulfilment of which he did not really desire. If he had not given his order, he
would not have been able to justify himself; and if had really desired its
fulfilment he would have desired destruction for himself, which thing is
impossible.
The fourth principle is the knowledge that Allah Is generous in
creating and inventing and gracious in imposing obligations upon men. Neither
creation nor imposing obligations were necessary for Him although the
Mu‘tazilites hold' that these were necessary for the welfare of men. But this
is impossible since He is the sole cause (mujib),
the only being to enjoin and to forbid. How then can He be subject to any
necessity or exposed to any need or petition.
Necessary
(wajib) means one of two things :
First an act in the neglect of which is harm, either remote as is the case when
we say that it is necessary for man to obey Allah if they want to escape
torment by fire in the hereafter, or immediate as is the case when we say that
it is necessary for him who is thirsty to drink lest he dies. Secondly, it
means anything the nonexistence of which would lead to an impossibility. .Thus
it is said that the existence of that which is known is necessary (wajib)
since its non-existence will lead to an impossibility, namely knowledge
becoming ignorance.
If the
adversary, by saying that the act of creation is necessary for Allah, should
mean the first signification, he would expose Allah to harm. If he should mean
the second signification, he would then be a Muslim, since when knowledge of
thing obtains, its existence will be inevitable. But if he should mean a third
signification, that thing is unintelligible. As to his statement that [creation
and imposing obligational are necessary for the welfare of men, it is worthless
since if no harm would overtake Allah for neglecting the welfare of men, the
assertion that [creation and imposing obligation] are necessary, as far as
Allah is concerned, is meaningless. Furthermore, the welfare of men demands
that Allah should create them in Paradise ; to create them in the world of
misery and to expose them to sin, lay them open to the dangers of punishment,
and to the terrors of resurrection and the day of judgment, spell no bliss in
the opinion of the intelligent.
The fifth principle is that, contrary to the position of the
Mu‘tazilites, Allah is free to impose on men obligations which are beyond their
power to fulfill, For if this were not contingent, it would be impossible for
men to ask Allah to spare them that burden. But as a matter of fact they have
beseeched Allah to. spare them that burden when they said.” “O our Lord ! Lay
not on us that for which we have no strength.” (2:286) Furthermore Allah has
informed His Prophet that Abu-Jahl would not believe Him, nevertheless Allah
commanded the Prophet to command Abu-Jahl to believe in all the words of
Allah. But among the words of Allah were those that Abu-Jahl would not believe
Him. How then would he believe Him by not believing Him? The existence of such
a thing is absolutely impossible.
The sixth principle is that, contrary to the position which
the Mu‘tazilites hold, Allah is free to inflict pain on men and to torment
them, without their having previously committed any offence, and without the
necessity of compensating them with future rewards. For He has freedom of
action among His . subjects and its inconceivable that His subjects would
oppose His freedom therein. Tyranny is dispensing with the possessions of
others without their permission. But this is impossible in the case of Allah,
because He does not confront possessions belonging to others besides. Himself
whereby His dispensing with these possessions could be tyrannous.
The
existence of such a thing proves its contingency. Thus the slaughter of
animals4s an infliction of pain on them, and the various kinds of torture which
man imposes upon them have not been preceded by any offence. If it should be
said that Allah will raise them from the dead and will reward them according to
the amount of pain which they suffered, and that such action is necessary, and,
therefore, incumbent upon Allah to perform, we would say that anyone who would
claim that it is incumbent upon Allah to bring every ant which was killed under
the feet and every bug which was crushed between, the fingers back to life, so
that He might reward them for the pains which they suffered, would violate the
dictates of the Law and reason, since He would regard resurrection add reward
necessary and therefore incumbent upon Allah. If he means thereby that Allah.
will suffer some harm through its neglect, then it is impossible; and if he
means something else, we have already said that it will be intelligent whenever
it does not conform to [any of] the [two] meanings of the term necessary (wajib)
mentioned above.
The seventh principle is that Allah does with His servants
whatever He wishes and does not have to take into consideration that which is
salutary (al-aslah) for His servants, because of what we have already
mentioned regarding the fact that there is nothing necessary and, therefore,
incumbent upon Allah. In fact it is not reasonable to think of necessity in connexion
with Allah. “He shall not be asked for His doing, but they shall be asked.”
(21:23) I wonder what answer would the Mu‘tazilites give when, in connexion
with his statement that it is incumbent upon Allah to do what is salutary and
good, we place before Him the following [hypothetical] problem : It is supposed
that in the hereafter an
argument takes place between two persons, a child and an adult, both of whom
died Muslims. Now, according to the Mu‘tazilites, Allah exalts the rank of the
adult and gives him preference over the child, because the former toiled and
laboured in acts of worship after he attained maturity. In fact this is
incumbent upon Allah according to the Mu‘tazilites. Suppose then that the child
says, “O my Lord I Why hast thou exalted his rank above mine?” And Allah
answers, “Because he hath attained maturity and hath laboured in acts of
worship.” Thereupon the child rejoins, “But Lord, it is thou who hast caused me
to die a child. Thou shouldst have prolonged my life until I attained maturity
; then I would have
laboured
in Thy worship. But thou, O Lord, hast deviated from justice by favouring him
with long life. Lord ! Why hast thou so favoured him?” Allah would then reply,
“Because I knew that if thou hadst lived to attain maturity, thou wouldst have
committed the sins of polytheism and disobedience. Hence it was salutary for
thee to die a child.” Such will the apology of the Mu'tazilite be for Allah.
But then the unbelievers will cry up from the midst of Hell-fire saying “O
Lord ! Hast thou not known that if we had lived to attain maturity we should
have committed the sin of polytheism ? Why then hast thou not caused us to die
in childhood before we could sin ? We should have been content to enjoy in
Heaven a lesser rank than that of the Muslim child.” [100] What kind of answer
could be given for this? In the face of this situation, is it not imperative to
conclude that divine matters, in view of their majesty, transcend the evaluation
and judgment of the. followers of the Mu‘tazilite school ?
If it
should be said that since Allah can consider that which is salutary for men but
instead he inflicts Upon them all manner of torment, His action is undesirable
and unworthy of wisdom, we should then say that the undesirable is that which
does not promote the satisfaction of one's desire. But a thing may be
undesirable to one person and desirable to the other if it disagrees with the
desire of the one and promotes that of the other. Thus a family would deem the
murder of their child undersirable but their enemies would welcome it. Hence if
that which does not promote the satisfaction of the desire of Allah is what is
meant by the word undesirable, then it is impossible, because Allah has no
desire and, therefore, it is impossible to conceive of anything undesirable
proceeding from Him, just as it is impossible to conceive of Allah being
tyrannous, because it is impossible to conceive of Him acting freely with the
possessions of others, [since He does not confront possessions belonging to
others besides Himself]. But if that which does not promote the desire of some
other than Allah is what is meant by the word undesirable, then why did you say
that it was impossible for Him? Is it not merely wishful thinking, disproved by
what we have postulated in- the debate of the adult and the child and the plea
of the unbelievers from the midst of Hell-fire? Furthermore the wise is he who
knows the realities of things and capable of harnessing them in accordance with
his will. It is here where the consideration of that which is salutary is
imperative. And as to the wise among us, he takes into .consideration that
which is salutary as far as he himself is concerned, in order to gain
therewith praise in this world and reward in the hereafter, or to prevent some
evil from befalling him-all of which are impossible in the case of Allah.
The eighth principle is that the knowledge of Allah and
obedience to Him are obligatory upon men, not, as the Mu‘tazilites say, on
account of reason, but on account' of the ordinance of Allah and His Law. For
if reason renders obedience obligatory, it does so either for nor purpose,
which thing is impossible, or for some purpose or desire. This must refer
either to Allah, which thing is impossible since Allah is free of all desires
and wants [in fact belief and unbelief, obedience and disobedience, are, the
same in relation to Allah], or to the desire of the creature, which is also
impossible, since the creature has no desire at the time, but rather he is
worried by reason and is deterred from his desires because of it.; and he has
no desire except reward or punishment in the hereafter. But how could it be
known that Allah rewards man for obedience and disobedience and does not punish
him for them when both, in relation to Him, are the same Furthermore He has no
inclination to the one or to the other and is not characterized by the one or
the other. The knowledge of how to distinguish between them was arrived at
through the Law; while he who arrives at it through drawing an analogy between
the creator and the creature errs, as the creature distinguishes between
gratitude and ingratitude on the basis of the amount of joy, gladness, and
pleasure which he derives from the one or the other.
If it
should be said that if study and knowledge are not rendered obligatory except
through the Law, which does not become fixed and defined unless the person who
is required to fulfil its obligations studies and examines it, and if that
person should say to the Prophet that reason does not place upon him any such
obligation, and, therefore, he is not going to pursue the study of the Law
despite the fact that it becomes fixed and defined only through such' study,
with the result that the Prophet is silenced, we would then say that this
argument is the same as that of the person who, on being warned by another that
there is a wild lion standing behind him, and that unless he runs away the
beast will devour him, and that he can ascertain that the, warning is true if
he will only look behind, says to the one who warned him that the truth of the
warning can be established only if he looks behind him, yet he is not going to
do so unless the truth of the warning is first established. This will reveal
the. foolishness of the man and will accomplish nothing besides exposing him to
the danger of being devoured. It will not, however, cause the warner any harm.
The same is true of the Prophet -who says, “Beware, for death is
lurking behind you and further beyond wild lions and consuming fire await you.
If ye do not take heed for yourselves and admit my truthfulness[50] by
acknowledging my miracle, ye will. surely perish. He who will take notice will
realize the dangers, take the necessary precautions, and will consequently be
saved but he who will not take notice and persists in his stubbornness will die
and perish. But I shall suffer no harm even though all men may perish, because
my duty is confined to warning.”
The Law
declared the existence of the wild lions beyond death, while reason aids in
understanding the words of the Prophet and in realizing that what he foretells
is possible, and nature urges that precautions be taken against injury and
harm. A thing is necessary because its neglect causes injury and harm ; while
is reason that which renders a thing necessary because it makes known the
impending harm. But reason in itself does not lead to the knowledge that when a
person follows his appetite he will expose himself to harm after death.
This
then is the meaning of both the Law and reason as well as their part in
determining that which is necessary. For had it not been for the fear of punishment
for the neglect of things enjoined, necessity would not have been established,
since the term necessary would be meaningless if no harm in the hereafter were
consequent upon its, neglect in this world.
The ninth principle is that sending prophets is not
impossible. This is contrary to the Brahmans who say there is no use in sending
prophets since reason renders it unnecessary. [This is false] because reason
does not guide men to works which lead to .salvation in the hereafter, just as
it does not guide them to discover medicines which are useful in the health.
Therefore the need of men for prophets in just like their need for physicians.
The integrity of the physician is known through experience white the truthfulness
of the principle is known through miracles.
The tenth principle is that Allah sent Muhammad as the last of
the prophets and as an abrogator of all previous Laws before him; the laws of
the Jews and the Christians and the Sabians;[51] He
upheld him with unmistakable miracles and wonderful signs such as the splitting
of the moon,[52] the
praise of the pebbles,[53] [101]
and causing the mute animal to speak,[54] as
well as water flowing from between his fingers[55] and
the unmistakable sign of the glorious Qur’an with which he challenged the
Arabs.[56] For
the Arabs, in their struggle with the Prophet, did everything to check mate
him, but despite their distinguished ability and excellence in eloquence and
rhetoric, they were not able to oppose him with anything like the Qur’an,
because it was not within the power of human beings, [in their writings], to
combine the succinctness of the phrases of the Qur’an and the smoothness of its
style (notwithstanding the richness of the Qur’an in narratives of
early history and the fact that the Prophet himself was unlettered (ummi and unfamiliar with books) with
the prediction of unknown fixture events the subsequent to occurrence of which
established the truthfulness of the Prophet. Examples of this are found in the
words of Allah when He said, “Ye shall surely enter the sacred Mosque, if Allah
will, in full security, having your heads shaved and your hair cut;” (48:27)
and again, “Alit, Lam, Mim. The Romans[57] have
been defeated in a land hard by; but after their defeat, they overthrow their
foes in a few years.” (30:1-3)
The
reason why a miracle attests the truthfulness of apostles is because everything
which human beings cannot do must be the work of Allah. Whatever is linked by
the Prophet with a challenge enjoys the same position as that to which Allah
says “You are right.” This is like the case of the person who, standing before
the king announces to the subjects that he is the king's messenger, and in
order to prove that he is right asks the king to stand upon his throne and sit
down three times contrary to his usual practice. The king obliges and the
subjects know, beyond the shadow of doubt, that the king's action takes the
place of his saying “You are right.”
The
Fourth Pillar Concerning the Things Accepted on
Authority and Believing what the Prophet Related
Concerning them, and it Involves Ten Principles.
The first principle is the belief in the resurrection of the
dead and the day of judgment both of which have been mentioned in tradition.[58] They
are real and belief in them is obligatory, because, according to reason, they
are possible. They signify restoration to life after death which, like the
first act of creation, is within the power of Allah. Said Allah, “Who shall
give life to bones when they are rotten? Say: 'He shall give life to them who
gave them being at first'.” (36:78) Therefore the ability of Allah to restore
the dead to life is deduced from His ability to .perform the first act of
creation. Said, Allah, “Your creation and quickening (hereafter), are but as
those of a single individual.” (31:27) Restoration to life is nothing but a
second act of creation, and is possible like the first act of creation.
The second principle is the belief in the inquisition of
Munkar and Nakir. This -is mentioned in tradition,[59] and
should, therefore, be accepted, because it is possible, since it does not
require anything except the restoration to life of that part [of the body] with
which dialogues are understood. This is possible in itself and neither the
apparels stillness of the dead man’s corpse nor our failure to hear the
questions put to him will refute it. For the sleeping person is outwardly still
and motionless, but he perceives .in- pains and pleasures the effects of which
he feels once he is awake. Furthermore the Prophet used to hear the voice of
Gabriel and to see him while those who were around neither heard nor saw him.[60] For
“nought of His knowledge shall they grasp, save what He willeth.” (2:256b) Thus
if Allah does not create for men hearing and sight, they will not know Him.
The third principle is the belief in the punishment of the
grave which is mentioned in tradition.[61] Allah
[also] said, “It is the fire to which they shall be exposed morning and
evening, and on the day when `the Hour' shall arrive Bring in the family of
Pharaoh into the severest punishment.” (40:49) It was also well known that the
Prophet and the righteous Fathers were wont to seek refuge in Allah from the
punishment of the Grave.[62] This
punishment of the grave is possible and the fact that the corpse may be
dismembered and scattered in the bellies of lions and the gizzards of fowls
does not prevent the belief in it; because the bodily members which feel the
pains of punishment are those particular members to which Allah ordains [102]
the restoration of sense perception and feeling.
The fourth principle is the belief in the balance which is real.
Allah said, “Just balances will we set up for the day of resurrection ;”
(21:48) and again, “And they whose balances shall be heavy, these are they who
shall be happy. And they whose, balances shall be light, these are they who
have lost their souls.” (7:7-8) The manner in which this is done is that Allah
causes to exist in the balance sheets of men's works a weight in proportion to
the value of these works in His sight. Consequently the value of the works of
men becomes known to them so that the justice of Allah in punish went,. His grace in forgiveness, and generosity
in reward might become evident.
The fifth principle is the belief in the bridge (al
sirat), which is stretched
over Hell; it is finer than a hair and sharper than the edge of the sword.
Allah said, “And guide them to the road for Hell, and set them forth : they
shall be questioned.” (37:23-24) This is also possible and belief in it is
obligatory. For Allah who is able to make the birds fly in the air is also able
to make man walk over the bridge.
The sixth principle is the belief that Paradise and Hell are
created. Allah said, “And vie in haste for pardon from your Lord, and a
Paradise, vast as the Heavens and the Earth, prepared for those who fear Allah.
(3:127) The word of Allah 'prepared proves that both Paradise and Hell are
created. Therefore the literal meaning of the verse, should be accepted,
especially since it is not impossible. Nor will it be said that there is no use
in their creation before the day of judgment because “Allah is not responsible
to anyone for His works while His servants are answerable for theirs.” (21:23)
The seventh principle is that the rightful imams after the
Apostle of Allah are Abu-Bakr, then ‘Umar, then ‘Uthman, and then ‘Ali. No
clear designation of an imam was ever made by the Apostle of Allah. For had
there been any such designation it would have had a much better chance to
become known and survive than the designation of a local imam in some part of
the land by unknown governors and army commanders. In the latter case the
designation became known and survived. How then did it not become known and
survive in the case of the Apostle? If it were really made, how then did it
disappear and why was it, not transmitted to us? Accordingly Abu-Bakr was not
an imam except through election (ikhtiyar)
and through the oath of allegiance (bay'ah).
To hold that someone other than Abu-Bakr was designated[63] would
amount to the same thing as accusing all the Companions of contradicting the
Apostle and of violating the principle of catholic consent. No one dares
fabricate such an accusation except the Rafidites.[64] The
belief of the orthodox community requires the vindication of all the Companions
as well as their praise just as Allah and His Apostle have praised them.[65] As to
the struggle which took place between Mu'awiyah and ‘Ali, it was the result of
different points of view in independent interpretation (ijtihad) rather than a struggle wherein Mu‘awiyah disputed ‘Ali's
right to the imamate. `Ali deemed that the surrender of the assassins of
‘Uthman, because of their many relatives among the tribes and the fact that
these relatives were scattered all over the army, would lead to disturbances
which. would endanger the safety of the imamate in its early days. He,
therefore, saw fit to postpone their surrender. On the other hand, Mu‘awiyah
thought that any delay in the surrender of the assassins to justice would, in
view of the enormity of their crime, incite further attacks on the lives of
imams and would lead to the shedding of blood. One of the celebrated learned
men said that every independent interpretor (mujiahid)
of the law was right in his own interpretation; while others said that he
who is right is one. No one of learning and intelligence, however, has
charged ‘Ali with error [in his interpretation].
. The eighth principle is that the excellence of the Companions
is in accordance to their chronological order in which they succeeded the
Prophet. For real excellence is that which is excellent in the sight of Allah,
and no one will have knowledge of it except the Apostle of Allah. Several
verses in praise of all the Companions were revealed and a number of traditions
which recite their honour have been handed down. Yet the subtle distinction of
excellence and precedence is not grasped except by those who were eye-witnesses
to revelation and had the opportunity to observe it in its setting and to watch
its development. Had they not understood that so well they would not have
arranged matters as they did, since. they did not use to abandon the way of
Allah because of threat of pressure and nothing would turn them away from
truth.
The ninth principle is that, in addition to Islam, the
qualifications of the imamate are five:[66] male.
sex, being of age (taklif ), piety (wara’), learning, competence (kifayah), and membership in the Quraysh
tribe, because the Apostle said, “The imams should be of the Quraysh.”[67] When
these qualifications obtain in several candidates, the imam will be the one who
receives the homage and allegiance of the majority of Muslims, and he who
contradicts the [will of the] majority, is a trespasser who should be brought
back into line with the majority.
The tenth principle is that if neither piety nor knowledge
obtain in the claimant, yet any attempt to oust him will result in perilous and
unbearable strife, we hold that his :imamate should be considered legitimate
and binding because of the grave dilemma which confronts us. Thus we have
either to replace him by another and consequently stir strife, in which case
the evil that will afflict the Muslims will surpass any loss they may incur
because of the claimant's lack of piety and knowledge, qualifications designed
to promote the public welfare ; but no one will destroy the means of welfare in
order to promote and enhance it, for this will be just like the person who will
erect a single house and demolish a whole town ; or we have to declare that
there is no imam and consequently there is neither law nor equity in the land,
which thing is impossible. We declare that the authority of unjust rulers
should be enforced in their land because of the urgent need for authority
therein. How, then, do we not declare an imamate legitimate when the need for
it is great and urgent?
These
then are four pillars which comprise the forty principles which pertain to the
foundations of the articles of faith. He who believes therein will be in
harmony with the orthodox community and the enemy of all heretics. May Allah by
His grace guide us and lead our steps into the way of truth.
The Fourth Section of the Book on the Foundations of
the Articles of Faith
On belief and Islam, the relation between
and the differences which distinguish them, whether belief Increases or decreases
and the qualifications which the Fathers laid down concerning it. This
section comprises three problems
(Problem).. People disagreed concerning Islam,
whether it was identical with belief (Iman) or different there from ; and, in
the event it was' different, whether it was removed from belief and could exist
without it, or inseparable from it and does not exist without it. Some have
said that they are one and the same thing,. others that they are two different
things wholly unrelated, and still others that although they are two different
things, they are closely related to each other. Abu-Talib al-Makki had
something to say in this connexion ; yet what he said was greatly confused and
extremely long.[68] Let
us, therefore, proceed to declare the truth without bothering about what is
useless.
To
begin with, this discussion comprises three considerations : first concerning
the literal meaning of the two terms Islam and belief (iman); second the
technical meaning of the two terms in the Qur’an and tradition; and third the
functions which they, fulfil in this world and the next. The first is one of
language, the second is one; of interpretation, and the third is one of
jurisprudence and Law.
The
first consideration concerning the literal meaning of the words. Belief (iman) means literally acceptance (tasdiq). Allah said, “But thou wilt not
believe us;” (12:17) which is the same as saying that he will not accept their
word. Islam on the other hand means submission (taslim), and surrender (istislam)
to Allah through yielding (idh‘an) and
compliance (inqiyad); and henceforth
abjuring rebellion, pride, and stubbornness. Acceptance lies in the heart while
the tongue serves as its interpreter. But submission is more comprehensive and
pervades the heart, the tongue and the senses. For every acceptance with the
mind (tasdiq bi'l-qalib) is a
submission and a dis. avowal of pride and unbelief. The same is true of verbal
confession (al-i’tiraf bi'l-lisan) as
well as of obedience and compliance with the senses. According to the dictates
of language Islam is the more general term, while belief (iman) is the more specific. Therefore belief. represents the
noblest part of Islam. Consequently every acceptance is submission, but not
every submission is acceptance.
The
second consideration treats of the technical meaning of the two terms in the
Qur’an and tradition. The truth of the matter is that the Law (al shar') i.e. the Qur’an and
tradition, has used the two terms as synonyms interchangeably, as different
terms of different meaning, and as related terms the one being a part of the
other.
Their
use synonymously is shown in the words of Allah when He said, “And we brought
forth the believers who were in the city: but we found not
in it bur one family of Muslims.” (51:35-36) Yet as a matter of fact there was
only one family. Allah said again, “O my people. If ye believe in Allah, then
put your trust in Him--if ye be Muslims.” (10:84) The Apostle also said, “Islam
was built upon five pillars.”[69] At
another time the Apostle was asked what belief (iman) was and he gave
the same answer, namely the five pillars. [70]
The use
of the terms Islam and belief (iman) to
signify different meanings is shown in the words of Allah when He said, “The
Arabs of the desert say, ‘We believe’. Say thou : Ye believe not ; but rather
say, ‘We profess Islam’. (49:14)”[71] This
means that they have surrendered outwardly only. In this case the Apostle used
belief (iman) for acceptance with the
mind only and used Islam for surrender outwardly through the tongue and senses.
[Similarly
when Gabriel assumed the aspect of a stranger] and interrogated the Prophet
concerning belief (iman) the latter
replied saying, “Belief is to believe in Allah, His angels, books, apostles,
the last day, the resurrection of the dead, the judgment, and in the decrees of
Allah, the good and the evil.”[72]
Gabriel then asked what Islam was, to which the Apostle replied by citing the
five pillars.[73] He
thus used Islam for submission outwardly in word and deed.
According
to a tradition related on the authority of Sa'd [ibn-abi-Waqqas] the Apostle
once gave a certain man a gift and to another he gave nothing. Whereupon Sa‘d
said, “O Apostle of Allah. Thou bast given this man nothing although he is a
believer;” to which the Apostle added, “Or a Muslim.” Sa‘d repeated his
question and again the Apostle added, “Or a Muslim.”[74]
Their
use as related terms, the. one. being a part of the other is shown by what has
been related concerning the Apostle of Allah when he was asked what works were
best and he replied, “Islam”; and when he was asked which type of Islam was
best he answered. “Belief”.[75] This
proves the use of Islam and belief (iman) both as different terms and as
related terms the one being a part of the other, which latter use is the best
linguistically, because belief is in reality a work-in fact the best of works.
Islam on the other hand is submission either with the mind, or with the tongue,
or with the senses; but the best is the submission with the mind. It is that
acceptance which is called belief.
The use
of the terms Islam and belief (iman) as two
different words of different meanings, as [104] related terms, the one being a
part of the other, and as synonyms, does not overstep the possibilities which
the language allows. Their use as different terms of different meanings makes
belief (iman) signify acceptance
with the mind only, which signification conforms to the dictates of language;
it makes Islam signify submission outwardly, which thing is also in harmony
with the requirements of language. For the submission in part is also called
submission, since the universal application of a term is not a necessary
prerequisite for its use. Thus he who touches another with but a part of his
body is nevertheless called contiguous despite the fact that the whole of his
body is not in contact with that of the other. Hence the application of the
term Islam to outward submission, although the inward submission is lacking,,
is in complete harmony with the rules of language. In this sense were the words
of Allah used when He said, “The Arabs of the desert say, ‘We believe.’ Say
thou : Ye believe not, but rather say ‘We profess Islam’.”(49:14) The same is
true of the. use of the two words [Islam and (iman)] in the tradition related by Sa‘d
[ibn-abi-Waqqas] where the Prophet added “Or a Muslim.”[76] He did
that because he preferred the one to the other. What is meant by the use of the
two. terms as different words of different meanings is that the terms contend
for superiority and vie with each other in excellence.
Their
use as related terms, the one being a part of the other, is also in harmony
with the rules of language. It is the use of Islam for submission with the mind
as well as with word and deed ; while using belief (iman) for a part of Islam, namely acceptance with the mind. This
is what we meant by the use of Islam and belief (iman)[77] as related terms, the one being a part of the
other (tadakhul). It satisfies the
rules of language with respect to both the specific application of belief (iman) and the general use of . Islam,
which is all-inclusive. [The one is specific and particular while the other is
general and universal]. It was in this sense that the Apostle used the term
belief (iman) when he replied to the question put to him as to which
type of Islam was best, thereby making it a particular aspect of Islam and a
part of it.
The use
of the two terms synonymously, thereby using the word Islam for both inward and
outward submission, would make it all submission; the same is true of belief (iman), which may be used freely and its
particular meaning extended, thereby making it general and including under it
outward [as well as inward] submission. This is quite possible because the
outward submission through word and deed is the fruit and result of inward
submission. Thus the name of a certain tree is freely used to signify both the
plant itself as well as the fruit of the plant. Similarly the signification of
the term belief may be extended so as to become general, thereby Making it
synonymous with the term Islam and in exact agreement with it. It was in this
sense that Allah used the words, “But we found not in it but.one family of
Muslims.” (51:36)
The
third consideration deals with the legal rules which govern the two terms.
Islam and belief (iman) have two functions, one which pertains to the
hereafter (ukhrawi) and one which
pertains to this world (dunyawi).
The
function which pertains to the hereafter is for the purpose of bringing men
forth from Hell fire and preventing them from remaining there for ever. The
Apostle of Allah said, “Whoever hath in his heart the weight of an atom of
belief will be brought forth from Hell fire.”[78] People
disagreed concerning this function and concerning its fulfillment, and have
asked what things comprised belief ([man). Some have taught that it is simply
an inward adherence ('aqd bi'l-qalb) and
verbal confession (shahadah bi'l-lisan). Others
add a third element, works according to the pillars [of Islam].
We
shall then draw the veil off and declare that there is no disagreement at all
that anyone who combines in himself all these three elements will have his
final abode in Paradise. This is the- first degree.
The
second degree is that where a person has the first two elements and a part of
the third, namely inward adherence and verbal confession together with some
works [according to the pillars of Islam], but commits one or several [ mortal
] sins (kaba’ir). According to the
Mu‘tazilites, the person [by committing such mortal sins] departs from the
true belief (iman) but does not
thereby become an unbeliever. He simply becomes a reprobate (fasiq). [He
is neither a believer nor an unbeliever] but occupies an intermediary position
between the two, and will remain eternally in. Hell fire. This,
however, is false as we shall show.
The
third degree is where the person fulfils the inward adherence and verbal
confession but fails to perform the works (according to the pillars of Islam].
Men have disagreed concerning it. Abu-Talib al-Makki held that works were a
part of belief (iman) and the latter
is incomplete without them. He also claimed that consensus[79] (ijma‘) back his position and cited in its support
proofs and evidence which tend to prove the contrary, such as the words of
Allah when He said. “Those who believe and do the things that are right.” (2:
23,76,277) This quotation would indicate that works are something over and
above belief (iman) rather than a
part of it. Otherwise the reference to works would be a, repetition,
which is redundant.
It is
strange that Abu-Talib al-Makki should claim the support of consensus [80] for this position of his and yet relate the
following tradition, “No one would be declared an unbeliever unless he should
deny what he hath professed,” and finds fault with the Mu‘tazilites because they
insist that a person who commits a mortal sin will remain eternally in
Hellfire. Yet he who holds such views holds the same views the Mu‘tazilites
hold, since if he were asked whether or not a person, who accepted Islam with
his heart and testified with his tongue thereto and then died would be in
Paradise, he would necessarily say 'Yes', thereby asserting that belief (irnan) could exist without works. We
would then add another question and- ask him whether or not that
person, if he had lived until the time of prayer had arrived, but neglected to
perform his prayer and died immediately after, or if he had committed
fornication and died whether or not he would remain eternally in Hell fire? If
he should answer, `Yes', he would agree with the Mu‘tazilites; but if he should
say, 'No',.it would amount to a declaration that works are neither a part of
belief (iman) itself nova prerequisite for its existence. Neither are
[105] the necessary for gaining the reward of Paradise.. But if he should say
that what he meant was that the person [would remain eternally in Hell fire ]
only if he had lived a long time without either praying or attempting any of
the works prescribed by the Law, we would are, “Exactly how long is that
period, and how many say, those good works through the neglect of which belief
is rendered worthless? How many of the mortal sine would, if committed, annul
belief?” Such a thing is impossible to determine and no one has ever. done so.
The
fourth degree is represented in the case of the person. who accepts [Islam]
inwardly with his mind but dies before either confessing it verbally with his
tongue or performing any of the works which its pillars prescribe. Would it be
said that such a person died a believer? People differ on this question. Those who
insist on verbal confession as a prerequisite of belief would say that he died
before fulfilling the conditions of belief. But this is false because the
Apostle said, “Whoever hath in his heart the weight of an atom of belief will
be brought forth from Hell fire.” This person's heart overflows with belief.;
how then would he remain eternally in Hellfire ? Furthermore when Gabriel
interrogated the Apostle concerning belief (iman), the only condition set forth was to believe (tasdiq) [i.e., verbal confession] in Allah, His
angels, His books the last day [the resurrection of the dead, the judgment, and
in the decrees of Allah, the good and the evil], as has already been mentioned.
The
fifth degree is when a person accepts [Islam] in his mind and lives long enough
to be able to confess the two words of the witness with his tongue and to know
that they are obligatory upon him, but for some reason, he does not so confess
them. It is possible that his failure to confess them with his tongue is like
his failure to pray. Concerning such a person we will say that he is a believer
not doomed to Hell fire eternally. For belief (!man) is simple acceptance (tasdiq)
and the tongue is its interpreter. It is certain, therefore, that belief
exists in its entirety ever before its verbal confession with the tongue, so
that the tongue can interpret it. This is the most plausible position, since
there is no choice but to follow the exact meaning of terms and to satisfy the
dictates of language. The Apostle said, “Whoever bath in his heart the weight
of an atom of belief will be brought forth from Hell fire”. The heart does not
becomes void of belief because of the failure of the person to fulfill the duty
of confessing that belief with the tongue, just as it does not become void of
belief because of the failure of the person to perform obligatory works. Some
men have said that to confess the two words of the witness with the tongue is
indispensable (rukn) because it is
not merely an outward expression of the inward [belief], but rather the
sealing of a contract and the commencement of a life of witness and obligation.
The first position is the more correct. In this connexion the Murji’ites[81] have
gone to the extreme, declaring. that no one who professed to be a Muslim will
ever enter Hell fire, and that a believer, even if he should sin, is sure of
salvation. We shall see to it that their position is refuted.
The
sixth degree is to say with the tongue that there is no god but Allah and that
Muhammad is the Apostle of Allah, but disbelieve it in his mind. We have no
doubt that the fate of such a person in the hereafter is with the unbelievers
and infidels, and that he will remain eternally in Hell fire. On the other hand
we are sure that in this world, the affairs of which are entrusted to imams and
governors, he will be reckoned among the Muslims, because we have no access to
his heart and have, therefore, to give him the benefit of the doubt and assume
that he adheres in his mind to what he had professed with his tongue.
We,
however, have our doubts concerning a third matter, namely the status which
exists in this world between such a person and his Allah,. in the event that
one of his relatives should die, and as a result of his relative’s death he
accepts Islam in his mind as well. Having thus accepted Islam in his mind as
well, he sounds the learned men concerning his status saying, “I did not accept
Islam with my mind, [although I had confessed it with my tongue], until my
relative died. Having fallen heir to his property. I wish to know whether or
not it is lawful for me to receive it?” Or in case he had married a Muslim
woman [while he yet disbelieved in his mind], but upon his marriage he came to
accept Islam in his mind; would he be required -to go through the
marriage contract again? These questions are controversial and leave room for
different opinions. Thus it may be said. that the decisions of this world,
whether they be manifest or hidden, depend upon -the express
confession of Islam. It may also be said that, in so far as they pertain to the
individual in his relations to other men, these decisions depend upon the
outward confession of Islam, because the mind of the individual is not known to
others besides himself and Allah. The more correct position, and Allah knows
best, is that it is unlawful for that person to receive the inheritance of his
deceased relative, and that he must go through the marriage contract a second
time.. For this reason, Hudhayfah [ibn-al-Yaman] used to stay away from the
funerals of hypocrites, and it was customary for 'Umar to follow his example
and absent himself whenever Hudhayfah did so. Nevertheless prayer over the dead
is a formal ceremonial, although it is also one 'of the acts of worship. To
guard oneself against what is unlawful is, like prayer, among the obligations
of the individual towards Allah. This is not contradictory to our saying that
inheritance is the law of Islam. Islam is surrender (istislam), in fact complete surrender is that which includes both
out ward and inward [acts]. These are doubtful problems in jurisprudence,
based upon the outward meaning of words, vague generalities, and, mechanical
analogies. Consequently no one immature in knowledge should think that he could
arrive at absolute certainty in any of these cases, although it has been
customary to cite them under those parts of scholastic theology where absolute
certainty is the desired goal. For no one who follows the common practices and
conventional formalities will ever succeed.
If you
should say, 'What then are the fallacies of the Mu‘tazilites and the
Murji’ites, and what are the proofs that their position is false ?” I would
then say that their fallacies arose from [their failure to understand] certain
generalities mentioned in the Qur’an. As to the Murji’ites, they said that no
believer would enter Hell fire, although he might commit every possible sin.
They based their position on the words of Allah. when He said, “And
whoever believeth in his Lord, need not fear either loss or wrong,” (72:13) and
again on His words when He said, “And they who believed in. Allah and His
Apostle ire the men of truth, and the witnesses in the presence of the Lord ;
they shall have their reward and their light ; but as for the infidels and
those who give the lie to Our signs, these shall be the inmates of Hell.”
(57:18) [As further evidence for their position] they quote the words of Allah
when He said, “So oft as a crowd shall be thrown into it, its keepers shall ask
them, `Came not the warner to you?' They shall say, 'Yes, there came to us one
charged with Warnings; but we treated him as a liar and said, “Nothing hath
Allah sent down. Ye are in nothing but a vast delusion”.’ ” (63:8-9) His
saying, “So oft as a crowd is thrown”, is inclusive and therefore every one who
was thrown into Hell fire must have treated the warner as a liar. [They too
quote] the words of Allah “None shall be cast to it but the most wretched,-who
bath called the truth a lie and turned their back.” (92:15-16) In this verse we
find a specification, as well as an affirmation and a negation. Again they
quote the words of Allah when He said, “To them who shall present themselves
with good works, shall be a reward beyond their desert, and they shall be
secure from terror on that day.” (27:91) But belief is the beginning
of good works. Again they quote, “And Allah loveth of doers of good.” (3:129)
Allah also said, “Verily We will not suffer the reward of him whose works were
good to perish.” (18:29) [106] But they have no proof in any of these verses,
because when belief is mentioned in them it means belief coupled with good
works. We have shown that belief is used to signify Islam, which is in
conformity with the mind, word, and deed. Supporting this interpretation are
many traditions concerning the punishment of sinners and the extent of their
penalty. Furthermore the Prophet said, “Whoever bath in his heart the weight.
of an atom of belief will be brought from Hell fire.” But how could anyone be
brought forth from Hell fire if he had not first entered therein? We also find
in the Qur’an the following words of Allah, “Truly Allah will not forgive
associating other gods with Him ; but other sins He will forgive to whom He
will.” (4:116) The fact that Allah may exempt from punishment according to His
will, signifies discrimination. He also said, “And for such as will rebel
against Allah and His Apostle is -the fire of Hell. They shall
remain therein always,-forever.” (72:24) To declare such a person an unbeliever
is, nevertheless, unjust. Allah also said, “Verily the unjust are in lasting
torment.” (42:44) And again, “And they who shall present themselves with evil
shall be flung downward on their faces into the fire.” (27:92) All these
generalities contradict theirs. Therefore it is inevitable to resort to specification
and interpretation on both sides ; especially when traditions are clear in
their pronouncements that the sinners will be punished. In fact the words of
Allah, “No one is there of you who shall not go down unto it,”[82]
(19:72) is almost an express declaration that punishment is inevitable to all,
because every believer cannot help but commit an offence. Furthermore, by the
words, “None shall be cast to it but the most wretched,-who hath called the
truth a lie and turned their back,” (92:15-16) Allah meant certain particular
men, since the appellation ‘the most wretched’ refers to a particular person.
Again in His word, “So oft as a crowd shall be thrown into it, its keepers shall ask them ...”, (67:8) Allah
meant, a special group of unbelievers. At any rate the particularization of the
general is not difficult. Because of this last verse al-Ash‘ari as well as
several other scholastics was misled into denying the general application [of
anything at all], and said that such terms must await the development of [new]
contexts which will determine and clarify their significations.
The
fallacy of the Mu‘tazilites arose from failure to understand the following
words of Allah. [They have thus failed to grasp the real meaning of]. the words
of Allah when He said, “Surely will 1 forgive him who turneth to Allah and
believeth, and worketh righteousness, and then yieldeth to righteousness;”
(20:84) and His words when He declared, “I swear by the declining day. Verily
men's lot is cast amid destruction, save those who believe and do the things
which be right.” (103:1-3) Also His words when He said, “No one is there of you who shall not go down unto it-this is a settled
decree with thy Lord,” (19:72) and added, “Then will we deliver those who-had
the fear of Allah.” (19:73) Also the words of Allah when He said, “And for such
as will rebel against Allah and His Apostle is the fire of Hell,” (72:24) as
well as every verse wherein Allah mentioned good works coupled with belief.
Also the words of Allah when He Said, “But whoever shall kill a believer of set
purpose, his recompense shall be Hell-forever shall he abide in it.” (4:95)
These generalities are also specific as is proved by the words of Allah when He
said, “But other sins He will forgive to him whom He will.” (4:116) Therefore
freedom to forgive men sins, other than the sin of polytheism, must be left to
Allah. Similarly the words of the Apostle when he said, “Whoever hath in his
heart the weight of an atom of belief will be brought forth from Hell
fire,” prove the same thing. So also do the words of Allah when He declared,
“Verily we will not suffer the reward of him whose works were good to perish;”
(18:29) and again “Verily Allah suffereth not the reward of the righteous to
perish.” (9:121) How then would Allah suffer the reward of belief itself as
well as that of good works to be lost because of one single offence? As to the
words of Allah, “But whoever shall kill a believer of set purpose,” they mean
whoever shall kill a believer because of his belief, and the words have been
revealed for that particular purpose.
You may
say, “What has already been said will lead to the conclusion that belief
obtains without good works although it is well known that the Fathers said that
belief comprises inward adherence, verbal confession and good works ; explain
to us therefore the meaning of all this.” I shall then say It is not unlikely
that good works be considered a part of belief, because they perfect and
complete it, just as it is said that the head and hands are part of man. It is
evident that a person will cease to be human if his head no longer exists; but
he will not cease to be a human being if one of his hands is lost through
amputation. Similarly both the magnificent (takbir)
and the praise (tasbih) [at the
beginning of prayer] are considered a part of prayer, although it is not
annulled with their omission. Therefore acceptance with the mind stands in
relation to belief as does the head in relation to the existence of man [in
this life], since the one depends for its existence upon the other and ceases
to exist when the. other no longer is. The remaining good works are like the
limbs of the body, some are more important than the others. The Apostle said,
“A believer is no longer a believer when he commits fornication.”[83]
Furthermore the Companions held the same opinion as the Mu‘tazilites concerning
the fact that a person ceases to be a believer when he commits the sin of
fornication. When this really means is that ,such a person is no longer a real
believer possessing a correlate and perfect belief, just as the deformed
individual whose limbs have been amputated is described as being no longer a
human being;. in other words he lacks that perfection which is beyond actual
humanity.
(A problem). You may say, “The Fathers have agreed
that belief is subject to increase and depreciation-increasing with obedience
and good works, and decreasing with disobedience and sin.” In that case I shall
say that the Fathers are just witnesses, and no one has any right to depart from
their judgment. What they have said is true ; but the important thing is to
grasp its meaning. It proves that good works are not an integral part of belief
nor a basic thing for its existence. Rather they are a superaddition (mazid) which augments belief. Both the
surplus, and the deficit exist, but nothing increases in itself. Thus it cannot
be said that man’s head is an addition or a surplus which increases his stature or size ; but his beard and corpulence are. Similarly it
is not permissible to say that prayer is augmented and increased by kneeling
and prostration ; rather it is augmented by the manner of its execution and the
usages followed therein. This, therefore, is a clear declaration that belief
as such does exist, and that once it exists, it may vary, subject to increase
and depreciation.
If you
then say that the ambiguity lies in the problem of acceptance ; how could it
increase and diminish when it is always the same? I shall then say that if
we-put aside all hypocrisy and ignore the opposition of adversaries and then
lift the veil off the exact meaning of the word, all ambiguity will be removed.
We consequently say that belief is a common noun used in [107) three different
ways.
The
first usage denotes an acceptance with the heart. (tasdiq bi'l-qalb), a belief (i'tiqad)
based on the authority of others (taqlid)
without the benefit of revelation and an open heart. This is the belief of
the common folk ; in fact it is the belief of all people except. the elite.
This belief is, as it were, a knot bound around the heart, sometimes tightened
and made stronger and sometimes loosened and made weaker, just like the knot of
any string.
Do not
consider. this unlikely but remember the tenacity of Jews in holding fast to
their doctrine, how they cannot be shaken or moved from it either by
threatening, or warning, promising or admonishing, examining or proving. The
same is true of Christians and heretics among whom exist some who can be made
to doubt with the least word, and can be made to move from their belief with
the least attraction or, threat, although, like the Jews, they do not doubt the
veracity of their own doctrine, yet they differ in the degree of their
determination. Such variations in the degree of determination do also exist in
the true belief, and good works influence the development and growth of this
determination, just as irrigation influences the growth of trees. Said Allah,
“[Whenever a Surah is sent down] ... it will increase
the belief of those who believe, [and they shall rejoice].” (9:125) And again,
“[He it is who sendeth down tranquility into the hearts of the believers] that
they might increase in belief.” (48:4) According to one tradition the Prophet
said, “Belief is subject to increase and depreciation.”[84] This
is accomplished by the influence of good works upon the heart, a thing which is
not perceived except by him who meditates over his different inner states
during the hours of worship and applies himself solely to it through the
presence of the heart at the time of inactivity and languor, as well as
realizing the variations which are inherent in devoting oneself in these
states to the articles of belief, so that the tie which binds him to his belief
might become firmer and consequently harder to undo for the person who wishes
to. loosen it with doubt. In fact if the person, who believes that the orphan
offers him the opportunity to reveal the quality of mercy, will act according
to his belief and show kindness toward the orphan, he will be assured within
himself of the real existence of mercy as well as of its manifold increase
through its active operation. Similarly if the person who believes in modesty
will, in accordance with his belief, humble himself before another person, he
will sense the quality of modesty within himself at the time he performs the
act. The same is true of all the qualities of the heart : all bodily actions
proceed from them, and then the very influence of these actions react upon
them, thereby confirming [their existence] and increasing [their strength].
This subject will be discussed in bath the Quarter on the Saving Matters of
Life and the Quarter on the Destructive Matters in Life when we take up the
relation of the inward to the outward and that of works to beliefs. This
relation is of the same nature as that of the relation between the visible
world (‘alam al-mulk) and the
invisible world (‘alam al-malakut). By the
visible world (‘alam al-mulk), which
is also called ‘alam al-shahadah, I mean the world which is perceived
by the senses; and by the invisible world (‘alam al malakut), which
is also called ‘alam al-ghayb, I mean the world which is perceived
by the light of the mind (nur
al-basirah). The heart belongs to the invisible world while the members of
the body as well as their activities belong to the visible world. The subtlety
and fineness of the interdependence 'of the two worlds have led some men to
think that they are closely connected, while others thought that there was no
world except the visible (‘alam
al-shahadah) which is made of the concrete and tangible bodies. One who has
perceived the two worlds and. realized, first their independence and then
their interdependence expressed his observation in the following manner
“The
glass was fine, the wine was clear,
Like a
single body they seemed to appear.
So
confusion spread : to some it seemed Nothing but glass; while others swore
‘This
is but wine, no glass is here’.”
Let us
go back to the main purpose of our discussion, especially since the invisible
world is outside the scope of the science of practical religion (`ilm almu‘amalah) Nevertheless the two
worlds are connected and interdependent. For this reason the science of
revelation (‘ilm al-mukashafah) extends
its scope every now and then into the realm of practical religion and does not
withdraw until it imposes some obligations. This then is how belief, in
accordance with this usage, increases through good works. For this reason `Ali
said, “Verily belief will loom as a single white spot in the heart of man. If
the man will do that which is good, the white spot will grow and spread until
the whole heart is white. On the other hand hypocrisy makes its first
appearance as a black blotch in the heart of man. If the man will do that which
is unlawful, the black blotch will grow and spread until the whole heart is
black, and blackness becomes man's second nature.” Said Allah, “Nay. But their
own works have got the mastery over their hearts.” (84:16)
The
second. usage of the term belief (iman) denotes both acceptance and
works, just as the Apostle stated when he said, “Belief comprises over seventy
divisions (sing. bab).”[85] The same thing is also seen in the words of
the Apostle when He said, “A
believer is no longer a believer when he commits fornication.” And when works
become an integral part of belief, it becomes evident that it is subject to
increase and depreciation. Does this, however, affect belief which is mere
acceptance? The question is one of opinion, and we have already stated that it
does.
The
third usage of the term belief denotes certain acceptance resulting from
revelation and an open heart as well as from seeing [ truth ] with the light of
the mind. This last is the least to lend itself to increase. I shall, however,
say that the way in which the mind accepts certain things which are free of
doubt differs. Thus the way the mind accepts the fact that two are greater than
one [ 108 ] is unlike the way it accepts the fact that the world is created and
originated, although there is not the slightest doubt of the certainty of either
fact. For the certain things differ in the degrees of their clarity and in the
degrees to which the mind accepts them. We touched on this subject in the
section on certainty (yaqin) in the
Book of Knowledge under the characteristics of the learned men of the
hereafter; therefore there is no need to go over it again. In all these usages
it became evident that what they have said concerning the increase and
depreciation of belief was true. How could it not be true when we have the
express testimony of tradition that “Whoever has in his heart the weight of an
atom of belief will be brought forth from Hell fire.” According to another
tradition, “He will be brought forth from Hell fire, who has in his heart the
weight of a dinar of belief.”[86] Why
then should the amount differ if the belief in the heart does not vary?
(A problem). You may ask, “What then have the
Fathers meant with the saying, ‘If it be the will of Allah I am a believer?’” A
qualification implies doubt, and to entertain doubts concerning the veracity of
belief amounts to unbelief. Yet all the Fathers used to refrain from giving a
definite reply concerning belief, and were extremely careful not to commit
themselves. In this connexion Sufyan al-Thawri said, “He who says, ‘I am a
believer in the sight of Allah’, is a liar; and he who says, ‘I am really a
believer’, is an innovator.” But how can he be a liar when he himself. knows
that he is a believer? For he who is a believer in himself is a believer in the
sight of Allah, just as he who is big[87] and
generous in himself and is aware of this fact, will be big and generous in the
sight of Allah. The same is true of him who is likewise glad, or sad, or
hearing, or seeing. On the other hand if man were asked whether or not he was
an animal it would not be fitting for him to reply, “.If it be the will of
Allah, I am an animal.” When Sufyan made this statement he was asked, “What
then shall we say?” Thereupon he replied, “We believe in Allah, and that which
hath been sent down to us.” (2:130) And what is the difference between saying,
“We believe in Allah and that which hath been sent down to us” and saying, “I
am a believer?”
Once
upon a time al-Hasan [al-Basri ] was asked, “Art thou a believer?” al-Hasan
which he replied, “If it be the will of Allah.” Thereupon he was told, “O
Abu-Sa’id ? Why do you qualify your belief?” He answered and said, “I fear
saying, ‘Yes’, and then Allah will say, ‘Thou hast lied, Hasan.’ Then I shall
rightly merit His punishment.” He also used to say, “I fear that Allah may find
out that I have done something abominable to Him and will consequently abhor me
and say, ‘Go away. I accept none of thy works.’ Then I shall be toiling in
vain.”
Ibrahim
ibn-Adham once said, “Whenever you are asked, ‘Are you a believer?’ say, ‘There
is no god but Allah’.” At another time he said, “Say, ‘I do not doubt belief;
your question to me is an innovation’.”
‘Alqamah[88] was
once asked, “Are you a believer? To which he replied, “I do hope so. If it be
the will of Allah.”
[Sufyan
I al-Thawri said, “We believe in
Allah and in His angels, books, and apostles. But we do not know what we are in
the sight of Allah.”
[You
may ask all this and say], “What then is the meaning of all these
qualifications?” The answer to your question is that these qualifications are
correct and are put forward for four reasons, two of which arise from doubt,
not of the reality of belief itself, but of its end and perfectness; and two do
not arise from doubt at all.
The
first reason which does not arise from any doubt at all is the care not to be
decisive for fear of self-justification (tazkiyat
al-nafs) and making one's self out to be pure. Said Allah, “Assert not your
own purity.” (62:33) And again, “Hast thou not marked those who hold themselves
to be righteous?”(4:52) And again, “Behold how they devise a lie of
Allah.”(4:53)
A
certain wise man was once asked, “What is detestable truth?” He replied, “Man’s
praise of himself.” Belief is one of the highest forms of praise and to be
definitely certain of it amounts to absolute justification. The formula of
qualification (i.e, if it be the will of Allah) is nothing but an attempt to
temper and tone down such justification, just as when the man is told that he
is a physician, or a jurisprudent, or a commentator, he will say, “If it be the
will of Allah,” not because he doubts the fact but simply to avoid being
boastful. This formula is that of disavowing and disclaiming the fact itself
and means disclaiming one of the implications of the fact which is [self-]
justification. Following this interpretation, when the person is asked
concerning something uncomplimentary, it will not be fitting for him to put
forth any such qualification.
The
second reason for the use-of these qualifications is courtesy (ta'addub) by remembering Allah at every
time and under all conditions, and by submitting all things unto His. Will:
Thus Allah instructed His Prophet in courtesy and said to him, “Say not thou of
a thing, ‘I will surely do it tomorrow;’ without, ‘if it be the will of
Allah’.” (18:23) Nor has Allah limited [the use of the qualifying phrase] to
those things the occurrence of which is subject to doubt. On the contrary He
said, “Ye shall surely enter the sacred mosque, if it be the will of Allah, in
full security, having your heads shaved and your hair cut: ye shall not fear;”
(48:27) although He had full knowledge that they were to enter undoubtedly
therein and that He had willed their entrance. What Allah had meant was to
instruct the Prophet in the use of the qualifying formula. Consequently the
Prophet learned the lesson and showed his courtesy by the use of that formula
in connexion with everything he had said-whether that thing was known with
certainty or doubtful; so that when he entered the cemetery, he said, “Peace be
upon you, the believing inmates of this abode.. Verily, if it be the will of
Allah, we shall follow you.”[89] This
he said, notwithstanding the fact that death is not subject to any doubt,
because courtesy demands that Allah be always remembered and that all things be
made dependent upon Him. This formula indicates such a thing and has become, by
virtue of its common use, representative of the expression of desires and
wishes. Thus when you are told that such and such a person is about to die and
should happen to say, “If it be the will of Allah,” you betray your desire and
not your doubt. The same is true when you are told that a certain person will
recover from his sickness and you say, “If it be the will of Allah,” by way of
expressing your earnest desire. The phrase has thus been transferred from one
expressing doubt to one which signifies desire. In the same way also is its
transfer to express courtesy and respect for remembering Allah under all
conditions.
The
third reason for the use of those qualifications arises from doubt [109] and
means, “If it be the will of Allah, I am truly a believer,” since Allah spoke
of some particular men as being truly believers. (8:4) Consequently believers
are divided into two groups: [those who are described as truly believers and those
who are not]. This arises from doubt concerning the perfection of belief and
not its reality. Every person doubts the perfectness of his belief, yet this
doubt does not constitute unbelief. Doubting the perfectness of belief is right
and justified for two reasons: The first is because hypocrisy militates against
the perfectness of belief; and hypocrisy is something hidden while freedom from
it is 'readily discerned or determined. The second is because belief is
perfected through the fulfillment of good works which are not known to exist in
their perfect form.
As to
works Allah said, “The true believers are those only who believe in Allah and
His Apostle, and afterwards doubt not; and who contend with their substance and
their persons for the cause of Allah these are the truthful.” (49:15) The
doubt would, therefore, be concerning this truthfulness. Similarly Allah said,
“But righteousness is to believe in Allah, and the last day, and the angels,
and the Book, and the prophets.” (2:172) Thus Allah laid down twenty qualities,
such as the fulfillment of promises and fortitude under hardships, as
conditions for belief, and then Said [of those who possess them], “These are
they who are true.” (2:172) Allah also said, “Allah will raise those of you who
believe, and those to whom knowledge is given, to lofty grades.” (58:12) And
again He said, “Those among you who contributed before the victory, and fought,
shall be differently treated from certain other among you.” (57:10) He also
said, “They are of varying ranks before Allah.” (3:157)
The
Apostle said, “Belief is like unto a nude who should be clothed with piety.”[90] And
again, “Belief comprises over seventy divisions, the least of which is to clear
the road of obstacles.”[91] This shows the dependence of the perfectness
of belief on good works. Its dependence on freedom from hypocrisy and concealed
polytheism is shown by the words of the Apostle when he said, “Four things, if
they obtain in a person make him an utter hypocrite, no matter how much he
prays, and fasts, and claims that he is a believer; he who lies when he speaks,
breaks a promise when he pledges his word, betrays a confidence when he is
trusted, and deviates from justice when he enters a controversy.”[92] According to another version “And when he
makes a compact with his neighbor, he defrauds him.”[93]
A
tradition related on the authority of Abu-Sa`id al-Khudri, says, “The hearts
.are of four kinds : a sealed heart, which is the heart of the unbeliever ; a
double-faced heart, which is the heart of the hypocrite; a clean heart from the
midst of which a radiant lamp sheds its radiant light; and a heart which
contains some belief and some hypocrisy. The belief it contains is like unto
the vegetable which receives its nourishment from fresh waters. The hypocrisy
it contains is like unto an ulcer which feeds on pus and blood, whichever of
the two substances will prevail will determine its fate.”[94]
According to another version “whichever will prevail will seal his doom.” The
Apostle also said, “The worst hypocrites of this people are its Qur’an
readers.”[95]
According to another tradition, “Polytheism among my people is more subtle than
the creeping of the ant on the rock.”[96]
Hudhayfah
said, “At the time of the Apostle there were things which made the man who
repeated them a-hypocrite as long as he lived. Now, however, I hear
these same things repeated ten times a day, [and no one seems to mind].”[97] A
certain learned man said, “The person closest to hypocrisy is he who deems
himself free thereof.” Hudhayfah also said, “Hypocrites are more numerous
today than they were at the time of the Prophet. At that, time, they
used to conceal their hypocrisy; now they [ are not ashamed to ] reveal it.”[98] Such
hypocrisy militates against the reality of belief as well as against its perfectness.
It is something concealed and subtle: the farthest removed from it are those
who are constantly afraid of it, while those who deem
themselves free of it are they who are nearest to it:
Al-Hasan
al-Basri was once told, “There is. No more hypocrisy nowadays.”. To which he
replied, “Brother ! Were the hypocrites to, perish from the land you would feel
lonely on the way.” Again either. al-Hasan himself or someone else said, “Were
tails to grow [by a miracle) on the backs of the hypocrites and trail behind
them, our feet would no longer be able to touch the earth.
Once
upon a time Ibn-‘Umar, on hearing a man speak disparagingly of al-Hajaj,[99] told
him, “Would you speak disparagingly of him if he were here present?” The man
answered, “No.” Thereupon Ibn-‘Umar said, “We used to consider this
hypocritical at the time of the Apostle. The Apostle said, ‘He who is
double-tongued in this world will, in the hereafter, be made double tongued by
Allah’.” The Apostle also said, “The worst man is the double-faced who meets
one people with one face and another people with another face.”
Al-Hasan
al-Basri was once told, “There are some who say that they do not fear
hypocrisy.” Thereupon he answered, “By Allah, I would rather be sure that I am
free of hypocrisy than have all the world’s contents [110] gold.” Al-Hasan
also said, “Among the different. kinds of hypocrisy are the disagreements
between the tongue and the heart, between the secret and the public, and
between the entrance and the exit.”
A
certain person told Hudhayfah, “Verily I fear I am a hypocrite.” To which
Hudhayfah replied, “Fear not. If you were a hypocrite you would not have feared
hypocrisy. Verily hypocrisy does not fear hypocrisy.”
Ibn-abi-Mulaykah
said, “I have known one hundred and thirty [and according to another version
one hundred and fifty] of the Companions of the Prophet, all of whom feared
hypocrisy.”
It was
related that the Apostle of Allah was once sitting with a group of his
Companions who were discussing a certain man and praising him to the skies.
Suddenly, while they were in the midst of their discussion, the man himself
appeared before them with his face still wet with the water of ablution,
carrying his shoes in his hands and his forehead covered with dust from prayer.
Thereupon they said to the Apostle “Behold. This is the man whom we were
discussing.” The Prophet, turning to them, said, “I see on his face the mark of
Satan.” Then the man arrived and, after greeting the group, sat in their midst.
The Prophet then addressed him and said, “Tell me, I beseech thee by Allah,
hast thou not said to thyself when thou approached the group that there was no
one among them who was better than thee?” The man replied. “O my Allah I Yes, I
have.”
In his
prayer the Apostle said, “O Allah, I seek refuge in thee against the evil of
things I did. and things I left undone.”[100] He was
then told, “Art thou afraid O Apostle of Allah?” To which he replied, “What
could make me feel secure when the. heart lie between two of the fingers of the
Merciful [Allah], and He doeth with them what He willeth?”[101] Said
Allah, “And there shall appear to them, from Allah, things they have never
reckoned on.” (39:48) This was interpreted in
commentaries to mean that men have done things which they thought were good but
[on the day of judgment] these things appeared in the balance in the scale of
evil.
[Al-]
Sari al-Saqati once said, “If a person enters a garden containing trees of
every kind and on these are birds of every kind, and then each bird calls to
him in a different language saying, ‘Peace be upon thee, O friend of Allah’,
and as a result he feels very well pleased and satisfied, he becomes a captive
in their hands.” These traditions and narratives reveal to you the gravity of
the matter, particularly because of the subtle nature of hypocrisy and hidden
polytheism, and bring out the fact that no one can be safe against them. This
led 'Umar ibn-Khattab to ask Hudhayfah about himself-whether or not he was
numbered among the hypocrites.
Abu-Sulayman
al-Darani said, “I heard a certain governor say something and I wanted to
express my disapproval of it but feared lest he order me to be killed. And
although I feared not death I was afraid lest I be tempted to boast before men
when my spirit departs. For this reason I refrained from expressing my
disapproval of the governor's words.
This
kind of hypocrisy militates against the truth, perfectness, and purity of
belief, rather than against its reality. For hypocrisy is of two kinds: The one
results in parting with religion, pursuing infidels and joining the company of
those who are deemed eternally to Hell fire; the second leads the person to
Hell fire for a certain period of time and puts him down from the lofty heights
of Paradise (‘illiyun)[102] and denotes the saints from their exalted
ranks. It is a field open to doubt and therefore it is desirable to resort to
the use of qualifications therein. This kind of hypocrisy rises from the
disparity and disagreement between the secret and the public, from feeling
secure from the deep counsel of Allah,[103] and
from conceit and other things from which only the saints are free.
The
fourth reason for the use of these qualifications arises also. from doubt. It
is the fear of the end, for no one knows whether or not he will still have any
belief at the hour of death. If he should end with unbelief all his previous
works would come to naught and fail, because [the value of these works] depends
entirely upon their good ending. Thus if a fasting person were asked early in
the day concerning the validity of his 'fast and replied, “I am surely
fasting,” but later in the day he broke his fast, it would become evident that
he was lying since the validity of his fast depends upon the maintenance of the
fast until sunset at the end of the day. And just as the day is the set period
for the fulfillment of fasting, so the lifetime is the set period for the
fulfillment of the validity of belief. To describe it as valid before its
conclusion simply because it has already been fulfilled in part is very doubtful
and its end is frightful. It was because of the end that most of the [Allah-]
fearing have wept. For the end is the outcome of a pre-ordained event and the
result of the eternal will which does not become known except when the
pre-ordained event itself takes place and which no human being can ever tell.
The fear of the end is the result of the fear of that which was pre-ordained
and there may appear in the present a thing which will give the lie to the
words, [“I am a believer”]. And who can be sure that he is one of those for
whom Allah has preordained good things? (21:101) It has been said that the
words of Allah, “Allah the stupor of death cometh upon him,” (50:18) mean that
the pre-ordained thing [has been fulfilled] and made known. One of the Fathers
said that works would be judged by their ends. Abu-al-Darda’ used to swear by
Allah saying, “There is no one who feels safe in his belief who is not robbed
of it.” It was also said that some sinful deeds were not punished except by
their sad ends. We seek refuge in Allah against such deeds and such
punishments. It has also been said that such punishments await those who
falsely claim sainthood and the gift of miracles (karamah).
One of the
gnostics once said, “If I were given the choice between martyrdom at the outer
gate of the house and death as a true believer at the door of an inner room, I
would, choose the latter because I do not know what might occur to me and
divert my heart from true belief on my way [from the inner room] to the outer
gate [111] of the house.” Another said, “If I had known a certain person to
have been a true believer for the last fifty years and then, even though so
frail a thing as a pole should hide him from my sight before his death, I could not be sure that he died a true believer.”
According
to one condition, “Whoever says, 'I am a believer', is an infidel; and whoever
says, ‘I am learned’, is ignorant.”[104] In the
interpretation of the words of the Allah, “And the words of thy Lord are
perfect in truth and in justice,” (6:115)it has been said that ‘perfect in
truth’ relates to those who died in belief and ‘perfect injustice’, to those
who died in polytheism. Allah also, said, “And the final issue of all things is
unto Allah.” (22:42) A No matter how little doubt may be in such cases the
resort to qualification is obligatory. since belief is a means of grace for the
hereafter just as fasting is a means off grace for absolving the heart from
guilt in this life. Whatever fast is rendered void before sunset is no longer a
fast and will not absolve from guilt. The same thing is true of belief. In fact
a person may be asked about a previous fast concerning which there is no
doubt. He will be asked, “Have you fasted yesterday?” and he will reply.
“Yes,
if it were the will of Allah.” For genuine fasting is the only acceptable
fasting and the acceptable fasting is unknown except to Allah. For this reason
it is desirable to use the qualification (istithna),
if it be the will of Allah, in all the works of righteousness. This will
imply doubt as to their acceptance [by Allah], since such acceptance, despite
the outward fulfillment of all the prerequisites of validity, may be blocked by
hidden cause unknown except to Allah, the Lord of Lords of the mighty majesty.
Hence it is desirable to entertain some doubts concerning the validity [of
belief as well as all the works of righteousness].
These,
therefore, are the different reasons for the desirability of qualifying one’s
assertion of his belief, and with them we conclude the Book on the foundations
of the a Articles of Faith.
Here ends the Book.
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[1] Literally through ingress (hulul) and egress (intiqat).
[2] Cf. al-Tirmidhi, Jana’iz : 70.
[3] Cf. al-Tirmidhi,
Qiyamah:14-15.
[4] A river in Paradise. Cf. Surah 108.
[5] Cf. al-Tirmidhi,
Tafsir, Surah 2:9.
[6] The translator used “Lord” ed.
[7] See Book II, Sect. 1.
[8] Yunus al-Sadafi, A.H. 264/A D. 877-78. See Ibn Khallikan, Vol, III, pp.
548-51.
[9] Al-Fihrist, p. 120 ; al-Shahrastani, Kitab al-Milal w-al-Nihal,
ed. William Cureton (London, 1842), pp. 19, 63.
[10] Abu ‘Ali a3-Hasan ibn-Muhammad al-Sabbah, A H. 269/A.D. 874. See ibn-Khallikan, vol I. p. 229; cf
al-Sam‘ani, f. 275a.
[11] Abu 'Abdallah al-Harith ibn-Asad al-Muhasibi, A.H. 243/A D. 857. See al-Fihirist, p. 184;
ibn-Khallikan. Vol. I p. 224. Also Margaret Smith, An Early Mystic of
Baghdad (London, 1935).
[12] The title of work is al Radd’
ala.al-Mu‘tazilah -(On the
Refutation of the Mu‘tazilah.) See
Fihrist, p.184, l.17.
[13] A means of purification which is a religious ditty for every Muslim who
has attended to the call of nature. It is elaborately described in the
tradition : cf. al-Dirimi, Salah;10-13; ibn-Majah. Taharah: 15-16.
[14] Cf. al-Tirmidhi, Farad'id : 2; ibn-Mijah, Fara'id
:1.
[15] See also 21:24, 17:69, and 28:75
[16] The full translation is as follows: 026.023 Pharaoh said: “And what is the ‘Lord
and Cherisher of the worlds’?” 026.024
(Moses) said: “The Lord and Cherisher of the heavens and the earth, and
all between,- if ye want to be
quite sure.” 026.025 (Pharaoh)
said to those around: “Did ye not listen (to what he says)?” 026.026 (Moses) said: “Your Lord and the Lord
of your fathers from the beginning!” 026.027 (Pharaoh) said: “Truly your apostle who has been sent to you
is a veritable madman!”
026.028 (Moses) said: “Lord of the
East and the West, and all between! if ye only had sense!” 026.029
(Pharaoh) said: “If thou dost put forward any god other than me, I
will certainly put thee in prison!”
026.030 (Moses) said: “Even if I
showed you something clear (and) convincing?” Source:
(http://www.islam101.com/Qur’an/Qur’anYusuf/026.q)
[17] Ar. Yawam al-Jamal, 10 Jumada II, A.H. 36 Dec. 4, A.D. 656. The day
when ‘Ali won a decisive victory against the armies of Talhah and al-Zubayr,
‘A’isha, who aided with the rebels against ‘Ali, watched the battle on a camel,
hence the name of the day. She was captured but ‘Ali treated her with great
deference. See Tabari, Vol. I, pp. 3108-3233.
[18] Cf. Surah 33.
[19] The incident is related in full in Hilyat
al-Awliya', Vol.1, pp. 318-20, where the number of those who surrendered
is given as twenty thousand.
[20] The Qadarites denied absolute predestination and believed in free will
(qadar-power). Cf. Sharastani, pp. 29.31;
al-Baghdadi, al-Farq bayn al-Firaq, ed. Muhammad Badr (Cairo,
1910), pp. 18, 93 sag ; Mukhtesar al-Farq
bayn Firaq, ed. P. K. Hitti
(Cairo, 1924), pp. 95 seq; al-Nawbakhti.
Firaq al-Shi'ah, ed. H. Ritter (Istanbul, 1931). p. 5.
[21] Ibn-Sa'd, Vol. VII, Pt. 2, p.152.
[22] A period after the conclusion of a bargain during which either of the
parties may cancel the transaction. Cf. ibn Majah, Tijarat : 13, 18 ;
al-Darimi, Buyu‘ :16-18.
[23] Lit. a school of Islamic
jurisprudence, i.e. one of the four prevalant sunni schools: Hanafi, Shafi‘i,
Malaki, or Hanabli. (Ed.)
[24] The Jerusalem Epistle, so called because it was written in Jerusalem,
comprises Section III of this Book; see below, p. 53.
[25] Printed in Cairo, A. H. 1327. [This book was also partially translated and
available on the www.ghazali.org site. (ed.)]
[26] What the scholastic theologians call propensity (i'timad) the philosophers call tendency (nays), both terms being
loosely used. See Dict, of Tech. Terms.
[27] Sing. Kawn.
[28] Sing, idrak.
[29] This term has been mistranslated
here. The translator had (holy war). Imam Ghazali is using Jihad in the
sense of Qital (war, fighting). The term encompases many actions which
include Qital fi sabeel ‘Allah (Fighting for the sake of Allah) as well
as struggling with your self to overcome desire, etc. (Ed.)
[30] A term used in Jurisprudence. It
means an obligation until fullfiled. Where the action is obligatory on everyone
until someone fullfils it then it no longer is obligatory. An example of this
is teaching Islam, it is obligatory on everyone to learn and teach Islam until
a teacher is found then it is not obligatory on everyone so long as the teacher
fullfils his duties. (Ed.)
[31] Lit. the acts that obligatory
until fullfiled by someone. (Ed.)
[32] The translator used Fathers.(ed.)
[33] Note that this term has the same
root as the word jihad. (Ed.)
[34] Al-Tirmidhi, Zuhd : 9; al-Darimi, Riqaq : 26; ibn.Majah, Zuhd :19.
[36] Cf. Surah 17:87 ; al-Bukhari, Tafsir Surah bani-Isra'il [17 also called
a-Isra’]:12.
[37] Cf. Ibn-Majah, Intro. 13; 18-19.
[38] Abu-al-Husayn Ahmad ibn Yahya ibn-Ishaq, one of the three arch-heretics
of Islam. the other two being abu-Hayyan al-Tawhidl and abu-al-'Ala'
al-Ma'arri. The date of al-Rawandi's death is variously given in the sources
but most probably he died around A.H. 250/A. D. 864. Cf. al-Fihrist, p.108 ; al-Mas'adi, Muraj al-Dhahab, ed. and tr. into French by C.B. de Meynard and P.
de Courteille (Paris. 1866-77). Vol. VII, p. 237 ; ibn.Khallikan. Vol. 1, pp.
47-48. Shadhart al-Dhahab, Vol. II, pp. 235.36.
For his beliefs see al-Ashari. Maqalat
al-Islamiyin wa-Ikhtlaafat al-Masalin, ed. H. Ritter (Istanbul, 1929-30).
pp.140.41,149.159.60, 352, 388, 422-24, 28,445-46.
[39] Al-Darimi. Salah, : 72 ; al-Tirmidhi. Jum‘ah: 56.
[40] The verse is by abu-Tammam, the great poet and anthologist; d. A.H.
231/A.D. 845-46. See al-Aghani, Vol.
XV, pp. 100-108; ibn-Khallikan. Vol. 1. pp. 214-18.
[41] The system of Muslim orthodoxy developed by abu’l Hasan 'Ali al-Ash'ari
and hence the name. Al-Ashari died around A.H. 330/ A.D. 941-42. For his life
and works al-Fihrist. p. 181; ibn-Khallikan, Vo:. I, pp. 586.87. For his
System see al-Shahrastani, pp. 65-75. [There are many articles found on the
muslimphilosophy.com site on ‘Asharism, al-‘Ashari and Mu’tazilah. Ed.]
[42] Maqalat al-Islamiyin, pp.
155-278.
[43] Eventhough the position of a
majority of Muslim scholars that it was a journey with both body and soul,
there are those who do belive that it was only a journey of the soul. See The
Message of the Qur’an by Muhammad Asad, Appendix 2. (ed.)
[44] Imam al-Ghazali aruged against
these ideas in his work Tahfut al-Falaisfah (Incoherence of the
Philosophers), also available on the ghazali.org site in Arabic, and an English
translation. A more recent (1999) translation was rendered by M. Marmura. A
lesser treatment is offered in his semi autobiography al-Munqidh min
al-Dalal (Deliverence from Error) widley available on the net as well as
ghazali.org (ed.)
[45] The translator translated salaf
as (Fathers) ed.
[46] Words In brackets are in 'C' only.
[47] The poet is the famous al-Akhtal, Ghiyath ibn-Ghawth, ca A.H. 95/A.D. 714. See al-Aghani, Vol.
VII, pp: 169-188; ibn Qutaybaa, al-Shi'r wal-Shu’ara ed. M. J. de Geoje. (Leyden,1902-4). pp. 301.12 ; Shi'r al-Akhtal, ed. A Salhini (Beirut. 1891),
pp. 333-400.
[48] Ibn-Marwan ibn-al-Hakam; Umayyad governor of al-Basrah and al-Kufah ; ca
A.H. 75 A D 695. See Ibn-Qutaybah, al-Ma'arif, p. 180; al-Tabari, Vol. II, p.
852; Shadharat al-Dhahab, Vol. I. p.
83.
[49] Shi’r. Al-Akhtal, p. 390.
[50] Word is unclear in the book
(ed.)
[51] The Sabians. Ar. al-Sabi'ah, mentioned
in the Qur’an three times (2, 5:73; 22:17). were identical with the Mandeans, a
Judeo-Christian sect who also called themselves Nasoraie d’ Yahya, the Nasoreans (i e., the observants)
of St. John, and therefore became erroneously known to the modern world as the
Christian of St. John (the Baptist), They practiced the rite of baptism after
birth, before marriage, and at various other occasions. Evidently Muhammad
regarded them as believer in the true God.
[52] Al-Bukhari, Manaqib al-Ansar :
35; al-Tirmidhi, Fitan: 20.
[53] A very common tradition although it is not found in the various
collection of hadith. [The translator here is alluding to the six canonical works (Sihah al-sita), ed.]
[54] Cf. 7:173-174
[55] Al-Bukhari, Manaqib: 25.
[56] The Holy Qur’an (17:90)
[57] The translator has used Greeks?
(ed.)
[58] Al-Bukhari, Bad'al-Khalq : 27; al-Tirmidhi, Fitan : 21, 42. Qiyamah: 3.
[59] Al-Tirmidhi, Jana’iz: 70.
[60] Cf. al-Darimi,
Isti’dhan:10.
[61] Al-Tirmidhi, Jana‘iz: 70.
[62] Muslim, Jannah: 67.
[63] The reference here is to Shi‘ites who reject the doctrine of election and
hold that 'Ali was clearly and directly designated by Muhammad as his
successor. They find support in the hadith in which the Prophet tells ‘Ali that
the relation between them was the same as that which existed between Moses and
Aaron. See al-Bukhari. Fada'il Ashab an-Nabi; 10; al-Tirmidhi. Maniqib :19.20.
[64] The term is used here in its loose application to the Shi’itee in
general. [The term literally means rejecters i.e those who did accept the
caliphate except ‘Ali (RA) and Hadith ed. ]
[65] Cf. Tayalisi : 31.
[66] Cf. Al-Mwardi, al-Akham
al-Sultaniyah, ed. M. Enger (Bonn, 1153), pp. 3-7.
[67] Al-Bukhari, Ahkam : 2 : al-Tirmidhi, Fitan : 49.
[68] Cf. Abu-Talib
al-Makki, Qut-al-Qulub (Cairo, 135l),
Vol. III, pp. 183-205.
[69] Al-Bukhari, Iman :1. These five are the witness (al-shahadah), prayer (salah).
almsgiving (zakah). Pilgrimage (hajj), and fasting (sawm).
[70] Al-Bukhari, Iman : 40.
[71] Cf. Al-Tabari, Jami‘
al-Bayan, Vol. XXVI, pp. 89-91.
[72] Al-Bukhari, Iman : 37.
[73] Al-Bukhari, Iman : 37.
[74] Al-Nisa’i, Iman: 7.
[75] Cf. Al-Nisa’i, Iman: 1,11.
[76] See above. p.102. [just a few paragraphs above. ed.]
[77] the text reads (Inam) which is a typo. ed.
[78] Cf. Al-Bukhari, Iman :13; al-Tirmidhi, Fitan :17.
[79] The translator used ‘catholic consent’ ed.
[80] The translator used ‘catholic consent’ to translate the
original Arabic Ijma’ which means consensus. ed.
[81] The
Murji'ites' fundamental doctrine consisted in the suspension (irja') of judgment against believers
who commit sin.. They refused to declare a person an infidel because, to them,
the fact that he was nominally a Muslim sufficed. More specifically they
refused to see in the suppression of religious law by the Ummayad caliphs a
justifiable Cause for denying that house the homage due them as the do facto rulers of Islam. See Ibn-Hazam,
al-Fasl fi al-Milal w-al-Ahwa' w-al-Nihal
(Cairo, 1347-48), Vol. II, p. 89; Mukhtasar al-Fanq bayn al-Firaq, pp. 122-23.
[82] See also Jami‘ al-Bayan,
Vol. XVI, pp. 81-87.
[83] Al-Bukhari, Mazalim: 31, Hudud ;1,19 ; ibn Majah, Fitan :3
[84] Ibn-Majah, Intro 9. ; cf. al-Bukhari, Iman : 33; al-Tirmidhi, Imin; 6.
[85] Cf. Al-Bukhari, Iman : 2 ; ibn-Majah. Intro. 9.
[86] Cf. Al-Bukhari, Riqaq: 35, 51; abu-Dawud, Libas: 26.
[87] Arabic tawil, lit. tall.
[88] Ibn-Qays A.H. 621A.D. 681-82. See ibn-Sa‘d, Vol. 6, pp. 57-62.
[89] Muslim, Jana’iz;103,104.
[90] Unidentified.
[91] Cf. Al-Bukhari, Iman : 2 ; ibn-Majah. Intro. 9.
[92] Al-Bukhari, Iman : 24.
[93] Al-Tirmidhi, Iman ;14.
[94] Unidentified.
[95] Unidentified.
[96] Unidentified.
[97] Unidentified.
[98] Al-Tayalisi: 410.
[99] Ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi A.H. 95/A.D. 714, the great Umayyad governor. For his life see Ibn-Qutaybah, pp. 201-202; Ibn-Khallikan Vol. I. pp. 218-224.
[100] Ibn-Majah, Du’a’ :3. al-Nasa’i, Isti‘adhah : 57, 58.
[101] Al-Tirmidhi, Da‘awat : 88.
[102] Cf. Qur’an 83 :18-19 ; Gen. xiv: 18. Evidently from Heb.
[103] Cf. Qur’an 7 : 97.
[104] Unidentified.
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