THE LIFE OF SALADIN

FROM THE WORKS OF 'IMĀD AD-DĪN
AND BAHĀ' AD-DĪN

BY

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**PREFACE**

This narrative of Saladin, based on 'Imād ad-Dīn and Bahā' ad-Dīn, is intended to present a short account of his life and activities as they are reported by the two historians who were closely associated with him. In opposition to them was the famous Ibn al-Athīr, who presents a narrative which is based on the work of 'Imād ad-Dīn, but deliberately takes the opposite view, as will be shown in the text and footnotes which follow. This narrative simply traces the stages of Saladin's life, and excludes all fiscal and administrative policies. It follows the main features of the Pennsylvania *History of the Crusades*, in the chapter entitled 'Saladin'.
The life and achievements of Saladin constitute one of the great moments in the history of the crusades. In literature he appears most frequently as a conquering hero, who fought his enemies victoriously and in the end beat them to a standstill. But closer examination of his actual life reveals him not only as a conqueror, but as a man who struggled with enemies of his own side who finally joined him and fought along with him under his sole command. From this angle we see him as a man who fought for his ideals, and fought, not victoriously, but in a measure that fell short of his hopes and ambitions.

The major historical work written by the most famous writer of his own period was the al-Kāmil fi al-Tārīkh of Ibn al-Athīr. His chronicle is the universal source of later historians, and includes an account of the campaigns of Saladin. But unfortunately he wrote a panegyric (rather than a history) of the Zangid princes of Mosul, who were the chief opponents of Saladin. In writing this account he used the al-Barq al-Shāmī of the historian, the Kātib ʿImād ad-Dīn al-Īṣāḥānī, and in using it almost throughout the narrative, he rewrites it in his own particular style. The malicious twist, the perversions and propagandist ascriptions that he introduces in many of the passages about Saladin, are all valuable in showing, in a pronounced form, the moral problem with which Saladin was confronted and the cynical attitude towards public life held by the Muslim community.¹

Almost the only source which records the early life of Saladin is the chronicle of Ibn Abī Ṭayyī. He was a Shīʿite of Aleppo, and was hostile to Nūr ad-Dīn but unexpectedly

friendly to Saladin. All his works are lost except for quotations cited by later authors.\footnote{1166–1235, practically contemporaneous with Ibn al-Athîr.}

In view of the peculiarities of Ibn Abî Ṭayyî and of Ibn al-Athîr as chroniclers, it is obvious that neither of them can be relied upon to solve questions of personality and of motive. If indeed we had nothing else to go by, we should have no means at all of discovering the real quality of Saladin’s achievement.

From 1188 the other historian from Mosul, Bahâ’ ad-Dîn Ibn Shaddâd (1145–1234), Saladin’s judge of the army, was his confidant. In his account of Saladin, written in a simple and straightforward style, he presents Saladin to us as an ordinary chronicle can, as an intimate friend, dealing with him man to man.\footnote{Bahâ’ ad-Dîn may perhaps be called uncritical, but he was no deluded hero-worshipper. His admiration was that of an upright and honest man from whom nothing was concealed, and there can be no question of deliberate suppression or deflection of the truth in his narrative of the last five years of Saladin’s life. To have one such source for the history of any medieval prince is rare indeed. The portrait it gives us, however, is that of Saladin at the height of his success and in the desperate climate of the Third Crusade; it supplies, therefore, little direct reference to the long and hard struggle to build up his power.}

In these circumstances, it is a piece of incredible good fortune that our fourth source, which covers (in the original text or in reliable summaries) the whole of his active career, is almost equally close and authoritative. This is the series of professional diaries of Saladin’s private secretary, the kâṭîb (the secretary) ‘Imâd ad-Dîn al-Iṣfâhâni (1125–1201).\footnote{Al-Kâṭîb ‘Imâd ad-Dîn al-Iṣfâhâni (1125–1201). He rose to high rank in the service of the Sultans and the Caliphate in Baghdâd (where he wrote a work on their administration which was subsequently abridged by al-Bundârî) and later of Nûr ad-Dîn and became secretary to Saladin from 1175. In this post he wrote an account of his experience in the service of Saladin, entitled al-Barq al-Shâmi, of which two volumes have survived at Oxford (vol. III, MS. Bruce, 11; vol. V, MS. Marsh, 423), but the greater part of his book has survived in the work of Abû Shâma. He subsequently wrote a smaller work on the victories of these volumes two (out of seven) have survived, as well as the separate work covering the campaigns of 1187–93, and fairly copious extracts of the missing years.}

‘Imâd ad-Dîn belonged to the new class of college-trained civil servants. He entered the employment, first of the Seljuq sultans and of the Caliphate in Iraq, then rose to high rank at Damascus in the service of Nûr ad-Dîn and became secretary to Saladin in 1175. He was one of the most famous stylists of his age and his writings are composed in the elaborate and florid rhyming prose cultivated by the secretarial class. Yet, in such a master of language and vocabulary, the fact that his narratives are cast in this medium does not detract from their clarity and their precision. On closer examination ‘Imâd ad-Dîn’s statements are remarkably sober. They are, leaving aside all questions of literary style, not unlike the reports of a conscientious civil servant— as indeed he was. It is almost a paradox that so solid and matter-of-fact a chronicle should be clothed in a garment of such literary exuberance. There is scarcely a sentence, even in the loftiest passages, of direct panegyric of Saladin himself. Certainly ‘Imâd ad-Dîn shows a deep admiration for Saladin, but his greatness appears wholly as a corollary from the facts themselves, and only occasionally does he express some criticism of his master.

A further argument for ‘Imâd ad-Dîn’s accuracy is found in the statements of other first-hand chronicles. Where there are statements of fact by William of Tyre or Ernoul, there is an astonishing degree of identity in general, which often extends even into details.

There is the further question raised by the relation of Abû Shâma (1203–67) and his abstract from the original text of the al-Barq al-Shâmi.\footnote{The Two Gardens, Kitâb al-Râzîfâ’tain, by Abû Shâma, summarizing the works of ‘Imâd ad-Dîn, Ibn al-Athîr, and other writers, ed. Cairo, 1287, and vol. I, part 1 by M. Hîlî M. A’hma’d, Cairo, 1956.} For on this we have to rely for about
two-thirds of the entire book. The answer is a straight one. Abū Shāma's abridgement is made with skill and care, leaving out the purely literary elaboration and much of the original and personal quality. Nevertheless, ʿImād ad-Dīn's narrative is preserved in selection, and what he himself has written is always carefully distinguished.

In addition to the texts that we can use, we have also the mutajaddidāt (now, alas, only the few citations in later authors that have survived) and the still abundant letters and documents made by al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, Saladin's faithful waṣīr and friend in Egypt. A few have been collected and edited but the majority are still to be found in various manuscript collections. And finally there are casual mentions in other works (for example, the Spanish traveller Ibn Jubair) and the Egyptian land agent, Ibn Mammātī, whose book on the lands of Egypt was produced just after Saladin's death, and two chronicles written in the next generation, that of Aleppo by Ibn al-ʿAdīm, and that of Syria, the Mufarrij al-hurūb by Ibn Wāsil (ed. G. al-Shayyāl, Cairo, 1953–60), both of which repeat many of the perversions of Ibn al-ʿAthīr.

Saladin (named Yūsuf) spent his childhood in Baʿalbak and other castles where his father Ayyūb was governor, first as castellan for Zangi and subsequently on behalf of the government of Damascus. At the age of fourteen, in 1152, he joined his uncle Shīrkuḥ in the service of the sultan Nūr ad-Dīn and was allotted a fief. In 1156 he succeeded his elder brother Tūrānshāh as his uncle's deputy in the military governorship of Damascus, but relinquished the post after a short time in protest against the fraudulence of the chief accountant. He then rejoined Nūr ad-Dīn at Aleppo and became one of his close associates, 'never leaving him whether on the march or at court'. Later on he again held the office of deputy commandant at Damascus for an unspecified period. Apart from his skill in polo (inherited from his father) and an interest in religious studies, probably inspired by his admiring emulation of Nūr ad-Dīn, nothing is known of his early years.

The first campaigns of Shīrkuḥ, on behalf of Nūr ad-Dīn, were unsuccessful. In 1164 he was besieged by Amalric's crusaders and the Egyptians under Shāwār at Bīlbaṣ and was fortunate in Nūr ad-Dīn's armistice. In 1167 Shīrkuḥ was again accompanied by Saladin and fought a battle south of Cairo in which Amalric was routed. Then he marched north to Alexandria, where he left Saladin in command, himself returning to Upper Egypt. Saladin held out for seventy-five days, and was eventually relieved by Shīrkuḥ's arrangement to make peace with the Egyptians. Saladin spent some days in the Frankish camp, perhaps as a hostage, and he probably had an opportunity to make a friendship with Humphrey of Toron.

When, for the third time, Shīrkuḥ was ordered into Egypt at the end of 1168, on the urgent entreaty of the Fātimid Caliph al-ʿĀḍīd, Saladin, on his own statement, submitted unwillingly to Nūr ad-Dīn's command to accompany him. 'I felt as if I was going to my death', he said. It seems evident that Nūr ad-Dīn intended the occupation to be a permanent one this time; according to Ibn al-ʿAthīr, the Fātimid Caliph had, indeed, asked that it should be so, and had made provision for fiefs to be given to the Syrian officers (or rather their mamluks). He gave Shīrkuḥ the command of two thousand of his own guard, the Asadiya, called by the title of

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1 ʿImād ad-Dīn in Abū Shāma, I, 262.
2 The most reliable source is Saladin's own statement to Bahš ad-Dīn (Schulten, 33 = Cairo, 31). Ibn al-ʿAthīr's vivid narrative is related at second-hand from an anonymous source (XI, 226) and is not above suspicion in its details. Nothing bearing on the subject is quoted from ʿImād ad-Dīn, but Abū Shāma (I, 155–6) cites a contemporary poem by the Damascene poet Ḥasan al-ʿAqqalāh in which, while praising Saladin, he chides him for hanging back from the expedition to Egypt.
Asad ad-Dîn (the name of Shirkuh) and six thousand of the Turkman troops, paid for by him. Saladin's first exploit on the advance into Egypt was the seizure of the intriguing wazir, Shâwar, who had been responsible for calling in the Franks, and his execution on the Caliph's orders. Shirkuh was invested with the wazirate and the administration was directed on his behalf by Saladin (this most probably being the reason, indeed, why Nur ad-Dîn had insisted on his accompanying his uncle to Egypt).  

When Shirkuh died suddenly nine weeks later, the amirs proposed Shihâb ad-Dîn Mahmûd al-Hârîmî, Saladin's maternal uncle, as his successor, but he, fearing the opposition of some of them, advised al-Acid to appoint Saladin. The nomination was made in consequence, although some of Nur ad-Dîn's officers resented it and returned to Syria. The official diploma of his investiture on 26 March 1169, with the title of al-Malik an-Nasir ('the victorious king'), is still extant. It was composed by his devoted friend and counsellor, the al-Qâdî al-Fâdil, and amongst its grandiloquent periods there is one prophetic phrase: 'As for the jihâd, thou art the nurling of its milk and the child of its bosom. Gird up therefore the shanks of spears to meet it and to plunge on its service into a sea of swordpoints; ... until God give the victory which the Commander of the Faithful hopeth to be laid up for thy days and to be witness for thee when thou shalt stand in His presence.'

The main obstacle, of course, was the Egyptian army, composed of several regiments of white cavalry and some 30,000 Sûdâni infantry. Saladin (we are told) immediately began to build up his army at the expense of the Egyptian officers, and when a revolt broke out among the black, he already had enough regular troops of his own to decimate them and to drive them out of Cairo into Upper Egypt, where, in the course of the next five years, his brothers gradually crushed their risings.

The white troops made no move and seem to have cooperated with Saladin in repelling Amalric's attacks on Damietta and in the raid on Gaza and the subsequent capture.

1 Bahâ ad-Dîn's further statement on the change in Saladin's conduct and renunciation of wine, etc. (Schultens, 35 = Cairo, 32-2) from that time is perhaps reminiscent of Ibn Abî Tâyî (Abû Shâma, I, 173). The term Sultân occurs in the diploma of investment of Shirkuh, the Caliph's superscription being addressed as Sultân al-Jayûsh ('the Sultan of the forces') (Abû Shâma, I, 159, 8) and is repeated (with reference to Shirkuh) in that of Saladin (Helbig, op. cit., p. 58, l. 9). This text confirms the statement of Abû Shâma (I, 131, l. 4) that in Fâtimid Egypt the term Sultân was applied to the wazir in his capacity as the Commander of the Faithful's armies, and that in the person of Saladin this sense merged into the sense of 'temporal sovereign' which had become current in Asia in the Seljuq period. There is no indication that the title of Sultân was at any time 'conferred' on Saladin by the 'Abbasid Caliph; on the contrary, he continued to be styled officially and on his coinage by the Egyptian vizierial title al-Malik an-Nâsir. See further G. Wiet, 'Les Inscriptions de Saladin', in Syria (1922), pp. 307-28. For examples of the use of the term Sultân applied to Saladin before 570/1174 see Ibn Abî Tâyî, apud Abû Shâma, I, 184, 3 and 6 (6); 192, 15 (566); 196, 18 and 27 (597). The last reference is particularly significant as being a quotation of the official Khubtsai. Imâd ad-Dîn, apud Abû Shâma, I, 194, 20 and 24 (557), and Bustân al-Manûs (ed. Cahen, B.E.O., VII-VIII, 139, 17 (568)).

2 Al-Maqirizi, Khita, I, 86, recognized the obstacle presented by the Egyptian army, composed of several regiments of white troops amounting to 40,000 horsemen and Sudani foot-soldiers amounting to 30,000 troops. His source was al-Qâdî al-Fâdil, then director of the düsân al-Jayûsh. The first figure must evidently include many thousands of Arab auxiliaries. The hostility of the Egyptian troops to the Syrians is vividly portrayed by Imâd ad-Dîn, apud Abû Shâma, I, 162.

3 In 1171 and 1172 Turânshâh defeated the Sûdâni in Upper Egypt and in 1173 captured the town of Ilqâm. They rose again at Ašwân in 1174, and were put down by his brother al-Adîl, and again defeated at Koptos in 1176. At the same time expeditions were sent out across North Africa as far as Tripoli under Qârâqûsh.

4 William of Tyre, ed. Salloch, Leipzig, 1934, XX, 21 (trans., II, 376) asserts...
of Aila in December 1170. But Nūr ad-Dīn was pressing him to take the decisive step of proclaiming the 'Abbāsid Caliphate in Egypt, and at length in June 1171 sent him a formal order to do so, at the same time notifying the Caliph himself of his action. The order was obeyed, with no immediate outward disturbances. On al-Āḍīd’s death shortly afterwards the members of the Fāṭimid ruling house were placed in honourable captivity and the sexes segregated, so that the race should die out in the natural course of time, and the immense treasures of the palaces were shared between Saladin’s officers and Nūr ad-Dīn.

The good relations seemed to have been little strained of the Gaza raid that ‘at no time had so great a host of Turks assembled. According to report, the number of knights alone was about forty thousand.’ It is obvious that, allowing for the exaggeration, Saladin must have employed the Egyptian army as well as his own troops on this occasion. On the occasion of a general review held in September 1171, the number of troops in his cavalry regiments (excluding the Arabs) was officially recorded as 14,000 (Al-Maqrīzī, Khitaḥ, I, 86, quoting the diaries of al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍīl).


2 ‘Imād ad-Dīn, who was at that time Nūr ad-Dīn’s secretary, states positively (Abū Shāma, I, 198-9) that Nūr ad-Dīn, having the utmost confidence in Saladin’s loyalty and obedience, sent his instructions in Shawwāl 566 (June 1171) and at the same time a public announcement of the change and a letter to the Caliph. The text of the announcement was drawn up by ‘Imād ad-Dīn himself, and was carried by Shīhāb ad-Dīn Ibn Abī ‘Aṣrūn, with instructions to read it in every city on his way to Baghdad; it is quoted by Abū Shāma, 197-8 (from the chronicle of Ibn Abī Taṣrīḥ), and it confirms his statement that it notified the Caliph of Nūr ad-Dīn’s orders to Saladin, without waiting for any report of his action. ‘Imād ad-Dīn then goes on to say that later on news was received at Damascus on 10 Shawwāl (16 June) that the ‘Abbāsid khūṭba had been introduced at Alexandria on 7 Ramaḍān (14 May) and in Cairo on 28 Ramaḍān (5 June), i.e. before Nūr ad-Dīn’s orders had reached Saladin. The Caliph was then at the point of death. The precision and authority of ‘Imād ad-Dīn’s statement, confirmed by the terms of his dispatch to the Caliph, make it difficult to reject it in favour of the livelier versions of the Aleppo and Mosul chroniclers. Furthermore, Ibn al-Jawzī (Munattazam, ed. Krenkow, Hyderabad, 1355-6/1938-40, X, 237, 3) dates the arrival of Ibn Abī ‘Aṣrūn in Baghdad on Saturday 22 Muharram 567 (25 September 1171) with the report that ‘the Khalifa had been professed in Egypt’, which is clearly irreconcilable with the statement that the ‘Abbāsid khūṭba was introduced only on the 10th of the same month.

1 The main accusations to the contrary are made by Ibn Abī Taṣrīḥ ‘apūd Abū Shāma, I, 172, and are pointedly rejected by Abū Shāma who, rightly, charges Ibn Abī Taṣrīḥ with hostility to Nūr ad-Dīn because of his measures against the Shi‘a and the historian’s family at Aleppo.

2 Ibn al-Aṭṭī says that there was no decay between them until the first Shawkāb expedition of 567/1171, following this up by the recital of Saladin and the amirs (History of the Atabegs, R.H.C., Or., II, 68; Kāmil, XI, 244-5).

3 Ibn Abī Taṣrīḥ (‘apūd Abū Shāma, I, 199 inf.) states that Saladin found little money in the Fāṭimid treasury, ‘because Shīwār had spent it all in repeated payments to the Franks’.

4 In his dispatch to the Caliph, Nūr ad-Dīn took to himself the credit for the conquests in both Nubia and North Africa (Abū Shāma, I, 215).

5 Kāmil, XI, 259-9. It is interesting that this episode is not mentioned in the Atabegs, R.H.C., Or., II, 2, 293-3.

6 William of Tyre, XX, 28, trans., II, 380-90.

7 Abū Shāma, I, 206.
Arslân in the north.\(^1\) It is not surprising that Abû Shâma omits his usual citation of Ibn al-Athîr’s narrative in reference to Saladin’s expedition.

At root, any differences between them lay, more probably, in a divergence of political views. Nûr ad-Dîn regarded Syria as the main battlefield against the Crusaders, and looked to Egypt first as a source of revenue to meet the expenses of the jiḥâd, and secondly as a source of additional manpower. Saladin, on the other hand, judging from the former competition for Egypt and the attempt on Damietta in 1169, and probably informed of the tenor of Amalric’s negotiations with the Greek Emperor in 1171, seems to have been convinced that, for the time being at least, the main point of danger lay in Egypt. Furthermore, he was more conscious than Nûr ad-Dîn could be of the dangers arising from the hostility of the former Fâtimid troops and their readiness to make a common cause with the Franks. In his view, therefore, it was his first duty to build up a strong force, to hold Egypt in all contingencies, and to spend what resources he could command on this object. There were also reasons of internal security, illustrated by the fact that he had sent troops to Upper Egypt, and later on to the province of Yemen, which had been a Fâtimid stronghold until Tûrânsâhâ attacked and captured the towns in the early part of 1174.\(^2\) To the end of his life the defence of Egypt against attack remained one of Saladin’s constant preoccupations.\(^3\)

That there was, about this time, talk of some kind of action by Nûr ad-Dîn is confirmed by Saladin’s explicit denial of the distorted version current in Mosul, in a conversation with Baha’ ad-Dîn: ‘Some reports reached us of a possibility that Nûr ad-Dîn might come down to Egypt against us. All our friends were of the opinion that we should oppose him and break off our allegiance to him, and I was the only one to hold the opposite view, saying “Nothing of this kind must ever be said,” but the controversy continued until we heard of his death.’\(^4\) Nevertheless, Nûr ad-Dîn’s growing exasperation at Saladin’s delay in supplying him with funds for jiḥâd\(^5\) is explicitly asserted by ‘Imâd ad-Dîn\(^6\) and his jealousy might well have been aroused by extravagant panegyrics addressed to ‘the kings of the House of Shâdhî’. Nûr ad-Dîn, it may be remarked, was not a favourite with the poets, because of his niggardly rewards.\(^7\) However, whatever further plans he may have had in view were cut short by his death on 15 May 1174.

The chief officers of Nûr ad-Dîn’s army at once entered into competition for the guardianship of his young son al-Malik as-Ṣâlih. Saladin could not remain indifferent to this outbreak of rivalries, but for the time being he took no action beyond acknowledging as-Ṣâlih as his suzerain.\(^8\)

In June Amalric laid siege to Bûnâs, but Saladin, having received warning from Constantinople to expect an attack by the Sicilian fleet, was unable to move.\(^9\) It was not until the end of July that the naval assault on Alexandria was made and beaten off and in the meantime the situation in Syria had taken a grave turn. The amirs of Damascus had made a separate peace with Jerusalem on payment of tribute;\(^10\) Nûr

\(^1\) Baha’, Schultens, 50 = Cairo, 37.

\(^2\) ‘Imâd ad-Dîn’s report of his statement to Nûr ad-Dîn’s commissioner (Abû Shâma, I, 219, 22–3): ‘A province of this size cannot be adequately guarded without heavy expenditure.’

\(^3\) ‘Imâd ad-Dîn (in Abû Shâma, 206) conveys Nûr ad-Dîn’s growing exasperation at Saladin’s delay in supplying him with funds for the jiḥâd.

\(^4\) Abû Shâma, I, 200 foot; Nûr ad-Dîn’s parsimony with the poets, ibid., 220.

\(^5\) Dispatch, cited by Abû Shâma, I, 230.

\(^6\) He was encamped at the time at the frontier station of Fâqûs, to which he had advanced his troops on learning of the Crusaders’ attack on Bûnâs: ‘Imâd, apud Abû Shâma, I, 231 (cf. Ibn Abî ‘Ṭâyi’i, ibid., 233, 14 and 235, 7).

\(^7\) In a letter to the Qâdi of Aleppo, the famous Ibn Abî ‘Aṣrûn, cited by Ibn Abî ‘Ṭâyi’i (Abû Shâma, I, 233), Saladin makes it plain that his chief grievance is.

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2. Al-Qâdi al-Tâdîl’s dispatch to Nûr ad-Dîn after the attempted Fâtimid rising in 1174: Abû Shâma, I, 220.

3. The influence of the Fâtimid propaganda in Yemen is explicitly offered by Saladin himself as a reason for the expedition to Yemen in his letter of 585/1185 to the Almohad Abû Yusuf Ya’qûb; see Melanges René Basset, II Paris, 1925, 252. Ibn al-Athîr’s explanation that Saladin was exploring possible bolt-holes in case of a conflict with Nûr ad-Dîn (an improbable suggestion in any circumstances) displays a typical lack of effort to appreciate the actual situation with which he was confronted in Egypt between 1171 and 1174.

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ad-Din's cousin at Mosul had invaded and annexed all his provinces beyond the Euphrates, and in August the eunuch Gumushlagin, having secured the person of as-Salih, established himself at Aleppo and threw Nur ad-Din's lieutenants into his dungeons. The unity of Islam in face of the Crusaders was disrupted. In reply to Saladin's remonstrance and hints of intervention, the amirs appealed to him to be loyal to the house that had raised him up. His answer was categorical: 'In the interests of Islam and its people we put first and foremost whatever will combine their forces and unite them in one purpose; in the interests of the House of Atabeg we put first and foremost whatever will safeguard its root and its branch. Loyalty can only be the consequence of loyalty. We are in one valley and those who think ill of us are in another.' It was therefore with full consciousness of his mission as the true heir of Nur ad-Din that he set himself to rebuild the shattered edifice of his empire and, on an urgent appeal from the commandant at Damascus, occupied it, almost without opposition, on 28 October 1174.

Fully justified as Saladin's action was both to himself and in the light of history, his contemporaries and rivals could not be expected to see it in the same light. In their eyes, naturally enough, he was only one of themselves, and presumably inspired by the same motives of self-interest and lust for power, cloak them as he might by high-sounding appeal to the principles and interests of Islam. His occupation of Damascus against the amirs of Damascus was that this armistice freed the Crusaders to attack the Muslims on other fronts.

1 Ibn al-Atahir (XI, 276–7) naturally omits from his narrative the details of the concessions made to the Shi'ites of Aleppo in return for their support: see Ibn Abi Taysir, apud Abū Shāma, 1, 238 foot.

2 Ibn Abi Taysir (apud Abū Shāma, 1, 240) states that during his first investment of Aleppo Saladin had sent a detachment of his army to support the Zangid 'Imad ad-Din, who was being besieged by his brother Saif ad-Din of Mosul in Sinjar, and had adhered to Saladin. The relations between 'Imad ad-Din and Saladin are mentioned also by Bahā' (Schultens, 44 = Cairo, 40) and Ibn al-Atahir (XI, 278) but neither refers to military assistance from Saladin to 'Imad ad-Din. On his relations with the Assassins see B. Lewis, 'Saladin and the Assassins' in D.S.O.A.S., XV, 1953, 239–45.

3 According to William of Tyre (XXI, 8; trans., II, 410), Saladin, after his capture of the citadel of Homs (which he had merely masked on his rapid advance), released the hostages held there as guarantee for the execution of the terms on which Raymond had been released by Nur ad-Din, and did so in return for an undertaking by Raymond not to interfere in his conflict with Aleppo. But as William of Tyre places the capture of the citadel after the battle of the Horns of Hamah, whereas 'Imad (on this occasion an eyewitness) dates it exactly on 17 March (apud Abū Shāma, 1, 245), and the battle took place on 13 April, it seems probable that his statement is to be connected with the armistice which Saladin concluded with Raymond in the course of the summer ('Imad, apud Abū Shāma, 1, 252). The intermediary was Humphrey of Toron (William of Tyre, loc. cit.) whom Syrian tradition credited with having knighted Saladin at some earlier time (see Lane-Poole, 91).
as the lieutenant of as-Sāliḥ. The allies then tried to press their advantage, and on his refusal to yield further, they attacked, only to be routed at the Horns of Hamāh, thanks to the timely arrival of the Egyptian regiments.1 When Saladin posted his forces around Aleppo for the second time, Gmnush-taqin had no alternative but to accept his terms, which left Aleppo in the hands of as-Sāliḥ on the condition that the two armies should combine in operations against the Franks.2

This was at the end of April 1175. A few days later, at Hamāh, the envoys from the Caliph brought his formal investiture with the government of Egypt and Syria.3 For most princes of his time this investiture was a mere formality but for Saladin it was much more. If the war to which he had vowed himself against the Crusaders was to be a real jiḥād, a true ‘Holy War’, it was imperative to conduct it with scrupulous observance of the revealed Law of Islam. A government which sought to serve the cause of God in battle must be not only a lawful government, duly authorized by the supreme representative of the Divine Law, but must serve God with equal zeal in its administration and in its treatment of its subjects. In brief, Saladin’s object was to restore to Islamic politics the reign of law, a concept that had become for the contemporary princes not only an empty phrase but

an absurdity. Already, during his first years in Egypt and following the example set by Nūr ad-Dīn, he had abolished all forms of taxation which were contrary to Islamic Law, and his first action in Damascus was to abolish them there. This became his invariable practice on each addition to his territories, and was stipulated formally in the diplomas issued to his vassals.1 It is true that they did not always observe the condition but an offender was liable to find himself summarily dispossessed of his government in consequence.2 The duty of the ruler, he asserted over and over again, was to be the protector of the Faith and the guardian of the property of the Muslims and he rebuked his brother al-`Adil for thinking that ‘countries are to be bought and sold’.3

The sources vividly portray the repeated amazement of his officers and subjects that the personal acquisitions and exercise of power which were the first objects of most princes and governors—including those of his own house—were of no interest to him, and that wealth was a thing to be used in

1 The preamble to the decree abolishing illegal dues in Egypt published on 3 Sa`ār 567 (8 October 1171), quoted by Abū Shāma (I, 265), shows this idea already present: ‘We praise God for that He has established us firmly in the land, and has made agreeable to us the performance of every duty, whether supererogatory or obligatory, and has raised us up to remove from amongst His creatures whatsoever intrudes upon the worship of Him, and has chosen us to engage in the Holy War on behalf of God in the true sense of the term (al-`iḥād fil-lāh ḥaqqa `iḥādīhī) and has made us to esteem little the paltry goods of this world . . . ’ The list of Mukās affected by the decree is given by al-Maqrizi, Khāṣṣ, I, 104–5 (ed. Wiet, II, 1, 81–6, where the editor points out that about the same time Nūr ad-Dīn abolished the Mukās at Damascus—actually some years earlier, see Abū Shāma, I, 25, where Saladin supports Nūr ad-Dīn against the strong criticism and opposition to this measure of Shīrkūh at Hamāh). Other instances of Saladin’s abolition of Mukās: at Damascus, on his occupation, Abū Shāma, I, 235, 237; at Aleppo, ibid., II, 47 (‘Imād, Barq, V, p. 87, contains the text of a dispatch on this subject by ‘Imād): at Mecca, ibid., I, 270; at Raḥba, ibid., II, 69, with an important quotation from the rescript representing this as his general policy. Cf. also the conditions on which Nūr ad-Dīn Qarā` Arslān was invested with ‘Imād: ‘Imād apud Abū Shāma, II, 44 (‘Imād, Barq, V, p. 730), and generally in all other investitures. The same theme appears over and over again in his correspondence with the Caliph’s divān at Bagdād, and in passages relating to the government of his deputies, e.g. ‘Imād, Fath, 123. On the parallel development of the idea of jiḥād and orthodoxy and good government under Nūr ad-Dīn and Saladin, see E. Sivan, L’Islam et la croisade, Paris, 1968, 59–139.


3 Ibn Abī Ta`yī, apud Abū Shāma, II, 52.
prosecution of the Holy War or to be given to others. The fact was patent even to the Crusaders. As early as 1175, when Raymond agreed to terms with Aleppo in order to draw off Saladin, William of Tyre observed that 'any increase of Saladin’s power was cause for suspicion in our eyes... For he was a man wise in counsel, valiant in war, and generous beyond measure. It seemed wiser to us to lend aid to the boy king... not for his own sake, but to encourage him as an adversary against Saladin.'

No greater justification than this could well be found for the policy which Saladin had adopted. Eight years later he used the same argument in an outspoken dispatch to the Caliphate:

Your servant believes that there is no stratagem more fraught with mischief for the enemy and the infidel, no effort more effective against the misguided, no favour more profitable in stirring up the anger of the leaders of heresy, than to enlarge your servant’s power to increase his opportunity of service. For let it be considered, is there amongst all the rulers of Islam another one whose extension of power is a source of grief and affliction to the infidels?

But the facts were not so patent at Mosul, where the terms of the agreement with Aleppo, and probably also the diploma from the Caliph, were received with incredulous anger. It was not only that a prince of the Zangid house was reduced virtually to a vassal of one of his father’s creatures. What was still more disagreeable was that the creature was a Kurd, who challenged the Turkish monopoly of sovereignty, now established for a century and a half, and bestowed his conquests upon his own kinsmen. It was indeed the hardest task with which Saladin was faced to overcome the professional jealousy of the Turkish officers. It delayed his occupation of Aleppo for six years, and made its embarrassing influence felt throughout the Third Crusade. Ibn al-Athir vividly represents it in repeating the indignant words of one of his Mosul compatriots, as he watched Saladin being assisted onto his horse during the defence of Jerusalem: 'Have a care son of Ayyub, what sort of death you will come to—you who are helped to mount by a Seljuq prince and a descendant of the atábeg Zangi!'

To what extent, indeed, personal motives were mingled with Saladin’s genuine devotion to the cause and ideals of Islam is a question which it may never be possible to resolve. But in the circumstances of the time, however un-self-regarding his motives were, the only way in which his objectives could be realized was by concentrating power in his own hands, and establishing in all key positions persons on whose loyalty he could count with absolute assurance. This meant first and foremost the members of his own family, and after them such of his Mamlûk or Kurdish generals and of the vassal princes who had proved themselves trustworthy. The attitude of the Zangids themselves drove him in the same direction, when he had learned the futility of relying upon alliances and confederations.

Before leaving northern Syria, Saladin sent his troops to raid the Isma’îli territories in Jabal as-Summâq then withdrew to Damascus, where he made a truce with Jerusalem. An envoy had been sent to Mosul to ensure Saif ad-Din’s acceptance of the agreement, and had obtained satisfactory assurances. When, however, the envoy of Mosul in turn came to Damascus to swear Saladin to its terms, he presented in error a document which provided for an offensive alliance between Mosul and Aleppo. Saladin was prepared, therefore, when, in April 1176 the allies mustered their forces again. Marching northwards, he met them on the 22nd at...
Tall as-Sultān, fifteen miles from Aleppo, and drove them in headlong flight from the field. Restraining his army from pursuit, he distributed amongst them the immense booty, released the captives, and sent back to Saif ad-Din the cages of doves, nightingales, and parrots found in his canteen with an ironic message to amuse himself with them and keep out of military adventures in future. The disgusted Sultān, says the contemporary Aleppo chronicler, ‘found the Musul camp more like a tavern, with all its wines, guitars, lutes, bands, singers, and singing girls, and showing it to his troops prayed that they might be preserved from such an affliction’.

In spite of Saladin’s magnanimity Aleppo still held out, but when, after storming its protecting fortresses to the east and north, Buzā’a, Manbij, and ’Azāz, he again invested it on 26 June, its defenders consented to a renewal of the arrangement made the year before, and a general peace was signed a month later between Saladin, his brother Tūrānshāh at Damascus, the princes of Aleppo and Mosul, and the Artuqid vassals of Mosul (the princes of Ḥīṣn Kaṭāfā and Mardin) all parties swearing to join together against any one of them who should break the agreement. The alliance was formally ratified by an exchange of envoys in the course of the year. Aṣ-Ṣalih regained ’Azāz on the intercession of his little sister, and undertook to give Saladin the assistance of the army of Aleppo should he require it.

During the siege of ’Azāz, a second and still more determined attempt had been made on Saladin’s life by emissaries of the Assassins. On his return from Aleppo, therefore, he marched on Miṣyāf, the Syrian headquarters of the sect, and laid siege to it, while his troops ravaged the neighbourhood. What followed is largely enveloped in legend; but Saladin withdrew to Damascus and dismissed his Egyptian forces to their homes. The only certain thing is that for the rest of his life he had nothing to fear from the Assassins.

After marrying at Damascus the widow of Nār ad-Dīn, Saladin returned to Egypt, which had been governed in his absence by his brother al-ʿAdi, and occupied himself for a year in internal affairs. His restless brother Tūrānshāh, who had returned from the Yemen on learning of the Syrian conquests, had been left at Damascus as governor with full power.

1 Ibn Abī Ṭayyīr (apud Abū Shāma, I, 260-7) gives the chief credit for the victory to Saladin’s brother Shams ad-Dawla Tūrānshāh, who had returned from Yemen. Damascus only three days before (Ibn Abī Ṭayyīr, apud Abū Shāma, 259, 260), apparently by a confusion of Tūrānshāh with Farrukhsāh (cf. ’Imād apud Abū Shāma, 254 foot and 256, 5). Tūrānshāh had in fact returned to Damascus as its governor, with instructions to prevent Frankish incursions during the campaign in the north (Ibn Abī Ṭayyīr, apud Abū Shāma, I, 260, 8), and ’Imād asserts positively that Saladin and Tūrānshāh met for the first time since the latter’s expedition to Yemen, at Hamāh on 2 ʿĪḍar (18 August): Abū Shāma, 261 foot. Ibn al-Athīr’s account of the battle (XI, 283) is highly artificial, in point of asserting that only one man was killed, and he finds a scapegoat in Saif ad-Dīn’s favourite Zulfāndār.

2 Ibn Abī Ṭayyīr, apud Abū Shāma, I, 255. Although such anecdotal embellishments are suspect on principle, the last part is clearly not an invention. In the same spirit ’Imād, as an eyewitness, contrasts the sobriety and discipline of Saladin’s troops at the siege of Sinjār in 578/1182 with the laxity and disorder of the troops of Diwār Bahk: ’Imād, Barq, V, f. 17b.

3 The resistance of the Nūrīyya at Aleppo was presumably stiffened by expectation of the assistance on ‘guarantee’ of which Reynald and Joscelin had been released on the arrival of the Mosul forces at Aleppo (’Imād apud Abū Shāma, I, 255 top; cf. William of Tyre, XXI, 11 (trans., II, 414)). It is possible also that they had information of the impending raid by Baldwin IV on the Biqa’ at the beginning of August, of which Saladin had warned his brother Tūrānshāh (see n. 1 above). Cf. ’Imād’s account of the raid, the riposte of Ibn al-Muqaddam from Baalbek, and the reverse suffered by Tūrānshāh at Am al-Jarr (apud Abū Shāma, 263 infra), with William of Tyre, loc. cit. (trans., II, 412-13), where the mention of Shams ad-Dawla proves that the correct date is 1176, not 1175 as stated in the note on p. 412).
time he was earnestly concerned to foster in Egypt the orthodox reform movement which had grown up in Syria under Nūr ad-Dīn's government, and both he and al-Āḍil set the example of founding the new colleges from which it was diffused.

In August 1177, the news of the arrival in Palestine of Philip of Flanders gave the signal for fresh preparations for war. Whether or not he was informed of the proposals made to Philip to invade Egypt, it was a natural result of the truce with the Franks that 'if any king or great noble arrived they were free to give him assistance, and the armistice should be renewed on his withdrawal.'1 The first attack in the new campaign, that made on Ḥamāl in October, was repulsed by local troops and volunteers under the command of Saif ad-Dīn al-Mashṭūb.2 As the Crusaders moved up to besiege Hārīm, Saladin planned a large-scale raid on Ascalon and Gaza. On this occasion he seems to have thought it safe to engage a larger proportion than hitherto of the Egyptian forces on the raid.3 'Imād ad-Dīn gives a vivid picture of the light-hearted confidence of the Egyptian troops as they assembled at the

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1 See 'Imād, Barq. III, 253: "وَمِنْ أَثَرُهُمْ حُمَّارُ الْأَرْضِ"; also 'Imād, Barq. III, 1206: عَرِضَ عَلَيْهِ أَخُوَّاهُ أَخْبَارَ الْإِسْلَامِ فِي الْفَضْلَةَ ... وَقَزَّاهُ الْأَمْرُ وَوَلِيَّةً قَمَطَةً.

2 Ibn Abī Ṭayyīl, opud Abū Šāma, I, 266, 279. For the raids of 577/1179 ibid., II, 16; of 577/1181 ibid., II, 27; and the capitulation of Tripoli and the invasion of Ḥirṣīqa in 578/1182, ibid., II, 38. It is noteworthy that Ibn Abī Ṭayyīl is the source of all these notices, and that he confuses 'Imād ad-Dīn's Armenian general Sharaf ad-Dīn Qarāqūsh with Saladin's 'intendant Bahā ad-Dīn Qarāqūsh.

3 See, for example, 'Imād, opud Abū Šāma, I, 17.


5 Details of measures for expansion of the fleet are given from Ibn Abī Ṭayyīl, opud Abū Šāma, I, 269 sup. and al-Maqrīzī (Tulūk, I, 73, states under date 577/1181-2 that Saladin fixed the appointments [qarrara] of the divān of the

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Fleet, to include the Fayyūm, the Juyurš waqf [126–2], al-khāṭif [?], and the naṭrān [Ibn Mammātī, 314–46]. Ibn al-Ṭūr, p. 341, states that certain estates were assigned for the expenses of the wall and citadel, and the officials were authorized to demand the materials required for their construction.

1 'Imād, Barq, III, f. 258, quoted Abū Šāmā, I, 275. He adds that the attack on Ḥamāl was not, therefore, a breach of the truce.

2 'Imād, loc. cit.: Ṣuṣṭān al-ṭalab al-ṭāriq al-taḥāni wa-dār. Ibn al-Ṭūr, XI, 294 mistakenly places this event after the disaster at Ramla, and represents it as the consequence of the temporary disablement of Saladin.

3 William of Tyre, XXI, c. 23 (trans., II, 435–41), estimates Saladin's forces at 8,000 tosains (fawāshis), including Saladin's private guard of 1,000 mamlūks, and 18,000 qarāqūshams. From the exact figures of the Egyptian forces quoted by al-Maqrīzī (Khitat, I, 86, 87) from the diaries of al-Qāḍī al-Fidil for the years 566/1171 and 577/1181, it is clear that the total number of fawāshis or regular mamlūks in the Egyptian army did not at any time exceed 8,000 and the qarāqūshams (probably non-mamlūk horsemen) numbered 7,000 at the most, though there may have been some squadrons of Arab cavalry in addition. Since Saladin was able to set our only four months after the disaster with a considerable force, it is evident that by no means the whole of the Egyptian akhār was involved at Ramla, nor even (as Ibn al-Ṭūr asserts, XI, 293) the greater part of it. 'Imād's account is given in Barq, III, f. 5 sqq., and summarized by Abū Šāmā, I, 271–2.
advanced base and as they dispersed on plundering raids over the countryside. Baldwin IV’s vigorous counteraction, and well-timed surprise attack on the regiment of guards at Mont Gisard near Ramla on 25 November, threw the whole force into confusion, and the remnants struggled back to Egypt as best they could, harassed by the Franks and the bedouins and by lack of both food and water. To Saladin himself, who owed his escape to the foresight and loyalty of al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, it was a lesson that he never forgot.

Nevertheless, so far from decisive was the defeat that only four months later he was able to set out again with a refitted army, and yet leave sufficient forces behind to guard the security of Egypt. The expedition this time was to be no mere raid, but had the definite object of attacking the Frankish forces besieging Hārim, and although Saladin was forestalled in this by the raising of the siege on payment of an indemnity by the government of Aleppo, he pushed on to Ḥims and encamped there in readiness to take the field at the first opportunity. The withdrawal of the Count of Flanders automatically brought the armistice into effect again; in addition, a bad year had brought severe scarcity in Syria. Yet Saladin was eager to resume the jihād, and although all the eloquence of al-Fāḍil was exerted to persuade him to hold his hand until conditions were more favourable, he was already assuring the Caliph’s ministers that, if all went well and if the troops duly mustered, he would attack Jerusalem in the following year.

Saladin’s military and naval measures for the defence of Egypt before setting out in March 1178 are detailed in a dispatch written by Imād to Baghdad, quoted in Barq, III, f. 45b. That the object of the expedition was to attack the Crusaders who were besieging Hārim is definitely asserted by him, f. 28b, and in the same and other dispatches, ff. 42b and 45a. Kamāl ad-Dīn (III, 32; Blochet, 64) says that the hard-pressed garrison of Hārim had called on Saladin to defend them.

Cf. William of Tyre, XXI, 25 (trans., II, 435). ‘Imād in a dispatch to Baghdad (Barq, III, f. 42b) points to the truce arranged between Aleppo and the Crusaders on learning of Saladin’s arrival in Syria as resulting from a common interest. Michel le syrien, III, 376, states the amount paid by al-Malik as-Ṣālih to ‘the prince’ as 30,000 dinars.

‘Imād, Barq, III, ff. 37-40, 46, 63 sqq., contains extracts from the correspondence between Saladin and al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil during this period; cf. Abū Šāma, I, 276; II, 2-3. In the first letter the Qāḍī refers to a Frankish attack on Sadr, on the Egyptian border. The dispatch to the Caliph’s diwan was written by ‘Imād, Barq, III, 43 ab.

1 Ernoult, 52, asserts definitely Baldwin’s reluctance to undertake this construction in time of truce, and that Saladin tried to dissuade him from it. Saladin’s offer of 60,000 and finally of 100,000 gold pieces to him if he would abandon the plan is related by both Ibn Abī Tayyīr (apud Abū Šāma, II, 8) and ‘Imād, Barq, III (Abū Šāma, II, 11).

2 ‘Imād, Barq, III, f. 25a (briefly summarized apud Abū Šāma, I, 275, where in l. 19 bi-dhāthām should be corrected to bi-ladhāthām): قد بذل فلسطين بالله يا أنت آدات [Aṣṣad] بيد البلد من مضراتهم وسلمت بالعاق(ab) من غازهم وهو خائر في أمر وإنفاذ عناصر في حرملاأن... اشتغل كل من الأمراء... ينزل ونهج ونهج...

the north; the loyal relationship between him and Saladin remained unbroken, and on the death of Farrukhshāh in 1183 he was reappointed to the governorship of Damascus. The episode temporarily weakened Saladin’s diplomatic position as against his rivals; but in the long run it was largely due to his firm, yet conciliatory, attitude towards Ibn al-Muqaddam in this conflict that he never again had to take military measures against an insubordinate officer.

With this problem out of his way, Saladin was free to resume the offensive in the spring of 1179. He began by reorganizing the commands in the north, appointing Taqi ad-Dīn to Ḥamāh and Nāṣir ad-Dīn ibn Shirkūh to Hims, to hold Raymond of Tripoli in check. A second winter without rains had created famine conditions in Syria, his troops were suffering severely and remonstrated with him, but he answered only 'God will provide' and sent the most incapacitated back to Egypt with Tūrānshāh, asking al-ʿĀdil to send him 1,500 picked men in return, along with supplies. Early in April, on receiving reports of a projected raid by Baldwin, he sent out Farrukhshāh with the Damascus regiment, numbering about 1,000 mamlûks, with orders to shadow the Franks, and send back information of their movements. Farrukhshāh, however, found himself engaged almost by accident near Belfort, and gained a brilliant success, the more welcome to the Muslims in that the Constable Humphrey of Toron was amongst the killed.

Shortly afterwards Saladin moved out to Bānyās and, trusting to receive warning from his spies of any concentration of Frankish troops, posted a guard at Tall al-Qāḍi and dispersed his forces to loot for forage and supplies. Bands of starving Arab tribesmen, who had followed him up, were dispatched into the districts of Sidon and Beirut to reap all the grain that they could find. In the plain of Marj ʿUyūn, he was surprised by the appearance of a large force under Baldwin, but hastily mounting all the available troops he turned an initial reverse into a notable victory. The date was the second day of the year 575, 10 June 1179, and Imād ad-Dīn, who drew up the register of the prisoners, relates that over 270 knights were among them, exclusive of lower ranks.

Adequately supplied now for a major operation, Saladin enlisted large auxiliary forces of Turkmen and siege troops to supplement the regiments from the Syrian cities and the fresh Egyptian contingent, and on 25 August invested Jacob’s Castle. In order to forestall intervention, the siege was prosecuted with the utmost vigour and resolution. On the sixth day the castle was stormed, the 700 defenders taken prisoner, and the Muslim captives released. In spite of the heat and stench of dead bodies, Saladin would not leave until the last stone had been razed, and carried out a series of forays into the territories of Jerusalem before returning to Damascus.

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1 The episode is related in detail by Imād in Barq, III, 62, 102 sqq., Abū Shāma, II, 2, 5, and Ibn al-Athir, XI, 298, and briefly in Michel le syrien, III, 379, who asserts that Ibn al-Muqaddam sent gifts to the Franks and promised his allegiance to them. But his narrative of events in general is not reliable except in relation to Northern Syria. The acute discomfort which it caused Saladin is reflected in the embarrassment with which he tries to explain his action against Ibn al-Muqaddam and excuse his failure to resume the jihād in his dispatches to the Caliph's divan, covering it up by complaints of the obstacles placed in his way by 'kings and Sultans' and their failure to support him in his struggles with the Franks ('Imād, Barq, 103 b, ff.). Tūrānshāh held Baṣlahāk only for a year; in 1180 he asked, or was persuaded, to take Alexandria in exchange for it and died there soon afterwards.

2 Imād, apud Abū Shāma, II, 8. With Taqi ad-Dīn were Ibn al-Muqaddam and Saif ad-Dīn al-Mashhtūb, and his second-in-command was Nāṣir ad-Dīn Mankūrus (sic) b. Khumārtādān, who held the fief of Abū Qubās.

3 Imād, apud Abū Shāma, II, 6, from Barq, III, 114. In his letter to al-ʿĀdil (ibid., I, 142) Saladin refers to rumours of another project of invasion by the Sicilian fleet, but this may have been only a cover for the return of Tūrānshāh.
maintain in the field at one time were insufficient for a decisive campaign. So long as the Nurîya troops at Aleppo were under the control of others, they constituted a potentially hostile force on his flank. But even if they were securely brought over to his side, that very operation would only deepen the hostility of the Zangids of Mosul, who with their 6,000 troops, would still effectively neutralize him. The conclusion was inescapable; since he could not concentrate the forces of Syria and Egypt against the Crusaders so long as he was endangered by flank or rear attacks from Mosul, the forces of Mosul too must be brought under his control, and turned into auxiliaries in the Holy War.

Having arrived at this conclusion, he set himself to accomplish it. That it could not be done without armed conflict must have been clear to him, and he was reluctant to take arms against those who were to be his future allies. Persuasion and diplomacy would yield better returns than conquest, and he knew himself to possess one powerful advantage. In the eyes of all Islam he had established his claim to the spiritual succession of Nur ad-Din, and those moral forces which had been fanned into life by Nur ad-Din were ranging themselves on his side. However much the interests of the Zangids might be supported by the narrower loyalties of local patriotism and military tradition, he gained the sympathies of an increasingly influential faction, not only at Aleppo, but also at Mosul.

1 The most striking evidence is to be found in the steady drift of the leading ulamâ and influential personalities towards his side. Nur ad-Din’s two most respected qadis, Diyaa’ ad-Din Shahrazûrî and Sharaf ad-Din Ibn Abi ‘Asrûn, had joined him from the first; indeed, the latter left Aleppo to take up the Qâdiship at Damascus as early as 1175 or 1176, thereby, as al-Fadîl reminded Saladin in a later letter (‘Imâd, Barq, III, f. 170b) greatly weakening the cause of his adversaries. Cf. also Ibn Jubair’s account of the public prayers at Mecca in 1183, when at the mention of Saladin’s name the whole concourse uttered fervent Amens (ed. G.M.S., 07, 3-4) and the course of the negotiations with the Shaikh ash-Shuyûkh related below.

2 The fact is obvious from the ultimate surrender of these cities, but the details are very obscure. From his later actions, the leader of the party at Aleppo favourable to Saladin seems to have been Husam ad-Dîn Tunân. At Mosul (where Ibn al-Athîr himself expressly confirms the existence of a pro-Saladin party amongst the amirs, see p. 13, n. 2, above) Saladin would appear at first to have had hopes of gaining the support of the generallissimo Mujâhid

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1 ‘Imâd, Barq, III, ff. 40b and 58; Abû Shâma, l. 276, 278. It was Zâhir ad-Dîn who established an-Nâsir as Caliph in succession to al-Mustakil’ at the end of March 1180, only to be arrested five days later and put to death: Ibn al-Athîr, XI, 304.

3 ‘Imâd, III, f. 58a, shows also that the time-honoured practice of making lavish gifts to the ‘notables, nobles, dignitaries, religious leaders, poets, saints, etc.’ at Baghdad was not neglected.

4 After the battle of Marj ‘Uyun and again after Taql ad-Din’s campaign against Qilij Arsân, dispatches were sent to Mujâhid ad-Dîn Qâymaz at Mosul: ‘Imâd, Barq, III, ff. 134-5, 139-9.
The rivalries and secret or overt communications of the Zangids with the Franks undermined their own cause, and it seems even that the doctrine of legal rights, so industriously pursued by Saladin, helped to turn the scale. He had only to repeat the tactics employed by Nūr ad-Dīn himself against Damascus: to weaken the opposing party by encouraging defections and by organizing military demonstrations at appropriate moments, at the same time observing to the letter his treaty obligations and the sovereign rights of the Caliphate.

Saladin's history during the next six years, 1179 to 1185, is the record of his successive advances towards this aim. The complex tale of campaigns and negotiations with the minor princes of Mesopotamia, the Zangids of Mosul, and the envoys of the Caliphate, though not difficult to unravel, is difficult to present without entering into a mass of detail. With this main thread in the narrative, two others are interwoven: the continued warfare with Jerusalem, and the problems of internal administration and relations between his relatives and vassals. For the sake of clarity, we shall deal with these aspects separately.

During the campaigns of 1179, the Seljuq Sultan of Rūm, Qīlij A онлān, who had in the previous year sent an envoy to assure Saladin of his friendship, suddenly demanded the cession of Raḥbān, captured by Saladin in 1176 from aq-Ṣalīh. ad-Dīn Qāyūmāz. Although Qāyūmāz directed the defence of Mosul against Saladin in 578/1182, his dismissal by 'Izz ad-Dīn in the following year was immediately followed by the abdication of his two beys of Irbil and Jazīrāt ibn 'Umar to Saladin (Ibn al-Athīr, XI, 329; Bahā', Schultens, 57 = Cairo, 52) but the precise significance of these two events cannot be determined. According to Ibn al-Athīr, XI, 370, Qāyūmāz had come to power in Mosul by overthrowing the young sāhib Jalāl ad-Dīn b. Jamāl ad-Dīn, who was suspected of being on friendly terms with Saladin.

1 'Imād, dispatch cited in Barq, III, f. 123a. The envoy was instructed to inform Saladin that Qīlij A онлān was proceeding to Malʿatya 'to organize its affairs' and expected Saladin either to remain neutral or to support him. Saladin's answer was a forthright statement that he 'would not permit mutual warfare between Muslim princes instead of uniting in the jihād, and that his own friendship or hostility depended upon their attitude towards the cause of God'.
achieved even greater success than he could have anticipated. The two Sultans met on the Geuk Su in June and there, apparently, concluded the alliance which was to mean so much to Saladin in later years. Its first fruits were a short and successful campaign against Ruben of Little Armenia, on the pretext of harsh treatment of the Turkmen tribes in his territories.

Bahá’ ad-Din relates that on the conclusion of this campaign a general peace was concluded, on the initiative of Qilij Arslán, between Saladin, the Seljuq Sultan, Mosul, and the princes of Diyār Bakr at a meeting on the river Sanja, near Sumaisāt, on 2 October 1180. There is no confirmation of this statement in any other contemporary source, and indeed the evidence is all against it. For on 29 June Saif ad-Din of Mosul had died and his brother 'Izz ad-Din, setting aside Saif ad-Din’s nomination of his son Sanjarshāh, had succeeded him. On his accession 'Izz ad-Din sent an envoy to Saladin to ask his agreement to the continuance of the suzerainty of Mosul over the Mesopotamian cities seized by Saif ad-Din after Nūr ad-Din’s death in 1174. Saladin refused point-blank. These provinces, he said, were included in the general grant made to him by the Caliph, and he had left them in Saif ad-Din’s possession only in return for his promise to assist Saladin with his troops. At the same time, he sent a dispatch to Baghdād, pointing out that he could not draw indefinitely on the Egyptian forces for his Syrian campaigns but needed the armies of those provinces, and asking for a confirmation of the grant, which was sent to him accordingly.¹

The breach with Mosul was consummated by the death of as-Sālīh at Aleppo on 4 December 1181. Saladin was in Egypt at the time, and on learning of as-Sālīh’s illness had sent urgent orders to Taqi ad-Din at Ḥamāh and Farrukshāh at Damascus to occupy the western Jazīra and prevent the army of Mosul from crossing the Euphrates. But Farrukshāh was engaged in countering Reynald’s scheme of invading Arabia from Karak, and Taqi ad-Din was unable to prevent 'Izz ad-Din from entering Aleppo.² The confusion which had followed as-Sālīh’s death was ended by 'Izz ad-Din’s appointment of his own brother 'Imād ad-Din as governor of the city, in exchange for Sinjār, and after emptying the contents of its treasury and arsenal he returned to Mosul.² Saladin’s intense anxiety over the situation is shown by the succession of letters addressed to the Caliph’s diwān, contrasting the conduct of the prince of Mosul in seizing a province which had been assigned to him, while his troops were in the very act of protecting the city of the Prophet (Madīna) from the infidel, complaining that the disputes between the Muslim princes were hindering the jihad, reasserting his claim to Aleppo on the basis of his diploma from the Caliphate, and declaring that if the Exalted Commands should ordain that the prince of Mosul be invested with the government of Aleppo, then it was better to invest him with all Syria and Egypt as well.³ The urgent tone of these letters is no doubt explained partly by the necessity to counteract the similar pressure of the partisans of Mosul at Baghdād, but though propaganda points may be difficult to disentangle from religious zeal, there can be little doubt that Saladin was genuinely in earnest over the stalemate that would follow from a reunion of Mosul and Aleppo.

In May 1182 he left Cairo, accompanied by half of the newly reorganized regular army of Egypt, some 5,000 troopers in all,⁴ and rejoined his lieutenants in Syria. After an

¹ Dispatches quoted by Abu Shāma, II, 22–3. Ibn al-Athir, XI, 312, 315, relates that there was a rising at Hamah, and that Taqi ad-Din was forced to flee back to Hamah from Manbij. In the absence of confirmation, his statements must be treated with suspicion.

² Abu Shāma, II, 22 (quoting Bahā’, Schultens, 48 = Cairo, 44–5). The latter (who was still at the time a qādi in Mosul) adds that his troops refused to face the campaigns against Saladin which the occupation of Aleppo would entail, and that the generalissimo Mujahid ad-Dīn Qāyūm ‘could not stomach the rudeness of the Syrian amirs’. On the confused situation at Aleppo before 'Imād ad-Din’s establishment see C. Cahen, La Syrie du nord à l’époque des croisades, Paris, 1940, p. 431.

³ Dispatches quoted by Abu Shāma, II, 23.

⁴ 'Imād, apud Abu Shāma, II, 27 (the first five pages of the MS. of vol. V of Bayr (Bodl. Marsh. 425) are missing). Al-Maqrizi, Kitāb, I, 86 (ed. Wiet, II, 1, 17), preserves a report from the diary of al-Šāhī on the reorganization of the Egyptian 'āshar in Rajab 577 (November 1181), giving the total numbers as
unsuccessful coup de main against Beirut by sea and land, he marched with his Egyptian forces on Aleppo, fortified in his purpose by the Caliph’s diploma. But before investing it, he was visited by Muẓaffar ad-Dīn Geukburi, the governor of Ḥarrān, with an urgent invitation to cross the Euphrates and assurances that he would be welcomed on all sides. Accordingly, since he was in fact, by virtue of the Caliph’s diploma, lawful ruler of the Euphrates and Khābūr provinces, Saladin crossed the Euphrates at the end of September and with only scattered opposition occupied the former possession of the atābeg Nūr ad-Dīn in the Jazīra. 3 Izz ad-Dīn attempted to

11 amīr, 6572 tawāshīr or regular mamlūks, and 1553 qarāḥūkāmah, i.e., 8,640 in all, exclusive of unbeneficed (mahlūk, i.e., free) troopers, Arabs, and the remains of the Fātimid regiments. In a brief and incomplete note by Ibn Māmmati (p. 360), the pay and allowances for each category of troops are listed on the basis of the assessed value (libra), the money account being the dinār jundi.

1 Ibn al-Athīr, XI, 317, asserts that the march on Aleppo was a feint, and to give substance to his statement, represents Geukburi as having made his proposition to Saladin during the attack on Beirut. But ‘Imād (Barq, f. 5b) says definitely that Saladin intended to attack Aleppo and (ibid., 8b) speaks of Geukburi’s envoy arriving unexpectedly (wa-ma shaharā illā bissālī Muẓaffar ad-Dīn) to propose the change of plan after the halt before Aleppo, subsequently reinforced by the arrival of Geukburi himself. That Saladin had in fact received the diploma for Aleppo is clear from al-Fāḍil’s letter to the dinār jundi after its capture, which opens with the words ‘This homage is sent after he has received the surrender of the city of Aleppo, in obedience to the command issued to him’ (‘Imād, Barq, V, f. 90b). صدر هذه الحملة وقد تسلم كلمة حامض محتوى لم يرغ ولم يكن له الوارد عليه واضحاً حيث تلقاه الأخبار.

2 ‘Imād, Barq, V, ff. 8b–9a. Michel le syrien, III, 389, also attributes the initiative to Geukburi, and mentions the dispersal of the forces of Mosul and its vassals on Saladin’s advance. Ibn Abī Tāyyīr (apud Abū Shāma, II, 30) asserts that Geukburi (who had formerly commanded the armies of Mosul) had been shahāna of Aleppo and tried to seize the citadel, but was foiled and given Ḥarrān instead by Izz ad-Dīn when the latter made the exchange with ‘Imād ad-Dīn. Kamāl ad-Dīn (Blothet, 72–3) asserts that ‘Imād ad-Dīn himself proposed to Saladin that he should capture Sinjār and give it back to him in exchange for Aleppo. But although some years earlier ‘Imād ad-Dīn had appealed to Saladin when Saif ad-Dīn besieged him in Sinjār (see p. 18, n. 2 above), there is nothing in the very detailed narrative of the secretary ‘Imād to support the story, which is most probably an anticipation of the arrangement made on the surrender of Aleppo. It may well, however, have been in Saladin’s mind.

3 Saladin crossed at al-Bira, whose governor had appealed to him earlier in the year for assistance against the aggression of the Artuqid prince of Mardin at the instigation of Izz ad-Dīn (Ibn al-Athīr, XI, 317–18). Sinjār surrendered and its governor, Ibn Malik, was confirmed in possession. At Edessa the governor az-Za’farānī resisted, but after a siege of three days surrendered and

take the field against him, but was foiled by the opposition of his own officers and the open adhesion to Saladin of his chief vassal, the Artuqid prince of Ḥīṣn Kaifa, Nūr ad-Dīn ibn Qarā Arslān. The sole result of his action was to supply Saladin with a valid reason for advancing on Mosul itself, an action justified by him in a lengthy dispatch to Bagdad, accusing the rulers of Mosul of paying the Franks to attack him, of oppression of their subjects, and finally of appealing to the sworn enemy of the Caliphate, the Seljuk atābeg in Persia. The last accusation is confirmed by the Mosul sources; in desperation ‘Izz ad-Dīn was seeking help in every direction and sent Bahī ad-Dīn himself to ask for the Caliph’s support against Saladin. In response to this appeal, the Caliph sent

the city was given to Geukburi. Ibn al-Athīr’s statement (ibid., 318) that ‘Izz ad-Dīn sent forces to defend Edessa is not supported by other sources, but the fact of the siege (not mentioned by Abū Shāma) is confirmed by ‘Imād, Barq, V, f. 20a. Raqqa was held by Saladin’s old rival Ya‘qūb al-Manbijji, who joined ‘Izz ad-Dīn, and the town was given to the former governor of Edessa, az-Za’farānī. The Khābūr province was rapidly overrun and was given to the Kurdish general Jamal ad-Dīn Khushurātin (on whom, see Ibn Abī Tāyyīr, apud Abū Shāma, I, 167 foot. He had distinguished himself at the battle of Marj ‘Uyun by taking Baldwin, son of Baldwin, prisoner: ‘Imād, Barq, III, 130b–131a). The citadel at Naṣīfīn also held out for a few days, and another Kurd, Husam ad-Dīn Abū-l-Hajāj, was installed as governor, but subsequently removed for his oppressive conduct (‘Imād, apud Abū Shāma, II, 33). With his usual liberality the campaign proved almost too successful for Saladin’s financial resources, and he was forced to send urgent requests for money to Farrukkhāsh and al-‘Adil: ‘Every time a city opens its gates, desires open their mouths; the treasuries are exhausted by expenditure and donations, and we have entered a sea which nothing will bar but another sea’ (Abū Shāma, II, 30, from ‘Imād, Barq, V, ff. 19–22, 13). The whole campaign, down to the action of Nūr ad-Dīn’s brother Qari Arslān in joining Saladin and the appeal of the ruler of Mosul to the princes of Azerbaijan and Northern Persia, is strikingly reminiscent of Nūr ad-Dīn’s own campaign against Mosul in 1166/1170: Ibn al-Athīr, XI, 328–9.

4 ‘Imād, Barq, V, 19a (Abū Shāma, II, 32), relates that the prince Nūr ad-Dīn’s envoy reached Saladin at Bira, and undertook on his behalf to give loyal service if Saladin would promise to obtain ‘Amid for him.


6 Bahī, Schultens, 50 = Cairo, 46. He adds that Jahān-Pahlavān replied by an offer to help on conditions ‘which were more perilous even than fighting Saladin’, i.e. the recognition of the suzerainty of Sultan Tughhrī.
a delegate to mediate between the parties, and for a month protracted negotiations went on, while Saladin’s nephew Taqi ad-Din and brother Taj al-Muluk continued to prosecute the siege.¹

It must be emphasized that the point at issue in these negotiations was not at any time Saladin’s claim to the physical possession of Mosul, but the terms on which the prince of Mosul would adhere to Saladin and send his armies to co-operate in the war with the Franks. On this first occasion the main object of the Zangid prince was to retain his suzerainy over Aleppo, and although Saladin, anxious to reach an agreement, yielded to all his demands short of this, he refused to ratify the terms. At the urgent intercession of the Shaikh, Saladin agreed to withdraw from Mosul, but refused to continue the negotiations.² The fact that they were set on foot had severely strained the confidence of his new vassals in the Jazira and, in order to reassure them, he announced to the divân his firm determination not to leave the province until he had completed the conquest of it.³

He began, therefore, by besieging Izz ad-Din’s brother in Sinjar, with the assistance of Nur ad-Din of Hisn Kafis. It was surrendered on terms after fifteen days (30 December 1183).¹

¹ Imad, Barq, V, 15a, and in his dispatch to the divan, ibid., 23a, says that in response to the Shaikh’s appeals, Saladin stopped active operations during the negotiations, but does not imply that the siege was lifted. He encamped before Mosul on 11 Rajab (10 November) and left about 12 Sha‘bân (31 December). The Shaikh ash-Shuyukh was ‘Abd al-Rahîm b. Isma‘îl b. Âhmad al-Nâsîbî, the son of a celebrated Shâfi’i scholar known as Abû Sa‘îd b. Abî Shâhî, see Subki, Tadhqîq at Shafi‘iya. IV, 204. Saladin had been in correspondence with him for some years; a dispatch addressed to him in Âût. 575 (‘Imad, Barq, III, 134a–135a) on the exploits of the Egyptian fleet in the Red Sea, opens with an apology for an intermission in the correspondence.

² The whole course of the negotiations is narrated at length by ‘Imad who was himself one of the negotiators, in Barq, V, ff. 11–12, 15–16. According to his account, when the Shaikh ash-Shuyukh, after the rejection of the agreement, finally left Mosul in anger at the duplicity of the Mosul authorities, he returned to Saladin and ‘told him what he had seen and heard of their divisions’. There is no indication of the roles played by the envoys of Qizil Arslan of Azerbaijan and Shâh Arman of Khulat, who also offered to mediate (‘Imad, Barq, V, f. 20a; Ibn al-Âthîr, XI, 321). Saladin’s refusal to resume negotiations is contained in a later dispatch to Shaikh ash-Shuyukh, ‘Imad, Barq, V, 33a.

³ ‘Imad, Barq, V, ff. 12a–b, and dispatch written by ‘Imad to the divan, ibid., 23b–24a.

and the garrison was evacuated to Mosul.¹ After Dârâ also had been surrendered by its Artuqid prince Bahrân, Saladin dismissed his forces and went into winter quarters at Harrân with his regiment of guards at the end of February 1183. But that he had no intention of relaxing the pressure upon Izz ad-Din is shown by the vigorous correspondence directed to the chief ministers at Bagdad and repeated requests for his recognition as suzerain of Mosul.² Though this was still withheld, his application to receive the Caliph’s diploma for Âmid was granted.³ In April ‘Izz ad-Din made a last attempt to rally his remaining allies,⁴ but Saladin called up Taqi ad-Din from Hamâh and on his approach the coalition was dissolved. Without waiting for the remainder of his forces, he at once laid siege to the all but impregnable fortress of Âmid in Diyar Bakr, in pursuance of his promise to Nur ad-Din. Its surrender within three weeks set the seal on his reputation, and his quixotic generosity, both to the defeated governor and in handing it over with its immense stores intact to Nur

¹ A relieving force sent from Mosul towards Sinjar was surprised by Taqi ad-Din at Aranjan and sent back stripped of its equipment (‘Imad, Barq, V, 17a). Shâh Arman again attempted to intercede with Saladin for Sinjar, but refused to accept his terms (ibid., 50b). The capture of the town is attributed by Ibn al-Âthîr (XI, 321) to the treachery of a Kurdish amir, who admitted the besiegers by night. This story is to some extent confirmed by the implications of ‘Imad’s account: Barq, V, 27b) (not in Abû Shâma). Lane-Poole’s statement that Sinjar was sacked (Saladin, London, 1898, 171) does not appear to be based on any of the firsthand sources. Sinjar was given in fief to Sa‘îd ad-Din Mas’ud b. Unar, the son of Mu‘in ad-Din Unar, the former prince of Damascus, with whom Saladin left a party of his own officers (‘Imad, Barq, V, 31a). Bahâ’s statement (Shultens, 40 = Cairo, 40) that it was given to Taqi ad-Din is erroneous; the actual diploma of Sa‘îd ad-Din’s appointment is reproduced in the Barq. It seems clear that Saladin did not give it to any of his relations or princely vassals, since he wished to hold it in reserve for ‘Imad ad-Din of Aleppo (see p. 31, n. 2 above). A noteworthy feature of ‘Imad’s account of the siege is his description of the sobriety and discipline of Saladin’s own troops, whom he contrasts with the disorderly Kurds in the Artuqid army (17b).

² Dispatches from al-Fâdîl and ‘Imad to the divan (‘Imad, Barq, V, ff. 23–4, 34–5) and to the Shaikh ash-Shuyukh (32–3).


⁴ The armies which assembled at Khurram (near Mardin) were those of Mosul, of the Shâh Arman Sukman of Khiłat, Qub ad-Din Ilghazî b. Alib of Mardin, Dawushâsh of Arzana and Bidda, and some of the troops of Aleppo; ‘Imad, Barq, V, 59–2 (Abû Shâma, II, 38); dispatch of al-Fâdîl, ‘Imad, Barq, V, 53a; Ibn al-Âthîr, XI, 322.
ad-Dīn, disapproved once and for all his enemies' imputation of selfish ambition.

In his dispatches to the Caliphate after the capture of Āmid Saladin himself pointed the moral. The Caliph's authority to take and govern Āmid had unlocked its gates to him; why was the patent for Mosul still denied? This alone stood in the way of the union of Islam and the recovery of Jerusalem. Let the Commander of the Faithful compare the conduct of his clients and judge which of them had most faithfully served the cause of Islam. If Saladin insists on the inclusion of Mesopotamia and Mosul in his dominions it is because 'this little Jazīra (i.e. Mesopotamia) is the lever which will set in motion the great Jazīra (i.e. the whole Arab East); it is the point of division and centre of resistance, and once it is set in its place in the chain of alliances, the whole armed might of Islam will be co-ordinated to engage the forces of unbelief.'

The submission of Āmid brought the remaining Artuqids at Mayyāfārīqīn and Mārdīn over to Saladin, and he now turned back to settle his account with Aleppo, receiving on the way the submission of the last outer fortresses of the city, Tall Khālid and 'Ain Tūb. By 21 May he was already encamped before Aleppo, with a reasonable expectation of its early surrender. Nevertheless, Nūr ad-Dīn's old guard fought against him with as much determination as ever. Saladin's secretary vividly presents the strange complexity of the conflict; neither 'Imād ad-Dīn Zangī nor Saladin was eager to fight, the former because he had set his heart on returning to Sinjār, the latter because the Nūrīya, the atābēg Nūr ad-Dīn's old guard, were 'the soldiers of the jihād, who had in the past done great services for Islam' and 'whose gallantry and courage had gained his admiration', whereas they for their part 'stirred up the flames of war' and the younger and more ardent of Saladin's own troops, notwithstanding his admonitions and those of his more experienced officers, plunged eagerly into the fray, headed by his brother Tāj al-Mulūk who was killed in the battle. After a few days he withdrew to the hill of Jawshan, overlooking the city, set his builders to construct a fortress there, and started to distribute the territories of Aleppo in fief to his own troops. 'Imād ad-Dīn Zangī saw that the critical moment had come, and secretly arranged

Yārūq, the governor of Tall Bāshī, 'in recognition of his promptitude in giving allegiance', its castle being destroyed; 'Ain Tūb remained in the possession of its governor Nābi ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Khūrāṯāqīn: 'Imād, Barq, V, 99 (Abū Shāma, II, 42).

1 The change of attitude of the citizens is indicated by the report of Kamāl ad-Dīn (III, 63; Blochet, 76) that 'Imād ad-Dīn thought it advisable to take hostages from them, 'for fear that they might surrender the city to Saladin'. It is difficult to understand the reasons for which 'Imād ad-Dīn in the preceding year had taken the step of destroying the citadels guarding the eastern approaches to Aleppo (ibid., III, 59; Blochet, 74-5).

2 'Imād, Barq, V, 178-80, relates that 'Imād ad-Dīn's account (III, 63) tallies in essentials with that of 'Imād, but he has taken some details from Ibn al-Athīr, notably the story of 'Imād ad-Dīn's interview with his amirs. Blochet has evidently misunderstood this passage, which, however, seems to have its origin in the secret of 'Imād's statement that 'he was set on putting an end to the conflict . . . and found that he was paying out 30,000 dinars a month to the troops and that if the siege were prolonged without hope of success, he would become bankrupt' (Ibn al-Athīr, Yūnus al-Dīn, 'Imād, Barq, f. 84b). It was at this juncture that he arranged to send the amir Tūmān al-Yūnūsī secretly as his emissary to Saladin 'with whom the amir was on terms of friendship from old'. The joy of victory was dimmed for Saladin by the death from wounds of his brother Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī ('Imād, Barq, 96b), a circumstance which was dramatically worked up by Ibn al-Athīr (XI, 328) with the dubious addition that he had intended to appoint Tāj al-Mulūk as governor of Aleppo.
the exchange of Aleppo for Sinjar and the eastern Jazira, on condition of his co-operation in the war with the Franks. On 11 June, Saladin's yellow banner was hoisted on the citadel, although he himself did not occupy it until 'Imād ad-Din had removed all his treasure, and secured possession of his new provinces. The Nurîya troops in turn made their submission with what, from the external events, would seem surprising readiness, were received by Saladin as old comrades in arms, and overwhelmed by his generosity. The governor of Hārîm alone held out and attempted to assure himself of support from Antioch, but was arrested by his own men, who surrendered the castle to Saladin in person on 22 June.¹

A truce with Bohemond of Antioch having been arranged on condition of the liberation of Muslim prisoners, Saladin was now in a position to retaliate on the Franks of Jerusalem for their raiding expeditions during his absence in Mesopotamia, and more especially on Reynald at Karak for his forays in Arabia and on the Red Sea. Announcing to the disîmân at Baghâd his decision to prosecute the jihād, now that the main obstacles had been removed,² he set out with the regular troops of Aleppo and the Jazira, together with the Turkmen cavalry and a large force of volunteers and auxiliaries.³ After a brief halt at Damascus, he crossed the Jordan to Baisân on 29 September, but failed to bring the main forces of the kingdom to battle.⁴ Returning to Damascus, he summoned al-ʿĀdil to join him before Karak with a body of the Egyptian troops, and laid siege to the castle in November. The Muslim forces were so confident of success that the failure of their mangonels to effect a breach produced a corresponding discouragement, and when news was received of the arrival of a relieving force at Wâl, they found excuses for putting off the attack and Saladin withdrew to rest and refit his armies.⁵

During the interval before the attack, another attempt was made to solve the problem of Mosul by negotiation. The initiative came from ʿIzz ad-Din, who had imprudently arrested his generalissimo Mujâhid ad-Din, with the result that his own nephew Sanjarshâh, at Jazîrat ibn ʿUmar, with Geukburi's brother at Irbil and the governors Takrit and Hadîtha, threw themselves on the protection of Saladin and through envoys obtained from him a guarantee of support.² 'Izz ad-Din appealed to the Caliph to send the Shaikh ash-Shuyukh once more to mediate with Saladin, 'knowing', as Saladin's secretary wrote, 'that our policy was one of strict obedience to the Caliph's commands'.³ An agreement was reached with the Shaikh on the basis that 'Izz ad-Din's rights in Mosul would be respected, and that his former vassals should be left free to choose between Saladin and him, but it was rejected by the envoy from Mosul, and so matters remained as they were, or rather worse.⁴

¹ Detailed narrative in 'Imād, Baraq, V, 118a–119a and 126b, Abû Šâma, II, 51.
² 'Imād apud Abû Šâma, II, 53, from 'Imād, Baraq, V, f. 130. Sanjarshâh had been nominated by his father Saif ad-Din to succeed him at Mosul, but was removed by ʿIzz ad-Din and compensated by the government of Jazîrat ibn ʿUmar under the control of Mujâhid ad-Din Qâyûnâz. As his title is commonly called al-Jazîra by the Arabic writers, western historians have confused it at times with Mesopotamia. It is an interesting commentary on the attitude towards Mosul in Baghâd that, according to Ibn al-Athîr, XI, 329, the Caliph an-Nâṣir had taken advantage of the same incident to seize Dûqûq. Ibn Abî Taṣâyîl apud Abû Šâma, II, 53, speaks of envoys also from al-Pahlawan, Qâzîl Arslân and Shâh Arman, but this is unlikely in itself and there is no reference to their presence in the direct sources.
³ 'Imād, Baraq, V, f. 129a.
⁴ By a rare coincidence these negotiations are reported by two writers who took a leading part in them on both sides. Bahâ‘ acompañó al jefe qâ’ar of Mosul, Muhîyî ad-Dîn al-Shahrazarî (Schultens, 57 = Cairo, 52) and his account fully agrees with that of 'Imād (Baraq, V, ff. 127a–132b) on the general conduct and outcome of the negotiations, as against the misleading statement of Ibn al-Athîr, XI, 330. 'Imād's narrative is detailed and lively, particularly in his description of the overbearing attitude of Muhîyî ad-Dîn, Saladin was anxious
⁵
For his fresh assault on Karak (August–September 1184) Saladin assembled the most powerful army that had yet operated in Syria, comprising the forces of Damascus, Aleppo, the Jazira and Sinjar, Hisham Kaif and Mardin, and a contingent from Egypt. Again it failed, and the armies were dismissed after a raiding expedition through Samaria. Back at Damascus, he found the Shaikh awaiting him with the Califh’s patents for his new provinces and official robes for his chief vassals as well as for himself. This was followed by graver news. ‘Izz ad-Din of Mosul had accepted the offers of the atabeg of Persia, and had received a reinforcement of 3,000 horsemen from the atabeg Qilij Arslan of Azerbaidjan for an attack on Irbil. Although the attack was unsuccessful, the governor called on Saladin to honour his promise, and thus provided the occasion for Saladin’s renewed assault on Mosul.

to reach an agreement, and even after Mujji ad-Din’s rejection of the formula approved by the Shaikh ash-Shuyukh made a last effort to prevent a breakdown. But the qadi refused outright to reopen discussions and by his violence and threats only managed to convince Saladin, who had been reluctant to return to Mosul’ that there was no alternative (132b: وكان السلطان قاشر العزم في العود إلى الموصل نهائدة وارتباطًا مزاحم). ‘Imad mentions also that he was related by marriage to the Shaikh ash-Shuyukh, whose wife was the daughter of his uncle, the former waqf Abú Naṣr Ahmad ibn Abū Hāmid (Burq, 128a). The extant portions of al-Barq al-Shāmī end, unfortunately, with this episode and the notification to ‘Imad ad-Din of Sinjar and to Taqī ad-Din of Saladin’s intention to resume the attack on Karak.

1 ‘Imad, apud Abū Shāma, II, 56, 60; Bahā’, Schultens, 59 = Cairo, 54. The robes were sent for al-‘Adil, Nasir ad-Din ibn Shirkūh, and Nūr ad-Din of Hīṣam Kaif, Abū Shāma quotes also the terms of Saladin’s diploma conferring Irbil on Zain ad-Din Yūsuf b. ‘Alī Kūchak, which laid stress, as usual, on the obligation of engaging in the jihād. The territories comprised in the diploma were Irbil with its citadel and dependencies, the whole region of the Great Zāb, Shahrizūr and its dependencies, the ranges (ma’dāyih) of the House of Qipchaq (Turkmen) and of Qaraqūz, ed-Dast, and the Zarāriyya (Kurds). On the widespread Turkmen-Kurd feud which broke out in 1185 and lasted for eight years, see Michel le Care, III, 400–2 (a clear account, giving many precise details).

2 ‘Imad and Bahā’, loc. cit., Ibn al-Athir, XI, 332. Ibn al-Athir stigmatizes the violence and brutality of the Persian troops of Azerbaidjān, and describes the revulsion with which Mujaḥid ad-Din observed the conduct of his new allies. Although he draws no conclusions, it is very possible that this was a factor in the submission of Mosul to Saladin in the following year. In Atabegs (R.H.C., Os., II, 2, 335–6) Ibn al-Athir relates a siege of Sanjarshāb by ‘Izz ad-Din in Bahā’, I, 581–4, at the precise date when Sanjarshāh was accompanying Saladin in his advance on Mosul. The story is revised in his Kamāl (XII, 38–40) dated 587, and the occurrence referred to ‘Izz ad-Din.

Before setting out in the following year, however, he had the good fortune to be invited by Raymond of Tripoli to agree to a truce for four years. With his rear thus protected, he assembled his forces at Aleppo in May 1185, crossed the Euphrates, and marched on Mosul, although he had been warned by the Seljuk Sultan Qilij Arslan that he would be opposed by a coalition of the ‘eastern princes’. But Mosul was in fact left to its fate, and even the Califh now refused to intervene further, presumably because (as Saladin lost no opportunity of reminding him) ‘Izz ad-Din had been forced to acknowledge the Sultan Tughril as his suzerain. During the summer heats Saladin slackened off the siege, and leaving part of his forces in front of Mosul, led the rest northwards to deal with a confused situation which had arisen there after the deaths of Nūr ad-Din and the princes of Khilāṭ and Mārīn. Before leaving, he applied to the Califh for formal investiture with the sovereignty of Armenia, Diyar Bakr, and Mosul, and received in reply the patent for ‘the supervision of Diyar Bake and the interests of its orphan princes’. With or without this, he succeeded in restoring his position in Mayyafāriqīn, Mārīn, and Āmid, although Pulawān forestalled him at Khilāṭ.

See p. 46, n. 2 below.

2 On crossing the Euphrates Saladin took a step which it is not easy to interpret with certainty. Geokbu’s envoy s had undertaken that on Saladin’s arrival at Harrān Geokbu would ‘make up his appearance, meet all the requirements in the way of supplies and expenses in that province, and pay a sum of 70,000 dinars’. The engagement was not kept, whereupon Saladin, fearing that he might be turning disloyal, dispossessed him of the citadels of Harrān and Edessa and kept him under observation. But, later on, convinced that Geokbu was really trustworthy, he restored the citadels to him (‘Imad, apud Abū Shāma, II, 61; Bahā’, Schultens, 62 = Cairo, 54–5). Ibn al-Athir (XI, 33) represents his release of Geokbu as due to fear of popular disaffection, implying that Saladin had really intended to remove him from his fiefs altogether. But it is hard to understand why, if Saladin really did not trust Geokbu, he should have cleaned him out shortly afterwards for the distinction of marrying his sister, Rabī’ā Khātūn, after the death of her first husband Mas’ud b. Unar in September 1185 (‘Imad, apud Abū Shāma, II, 67, who adds that she died in A.H. 643, the last survivor of the children of Ayūb).

3 Bahā’, Schultens, 62 = Cairo, 56; he was himself the envoy sent to Baghdad, and adds that Pulawān also refused to send assistance. For Saladin’s mission to the Califh, ‘Imad, apud Abū Shāma, II, 62.

4 Mārīn was governed by an amīr, Niḥām ad-Din b. Abūqish, on behalf of
 Returning to Mosul in November, he prepared to continue the siege through the winter. In a last attempt to stave off the now inevitable end, 'Izz ad-Din appealed to Saladin's chivalry by sending out a delegation of the Zangid princesses to intercede. But the issue at stake was too serious, and Saladin could promise no more than to accept the mediation of 'Imād ad-Dīn Zangi of Sinjar. What followed is not quite clear. Saladin suddenly fell ill, and 'repenting of his rebuff to the envoys, sent to 'Imād ad-Dīn to dispatch a mission to Mosul'. Without waiting for the conclusion of the negotiations he left Mosul on 25 December for Ḥarrān and withdrew his troops to Naṣībin. In the following February 'Izz ad-Dīn, having already been forced to concede to Saladin possession of the territories of his allies south of the Greater Zāb, including Irbil and Shahrizur, sent the qādis Bahā' ad-Dīn as his envoy to Ḥarrān with instructions to get a sworn agreement on the best terms that he could. Saladin restored to him the small district of Bain an-Nahrāin, lying between Naṣībin and the Tigris, and on swearing to these conditions was recognized as suzerain of Mosul, and 'Izz ad-Dīn undertook to send his

the minor son of Ḥiṣam ad-Dīn, and another of his amirs, Ṡasād ad-Dīn Yariqtāsh (?), had occupied Mayyāfāriqin, and held out against Saladin until an accommodation was reached through Ḥiṣam ad-Dīn's widow. On the death of Nūr ad-Dīn b. Qarā Arslān on 15 July 1185, he was succeeded by his son Ḥiṣam ad-Dīn Sukmān; but 'Imād ad-Dīn b. Qarā Arslān, who commanded his brother Nūr ad-Dīn's forces before Mosul, attempted to seize Ḥiṣam for himself. Failing in this, he seized Khartbir instead. Before returning to Mosul, Saladin left his trusted mamluk Ḥusām ad-Dīn Sunqū al-Khāliṭī in command of Diyar Bakr. Michel le syrien, II, 397, mentions the seizure of Shabkhan by the governor of Edessa from Mārdis on Saladin's orders, and an unsuccessful attack by the troops of Mārdis on Edessa; after which Saladin advanced on Mārdis, but 'being unable to capture it by flattering promises', he accepted the ruler of Mārdis as a direct vassal.

1 Ibn al-Athir, XI, 337, places this incident at the beginning of the siege, and attempts to deny that it was an indication of the weakness of 'Izz ad-Dīn's position. But 'Imād (Abū Shāma, II, 64) places it, more credibly, after Saladin's return from Mayyāfāriqin. That it was, in fact, a desperate expedient is shown by the similar action of Ibn Nīṣān during the siege of Amīd (see Abū Shāma, II, 40). A typical example of pseudo-historical 'reconciliation' is given by Abu'l-Hajjāj Barbuqrus in his Syriac Chronography (tr. Budge, London, 1932, 316) where, drawing upon both 'Imād ad-Dīn and Ibn al-Athir, he combines the two narratives and on Saladin's return says 'the men of Mosul sent those same women a second time to supplicate for peace.'

troops to support him in the reconquest of Palestine.2 The grand coalition was formed at last.

Throughout all these years, in which Saladin was devoting his chief attention to organizing the forces for the coming struggle, it was clearly to his advantage to avoid any major operations against the Franks. In 1180, after the defeats inflicted on them during the previous year, and in view of the shortage of supplies due to a succession of years of drought, he had willingly agreed to a truce with Baldwin on both land and sea. Raymond of Tripoli had, it seems, refused to become a consenting party, and was only brought to reason by a series of devastating raids as well as the seizure of Aradus by the Egyptian fleet.2 One of the most important stipulations from Saladin's point of view was the freedom of trade, since the route between Egypt and Damascus, lying as it did between the Crusading castles in the coastal province and the outposts of Karak and Shawbak, was precarious and exposed and in times of warfare caravans had to be conveyed by bodies of troops. It was the violation of this condition by Reynald of Karak in 1182 which gave the signal for the reopening of hostilities. Already in the autumn of 1181 he had made a raid on Taimā, in the northern Hijāz, from which he was recalled by an energetic counterattack on Transjordan by Farukhshāh from Damascus. This was bad enough, but Saladin made no move until Reynald seized a caravan on its way from Damascus to Mecca. After all efforts to repair the wrong had failed, he took the field in the spring of 1182. Though his forces were not yet strong enough for a decisive blow, he no doubt hoped to inflict some further losses on the Franks. Baldwin's defensive
tactics, however, prevented a major engagement but left the countryside open to the raids of Farrukhshāh's cavalry, with the booty from which the Muslim forces retired well-content to Damascus.

Saladin's next operation was of a more audacious kind. As early as 1177 he had begun to reorganize the Egyptian fleet, making it a separate and independent department under its own head, with powers to take all the materials and impress all the men that it needed, and at the same time raising its grades of pay.† By the middle of the same year, the 'fleets of Alexandria and Damietta' were already engaged in raiding,‡ and in 1179 they carried out a daring attack on 'Akkā and the Syrian coast, 'such as no Muslim fleet had ever been known to make'.§ The seizure of Aradus in the following year has already been mentioned. In the general reorganization of the Egyptian forces which Saladin made in 1181, the fleet was still further strengthened.¶ He now planned a combined land and sea operation against Beirut in the hope of taking it by surprise. The plan was skilfully carried out, but the garrison held off his assaults until Baldwin was ready to relieve them, when Saladin, who had come out only with light raiding equipment, withdrew, reassembled his forces at Ba'labak, and marched northwards.‖

† 'Imād and Ibn Abī Tāyyî, apud Abū Shāmā, I, 269; most of the details are supplied by Ibn Abī Tāyyî. The raising of the rates of pay is reported by Al-Maqṣūrî, Sulākh, I, 457; the dinār al-usūfî (i.e. proportion of pay and allowance given to naval personnel in relation to the assessed value of the ships allotted to them) was raised from five-eighths to three-quarters. The qualities of the men pressed into the navy are severely judged by 'Imād after the defeat of the fleet before Tyre in 1187: 'Imād, Fatḥ, 81.
‡ 'Imād, apud Abū Shāmā, I, 270.
§ Dispatch of al-Fālîq quoted Abū Shāmā, II, 13-14. In this dispatch (p. 14, l. 1) and in the report by Ibn Juhâr (ed. G.M.S., p. 59, l. 20) special mention is made of the Maghribî sailors recruited for the fleet.
¶ See n. 1 above. Summary notices of the measures for strengthening the fleet in this year are preserved by Al-Maqṣūrî, Sulākh, I, 73.
‖ In the absence of the narrative in Barq of 'Imād ad-Dîn, on which the brief statement in Abū Shāmā, II, 29, is based, the fullest account is that of William of Tyre, XXII, cc. 17-18 (trans., II, 475-9), who confirms 'Imād's statement that Saladin had no heavy equipment with him. This raises the question of Saladin's object in making the raid, for it seems improbable that he should have intended to hold Beirut, which as an isolated and not naturally strong fortress lying between Jerusalem and Tripoli would have been untenable in these circumstances. It is just conceivable that he may have had plans at this stage to use Beirut as a base for more extensive operations against either Tripoli or Jerusalem, and to widen his holding sufficiently to establish a corridor to the coast. But the troops at his disposal were obviously too few to hold an exposed position of this kind. It is certain from our documentation that Saladin was convinced that no decisive action was possible in Palestine until Aleppo was brought under his control and he could utilize also the Mosopotamian forces; and since it is probable that he had already determined to march on Aleppo in the course of this year, he could not extend his forces in the south, but on the contrary had to concentrate them. The evidence consequently seems to point to the conclusion that the attack on Beirut was conceived simply as a raid.

1 The phrase is quoted by Ibn al-Athîr, XI, 219, and may be no more than ben trovato. But William of Tyre, XXII, 20 (trans., II, 481) makes no secret of the fact that the Franks regarded the absence of Saladin's army as an opportunity for ravaging rather than for attempting any substantial conquest, and that they were not a little indignant at the way in which he turned his back on them.
2 See, e.g., Ibn Juhâr, 59, who was present during the parade of prisoners at Alexandria in the following May. The main account of the episode is that given by 'Imād, Barq, V, ff. 42 sqq., very adequately summarized by Abū Shāmā, II, 35.
3 William of Tyre, XXIII, prefacc (trans., II, 306): 'In punishment for our sins the enemy has become stronger than ourselves and we who used to triumph over our foes and customarily bore away the glorious palm of victory now, deprived of divine favour, retire from the field in ignominious defeat after nearly every conflict.'
served one useful purpose nevertheless, in that it brought together for the first time most of the diverse contingents of Saladin’s army and gave them some much-needed practice in combined operations. The Egyptian fleet also continued its activities in both of these years, although in less spectacular ways. Raymond of Tripoli and the barons were, therefore, ready enough to ask for the armistice which, in the spring of 1185, freed Saladin for his final campaign against Mosul.  

Saladin’s most conspicuous weakness was in the field of administration. Each extension of his territories involved the selection of a governor who would maintain his own principles and loyalty co-operate in the great design. But across this there cut the intense loyalty which he felt towards the members of his family, a trait in him which was perhaps reinforced by his Kurdish origin. He gave them his complete confidence and expected of them an equal confidence and loyalty in return. Himself completely indifferent to the material rewards of power, he seems to have had no conception of the corrupting

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2 The main authority is Ernouf (Chronique d’Ernouf et de Bernard le trésorier, ed. M. Daniel, 187, 5, 12, 14), who attributes Raymond’s action to the desire of the harvest and threat of famine, and adds that Saladin immediately supplied the Christians with ample stocks of food, whereby Raymond acquired great popularity. The only direct mention of the armistice in the Muslim sources is in Kamāl ad-Dīn (II, 50; Bioclet, 95), but it is referred to by *’Imād, Abū Shāma, II, 52;* the original has been misunderstood by Ibn al-Athir, XI, 348, and presented as a separate truce with Raymond. The bearing of the armistice has been misrepresented both by Lane-Poole and by Grousset. The former (Saladin, 187) asserts that ‘With Raymond it was more than a truce; it was an offensive and defensive alliance. Saladin was to support him in his designs on the crown.’ This anticipates the events of 1186-7, and has no authority whatsoever in the sources. Grousset’s comment is still more astonishing: ‘La conclusion de cette trêve prouve que Saladin, satisfaite de la constitution de son vaste empire syro-égyptien, en arrivait, misgéré ses proclamations en faveur de la guerre sainte, a tolérer pratiquement l’établissement franque de Sahel’ (Grousset, *Histoire des Crusades*, Paris, 1934-6, II, 761). It would be impossible to misunderstand Saladin’s character more completely. This is to restate the cynical view that is represented by Ibn al-Athir, and even to enlarge on it, for even Ibn al-Athir never doubts Saladin’s ultimate object. It may be asked further what was the ‘satisfaction’ that the mere constitution of an empire gave to him. In a letter written after the occupation of Aleppo he had said: ‘Our desire in the possession of territories is their men, not their money, their military force, not the abundance of their goods, their readiness to engage the enemy, not their material comfort!’ (Abū Shāma, II, 43), and there is not a single action of his career which conflicts with this declaration.

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1 On Tūránshāh’s power at Damascus see p. 20, n. 1 above. Similarly, ‘Imād says of al-Adil’s government in Egypt: ‘وَهُوُ مِسْتَقِلٌ بِالْأَمْرِ وَالْأَنْهَى’... إِبْرَاهِيمُ السَّاعِدُ وَكَحْلُ حَمْةَ الطُّورُقَةَ... وَسَلَامُ الدِّيْنِ العَسَرِيِّ رَبِّيْ عَلَى الْفِتْرَةِ... وَهُوَ يَهِدُ’ (‘Imād, *Barq*, V, f. 116b.) The terms of Ibn al-Muqaddam’s diploma as governor of Damascus (‘Imād, *Barq*, V, 67b; 47b) present even more clearly the principles of Saladin’s administration. Michel le syrien, III, 409, 410, says categorically that Taqi ad-Dīn, al-Adil, and Saladin’s three sons al-Afdal (Damascus), al-Aziz (Egypt), and az-Zahir (Aleppo) were called by the title of Sultan.

2 ‘Imād, *apud* Abū Shāma, II, 69. It is in this connection that Ibn al-Athir (XI, 341) finds, for the one and only time, an occasion to charge Saladin with the appropriation of property. After relating, on the authority of some unknown persons, but with a repudiation of any personal responsibility for the story ‘ذَكَرَهُ وَأَعْلَمَهُ’ (‘Imād, *Barq*, V, f. 116b), that Nāṣir ad-Dīn was poisoned at Saladin’s instigation, he states as a fact that Saladin reviewed his cousin’s possessions and ‘took most of them, leaving for his son only what was useless’, and embroiders the story with a malicious tailpiece, introduced, significantly, by ‘And I have heard that...’ (‘الَّذِيْ بَدْ أَهْلَهُ’). But ‘Imād, who was an eyewitness, states categorically that Saladin had Nāṣir ad-Dīn’s possessions inventoried and divided the whole of them in the legal proportions between his widow, his son, and his daughter, ‘without bestowing a single glance on them’.

frequent prohibitions of 'illegal' taxes and other oppressive practices in his rescripts and diplomas, and occasional specific references to the conduct of sheikholders. But he had little patience with the perpetual and petty, but necessary, details of daily administration, and the lack of his personal supervision made itself felt.

From the time he left Egypt to occupy Damascus in 1175, his viceroy there had been his brother Saīf ad-Din al-Ādil, and in 1179 his nephew Farrukhshāh had replaced Turānshāh in Damascus. Farrukhshāh's brother Taqī ad-Dīn 'Umar held Ḥamāh and its northern dependencies, and still had hopes of an African empire. In 1182 the state of anarchy in Yemen led to the appointment of Saladin's brother Tughtaqīn as viceroy in that province, and on Farrukhshāh's death in the same year Ibn al-Muqaddam was reinstated as governor of Damascus. The occupation of Aleppo in 1183 involved a major reorganization. Saladin at first invested his own son az-Zāhir Ghāzī 'as Sultan with a number of trusted officers to support him, but this arrangement was challenged by al-Ādil, who asked that he might exchange the government of Egypt for that of Aleppo. Whatever Saladin's regrets at deposing his favourite son may have been, he agreed without demur, and the diploma of appointment, which was drawn up in terms of brotherly affection unusual for such formal documents, conferred on al-Ādil unrestricted authority, subject to the usual stipulations that he should furnish a fixed sum for the arsenal and treasury of the jihād and a fixed number of foot-soldiers. On the advice of his trusted counsellor, the Al-Qādī al-Fādīl, he replaced al-Ādil in Egypt by Taqī ad-Dīn 'Umar, but with a well-justified fear of his impetuosity reluctantly sent the Qādī with him to exercise a moderating influence.

During his grave illness, several of his relatives, anticipating his death, began to make dispositions in their own interests. Partly because of this, partly because he was anxious to establish his own sons, now in their teens, he distributed the provinces in 1186. Al-Ādil, on his own suggestion, was reappointed to Egypt, not, however, in full possession but as guardian of Saladin's son al-Azīz 'Uthmān. Taqī ad-Dīn took his deposition in bad part, and for a moment threatened to go out west, taking with him a large part of the Egyptian army. Nevertheless, he at length obeyed Saladin's order to present himself in Damascus and was reappointed to his fiefs in the north, together with Mayyāfārīqīn in Diyar Bakr. Aleppo was restored to az-Zāhir Ghāzī.

In any estimate of Saladin's career the chief place must be given to the efforts by which he built up the material power

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1 The manṣūḥ is transcribed in full in 'Imād, Barq, V, ff. 124a–126a. By 'foot-soldiers' are meant, in all probability, siege-troops, who are actually found accompanying the 'askar of Aleppo to the siege of Tyre ('Imād, Fatḥ, 75). Ibn Abī Ṭayyī, apud Abū Shāma, II, 52, asserts that al-Ādil wished Saladin to draw up a contract of sale for Aleppo, but he refused, saying 'Do you imagine that cities are bought and sold?'

2 'Imād, Barq, V, f. 117b.

3 'Imād, Barq, V, 120b, followed by the text of the manṣūḥ (in much more formal terms), 121a–122b. Taqī ad-Dīn retained at the same time his fief of Ḥamāh. The exchange was carried through at the siege of Karak in 1183, when al-Ādil came up from Egypt with his contingent, and Taqī ad-Dīn and his personal troops went back with it.

4 Ibn Khallikān (No. 856, Wafâyāt al-ʿayān, XII, 58; de Slane, IV, 511 (also R.H.C., Or., III, 411)) relates a story that one of his officers reproached him on his recovery for appointing his brothers to all the great fiefs and leaving his sons unsupported.

5 'Imād, apud Abū Shāma, II, 69–70; Bahā', 64–5. When, however, Taqī ad-Dīn summoned his troops from Egypt to rejoin him, he detached his qamlūk Yūsūf with a cavalry force to join Qārāqūsh in the Maghrib.
now about to be discharged upon the Franks with accumulated force. But there was another, less obvious, group of activities which were being prosecuted at the same time and to the same end. The extent to which Saladin’s diplomacy was employed to isolate the Franks in Syria and to ensure that as far as possible he should be on terms of peace, if not of friendship, with every external potential antagonist before opening his decisive campaign, has not been sufficiently appreciated. It was directed on two fronts.

The Muslims in Syria and Egypt were well aware of the large place that the trading interests of the Italian republics represented in the maintenance of the Latin states, and of the rivalries between Pisa, Genoa, and Venice. From the beginning of his government Saladin made efforts to attract their trade to Egypt, trade which, in view of his control of the Red Sea, might have the double advantage of increasing his own resources and diminishing the value of the Syrian trade. The earliest treaty which has so far been attested was one with Pisa in 1173,1 and its utility was demonstrated in the following year, when the Pisans and other European merchants assisted the Egyptian forces against the Sicilians at Alexandria.2 Saladin’s own letter to Baghdad on this occasion affirms the existence of treaties with Genoa and Venice as well: ‘There is not one of them but supplies our land with its materials of war... and treaties of peaceful intercourse have been negotiated with them all.’ Three years later, a letter from al-Fāḍil to Saladin refers in passing to the ‘envoys of the different peoples’ in Cairo,4 and there can be no doubt that this trade greatly assisted the reconstruction of the Egyptian fleet.

Still more effective for Saladin’s purpose were the diplomatic negotiations with Constantinople. The efforts of the Greeks to persuade the Latins in Syria to co-operate in attacks on Egypt constituted a standing threat to its security. At the same time, it was difficult to reach an agreement with them, without turning the Seljuqs of Anatolia against him. The disaster inflicted on Manuel’s army by Qilij Arslan at Myriakephalon in 1176, however, ended for a time direct hostilities between them, and on Manuel’s death in 1180 his successors took the initiative in opening relations with Saladin, which were affirmed by a treaty in 1181. The growing hostility between the Greeks and Latins increased the utility and frequency of these relations, which were maintained between Saladin and both Isaac Angelus at Constantinople and Isaac Comnenus in Cyprus.1 Such terms of friendship with the traditional foes of Islam were no doubt sufficiently justified in Saladin’s eyes by their immediate advantage, but they gave him the further satisfaction of restoring, if only temporarily, the old institution of Muslim worship at Constantinople in the name of the ‘Abbāsid Caliph.’2

By the end of 1186 everything was organized and ready for the signal. But Saladin was still bound by the terms of the treaty of 1185 and had to wait until he was furnished with a casus belli. A promising opening had been offered by the conflict between Raymond of Tripoli and Guy, and the ensuing alliance between Raymond and the Sultan.3 Some of his troops were actually sent to reinforce the garrison of

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1 Cf. C. Cahen, Syrie du nord, 422–5; Rohricht, Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem, 1200–1291, Innsbruck, 1898, 493–4. The report from a Latin source of the terms agreed on between Saladin and Adonicus Comnenus (Grousset, II, 751, note) is suspect, and improbable in detail.
2 Baha’, Schultens, 120–30 = Cairo, 115–16 and ‘Imad, opud Abu Shāma, II, 159 inf. It is probable that this had not been done since the beginning of the Crusades.
3 ‘Imād, Fath, 17–18, and Abu Shāma, II, 74. Ibn al-Athir, XI, 347–8, gives a reconstruction of this passage, adding the implausible statement that ‘Saladin guaranteed that he would make him the future king of all the Franks.’ ‘Imad says only that ‘Raymond whipped up the Sultan’s determination to attack them, that he might restore the kingdom to him’.
'Tiberias; consequently, Guy’s first intention, urged on by the Master of the Templars, to attack Tiberias would have had the effect of setting the war in motion. Early in 1187 Reynald of Karak made his fatal blunder of attacking a Mec-
can trading-caravan in violation of his engagements, and refused to yield up his booty in response either to the threats of Saladin or the appeals of the king. Saladin, vowing vengeance, issued the summons to all his viceroyos and vassals, and himself set out with his guard on 14 March to protect the return of the pilgrim caravan. The Egyptian contingent, arriving after some delay, joined in ravaging the lands of Karak and Shawbak, and returned with him to Damascus two months later; meanwhile, the contingents from Damascus, Aleppo, Mesopotamia, Mosul, and Diyar Bakr assembled at Râ’s al-Mâ², and raided the country of Tiberias. At Saffuriyya a body of Templars and Hospitalers, disregarding Raymond’s instructions, engaged a powerful force making a demonstra-
tion raid on 1 May, and were killed or captured almost to a man.  

At the end of May Saladin reviewed the combined forces at ‘Ashtarā in Hawrān. The regular contingents mustered 12,000, with possibly as many again of auxiliary troops and irregulars. ‘To each amîr he assigned his place on the left or right wing, from which he might not depart; no contingent must absent itself, nor a single man leave. From each company he picked out the advance guard of archers . . . and said: “When we enter the enemy’s territory, this is the order of our forces and these the positions of our companies.”’

On Friday, 26 June, he set out for Palestine and after a halt of five days at Uqhuwān, at the south end of the lake, advanced into the hills above Tiberias. While the two armies lay opposite one another, Saladin, whether by accident or design, led his guards and siege personnel to Tiberias on Thursday, 2 July. Raymond’s countess held the castle against his assault, but her appeal to Guy for help secured the opportu-

The overwhelming character of the victory at Ḥattīn (4 July) was proved immediately by the tale of cities and  

| ‘Askar of Aleppo | 1,000 |
| Mesopotamia, Mosul, and Diyar Bakr contingents | 5,000 |

There is no indication at all in the Arabic sources of the numbers of auxiliary troops, foot-soldiers, and irregulars, but their presence at the Battle of Ḥattīn is casually attested, in particular by ‘Imād’s statement that the grass was set on fire by ‘some of the volunteers for the Holy War’. (بعض متطوعي المجاهدين).

1 Imād, Fath, 19.
2 It is well known from Ernoul’s narrative (158-62) that Raymond himself opposed the advance and that Guy gave the signal for it on the persuasion of the Master of the Temple. ‘Imād in his epic, but, of course, imaginative presenta-
tion of the scene in the Crusaders’ camp, pictures Raymond as the instigator of the march and precisely reverses his argument (‘Imād, Fath, 22: وفِيمَا بَلْدَةٍ تُبَنَّى طَرْبِيْرَةِ . . . فَأَلْقَلُوْلَمُ لِقَلْدَمُ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ وَإِنْ تَأْخَذُواْ Wlqalas Snum: القوبض يمنح طيرية... قال لهم لامعده يعد يوم ولا بد لنا من وقم القوم اذا . أتى طيرية أتى البلاد وذهب الطراف والبلاد. (On the other hand his statement as to Saladin’s reception of the news can be taken at face value: ‘He was rejoiced on learning of their advance and said ‘At last we have got what we want!’’ It is interesting that Ibn al-Athir (XI, 352), also developing the theme on his customary lines of imaginary dialogue, hits off Raymond’s attitude correctly, at least in the first part of the argument.
3 On the battle itself there is little to be added to the narratives of Rohricht (Geschichte, 431-41) or Lane-Poole (Saladin, 209-15). (Grousset, II, 791-9, is...
fortresses that fell either to Saladin personally (‘Akā,1 Tibnīn, Sidon,2 Beirut)3 or to separate contingents under their generals (such as Nazareth, Caesarea, and Nābulus). Then, passing Tyre for the time being,4 he joined forces with al-‘Ādil (who had already stormed Jaffa) and besieged Ascalon, which was surrendered on 5 September, on his promise to release Guy and the Master of the Temple, a promise duly fulfilled. The remaining castles in this region were captured either on the march to Ascalon or just afterwards. Finally, reuniting his armies, Saladin advanced to the goal of his ambitions, the capture of Jerusalem. After a siege of less than a fortnight the city surrendered on 2 October, on terms which confirmed—if confirmation were needed—his reputation for

less objective.) Michel le syrien, III, 404, adds the imaginative detail that Saladin, after killing Arnulf with his own hand and the 300 ‘phrac’ (i.e. Templars), ‘took a bath in their blood’. ‘Imād, Fath, 20 adds two details: Saladin took Reynald of Krak prisoner, but handed him to an attendant to kill him, and there is a grim account of the slaughter of 100 of the Templars and Hospitallers (‘Imād, Fath, 20).

1 ‘Akā, captured on Thursday 9 July, was given in fee to Saladin’s eldest son al-‘Āfjal, who was born in 565/1170-1 (Aḥū Shāma, I, 270), and after the evacuation of its inhabitants their houses and treasures were given to the troops: ‘Imād, Fath, 31. Ibīn al-Athir, XII, 355-6 et seq., is merely a transcript of ‘Imād.


3 Captured Thursday, 20 Jumādā I (6 August), after a week’s siege: ‘Imād, Fath, 38. Both Sidon and Beirut were given in fee to the Kurdish amīr ‘Alī al-Mashhūb. ‘Imād, Fath, 73.

4 Ernout, 179-83, has a circumstantial account of Saladin’s negotiations with the inhabitants of Tyre, their readiness to surrender, and the delivery of the city by the sudden arrival of Conrad, followed by a brief and unsuccessful siege by Saladin on his way to Ascalon. Conrad’s arrival at ‘Akā after its capture and his stratagem to ensure his escape seems to have been a well-known story and is related in much the same terms by ‘Imād (Fath, 43). But this historian was positive that Saladin made no attempt to attack Tyre on this occasion: Fath, 44:

لالهي على نظلى ولم ما أعرف... وهو اليت المسد
وجه إلى صور نظرني إليها إياها وعابرا عليها غير مكتوب بأمرها. Bahā also (Schultens, 72 = Cairo, 65) relates that Saladin avoided a siege of Tyre ‘because the army was dispersed throughout Palestine, each man taking something for himself’. Neither Bahā nor ‘Imād were with Saladin at the time, however, the latter having retired to Damascus to recuperate from an illness. Ernout’s statement is certainly false in the last particular, that on leaving Tyre Saladin captured Caesarea, since this town had already been captured by the Ayyubid troops under Dīderim al-Yārūqi and Ghrs ad-Dīn Qilī (‘Imād, Fath, 33).

limitless courtesy and generosity.1 The collapse of the Kingdom encouraged Saladin to hope that Tyre too might be captured before the winter began, and he laid siege to the city on 13 November. But the tenacious defence of Conrad disheartened the eastern contingents, who, now that winter was at hand, were eager to return home with their booty. A disastrous defeat of the Egyptian blockading fleet at the end of December strengthened their opposition, and in spite of Saladin’s arguments for perseverance, supported by the commanders of the Ayyubid regiments,2 the amirs took their men off and dispersed, Taqi ad-Dīn and the armies of Mosul, Sinjar and Dīyar Bakr in the lead, ‘every bird of them longing for his nest, and not knowing that this short repose would be followed for them by bitter toil’.3 On 1 January Saladin found himself compelled to relinquish the siege and retired to winter at ‘Akā, where a succession of embassies brought him the congratulations of all the Muslim princes, including his former rivals in Azerbaijan and Northern Persia.4

1 The main source is again Ernout, 211-15, the details of whose description are sufficiently familiar from the standard works. ‘Imād (Fath, 56) gives the total sum received by the treasury in ransom as about 100,000 dinars, but does not subtract the rascality of its Egyptian and Syrian agents.

2 ‘Imād, Fath, 88.

3 Ibid., 90. There can be no doubt on any historical principles that this account is the true one. It was written by one in intimate touch with the events; it is fortified by names and precise details, and its statements are wholly consistent with the persons concerned. It is difficult to understand why, with this original text before their eyes, so many historians (Rohricht, Geschichte, 470, is an exception) have disregarded it in favour of Ibn al-Athir’s derivative and partisan account (XI, 468) which, by deliberate inversion of the paragraphs relating Saladin’s discontinuance of the siege and the withdrawal of the amirs, places the commanders in a false light and attempts to excuse the action of the Mosul commanders by throwing the blame on Saladin’s shoulders. This is by no means a unique example of Ibn al-Athir’s ‘editorial’ methods, as has been seen in the notes above. An even more blatant example of the same kind is found in his account of the relief of the garrison of ‘Akā during the winter of 1190 (XI, 35-6). This entire passage is taken from ‘Imād (Fath, 312-14) who indeed criticizes Saladin’s decision as mistaken, though based on compassionate motives. But when ‘Imād goes on to describe Saladin’s energy in pressing on with the relief and urging his officers and agents to greater efforts, Ibn al-Athir sees fit to substitute an accusation of negligence on his part and dependence upon the efforts of his lieutenants. (Michaud, Bibliothèque des croisades, Paris, 1829, etc., IV, 298, in quoting this passage from Ibn al-Athir, improves it further by adding another adjective: ‘l’indulgence accoutumée du Sultan’.)

4 ‘Imād, Fath, 94, 119-20. At this year’s Pilgrimage, Ibn al-Muqaddam,
After the surrender of the latter on 5 January, the rest of his forces dispersed and Saladin made a tour of inspection of his coastal fortresses from Ascalon to 'Akka.¹

The spectacular success of Saladin in reducing the holdings of the Crusaders in Syria to three cities, Tyre, Tripoli, and Antioch, with one or two outlying but doomed fortresses, within the short space of eighteen months, has led both Muslim and western historians to regard him primarily as a great and successful general, whose victories were due to the same military qualities as those of other successful commanders of armies. This is a complete misapprehension. Saladin possessed, indeed, personal military virtues of a high order; but his victories were due to his possession of moral qualities which have little in common with those of a great general. He was a man inspired by an intense and unwavering ideal, the achievement of which involved him necessarily in a long series of military activities. Down to 1186 these activities were directed to imposing his will upon the prevalent feudal military system and shaping it into the instrument which his purpose required; and the preceding pages have shown that their military aspect was subordinate, in his own mind and to a large extent in practice, to the task of uniting the political forces of western Asia 'in one purpose', and imbuing them with something of his own tenacity and singleness of outlook. It was by this means, and not by superior strategic ability, that he succeeded in assembling the army that was to destroy the kingdom of Jerusalem. Even the striking campaigns of 1187 and 1188 cannot be held to prove that Saladin possessed outstanding generalship. The victory at Hattin owed more to the mistakes of the Franks than to his strategy, even when every credit is given to the skill with which the opportunity was seized. The subsequent crumbling of the inner defences of Jerusalem and Antioch demonstrate rather the fundamental weakness of the Crusading states than the military genius of the conquerors, a point emphasized by the fact that many of them fell to small detached forces.

¹ 'Imad, Fath, 168.
Furthermore, these very successes were due largely to the exercise of the qualities which most sharply distinguished him from his military contemporaries. Nothing is more remarkable in the sources than his reiterated appeal from the criticisms of his officers to the principles of honour, of good faith, and of a firm religious conviction. When the turn of the Christian cities and castles came, it was chiefly because of his reputation for scrupulous observance of his plighted word and for uncalculating generosity that they surrendered so easily. Those critics who have found fault with him for allowing such numbers of knights and merchants to find a refuge in Tyre and so to build up a bridgehead there for the counterattack have usually failed to consider what the course of the Third Crusade would have been if on its arrival it had found Saladin still engaged in the task of reducing one by one the castles of the interior, without complete freedom of movement and complete security in his rear. That he did not in fact capture Tyre as well was the result, partly of the accident of Conrad’s arrival, and partly of the impatience and insubordination of the eastern regiments.

The second of these causes illustrates sharply the persisting defects in the forces with which he had to meet the later struggle with the Crusaders. But this was still in the future, and it is unhistorical to imagine Saladin as preparing plans and disposing his forces to meet the forthcoming invasion from the west. His thought had from the beginning been concentrated upon offensive, not defensive, warfare; it was for this purpose that he had built up his armies, and it had now been largely, and brilliantly, fulfilled. Though he grieved in 1187 over the lack of staying power of his vassals before Tyre, and again in 1188 before Antioch, he saw in these no more than temporary checks, and confidently expected to make up for them in later campaigns. The first hint of the coming invasion reached him from a Sicilian sea-captain at

Ladhiqiyâ in the autumn of 1188, and so little disturbed was he by the report that he granted Bohemond a truce only until May 1189, and busied himself during the winter with preparations to attack Antioch and Tripoli.

In all probability, therefore, he was taken by surprise when the first convoys arrived and Guy’s troops succeeded in marching to ‘Akká and investing the city. From that moment his role was transformed, and he was faced with a new and grimmer task which no Muslim commander, for centuries before him, had ever attempted: the task of holding an army in the field for three years, and that with every circumstance of discouragement. Had he been no more than a leader of armies, he could not have achieved it; his feudal troops would have melted away and left the field to the Franks. But it was in this wholly unexpected conjunction that the true greatness of Saladin and the inner strength of the instrument which he had created were put to the test. He had a double conflict to wage: the external struggle with the Crusaders, and the internal struggle with the fissiparous tendencies and the instability of the feudal armies. Military genius had but a small part in the combination of qualities by which he fought the Crusade to a standstill. The long campaign was an almost unbroken succession of military reverses and disasters; his generals were openly critical, his troops often mutinous. It was by the sheer force of personality, by the undying flame of faith within him, and by his example of steadfast endurance, that he inspired the dogged resistance which finally wore down the invaders.

At the moment when the operations of the Third Crusade

2 This is clear from the letter addressed to his brother Saif al-İslâm Tughtagin in Arâb (Abū Shâma, II, 136–7) in which, while he speaks of the possibility of a descent upon Egypt and Syria and the consequent necessity of keeping the Egyptian forces inside Egypt, he calls on Saif al-İslâm to occupy Palestine and protect the recent conquests there, while he (Saladin) himself will engage in the siege of Antioch and Taqī ad-Din will deal with Tripoli. The various hints and references to the future campaigns against the Crusaders which are to be found in the Arabic sources (and in Ibn al-Anbar in particular) were, of course, written after the event.

58 59


See p. 54, n. 4 above.
opened with the march of Guy to 'Akkā, Saladin was at Belfort (Shaqif Arūnū) to receive its expected surrender from Reynald of Sidon. The north Syrian troops had been sent to mask Antioch, and besides his own, Kurdish and mamlūk guards and the troops of Damascus he had with him only the contingent of the Artuqid prince of 'Āmid and a number of foot-soldiers and volunteers for the Holy War. In July he had made a reconnaissance in force towards Tyre (where some of his auxiliaries had suffered heavy losses in an unauthorized attack on the causeway) and had strengthened the defences of 'Akkā. Yet it was not until he actually received news of Guy’s march that he called up the contingents of his nearer vassals and, leaving a small force to blockade Belfort, moved down to 'Akkā. His own plan was to cut across country and intercept the Crusaders on their march, but his officers insisted on making the long and easier detour by Tiberias and he was forced to yield to their ‘inclination to do the easiest thing’.1

Before the siege of the town was fully formed, Saladin was able to reinforce the garrison, but by doing so he left his own forces too weak to attack the besiegers until the contingents from the east, followed by Taqī ad-Dīn and Geukburi, enabled him to draw up a line of battle based on Tall Kaisān.2 During the first major engagement on 16 September, the troops on the right, commanded by Taqī ad-Dīn, succeeded in forcing their way into 'Akkā. But their success was followed by a debate which was to be renewed time and again with wearisome iteration during the campaign. Should they endeavour

1 Ibn al-Athīr, XII, 21, summarizing 'Imād, Fath, 118; and cf. Bahā', Schultens, 114 = Cairo, 101 (R.H.C., Or., III, 152).
2 'Imād, Fath, 118-9; Bahā', Schultens, 99 = Cairo, 87-8 (no mention of the arrival of the eastern contingents), Schultens, 104 = Cairo, 92-3: on the right al-Afdal (with the Damascus contingent?), followed by the contingents of Aleppo, Mūsul, Diyar Bakr, and Nablus, with Taqī ad-Dīn on the extreme flank; on the left the Sultan's Kurdish guard with other bodies of Kurds, followed by the contingents of Sinjar, Saladin’s Turkish mamluks, with the Asadi mamluks on the flank. The centre was commanded by Saladin himself and the Kurdish fāqih 'Īsā al-Hakkāri. The Egyptian army was left on guard in Egypt, in case the Crusaders should attempt another descent on it. Saladin’s total of regular forces was thus probably some 10,000, in addition to unspecified numbers of foot-soldiers, volunteers, and camp-followers.

boldly to exploit their advantage and press home the attack against the ‘unbroken wall’ of the Frankish infantry? In spite of Saladin’s earnest pleas, all the instincts and traditions of the regular troops were opposed to such tactics. They were cavalrymen, at home only in the open field where they had ample room for manœuvre; faced with the slow undermining of an enemy’s morale and material defences by siege processes, or the keeping up of a steady pressure against an entrenched army, they were quickly discouraged, and discouragement easily passed into discontent. Men and horses must be fed and watered, battles broken off at dusk, and the main force moved back to a safe distance, where the weight of armour could be discarded under the protection of an advance guard. There were some, particularly among Saladin’s own regiment of guards, in whom zeal for the Holy War overcame these tendencies to relax, but the majority, especially in the eastern contingents, felt no such compulsions and found no lack of plausible excuses for delay. Let wind, weather, famine, and wounds take their toll of the enemy; meanwhile, let Saladin do everything in his power to strengthen his armies and his fleets, then finally the assailants must be crushed.3

Such complete confidence was felt in the outcome of the campaign, however, that the Al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil wrote to Saladin from Egypt that the announcements of the victory had already been drafted.4 After the defeat of the Crusaders’ attack on 22 September Saladin moved his forces up to Tall al-Iyādiya, facing the centre of their position on Tall al-Musalla. The ‘great battle’ which followed on 4 October ended in the utter rout of the Crusaders, and for once the commanders of the Muslim armies were in agreement to exploit the victory. But the troops, in the words of 'Imād ad-Dīn, ‘were nowhere to be seen’. When the Kurdish cavalry in the centre had been driven in panic flight by the first charge, the retainers, imagining the army to be in full retreat, had started to load up the

1 This debate and the motives of the parties are presented in detail by 'Imād, Fath, 110-3; more briefly by Bahā', 100-1.
2 Abū Shāma, II, 144.
baggage-trains, and the mass of camp-followers had rushed into the camp and plundered everything that could be carried away. The returning troops, finding all their possessions gone, had started off in pursuit, and it took several days to collect them together again and to restore the stolen goods to their owners. But the opportunity was lost, and when the debate was resumed a week later, the counsels of delay prevailed and Saladin, himself in the grip of a malignant fever, moved back to winter quarters at al-Kharrūba on 16 October, while the Crusaders dug themselves in.

The contingents of Saladin's eastern and Syrian vassals were now dismissed to their homes with instructions to return in the spring. His own Kurdish guards and mamluks remained in position, together with Taqi ad-Din and his regiment; the retiring forces were replaced by a contingent of the Egyptian army under al-Ādil, and foot-soldiers from Damascus and other Syrian cities were called up to attack the Frankish infantry.

Even yet, however, Saladin continued to nourish hopes that the appeal of the Holy War would bring him support of other Muslim princes. A stream of letters and dispatches went out from his camp to all quarters, contrasting the zeal of the Polytheists with the strange apathy of the Believers, and his hopes were encouraged not only (for their own purposes) by the commanders of eastern contingents, but even (and still more fallaciously) by the Caliph, who promised support in return for the cession to him of Shahrizur. Most of all he desired the support of the Almohad fleet, to block, if possible, the passage of the new Crusaders to Syria; but the Sultan of Morocco, Abū Yusuf Ya'uqūb, had a long-standing grievance against Taqi ad-Din and returned no answer to this or to succeeding appeals.

During the winter months Saladin's anxieties were increased by the reports received from Constantinople and Konia of the advance of the German Crusade. When in October he heard news of their arrival at Constantinople, he had dispatched the Qāḍī Bahā' ad-Din to his eastern vassals at Sinjār, Mosul, and Irbil, to bid them hold their forces in readiness, and to Baghdad to appeal for reinforcements. In the meantime, an Egyptian fleet reprovisioned 'Akkā and strengthened the garrison with 10,000 troops and seamen to man the defences. But so little did the defence of Syria interest the princes outside Saladin's dominions that the Seljuq Sultan Tughril, driven out of his province of Khurāsān by a revolt, chose this moment to appeal to Saladin for military aid to reinstate him.

The return of the Crusading fleet in the early spring of 1190 cut 'Akkā off again. The Syrian contingents began to rejoin Saladin in April, together with Arab and Turkmen light horse, and the Muslim forces moved up to Tall Kaisān on the 25th. During May and June the eastern contingents from Harrān, Sinjār, Jazirat ibn 'Umar, and Mosul arrived, followed by those of Irbil in July, and a new fleet from Egypt had entered 'Akkā with fresh provisions after a naval battle on 14 June. In June, however, news came of the arrival of the German Crusaders at the frontiers of Cilicia. Saladin, it would appear, had placed his hopes on a successful resistance to them by the Seljuq Sultan Qilij Arslān, and the new imminent threat from the north compelled him to deplete his forces.
before 'Akkā by detaching all the Syrian contingents and the Turkmens on 13 July to oppose their expected advance. That he had small hope of their being able to withstand the vast armies of Frederick is shown by the preparations that he began to make at the same time for a desperate defence in Palestine by destroying the defences of Tiberias, Jaffa, Arsuf, Caesarea, Sidon, and Jubail. Meanwhile operations at 'Akkā were temporarily slowed down by the outbreak of an epidemic which seems to have been most severe among the Crusaders.

Fear of pestilence from the thousands of bodies killed in the infantry attack on 25 July, followed by the arrival of Henry of Champagne two days later, forced Saladin to withdraw the main forces to al-Kharrāba (1 August), leaving only an advance-guard in the forward position of Tall al-'Iyādiyya. To add to his troubles he was now in desperate straits for money. The cost of so long a campaign and the unceasing outlay in weapons, food, forage, equipment, and the pay of the auxiliary troops was a contingency for which the treasuries of his feudal states were wholly unprepared and inadequate. One of the chief reasons why Saladin was so determined to hold 'Akkā was that he had made it his principal arsenal and had transferred to it almost the whole military stores of Egypt and Syria. Such reserves as he had acquired from time to time in the past had been spent in the campaigns to extend his control over Mesopotamia and Mosul, and in the campaigns of 1187 and 1188. Egypt was his financial mainstay; but his representative, the chancellor al-Qādi al-Fādil, had repeatedly

1 'Imād, Fath, 264; Bahā', Schultens, 123 = Cairo, 109–10. There is just a hint in 'Imād’s narrative that Saladin at first intended to march north with the whole army, but when the decision to remain at 'Akkā was taken, the local Syrian princes insisted on moving to protect the borders of their own territories and their terrified populations.

2 'Imād, Fath, 264. He was rebuked for this measure by al-Qādi al-Fādil in a dispatch quoted by Abū Shāma, II, 176.

3 'Imād, Fath, 265.

4 'Imād, Fath, 272–3, estimates their losses at 9,000–10,000; Bahā', Schultens, 128–8 = Cairo, 111–14, indicates much the same figure with circumstantial evidence.

5 'Imād, Fath, 279–80.

6 Bahā', Schultens, 174 = Cairo, 146 (oddly misinterpreted in Michaud, Bibliothèque, IV, 313, as 'l'ôte des guerriers').

to advise him that its resources could not be stretched indefinitely, especially as the economic life of the country was suffering severely from the interruption of trade with the European states and the drain of gold. Nor was it Saladin only who was beset by these difficulties. The incessant demands of his Syrian fiefholders were beginning to cause severe distress and even disorders among the population of their provinces. His mamluks and the other troops retained in the field were running up debts for the supplies of provisions and provender to an extent which was taking the edge off their enthusiasm, and despite Saladin’s efforts to ease their difficulties at his own expense the point was to become more and more ominously stressed in their arguments with him.

The success with which the garrison of 'Akkā beat off the repeated assaults of the Crusaders, and the flow of deserters from the hunger and disease which stalked the Frankish camp, maintained the spirits of the army for a time. But the reports brought by the deserters of the expected arrival of the kings of France and England and of plans for a general attack induced Saladin to draw back to Shafra’āmm (21 October) in spite of the return of the Syrian forces a few days earlier. There are some statements attributed by Bahā’ ad-Dīn to
Saladin at this time which mention the arrival of envoys from the Crusaders to discuss terms of peace, but no further indications are given in any of the sources. His ill health, and the insistence of his eastern contingents on withdrawing to their homes in November, appear to have induced a mood of despondency in him, which is reflected in a series of letters of consolation and encouragement from al-Qādī al-Fāḍil, who finally came to join him in person before ‘Akkā in January.

In the same month, profiting by the withdrawal of the Crusaders’ fleets, he arranged for the relief of the hard-pressed garrison of ‘Akkā. The operation should have been organized well in advance; improvised as it was at the last moment, it was hampered by delays and hindrances of many kinds. The civil population of the town streamed out as well as the garrison, and their loss could not be made good. The regular troops were understandably reluctant to undertake an uncongenial and dangerous task; an appeal for volunteers amongst the auxiliary troops had little success; gales caused losses of ships, men, and provisions; and there were financial difficulties. ‘Imād ad-Dīn accuses civil officials in the administration of sabotage; most of them, he says, being Copts, were secret supporters of the Franks. It is more probable that, as in all bureaucracies, the obstacle was constituted by red tape rather than by ill will, in spite of Saladin’s repeated and urgent appeals to set aside normal accountancy precautions at this crisis. Before the relief was completed the Crusading fleet returned, and the total garrison, now commanded by the valiant Kurdish officer al-Maṣḥūṭ, was probably reduced to about a third of its former effectiveness.

In spite of the criticisms that have been directed after the event to this relief of the garrison, the new defenders succeeded in holding ‘Akkā until July, in face of the entire Crusading army. No power that Saladin disposed of could have sufficed, in all human calculations, to save the fall of the city at this stage of events. But for Saladin himself the most cruel deception was that at this decisive moment he was both materially and morally weakened from an unexpected quarter.

In October 1190 his vassal at Irbil, Zain ad-Dīn, had died, and the successful competitor for his succession was his brother Geukburi, who surrendered in return his Mesopotamian fiefs of Harrān, Edessa, and Sumaisat. These were bestowed by Saladin on his nephew Taqi ad-Dīn, in addition to his north Syrian fiefs. Early in March Taqi ad-Dīn was permitted to leave the camp with his mamlūk regiment of 700 guards to organize his new fief, but with strict orders not to dispose any other vassal of Saladin nor to engage in any fighting, and to return with the enlarged force which he would now be able to maintain. No sooner had Taqi ad-Dīn reached the Jazira than he attacked and expelled the allied Bogusag chiefs of Sevaverak, seized Ḥāni, and appropriated the fiefs of Saladin’s Artuqid vassal, Ibn Qari-Arslan. He then engaged and defeated the Shāh-Arman Begtimur and besieged Khīlāt (on Lake Van) but failing to capture it, ravaged Armenia for several months and laid siege to Miľāzgird, where he died on 10 October 1191.

The anger and dismay which Saladin felt at this reckless and insubordinate conduct of his kinsman was intensified by its immediate consequences. All his vassals in Diyār Bakr, fearing for their lands, stayed at home instead of rejoining him before ‘Akkā, and even Geukburi at Irbil remained absent, engaged in his own designs. In due course there came also a letter of vigorous disapproval from the Caliphate, to which Saladin could only plead in reply his repudiation of Taqi ad-Dīn’s...

1 ‘Imād, Fath, 295–9 and ‘Imād, Barq, apud Abū Shāma, II, 104. Geukburi undertook to pay 50,000 dinars (annually?) for his fief.
2 ‘Imād, Fath, 312–3, 358; Bahā‘, Schultens, 154 = Cairo, 138–40. The 700 horsemen are explicitly mentioned by Ibn al-Athir, XII, 40–1.
3 ‘Imād, Fath, 401–6; Michel le syrien, III, 408–9, who notes that he had the title of Sultan, and compares him as a persecutor of the Christians to Julian the Apostate; Ibn al-Athir, XII, 40–1.
conduct. More than any other person, he exclaimed later, Taqi ad-Din was responsible for the fall of 'Akkā. But the consequences did not end there; they continued to hamper him until the finish of the struggle with Richard, since the settlement of the situation left by Taqi ad-Din involved the absence of both az-Zahir and al-'Adil during the critical campaign on the Jerusalem road.

Saladin’s forces during the campaign of 1191 were thus reduced to his personal troops, the Syrian contingents, the troops of Sinjar, and partial contingents from Egypt and Mosul, most of which arrived only in the latter part of June. On 4 June he had moved up to Tall al-Iyadiya, and in spite of the consternation caused by the arrival of Richard immediately afterwards, kept up a regular offensive against the Crusaders’ lines. After the failure of the general assault on 3 July, when the Muslim cavalry were unable to confront the ‘wall of arms’ formed by the Crusading infantry, he realized that the end was at hand, and instructed the garrison to break out on the night of the 4th. The whole army stood under arms all night to support the evacuation, but the plan miscarried through delays within the town and the leakage of the project through deserters. Nothing now remained but to arrange terms for its surrender, when the garrison capitulated on its own terms on 12 July.

Although the capture of ‘Akkā was a resounding victory for the Crusaders (which was to be thrown into still stronger relief by the part it played in the following century) yet the balance-sheet of the long struggle was not unfavourable to Saladin. In the absence of adequate statistical data on the numbers and casualties on both sides, it is difficult to reach precise conclusions on the military losses involved. The Muslims might console themselves by placing the losses of the Franks at not less than 50,000; but even if the casualties in battle were less unequal, it is clear that the losses among the Crusading forces from pestilence and famine were far greater than among the Muslims, and may have outnumbered their losses in battle. Much more important is the consideration that Saladin’s tenacity, by pinning the Crusaders down to this single enterprise for nearly two years, fatally weakened their first offensive power, gave time for psychological fissures to widen and to disrupt their unity, and thus finally saved the situation. Furthermore, the losses on the Muslim side were more easily recuperated; and the fact that the stream of fresh contingents from Europe had dried up before the war of movement was renewed was not without its effects on the morale of both sides.

On the other hand, the defeat before ‘Akkā did much to weaken Saladin’s control over the regular troops, and so to weaken their fighting power as an army. Their loss of confidence in his generalship (or in his luck) and their open disgust with the long, heavy, and unrewarding campaign, with nothing to show for it but mounting debts and the exhaustion of men and animals, placed him at a serious disadvantage. They refused to garrison any fortress, in case (they argued) they would be left to suffer the fate of the garrison of ‘Akkā. They were seldom willing to engage in general combat in the open field. Thus the only tactics open to him were essentially the same as those to which he had been reduced at ‘Akkā: to contain the Crusading force to the best of his ability and hope to wear them down by the tenacity of his defence.

While the parleys and negotiations were dragging out to their tragic end on 20 August with Richard’s slaughter of the Muslim prisoners, Saladin was actively calling up fresh

3 ‘Imad, Fath, 326, 343-4. A portion of the army of Mosul was engaged, on Saladin’s orders, in besieging Jazirat ibn ‘Umar from April to August, in order to punish its Zangrid prince Sanjarshah, who had left the camp before ‘Akkā in the previous year without permission (Ibn al-Athir, XII, 38-40; cf. ’Imad, Fath, 298-9, and ’Imad, Barq, apud Abū Shāma, II, 165). The forces of Shaizar and Hims, and the Turkmens under Diderim whom Saladin had hired, arrived between 8 and 10 July (’Imad, Fath, 557), as ‘Akkā was on the point of surrender.
4 ‘Imad, Fath, 336.
5 ‘Imad, Fath, 350-1; Bahā’, Schultens, 174 = Cairo, 166-7.
7 ‘Imad, Fath, 360.
8 Both ’Imad (Fath, 373) and Bahā’ (Schultens, 183 = Cairo, 164-5) give this date. In regard to the negotiations there is little to add to Stevenson’s discussions (The Crusaders in the East, 269-75). It is noteworthy that when Louis
troops, and after the massacre renewed his appeals to the deaf ears of the Muslim princes. Urgent summonses were sent out to his Artuqid vassals and to Geukburi at Irbil, and his envoy at the Almohad court was instructed to inform the Sultan that the struggle would continue and that his naval support was more necessary than ever. When the march down the coast began, the Al-Qâdi al-Fâdil was sent to Damascus to give instructions to the expected reinforcements; but Taqi ad-Din was still operating in Upper Mesopotamia, and there is no record of their arrival.

As soon as the direction of Richard's march was known, Saladin sent out scouts to select suitable places on the coast road where the Crusaders might be attacked on the march. The ill humour of his troops at the outset was displayed in their unwillingness to support al-Afdal in his attack on the Crusaders' rearguard during the march from 'Akka to Haifa; but in harrying the Crusaders on the march, they were more in their element. The unfamiliar type of defence put up by an organized and disciplined infantry defeated their normal tactics, and the attempt to smash through it by sheer mass in the organized general attack at Arsuf (7 September) only threw them off their balance before the sudden counterattack of the cavalry. The famous battle is described in epic style and with legendary detail in the Itinerarium, and with some exaggeration even by Bahâ' ad-Din, since he himself subsequently records that the contingents of Aleppo, Damascus, and Mosul stood firm when Saladin's own squadrons fled left for Tyre, Saladin, learning of his departure, 'sent an envoy after him with gifts suitable to his rank': 'Imād, Fath, 371.

1 Dispatch from 'Imād, Barq, quoted apud Abū Shâma, II, 190.
2 'Imād, Fath, 364–5.
4 'Imād, Barq, apud Abū Shâma, II, 190.
5 'Imād, Fath, 374.
6 'Imād, Fath, 376; Bahâ', Schultens, 185 = Cairo, 166, gives a different version.
7 Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi (ed. Stubbs), Rolls Series, London, 1864, IV, cc. 18–22. The legendary element is especially obvious in relating the attack of Taqi ad-Din, who was engaged with Begtimir in Armenia at the time, and in the speeches of Saladin and 'Sanscunsus' of Aleppo.

before the charge of the knights. The decisive stroke on which Saladin had counted was beaten off and turned into a near defeat; but the Muslim forces remained intact after the battle, and it would be difficult to substantiate Oman's argument that it 'gave the Franks the whole coast-land of Southern Palestine'.

The Crusaders' halt at Jaffa put Saladin in a dilemma. Since he could not be certain whether they intended to march on Jerusalem, or whether his never-absent fears of a descent on Egypt were about to be realized, his first intention was to place a strong garrison in Ascalon to bar the way to Egypt. But on consulting his amirs, they argued that the Muslim forces were insufficient to garrison both Ascalon and Jerusalem, each of which would require 20,000 fighting men, and bade him choose which of them he wished to hold and to destroy the defences of the other. Their argument was unanswerable, even if it was motivated in part by fear of another 'siege of 'Akka'; and sorrowfully, but resolutely, and realizing that there was no time to be lost, Saladin marched down to Ascalon and remained there until the work of dismantling was far advanced (12–24 September), while al-'Adil stood on guard outside Jaffa with a skeleton force. He then rode to Jerusalem to see to the strengthening of its defences, dismantled Ramlah and the castles in its vicinity, and on 1 October rejoined the main forces which had been posted at Ramlah in battle order.

1 Bahâ', Schultens, 196–7 = Cairo, 175–7; cf. 'Imād, Fath, 385. There is a curious phrase in 'Imād's letter to the dinâr which looks like an oblique rebuke to Saladin: 'The Sultan imagined it to be a defeat, but the events proved it to be warlike resolve' (وَظَنَّهَا السَّلَتاَنُ عَزَّةً وَباَتَتَ يَعْتَقَاهَا أنَّهَا كَانَتْ عَزَّةً) Bahâ', Schultens, 193–4 = Cairo, 173–4, states that Saladin had hoped to spin out the negotiations before Arsuf until the expected Turkmen reinforcements arrived, but the heat engendered by the dispute brought about an immediate move by the Crusaders, and Saladin was forced to draw up his forces for battle without delay.

3 'Imād, Fath, 389; Bahâ', Schultens, 198–9 = Cairo, 177–8, agrees in substance, but with less detail.
4 'Imād, Fath, 390; Bahâ', Schultens, 202–3 = Cairo, 182–3.
The complicated negotiations which now followed with Richard on the one hand and Conrad on the other were in a measure forced upon Saladin by the war-weariness of his troops, added to the difficulties of food, forage, and equipment. It seems evident from the detailed accounts given by Baha’ ad-Din that Saladin, though distrusting both, was more inclined to accept Conrad’s proposals. ‘If I were to die,’ he told Baha’ ad-Din, ‘it is most unlikely that these askars would ever be brought together again, and the Franks would recover their strength. Our best policy is to continue to fight with them until we drive them out of Palestine.’ But Richard’s offers found more favour with the commanders, for peace with him would mean the disbanding of the armies. Consequently, the report of the proposed marriage of Joan to al-‘Adil (who would then take over the government of all Palestine) caused general rejoicing in the camp. Richard’s inconstancy, however, ‘breaking every agreement as soon as it was made, and ever going back on his word’, wore out their patience, and ultimately Saladin had his way. His legate had actually been dispatched to Tyre to settle the terms of the alliance when Conrad was assassinated (28 April) to the general dismay of the Muslims.

Meanwhile, the Crusaders had made their first advance to Bait Nubæ, followed by their withdrawal to Ramlah and thence to rebuild Ascalon (21 January). Saladin’s main efforts continued to be directed to the fortification of Jerusalem. The contingents from Mosul and Sinjar had returned to their homes, and were replaced on 22 December by an Egyptian contingent; and he had in addition his Kurdish and Mamlik regiments (of whom the Asadiya were poised near Ascalon), the troops of Damascus, and a force of Turkmen auxiliaries from Anatolia. Avoiding any general engagement, therefore, Saladin’s tactics were to use light forces, with Arab auxiliaries, to strike at their lines of communication, to hinder the movement of supplies, and to keep their main body occupied with skirmishes.

At the same time, he was harassed by further difficulties with his kinsmen. Taqi ad-Din’s young son Nasir ad-Din Muhammad had, on his father’s death, asked for confirmation of his father’s feuds, but Saladin, unwilling to entrust such wide powers to an inexperienced youth, imposed conditions. The young prince now revolted. Thereupon Saladin conferred the Mesopotamian provinces on his son, al-Afdal, who left in February 1192 to refit his troops at Damascus, and prepared, with the assistance of his brother az-Zahir at Aleppo, to recover them from Nasir ad-Din. The latter in alarm appealed to al-‘Adil to intercede for him, and eventually, after the negotiations with Richard in March and April Saladin agreed to recall al-Afdal and made over the province to al-‘Adil.

The point on which these negotiations with the Crusaders foundered was Saladin’s determination not to allow Ascalon to remain in the hands of the Crusaders. Otherwise, an agreement was in sight, and towards the end of May, Saladin, expecting the arrival of the eastern contingents, allowed al-‘Adil to leave the camp to take over his new possessions. It may have been due to the much diminished effectiveness with which Saladin was now operating that Richard suddenly resumed the offensive with the siege of Darum (23 May) and advanced towards Jerusalem early in June. Saladin again adopted the tactics of attacking his supply lines, and with considerable success, but was repaid in his own coin when

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1 Bahā’, Schultens, 200 = Cairo, 180, and especially the dispatches quoted in ‘Imād, 452–3.
3 ‘Imād, 394.
4 ‘Imād, 398.
5 Bahā’, Schultens, 219 = Cairo, 202; Cf. ‘Imād, 432.
6 Ibn al-Athir, XII, 52; ‘Imād, 390.
7 ‘Imād, 418.
8 Bahā’, Schultens, 211 = Cairo, 190.

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1 One reason for the substitution may have been to ensure a firm control over the Zangids of Mosul. The arrangement was that Nasir ad-Din should, after one year, evacuate Mesopotamia and resume Taki ad-Din’s fief of Hamah and Ma’arra: ‘Imād, 428. Al-‘Adil was to retain at the same time his fiefs in Transjordan: Bahā’, Schultens, 127 = Cairo, 204.
2 ‘Imād, 432.
Richard attacked and looted a caravan coming up from Egypt (23 June).1

In normal circumstances, the loss of a caravan would have passed as a natural risk of war. But when both sides were almost at breaking-point with strain and disappointment, such an incident might prove to be the crisis. The weight of the campaign was being borne by Saladin’s personal troops, Kurds and Mamlûks, who had remained in the field almost without a break for four years. The caravan had been bringing them sorely needed supplies, animals, and weapons, as well as reinforcements; the reinforcements were scattered, the supplies had gone to strengthen the enemy, and many no doubt had suffered much personal loss. For four years, the influence of Saladin’s enthusiasm and the example of his resolution had kept up their morale, in face of continuous loss and retreat; but now, with nothing but the prospect of further loss, and even disaster, to crown the long, weary years of struggle, criticism, and complaint, they were turning to mutiny. When Saladin took the resolve to destroy the wells and cisterns round Jerusalem and to prepare for a siege, and made his final appeal to the troops at the council on 1 July, it was the Kurd al-Mashṭûb who pledged their loyalty to him, while the Mamlûks were openly critical and insubordinate.2

To make matters worse, the contingents from Mosul, Sinjâr, and Diyar Bakr were already arriving at Damascus, but delaying there.3 The tension was relaxed, but not removed, by Richard’s retreat and renewed proposals for a treaty, which as before broke on the issue of Ascalon, in spite of the eagerness of the troops for peace.4 Once aroused, the spirit of mutiny and rivalry remained latent, and only needed an occasion to break out in sudden violence. The occasion came a few days later. Saladin, learning of Richard’s intention to attack Beirût, sent al-Afdal to Marj ‘Uyun with instructions to assemble there the eastern armies still at Damascus and to

watch the situation.5 He himself, with his personal troops, marched on Jaffa and in a furious three-day attack, forced a capitulation, exclusive of the citadel (31 July). This was too much for the troops, hot with desire to loot at last a captured town, and the Kurds and Turkmens burst in to gorge themselves with plunder.6 The Mamlûks, however, stationed themselves at the gates of the town, and as the Kurds came out, seized their loot from them and beat them up.7

This situation sufficiently explains the astonishing scenes which followed, when the indiscipline of the troops allowed the relief of the citadel of Jaffa by Richard; and again when, a few days later, Saladin attempted his coup de main on Richard’s camp. In vain he ordered his troops to attack; squadron after squadron held back, and it was al-Mashṭûb’s own brother who turned on him saying ‘Give your orders to those mamlûks of yours who beat up the troops at Jaffa’.8

Thus Saladin’s best and trustiest weapon had finally broken in his hands. But it had done its work; Richard’s Crusade was checkmated, and the eastern contingents came up in time to compel him to yield the point of Ascalon. Saladin, recovering from the humiliation before Jaffa, was eager to prosecute the struggle,5 but was overborne by the remonstrances of the troops, and the armistice was duly signed on 2 September for a period of three years and eight months. Ironically enough, at this very moment, Saladin gained an unexpected accession of power by the arrival of envoys, one from his old enemy, the powerful Shah-Arman of Khilât, offering his allegiance and the service of his troops, the other from the prince of Erzerum.6 But the Crusade was over, and within a fortnight the armies were dispersed.

The Crusaders gained the coast from ‘Akkâ to Jaffa, but not Ascalon, which remained unfortified. Saladin himself went

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2 Bahâ’, Schultens, 235–6 = Cairo, 212.
3 ‘Imâd, Fath, 425, 428.
6 Bahâ’, Schultens, 260 = Cairo, 235.
to Jerusalem and then toured the castles and returned thence to Damascus. In February he greeted the pilgrims returning from the Ḥajj, and one evening was attacked by fever. All efforts were unable to check it, and on Wednesday, 4 March 1193, he died. One of those who knew him said, 'This was the only instance of a King's death that was truly mourned by the people'.