When the British Museum in London bought Baron von Kremer’s collection of oriental manuscripts in 1886, it acquired a volume that—according to its title page—was a copy of al-Ghazâlî’s well-known *Maqâṣid al-falâsifa* (‘Intentions of the Philosophers’). Alfred von Kremer (1828–89), who was an Austrian scholar of Islamic and Arabic studies, had purchased the manuscript while serving as a diplomat in the Middle East.¹ He describes the volume in the catalogue he wrote of his own collection as a copy of al-Ghazâlî’s *Maqâṣid al-falâsifa* and mentions no differences from other copies of the book.² However, when Charles Rieu

¹ Von Kremer was professor of Arabic language at the Königliche Polytechnicum in Vienna between 1850 and 1852. Prior to that he had studied Arabic in Syria. From 1852 he held a diplomatic post in Alexandria, and another from 1870 in Beirut. He was a member of the commission overseeing Egypt’s national debts in 1876 and returned from his diplomatic posts in 1880. See Johann Fück, *Die arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955), 187–9. On the acquisition of his collection, see Stephan Roman, *The Development of Islamic Library Collections in Western Europe and North Africa* (London: Mansell, 1990), 9.

² Alfred von Kremer, ‘Über meine Sammlung orientalischer Handschriften’, *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historischen Classe der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Wien) 109 (1885), 153–228, at 208. At the time of von Kremer’s research, the Arabic *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* was still unprinted. A number of manuscripts existed in European libraries and the medieval Latin translation *Logica et Philosophia Algazelis* was available in Renaissance printings. For a list of von Kremer’s works, see Fuat Sezgin (ed.) *Bibliographie der deutschnsprachigen Arabistik von den Anfängen bis 1986* (Frankfurt: Institut für die Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 19 vols., 1990–2001), xv, 310–16. Von Kremer apparently never quoted this MS in his publications. He was familiar with al-Ghazâlî’s autobiography from August Schmödel’s edition and French translation of 1842, and he knew *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* in a manuscript of the K.u.K. Hofbibliothek in Vienna.
(1820–1902) described the manuscript in his *Supplement to the Catalogue of the Arabic manuscripts in the British Museum* of 1894, he stressed that ‘the work cannot be identified with any of the known writings of the great theologian as described by Dr. Gosche (…), or noticed by Hajji Khalifa’. Rieu repeats von Kremer’s observation that the book had lost a number of folios at the beginning and must be considered acephalous. Rieu realized that the current front-page was added later and might not contain the original title of the book. Since there is neither an *incipit* nor an indication of the book’s title within its text, the original title of the book is unknown. Rieu listed the content of the seven maqālāt in which the book is divided and identified the text as a treatise on metaphysics, by ‘al-Ghazzālī’. He added that ‘[t]here can be no doubt that the author is al-Ghazzālī, for in the concluding lines he refers the reader to his own work (…)’.4

On the basis of Rieu’s description, Carl Brockelmann included the text in his *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur* as an independent work of al-Ghazālī, and described it as ‘an untitled metaphysical work in seven Maqālāt’.5 Yet, despite its identification as an independent text of considerable size, the two main bibliographical studies on al-Ghazālī by Maurice Bouyges and ‘Abd al-Rahmān Badawi do not devote much attention to it. Both knew the text only from Rieu’s description and did not study the original manuscript in London. Bouyges, who wrote his bio-bibliographical study of al-Ghazālī around 1924 and left it unpublished during his lifetime, speculates whether the text of the manuscript in London can be recognized as one of the unidentified books by al-Ghazālī mentioned by him in the introductory section of his *Tahāfut al-falāṣifa* (‘Incoherence of the Philosophers’).6 He calls the text

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4 Rieu, *Supplement*, 494 f.


6 Maurice Bouyges, *Essai de chronologie des œuvres de al-Ghazali* (Algazel), ed. Michel Allard (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1959), 26 f. The book was published after Bouyges’ death in 1951 and was already outdated by that time. Much of Bouyges’ speculation must be considered corrected by his own later work on the critical edition of al-Ghazālī’s *Tahāfot al-Falāṣifat ou
the ‘pseudo-Maqāṣid of al-Ghazālī’ and suggests that it is one of the books that al-Ghazālī recommends as a preparation before studying his Tahāfut. Bouyges acknowledges, however, that this is a mere hypothesis ‘qui me paraît de moins en moins probable’.7 Badawi directly responds to this hypothesis in his Mu'allafāt al-Ghazālī of 1964. He rejects Bouyges’ suggestion—to identify the text with one of the book-titles mentioned in the Tahāfut—on the grounds that the title in question can be identified with a known book by al-Ghazālī.8 Von Kremer, Rieu, Brockelmann, Bouyges, and Badawi are the only Western scholars who, to my knowledge, have commented on this text. So far, no other copy of the text preserved in London has come to light.

The present article re-introduces an important document on al-Ghazālī’s intellectual debate with philosophical metaphysics that so far has not been used by researchers in this field. In the following, I will first describe the manuscript London, British Library, Or. 3126 and secondly characterize the text contained therein. I will compare it to Maqāṣid al-falāsifa as it is known to us from other manuscripts and from a Latin translation of around 1180.9 Finally, I will provide evidence that

‘Incohérence des Philosophes’ (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1927). In that edition Bouyges suggested that the title of the unidentified work mentioned in the fourth introduction to the Tahāfut (pp. 17.3, 20.9) is ‘Mi’yār al-‘aql’, not ‘Mi’yār al-‘uql’ as he had conjectured around 1924 and as it appears in his Essai de chronologie.

7 Bouyges, Essai, 26.
8 ‘Abd al-Rahmān Badawi, Mu'allafāt al-Ghazālī (Kuwait: Wikālat al-Matbū‘āt, 2nd imp., 1977) 72, identifies ‘Mi’yār al-‘uql’ with the known Mi’yār al-'ilm and thus excludes ‘Mi’yār al-‘uql’ (or rather, ‘Mi’yār al-‘aql’—see n. 6, above) from being the title of the London book. The text of the MS in London is mentioned a second time in Badawi’s bibliography. Inspired by Brockelmann’s entry on the text as ‘an untitled metaphysical work in seven Maqālat’, Badawi also lists a ‘Maqālat’ in his Mu'allafāt al-Ghazālī, 322. The ‘Maqālāt’ is identified with the Kremer MS in London but classified as a work most likely not written by al-Ghazālī. As an additional witness who attests to the existence of a Maqālāt by al-Ghazālī, Badawi quotes Mohammed Ben Cheneb, ‘Études sur les personnages mentionnés dans l’idjāza du Cheick Abd el Qadir el Fāsi’, in Actes du XIV congrès international des Orientalistes à Alger, 5 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1905–8), iii. 2:168–561, at 517–21. Ben Cheneb's list of al-Ghazālī's works is, however, not new and independent evidence, since it depends in this case on Brockelmann’s Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur.

the text in the London manuscript belongs to the corpus of al-Ghazālī’s
drawings. The text in the London manuscript stands in a close
relationship to Mi‘yar al-‘ilm fi fann al-maṭṭiq (‘The Touchstone of
Knowledge in the Art of Logic’), a book that is mentioned in at
least seven other books by al-Ghazālī and thus can be securely ascribed
to him. The text preserved in the London manuscript should be
considered a new and previously unused work by al-Ghazālī.

DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUSCRIPT

Manuscript London, British Library, Or. 3126 is a book of 285 leaves
in quarto size. The handwriting is in large naskhī with only 15 lines per
quarto page. There is no colophon indicating the identity of the copyist
or the date of the copy. At times the handwriting has been done with
great care. At other times it is very negligent and can barely be
deciphered. Diacritical points are sometimes complete, at other times
totally absent or set at random. This is probably the hand of a
professional scribe.

The handwriting can only be dated to ‘some time’ before the ninth/
fifteenth century. A manuscript whose writing shares many, but not all,
features of the hand of this scribe is MS Sprengler 763 of the Berlin
Staatsbibliothek, which was copied in 763/1362. Rieu writes that the
book is written in ‘fine, large and bold springy Neskhī, probably in the
12th century’.13

The text of the manuscript is often corrected in the margins or
between the lines. These corrections and additions are in the same
handwriting as the main text.14 Towards the end of the book,
Translation*, ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto: St Michael’s College, 1933). The latter
contains two parts, the metaphysics and the natural sciences.

10 al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yar al-‘ilm fi fann al-maṭṭiq, ed. M. Šabri al-Kurdi (Cairo:

11 Mi‘yar al-‘ilm (including its alternative title, Mi‘yar al-‘ulūm, which also
appears in some MSS of this work) is mentioned in Mizān al-‘amal, Miḥāk
al-naẓr, al-Qistās al-mustaqīm, Jawāhir al-Qur’ān, Mishkāt al-anwār,
al-Mustasfā min ‘ilm al-ṣūd, and in some MSS of Tabāfut al-falāṣīfā. See

12 For a full description, see Rieu’s entry in his *Supplement*, 494–6. In the
following I focus on aspects not mentioned by Rieu.

13 Ibid. 494.

14 On fo. 14b, however, there is a marginal note by a different hand. I am
indebted to Muhammad Afifi al-Akiti of Oxford University for pointing me to
this note.
starting with fol. 235, pages are water damaged and the holes have been repaired with modern European paper. The damage as well as the repair led to a significant loss of text that increases towards the later pages of the book. The final pages show a level of severe damage of roughly 40 per cent.

The current binding of the book in red morocco is from the late nineteenth or early twentieth century and is the work of the British Museum workshop. Originally, the book was bound in 21 quires with each quire having normally 7 double-leaves, folded in the middle and bound together with string. A quire thus has 14 leaves or 28 pages. The 5th and the 17th quires (fos. 55–67 and 220–32) have only 13 leaves, suggesting that in these two cases one leaf was cut off during the copying process, presumably after a mistake was discovered before the work on the following leaf had begun. The 20th quire (fos. 261–78) has 9 double-leaves (18 leaves) and the 21st, which is the last in the volume, has only 6 leaves cut from what seems to have been an original quire of 14 blank leaves.

Since the first quire has only 11 leaves, 7 of which are after the fold that divides the quire, it is evident that three leaves are missing at the beginning of our text. Given that the first page was reserved for the title of the book, the book has lost 5 full pages or 75 lines of writing.\(^\text{15}\)

The dimensions of the leaves are 25.7 \times 17 cm. The paper is polished laid paper of a cream, sometimes dark cream colour. Its quality of pulp is uniform to floccular. It is fibrous and the fibres can be as long as 10 mm but are mostly less than that. The paper is of medium transparency and there are on average 6 to 7 laid lines per centimetre. Laid lines are slightly curved, parallel to the trim edges of the paper. The paper has no horizontal chain line. The leaves of the book are on average 1.4 to 1.8 mm thick. According to the known characteristics of Islamic paper drawn from dated manuscripts, the production of this type of paper may be cautiously dated to sixth/twelfth century Iran.\(^\text{16}\)

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\(^{15}\) For Rieu the book ‘appears, from the original number of quires, to have lost two leaves’. It has lost, in fact, three leaves.

The front page of the book does not share these characteristics. It is thinner (around 0.4 mm) and brighter than the other leaves of the book. There are 6 to 7 laid lines per centimetre but this paper has been produced with a mould that had horizontal chain lines. There are three chain lines visible on the paper, irregularly spaced, between 4.6 and 7.7 cm apart. This leaf has been repaired at the bottom and shows signs of having been folded in the middle before being bound in this book. The production of this single leaf may be tentatively dated to the eighth/fourteenth century from Iran, Syria, or Egypt. It should be stressed that such dating is not at all precise, particularly if one is dealing with a single leaf, whose thickness, for instance, may be difficult to measure. The estimate is the result of comparing the paper with features known from dated manuscripts of this period.

Due to the characteristics of the paper and the handwriting, the production of the codex can be tentatively dated to the sixth/twelfth century and placed in Iran. The book may date to al-Ghazālī’s lifetime at the turn of the sixth/twelfth century.

**DESCRIPTION OF THE TEXT**

This book is not, as it says on its front page, al-Ghazālī’s *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*. While the *Maqāṣid* is divided into three main parts—logic, metaphysics, and natural sciences—this text contains seven ‘treatises’ (*maqālāt*). Each treatise is, in turn, divided into ten chapters (*abwāb*) and each chapter into a varying number of either sections (*fuṣūl*), remarks (*ishārāt*) and admonitions (*tanbīḥāt*), or invocations (*dāʿwāt*). (A line by line translation of the table of contents of the entire manuscript is given in Appendix I.)

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18 The text of the front page reads: Kitāb Maqāṣid al-falāsifa, taṣniṭ al-Shaykh al-Imām Ḥujjat al-Islām Abī Ḥāmid b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī al-Tūsī, nafaṭha-llāh al-anām. Amin, amin. At the bottom of the title page is a line in Ottoman Turkish with what appears to be a pharmaceutical recipe. The Turkish text reads: Bir kimesne süs[end olsa, kaşmı[ bedenos, ya ni[ burūs yاغ[ya ezüp, alet-i tengile şırt[a ko[y or: kavi] bastr. İlker Evrim Binbaş of the University of Chicago—to whom I am most grateful for his assistance—suggests the following translation: ‘[To treat] a debilitated person, [one should] pound galbanum [Galbanum officinale] with bedenos [a kind of grouse in Greek], i.e. rooster fat, and put it and press [or (if reading ‘kavi’) press hard] on the [debilitated person’s] back with a narrow tool.’
While we do not know how the text originally began, we do know how it ends. Since unfortunate circumstances left a large water-stain on the last leaves, the *khātimā* is defective. It reads:

Section (*fāṣl*): This is the sum of what I have gathered (*talāqqatu*) from the books [of the philosophers] (...) They are plain unbelievers regarding three questions. These are (...) the assembly of the bodies [on the Day of Resurrection], their conviction that the world is pre-eternal (...), high and exalted is He, knowledge of particulars. The rest is of a kind that (...)

(...) We do not oppose them regarding the things that they—through [their method]—prove apodictically on the subject of the unity (*tauḥīd*) of the being necessary by virtue of itself and that there is nothing that shares in its being. In fact, in this case we support them. The books of our peers (*āṣhābunā*) amongst the *mutakallimūn* are laden with this. We only oppose them regarding His attributes. They deny the attributes of the Creator (*al-bārī*), exalted is His name, but we proclaim them. We made the implication of this clear and we went deeply into what is taught about this matter in the book *Tabāfūt al-falāṣifa* (‘The Incoherence of the Philosophers’). It should be taken from there. This is only a report. Praise be to God, the one who deserves praise. Prayer be upon our lord, the one who was sent, God’s messenger, Muhammad, and on his virtuous kinsfolk and on his Companions (...)

This is the only passage in the manuscript from which the authorship of the book can be determined. If one accepts these words as genuine, one must conclude that this book was written by al-Ghazālī after the completion of, or at least after he started work on, *Tabāfūt al-falāṣifa*. While in the *Tabāfūt*, those teachings are gathered that are blameworthy and may even lead to unbelief and apostasy from Islam, this book gathers the sum (*jumla*) of what is contained in the books of the philosophers. The passage makes no claim as to how the author positions himself towards these teachings. The author says explicitly that this book is just a bare report (*mujarrad ḥikāya*) and refers the reader to his legal assessment of the *falāṣifa*’s teachings at the end of *Tabāfūt al-falāṣifa*.

20 Similar language is used by al-Ghazālī in his *Tabāfūt al-falāṣifa*, 6.5–9 when he refers to the passages in that book where he reports the *falāṣifa*’s teachings: ‘I took it upon myself to write this book in refutation of the (...) philosophers (...) with a report of their teachings as it actually is (mā`a hikayat madhabibīm `alā wa`jibīh).’ In his autobiography *al-Munqīdḥ min al-Dalāl / Erreur et délivrance*, ed. and trans. into French by Farid Jabre, (Beirut: Commission Libanaise pour la Traduction des Chefs-d’Œuvre, 3rd edn., 1969), 18.10–14, al-Ghazālī describes his alleged independent study of philosophy through their books as *mujarrad al-muṭāla*.`
At the beginning of this passage he repeats the condemnation of three of the teachings of the falāsifa: denial of bodily resurrection, pre-eternity of the world, and denial of God’s knowledge of particulars. There is no reason to assume the gathering of such teachings from the books of the philosophers also means an endorsement of them. Indeed, the reference to the condemnation expressed in Tahāfut al-falāsifa implicitly denies such an endorsement.

Regarding the proof for God’s existence and His unity, however, there is an endorsement expressed in this passage. The author says about the falāsifa: ‘we do not oppose them (...). In fact, in this case we support them.’ The reference is to Ibn Sinā’s proof of God’s existence as the being necessary by virtue of itself (wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātīhi). But the author does oppose the falāsifa regarding God’s attributes, particularly that of God as creator, meaning creator ex nihilo.

The book does not present itself as an introduction to the study of metaphysics in the way that Maqāsid al-falāsifa is. In the preface to the Maqāsid, al-Ghazālī writes that one should not attempt to refute any school of thought (madhhb) before one has completely grasped its teachings.

Therefore I chose to set a concise but complete treatment (kalām wa-jīz nushtama) on the report (ḥikāya) of [the falāsifa’s] intentions within the sciences of logic, the natural sciences, and metaphysics before the explanation of their collapse (tahāfut). [This treatment] does not distinguish between what is the truth within their teachings and what is false.

The ‘explanation of their collapse’ is al-Ghazālī’s own Tahāfut al-falāsifa. Thus the writing of Maqāsid al-falāsifa stands in direct relation to the goal of giving students an introduction to the falāsifa’s teachings that would enable them to follow the line of argument in the Tahāfut. Note, however, that this statement and others in the introduction and the concluding remarks (khātima) of the Maqāsid provide no clue that enables us to date the text. These remarks state the

23 al-Ghazālī, Maqāsid al-falāsifa, 1: 2.9 f.
24 Ibid. 1:3.13; 3:77.
purpose of the composition and say when the book should be studied, i.e. before Taḥāfut al-falāṣīfa. The fact that the Maqāṣid refers explicitly to the Taḥāfut while the Taḥāfut refers to many of al-Ghazālī’s books but not to the Maqāṣid suggests prima facie that the Maqāṣid was written after the Taḥāfut. Since motifs and metaphors in the introduction of the Maqāṣid appear in like manner in al-Ghazālī’s autobiography al-Munqidh min al-dalāl (‘The Deliverer from Error’)—which was written around 501/1107—one might even suggest that the composition of the Maqāṣid belongs to this late period.25

From the words in the introduction and khatima of the Maqāṣid, Bouyges (and others before him) assumed that the writing of Maqāṣid al-falāṣīfa immediately preceded the work on Taḥāfut al-falāṣīfa.26 From a note in MS Istanbul, Fatih 2921, Bouyges concluded that al-Ghazālī finished working on Taḥāfut al-falāṣīfa on 11 Muharram 488/21 January 1095.27 It was assumed that the Maqāṣid had been written in the months or years before. This has always been the standard account.28 A critical comparison reveals, however, that the two texts use different terminology and that the teachings presented in the Maqāṣid are not in line with those reported and criticized in the Taḥāfut.29 Ibn Rushd already complained about this discrepancy.30 The Maqāṣid does not offer adequate assistance to students looking to understand al-Ghazālī’s Taḥāfut. The Maqāṣid’s reports of philosophical teachings show no evidence of being composed in the perspective of the Taḥāfut. This enabled Erwin Graef and Jules Janssens to suggest that the Maqāṣid was

25 Ibid. 1:2: ‘[To develop] the position that the teachings [of the falāṣīfa] are false before one has completely understood them is impossible. It is a throw into darkness and error.’ Cf. al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh, 18: ‘I learned that a refutation of the teachings [of the falāṣīfa] before one has understood them and studied them in their entirety is a throw into darkness.’
26 Bouyges, Essai de chronologie, 23 f.
27 Ibid. 23. Cf. al-Ghazālī, Taḥāfut, p. ix.
written many years before the Tahāfut ‘by the young al-Gazzālī in his student days’, who ‘was probably an adept of the (Avicennian inspired) falsafa-school of his time’.31 Grāf and Janssens assume that the introduction and the khātima were added later to the main text of the Maqāṣid. This is indeed an interesting suggestion. It introduces a new motif in al-Ghazālī’s struggle with falsafa—a period in his life in which he was a devoted follower of it. There is, however, little evidence for such a period in al-Ghazālī’s life. Neither he himself nor his biographers refer to it. Also, Grāf’s and Janssens’s suggestion does not explain the difference of terminology in the two books, nor al-Ghazālī’s failure to mention the Maqāṣid in his Tahāfut. These are in my view indications that the Maqāṣid was written after the Tahāfut. Al-Ghazālī felt that some of his readers were unprepared for study of the Tahāfut.32 An early response to this situation was Mi‘ār al-‘ilm, whose function as preparatory to the study of the Tahāfut is spelled out.33 Later, al-Ghazālī might have felt the need for an additional and/or different kind of preparation. He responded with the Maqāṣid, which is mostly an adaptation of one of Ibn Sinā’s Persian introductory books. This meant to present a slightly different terminology and it did not introduce exactly the same teachings that he had earlier reported and criticized in the Tahāfut. Still al-Ghazālī—or his workshop—composed it as preparatory to the Tahāfut and the success of Maqāṣid al-falāsifa in Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin literature shows that there was indeed a need for such a book.34

32 Cf. al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 17.2 f.
33 al-Ghazālī, Mi‘ār al-‘ilm, 26.7 ff.: ‘[In the Tahāfut] we dispute with the falāsifa in their language and we address them according to their terminology that they agreed upon in logics. In this book [sc. Mi‘ār al-‘ilm] the meaning of that terminology will be explained.’
34 Recently Nasrollah Pourjavadi discovered a version of al-Ghazālī’s Kitāb al-Madāmūn bihi ‘alā ghayri aḥlib in which the teachings of Maqāṣid al-falāsifa are presented as being those of al-Ghazālī himself. The significance of this finding still needs to be explored. Cf. Nasrallah Pūrjavādī, Majmūʿa-i falsaft-yi Marāgha: A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha, Facsimile Edition with Introduction in Persian and English (Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh, 1380/2002).
The treatment of the *falāsifa*’s teachings in al-Ghazālī’s *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* is based on the parts of logic, metaphysics, and the natural sciences in Ibn Sinā’s (Avicenna, d. 429/1037) Persian book Dānish-nāmeh-yi ‘Alā’ī, a work that comprises all the philosophical sciences. In his *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, al-Ghazālī follows closely the order of treatment of Ibn Sinā’s Persian book, translates key passages from Persian into Arabic, leaves out other passages and doctrines, and inserts his own additions to Ibn Sinā’s text. In comparison to *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, the text of MS London only deals with metaphysics. At the same time it is about one and a half times as long as *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*. The aim of the London MS may have been to replace the philosophical textbooks on metaphysics rather than to provide an introduction to their teachings. In its report of the teachings of the *falāsifa* on ontology and theological metaphysics it is immediately based on Arabic works by Ibn Sinā and al-Fārābī (d. 339/950). Rieu noted ‘that a considerable portion of the last Makālah is textually borrowed from the *Ishārāt* by Ibn Sinā.’ This is, in fact, true for the whole text of MS London Or. 3126, nor is Ibn Sinā’s *al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbihāt* (‘Pointers and Reminders’) the only source. The work is mostly a compilation of quotes from books by Ibn Sinā, al-Fārābī, and others.

The reliance of the London MS on writings of the *falāsifa* is more direct than the *Maqāṣid*’s dependence on Ibn Sinā’s Dānishnāmeh.


37 *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* has about 5460 lines (273 pages × 20 lines) of text in the edition of Sabrī al-Kurḍī. The MS in London has about 8550 lines (570 pages × 15 lines) of roughly equal length.

38 Rieu, *Supplement*, 496.
This holds true throughout the whole work. The beginning of the preserved text on fo. 2⁴ would have been the sixth page of the original book. The goal of the text on fo. 2⁴ is to establish the notion of a universal idea (kulliyya) and of the essence or quiddity (māhiyya) of a thing. These words, however, are not used at this stage. The text explains that both Zayd and ‘Amr have things in common that may be subsumed under the universal of insāniyya, ‘humanity’. This text is taken almost word for word from the beginning of the third, i.e. the metaphysical, part in Ibn Sinā’s al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt and pasted into our text. Alterations are limited to the introduction of further examples and the addition of a few explanatory sentences.

The text continues in the 2nd chapter on the ‘subject matter of this science’ with excerpts of passages from the first chapter of Ibn Sinā’s book on metaphysics from al-Shifā. This is the famous chapter where Ibn Sinā writes on the subject matter of metaphysics as opposed to what it is able to achieve.39 Our book then continues in the 3rd chapter on the benefit of this science and its place in the curriculum with further quotations from Ibn Sinā’s Ilāhiyyāt of al-Shifā. In this passage, it finally becomes clear what ‘this science’ is—although the original reader of this MS may have known this from its original introduction. In a passage taken from the Ilāhiyyāt of Ibn Sinā, MS London informs its reader that the name of ‘this science’ is ‘metaphysics’ (mā ba’d a l-ṭabī‘a) or, as the author also calls it (in a phrase not literally taken from Ibn Sinā but inspired by his terminology) ‘the divine science’, al-ʿilm al-ilāhi.40

The entire First Maqāla of this book consists of quotations from either Ibn Sinā’s al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt—at the beginning of the book—or, where matters become more technical, from the metaphysics of al-Shifā. The following list represents the sequence of passages from books by Ibn Sinā pasted together in the introduction and the opening two chapters of the MS (fos. 2ᵃ–11ᵇ):

*Introduction (beginning is missing) (fos. 2ᵃ.1–3ᵇ.1)*

− al-Ishārāt, p. 139.1–4.


40 MS London, British Library Or. 3126, fo. 11ᵃ. The passage mentioning mā ba’d a l-ṭabī‘a is taken from Ibn Sinā, al-Shifā’, al-Ilāhiyyāt, 21 f. Earlier on fo. 7ᵃ, the text had already mentioned the definition of al-ʿilm al-ilāhi, and this passage is taken from al-Ilāhiyyāt, 15.
an original explanation (fo. 2a.3–9) drawn from the fact that an individual hand is different from ‘hand’ as a concept of all hands.
al-Ishārāt, p. 139.5–10 (includes an additional example from the fact that the meaning of a written text cannot be found in the material shape of the written letters).41
an original explanation (fos. 2a.14–3a.4) illustrating that aesthetic and normative judgements are not ‘in materiality’ (bi-l-māddiyya).
an original faṣl (fos. 3a.5–4a.1) comparing different kinds of proofs for the existence of God (translated below).

‘The first Maqāla on the principles and the premises’ (fo. 3b.2–15)
– a summary account of this first Maqāla.

‘The first Chapter (bāb) on the subject matter (mawḍū‘) of this science’ (fos. 4a.1–10a.11)
– introductory sentence: The subject matter of this science is either the existence (anniyya) of God or the remote causes for all being as such.
al-Shifā’, al-Ilāhiyyāt, I.1, p. 5.18–6.12.
al-Najāt, p. 198.13–199.7.
al-Najāt, p. 199.10–11.
– a passage loosely adapted from the beginning of al-Shifā’, al-Ilāhiyyāt, I.4, p. 25.
al-Shifā’, al-Ilāhiyyāt, I.2, p. 15.16–16.11.
an original faṣl (fos. 7b.9–8b.3) explaining:
1. that existence is not a genus of essence,
2. that knowledge about a substance (jawhār) is distinct from knowledge of the existence of the substance.

‘If humans did not have in their primordial nature (fitra) the knowledge by which they know, for instance, what is impossible and possible by itself, they would be, in regard to the sciences, like one writing (kātib), who knows only that he needs ink, pen, and paper but who (even with those implements) would still not know how to write.’
– a second original faṣl (fos. 8b.4–9a.2) explaining that unity and variety do not reside in the substances or accidents, but are rather concomitants of the essences.
– a faṣl adapted from a chapter in al-Najāt, p. 223f., and parallel to Mi’yār al-‘ilm p. 218f.

‘The second Maqāla on the benefits of this science, its place in the curriculum, and its name’ (fos. 10a.12–11b.4)


The list illustrates that the units of texts pasted together are often very short, sometimes no longer than a single sentence and that they come from various sources among Ibn Sīnā’s writings. Much care has gone into the selection and combination of passages of text from Ibn Sīnā.

The book continues, in the Second Maqāla, by explaining the 10 Aristotelian categories and how they are connected to being. Here, the ontological difference between a substance (jawhar) and an accident (‘arad) is explained on several levels. After having dealt with the subject of the categories, the book switches to a discussion of the three modes of propositions in modal logic: necessary, contingent, and impossible. As in the case of the 10 categories, the book applies these logical tools to the science of being. It establishes the Avicennan matrix of the division of being into necessary and contingent and ‘by itself’ (bi-dhātibī) and ‘by something other than it’ (bi-ghayrihi). This leads into a discussion of the necessary being by virtue of itself (wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātibī), i.e. of God and of His attributes (ṣifāt). The systematic progression in this manuscript from the individual being to God is complemented by the Seventh Maqāla, which makes use of the previous systematic treatment of metaphysics for the explanation of questions that are related to the study of metaphysics such as cosmology and prophecy.

While the segments of texts combined in the first Maqāla are quite short, the texts combined in the seventh and last Maqāla tend to be significantly longer. The first two chapters in the Seventh Maqāla are almost as meticulously composed as in the First Maqāla. Starting with

42 If texts are described as taken or adapted from al-Najāt then this passage has no direct parallel in the Ilāhiyyāt of Ibn Sīnā.
the third chapter the author has chosen larger passages of often five to ten pages and collated them wholesale into his book. Here, the division in chapters (aba'āb) largely follows the division of the chapters copied from the books of Ibn Sīnā, al-Fārābī, and Miskawayh (d. 421/1030). The table of concordances for the Seventh Maqāla is as follows:

Seventh Maqāla: ‘On what is consequential from this book (fi lawāhiq al-kitāb)’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Corresponds to philosophical text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The second part of this chapter (fos. 236ᵃ.pae.–237ᵇ.5) is an original fasl arguing that things that come into being do so by virtue of an active faculty or a passive one and that the will (irāda) of humans is caused by inner perception (tasāweynur).

End of chapter (fos. 237ᵃ.5–13) | *al-Shifā’, al-Ilāhiyyāt, X.1, 437.6–13*

2) ‘On divine providence’ fos. 237ᵇ–240ᵃ | *al-Ishārāt, 185.11–16, al-Shifā’, al-Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, 415.1–3*

Contains an original passage (fos. 238ᵃ.8–238ᵇ.9) on the fact that the perfect dispositions of nature point towards divine providence and the fact that prophecy and its legislation is part of this providence.


The last three chapters of the Seventh *Maqāla* of MS London are almost literally identical to the last three chapters of Ibn Sinā’s *al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbihāt*. One must say ‘almost’ because our author makes deliberate changes to the text. He changes, for instances, the order in which particular subjects are treated, leaves out passages that he might not deem important, or introduces additional examples. He is also inclined to make Ibn Sinā’s philosophical language more accessible by restructuring sentences or transforming the terminology to expressions that are morphologically more appealing in Arabic than Ibn Sinā’s. All this, however, remains still close to the text of Ibn Sinā and in no way alters his teachings.

One purpose of the chart is to indicate which passages in MS London are original and not simply copied from the works of the *falāsifā*. These passages give additional examples or illustrations, or they summarize the content of a *Maqāla*. The most remarkable passages are those that report philosophical teachings and combine the report with an analysis. The first *Maqāla*, for instance, contains an interesting comment on types of proofs for God’s existence. Here, the author compares the benefits of two different types of such proofs. The passage juxtaposes the kinematic proof of God as the prime mover known from Book XII of Aristotle’s

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46 Note, however, that the author changes the titles of the *nimāṭ* when he moves them into his book. What in Ibn Sinā is the chapter ‘On Magnificence and Happiness’ (*Fī l-bḥa‘ja wa-l-sā‘āda*) becomes ‘On the Admonition of the Intellectual Pleasures’ (*Fī tanbih ‘alā l-ladhdhāt al‘aqliyya*) while the title ‘On Magnificence and Happiness’ in the London book is moved to the chapter right before this, representing the text of *al-Ilāhiyyāt* IX.7 ‘On the Return’ (*Fī l-mā‘ād*).
Metaphysics with Ibn Sīnā’s proofs of God as the necessary existent (wājib al-wujūd) by virtue of itself. The passage reads in English translation:

Section: Know that a group amongst the elders (mutaqaddimūn) argued by way of the contingent for (the existence of) the necessary and by way of the effect for (the existence of) the cause. They started with composite beings. They analysed them and ascended from there to the elementary things (basā’īt). They proved demonstrably that there is nothing that moves without (being moved) by a mover until they ended at a mover who does not move (himself). He is the first mover. The more recent ones (muta’akkhirūn) argued by way of the creator for (the existence of) His created beings. They began with the elementary beings then climbed up from them and discovered the necessity of the creator’s existence from His existence itself. Once they had established this, they established (the existence of) contingent beings through it. They said: ‘This way to argue is more reliable and nobler, because if we consider the state of being, [we find that] the absolute being (wujūd muṭlaq) inasmuch as it is existence, bears witness to Him. So we had no need for the ascent from low to high, because the closest (aulā) thing [to mind] is giving evidence to the created things by way of their Creator and not giving evidence to Him by way of the created things.’ This is all good, but the second [method] is better. And everything that this science says about this is presented in seven Maqālāt.

Although this passage contains a quote from Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārat wa-l-tanbihāt it is an original piece of writing by the author of our text. It presents the matter from the point of view of the faṣīfa and our author may or may not agree with this report.

The division of the seven Maqālāt is apparent from the table of contents of the MS London, Or. 3126 (Appendix I, below). The technique of ‘cutting and pasting’, mainly from books like Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārat wa-l-tanbihāt or the metaphysics of al-Shifā’, is used throughout the work.

47 Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.7, 1072a 19ff. From the necessity of every movement being the effect of a mover, Aristotle argues that, since there are evidently movements and thus movers in the world, there must be somebody or something that has caused the very first movement.

48 MS London, British Library Or. 3126, fos. 3a f.

49 The brief passage in quotation marks contains a sentence from Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārat wa-l-tanbihāt, 146.15–17: ‘This mode, however, is more reliable and nobler, that is, when we consider the state of existence, we find that existence inasmuch at it is existence, bears witness to Him.’ English translation by Michael E. Marmura in Encyclopediā Iranica, iii. 77. The author of the MS in London replaced ‘existence’ with ‘absolute existence’, which is still within the bounds of Avicennan terminology. This kind of clarification/interpretation can often be found in the text.
REFERENCES TO OTHER TEXTS WITHIN THIS BOOK

There is good reason to assume that the author of the text explains his excerpts from and extensive references to the books of Ibn Sinā, al-Fārābī and other authors in the lost part of the introduction. The available text makes no particular effort to make the literal relationship between this book and the works of the falsafī evident. Only in a small number of passages does the author explicitly mention his sources and the fact that he adapted them for the purpose of his book. I am aware of two such passages, both from the seventh Maqāla. At the beginning of the second section (faṣl) of the third chapter (bāb), the author says that the treatment in chapter three of the seventh Maqāla (fos. 240–47) is adapted from a risāla by al-Fārābī on the ‘knowledge of the arrangement and the order’ (maʿrifat al-tartīb wa-l-nizām).

The text that follows is indeed a long verbatim quote from al-Fārābī’s al-Siyāsah al-madaniyyah. At the end of this chapter, the author of MS London states that the subject dealt with in this passage, namely the orderly progression of being from the First Principle, is treated in a way that follows the procession from the high to the low:

This (that you just read) is the knowledge of the arrangement and the order (tartīb wa-l-nizām) when you start with the elementary [= celestial] beings and then move (towards the composed beings). And if you wish to start with the composed beings and then move beyond them towards the elementary [= celestial] beings, the method for this is what Ibn Miskawayh mentions in his book on The Accomplishment (Kitāb al-Fawz [al-āshghar]). We singled it out according to what it is, so listen to it.52

The following three chapters in the seventh Maqāla are taken from the section on prophecy in Miskawayh’s al-Fawz al-āshghar. These three chapters are particularly rich in references to other books. The references are not to specific titles, but rather to standard philosophical textbooks. Once a subject matter is mentioned, Miskawayh informs the readers that this subject is also treated in, for instance, ‘books on astronomy’

50 MS London, British Library Or. 3126, fo. 241ª.2.
51 The text from the start of fo. 241ª.2 till the end of the chapter on fo. 247ª.9 is taken from al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsah al-madaniyyah, 31–8. (The Farabian text has been translated—but not published—by Thérèse-Anne Druart. I am grateful to her for making her translation available to me.)
52 MS London, British Library Or. 3126, fo. 247ª.9–12. The verb in the last sentence is afradnāhu, which also appears on fo. 253ª.2 = Miskawayh, Kitāb al-Fawz al-āshghar, 132.2.
(kutub al-hay’a) or a book that treats ‘physics’ (kitāb al-samā’ al-ṭabi‘i).53 These references are faithfully copied into our book.54 The most striking of the references is at the beginning of the sixth chapter in the seventh Maqāla, ‘On truthful dreams and the fact that they are a part of prophecy’. The original passage in Miskawayh reads as follows:

It is not at all impossible to claim that the truthful dream (al-manām al-ṣādiq) is a part of prophecy as we have explained in our preceding treatment of the soul and its essential movements, namely that we have explained what dreams are and what is their cause.55

After ‘as we have explained in our preceding treatment of the soul’ (mimmā sharāḥnā min amr al-nafs fī-mā salaf), the text of MS London adds the phrase ‘in the book on the soul’ (fī kitāb al-nafs).56 The addition is not reported to exist in any of the manuscript sources of al-Fawz al-āshghar used by Şālih ‘Udayma for his 1987 semi-critical edition. Adding ‘in the book on the soul’ makes the reference much more specific and suggests that there is a particular work with the title Book on the Soul that the reader of this book—i.e. MS London, Or. 3126—has already studied. It might then be understood as a reference to a Book on the Soul by al-Ghazālī. It is more likely, however, that the sentence is a part of Miskawayh’s original text, despite the fact that it does not appear in any of the MSS used by ‘Udayma for his edition of al-Fawz al-āshghar. In the London MS it is an atavism which has been carelessly copied from Miskawayh’s original texts where it had a proper function. This function expired once it was copied into the text of MS London, Or. 3126. The passages from Miskawayh also contain a relatively large number of self-references to the author (‘we have done so and so’) where the ‘we’ clearly refers to Miskawayh and not to the author of the text in MS London. This may be one of the reasons why the author chose to go out of his way and explicitly mention his source when he starts copying from Miskawayh.

CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BOOK AND ASCRIPTION TO AL-GHAZĀLĪ

The book preserved in MS London, Or. 3126 is an accomplished anthology of philosophical texts dealing with metaphysics that reveals its

54 MS London, British Library Or. 3126, fo. 248va.3–7.
55 Miskawayh, K. al-Fawz al-āshghar, 133.3–5.
56 MS London, British Library Or. 3126, fo. 253bpaenult.
character of being a compilation in only very few instances. The author has made a careful selection of a great number of passages from various metaphysical works of philosophical authors. Writing and compiling this book required a significant degree of expertise and familiarity with the works of the falāsifa. It also required expert decisions about which parts of these books were to be selected, which omitted, and how the texts can be adapted by, for instance, slightly changing the terminology. The proficiency required to write and compile the text of MS London is similar to that developed by al-Ghazālī during the work on his Tabāštut al-falāsifa.

The book covers subjects that are extensively discussed in the Tabāštut. One of these subjects is causality, which is dealt with in the famous 17th discussion of the Tabāštut.57 In our book, causality is treated in the three last chapters in the fourth Maqāla. These chapters are longer than most others and together make up 101 pages (fos. 121a–71b) or almost 20% of the text of the MS. Other chapters cover subjects rarely dealt with in books of Aristotelian philosophy or in kālām but known to have attracted the attention of al-Ghazālī in other works of his. Chapter 5 in the seventh Maqāla, for instance, is taken from Miskawayh’s Kitāb al-Fawz al-asghar and explains that the intellect is by its nature like a ‘king’ that is obeyed (muṭā’a).58 Readers of al-Ghazālī are familiar with this motif from his Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn, for instance, where he laments the desire of the human nafs to be obeyed rather than to serve.59

In an enigmatic passage in his Mishkāt al-anwār, al-Ghazālī implies that...
creation is due to an intellect that is distinct from God and that this intellect is ‘the one who is obeyed’ (muta‘).\textsuperscript{60}

While these are clear indications for al-Ghazālī’s authorship of the book, an ascription to him would be difficult to uphold if the book preserved in MS London, Or. 3126 consisted exclusively of almost literal quotations from the books of falāsifā. A number of highly educated philosophical scholars could have compiled such a book from the existing writings of the falāsifā, added the khātimā that mentions Tahāfut al-falāsifā, and aimed to pass it on the book market as a genuine work of al-Ghazālī. Fortunately, the book is not exclusively a compilation from the works of Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī. It contains some extensive and important passages that cannot be found in previous philosophical literature. These passages are original compositions by the author and are key to determining the authorship of this text. In the following we will compare one particular chapter in the manuscript London, Or. 3126 with a chapter in one of al-Ghazālī’s established books in order to demonstrate that they were written by the same author.


comparison of the Chapters on Jawhar in Al-Ghazālī’s Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm and MS London, Or. 3126

The second Maqāla of the London manuscript deals with the issue of the categories. This is a subject that is normally not included in textbooks of metaphysics. Following Aristotle, this subject stands at the beginning of the study of logic and is therefore included in the textbooks covering the Categories (Kitāb al-Maqūlāt). Although Ibn Sīnā wrote a Kitāb al-Maqūlāt as part of the section on logics in al-Shifā’, he held that a thorough exposition of the categories is not necessary for the study of logic. For Ibn Sīnā, studying how to define a thing and how definitions are used in syllogisms teaches logic best. These two subjects do not require a proper knowledge of the ten Aristotelian categories. According to Ibn Sīnā, disregarding the ten categories causes no harm in logic. In fact, the subject of the ten categories belongs more properly to

metaphysics or to psychology. But even within these two fields, Ibn Sinā’s treatment of the ten categories was quite negligent.

Al-Ghazālī followed Ibn Sinā in his opinion that the ten categories should be studied in metaphysics rather than logic. This is evident from his book Mīyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-mantīq (The Touchstone of Knowledge in the Art of Logic). Although the title of this book limits it to logics, it also contains a basic treatment of subjects in philosophical metaphysics at the end. Al-Ghazālī explains the prime divisions of existence (wujūd) and here, within the context of Avicennan metaphysics, he includes the division of being into the ten Aristotelian categories. The fact that the categories are not treated systematically earlier in Mīyār al-ʿilm where he treats the logic of the falsa but are found instead in the context of the metaphysics at the end of that book reveals that al-Ghazālī followed Ibn Sinā.

The author of the MS London shares the notion that the categories should be dealt with in metaphysics since they represent one of the prime divisions of being. The important division here is the one between a substance (jawhar) and an accident (ʿaraḍ). Our author is even more Avicennan than Ibn Sinā was, since here within the context of metaphysics he treats each category one by one—something Ibn Sinā apparently never did in his metaphysical writings. This forced our author to go his own way in this Maqāla. He could not copy any of the works of Ibn Sinā, since they don’t contain a thorough and at the same time easy-to-understand treatment of the ten categories. Instead, he composes his own text and explains the role of the ten categories for the study of metaphysics.

In his presentation of the categories he still paraphrases texts by Ibn Sinā where they are appropriate. He also uses al-Fārābī’s treatment of the ten categories in his logical writings, namely his Kitāb al-Maqūlāt. Al-Fārābī represents the pre-Avicennan system where the ten categories are dealt with in the Organon. Since al-Fārābī’s text deals with the categories in the context of logics, it is sometimes in need of significant adaptation in order to fit into a book on metaphysics. Still, some passages by al-Fārābī are copied verbatim into this Maqāla. In general, the writings of both Ibn Sinā and al-Fārābī, which form the basis of this Maqāla, are much less literally adapted than in other parts of this book.

62 al-Ghazālī, Mīyār al-ʿilm, 199–222.
This offers the opportunity to study how the author of this unknown text actually writes.

The second Maqāla on the categories turns out to be very close to the text of al-Ghazālī's Mi‘yār al-‘ilm fi fann al-mantiq. That work is— according to its own statement—a textbook on logic that aims to fulfil two goals at the same time. Its first goal is to teach correct methods of thinking and of theological speculation and to give insight into the syllogistic method and the way to argue through examples.63 The second goal is to acquaint its readers with the technical language of the falāsifa, in order to prepare them for the study of Tabāfut al-falāsifa where this terminology is employed.64 Combining these two goals in one book implies that al-Ghazālī was committed to the logical teachings of the falāsifa, a fact he readily admitted to in his autobiography.65 It has already been said that Mi‘yār al-‘ilm contains at its end a part on metaphysics.66 Jules Janssens established that the text of the Mi‘yār depends heavily on works by Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī and he listed the sources al-Ghazālī used in writing the book.67 Like the text of the manuscript preserved in London, Mi‘yār al-‘ilm may be characterized as a compilation based on philosophical texts. In its character as a compilation, however, the Mi‘yār is much less literal than the book preserved in MS London. It uses and paraphrases philosophical texts rather than copying them literally. The text of Mi‘yār al-‘ilm stands in no apparent connection to al-Ghazālī’s Maqāṣid al-falāsifa.68

63 Ibid. 25.1 ff.: ‘taḥṣim ṭurūq al-fikr wa-l-nazār wa-ta‘nīr waṣālīk al-aqīsa wa-l-‘ībar.’
64 Ibid. 26.7 ff. The passage has been quoted earlier, n. 33 above.
66 In his autobiography al-Ghazālī writes that metaphysics is the field of philosophy where most of the errors of the falāsifa occur and he singles out the ‘twenty teachings’ criticized in the Tabāfut (al-Munqidh min al-‘alā‘lāl, 23.14 f.) These and other comments still leave room for some metaphysical teachings of the falāsifa to be accepted by al-Ghazālī.
68 Ghassan Ghanem Hana, ‘Zur Logik al-Ǧazālī’s’, in ZMDG Supplement II, 1974/ Vorträge des XVIII. Deutscher Orientalistentag Lübeck 1972, 178–85, at 182 claims that the metaphysical part of Mi‘yār al-‘ilm is an epitome of selected chapters from Maqāṣid al-falāsifa / Đanīshnāme-yi ‘Alā‘i. Hana, however, is wrong: there is no direct textual relation between Maqāṣid al-falāsifa and Mi‘yār al-‘ilm.
Even a superficial reading reveals that the manuscript of London and Mi’yar al-‘ilm share some sentences almost verbatim. There are, however, also differences that may allow us to determine that neither of the two texts was simply copied from the other. In order to compare the two texts, we have chosen the passages in the two books that explain the nature of the substance (jawhar). The passages of the two books were lumped together and divided into 11 parts. Each part or section was in turn divided into ‘sentences’. Appendix II presents the result of this analysis. The chart documents the 11 parts of the respective passages devoted to explaining jawhar. The last column of the chart gives information regarding the texts by Ibn Sinâ and al-Fârâbî that have been adapted or literally copied into our two texts. An equals (=) in the chart signals that these parts (i.e. 7, 9, 10, and 11) are literal quotations from al-Fârâbî’s al-Maqlûbât.

While there are certain differences between the book preserved in London, Or. 3126 and Mi’yar al-‘ilm, the treatment of the ten categories in both books is remarkably similar. The passages on jawhar in Mi’yar al-‘ilm and in the London manuscript both begin with the adaptation of a passage in Ibn Sinâ’s al-Najât. The two texts are, however, much closer to one another than to the text by Ibn Sinâ. The text in Mi’yar al-‘ilm (abbreviated as M) has 11 sentences while the London manuscript (abbreviated as L) has 14. Every sentence in M has an equivalent in L with the exception of sentence M 1.2 which is a reference to a passage mentioned earlier in M. (The Arabic text of the two passages analysed here is given in Appendix III, which also includes the Avicennan text, from which the passages are adapted, and an English translation of it.) The following lists contain a brief description (not a full, proper translation) of the subject matter of the sentences in Mi’yar al-‘ilm and the London manuscript. The table of correspondence is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M 1.1</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>L 1.1</th>
<th>existence divides into substances (jawâhir) and accidents (ā’rād).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M 1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>=</td>
<td>‘jawhar’ is equivocal, this has been explained earlier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>=</td>
<td>here, we talk about ‘jawhar’ as not subsisting in a subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>L 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>L 1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69 ‘Sentences’ here does not mean grammatical sentences in Arabic, but distinct single propositions.
70 Ibn Sinâ, al-Najât, 230 f.
1.5 the essences of ‘human’ (and ‘body’) do not subsist in the colour.

1.6 the colour subsists as an accident in a body after the essence is established.

1.7 likewise warmth and coldness in water: they are accidents.

1.8 the form of ‘waterness’, which inheres within water, is the jawbar.

1.9 when water changes into steam, its jawbar and not its ‘araḍ changes.

1.10 if we are asked whether steam is water, we say that it is not.

1.11 we regard the warmth and coldness of water as its additional aspect (ziyāda).

1.12 by contrast, we don’t say that steam is an additional aspect to water.

1.13 steam is not just dispersed water because there is an addition to the form of water.

Text M seems to have suffered severely during the transmission process. This is evident from a comparison of the Arabic text at the end of the passage where sentences M 1.10 and 1.11 are unintelligible in the edited version of Miṣr al-‘ilm and can only be reconstructed with the help of L. The Miṣr is unfortunately not well edited.71 Manuscripts of the text are rare and could not be consulted.72 Three sentences in L (1.4, 1.5, 1.8) have no equivalent in M. While sentences L 1.4 and 1.5 are further clarifications of what has already been stated before, sentence L 1.8 introduces warmth and coldness in water as examples of accidents. This example is not to be found in the Avicennan text, which generally doesn’t include many illustrations. Text M mentions the water’s warmth and coldness later in sentence M 1.9. It is, however, lacking a clear equivalent to L 1.8. Its introduction of warmth and coldness is therefore quite abrupt and has no context. Text M would read much better if it had a sentence like L 1.8 that properly introduces the idea of warmth and

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71 Muḥyī al-Dīn Ṣabrī al-Kurdi prepared the editio princeps of Miṣr al-‘ilm in 1329/1911 (Cairo: Matba‘at Kurdistān). He published a second edition in 1346/1927 (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘a al-‘Arabiyya), which is the text referred to in this paper. The Miṣr was later edited by Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1961) and by Husayn Sharāra (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1964). These new editions show no differences. Other editions have since come out but it seems they are all ultimately based on Ṣabrī al-Kurdi’s text.

72 There are only five reported MSS of Miṣr al-‘ilm: two are in Istanbul (Ragib Paşa, 912, and one in the Fatih collection), one in Fès (Qarawiyīn Mosque, 1318/4), one in Cairo (Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, in Majāmī‘ Ta‘līf, 967), and one incomplete at Djakarta (Museum Pusat, Catalogue von Ronkel, 591) which lacks this passage. I was unable to consult the MSS in Istanbul, Fès, and Cairo.
coldness as accidents. Text M is apparently a reduced version of text L. This kind of reduction may be due either to a corrupt manuscript tradition or to the work of a common author of both books.

Appendix IV presents the Arabic text of part 3 of the section on jawhar. This part provides further evidence for the assumption that M is closely related to L. These passages are very loosely adapted from al-Fārābī’s al-Maqūlāt. In this case, the two compared texts correspond almost entirely:

M 3.1 = L 3.1 The substance divides into two kinds: individual and general.
M 3.2 = L 3.2 The first kind is the individual substance like Zayd and ‘Amr.
M 3.3 = L 3.3 The second kind is the universal substance like ‘human’, ‘animal’, etc.
M 3.4 = L 3.4 A universal substance can be the predicate of an individual one.
M 3.5 = L 3.5 In these cases, the predicate is a substance, not an accident.
M 3.6 = L 3.6 If the predicate is an accident it is not part of the essence of the subject.
M 3.7 = L 3.7 Therefore the subject of accidents cannot be defined by the accident-predicate.
— = L 3.8 The predication of accidents to substances cannot constitute a definition.
M 3.8 = L 3.9 If a universal substance is the predicate of an individual, the universal substance is always part of the definition of that individual substance.
M 3.9 = L 3.10 Now, the difference between individual and universal substance has become clear.

Despite the large degree of correspondence indicated in this chart, the two texts still read quite differently. The sentences of text L are generally longer and clearer than in M. Sentence 3.1 distinguishes in both texts what Aristotle calls first and second substances. Here, they are called ‘individual substances’ and are introduced as follows:

M 3.1 The substance is divided into that which is not in a subject and which cannot (at the same time) be a predicate and into that which is not in a subject and which can be predicated to a subject.
L 3.1 Know that substance divides into two kinds. The first is that which is not in a subject and what cannot (at the same time) be a predicate to a subject. The second is that which is not in a subject except that it can be predicated to a subject.

Both sentences teach the same. Sentence M 3.1 is, however, significantly shorter. It is a reduced version of L 3.1. Sentence M 3.1 gives the impression of being the result of the attempt to strip L 3.1 of all
syntactical elements that are not necessary for the understanding of that sentence’s teaching. It is a more compact version of L 3.1, in fact almost a skeleton of it. A similar impression of the relationship between M and L is given by a comparison of the sentences 3.2:

M 3.2 The first is the individual substance, such as Zayd and ‘Amr.

L. 3.2 That which is not in a subject and what cannot be predicated to a subject are the individual substances such as Zayd, and ‘Amr, and ‘this particular body’.

And of sentences 3.3:

M 3.3 The second are the universal substances, such as ‘human’, ‘body’, and ‘animal’.

L. 3.3 That which is not in a subject and what can be predicated to a subject are the universal substances such as ‘human’, ‘animal’, and ‘body’.

The impression that M represents a reduced version of the treatment in L is reinforced even where Mişr al-‘ilm has a sentence that is longer than in MS London. This is the case in sentences M 3.8/L 3.9:

M 3.8. As for (words such as) ‘human’, ‘animal’, and ‘body’ and the like, we use them as predicates of the individual Zayd, and we define these substances by exactly the same definition as the definition of the subject since we say about Zayd that he is a rational animal, a mortal, or that he is a body which has a soul that perceives sensually and is moved by the will.

L 3.9 This is like when you use ‘human’ as a predicate of the individual Zayd. You say ‘Zayd is a human’ and you find that the predicate is defined by the definition of the subject because the predicate is known from the subject as [part of] its essence.

Again, the sentences teach the same: When the universal substance ‘human’ is predicated to an individual substance like Zayd, the universal substance is always part of the known definition of the subject of predication (i.e. the individual human) and thus part of its essence. Sentence M 3.8 is longer but hardly more precise than L 3.9. In fact, it seems that whoever worked on these two sentences was not happy with sentence L 3.9, and added more explanation about what is part of the definition of ‘human’. The style also changes from an address in the second person (‘you use . . .’) to the first person plural (‘we use . . .’) which makes it more intimate. The resulting longer sentence M 3.8 has the benefit of explaining the elements of the definition of ‘human’ without bringing in the term ‘essence’ (dhāt).

By way of conclusion we might say that text L offers a well-structured and in the most cases clear exposition of the subject and has no repetitive elements. Text M, on the other hand, presents the same teachings as
text L but it is shorter, its language is more economical, and repetition is not always avoided. In all these cases one can readily understand how a sentence found in text L could be transformed to arrive at a text like M. The other way round (i.e. a transformation in the opposite direction) is much less readily understood. In almost all cases, MS London has the *lectio difficilior*. Its sentences are more precise and closer to a philosophical style than those in *Mi‘yar al-‘ilm*. I suggest that the section of *jawhar* in the *Mi‘yar* presents a more developed version, and was composed for a different kind of readership, than the text in MS London.

Most of the variations between the treatments of the categories in the two texts being compared can be explained by the different goals of the two books. *Mi‘yar al-‘ilm* aims to explain Aristotelian teachings to people who have an education in *kalām*. The text in the London manuscript does not share that interest and does not have those passages (part 2 and 6 in the list in Appendix II) where the usage of the word *‘jawhar’* in the language of the *falāsifa* is compared to the usage in *kalām*. The *Mi‘yar*, on the other hand, does not have those passages that deal with the more subtle metaphysical issues of the discussion of *jawhar*, like, for instance, the fact that we can only think in universals and not in particulars (parts 9–11). *Mi‘yar al-‘ilm* deals with these subjects in a few sentences at the beginning of part 4 of the section. 73

Each of the two books, *Mi‘yar al-‘ilm* as well as MS London, Or. 3126, contains passages that are literally adapted from al-Fārābī’s *Kitāb al-Mağūlat* but are not included in the other. Part 7 in the *Mi‘yar*, for instance, is a literal quotation from al-Fārābī’s *al-Mağūlat*—without mentioning its source or indicating its provenance. It has no equivalent in the text of the London manuscript. Equally, in the London manuscript, parts 9–11 are taken literally from the same text of al-Fārābī but are not found in *Mi‘yar al-‘ilm*.

An analysis of the terminology of these two texts further suggests that there is a development between them and that *Mi‘yar al-‘ilm* is the more developed one. While the text in the London manuscript starts out with al-Fārābī’s technical terminology for ‘individual substances’, namely *ashkhāṣ al-jawhār*, it uses in one instance a second term synonymously, *al-jawābir al-shakhṣiyā*. This latter term appears neither in al-Fārābī nor in Ibn Sinā. It is most probably a development of the author of the London MS trying to avoid the conceptually more complicated term of al-Fārābī. *Mi‘yar al-‘ilm* uses only the newly introduced term of *al-jawābir al-shakhṣiyā* even at places

73 These sentences have no equivalent in part 4 of the text in MS London.
where the London manuscript still has the Fārābīan term *ashkhād al-jawhar*. This strongly suggests that the text in *Mī’yar al-‘ilm* has gone through later revisions than the text in the London manuscript where the Fārābīan language has not been yet been replaced by what must be understood as Ghazālian idiom.

**TENTATIVE DATING OF THE TEXT**

The *terminus post quem* of the book preserved in MS London is determined by the appearance of *Tabāfut al-falāsifa* in the *khātima* of the book. The text must have been composed after the *Tabāfut* or at earliest during its composition. One manuscript of the *Tabāfut* says it was published in Muḥarram 488/January 1095. This tallies with the chronology of works given by al-Ghazālī in his autobiography, where the preoccupation with the teachings of the *falāsifa* follows the study of *kalām* and precedes that of the Ismā‘īli Shi‘ī. Through internal references in the works of al-Ghazālī one can determine that the *Tabāfut* was indeed published before *Iḥyā‘ ulūm ad-dīn*. Bouyges assumed that al-Ghazālī wrote *Tabāfut al-falāsifa* in the months before Muḥarram 488/January 1095.

In his autobiography, al-Ghazālī writes that he devoted three years to the study of *falsafa* while teaching at the Nizāmiyya in Baghdad. The parenetic and apologetic character of al-Ghazālī’s autobiography is now well established. The text presents an archetypical view of how a scholar should respond to the kind of challenges that al-Ghazālī faced.

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74 See n. 27.
The narration of facts in al-Ghazālī’s *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl* should be read with the caution applicable in the study of every kind of autobiographic literature.⁷⁹ The three years devoted to the study of falsafa may represent just the final stage in the preparation and execution of the writing of the *Tahāfut*. By the time al-Ghazālī wrote his *Munqidh* he had been severely criticized for having become too close to the teachings of the falāsifa, so the three years mentioned in the *Munqidh* may well be just the amount of time al-Ghazālī was willing to admit to. The aim of this might have been to appease some of his critics by stating that he spent ‘only’ three years on the study of falsafa—and that he did so after he had already accomplished his higher education—thus countering the accusation that falsafa had a significant influence on his intellectual formation.⁸⁰

The actual time that al-Ghazālī spent studying the books of Ibn Sinā and al-Fārābī and subsequently writing his own books in this genre—books that include *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*—is likely to have been much longer than just three years. In fact, there is reason to assume that al-Ghazālī started to read these books with his teacher al-Juwaynī, who himself studied the works of Ibn Sinā.⁸¹ This adds up to a period of almost 20 years, from the time al-Ghazālī entered the seminar of al-Juwaynī until the final publication of *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* in 488/1095. During these years, we can assume, al-Ghazālī studied the works of falāsifa such as Ibn Sinā, al-Fārābī, and Miskawayh, before then

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composing *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*. It is likely that these years were interspersed with other activities and that it was not a linear process as the passage in the *Munqidh* suggests. Periods of preoccupation with the teachings of the *falāsifa* may have alternated with other work. It makes little sense to assume that al-Ghazālī arrived in Baghdad in the summer of 484/1091 with empty notebooks, so to speak, without having already written or drafted at least parts of the many books he was about to publish between his arrival at the Nizāmiyya and his departure only four and half years later.

The fact that our book mentions *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* does not mean, therefore, that it was written after Muharram 488/January 1095. The publication of the *Tahāfut* may be anticipated in this work. Drafts of the *Tahāfut* may have been in circulation among close students and colleagues. The *terminus post quem* of our book should accordingly be set somewhere in the period between al-Juwayni’s death in the summer of 478/1085—when al-Ghazālī became an independent scholar—and the publication of the *Tahāfut* in Muharram 488/January 1095.

The *terminus ante quem* is much more difficult to establish. The only indication in this regard is given by the book’s close relationship to al-Ghazālī’s *Mi’yār al-‘ilm*. This book was written before *Ihya ’ulūm al-din*. It is mentioned in al-Ghazālī’s *al-Iqtisād fi l-‘tiqād*, which itself is mentioned in book one of the *Ihya*. 82 Although there are still a great number of uncertainties regarding the dating of al-Ghazālī’s books, the *Ihya* is regarded as one of the first books published after al-Ghazālī’s sudden departure from Baghdad in 488/1095. Al-Ghazālī read from the *Ihya* while passing through Baghdad on his way to Khorasan in Jumādā al-Akha‘a Jawwal 490 / May 1097. 83 It is generally assumed that he started writing the *Ihya* soon after 488/1095. 84 *Mi’yār al-‘ilm* was published before that time. A tentative dating of the book preserved in MS London puts it into the ten years between 478/1085 and 488/1095. Such a date would fit into the most generally accepted view about a change in the subject matter of al-Ghazālī’s writings following his departure from Baghdad in the fall of 488/1095. Throughout his life, al-Ghazālī

83 See the references in Frank Griffel, *Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 304.
84 This is supported by the fact that the *Risāla al-Qudsiyya*, which was written and published while al-Ghazālī passed through Jerusalem in the summer of 489/1096, features as part of the second book of the *Ihya*, i. 169, 180–91. See A. L. Tibawi, ‘Al-Ghazālī’s Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalem’, *Islamic Quarterly* 9 (1965): 65–77.
remained preoccupied with the teachings of the *falāsīfa* and their epistemological significance. There is agreement, however, that the detailed study of these teachings and the refutation of some of them falls into the period before 488/1095.

**CONCLUSION**

Comparing the treatment of *jawhar* in the London manuscript and in al-Ghazālī's *Miʿyar al-ʿilm* leads to the conclusion that both texts are written according to the same technique. They present the Aristotelian category of substance (*jawhar*) in a text that is an adaptation of passages in Ibn Sīnā’s *al-Najāt* and al-Fārābī’s *al-Maḥūlāt*. Both books also include literal quotations from the latter text. The fact that each of them features quotations from al-Fārābī not to be found in the other excludes the possibility that either is an adaptation of the other. The passage on *jawhar* in *Miʿyar al-ʿilm* cannot draw exclusively on the text in MS London, and the MS London cannot exclusively depend on *Miʿyar al-ʿilm*.

The fact that the writing technique in these two books is quite elaborate, that this technique is nowhere explicitly explained, and that the sources for these passage are not mentioned, leads us to conclude that the two books were written by one and the same author. Were one to hypothesize that MS London is a forgery, the forger would have had to have been extremely familiar with the way al-Ghazālī composed *Miʿyar al-ʿilm*. While such an assumption is not entirely impossible, ever detecting so skilful a forgery is highly improbable. It is more reasonable to assume that both texts were written by the same author—or the same workshop—and/or that both texts are excerpts from a third unknown text that contains all those passages from al-Fārābī’s *Kitāb al-Maḥūlāt* that are exclusive to one or other of the two texts. Such a third text, for instance, might have been some sort of notebook from which *Miʿyar al-ʿilm* and the text of MS London have both been adapted. Given that al-Ghazālī’s authorship of *Miʿyar al-ʿilm* is not disputed, the author of such an assumed third text would still be the same person. This leaves only a slim possibility that al-Ghazālī is not the author of the text in MS London.

In a series of articles, Jules Janssens pointed out that quite a number of works published by al-Ghazālī contain large amounts of textual material that have been copied, translated, or adapted from the writings of
falāsifa. Janssens made clear that works like Maqāṣid al-falāsifa, Mi’yār al-’ilm, and Ma’ārij al-Quds fi madārij mā rifat al-nafs, are essentially adaptations of writings by Ibn Sīnā.\textsuperscript{85} Others noted that important ethical writings of al-Ghazālī depend on philosophical authors\textsuperscript{86}—among them Miskawayh.\textsuperscript{87} It seems that the text preserved in MS London, Or. 3126 is evidence for an early stage of al-Ghazālī’s technique of adapting philosophical texts for his own purposes.

So far, the book preserved in the London manuscript cannot be identified with any of the works described in the bibliographical lists of books written by al-Ghazālī. It seems that this book was not distributed to a wider readership on a book-market like Baghdad or Nishapur. In his Jawābīr al-Qur’ān, al-Ghazālī mentions that he has written books on systematic theology, or rather, as he says, on the four subjects of God’s essence, His attributes, His actions, and the afterlife, but because of the complicated and controversial nature of these books, he writes that he shies away from publishing them.\textsuperscript{88} We know that al-Ghazālī had a complex view about which books should be read by which kinds of readers. MS Or. 3126 in London may well have belonged to a corpus of texts that was written by al-Ghazālī for himself and his closest students and that never reached the book-market. It may prove to be of key significance in bringing to light a crucial moment of Muslim theology, namely the beginning of the application of Avicennan metaphysics within the Ash’arite school.


Appendix I

English translation of the table of contents of MS B.L. Or. 3126

(Incomplete Introduction), fo. 2^a

**First treatise** on the principles and the premises, fo. 3^b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>explaining the subject matter of this science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>explaining the benefit of this science, its place in the curriculum (<em>martabatuhu</em>), and its name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>on the relationship of ‘thing’ and ‘being’ with the categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>explaining the necessary, the contingent (<em>al-mumkin</em>), and the impossible (<em>al-muntani‘</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>on the decisive statement (<em>faṣl al-gawil</em>) about the necessary existence (<em>al-uwqūd al-darīrī</em>) and its conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>on the explanation of the substance and its divisions by way of statements about universals (<em>bi-qawl kullī</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>on the verification of what has been said about the bodily substance and about that which we abandoned of it (<em>ma ta'raknā minhu</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>on the proof of primal matter (<em>hylē</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>on the fact that bodily matter cannot exist deprived of form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>on the temporary priority of form above matter with respect to rank of existence</td>
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</tbody>
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**Second treatise** on the division of being into categories, fo. 44^b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Content</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>on the category of substance (<em>jawhar</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>on the category of quantity (<em>al-kamm</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>on the category of quality (<em>al-kayf</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>on the category of relation (<em>al-mudāf</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>on the category of where (<em>al-ayn</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>on the category of when (<em>al-matā</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>on the category of position (<em>al-waḍ‘</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>on the category of having (<em>al-milk</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>on the category of that it is acted upon (<em>an yanfā‘ila</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>on the category of that it acts (<em>an yaf‘ala</em>)</td>
</tr>
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**Third treatise** on concomitant attributes (*lawāhiq*) of the categories including an explanation of their being accidents (*‘arāḍiyyatūbihā*), fo. 67^b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>on the concomitant attributes of the categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>on how to prove apodictically that the nine categories are accidents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 on how to prove apodictically that unity (wahda) is an accident 71b
4 on how to prove apodictically that quantities are accidents 74a
5 on how to prove apodictically that qualities are accidents 78a
6 on the evidence for the fact that there are qualities in quantities and an explanation of their being accidents 82b
7 on how to prove apodictically that knowledge is an accident 83a
8 verifying the nature of ‘number’: on defining its kinds and explaining its beginnings (awā’iluhū) 87a
9 explaining twoness (al-ithnawiyya) 89b
10 explaining the opposition (taqābul) that exists between unity (al-wahda) and multiplicity (al-kathra) 90b

Fourth treatise on the division of being into nonessentials (ā’rād) and into kinds (aṣnāf), fo. 94a
1 on the division of being in necessary and contingent (al-mumkin) 94a
2 on the division of being into one and many 94b
3 on the division of being into what precedes and what comes after 98a
4 on the division of being into pre-eternal and created in time 101b
5 on the division of being into perfect, into deficient, into what is above perfection, and on [the difference between] ‘the whole’ (al-kull) and ‘the total’ (al-jamī’) 101b
6 on the division of being into what is potentially and into what is actually, on what needs to be said on power and weakness and the proof that everything composed has matter 104b
7 on the division of being into universal and particular (al-kull wa-l-ju’z’ī) 111b
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Fifth treatise on the proof of the necessary existent (wajib al-wujūd), fo. 171b
1 on the statement that the first cause is absolute (mutlaq) and restricted (muqayyad) 172b
2 on the proof of the primary attributes that the necessary existent has 173a
on the fact that the necessary existent has no quiddity
(*māhiyya*) other than existence (*al-anniyya*)

4 on the unity (*tauhid*) of the necessary existent

5 verifying the statement that the necessary existent has no associate

6 on the fact that the necessary existent is not only perfect
   but above perfection and that it is good

7 on the fact that the necessary existent is pure intellect
   (*'aql mahd*)

8 on the fact that the necessary existent comprehends
   (*ya'qilu*) the rest of the things (*sā'ir al-ashyā’*)

9 on the fact that the necessary existent has a knowledge that
   is not different from itself

10 on the relation of the categories with it (*sc.* the necessary
   existent)

**Sixth treatise** on the attributes of the necessary existent, fo. 197b

1 on the fact that the necessary existent by virtue of itself is
   necessary existent in all its aspects (*min jāmi’ jibātihi*)

2 explaining the mover that moves the celestial bodies

3 on the fact that although the prime mover is one,
   each sphere has its own mover

4 on how actions emanate from the high principles

5 on the refutation of those who mistakenly assume that
   the objects of desire (*mutashawwaqat*) are bodies

6 on the actions of the necessary existent

7 on the impossibility of multiplicity among the first
   originations of the necessary existent

8 on the impossibility that some celestial bodies (*ajrām*)
   are the causes for others of their kind

9 explaining the uninterrupted sequence (*al-tasalsul*)

10 on the proof of the active intellect (*al-aql al-fa‘āl*)

**Seventh treatise** on what is consequential
   from this book (*fi lawahiq al-kitāb*), fo. 233b

1 explaining the formation of elements (*ıṣṭaqişāt*) from
   the first things

2 on divine providence (*al-ıniyā al-ilahiyya*)

3 explaining the arrangement and the order
   (*al-tartib wa-l-nizām*)

4 explaining the degrees of existent things
   (*marātib al-mawjūdāt*)
on the fact that the intellect is by nature a king who is obeyed (malik muţā’ bi-l-tab‘)  

on truthful dreams (al-manâm al-şādiq) and the fact that they are a part of prophecy  

on Magnificence and Happiness  

on the admonition of the intellectual pleasures (al-ladhdhāt al-‘aqliyya)  

on the stations of those who know (maqāmāt al-‘ārīfîn)  

on the secrets of signs (Conclusion)  

Appendix II

The chapter on jawhar (substance) in al-Ghazālī’s Mīyār al-‘ilm and MS London Or. 3126

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mīyār al-‘ilm</th>
<th>MS London</th>
<th>Ultimate source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Explanation of jawhar as that which does not subsist in anything else, distinction from ʿaraḍ (accident).</td>
<td>11 sentences (M 200.10–201.1)</td>
<td>Ibn Sīnā, Najāt 200f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Comparison of how ‘jawhar’ is used by mutakallimūn and falsāfī</td>
<td>10 sentences (M 201.1–10)</td>
<td>not included (influenced by Ibn Sīnā, Najāt, 200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Distinction of substances that are universal and those that are individual.</td>
<td>10 sentences (M 201.10–22)</td>
<td>(depends on Fārābī, Maq., 169.17–22 and 170.14ff.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Accidents also divide into universal and individual. Only universal substances and accidents allow predication.</td>
<td>12 sentences (M 201.22–202.8)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) How substances are divided in 4 groups.</td>
<td>5 sentences</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 not in MS London  
not included in Miya’r
2 not in Miya’r
3 not in Miya’r
4 not in Miya’r
6) That all substances are ultimately based on individuals.

- 6 sentences (M 202.8–13)
- 14 sentences (depends on Aristotle, all in MS London)
- 8 not in Mi’yār Cat., 3b, 10–24;
  
- 11f.)

7) How substances are grouped.

- 7 sentences (M 202.13–19)
- not in MS London
- not included

8) Point of comparison between the technical language of kalām and falsafa.

- 6 sentences (M 202.19–203.2) not in MS London
- not included

9) Things cannot appear in the intellect (‘aql) unless they are universals (kulliyāt), and universals must always be based on individuals.

- 9 sentences = Fārābī, not included
  
- Maq., 170.23–171.4

10) Universals that are not substances and that inhere in a thing are accidents and they convey no information on the quiddity (māhiyya) of the thing.

- 8 sentences = Fārābī, not included
  
- Maq., 171.5–11

11) The species of ‘first substances’ are more aptly called substances than their (higher) genus.

- 9 sentences = Fārābī, not included
  
- Maq. 171.11ff

M = al-Ghazālī, Mi’yār al-‘ilm fi fann al-mašṭiq, ed. M. Šabrī al-Kurdī, Cairo 1346/1927.


Appendix III

MS London, Or. 3126, fos. 45ª–45ª.8

1. إذا لم يوجد بقسم بنوع من القسمة إلى الجوهير والأمور

2. وقد رُسم الجوهير بانه يوجد لا في موضوع والعرض بانه

3. الموجود في موضوع

4. والوضوح هو محل الغريب الذي يقوم بنفسه لا بتقويم الشيء.

5. فالإنسان أو الجسم هو الجوهير

6. واللولون هو العرض.

7. إذًا ماية الإنسان لا يقوم باللولون ولا ماية الجسم.

8. بل اللولون عرض بخصوص الجسم بعد قوام ماية الجسم ذاته.

9. وذلك الحارة والبرودة في الماء فإنهما عرضان.

10. فالماية الماء لا يُبدي بيديهما في خلاف صورة المائية.


12. وللهذا إذا فارقت اللولون عند انقلاب هي وراء كان المفارقة.

13. ما يُبدي المائية بيديهما في خلاف مقالة فيه الحرارة والبرودة له.

14. وللهذا إذا سُلتنا عن الماء الحرّ والماء الدافئ ما هو؟ فإننا ماء وإذا

15. سُلتنا عن الماء الذي كان ماء ما هو؟ لم نقل أنه ماء.

16. وإننا في الماء زيادة وفعلنا ما حار أو بارد.

17. لم نرد بحرًا زيادة في الماء الذي انقلب هواء.

18. ولم نقل أنه ماء قد تخلخل وانثر لأن صورة المائية قد زالت

19. بانقلابه هواء ولم نزل بانتقالنا من الحارة إلى البرودة.

— al-Ghazâlî, Mi'yar al- 'ilm fi fann al-mantîq (ed. Šabrî al-Kurdî, 200 f.; ed. Šarâra, 232 f.; ed. Dunyâ, 313 f.)
English translation:

We say: Existent things (…) divide by way of a (prime) division into substance and accident. If we aim at determining what a substance is, we need to set before it the discussion of premises. We say: If two entities come together and if each one of the two entities is not completely conjoined with the other, like it is the case with the nail and the wall, because here, although they have come together, the nail only penetrates into one part of the wall without becoming (completely) conjoined [with the wall], but rather it conjoins only superficially, and if they are not the nail and the wall, but rather each one of the two would spread out and connect itself (completely) with the other, then, if one of the two would be a firm being by itself and also distinguished from the other and if (the other) one of the two would bring something into this conjunction, then the conjunction would be described as an attribute (ṣīfa), and the other thing would be described as the one that acquires something from [the first]. Now, the firmly existing being that acquires something is called the substrate (mahall) and the other is

The teachings of these two passages are adapted from Ibn Sinā, al-Najāt, ed. Šabri al-Kurdi (Cairo; Maṭba’at al-Saʿāda, 2nd edn., 1938), 200.3–201.2

فنقول ان الموجود (…) وهو ينقسم نحوًا من القسمة الى جوهر وعِرْض،

وإذا أردنا تحقيق الجوهر احتاجنا ان نقتدم أمامه مقدّمات: فنقول إذا اجتمع ذاتان ثم لم تكن ذات كل واحد منها مجمالاً للأخرى بسراها كمالا، في الجوهر والحاطط فأنهما وإن اجتمعا فداخل الودود غير مجمالاً والحاطط بن كان كل واحد منهما يوجد شائعاً بمجمع ذاته في الآخر ثم إن كان أحدهما ثابتاً باحاله مع مفارقة الآخر وكان أحدهما مفيداً معناه به، بصير الجمع موصوفًا بصفة والآخر مُستَفيدًا له. فان الثابت والمستفيد لذلك بمعنى محالم والآخر بمعنى حال فيه. ثم، إذا كان هذا مستفتيًّ في قوامه عن الحالة فيه فإنما نسميه موضووعًا له، وإن لم يكن مستفتيًّ عنه لم نسميه موضوعًا بل ربما سُميَّاً هبولي، وكل ذائت لم يكن في موضوع وهو جوهر. وكل ذات قوامها في موضوع وهو عرض، وقد يكون الشيء في المجال ويكون مع ذلك جوهره، أعني لا في موضوع إذا كان الحال الغريب الذي هو فيه منقولًّ به ليس منقولًّم بذاته، ثم يكون مع هذا مفرِّمًا له ونسميها صورة. وأما إسهامها فقد يأتينا من جديد، وكلا جوهر ليس في موضوع.

(…) وأما إذا كان الشيء في محل هو موضوع فانه نسبيًّه عرضًا.
called the one that subsists (ḥāll) in it. If the substrate is for its subsistence independent of the thing subsisting in it, only then we call it a subject (mawddī‘) for [the thing that subsists in it]. If it is not independent of it, we do not call it a subject, but we may have called it prime matter. And every entity that is not in a subject is a substance (jawhar). And every entity that is subsisting in a subject is an accident.

There may be a thing that (subsists) in a substrate and is despite this a substance. I mean it is not in a subject if the proximate substrate that it is in is subsisting through it and not through itself. In this case it is, despite this, still a component of it and we call this a form. The (proper) establishment of this will come to us at a later point. No substance is (residing) in a subject. (...) If the thing that is (residing) in a substrate is also a subject, we call it an accident.

Appendix IV

Distinction of substances that are universal (kulli) and those that are individual (shakhṣī or juʿī). MS London, Or. 3126, fos. 45b.8–46a.11

(3.1) And if the substance is divided into two, one of these may be in the same...

(3.2) And if the thing is not in a subject it is an entity that is subsisting in a subject and it is an accident.

(3.3) And if the thing is not in a subject it is in a subject and it is an accident.

(3.4) And if there is a subject it is in a subject and it is an accident.

(3.5) And if the thing is not in a subject it is an accident.

(3.6) And if the thing is not in a subject it is an accident.

(3.7) And if the thing is not in a subject it is an accident.

(3.8) And if the thing is not in a subject it is an accident.

(3.9) And if the thing is not in a subject it is an accident.

(3.10) And if the thing is not in a subject it is an accident.
These two passages have no clear equivalent in philosophical literature. They are adaptations of passages in al-Fārābī’s *Kitāb al-Maqūlāt*: see D. M. Dunlop, ‘Al-Fārābī’s Paraphrase of the Categories of Aristotle’, *Islamic Quarterly* 4 (1957): 168–97 and 5 (1959): 21–54. The two passages are at 169.17–22 (translation, 184) and 170.14–26 (translation, 185).