In conclusion, my comments do not reflect a negative appraisal of Genequand’s work. Genequand’s scholarship is impeccable, and he provides an excellent translation of this work, which will certainly be of great value to Classicists and Graeco-Arabists alike. Anyone interested in the thought of Alexander, and later Greek philosophy and science generally, as well as Islamicists interested in the Greek sources that so influenced Arabic philosophy will find Genequand’s contribution a must read.

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Analyzing al-Ghazālī’s religious doctrine is a task with many obstacles. One of the most daunting is the fact that al-Ghazālī wrote different things for different readers. By now it is well established that al-Ghazālī consciously divided his works into several different levels of instruction, distinguished by the amount of insight that he reveals therein. He assumed that people fall into different classes according to their understanding of doctrinal matters and he tailored his works accordingly. In a well-known passage at the very end of his book _Ma‘āni al-‘umal_—later famously quoted by Ibn Tufayl—al-Ghazālī seems to subscribe to a broad characterization of three levels of teachings (ma‘ālah). The first are those teachings that one clings to while in scholarly competition and controversy; the second are those teachings that one whispers during teaching sessions and instructions, and the third those theological views that one has become convinced of within one’s own soul. (Ma‘āni al-‘umal, ed. Nafisā bint Mu‘īn al-Dawāya [Cairo: Dar al-Ma‘ārif, 1964], 406.) Since scholars have become aware of this obstacle they have developed strategies to tackle it. Most successful has been the decision to search for those texts in which al-Ghazālī presents his teachings on the highest level. Given the possibility that none of his books contains the third level of teachings, these books would still be the most elaborate available and hopefully present a non-contradictory and comprehensive system of thought. The results of such an inquiry could then in a further step be compared to the teachings in his more basic books and the assumed litigious language therein deciphered. An attempt to accomplish the first step of this approach is, for instance, Richard M. Frank’s _Creation and the Cosmic System_ (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1992) in which Frank analyzes the cosmological views in the _Magāzī al-wusūl_, the _Ma‘āni al-‘umal_, the _Tahdīf al-jalānīf_, and other works. Frank, however, puts little emphasis on al-Ghazālī’s textbook of _kalām_ _al-IKhāṣṣāt fi al-Ikhāṣṣāt_ and, in deciphering its language, comes to the conclusion that it is almost decisive on the issue of God’s creation as the best of all possible worlds (pp. 83-77), a view held by al-Ghazālī but rejected by most ma‘ālahīm. In a number of articles, Michael E. Marmura complements Frank’s approach and focuses on the _Ikhāṣṣāt_, thus implicitly assuming that this is the key work that leads to a better understanding of lower levels of al-Ghazālī’s writings. The fact that the two come to different conclusions illustrates the limitations of the method of focusing on a selected group of al-Ghazālī’s works.

In his study on al-Ghazālī’s teachings on the soul, Timothy J. Giannotti, a student of Marmura, does not follow the strategy of either his teacher or of Frank. He chooses the textual basis of his analysis among the forty books of al-Ghazālī’s _Iḥyā‘_ _Ma‘āni al-‘umal_ (complementing it with additional material from the _Ikhāṣṣāt_ and the _Tahdīf_). Al-Ghazālī himself acknowledges that the _Iḥyā‘_ was written for a wider readership than, for instance, his _Magāzī al-wusūl_, _Ma‘āni al-‘umal_, or _al-Ikhāṣṣāt fi al-Ikhāṣṣāt_. Giannotti is well aware that there are various levels in al-Ghazālī’s writings—he calls them “types of discourses” (p. 8)—and that the _Iḥyā‘_ is limited in its goal (p. 123). He must have seen the problems his analysis runs into. He attempts to understand a text in which al-Ghazālī is never really explicit about his views on the soul and negotiates a path between the Aristotelian view of the soul as an accident of the heart and the views of both Śidīs and Jalānīf of an immaterial soul. The results of Giannotti’s research
are as unclear as the texts that he analyzes: al-Ghazālī probably subscribed to the view of an immaterial soul, but he also too often uses language that characterizes the soul as an accident of a body. 

Were it to follow the strategy of Fudāk and Minuaca, one would first of all need to assess where, within al-Ghazālī’s books, one finds teaching on the soul that use the most explicit language and treat the subject in the most systematic way. A manuscript at the Kütahya İrfanlı (no. 853) in Istanbul, copied in 1781-1782, contains a text that comprehensively treats matters of the soul. This book has the title Maʿalaj al-qadīs fī mudālaj maʿrifat al-nafs attributed to al-Ghazālī. Based on later manuscripts from other libraries, the text has been printed several times, in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus, it extends to roughly a hundred pages. Two studies, by George Vajda and Jules Janssen, have analyzed the large extent to which this text depends on the philosophical writings of Ibn Sina; both scholars have called the attribution to al-Ghazālī into question. Since publishing his article in 1993, Jules Janssen, however, has taken a closer look at al-Ghazālī’s established works and has analyzed his technique of borrowing from the books of Ibn Sina and al-Farābī. He now concludes that the amount and character of concealed quotations from philosophical literature within Maʿalaj al-qadīs is nothing unusual for al-Ghazālī. 2 His conclusion that al-Ghazālī is the author of this book is shared by Jamāl Rajab Sībīlī, who in a recent study, Naqṣ al-nafs fī bāyna bīn Sīn wa-i-Ghazālī (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-Maṭbū‘ah li-l-‘Ummah 1399/1980), bases most of his own analysis of al-Ghazālī’s teachings on the soul on Maʿalaj al-qadīs. 3

It is surprising that Giannoti makes no mention of Maʿalaj al-qadīs. He then makes "a throw into the dark"—i.e., to al-Ghazālī’s metaphor from the introduction to his Maqāṣid al-fikra and his Muṣnād—where light may be found between the covers of this book. A very similar but more concise exposition of a Ghazalian analysis of the soul was, however, available to Giannoti in the first half of the short book al-Rišāq al-Ladūsīyaw. In this work, the author—usually referred to as al-Ghazālī—expounds in a few pages what is dealt with in the Maʿalaj al-qadīs more comprehensively. The Rišāq al-Ladūsīyaw teaches that the soul is incorporeal, incorruptible, and separate from the body after its death. This text is quite sympathetic to the works of the fikra and its one passage praises these achievements on this subject: "Through decisive demonstrations and clear proofs it is shown in the philosophical sciences (alʿulūm al-fikrīyya) that the spirit that remains (al-nafs al-baʿth) is not a body and not an accident but a firm, permanent, and incorruptible substance (al-jawhar)." 4 He who wishes to know the arguments in favor of his theory should refer to the appropriate books written in that art. 4

Giannoti mistakenly understands these last words as a reference to al-Ghazālī’s books when in fact they refer to the philosophical books of the fikra, most probably Ibn Sīnā. That thirteen pages later Giannoti contradicts himself, when he cautiously concludes that the Rišāq al-Ladūsīyaw’s text isn’t written by al-Ghazālī after all. Giannoti follows ‘Hava Luzarz Ya‘ḥīy’s argument, namely that books which we philosophically termology cannot have been authored by al-Ghazālī. Her argument, however, which was first published in 1966, is circular. Luzarz Ya‘ḥīy observed that philosophical terms are absent from those works which scholars have accepted as authentic works written by al-Ghazālī. The fact that men Ghazālī-interpreters, starting with al-Sibīlī and going in W. M. Watt, were reluctant to acknowledge any philosophical temptation to which al-Ghazālī may have been subject becomes

2. See Janssen’s article "Al-Ghazālī and His Use of Avicennan Texts," in Problems in Arabic Philosophy, ed. Mihalis Marinis (Piraeus: Hellenic American University, 2003), 77-9; esp. 91-95.
the yardstick for discussions on the authenticity of his writing. To put it bluntly, Luzatto Yehiel and Gianotti reject al-Ghazzali’s authorship of books like the Risala al-Laduniyah simply because scholars have not learned to think that way.

Conclusive judgment on such works as al-Risala al-Laduniyah and Meqar al-qaydi can only be gained through a thorough analysis of the treatments of a subject in al-Ghazzali’s well-established writings and then a comparison of those results with the teachings in the assumed spurious works. Gianotti follows thus a promising strategy when he tries to analyze al-Ghazzali’s doctrine of the soul expressed in the Risalat al-Laduniyya, and the criticism within the Risala. His insight into the argumentative structure of the sixteenth and eighteenth discussions in the Tadfsir is indeed quite helpful. He establishes that al-Ghazzali’s criticism in these discussions is directed not to the text itself but to its eschatological status. Al-Ghazzali simply denies that the philosophers could have come to such results solely through demonstration and wants to force them to acknowledge that they must have been inspired by either revelation or divine inspiration when they were working on their doctrines of the soul. Gianotti could have said all this in fewer words; it is, for instance, difficult to understand why he paraphrases the whole discussion about what might cause the soul’s annihilation after the body’s death (pp. 101-7) when both parties, Ibn Sina and al-Ghazzali, do not even subscribe to this view. On the other hand, Gianotti neglects to analyze al-Ghazzali’s sudden change of position in the twentieth discussion, where he openly concedes the point that the soul may be incorporeal, self-subsisting, and incorruptible (Tadfsir, ed. Bouyges, 303ff.). Later, in his Iqydat al-Ghazzali explains this concession with the overall strategy of the twentieth discussion in the Tadfsir to establish belief in corporeal resurrection: “We compelled them (to accept) that following their own convictions on the continuance of the soul they will have to believe in the return, meaning in the re-placement of the soul into the arrangement of the body” (al-Iqydat, ed. H. Atay and I. A. Ateş, Istanbul, 1962, 215). Even the physical theories of the falsafah must acknowledge the possibility of corporeal resurrection, since rational argument (al-salif) has not shown its impossibility.

Here is an important clue: while both the philosophers and al-Ghazzali assumed that the nature of the soul as a firm, permanent, and incorruptible being can be proven through demonstration, neither of the two assumed that the remaining data, particularly the soul’s fate after death, can be proven apodictically. The same is true for the teachings of the neusafaalism, a group that did not make any attempt to prove a doctrine through demonstration. Given that philosophical science has proven some limited basic truths on the nature of the soul, there was, for al-Ghazzali, a certain epistemological equality between the view that the soul is immaterial and self-subsisting and the view that it is a material being in the human body preserved. For instance, in an incopetable way (al-qiyas) after the body’s death. This latter view, which al-Ghazzali puts forward in his al-Durrat al-fikhrayn ki kusha’ when al-dhiharn (ed. Lucas Gauthier [Geneva, H. Atay, 1979, 444]) is not mentioned in Gianotti’s book at all. Both explanations of the soul’s fate after the body’s death are non-contradictory within their own systems and both manage to explain bodily resurrection in the afterlife. From al-Ghazzali’s point of view, there is not much difference to be done if one sticks in some books (e.g., al-Iqydat) and al-Durrat al-fikhrayn, and some books of the Risalat to the latter view and in others (Mar‘at al-qadha’, al-Risala al-Laduniyya, and other books of the Risalat) to the former. It is important that all Muslim scholars be convinced of the corporeal character of resurrection. If one is able to teach this essential element of Islam without the need to change one’s readers’ views on the nature of the soul and thus confuse their convictions, that’s the thing to be done.

Damasque is done, nevertheless, to later scholars that aims to elaborate a consistent set of al-Ghazzali’s views. Gianotti’s book is a clever attempt to formulate an attempt to elaborate a systematic doctrine from what appears little less than minced works. He has a tendency to put results in suggestive questions (“Should we not assume that . . .?”), a style that soon weary the reader. There is too much “al-Ghazzali accepts in,” but too few results. The quotations from al-Ghazzali’s works are long and not always analyzed. Gianotti neglects to use authoritative editions, which on p. 99, for instance, leads to a misinterpretation of a crucial passage because he does not have in front of him Bouyges’ critical edition of the Tadfsir with its apparatus. Marmura in his translation (p. 3) correctly mentions the text. The text used by Gianotti is Bouyges’ only in name and varies from his critical edition of the Tadfsir pub-
This is the revised and expanded version of the author's Inauguraldissertation at the Freie Universität Berlin 1994. The central problem of the book is the question to what extent literature with religious content or background—in this instance, the Middle Persian literature of the Manichean communities in Turfan (Chinese Turkestan)—can be a source for studies of the social structure of ancient societies.

For this purpose, the author has chosen a limited set of terms found both in Manichean and other sources, such as the Zoroastrian literature of the Sassanid period (the Pahlavi texts) and the original inscriptions of the Sassanid kings and high officials, the use of which she discusses from four angles: (1) on the social level, as applied to actual social groups; (2) on the didactic-moral level, as applied to characterize certain behavior and qualities; (3) on the religious level, as applied to the actual religious sphere; and (4) on a generic level, as applied otherwise. To permit the reader better to follow her argumentation, all the Manichean passages involved are cited, but only a section of non-Manichean ones. Several indices and a comprehensive bibliography complete the book.

The introduction, in addition to the general description of the work summarized above, also contains a detailed description of the sources (pp. 9-33), which amounts to nothing less than a history and description of the Manichean literature, not only in Middle Persian languages (Middle Persian, Parthian, Sogdian, but also Coptic, Greek, Arabic, etc., as well as some of the Sassanid inscriptions and the Pahlavi literature). Since editions and secondary literature are quoted extensively, this is a very useful survey for anyone who wants to get his bearings in this literature.

The study of the individual terms is preceded by a chapter on the historical and social context of the Manichean literature (pp. 29-52). In this chapter Collopy discusses the social contacts of the Manicheans and the groups targeted by their proselytizing. She shows that the social behavior of the Manicheans is predicated on their world-view and on the Manichean understanding of the position of man in the cosmos.

The terms selected for study are: 67, 8, 18; "free," ṣanahvānd, approx., "servant," bārā, "poor," ṣulāde, etc., approx., "mighty," ṣurāp, "great," wispār, "prince." The discussion typically begins with the etymology of the word and in use in the ancient sources (Avestan, Old Persian, etc.); then, under 67, we also have an evaluation of the use of the word borrowed into Achemenid-period Avestan.

The meaning, Collopy concludes, developed from "noble" as a term for social status and "noble" as a descriptive epithet to the generic meaning of "free." After an exhaustive discussion of the simple word, she does the same for all derivatives and compounds, before examining their use as terms for social status, etc.