

In conclusion, my comments do not reflect a negative appraisal of Genequand's work. Genequand's scholarship is impeccable, and he provides an excellent translation of this work, which will certainly be of great value to Classicists and Graeco-Arabists alike. Anyone interested in the thought of Alexander, and later Greek philosophy and science generally, as well as Islamicists interested in the Greek sources that so influenced Arabic philosophy will find Genequand's contribution a must read.

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Al-Ghazālī's Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul: Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Ihyā'. By TIMOTHY J. GIANOTTI. Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, vol. 104. Leiden: BRILL, 2001. Pp. 205. \$76.

Analyzing al-Ghazālī's religious doctrine is a task with many obstacles. One of the most daunting is the fact that al-Ghazālī wrote different things for different readers. By now it is well established that al-Ghazālī consciously divided his works into several different levels of instruction, distinguished by the amount of insight that he reveals therein. He assumed that people fall into different classes according to their understanding of doctrinal matters and he tailored his works accordingly. In a well-known passage at the very end of his book *Mizān al-ʿamal*—later famously quoted by Ibn Ṭufayl—al-Ghazālī seems to subscribe to a broad characterization of three levels of teachings (*madhāhib*). The first are those teachings that one clings to while in scholarly competition and controversy, the second those teachings that one whispers during teaching sessions and instructions, and the third those theological views that one has become convinced of within one's own soul. (*Mizān al-ʿamal*, ed. Sulaymān Dunya [Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1964], 406.) Since scholars have become aware of this obstacle they have developed strategies to tackle it. Most successful has been the decision to search for those texts in which al-Ghazālī presents his teachings on the highest level. Given the possibility that none of his books contains the third level of teachings, these books would still be the most elaborate available and hopefully present a non-contradictory and comprehensive system of thought. The results of such an inquiry could then in a further step be compared to the teachings in his more basic books and the assumed figurative language therein deciphered. An attempt to accomplish the first step of this approach is, for instance, Richard M. Frank's *Creation and the Cosmic System* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1992) in which Frank analyzes the cosmological views in the *Maqṣad al-ʿasnā*, the *Mishkāt al-anwār*, the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, and other works. Frank, however, puts little emphasis on al-Ghazālī's textbook of *kalām*, *al-Iqtisād fi l-iʿtiqād*, and, in deciphering its language, comes to the conclusion that it is almost deceptive on the issue of God's creation as the best of all possible worlds (pp. 63–77), a view held by al-Ghazālī but rejected by most *mutakallimūn*. In a number of articles, Michael E. Marmura complements Frank's approach and focuses on the *Iqtisād*, thus implicitly assuming that this is the key work that leads to a better understanding of lower levels of al-Ghazālī's writings. The fact that the two come to different conclusions illustrates the limitations of the method of focusing on a selected group of al-Ghazālī's works.

In his study on al-Ghazālī's teachings on the soul, Timothy J. Gianotti, a student of Marmura, does not follow the strategy of either his teacher or of Frank. He chooses the textual basis of his analysis among the forty books of al-Ghazālī's *Ihyā' ʿulūm al-dīn*, complementing it with additional material from the *Iqtisād* and the *Tahāfut*. Al-Ghazālī himself acknowledges that the *Ihyā'* was written for a wider readership than, for instance, his *Maqṣad al-ʿasnā*, *Mishkāt al-anwār*, or *al-Iqtisād fi l-iʿtiqād*. Gianotti is well aware that there are various levels in al-Ghazālī's writings—he calls them "types of discourses" (p. 8)—and that the *Ihyā'* is limited in its goal (p. 123). He must have seen the problems his analysis runs into. He attempts to understand a text in which al-Ghazālī is never really explicit about his views on the soul and negotiates a path between the Ashʿarite view of the soul as an accident of the heart and the views of both Ṣūfīs and *falāsifa* of an immaterial soul. The results of Gianotti's research

are as unclear as the texts that he analyses: al-Ghazālī probably subscribed to the view of an immaterial soul, but he all too often uses language that characterizes the soul as an accident of a body.

Were one to follow the strategy of Frank and Marmura, one would first of all need to assess where, within al-Ghazālī's books, one finds teachings on the soul that use the most explicit language and treat the subject in the most systematic way. A manuscript at the Köprülü library (no. 853) in Istanbul, copied in 700-1/1301-2, contains a text that comprehensively treats matters of the soul. This book with the title *Ma'ārij al-quds fī madārij ma'rīfat al-nafs* is attributed to al-Ghazālī. Based on later manuscripts from other libraries, the text has been printed several times, in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus; it extends to roughly a hundred pages. Two studies, by George Vajda and Jules Janssens, have analyzed the large extent to which this text depends on the psychological writings of Ibn Sīnā; both scholars have called the attribution to al-Ghazālī into question.¹ Since publishing his article in 1993, Jules Janssens, however, has taken a closer look at al-Ghazālī's established works and has analyzed his technique of borrowing from the books of Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī. He now concludes that the amount and character of concealed quotations from philosophical literature within *Ma'ārij al-quds* is nothing unusual for al-Ghazālī.² His suggestion that al-Ghazālī is the author of this book is shared by Jamāl Rajab Sidbī, who in a recent study, *Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna bni Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī* (Cairo: al-Hay'ā al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 2000) bases most of his own analysis of al-Ghazālī's teachings on the soul on *Ma'ārij al-quds*.³

It is surprising that Gianotti makes no mention of *Ma'ārij al-quds*. He thus makes "a throw into the dark"—to use al-Ghazālī's metaphor from the introduction to his *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and his *Munqidh*—where light may be found between the covers of this book. A very similar but more concise exposition of a Ghazalian analysis of the soul was, however, available to Gianotti in the first half of the short book *al-Risāla al-Laduniyya*. In this work, the author—usually referred to as al-Ghazālī—expounds in a few pages what is dealt with in the *Ma'ārij al-quds* more comprehensively. The *Risāla al-Laduniyya* teaches that the soul is incorporeal, incorruptible, and separates from the body after its death. This text is quite sympathetic to the works of the *falāsifa* and in one passage praises their achievements on this subject: "Through decisive demonstrations and clear proofs it is shown in the philosophical sciences (*al-ʿulūm al-ḥikmiyya*) that the spirit that remains (*al-rūḥ al-bāqī*) is not a body and not an accident but a firm, permanent, and incorruptible substance (*jawhar*). . . . He who wishes to know the arguments in favor of this should refer to the appropriate books written in that art."⁴ Gianotti mistakenly understands these last words as a reference to al-Ghazālī's books when in fact they refer to the psychological books of the *falāsifa*, most probably Ibn Sīnā. But thirteen pages later Gianotti contradicts himself, when he cautiously concludes that the *Risāla al-Laduniyya* wasn't written by al-Ghazālī after all. Gianotti follows Hava Lazarus-Yafeh's argument, namely that books which use philosophical terminology cannot have been authored by al-Ghazālī. Her argument, however, which was first published in 1966, is circular. Lazarus-Yafeh observed that philosophical terms are absent from those works which scholars have accepted as authentic works written by al-Ghazālī. The fact that most Ghazālī-interpreters, starting with al-Subkī and going to W. M. Watt, were reluctant to acknowledge any philosophical temptation to which al-Ghazālī may have been subject becomes

1. Georges Vajda, "Le ma'ārij al-quds fī madārij ma'rīfat al-nafs attribué à al-Ghazālī et les écrits d'Ibn Sīnā," *Israel Oriental Studies* 2 (1972): 470–73; Jules Janssens, "Le Ma'ārij al-quds fī madārij ma'rīfat al-nafs: Un élément-clé pour le dossier Ghazzālī-Ibn Sīnā?" *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 60 (1993): 27–55.

2. See Janssens' article "Al-Ghazālī and His Use of Avicennian Texts," in *Problems in Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Miklós Maróth (Pilisbaca [Hungary]: Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003), 37–49, esp. 47–48.

3. Cf. also Muḥammad Ḥusaynī Abū Sa'da, *Al-Athār al-sināwiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-insāniyya* (Cairo: Dār Abū Ḥurayba, 1991).

4. al-Ghazālī, *al-Risāla al-Laduniyya*, in *al-Quṣūr al-ʿawālī min rasā'il Imām al-Ghazālī* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jundi, 1964), 101. Read *al-rūḥ al-bāqī* following ms Berlin, Spr. 1968 (Ahlwardt 3210), fol. 42b, instead of *al-rūḥ al-nāṭiq* ("the rational spirit") in the printed edition. This ms has a number of textual variations that offer a philosophically sounder text than the (not critically edited) printed editions, which do not seem to vary. Gianotti translates this passage on p. 180.

the yardstick for discussions on the authenticity of his writing. To put it bluntly, Lazarus-Yafeh and Gianotti reject al-Ghazālī's authorship of books like the *Risāla al-Laduniyya* simply because scholars have always done so.

Conclusive judgment on such works as *al-Risāla al-Laduniyya* and *Ma'ārij al-quds* can only be gained through a thorough analysis of the treatment of a subject in al-Ghazālī's well-established writings and then a comparison of these results with the teachings in the assumed spurious works. Gianotti follows thus a promising strategy when he tries to analyze al-Ghazālī's doctrine of the soul expressed in the *Ihyā'*, the *Iqtisād*, and the criticism within the *Tahāfut*. His insight into the argumentative structure of the sixteenth and eighteenth discussions in the *Tahāfut* is indeed quite helpful. He establishes that al-Ghazālī's criticism in these discussions is directed not to the truth of what the philosophers say, but to its epistemological status. Al-Ghazālī simply denies that the philosophers could have come to such results *solely* through demonstration and wants to force them to acknowledge that they must have been inspired by either revelation or divine inspiration when they were working on their doctrines of the soul. Gianotti could have said all this in fewer words. It is, for instance, difficult to understand why he paraphrases the whole discussion about what might cause the soul's annihilation after the body's death (pp. 103–7) when both parties, Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī, do not even subscribe to this view. On the other hand, Gianotti neglects to analyze al-Ghazālī's sudden change of position in the twentieth discussion, where he openly concedes the point that the soul may be incorporeal, self-subsisting, and incorruptible (*Tahāfut*, ed. Bouyges, 363ff.). Later, in his *Iqtisād* al-Ghazālī explains this concession with the overall strategy of the twentieth discussion in the *Tahāfut* to establish belief in corporeal resurrection: "We compelled them (to accept) that following their own convictions on the continuance of the soul they will have to believe in the return, meaning in the re-placement of the soul into the arrangement of one of the bodies" (*al-Iqtisād*, ed. H. Atay and I. A. Çubukçu [Ankara: Nur Matbaası, 1962], 215). Even the physical theories of the *falāsifa* must acknowledge the possibility of corporeal resurrection, since rational argument (*dalil 'aqli*) has not shown its impossibility.

Here is an important clue: while both the philosophers and al-Ghazālī assumed that the nature of the soul as a firm, permanent, and incorruptible being can be proven through demonstration, neither of the two assumed that the remaining details, particularly the soul's fate after death, can be proven apodictically. The same is true for the teachings of the *mutakallimūn*, a group that did not make claims to prove a doctrine through demonstration. Given that philosophical science has proven some limited basic truths on the nature of the soul, there was, for al-Ghazālī, a certain epistemological equality between the view that the soul is immaterial and self-subsisting and the one that it is a material being in the human body preserved, for instance, in an incorruptible *os coccygis* (*ʿajab al-dhanab*) after the body's death. This latter view, which al-Ghazālī puts forward in his *al-Durra al-fākhira fī kashf 'ulūm al-ākhira* (ed. Lucien Gauthier [Geneva: H. Georg, 1878], 40f.) is not mentioned in Gianotti's book at all. Both explanations of the soul's fate after the body's death are non-contradictory within their own systems and both manage to explain bodily resurrection in the afterlife. From al-Ghazālī's point of view, there is not much damage to be done if one sticks in some books (e.g., *al-Iqtisād*, and *al-Durra al-fākhira*, and some books of the *Ihyā'*) to the latter view and in others (*Ma'ārij al-quds*, *al-Risāla al-Laduniyya*, and other books of the *Ihyā'*) to the former. It is important that all Muslim scholars become convinced of the corporeal character of resurrection. If one is able to teach this essential element of Islam without the need to change one's readers' views on the nature of the soul and thus confuse their convictions, that's the thing to be done.

Damage is done, nevertheless, to later scholarship that aims to elaborate a consistent set of al-Ghazālī's views. Gianotti's book is a confused and confusing attempt to elaborate a systematic doctrine from what appears little less than minced words. He has a tendency to put results in suggestive questions ("Should we not assume that . . . ?"), a style that soon annoys the reader. There is too much "al-Ghazālī seems to," but too few results. The quotations from al-Ghazālī's works are long and not always analyzed. Gianotti neglects to use authoritative editions, which on p. 90, for instance, leads to a mistranslation of a crucial passage because he does not have in front of him Bouyges' critical edition of the *Tahāfut* with its apparatus. Marmura in his translation (p. 3) correctly emends the text. The text used by Gianotti is Bouyges' only in name and varies from his critical edition of the *Tahāfut* pub-

lished in 1927. Why Gianotti chose not to adopt Marmura's translation of the *Tahāfut* throughout his book (he does so on p. 104) is unclear. Marmura's works appeared three years before this book.

Was there something like a "truth discourse" (p. 116) in al-Ghazālī, i.e., a comprehensive position about the true nature of the soul? Our first question should rather be whether there needed to be such a position? Both competing views, the one of the Šūfis and *falāsifa* of an immaterial soul, as well as the one of the *mutakallimūn* of the soul as necessarily inhering in a body (as an accident or otherwise, cf. *al-Iqtisād*, 213f.), are viable explanations of the text of revelation as well as the results of science, i.e., apodeixis. And although we know that al-Ghazālī was a confident man when it came to his intellectual and probably also his super-intellectual capacities, he did not claim to have certain knowledge (*'ilm yaqīnī*) about the world that would exceed these two sources.

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Zur Sozialterminologie der iranischen Manichäer: Eine semantische Analyse im Vergleich zu den nichtmanichäischen iranischen Quellen. By IRIS COLDITZ. *Iranica*, vol. 5. Wiesbaden: HARRASSOWITZ VERLAG, 2000. Pp. xiii + 454.

This is the revised and expanded version of the author's Inauguraldissertation at the Freie Universität Berlin 1994. The central problem of the book is the question to what extent literature with religious contents or background—in this instance, the Middle Iranian literature of the Manichean communities in Turfan (Chinese Turkestan)—can be a source for studies of the social structure of ancient societies. For this purpose, the author has chosen a limited set of terms found both in Manichean and other sources, such as the Zoroastrian literature of the Sasanian period (the Pahlavi texts) and the original inscriptions of the Sasanian kings and high officials, the use of which she discusses from four angles: (1) on the social level, as applied to actual social groups; (2) on the didactic-moral level, as applied to characterize certain behavior and qualities; (3) on the religious level, as applied to the divine-demonic sphere; (4) on a generic level, as applied otherwise. To permit the reader better to follow her argumentation, all the Manichean passages involved are cited, but only a section of non-Manichean ones. Several indexes and a comprehensive bibliography complete the book.

The introduction, in addition to the general description of the work summarized above, also contains a detailed description of the sources (pp. 9–25), which amounts to nothing less than a history and description of the Manichean literature, not only in Middle Iranian languages (Middle Persian, Parthian, Sogdian), but also Coptic, Greek, Arabic, etc., as well as of the Sasanian inscriptions and the Pahlavi literature. Since editions and secondary literature are quoted extensively, this is a very useful survey for anyone who wants to get his bearings in this literature.

The study of the individual terms is preceded by a chapter on the historical and social context of the Manichean literature (pp. 29–52). In this chapter Colditz discusses the social contacts of the Manicheans and the groups targeted by their proselytizing. She shows that the social behavior of the Manicheans is predicated on their world-view and on the Manichean understanding of the position of man in the cosmos.

The terms selected for study are: *āzād* "free," *bannag/bandag*, approx. "servant," (*i)škōh* "poor," *tuwān*, etc., approx. "mighty," *wuzurg* "great," *wispuhr* "prince." The discussion typically begins with the etymology of the word and its use in the ancient sources (Avestan, Old Persian, etc.); thus, under *āzād*, we also have an evaluation of the use of the word borrowed into Achaemenid-period Aramaic. The meaning, Colditz concludes, developed from "noble" as a term for social status and "noble" as a descriptive epithet to the generic meaning of "free." After an exhaustive discussion of the simple word, she does the same for all derivatives and compounds, before examining their use as terms for social status, etc.