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The Hartford Seminary Foundation, Ph.D., 1958
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AL-GHAZALI’S
THE ASCENT TO THE DIVINE
THROUGH THE PATH OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
(MA’ARIJ AL-QUDS FI NADARIJ MA’RIFAT AL-NAPS)

(Being a psychological approach to theology, translated and annotated, with an introduction and Glossary-Index).

A THESIS
Submitted to

THE HARTFORD SEMINARY FOUNDATION
in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor in Philosophy
Yusuf Baza Shammas
Hartford, Connecticut
May, 1958.
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V I T A

The writer, Yusuf Easa Shammas, was born of Arabic speaking Protestant parentage in Midyat, a Syriac-speaking town of about 10,000 inhabitants in the section of Mesopotamia that is in Turkey, on Monday, October 19, 1908 (or October 14, 1907 - records were lost during the Christian massacre of 1915). The population of the town consisted mainly of Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites), Protestants and a few Catholic and Muslim families. The town is surrounded by Kurdish speaking and Arabic speaking Muslim villages scattered here and there. Religiously the Christians were fanatical towards Islam, and looked down upon Muslims as unclean people.

It was in such an environment and in a well-to-do, puritanically minded family that the writer was brought up. He attended a Protestant school until 1915, when the Ottoman Government massacred all the outstanding Protestant personalities in the town, over a hundred in number. Realizing that their turn was soon coming, the rest of the Christians, in July 16 of that same year, revolted against Islam, Government and people. After a siege of a week by the government and people from all the surrounding Muslim villages the revolt was suppressed. Many of the Christian inhabitants fled to the
nearest Christian villages, where they successfully continued their resistance. Those unable to run away were massacred, or (in the case of children and women) carried away by Muslims.

The writer was one of those carried away. My parents and most of my relatives were killed. My father was murdered before the revolt took place. The sight of my cousin being slaughtered like a sheep, my mother's naked body in the street, murdered in cold blood because she preferred death to denying Christ, and the sight and words of other young women, who, encouraged by women like my mother, had stood firm likewise in the faith, and accepted martyrdom, are among the things that had their great impression upon my young mind and specifically upon my attitude to Muslims. I lost all sense of security and gradually developed a bitter hatred for Muslims collectively. When I was told by the Muslims who were carrying me away that I should profess Islam, I yielded out of fear, but was beset at the same time with a fear that, having denied Christ, I had deserved his displeasure. That was the kind of religion that penetrated my young mind at home, and of which I was made aware by the behavior of those who preferred martyrdom to living as Muslims.

Before I was deported to Mardin, God, twice saved me from death. I was first saved at the hand of a Turkish officer who, seeing a Kurdish soldier about to empty the barrel
of his rifle into my brains, while I was screaming for mercy, hurried towards me and folded his arms around me. Another time in a neighboring Muslim village where this Turkish officer, who had now adopted me, left me temporarily with friends, a Muslim shot at me because I refused to go with him. But I was able to turn the corner and run away. Those two experiences also left their impression on me—a sense of fear mingled with a certain confidence in God, in so far as such thoughts could have significance for my young mind.

In the first period of my Muslim life in Mardin I led a more or less comfortable life. My Turkish masters were kind to me. They sent me to a Muslim religious school, where I found some satisfaction, and a feeling of being at home, as I was used to school life. The portions of the Qur'ān which I was given for text books reminded me of the Gospel of St. Matthew, my last text book in my Christian school in Midyat. Intermittently, I felt proud of being considered the son of a Turkish officer, belonging to the ruling class of the country. In a few months I completed the recital of the Qur'ān and received a good slap on the back of my head as a sign that I had completed my basic learning required by Islam. In another school I completed the book on Muḥammad's birth including chants used during the celebration of his birthday. I was now declared to be fourteen ranks above a born Muslim in religious virtues and value in the sight of God. In
spite of my young age, I was asked to go up to the minaret and give the call to worship. My first experience of this reminded me that I had done something against the desire of God as a Christian. For some time the idea worried me until I forgot about it. During religious festivals I was asked to recite portions from the Qur'ān over the dead in the cemetery. It was considered a great virtue for a Muslim to have a convert recite the Qur'ān on his or her dead people. Sometimes that gave me a sense of superiority, the more so because I was one of the very few who could read.

After my graduation from school, however, I was gradually subjected to harsh servitude. Sometimes the work that I was demanded to do was above the ability of a child of my age. In fact older boys sometimes could not do it. I served a family of thirteen, including children and babies whom I had to tend when I was free and they annoyed their mothers. I had never been used to that kind of life. I was very miserable. Even though I carried all the food home from the town I was often forgotten and left without food. Sometimes I slept without having had anything to eat for two days or more. My clothes in winter were very thin, and I walked on the snow barefoot. Moreover, I learned from the street boys the filthiest language imaginable. Physically and morally my life was in danger.
All these things reminded me of my Christian life, and made my heart pant for home. I had never forgotten that I was not a Muslim but a Christian. So why should I stay there? It is now my conviction that if life had not been made hard for me, I would perhaps have remained there and have been now a real Muslim. One early summer evening of 1918, depressed and feeble from fatigue, I went behind a big chest in the cellar where I used to sleep, and very earnestly lifted up my heart in the prayer, "Lord save me from this place in three days". It was the first prayer I had uttered out of my own initiative. Believe it or not, in three days I had set my back on Mardin and was on my way to Midyat with a small company of Muslims whose children I promised to carry on the way if they would take me with them. They were not going to Midyat itself, but I would manage, not thinking how, to make my way there. The distance between Mardin and Midyat was usually covered by caravans in two days. Due to the ignorance of the way on the part of my companions it took me about ten days to arrive at my destination, after many hardships and fear, including danger of murder by a band of robbers to whom we were exposed and from whom we were saved by an Arab peasant who endangered his life for ours.

In Midyat I lived with my single sister for one year. As her earnings and mine were very meager we lived with great thrift. Yet I was happy I shared in the earning of my living,
and had the opportunity again to go to church and sing some of those dear hymns I had forgotten while at Mardin. Thanks to my sister's care and effort, in a short time I gave up all the bad language I had learned and used in Mardin. There were some advantages of my life there too. Besides the Turkish and Kurdish languages I learned and added to my Arabic and Syriac, the one great lesson I came afterwards to learn was that Muslims were human beings like us Christians, that we could live together, play together, eat and drink together even from the same plate and bowl without becoming defiled. In fact after my return to Midyat some of my most intimate playmates were Muslims.

In 1919 I went back to Mardin, this time of my own choice, yet not to my Muslim masters but to the American Near East Relief orphanage. After the orphanage was closed, I continued my studies in the same school through the Junior High School. I did all kinds of jobs to earn my board and lodging. My tuition and other school expenses were taken care of by the American Mission there.

One afternoon, during the month of Ramadān - the month of fasting for Muslims - I met a friend from my old Muslim school. He asked me to go with him to the mosque to help him light the candles on the minaret and call for worship. "But I am a Christian now", I said. "But that has not changed your
appearance. You are the same Yusuf, and you can do the job", was his answer. He was so earnest in his pleading that I went with him. My old Muslim teacher, a shaykh, welcomed me back and was happy to learn that I was going up the minaret, where I agreed to light the candles though I let my Muslim friend perform the adhan. That event made me, as a Christian, feel more at home with Muslims, and like them more. For even as a Christian I could be loved and be kept as a friend by a Muslim.

In 1925 the American School at Mardin was closed by the Turkish Government never to open again. As my old interest in religious work increased I made my way to Aleppo, where for two years I studied at the American Boys' High School (now Aleppo College). The American Mission at Mardin financed my schooling. I had good contacts with Muslim boys of my age, especially in school. There was a great difference between the attitude of the Muslims of Aleppo and that of the Muslims of Mardin-Midyat region in Turkey towards Christians. The Muslims of Aleppo were kind. During the first World War they had protected their Christians, including Armenians, when Jamal Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Syria, desired to massacre them. In addition, during the French mandatory rule over Syria from 1920 their attitude was noble and humane towards the many thousands of Armenian refugees flocking in from Turkey. I still could not forget that it was once a Turk
and another time an Arab peasant who had saved my life from death. It was clear that all Muslims were not alike. There were very good Muslims and there were good Christians. Why then should I keep a grudge against all Muslims? Two changes took place in me. (1) My attitude was changed from sectarian (or communal) to a patriotic one. The birth place of this new attitude was Aleppo. (2) My love to Muslims took more concrete shape, even though at times a cloud of suspicion darkened the horizon before me for a while. Even Muslims who had so brutally wronged us, I was convinced, could be won over and made good useful patriots. The most fruitful means for that, I was also convinced, was a sound Christian education which would enable them to discover the joy and peace of mind the Christian life offers. Offensive action would make them more bitter enemies. What they needed was honest sincere love, including mine personally. With the help of the Rev. Moro Witherspoon, my Sunday School teacher, the class was able to hold special evangelistic meetings for Muslims. We gave out tracts. Muslim newspapers - very few then in number - wrote against those activities of ours. Though we never gave in, we did not achieve any satisfactory results, perhaps because our attitude exhibited fanaticism and our method was destructive, not constructive.

The feeling that I should prepare myself for the Christian Ministry including Muslim evangelism was strength-
ened by the constant reminder that the reason why God had three times saved my life from death most probably was that I should dedicate myself to that service. So in 1928, when I completed my High School studies, I attended the Near East School of Theology in Beirut (then called "School for Religious Workers"). All this time every now and then I thought of the Turkish family I had run away from, especially the officer who had saved my life. So I decided to write to him. I addressed him, "Dear father." A very kind and appreciative answer was received in which I was addressed, "My dear foster son." Although I did not continue correspondence with them they always enquired about me.

One of the interesting activities I had during my school period in Beirut was a trip I made to the Euphrates region in North Syria, where two Christian young men and I myself conducted in each of two Kurdish-speaking Muslim villages a Daily Vacation Bible School for the children, and social activities for the young people. Very good relationships were built up.

In 1933 I earned a B.A. degree from the American University of Beirut and a Diploma in Theology from the Near East School of Theology. I was then invited to be in charge of a church and a school in Kamishli, North Syria, for the Protestant refugees from Turkey. I had already done pioneering work
there five years before that in organizing that church. A
number of our Muslim adolescent students cooperated in Christ-
ian activities of their own initiative, and with the con-
sent of their parents. Two of them openly professed the
Christian faith, a third one played the role of Nicodemus.
But he was more than a sympathizer; he regularly studied the
New Testament which he kept in his pocket, even after he left
school. The rest of the Muslim students as well as the Jews
took part in Christian activities during Christmas and Easter.

In 1938, I was a teacher in Aleppo College, Aleppo,
Syria, where I was afterwards appointed head of the Department
of Religion and Ethics and acting head of the Arabic Depart-
ment. My experience with Muslim youth had now become richer.
The classes in religion and in Arabic literature (the section
dealing with Muhammad, the Qur'ān and Muslim thought) were
among the most interesting and useful courses I taught. They
brought about a healthy relationship between Christians and
Muslims, and a sense of fellowship that embraced all. Many of
the Muslim students acquired an appreciative sense of Jesus
and his religion, which clearly affected their outlook espe-
cially with regard to the teachings of the Qur'ān. In fact a
number of them had a reasonable understanding of, and accept-
ed such Christian Doctrines as God's fatherhood of mankind
and in a special sense of Jesus. A student from one of the
outstanding Muslim families of the city declared once in the
presence of his Muslim classmates that Jesus was the only authentic Apostle of God and that Muhammad, in view of his approval and propagation of war, was the greatest enemy of God. Though the argument, very fierce, was put down in class, it continued among the Muslim students outside the campus.

In 1947 I attended the School of Religious Education of the Hartford Seminary Foundation, where in 1949 I earned an M.A. degree in Religious Education.

In 1950, after one more year of service in Aleppo College, in spite of the direct wholesome contact I had with Muslim youth there, I was persuaded to accept an invitation to teach Islamics and Old Testament at the Near East School of Theology on the basis that here I would have - and now do have - the opportunity to prepare Christian leaders to carry, on a larger scale, the work I was doing.

It is the writer's conviction that the Church of Christ in Muslim lands has thus far failed its calling with respect to these Muslim brothers in humanity. It is time that she should awake to hear their earnest call, "Come over. ...and help us, x
GUIDE FOR THE TRANSLITERATION
OF ARABIC WORDS

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

BIOGRAPHY OF AL-GHAZALI

(450-505/1059-1111 A.D.)

Abū Ḥāmid ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, a Persian Muslim philosopher and theologian, was born in Tūs, Khurāsān, or rather in a village in that district called Ghazālah. His father was a spinner and seller of wool. Although materially poor, he was a generous man. Before his death he asked a ūrūf friend to take care of his two sons, Abū Ḥāmid and Ahmad, and spend whatever fortune he left behind on their education. The friend did all he could to carry out the father's wish, until the meager fortune was exhausted. Then he advised the two boys to attend a school (madrasah), where they could get free education and board.

The two boys enrolled in a madrasah at Tūs, where Abū Ḥāmid studied Divine Law (or religion) (fiqh) under


Note: In the present work the vertical line between two dates separates the one of the Hijrī Era (left) from the one of the Christian Era (right).

xv
Mādhkānī. Later in Jūrjān he studied under Imām Abū Nasr al-Ismāʿīlī, on whose lectures he took full notes.

On his way back to Tūs robbers took away all he had, including the bag containing his notes. On his request, the chief of robbers gave him back his bag of notes. He spent three years in Tūs studying those notes until he mastered them. According to Gardner it was at this period of his life that he began the study of sufism "under the guidance of Yūsuf al-Nassaj". His inquisitive mind drove him to seek freedom from the limitations and fetters of human authority (taqlīd) in matters of doctrine and faith, and to enlarge his range of knowledge in scholastic theology and attain authentic knowledge of realities. So he left for Naysābūr (or Nishāpūr) to attend the lectures of Abī'l-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, known as Imām al-Haramayn, then in charge of the Nizāmiyyah school there. Under this celebrated Sufi scholar he studied the different systems of religious thought (madhāhib), learned dialectics and logic, and studied philosophy. But above all


(4) Redhouse, J.W., A Turkish and English Lexicon (Boyajian, Constantinople, 1890) p.2082, 2117 - hereafter referred to as Redhouse; Encyclopaedia Britannica (Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., Chicago, 1943) Vol. 10, p. 331f.
he learned from this teacher the courage to forsake the paths the taqlīdīs trod. He proved to be so brilliant and schol-erly in his work that he became one of the three favorite pupils of Imām al-Ḥaramayn. In describing these three pupils the Imām said, "Al-Ghazālī is a copious sea, al-Kiyāf a tearing lion, and al-Khawāff a burning fire". On another occasion he is reported to have said of these same pupils, "When they debate together, verification belongs to al-Khawāff, intuitive hypotheses to al-Ghazālī, and clear exposition to al-Kiyāf. Yet in spite of the high opinion the Imām held of al-Ghazālī’s abilities it is reported that he was not completely sincere in the way he outwardly boasted of him, as he was at heart somewhat jealous of him and dis-pleased with the spirit of pride he developed and his con-tempt for others, as a result of his natural gifts and his superiority over others in accomplishments. While still a pupil, al-Ghazālī assisted his teacher the Imām in teaching. At the same time he disputed and wrote on every subject with the purpose of refuting the views of innovators and philo-sophers. According to Salībā and ʿAyyād it was possibly there


(6) Tabaqāt, IV, p. 106.

that his doubts about science started (8).

Sometime after the death of the Imám in 478/1085, al-Ghazâlî left Naysâbûr to make the acquaintance of Nizâm al-Mulk, the vizier of the Seljuk king Malik Shâh. At the court of Nizâm al-Mulk al-Ghazâlî had the opportunity to dispute with learned men and refute his opponents. Nizâm al-Mulk admired him and appointed him teacher at the Nizâmîyyah madrasah at Baghdad (484/1091), where 300 pupils gathered around him. There, due to the good impression he created by his skill in lecturing and writing and by sound legal opinions, (fatwâ) he expressed, he gained a great reputation.

On completing his writing against scholastic theologians (al-mutakallimûn) and their unsatisfactory methods of argument, along with his teaching in the madrasah, he engaged in the study of philosophy for three years all by himself (9). He gave special attention to the writings of al-Fârâbî (d.950 A.D.) and Ibn Sînâ (980-1037 A.D.). It was then that he wrote his book Maqâsid al-Falâsifah, in which he gives an exposition of the philosophers' views. He followed that by his book (Tahâfut al-Falâsifah), in which he refutes their

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(9) Ibid., p. 85; (quoted also in Tabâqât, IV, p. 126f.)
views, e.g., concerning creation, attributes of God, immortality, etc. (10)

Later, while he was engaged in the study of the teachings of the Taqī, as the Ismā‘īlīs or Bāṭinīs were called in Khurasan then, he received orders from the Khalīfah, (11) al-Mustashārī, to write against them. So he made a good exposition of their views and claims in his book al-Mustashārī, which he later followed by other books, (12) and refuted their teachings concerning the Infallible Imam (Al-Imām al-Mahṣūm), who, they claimed, should be resorted to for right guidance.

Later, and while still attending to his teaching duties in the madrasah, he started studying sufism, especially in such books as Qūṭ al-Qulūb by al-Makki (d. 388/998) and books by al-Muhāsibī (d. 243/857) and others. (13) All his intellectual studies until then had provided him with a belief based on certainty (Imān yaqīn) in God, prophethood and the Last Day (al-Yawm al-Dahīr). (14)

As to bliss in the other world, he was now convinced

(10) Ibid., IV, p. 86ff., 95ff.
(11) Ibid., p. 109 (but cf., p. 108, note (1) where according to Salībā and ‘Ayyūb it was Nizām al-Mulk that desired him to do that); Hāfiz, I, p. 119.
(12) Munqidh, p. 119
(13) Ibid., p. 122, 123f.
(14) Ibid., p. 126ff.
that it could not be obtained except through piety, forsaking the world and worldly things, and seeking approach to God.

As a result he underwent a severe inner struggle which con-

continued for six months. Psychologically and physically its
effect was so great that, as he himself states, he could nei-

ther teach nor utter a word, and finally he fell hopelessly

sick. The struggle ended in (15) giving up in 488/1095 or

his position as professor in Baghdād. Then, forsaking fami-

ly, wealth and fame he decided to leave for Syria, under the

guise of pilgrimage to Makkah and Madīnah.

In Syria he spent about two years in complete retirement,
giving himself to ṣūfī exercises and spiritual discipline,

often roaming out in the country and desert. For sometime

he shut up himself in the minaret of the mosque at Damascus

and spent all his day there. From Damascus he went to

Jerusalem, where he shut up himself similarly in the Dome

of the Rock. Finally he decided to perform the duty of pil-

grimage to Makkah and Madīnah, visiting on his way first the

grave of Abraham at al-Khaḍīl (Hebron). From there apparent-

ly he went back to Damascus, where he devoted himself to

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(16) Mungidh, p. 129.
(17) Tābadal, IV, p. 107f; RifāʿI, I, p. 122f.
worship in the ḏawīyah at the Umawī mosque, known then as al-Nāṣiriyyah (after Shaykh Naṣr al-Maqdisī), known today as al-Zāwiyyah al-Ghazāliyyah (after al-Ghazālī). It was during this period that he started writing his Ḥikāyat al-Dīn, and perhaps taught it in that same zāwiyyah. From Damascus he went to Cairo and Alexandria. After having spent about ten years outside Ṭrāq, the prayers of his children, his concern about his family affairs, and his own personal aspirations drew him back home.

He visited Baghdaḍ, but not as a regular teacher at the madrasah. Instead, he held meetings (majālis) for preaching and for teaching his Ḥikāyat. At home in Tūs he lived in seclusion giving himself to meditation and the observance of the appointed times of worship, and to writing, until his writings became known everywhere and met no contradiction.

The decline of faith and the corruption of life among...

(18) Gardner, p 21.
(19) For the diverse accounts given as reasons for al-Ghazālī's departure from Damascus see Ṣabaqaṭ, IV, p. 104f; cf. Gardner, p. 18 and 19 n. 2.
(20) Some think that from Egypt al-Ghazālī planned to go to Yūsuf ibn Ṭāshfīn, sultan of Maghrib, who was known for his justice. But on hearing of his death he changed his direction - Ṣabaqaṭ, IV, p. 105; Rifāʿī, I, p. 124.
(21) Instead of majālis Subki has majlis (in the singular) Ṣabaqaṭ, IV, p. 105.
(23) Ṣabaqaṭ, IV, p. 108.
Muslims, including learned men and sufis, grieved his heart.
A call from within, and strong advice by concerned sufis leaders compelled him to leave his retirement and accept the repeated invitation by Fakhr al-Mulk, vizier of Sanjar, ruler of Khurâsân, to teach in the Nizâmiyyah madrasah at Naysâbûr. Al-Ghazâlî's sole and sincere purpose was to bring about a reform under the patronage of Fakhr al-Mulk and the ruler. Thus after about ten years and a half of retirement from active life he became professor in that madrasah in the eleventh month (Jumâ'â-i-Qâ'dah) of the year 499/1106. The time he enjoyed that patronage, however, was very short, as Fakhr al-Mulk was assassinated in 500/1106. Al-Ghazâlî was now exposed to the slander and attacks of his opponents, which he bore patiently and silently.

Sometime later he retired to Tus, where, close to his residence, he opened a madrasah for those who sought learning in the law (fuqahâ) and a khanqah for those who sought instruction in the way of the sufis. At the same time,

(24) A good description of this sad situation is given in Mungidh, p. 147-150.
(25) Al-Ghazâlî's own claim is that the invitation came from the Sultan himself - Ibid, p. 151.
(28) Eleven lunar years (one lunar year = 354 days) - Ibid, p. 153.
(29) According to Macdonald, as quoted by Gardner, his assassination was in Muharram, the first month of that year - Ibid, p. 19, n. 3.
while continuing writing, he gave himself to careful study of hadīth, which he had thus far freely used and carelessly quoted. He studied the two Sahīhs, that of Muslim and that of al-Bukhārī, as well as the Sāman of Abī Da'ūd and thousands of various traditions. Thus he made full use of his time, teaching, preaching, writing and studying, without neglecting his devotions and acts of worship, until he passed away in Fāṣ on the fourteenth of Jamādī II, 505 A.H. (December 18th, 1111 A.D.). (30)

CHAPTER II

THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES AND OTHER FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED AL-GHAZALĪ

The growth and development of al-Ghazalī as thinker and writer, including that stage in his life termed "spiritual journey", or "conversion", was the outcome of the interaction of internal and external forces. His innate capacities and natural tendencies from within and the diverse intellectual, spiritual, and at times political factors had their bearings upon his mode of thinking and often conditioned his writing, as will be seen.

It was the third century of the Abbāsid Caliphate. Politically it was a period of weakness and decline, when the Saljuk Turks, in 1055 A.D. (three years before al-Ghazalī's birth), had Baghdād and all 'Irāq in their grasp. At the same time the Fatimid propaganda (e.g., through the Būtānīs) was threatening not only the Abbāsid Caliphate but the Sunnī madhhab and rule as a whole. This Shi'ī danger was responsible for the establishment of the Niẓāmiyyah schools by the Saljuk Turks. (1) On the other hand it was perhaps the greatest

(1) One evidence of that and of the motivating factors for al-Ghazalī's attack on the Būtānīs (or Ta'limīs) is the Ruler's desire from him to write against them - Kungidhī, p. 109.

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age of intellectual activity and progress in Muslim history, it was the age of intellectual disputes and controversies among the different schools of thought and sects in Islam. This was due to the invasion of the Muslim world by Greek philosophy, together with some Indian and even Persian elements. At the same time polemical writings between Christians and Muslims were not lacking.

It was at this juncture that al-Ghazālī appeared, and from those various fountains he drank his fill and quenched his thirst. He made a thorough study of the religious sciences of the day and all aspects of philosophy, which his inquisitive mind put to thorough examination, sifted, in some cases synthesized, and finally converted its choice of things to noble purposes and ends.

From his adolescent years, before he was twenty, as he himself states, his inquisitive mind was never satisfied with things taken for granted, or accepted on mere human authority. The first evidence of this appears in connection with religious beliefs. Realizing that each individual acquired by


(3) Mungidh, p. 67.
The religion of the family in which he was born, he began to question the truthfulness of the beliefs he himself had acquired from childhood. It was not the truthfulness of Islam as a religion that he questioned, but beliefs about it and those related to it. It was an intellectual turning point in his life, which, in time, culminated in his spiritual conversion.

As has already been indicated, it was this yearning for the knowledge of realities beyond the limitations of human traditional authority that motivated his trip to Imam al-Haramayn at Naysabur. The subjects he studied on this celebrated Shariah scholar, and the way they were transmitted to him had a strong impression on his thinking and writing. Besides freedom from the method of taqlid, he acquired the logical or rational evaluation of religious matters. But, as can be evidenced from such things as his doctrine of faith (Iman), qadar and qadar, belief concerning life after death (Hell taken as a temporary residence for believers), he was an or-

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(4) Ibid., p. 69f.
(5) P. xvi above.
(8) P. xxxvi with n. 39 below; al-Madnun Bihi 'ila Qayri Ahlihi (Maymaniyyah Press, Cairo, 1309 A.H.), p. 20 - hereafter referred to as Madnun. Cf. the carnal compensation in Paradise (ibid., p. 28) with his more liberal position later as in Ma'riti, p. 177-179, 182f; p. xxxviii with n. 44 below.
thodox (i.e., Ashʿarfī) Muslim. As such he submitted every thing he tackled, including evaluation of religious beliefs and conclusions, to the authority of the Qurʾān and the support of the sunnah, both of which sources he quoted extensively. (9) His orthodoxy, further, exhibits itself in his attack on such innovators as the Anthropomorphists (Mushabbi- nah and Mufassimah) and the Muʿtazilah on such subjects as the attributes of God and beatific vision of Him in the hereafter, both of which he bases on the doctrine of al-mu- khālāfa. (10) So in fighting innovators and philosophers, al-Ghazālī was actually taking his own post in the Ashʿarfī defensive line of orthodoxy, following the same method they followed of attacking the opponent by his own weapons, a method he admits as authentic but attributes to the theolo- gians themselves and not to the philosophers. (11)

Among other things which al-Ghazālī acquired and made use of are the Ashʿarfīs' attempt at a mutual submission of religion and scientific theories to each other with the purpose of defending their views, and the use of such theories in theological studies and disputes. (12) He himself states

(9) Some outstanding examples are his Thārīʿ, and Maʿārij and several other works.
(10) Maʿārij, p. 192f, 197, 180-188 (esp. 184).
(12) Rifaʿī, I, p. 74f; Minhāj, p. 93f.
that he was criticized for the use he made of "some of their vocabulary" some of which he claims to have already been found in books on divine law (knúb shar'íyyah), and the meaning of most of which is expressed in other terms in many Súfī books. Some of this "vocabulary" (or rather theories) are the theory of the ultimate atom (jawhar fard) and the order of creation in the system of causation, while the theory of causation (actually he attacked) is a sequence theory of causation (and may be considered in a way an orthodox Muslim version of the Neoplatonic system, possibly borrowed mostly by way of Súfism, with one essential difference: In al-Ghazálí's system the sole Cause and the moving force in the universe is God, the First Real One. By way of command he first created the First Intelligence, the noblest of all created things, before any matter or time, then the Soul, and then primary matter (hayúlah). With the excellence of the First (or universal) Intelligence and Soul is contrasted the excellence of the prophetic mind and soul as compared with

(16) Ma'ári, p. 203f (cf. 205), and 124 where the three created things are given a theological interpretation respectively as the Pen (gálam), the Tablet (láwb) and the Outside Darkness (zulmah kháriyyah). Cf. the Ash'ári coloring on p. 201-202 (particularly the last paragraph); of also Nádúm; p. 15 and 3.
the other human intelligences and souls. He is not only the Creator, but also permanent Sustainer, Supervisor and Guide. At the same time he admits as correct certain views of his opponents, such as the view held by some philosophers, as well as the Mu'tazilah, that God's knowledge of Himself is not something additional to Himself (or being). He also accepts the ethical teachings of philosophers, but claims that they have borrowed them from mystics. In the field of psychology al-Ghazâlî accepted and made use of theories of knowledge, its source, grades of intelligence, external and internal faculties, etc.

In spite of all the learning he had acquired from all religious sciences, philosophy and other sciences, he felt a vacancy in his heart and a lack in his knowledge; a sense of dissatisfaction with his status quo invaded him. His quest for realities culminated in Sufism, whose influence marks the climax in the moulding of his character as a religious thinker. That was not, however, a sudden occurrence, but rather a gradual process beginning with his childhood, and leading

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(18) Innâhu tâlim bi'l-dhat 18 bi'în al-lâhîn dhat - Mungidh, p. 97f; cf. Ma'ârîj, p. 133f - His view is the same concerning all the Divine attributes; ibid., p. 71.
(19) Apparently al-Ghazâlî does not make a spiritual distinction between Muslim and pre-Muslim mystics. Both groups are considered as being devoted to the remembrance of God and to religious exercises, etc. Mungidh, p. 99-100.
(20) Cf. al-Ghazâlî in his following works with the following Muslim philosophers as treated in Brett, G.S., History of
up to the final decision he made at Baghdād, as has already been mentioned, to quit fame, wealth and family and give himself to an ascetic disciplining of the soul. He was born in a pious and probably a şūfī home. After his father's death he was left to the care of a şūfī friend. His teachers al-Nassāj and Ṭāmm al-Ḥaramayn were both şūfīs. So before his work in Baghdād, he was already well acquainted and to some extent imbued with şūfī teachings, even though he was not aware of it before he made his thorough study of it later, when he arrived at the conviction that salvation from perdition was possible only by piety and turning away from the passionate desires of the soul, which conviction culminated in his above-mentioned decision.

Among the şūfī works which influenced him most and had a great bearing upon some of his outstanding writings

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Psychology (London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., New York, the Macmillan Co., 1921), Vol. II, respectively on (a) the grades of human intelligence, (b) the classes of the powers of the soul, (c) the internal faculties and their locations, and (d) the light that illuminates men:


(c) Maḫāriṣ, p. 46, 50-51; "AỈfāb al-Qalb in Īlm al-

   Din (with Sayyid Muḥtaṣib al-Zabīdī's Iṭḥāf al-


(21) P. xirf with n. 14 above.
(after his spiritual crises at Baghdad), such as the Thvāz, was al-Makki's Gūt al-Qulūb, (22) which is believed to have been almost literally copied in the Thvāz. (23) Among other sources of influence mention should be made of al-Shāfi’ī (24) both as a gūfī and as an authority in Muslim jurisprudence.

It should be noted, however, that al-Ghazālī did not accept everything gūfīsm offered him blindly. In the light of the Qur’ān he analyzed it and submitted it to the test of reason, to which he repaired after he had regained his faith in it. (25) Therefore, while he spoke highly and sympathetically of it, he deemed false such gūfī terms as God’s “inherence” in a man (wulūl), mystical union (ittithād) with and attainment (wujūl) of Him, together with the ideas they stand for.

But he recommended highly the gūfī way as being based on

(22) For this and other gūfī sources of influence see p. xxiv with n. 13 above.


(26) Munqidh, p. 133f. Cf. p. 126 for the significance he gives to rational knowledge, e.g., in gaining “faith based on certainty”, though experimental knowledge is rated above it.
religious knowledge and works (film wa 'amal), on piety, and the freeing of the heart from everything but God, leading to the mystical knowledge (ma'rifah), the unveiling (kaahr), and the vision (mushahadah) of Him, which, according to him, in turn leads to the meeting (liqa') and witnessing (ru'yah) of Him in the next World. This, according to al-Ghazâlî, forms the climax of the heavenly bliss. Other terms emphasized are "mystical taste" (dhawq) and the "condition" of the heart (bal). Al-Ghazâlî was a practical or realistic mystic, or rather a mystically-minded philosopher and theologian.

Another factor which even Muslim thinkers consider as having influenced al-Ghazâlî was Christianity. But what made him interested in Christianity? One factor may have been the question of inherited religion - in this case on the part of Christians - which troubled his mind since his youth.

(27) Ibid., p. 122, 132. A very good example for al-Ghazâlî's emphasis on 'amal as going hand in hand with film is Ayyuhab Walad. (cf. also Muzan al-'Amal for emphasis on virtue); cf. Ma'ârij, p. 175.
(28) Ma'ârij, p. 184-186. Cf. his previous views of the heavenly pleasures - p. xiv, no. 8 above.
(29) Muzâid, p. 124; Ma'ârij, p. 165.
(30) Mubâarak attributes the negative, or ascetic attitude of al-Ghazâlî to the negative teachings attributed to Jesus that influenced him. Rifa'i, on the other hand, speaks highly of those Christian teachings - Mubâarak, Q.e.cit., p. 90-94; Rifa'i, I, p. 202 - 205.
(31) P. xxx, n. 4 above.
To that may be added the hadith that says "Every child is born in accordance with natural disposition (fitrah), i.e., natural religion, namely Islam; but his parents make him Jewish, Christian, or Magian," which statement called for verification. The Christians' claim of the divine nature of Christ, and their refusal of Muhammad's claim of prophethood, both of which are contrary to the Qur'an, must have added to his interest. This is evident from the titles of two polemical works of his, namely, Al-Radd al-Jam'i Li'ilahiyyat 'Isa Bisa-rilib al-Injil (the fair reply about the divinity of Jesus from the explicit Gospel), and Al-Radd al-Jam'i Ala Maq Ghayyar al-Injil (the fair reply to those who have altered the Gospel). Parallel in spirit is the illustration he gives in the Qustas in his argument against the Ta'limis:

If you were asked to say, "There is no god besides God, and Jesus is the apostle of God," you would naturally shrink from it, saying, "This is the saying of Christians; how can I say it?" You do not have (enough) reasoning (power) by which you can tell that this saying in itself is right, and that a Christian is not hated on account of this or any other statement, except two, first his saying (that) God is the third one of three, and, second, (that) Muhammad is not the apostle of God. All other sayings of his are right. (33)

(32) Muniqah, p. 70; Ma'arij, p. 103. For this meaning of al-Fitrah, see p. 60 n. 4 below.

(33) Law gila laka, "qul,' Ia Ilahe illa Allah, 'Isa rasul Allah," nafara 'an dhalika tab'uika, wa qulta, "Haddh gawi al-Rasul; fa jabbir aqulu wu?" Wa lam yakun lakuminal-aqli wu tara'ifu bihi anna hadhath allah ghawla illa naasthi bagh, wa anna'll-Hasan al-mugita iladhini il-kalimah, wa la ila'ir il-kalimah, baal likalimatavi faqat. Īddahum qawlu wu Allah thalithu.

[Note: The text contains a question mark and a line of Arabic script.]
To do the subject justice, al-Ghazālī sought first-hand information. But what material was available to him? He had the information offered by the Qurān, as well as by some ḥadīths. He must have been acquainted also with some polemical works of the day connected with controversies between Christians and Muslims (34) In addition he must have had access to some Arabic, and/or perhaps Persian translations of portions of the Bible, including the New Testament, and particularly the Gospels. As may be inferred from the titles of his two polemical works mentioned above, and his statement, "I saw in the Gospel of Jesus, may blessing and peace be upon him..." (35) the probability is that the Gospel (Injīl) he knew was a translation of the Syriac Diatessaron,


(34) P. xxxiv, n. 2 above. One such influence is the Christian doctrine of the Logos, which al-Ghazālī attributed directly or through some Muslim medium to Muḥammad, whom he makes the first of creation and the crown of it. From his soul substance all other creatures were made - Maṭārizī, p. 125 and n. 27.

(35) Raʿaytu fī Injīl Isā ṣalāhu ṣalāma... Note it is Injīl (singular) and not Anājīl (plural) that is used. The continuation of the quotation is an apocryphal one - Ayyuḥāl-Walad, p. 19. In the titles of al-Ghazālī's two works mentioned on p. xxxiii above reference again is to Injīl and not to Anājīl. It is interesting, however, to note that many Ḥarīm-speaking Christians, esp. the uneducated, call the whole New Testament Injīl.
which was and still is used in the Syrian church in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. (36) As may be judged from the numerous apocryphal quotations he attributes to Jesus he must have also had access to some apocryphal work containing material about Jesus. (36) These variant sources from which al-Ghasālī derived his information about Christ rendered his knowledge of him imperfect, as may be seen from the statements he makes about him and the sayings he attributes to him. (37) In spite of the high opinion he often expressed of Jesus as an apostle of God with a miraculous birth and life, and as an example to be followed, still according to him this same Jesus does not rank with Muhammad, the seal of prophethood, and therefore all claims by Christians in that respect are false and hence condemned.

On the basis of the above conclusions al-Ghasālī expresses his opinion about Christians and their fate after death. Two contradictory statements by him in that regard


(37) For various collections of such statements and quotations see Margoliouth, D.S., "Christ in Islām" (Expository Times, edited by James Hastings) (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1893-94), Vol. V, p. 59, 107, 177-178, 503-504, 561; Zwemer, "Jesus
are brought out by Zwemer. The first is from his *Faysal al-Tafrīqah Bayn al-Islām wa'l-Zandaqah* to the effect that on the Day of Judgment two out of three classes of Christians will be included in the mercy of God. These are (1) those who have not heard about Muḥammad and his message, and (2) those who have not heard more than his name and title. The second statement is from one of the very last pages of the *Ihya*, where al-Ghazālī quotes with approval a hadith to the effect that for every Muslim destined to stay in Hell, at the last day God will substitute a Jew or a Christian.

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(39) This apparently is based on the Qur’ānic doctrine that every believer will spend a period of purgation in Hell before entering Paradise. *Wa in minkum illā wāridūhāa, kāna  ‘alā Rabbika hatim maqāliyyah* (19:71/72).

(40) N. 38 above: In the first source, p. 192, the hadith is simply interpreted, while in the second, p. 42, it is misquoted. The hadith actually reads: The apostle of God said, "On the Resurrection Day God will appear to us laughing, and will say, "Rejoice, O Muslim Community, for there is not one among you but I have substituted for him in the fire a Jew or a Christian". (Qalī Rasūl Allāh, sallā Allāh ‘alayhi wa sallam, *Yaṭalallā Allāh, azimuth wa sallā lāna yawn al-Giyyamah jahāla, tayyārī‘ ābshīrī, sallā al-Maṣūmīn, ja‘īna mu‘ayin minkum illā wa qad ja‘ītu makḥānu til‘-Nār yakūndiyyah wa māqūniyyah* - ‘Iraqī, Vol. IV, p. 466.)
It is interesting to note also that two pages following the above mentioned hadīth in the Ḥiyāh, al-Ghazālī quotes two other hadīths. One of them speaks of how after Muslims who had done the least amount of good were transferred from Fire to Paradise, God takes out the remaining Muslims there – those who had not done any good whatever (lam ya'amu khayrān qatt) – and throws them into a river in Paradise called the River of Life (Nahr al-Ḥayāt) of which they come out like pearls with divine stamps (khawātīm) on their necks. Then God says to them, "Enter Paradise; and whatever you see there is yours". (41) According to the other hadīth Gabriel gives the Prophet the good news that everyone who has not conjoined any thing with God will enter Paradise. The Prophet asks twice, "Even if he has stolen and committed adultery? " Every time Gabriel answers positively. When the prophet repeats the question the third time, Gabriel answers, "Even if he has stolen, committed adultery and drunk wine". (41)

This, no doubt, shows the darkest side of al-Ghazālī's religious thinking, even though in principle it is not inconsistent with orthodox Muslim beliefs. Yet it is important to note that the Ḥiyāh was written sometime during his period

(41) Ibid, p. 468.
of wandering and retirement, a period of transformation and
development in his religious attitude and thinking. The
Thawār itself has been criticized for inconsistency in thought
and principle by Muslim authorities who have great respect
for al-Ghazālī. Contrary in spirit to the last hadīth quoted
above from the Thawār, in his later writings his emphasis
is increasingly on the practical and spiritual aspects of
religion, to the extent that salvation from fire is made
impossible without them. That these were written out of
real conviction is evident from his concern over the moral
degradation among his people, and his earnest desire to bring
about a reform, for the sake of which he agreed to go back
to active life and accept a teaching position at Nayṣābūr.

(42) P. xxiv n. 17, 18, 22 above. The actual date of the com-
pletion of the Thawār is not certain. According to Rīḍī, I,
p. 170f, however, it was completed before 492 A.H. It was
taught at Damascus and Baghdad after his return there.
(43) E.g., Ibn Tufayl-Jumāh, M.L., Tarikh Falsafat al-
Islam fi 'l-Masāriq al-Ma'ārif (Al-Ma'ārif Press, Cairo,
1345/1927), p. 7ff. For other criticisms on the Thawār see
Habīb, Op. cit., p. 105ff, where twenty charges are mentioned.
Compare also al-Ghazālī's statement in a later writing to the
effect that the faithful among the Jews and Christians will be spared - al-Durrat al-Fīkhirah fi 'l-Durr al-Fīkhirah (al-
Karabiyah Press, Cairo, 1347/1928), p. 34-37 - hereafter
referred to as al-Durrat.
(44) P. xxii with n. 15 above. For example see Ayyūhā'1-
Walad, p. 15, 17, 19, 29ff, etc. Of Maṣāriq, p. 80, 84, 93 and 96.
(where the author speaks in terms of everlasting perdition
(halak muqaddab) to which obedience to physical desires and
fire lead); or also p. 173ff, where, without naming any special
religious faith, three categories of people are assigned each
one degree (milder, or greater) of misery, ending on p.175 where
he makes self reformation the one condition for attaining bliss.
For fuller and clearer details see Ibid., p.177ff; (of 175ff).
(45) P. xxiv with n. 24, 27 above.
More important than that among the characteristics of Apostleship he included what stands out peculiarly in the life and teachings of Jesus namely, "forgiveness of those who injure one, doing good to those who do one evil". The Christian influence on al-Ghazālī's development of this new religious attitude cannot be overlooked, as has already been noticed and as can be judged from his statements about Jesus, the connection in which he makes these statements and the purpose he has in view. That his renunciation of the world and worldly things for the pursuit of perfection in spiritual growth leading up to the attainment of the heavenly bliss was partly due to Christian influence (especially the life and teachings of Jesus in the form they were known to him) has been recognized, as has been already mentioned, even by Muslim thinkers, such as Mubārak and Rifā'ī. Through al-Ghazālī these Christian effects found expression in Muslim writings of later generations, especially by Sūfīs.


(47) P. xxxix, n. 30 above, cf Ayyūb īl-Walad, p. 29, 3d requirement with Matthew 19:24.

(48) For an illustration see Zwemer, A Moslem Seeker after God, p. 292f., 294.
CHAPTER III

AL-ĞHAZĀLİ'S IMPORTANCE

It is held that in Islam al-Ghazālī occupies the unique position "corresponding to that shared by Augustine and Aquinas in the Christian Church". (1)

The special title that is given him in Muslim literature is "the Defender of Islam" (Hilājat al-Islām) to which is added another title, "The Pride of Religion" (Zayn al-Dīn). (2)

Other honorific statements are not lacking. He is "the renewer of the fifth century [A.H.]". He is included among philosophers, sages, theologians, and prophets and reformers. (3)


(2) Lit. the conclusive proof of Islam. It is also rendered, "the Doctor of Islam", an honorific title of Ghazali, Abu Hamid Zayn-ud-Din - Redhouse, p. 765; cf. n. 3 below.


(4) This is based on the hadith, according to which God sends at the end of each century a reformer to renew Islam. The four forerunners of al-Ghazâlī, in the order of time, are (a) ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, (b) al-Ṣafī, (c) al-Ashā'irī, or Ibn Suraīj, and (d) al-Jâfarīn, al-Suhālî, or al-Baqilānî. - Rifāʿî, I, p. 135 (taken from SMZ); cf. Muhâqilah, p. 152 (where al-Ghazâlī himself seems to have been convinced that he was such one sent by God.

(5) Jum'ah, Op.cit., p. 73; Rifāʿî, I, p. 208 (where al-
He is considered one of the leaders (a'timmah) of the Shafi'i madhhab, the greatest scholastic theologian of his day, and one of the three chief authorities (autab) in Islam, namely (1) al-Bistami in the "temporary conditions" of the heart (ahwāl), (2) al-Ghazali in its "permanently acquired conditions" (maqāmāt), while (3) al-Ghazali in religious sciences. Moreover, the numerous legends woven around his name after his death are clear and genuine expressions of the lofty position he has won in Islam. A glance over his accomplishments and contributions may explain the reason why he is so highly revered.

As his biography shows, his skepticism motivated him to seek for realities. The effort he expended in that direction brought him valuable knowledge in diverse fields, such as science, philosophy, logic, law, theology and spiritual matters (e.g., sufism), which helped strengthen his faith in religion intelligently.

Yafi'i is said to have quoted the saying that "if there were a prophet after the Prophet [Muhammad] it would be al-Ghazali".

(6) See n. 4 above. With respect to his ability as a mutakallim of contradictory views by such men as al-Mazari, the Malik - Tabagat, IV, p. 123.

(7) For these guri terms see Muncidh, p. 124, n. 5.

(8) Rifai'i, I, p. 209
In philosophy his skepticism led him to tread the
path of empiricism long before David Hume (1711-1776) did.
Like Hume also he opposed the theory of causation. But in
each case he differed with Hume in the conclusion he reached.
In contrast with Hume empiricism led al-Ghazālī not only to
see the value of rational knowledge but also to enhance the
position of the theory of intuitive knowledge (hadith), which
he places above reason and which he attributes to divine in-
spiration. Again like Hume he realized the significance of
the Theory of Causation. But unlike Hume his treatment of
this theory on the basis of possibility, rather than necessi-
ty, helped him form his own theory of Causation, by means of
which he took to refute, as an orthodox Muslim, the theory
that held matter to be eternal, to establish the orthodox Mus-
lim view of God's being the Eternal, Omniscient, Omnipotent
Creator and Sustainer, Who created all things according to
His own will, and particularly to give place and credit to
prophetic miracles. In fact all his study of philosophy was
not simply to learn the views and systems of philosophers, but
for the purpose of refuting them in defence of "orthodoxy".

(9) Ibn Qidrī, p. 137ff; al-Risālat al-Laduniyyah, p. 41-45,
49-50. For details on knowledge based on external and inter-
nal senses, see, for instance, Ibn Qidrī, p. 40ff; on hadith
and prophetic inspirational knowledge, see p. 150ff, 156ff, 160-
162; of al-Risālat al-Laduniyyah, p. 46-49. Cf Hume in Durant,
W., The Story of Philosophy (New York, 1927), pp. 280-282; Encyclo-

(10) F. xxviii with n. 15 above. For a concise comparison
between the two philosophers see Rifa'ī, I, p. 228-232, 236;
of Ibn Qidrī, p. 36-39 (derived from Tabaqāt, p. 65-68).

The blow he gave philosophy, including the skepticism of rationalism, as well as the blow he gave innovation in Islam speaks highly for his ability as a scholar and for the service he rendered the Faith. In all his arguments the spirit of fairness he exhibits, allowing his opponent to present his point of view, makes him worthy of respect. One of the two conditions he puts before a person desiring to enter an argument is to aim at revealing the truth regardless of whether it is revealed through him or through his opponent. Furthermore, the language and style he used in the exposition he made of those philosophic systems and views (e.g., in his Maqāsid) before attacking them brought down philosophy and its treatment of religious matters from its inaccessible throne to the level of the understanding of the average man. This was one of the things that kindled the anger of Ibn Rushd, a century later, against him and made him criticize him bitterly. Yet from fear of jeopardizing the faith of the simple people and leading them astray he later advised against encouraging them to deal with such intellectual matters, which were above their mental capacity. At the same time he called for the protection of the faith of these people by the arm of the state against the unbearable theoretical argumentative.

(12) Ayyuhā'ī-Walad, p. 47.
religion imposed upon them by the intellectuals of the day. In spite of that it has to be admitted that al-Ghazālī stimulated free enquiry and rational argument. He awakened the consciousness of men to a reexamination of their religious faith and life in the light of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah. Moreover by reminding them of the fire of Hell he sought to turn their attention from a theoretical argumentative religion to a spiritual religion expressed in virtuous life. That led to the exaltation of the Sufi way, which, due to his influence, won a favorable and firm position in Islam. In this case al-Ghazālī is compared with al-Ash’arī, who gave a permanent place in Islam to scholastic theology. Hence to these two men, al-Ash’arī and al-Ghazālī are attributed the two most important epochs of development in the history of Islam. The doctrines al-Ghazālī laid down have been accepted by unanimous agreement (jimā’il). Yet unfortunately in spite of all that, al-Ghazālī has been laid on the reference shelf to add to the host of other similar authorities. The interest at present in the study of his life and works on the part of Muslims or Oriental Christians is comparatively new.

With pride Muslim writers quote, or refer to appre,
tive statements and articles by orientalists about al-Ghazālī. It is admitted that so far Western Christians and orientalists know more about him than people of the East. This gives evidence of the fact that his influence was not confined within the Muslim world but found its way to the West as well. Thomas Aquinas (13th century) and Pascal (17th century) are said to have been indirectly affected by him. Could not Hume himself have been affected in the same way by al-Ghazālī?

The work of Western scholars about al-Ghazālī that is still going on whether in the form of articles, tracts or books, and the number of Western languages in which translations of some of his works have been published gives evidence of the important position he still occupies in the Christian West. Dr. J. Rendel Harris opens his introduction to Zwemer's "A Moslem Seeker after God, thus, "Al-Ghazālī was a rare combination of scholar and saint, of the orthodox Moslem and the aberrant Sūfī". According to Jabrān, al-Ghazālī, together with Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd, are given by orientalists and scholars of the West first rank among the philosophers of the East.

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(18) Ribāṭ, I, p. 213ff; cf. note 15 above.
(20) One illustration is the Western references used in connection with the present work.
"while the spiritually minded among them consider him the noblest and loftiest thought that has appeared in Islam".

Jabran further adds, "I saw on the walls of a church in Florence, Italy, built in the fifteenth century, a picture of al-Ghazālī among the pictures of other philosophers, saints and theologians whom the leaders of the Church in the Middle Ages considered as pillars and columns in the Temple of the Absolute Spirit."

CHAPTER IV

WORKS BY AL-GHAZĂLĪ

Al-Ghazălī's works mentioned by Macdonald are all included in Brockelmann's list. This list includes quite a number of works that are not mentioned in the lists given by Subki, Bidā, or Maktab al-Nashr al-ʿArabī of Damascus, the publishing bureau of Salībā and ʿAyyād's edition of the Muncīd, unless some works are given more than one title, or different titles in different lists. For instance, the list in Muncīd includes many titles that are not found in any of the other four sources. Yet more than one of these titles may belong to the same work, e.g., Maʿārij al-Quds fī Madārij Maʿrifat al-nafs and Maʿārij al-Sālikān, which are considered by Brockelmann as probably being the same work, in Muncīd they are considered two different works. Then titles may vary in different lists while they actually represent the same work. For instance the work called by Brockelmann Misbāḥ al-ʿAqīdah in Subki has it ʿAqīdat al-Misbāḥ while Muncīd has both titles.

as two separate works. The work which is called in Mungidh Tadlis Iblis is called by Subki, Rida, and Dimashqi Tahbis (3)

Another aspect of this confusion is illustrated in the above mentioned edition of Mungidh where Mishkat al-Anwar is mentioned in the same list in the section called "printed works" (matbush), and again in the section called "manuscripts" (makhtutah).

Zuha al-Fath, Haqiq al-'Ulum li-Ahli'l-Fuhum and Padali al-Qur'an are again mentioned in this same list once in the section of manuscripts and another time in the section of lost works (mafqu dah), in which last section the first work has the definite article "the (al) suffixed to Zuha; the second work is preceded by the two words risalah P F, making it Risalah P F Haqiq al-'Ulum li Ahli'l-Fuhum; while the third work bears the same title in both sections. Again in the section called mafqu dah al-Jadawi al-Marqum bi'l-Daraj is mentioned a second time under the title Al-Daraj al-Marqum bi'l-Jadawi, interchanging the places of the first and the last word in the title.

Al-Radd al-Jami' ala Man Ghayar al-Infl is mentioned twice

(3) A book by this last title has been published for Ibn al-Jawzi by Muhammad Munir al-Dimashqi in the Maqamah Press, Cairo, 1926. Unless al-Ghazali also has written a book by this same title, other than Tadlis Iblis, which is improbable, then the title given in Mungidh alone is correct.

(4) Dimashqi Q., on al-Ghazali's, al-Qustas al-Mustag'im, (First Print, Taraggi Press, Cairo, 1318/1901), p. 11—hereafter referred to as Qustas.

(5) Can the last title represent a different work related to
with the same title in the same section. Al-Wadnūn bihi ʿalā Ghayrī Ahlīhī is mentioned once in the section for printed works, and another time in a separate section for works forged on al-Ghazālī (manḥūlah), in which last section other works are mentioned but not given in the list of authentic works by al-Ghazālī. Other similar illustrations are not lacking. On account of that, in spite of the reasonably possible precautions taken, the list below, which is intended to consist only of works by al-Ghazālī which are not mentioned by Brockelmann, may still include certain titles which belong to works bearing different titles in his list. It is mainly based on the list in Munqīd, which is the most exhaustive one of the above mentioned lists.

Works By Al-Ghazali Not Mentioned By Brockelmann or in The Encyclopaedia of Islam

1. ʿĀdūb al-Kash Waʿl-ʾIbāsh
2. ʿĀdūb al-ṣūfiyyah(6) (Printed in Egypt).
3. al-ʾAnīs fiʾl-Wihdah

the first, e.g., a commentary on it, or a supplement to it, etc. Of the work called by Subkī Risālat al-Radd ʿalā Man Taghā which is given in Munqīd the same title but with the word Risālat omitted from it.

(6)With the exception of numbers 2 and 4, which are printed, and titles with a cross at the end, which are exclusively derived from other sources than Munqīd, all the other works are considered in this last source as lost (mefgūdah).

5. *Arwāh al-Ashbāh*

6. *Aṣrār al-Qiyās*

7. *Al-As'ālah Wa'l-ʿAjwibah*


10. *Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣānīʿ* (printed several times in Cairo. There are also several manuscripts of it in Berlin and other places in the West).


15. *Fadāʾil al-ʿAnām* (Persian)

16. *Farzandnāmah* (Persian)

17. *Al-Fatāwā.*

18. *Fawātīh al-Sūr.*


20. *Ghaybat al-Ghawr fī Masāʾil al-Dawr* (in correction of his

![](https://example.com/)

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(7) *Muqaddim, p. 10*

(8) *Rida, Op. cit., p. 73*

(9) *Thādi, p. 80.*

(10) *Muqaddim, p. 17.*
view in this book al-Ghazālī wrote al-Ghawr fī’l-Dawr

22. Al-Ghāyat al-Qaswat fī Ma’rifat al-Dunya+(a four leaf lealet)(11)
25. Hall al-Rumūz
26. Ḥaqāʾiq fī’l-Durr al-Fāʾiq.
27. Ḥaqiqāt al-Qawlawn.
28. Hasht Fāʿīdah Anz Hāfīzīn(12) Asamm (Persian)
29. Al-Hudūd
31. Ḥisan al-Waḍākhadh.
32. ʿIdān al-Taʿrif fī Fadl al-ʿIlm al-Sharīf.
33. ʿIlm Aḥdāt al-Wafq Wa Ḥudūdihi+
34. al-Intithāl Ihlašī ati’illāh Taʾālā Wa’l-ṣuyūn Lāhā
35. Al-Intisār ʿalāʾī-imām al-Zanātī.
37. Ishrāq al-akhkhād.
38. Al-Istidrāj+(13)
39. Ithbāt al-Maṣer

(12) The kasrah at the end of the word (here represented by the letter "i") is the sign of the possessive case in Persian.
(13) This book is mentioned in al-Burrah p.36. (No. 46 below).
40. *Jannat al-'Asma*.
41. *Al-Jawāḥīr al-Maqūmah*.
42. *Al-Jawāḥir Wa'l-Durar fī'l-Tasawwuf*.
43. *Al-Kāfī fī'l-Īqrā' al-Ṣāfī*.
44. *Kelimāt* (10) Taqrīr Talāl Maqāmāt (Persian)
45. *Kanz al-Īddah*.
46. *Kashf Ulūm al-'Ākhirah* (also called *al-Durrat al-Fākhīrah fī Kashf Ulūm al-'Ākhirah*) (printed in Egypt, 1347 - 1928)
47. *Al-Khāṣim fil-Talāsim*.
49. *Khawāṣṣ al-Qur'ān*.
50. *Khulāṣat al-Wasā'il ilā 'ilm al-Wasā'il* (a summary of al-Maznī's *Anthony* with additional material)
51. *Kitāb al-Ṭalāq*.
52. *Kitāb al-Ḥikmah*.
53. *Kitāb al-Ṣīla*m.
54. *Al-Lubāb fī'l-Tasawwuf*.
55. *Al-Nabādī Wa'l-Ghayāt fī 'Asrār al-Hurūf*.
56. *Al-Nabādī Wa'l-Ghayāt fī Qatl al-Muslim bi'l-Dhiimā*.
57. *Al-Maḍīn Bīnī' alā Ahlihi*.

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(14) Huncidā, p. 17; Quṣṭās, p. 12.
(15) Huncidā, p. 15.
(16) Mentioned only in Quṣṭās, p. 11.
(17) Mentioned only in the Turkish Encyclopaedia of Islam—Kufralî, K., "Gazzali" (Ijārān Anısiklopedesi) (Istanbul, 1947), 37 Cüz, p. 759.
59. al-Maṣkhadh fī'īl-khilāf Bayn al-Ḥanafiyyah (or al-Maṣkhadh fī'īl-Khilāfīyyah Bayn Al-Ḥanafiyyah Wa'l-Shāfi'iyyah)
60. al-Maknūn fī'īl-Uṣūl.
61. Al-Maknūnāt
62. al-Maṣlūm min 'Aqīdāt 'Ahl al-ʿUlūm.
63. Manāhib al-Kārifīn.
64. al-Manāsīl al-Sā'Irah.
65. al-Manhaaj al-Athār al-Nabawīyyah.
67. Al-Maqāsid.
70. Al-Masā'il al-Baghdādiyyah.
71. Al-Masā'il al-Maṣṣāid.
73. Maṣwīm al-Bātiniyyah.
74. Minhāj al-Mutasallim.
75. Minhāj al-Rashād.
76. Mīyar al-Nāzar.
77. Mufassal al-Khilāf (or Uṣūl al-Qiyās, or Mufassal al-Khilāf fī Uṣūl al-Qiyās).
78. al-Mukātabāt.
79. al-Mukhtasar al-'Akhīr fī'īl-Mas'ālat al-Sarfiyyah.
80. al-Munādī Wa'l-Ṣāmit.
81. المتنزه في علم الدل (أو المتنزه في العلم، أو باب المتنزه في العلم).
82.stm Muslim al-Salatin.
83. Mutad al-'Ilm.
84. al-Mutagad.
85. Masihat al-Muluk.
86. Nihayat al-'Idâm ff'il-Fiqh.
87. Nima't al-Faqih.
88. al-Niyah Wa'il-'Ikhlâs.
89. Gahin al-Rasul.
90. al-Qurah *ilâ Allâh.
91. Al-Radd *alâ Man Taqâ (أو al-Radd *alâ Man Ta'ân)
92. Risâlat *Adâb al-Salât.
93. Risâlat al-'Aqâb.
94. Risâlah ff îAfât al-Mâl.
95. " ff'il-'Ahruf.
96. " ff Fadl al-Qur'an wa talâwatihi.
98. " ff Hâqiqat al-Dunyâ.
99. " ff'il-'Ibâd.
100. " ff Má Yajib *alâ Kull Muslim.
102. " Qawlihi Sallâ Allâh alayhi wa Sallam' Afdal al-Munîn *Imân an Ahsanhum Khulûm, an
103. Risâlah ff Rujû' *Ame' Allâh Ta'âlâ *alâ Dhât Wâhidah *alâ
"Rā'y al-Falāsifah Wa'l-Ma'tazilah."

104. Risālah fi'l-Thabāt.
105. Risālat al-Dhikr
106. al-Risālat al-Ghazāliyyah fi'l-Lughāḥ.
109. al-Ṣammāt (or, al-Ṣammāt al-Kawībah).
110. Sharḥ Dā'iirat ʿAlī Ibn ʿAbī Ṭālib.
111. Sharḥ al-ʾIrshād.
112. Sharḥ Mukhtab al-ʾAsmāʾ.
113. Sharḥ al-Ṣadr.
114. Shībāʾ al-Ghaffīl fī Maʿ Waqāʾ fī' l-Tawrāt Wa'l-'Injīl Min al-Tahrīf Wa'l-Tabdīl.
115. Siyar al-Mulūk.
117. Tafsīr al-Ayat al-Tāsi'fah Wa' l-Tahrīn min Sūrat Yūnus.
118. Tafsīr al-Qurʾān.
119. Tahassun al-Maʿākhidh.
120. Taḥsin al-ʿAdillah.
121. Taʿfīqah fi'l-Furūʿ (or, al-Taʿfīqah fi Furūʿ al-Madhahhab).
122. Taʿzīh al-Qurʾān.
123. Taqsim al-ʾAwqāt Wa' l-ʾAdwār.
124. al-Tawḥīd Wa Ithbāt al-Sifāt.
125. Ṭuḥfat al-Mulūk.
Works of disputed Authorship.

The following six works, which are not included in the list above, are not mentioned by al-Subki in his list of works by al-Ghazali. On his authority and that of al-Zabidi and some others, some writers have questioned their authorship and have considered them spurious. According to the publishers of the above mentioned edition of Muncidh they are all to be considered as falsely attributed to al-Ghazali. They are:

1. al-Madun bihi 'ala Ghayri Ahlihi.
2. al-Wafkh Wa'l-Taswiyah.
3. Sirr al-'Alamayn Wa Kashf Mā ff'l-Darayn.
5. Taḥṣīn al-Zunūn.

These publishers have treated as one and the same work

(18) Muncidh, p. 19.
al-Mādnūn Bihi ṣalā Ḥayrī ṭahāliḥī (also called al-Mādnūn al-Kabīr) and al-Mādnūn al-Saghīr (also called al-Ḥawīyat al-ǦazāṬiyah fi al-MasāṬil al-Ukhravyah). The two works have been treated by others, such as Macdonald, Brockelmann, Riḍā, Bimashqī and Ḥufralī, as two different works. They have been published as such by al-Ḥalabī in the Maymanīyyah Press in Cairo (1309 A.H.) in a collection containing also Ilīm al-Ǧawāmm and al-Mungidh min al-Dalāl. They have been also published as such by al-Ashārīyyat al-Misrīyyah Press in Egypt (1328 A.H.). Publishers of Mungidh maintain that, on the basis that al-Mādnūn contains the view that the world (Ṭālm) is eternal (qaddam) and that the Eternal One (al-Qāfīm) does not know particulars, al-Subkī, ibn al-Salāḥī (or ibn al-Ṣalāḥī) and al-Zābiḍī, "followed by Dr. "Alī al-"Anānī and other contemporary scholars" have excluded this book from the list of works by al-ǦazāṬī. In this connection Ḥubārak states that what al-"Anānī has said in Cairo University (al-Jāmi’at al-Misrīyyah) was to the effect that al-Mādnūn biḥī ṣalā Ḥayrī ṭahāliḥī (i.e., the book containing the above attributed teaching) is far from being the same as the booklet in the hands of the public at present, and that that

(19) Mungidh, p. 10 (under qaddam), and 11 (no. 30)
(22) Mungidh, p. 49.
book must have been a bulky volume containing al-Ghazālī's philosophical views which he deemed should be kept back from the common people. Mubārak himself rightly adds that the copy of Madnūn we have at hand does not include the view about the eternity of the world and the lack of knowledge by the Eternal One of particulars. According to Rida', on the basis of such facts as the absence of the above-mentioned false views in the copy of Madnūn existing today, the copy which al-Zabīdī had bearing this title was possibly the false copy which according to him was written by al-Sabtī, and not the copy printed and in use today. The following statements from the Madnūn itself speak for the book.

All originated and created things were created by God in order. He is the First before Whom there is no first. From Him come originated things, rather all things that are possible [of existence]. The order descends from the most excellent to the more excellent until it ends in matter, which is the lowest of things. (25)

The days of God..... stand for the grades of things. He created, made and originated in different senses.

(23) Mubārak, op. cit., p. 120.
(24) Rida', M., op.cit., p. 91f. In al-Dimashqī's list all such works are mentioned as belonging to al-Ghazālī. In connection with Madnūn he has between parentheses this statement: "It is said that it is forged on him" (Qila madsān 'alayhi) - Dimashqī, Op.cit., p. 12.
For instance, in the saying 'in four days' one day [stands for] the material substance of heaven, one day [for] its form, one day [for] its stars and one day [for] its souls. The saying... 'in two days' [stands for] matter and form.(26)

The most proper attributes of Him [i.e., God] are [a] His being self-subsistent, that is, He subsists by Himself, while all other than He subsist by Him, and [b] His being self-existent and not [existent] by some other than He, for all other than He were to exist by Him and not by themselves.(27).

It is thus evident that neither al-Madnūn al-Kabīr, nor al-Madnūn al-Ṣāghīr speak of the eternity (qidāw) of the universe, for all is created by God, the only Eternal One. The question of the Eternal One's claimed lack of knowledge of particulars is not, at least specifically, treated in either one of these booklets.

The third book in the list, Sirr al-Ḥamayn Wa Kasāf Mā fī’l-Dārayn, is considered a Bāṭini work. The sixth, al-Tibr al-Masbūk fī Ḥikāyāt Wa Ḥikam Wa Naṣṣih al-Malūk, is supposed to have been forged on al-Ghazālī under

(26) Ayyām Allāh ... merātibū makhlūqātihī wa magnū‘ā-
tihi we muhāqātīn min āwād; (minhā) gawīnū ‘fi arba‘āt
ayyām’. Nawaiwi madhat al-ṣamā‘, wa yawmī suratuhā, wa
yawmī kawākhā, wa yawmī nūrānīhā, Wa gawīnūn: ....
(27) Akhas̲u waṣī̲tihi an-nabū Qawīyy, ay huwa qā‘īm bidnā-
itihi, wa kullū ma siwānu qā‘īm bihi, wa annabu mawjūd bidnā-
tihi la bighayrīhī, ṭakūlū ma siwānu mawjūd bini la bidnā-
(28) Yet in the Madnūn the section on the means of sub-
the false pretext that it was translated from Persian by one of al-Ghazālī’s disciples. Except the reasons given in connection with Madmūn no reason is given in Muntiqāh nor any evidence why the other five works are claimed to be forged on al-Ghazālī. On the other hand other scholars consider some or all of them authentic works by him. Macdonald’s list includes as such the Madmūn, Siyar al-‘Ilamayn Wa Kashf Mā fi’l-Dārāyn, and al-Tibr al-Masbūk. Brockelmann’s list includes these three works and al-Nafkh Wa’il-Taswiyah, while Ridā’s includes all six works.

It should be noted, however, that names of such renowned writers as al-Ghazālī have been attached by other writers to their own works so that they may win the approval of their readers. With al-Ghazālī this may have been easier, in view of the large number of works he wrote, the various fields he treated, and, as a result, the more or less different styles he wrote in, as the subject and circumstance called for.

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(30) For more radical reasons see *Ibid.* p. 121.
CHAPTER V
AUTHORSHIP OF MAṢĀRIJ AL-QUDS

The question now arises: Is Maṣārij al-Ghazālī's work? To answer this question evidences, both external and internal, have to be considered.

1. External evidences. Although some sources, such as some of those quoted in chapter IV above, do not have it on their lists, yet, as has been already indicated, Brockelmann includes it in his list and tends to identify it with Maṣārij al-Sālikīn and/or Ṣīrāj al-Sālikīn. On the other hand Maktab al-Nāshr al-ʿArabī of Damascus, which questions the authenticity of ascribing the authorship of six books to al-Ghazālī has Maṣārij al-Quds on its list of his printed works on philosophy and logic, while it has Maṣārij al-Sā-

(1) P. lxxvi above.
(3) P. lvif above; al-Muṣīdī, p. 19.
likin on its list of manuscripts, where a copy of it is said
to be found in the library of Paris.

Apparently there is more than one manuscript in
existence of the book each printed by a different writer,
for at the colophon of the present edition the editor sta-
tes that for its correct revision and edition he compared it
with an older manuscript in Tunis, dated 923/1517-18, the
date of the manuscript at hand being 1066/1656.

The title of the book may have been derived from
Muhammad's "night journey" entitled "The Night of the Ladder"
(Laylat al-Mi'raj), or perhaps from some passage in the Qur-
ān, such as 70 : 3-4. The term Ma'ārij is itself one of the
favorite terms of al-ghazālī. Titles of some other writings
of his include it either in the singular (mi'raj) or in the
plural (ma'ārīj), such as the above mentioned Ma'ārīj, al-Sā-
likīn (or Mi'raj al-Sālikīn), al-Mi'raj, and Mi'raj al-Sā-
dah. Other derivatives of the term, such as verbs, are not
uncommon in his writings.

(5) Ibid., p. 12 : 46.
(6) Ma'ārij, p. 212.
(7) E.g., Miskāt, p. 2;13,19,23; al-Durrah, p. 10; 'Ajlā'īb
al-Qalb (SMZ) Vol. VII, p. 235,246- hereafter referred to as
'Ajlā'īb - Ma'ārij, p. 3, where both ideas and style are
practically identical with those in 'Ajlā'īb.
2. Internal evidences. The basic internal evidences, however, are doctrinal. Al-Ghazālī's religious doctrines expressed in Matārij are not different in nature from those expressed elsewhere in his writings. One example is the orthodox Muslim doctrine of God as the Omniscient Creator and Sustainer of everything in the universe, Who knows every thing both universal and particular. Other doctrines deal with such subjects as the attributes of God, life after death, sources of knowledge, prophethood, etc., all of which mark the highest development in al-Ghazālī's thinking, which he attained after his conversion to Sūfism.

There are other evidences which point in the same direction. Indeed Matārij is not completely different in substance, vocabulary and/or style from some other writings.

(8) Although on p. 202 of Matārij the author speaks of a series of causes in creation, yet on the same page he attributes all causes and their action to God, Who created all things according to His own will. Cf also p. 204.
(9) See p. xxviii with n. 15, xlii with n. 11 above; Matārij, p. 194.
(10) Mungidh, p. 97ff; Madmūn, p. 7ff; Ajwibah, p. 6,9; Matārij, p. 192-193, 195-197, 208-209; cf also p. xix, n. 10 above.
(11) Matārij, p. 167-180 (esp. 170-173), 180-188 (esp. p. 184); cf Knyaz', p. 18f; Madmūn, P. 42ff.
(12) See references in Matārij given on p. xxix, n. 20 above.
(13) Mungidh, p. 137-143, 159-162; al-Risālat al-taduniyyah, p. 41-43; Madmūn, p. 18-20; Matārij, p. 141-157 (esp. 145, 150ff, 160-162); Miṣkat, p. 15, 22, 40ff, 44f.
by al-Ghazālī. Most of[Aṣṣib al-Qalb, for instance, is almost identical with most of the first half of it. Much of the rest of it is found scattered here and there in the second half of the book. The following are some of the topics treated in[Aṣṣib: (1) The definition of the terms (14) qalb, nafs, and rūh, (2) The forces of the heart (that is the (15) internal and external senses), (3) The special property of (16) the human heart, (4) The example of the heart with respect (17) to knowledge, (5) The difference between inspirational and (18) acquired knowledge (or learning) (taṣallum), etc., which are treated almost in detail as in Mašāri. As these topics show, one difference is noticeable. Whereas more extensive use is made in[Aṣṣib al-Qalb of the term qalb, in the Mašāri, for the same purpose, the term nafs is mostly used.

Very few of the hadiths mentioned in Mašāri are misplaced in[Aṣṣib, and vice versa. The same thing is true of

the Qur'anic passages. Both hadiths and Qur'anic passages are on the whole used for the same purposes in both books. On the whole the subject matter is treated more in detail in Ma'arij than in Ajwab ib.

Other points of similarity between these two books are illustrated by some similar analogies used in both of them. One analogy is between the soul and its faculties of mental reflection (guwah 'aqliyyah mufakkhirah), ire (shadh) and physical desires (shahwah) on the one hand and a ruler of a city and his agents on the other hand. Another analogy is between intelligence, physical desires and ire on the one hand and the hunter, his horse and dog on the other hand. Still another analogy is between the heart and its degree of purity with respect to the acquisition of inspirational knowledge (alhām) on the one hand and the mirror and its degree of brightness with respect to the clarity of the reflection of forms on it on the other hand. The example of the niche (mishkat) is another illustration.

(19) In this connection cf. also Mishkät and Kitāb.
(20) Ajwab, p. 218; Ma'arij, p. 105-106, cf. also Kitāb, p. 8 ff.
(21) Ajwab, p. 219; Ma'arij, p. 107.
(22) Ajwab, p. 230; Ma'arij, p. 98-99f; Kitāb, p. 15, 17; cf. al-Misābīl al-Luduniyah, p. 48-49 (where the analogy is between this knowledge and sickness). On p. 17 of Ajwabah the analogy of the mirror is used in connection with creation.
(23) Ajwab ib, p. 225; Ma'arij, p. 58-59ff; cf. Mishkät, e. g., p. 15, 42-47, etc.
There are numerous points in which Ma‘ārij is similar to some other works by al-Ghazālī. Examples have been already given. Other examples are the similar treatment in Ma‘ārij and some of these other works by him of the following subjects: (a) Angels, their nature, and their contribution in man’s acquisition of knowledge. (b) the grades (or quality) of souls with respect to their acquisition of knowledge, (c) the nature of the heart (or soul), the indivisible nature of spirit, and the relation of the spirit to the body (spirit being the commander of the faculties of the body), (d) the niche and the grades of knowledge, (e) virtues (being middle between two extremes),

(24) In addition to references given above with Ma‘ārij in the present chapter see those given on p. xxvii, xxix, xxx, xxiii, xxxvii, xli and xlili above.
(28) Ma‘ārij, p. 20-23 (cf. 24-38); cf. Kīmīyā‘, p. 6ff.
(31) In addition to n. 23 above see Miḥkāt, p. 42ff; etc.
(32) Ma‘ārij, p. 88-98; cf. Madnūn, p. 25ff; Kīmīyā‘, p. 10ff; Mūsāmān, p. 43ff; (quotation from Mīrā‘ al-‘Amal).
(f) pairing in creation, (g) the nature of things below the orbit of the moon. Among other illustrations are the following: (a) The Sufi interpretation of the believer's positive answer "yes" (balā) to God's question about His unity "Am I not your Lord?" (TAklā bi-Rabbikum?) (7:172/171), (b) the analogy of the impotent (mīnān) illustrating the inability of some men to comprehend and enjoy the spiritual pleasure of the knowledge of God, and (c) (though seemingly insignificant) the verse of poetry used to illustrate the necessity of instructing in divine sciences only worthy individuals, never those who are unworthy of that.

In spite of all the well-advanced ideas which appear here and there in the book, in a general way it can be considered as a somewhat more developed combination of a number of ideas and views found scattered here and there in several of al-Ghazālī's other writings. The fact that it

(38) E.g., al-Ghazālī's theory of causation, Maṭāriṣ, p. 202-204; p. xxvii above; his theory of the nature of heavenly bliss and of misery, Maṭāriṣ, p. 172-173, 184-188; p. xxii above.
is not found on the oldest lists of his writings is an
evidence that it was either not known to those who wrote
those lists, such as al-Sukri, or that it was identified
with (or mistaken for) some other works by him. It
must have been written probably after the time Madnun
was written, as it speaks of "the preserved secrets and the
hidden knowledge which are withheld from those unworthy of
them" (al-faarar al-maksunah wa'l-ulum al-makunat al-mad-
nun bih al-ghayri ahlah). Although [Part II] of the
book is based on questions and answers—which questions are
imagined and not necessarily actual—the book as a whole
gives evidence of a rather settled state of mind with res-
ppect to arguments from unorthodox groups, such as described
in Mungidh. Further, although the section on prophethood is
more developed and exhaustive in Ma'arif than in Mungidh,
the latter book does not make reference to it, as it does
elsewhere to other works by al-Ghazali which have bearing on
the subject. In view of these two facts (among others) it
was most probably written after Mungidh. In any case it may
safely be said that Ma'arif was one of al-Ghazali's latest
writings.

(40) P. lxi with n. 2 above.
(41) Ma'arif, p. 4, 210; of Madnun, p. 2, "where these
withheld things are said to consist of the knowledge of
(a) the Lordship, (b) angels, (c) the real nature of pro-
phetic miracles, and (d) life after death, of which sub-
jects Madnun consists, and which are given ample treatment
in Ma'arif, (p. 141-211).
CHAPTER VI

DESCRIPTION OF MA'ARIF

The book is composed of two parts, (1) the book proper, bearing the title and consisting of 212 pages, one page being a colophone, and (2) two Sufi poems consisting of twenty pages, followed by the Arabic editor's table of contents. The present translation is limited to the book proper.

1. Subject matter of the book proper.

From chapter V and other sections above(1) it is evident that, in spite of the fact that some views are given a lengthy treatment, and others are better reproduced in Ma'arif than in some other writings by al-Ghazali, the book as a whole is largely similar in content to several other works by him. The preface offers a clear concise description of its aim and content, namely, the knowledge of the Divine through the knowledge of the soul- a psychological approach to theology. The keynote is the hadith quoted more than once in the preface itself, which reads, "Whoever knows himself surely knows his Lord" (Ma'an 'arafa

(1) See chapters 11 and 111 above. (For specific pages see p. lxiii ff above.)
Another form of it reads, "The one of you who knows himself best knows his Lord best" (A'zafukum binafihi a'rafukum bi Rabbihi).

The first part of the book deals with psychology, including the creation of the soul and the body, the nature of each, and the relation of each one of them to the other. The human soul, which is a spiritual substance created by the command of God when the sperma is capable of receiving it, is assigned two functions, one in relation to the heavenly world and the other to the body, which is created from matter, to receive and bear this soul. The soul receives enlightenment, inspirational knowledge and command from above through the mediation of celestial souls, such as that of the moon, and governs the body here below.

Once through with the treatment of the soul and body the author takes up the subject of how man can know God. His attributes and acts, the nature of the next world, life therein, and the conditions that lead to the heavenly bliss or to misery. Man is the epitome of the universe, he is the microcosm, the universe the macrocosm. The way the soul governs the body is an illustration of how God governs the universe. Thus, in addition to his knowledge of the spirit-

(2) Ma'ārif, p.4.
(3) See for example ibid, p. 198.
ual source and the nature of his soul, if a man knows the way the soul governs the body he should be able to know God. A gūfū tinge colors the whole book. One condition for authentic knowledge by man of God is the purity of his heart, which is attainable by giving himself to acts of worship and the remembrance of God. The more purified his heart, the higher in grade becomes his knowledge of the Divine One and His universe, and the more submissive he becomes to the Divine Will, and therefore the more capable he becomes of governing the body aright. That leads of certainty to his witnessing and meeting of the Divine One — a mystical state of being which is a representation on a much lower scale of the heavenly bliss obtained in the life to come. Misery is the deprivation on the part of man of that state of witnessing and meeting.

2. Order and treatment of material.

The preface is followed by a table of contents, which, due to its nature, has been divided in the present translation into seven parts. [Part I] consists of ten chapters. The titles of Chapters VI and VII in the table do not represent the material in the text in the order given. [Part II]

(4) See p. 6, chapter VI, n. 3 below. Note: References to the translation of Maʿārif below are to the page number of the Arabic Edition (on the left margin of the translation).
consists of fourteen "questions" (ṣūfālāt) connected with the material covered in [Part I]. They are actually answers to questions brought up in the text as something expected to be asked in opposition to views expressed in [Part I]. They state briefly but clearly the substance of the material they represent in the book. In this part also there are "questions" which do not exactly represent the material treated in the book in the order given. In each of [Part III] and [VII] the title of a chapter treated in the book is missing, each of which titles has been inserted in the table in the present translation as [chapters XVI and XXIX] respectively. [Parts III-VII] (and particularly VII) are in a somewhat continuous narrative form, rather than in the form of titles.

One thing that is evident in the text of the book is the rather unnecessary repetition, or repetitions, on different occasions of an idea or the like which has been already expressed once or more than once before. That may be partly due to the organization of the material in the book. For example, Part II being directly connected with Part I, as already stated above, may cause such a repetition. Another thing that attracts the attention of the reader is the number of "special sections" (fasl) and "conclusions" (khātimah) scattered here and there at the end of some chapters and sections which have

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(5) In the book there are actually sixteen questions named and discussed and not fourteen as the table of contents states.
(6) See p. 9, n. 6-9 below.
bearing on what has preceded them immediately or before that, and some of which cause a sort of interruption or break between sections and chapters. This sometimes is another factor for the unnecessary repetitions mentioned. In spite of all that one thing is felt clearly, the development of thought from the knowledge of the soul to the knowledge of the Unseen through logical steps.


To give his views and conclusions a scriptural force al-Ghazālī makes great and sometimes free use of passages, phrases and even single terms from the Qurʾān. Often his quotations are not verbal ones. Sometimes signs are not used that would indicate that they are quotations. Often also a proof-text method is followed with a free interpretation of passages quoted. His use of hadīth also is free. Many statements he makes as hadīth are either not based on authority or/and are not verbal.

(7) E.g., p. 89(37:8); p. 184(60:40-41); p. 194(34:3[c]); p. 204(7:54/52), etc. In the present work Qurʾānic passages are referred to by the surah and verse numbers, the vertical line separating the verse number of the traditional Arabic ed. (left) from that of the European ed. (right).

(8) E.g., p. 184(2:235[d]/236[a]); p. 206(86:4); p. 208 (21:27[b], 28[b], 20; 24:11[c]/9[c]), etc.

(9) E.g., the identification of the "throne" and the "higher throne" with a celestial body and the divine spirit with the Active Mind (ṣaqi faṭṭal) (p. 124), and the attribution of the pairing nature to animate and inanimate things (p. 200), etc.

(10) Similar to waṣāli in this respect is ʿAḫīt. See, for example, waṣāli, p. 93, 109, 121, 123, etc.; cf Notes in this connection based on ʿIrāqī. Of Tabagāt, IV, p. 127.
quotations. Use also is made of Muslim traditional sayings (akhabār).

4. Language and style.

Before his conversion to Sufism al-Ghazālī was a preacher and lecturer. At the same time he wrote on a variety of subjects, such as Muslim doctrine, jurisprudence, philosophy, logic, etc., each of which requires a somewhat different style. To that are to be added his later Sufi writings with their special style and language. The influence of these is conspicuous in Maṣāriq, whose style is mainly that of a Sufi preacher. The chiasmic form of statements pointed out in footnotes in the present translation is a good example of the influence of rhetoric.

In addition, al-Ghazālī was a Persian writing in Arabic. It is not surprising, therefore, to find here and there in Maṣāriq as well as in other works by him some colloquial Arabic of his day, (12) and Arabic terms used in Persian for meanings or shades of meaning different from the original ones, not to mention the Persian terms used in some of his other writings as well. (13) Even grammatical rules

(11) See, for example, Maṣāriq, p. 11, 14, 15, 121, etc.; cf. notes based on ʿIrāqī.
(12) The term maṣakān, which could not be found in any of the dictionaries and lexicons used in connection with the present translation, is used on p. 205 in the sense of maṣmal (= workshop, place of work).
(13) One example is the term jarbāsah (= shrewdness, etc.) on p. 91 (with n. 7) below; the misuse of the term takhfūs on p. 94 (of n. 5 connected with it); of the term taḡībūn on p. 96 (of n. 16 connected with it).
and syntax are often disregarded. In some cases different antecedents in the same sentence are not easily distinguishable. It is related that on being asked why he was not careful about that aspect of his writing he apologized, admitting that he had never practised that "art" and that he was satisfied with what served his purpose, his concern being the meaning rather than the letter. He forgot that a clear and expression of an idea requires the use of clear, correct language. He permitted his readers to correct linguistic defects they might come across in his writings.

As a result of these linguistic flaws in al-Ghazālī, in spite of the efforts of the Arabic editor of Maṣāri, to correct and render clear its language, there are still statements which are so obscure that they need deciphering.

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(14) A few of the many examples are on p. 33f, where in the same sentence the term nafs(soul) is given both the masculine and feminine gender; on p. 25 quwah(faculty), on p. 96 ṣadalah(justice) and quwah(faculties), and on p. 97 medinah(Town), and on p. 99 mihrab(mirror) are given the masculine gender. In p. 83 the term sāhan(ears) is used instead of udhunam(two ears). On p. 158 in tilās(t) to obtain sight or knowledge of) is used instead of in tilān(to ascend). One example of the disorder in the sequence of tense is on p. 67, the last line, where in the same conditional sentence the verb tadhadkara(remembered) (past tense) is followed by iṣāra(trembled)(past tense) and yaqıf(stands on end) (present tense). On p. 208 mablūn(each) is used instead of al-kull(all). Cf. on p. 185f the confusion in more than one respect.

(15) See, for example, the first four lines of each of pages 64, 159, 183, there is no consistency in the use of nafs as masculine or feminine in the same paragraph or sentence. See, for example, p. 18 (cf. p. 19), 33, 65, etc.

(16) Tabaqat, IV, p. 110.

(17) Maṣāri, p. 212.
still Subki excuses al-Ghazâlî for that defect on the ground (a) that he must have followed in that the example of other scholars, who do often intentionally avoid clarifying certain subtleties in religious sciences from fear that readers who are of weak character may misinterpret them, and (b) that some other statements of his require men of mystical experience and taste to understand.\(^{(18)}\)

5. Theological doctrines.

Regardless of what critics or defenders say, in view of the fact that Arabic was not his mother tongue, al-Ghazâlî is not to be strongly blamed for such linguistic shortcomings and sometimes lack of clarity of expression. Although at times effort has to be exerted to understand clearly some of his statements in Ma'tûri, the book as a whole is intelligible. Moreover it exhibits a refined religious sense some portions of the Ḥiyâ fail to exhibit\(^{(19)}\) as he apparently had not then attained the maturity of thinking he had attained at the time he wrote his Ma'tûri. His theological views and interpretations are lofty and advanced, especially so for his age. One example is his belief concerning the bliss and misery in the life to come, which he completely places on a spiritual level. The bliss according to him is __\(^{(18)}\) Tabaqât, IV, p. L28.\(^{(19)}\) Or chapter II, p. xxxvff together with n. 38,39 above.
a sublime spiritual experience of God - the enjoyment of
meeting and witnessing Him, while misery is deprivation of
that experience. All carnal pleasures and compensations
mentioned in the Qur'ān are ignored. The enjoyment of this
heavenly bliss is in one sense the continuation of spiri-
tual joy experienced in this world. An illustration of it
is the mystical experience of God and His heavenly world,
when God comes to dominate one's senses and thoughts - and
in the long run one's whole life. No statement is made
which explicitly limits this heavenly bliss to Muslims.
Those who cannot understand the truth about the will of God
and His divine law (e.g., children, insane and idiots), and
those who are completely ignorant of them go "to the wide
mercy of God". They have a place of rest in Paradise.
Otherwise, the only means by which this bliss is attainable
is the reformation of life and character. What one sows in
this life he reaps the result thereof in the next. In an-
other place the author maintains that the enjoyment of the
comforts of Paradise depends upon the degree of one's love

(20) Ms. Erījī, p. 158-188 (esp. 170-173)
(22) P. 173 below. See n. 20 above; cf. Lk. 17:21[f]: "The
Kingdom of God is within you".
(23) P. 177 below; cf. p. xxxvi with n. 38 above.
(24) P. 177ff below.
(25) P. 175 below. Cf. Phil. 1:10[b]-11, 22[a]; Heb. 13:
15-16; etc.
to God, which love is dependent upon the degree of experien-
tial knowledge one has of Him. This knowledge, which is the 
source of that happiness, is expressed in the divine law by 
the term faith (Ismān).

In one section residence in Hell is made a necessity 
to every human being, except those absorbed in meditation 
upon God and fused in the divine path, and constantly expos-
ing themselves to the influence of the Light of the Real One 
shining upon their inner souls. Those are in constant commu-
nication with God. The Sunnis, says the author without any 
comment, maintain that no matter how sinful Muslims may be, 
because their faith is sound, their punishment (i.e., resi-
dence in Hell) is temporary. Yet he does not make any sta-
tement to the effect that non-Muslims will stay therein per-
manently, even though he seems to admit the tradition that 
limits the period of Muslim residence in it.

His doctrine of God's relation to His creatures as 
Creator, Sustainer and Guide is not only supported by refined 
Muslim thinkers but is upheld by every orthodox thinker.

(27) P. 186 below.
(28) P. 183 below.
(29) P. 182 below.
(30) For a good illustration see p. 206f below.
Contrary to the Deistic philosophers of the 18th century, he maintains that God is not to be thought of as, having been through with His creational work, He left His creatures for themselves. For just as their creation and existence depend upon Him, their survival after creation is dependent upon Him as well. At the same time by the hands of His prophets He has supplied them with divine law by which they can live a virtuous life here that will entitle them to the heavenly bliss in the hereafter.

His doctrine of prophethood is worth consideration. A prophet is contrasted with the First Intelligence. Just as that "angel" was appointed by God to prepare men to come into existence in this world, a prophet was appointed to prepare them for the next world. According to Mā'ārij a prophet is created as such in the womb of his mother. So even though physically he is a human being, he is a unique human individual. In intelligence and spirit he practically belongs to a different species, above that of other men. Among the outstanding qualities of a prophet are complete purity of heart and virtuousness of life, mercy and forgiving wrong-doers and turning good for evil.

(32) P. 144ff. below.
(33) P. 143f. below. Notice the Christian influence. (Cf. Matt. 5:7ff., 44; Lk. 6:27ff.).
His treatment of the knowledge of the Unseen on the basis of the knowledge of the soul, that divine spark from the World of Command, which knowledge is the central theme and ultimate goal of the book, is another example of the valuable material it contains, for which al-Ghazālī deserves appreciation and respect. To a great extent the book, especially on such grounds as those already mentioned, can make a good ground for a wholesome theological understanding between Christians and Muslims.

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY OF MA'ĀRĪJ

After the preface and the table of contents the author starts the book with an introduction in which he introduces and defines four synonymous terms for soul (nafs): soul proper, heart (qalb), spirit (rūh), and mind (fāqīl). Each term is given two or three meanings:

1. Nafs denotes (a) the immaterial entity in which the blameworthy attributes (i.e., the animal faculties) inhere, and (b) man's real nature and essence, which is the locus of the intelligibles.

2. Qalb denotes (a) the fleshy organ on the left side of the chest, and (b) the human spirit, which is the center of religious knowledge.

3. Rūh denotes (a) the fine vapor which is the vehicle of life, and which rises from the physical heart to the brain and spreads all over the body, (b) the Divine Spirit which is comparable with all the angels, and (c) the Qur'ān. It denotes anything that has life.

4. Fāqīl denotes the First Intelligence, (b) the human soul, and (c) the attribute of the soul by means of which it
apprehends the intelligibles.

"Whenever in this book these terms are used without modification they are to mean the human soul, the seat of intelligibles". (1)

Then on the basis of common and different qualities of kind (naša'ī), the ability to move and apprehend universals, learn crafts, feel physical and emotional pain (e.g., shame, grief, etc.) and receive the declaration of the divine law of punishment and reward, etc., the author proves the existence of the soul as an incorporeal substance (jawhar) which has no quantity or dimensions, and which is aware of itself and apprehends the intelligibles without the aid of any corporeal organ.

Five sources (mabda') of action are distinguished:
(1) natural principle (or nature), which has identical action, (2) the vegetable soul, which has diverse movements but no perception, (3) the animal soul, which has perception but no intellection, (4) the human soul, which has intellection and choice to act, and (5) the celestial (or angelic) soul, which has intellection but its actions are identical.

The soul has two activities which oppose and hinder

(1) P. 16 below.
each other, one in connection with the body, and one in relation to itself and the spiritual principles through whose help it receives intelligibles. The soul performs its activities by means of the faculties it has. Those are (1) motor faculties (quwā muharrīka) and (2) apprehending faculties (quwā mudrikah). The first motivate action. They are (a) the faculty of physical desires, which attracts benefit, and (b) the imascible faculty, which repels evil; and (c) those which themselves act, and which are included in what is called "voluntary movement", in which knowledge of the situation motivates the will, the will motivates the "power" (qudrah), and the last moves the members of the body to bring about action.

The apprehending faculties are divided into (a) external (i.e., the five senses), and (b) internal, which are corporeal faculties. They are the following:

(a) Common Sense (or phantasy) (hiss mushterak, aw hintasvā), which apprehends individual images brought in by the external senses. Its seat is the retentive imagination (khavāl, or quwwah khavāliyyah).

(b) Estimation (quwwah wahmiyyah). It apprehends ideas and, without reasoning, makes the individual soul form right judgment. Its seat is memory (hāfizah) and recollection (zhākīrah).
(c) Imagination (mutakhayyilah), and reflection (mufakkirah). When the soul makes use of it in connection with the practical reason (fql 'amali), so that it analyzes and synthesizes but without apprehending, it is called "imagination". When it uses it in intellectual matters (i.e., in connection with the speculative reason) it is called "reflective faculty" (or reflection).

The corporeal seats of these various faculties are in the brain. The front seats are for faculties which grasp physical things best, such as Common sense and retentive imagination. The rear seats are for faculties that grasp mental things best, such as memory and recollection. The middle seats are for the faculties which govern the rest, such as estimation and imagination. (See figure below)

Diagram showing the seats of the faculties in the brain:

- a. Common sense
- b. Retentive imagination
- c. Imagination
- d. Estimation (which actually uses and occupies whole brain)
- e. Memory and recollection
In addition to these faculties man has two other faculties which belong specifically to him. They are (1) practical faculty (quwwah 'amaliyyah) (also called practical reason) (fasl 'amal), and (2) intellectual faculty (quwwah nazarīyyah) (also called speculative reason) (fasl nazarī). By the practical faculty the soul governs the body. This faculty uses the appetitive animal faculty (quwwah hayawāniyyah muhāfiyyah), and brings about states resulting in such emotions as feeling of shame, laughter, weeping, etc. It also uses the imaginative and estimative animal faculty (quwwah hayawāniyyah mutakhayyilah wa mutawwahimah) in discovering proper ways of managing worldly affairs and human crafts. From it and the speculative reason together are produced the wide-spread opinions, such as the opinion that justice is good, while injustice is bad. It should govern all the animal faculties so that we may have virtues; or else vices are the result.

The intellectual faculty is the faculty the soul has in relation to the supreme intelligences in act by means of which comes its perfection. It is recipient of forms potentially (bi'l-quwwah) or actually (bi'l-qiṣā). The term quwwah in this respect is applied to the absolute capacity in the individual (a) when nothing has actually proceeded from it as yet, such as the power of the infant to write. In this stage it is called "absolute primary power".
(quwwah muṭlaqah havūlāniyyah); (b) when nothing has come out to existence as yet except that by means of which one can acquire the act without a medium, such as the power of the child to write, who has grown and known the instruments of writing. It is called "potential power" (quwwah murūdīnāh), and habitude (malakah); and (c) when it is accomplished by means of an instrument and one has attained perfect capacity to act when intended. Such is the power of the writer to write, who has perfected the art. At this stage it is called "power in perfection" (kamāl al-quwwah).

Now from the view point of the relation of the faculty of speculative reason (quwwah nasariyyah) to the immaterial forms it is to receive, in these same stages it is given names corresponding respectively to those above, namely, "absolute primary intelligence" (‘aql hayūlāni muṭlaq), "possible (or potential) intelligence" (‘aql bi‘l-malakah), and "intelligence in act" (‘aql bi‘l-fīl). When the intelligible form is present in the faculty so that one actually notes it, knows it, and knows that he actually knows it, it is then called "acquired intelligence" (‘aql mustafrād), which is divine intelligence (‘aql qudsī).

The primary intelligence differs in grade and qua-

(2) On pages 137, 141 a distinction is made between acquired intelligence and divine intelligence. On the first instance the acquired intelligence is mentioned without any reference to divine intelligence. So ‘aql mustafrād may and may not be ‘aql qudsī.
lity according to the difference among the individual souls in superiority and gradation. An example is the difference between the soul of a prophet, who is not in need of any act of thought, and the soul of a stupid person, who may not derive any benefit from thought.

The growth of the soul in its intellectual capacity is illustrated by the metaphor of the niche of the light. It is said to resemble first the glass, then the tree. When it has habitue (melakah) it is the oil, then the lamp. When it receives intelligibles actually it is light—the light of acquired intelligence upon the innate intelligence (faol fitrif). All these lights are derived from a fire which has spread all over the world—the fire of the Active Intelligence, which makes intelligibles overflow upon human souls. The same metaphor is held applicable to the prophetic mind, which catches light from the Divine Command.

The question of the relation between religion and science, or scientific thinking, was a subject that had its importance in al-Ghazâlî's days as it has in this age, though with differences in the aspects of emphasis. For al-Ghazâlî the divine law is the system of the true beliefs and the right deeds; it leads to what is good for this world and the
next. Yet it is not independent of rational intelligence, just as the latter cannot do without it. There is a close correlation between the two. The divine law gives rational intelligence light, while the latter clarifies the divine law. Intelligence is to divine law as foundation is to a building, sight is to the ray, or as the lamp is to the oil that feeds it. It is on this belief that he bases his conviction that the ultimate goal to which all learning should lead is the witnessing and meeting of God which is the bliss of the soul here and in the hereafter. Otherwise learning may not only be useless but may be even detrimental to the life of the individual.

In analyzing the apprehending activity of the various faculties there is difference, according to the author, in the incomplete work of abstraction according to each. The difference in the ascending order of perfection is given thus:

1. With respect to the external sense, the sensory organs apprehend an image form (not the form) with the specific dimensions of the object. They do not apprehend the object when it is absent.

2. The apprehension of the retentive imagination is more complete, since without seeing the object it can apprehend its image, but together with the concomitant qualities.

3. The apprehension of estimation is still more per-
fect in its abstracting activity. It apprehends an idea apart from the concomitant qualities. Only it apprehends it as a particular idea, not as a universal one.

4. Perfect abstraction is accomplished by the intelligence. It frees the idea from all concomitant qualities, and apprehends it as a universal idea.

At this point a rather lengthy section follows of "questions and distinctions\(^{(4)}\) intended to shed light upon the material covered thus far, by way of commentation and additional material. The most outstanding contribution it makes consists of the following views:

Matter is not a secondary cause for the existence of incorporeal things, such as the soul. When occupied with the body the soul does not receive intelligibles so instantly as when it presents itself to the influence of God's favor, which act in itself is a divine product not acquirable by effort. In this respect three types, or classes of human souls are distinguished. They are the following:

1. The divine prophetic intelligence (or soul), upon which, due to its brightness, the light of knowledge shines at will or without will. As it is in direct communication with "the heavenly host\(^{(5)}\) it receives the intelligibles

\(^{(4)}\) P. 64-60 below.
\(^{(5)}\) 37:8; 38:69; p. 66 below.
readily together with their proofs.

2. A medial class of souls that attain the intelligibles only by means of the bodily faculties. After the departure of such a soul from the body by death, and after its purification and discipline there, it attains the intelligibles without any need for the retentive imagination and thought.

3. The lowest class of souls that cling to weak persuasions and insecure mental images. After death such a soul may and may not get rid of those images. Hence the reformation of at least some souls is not impossible after death. As a principle the soul is capable of knowledge in a gradual way, the knowledge of one intelligible leading to the knowledge of another. In acquiring authentic knowledge (especially religious) obedience and disobedience to divine statutes are great factors, since they enlighten or darken the heart respectively. The more enlightened the heart, the greater the knowledge of the soul, and consequently the greater its happiness.

VIRTUES AND VICES

The author now takes up the question of virtues and vices, which he attributes to three sources, namely the faculties of imagination, physical desires and ire, all of which assist and obstruct the soul.
1. With respect to imagination, just as it may receive from the physical sense forms that are not real (such as mirage, echo, etc.) similarly it may receive from the intelligence forms which may be false. If what it receives is truth it is prophetic inspiration (wahy), minor inspiration (ilhām) and intuitive insight (hads). If it is false it is magic, divination, etc. This faculty differs with different individuals. In some it may be one that is proper to angels so that the individual is affected by them and is made to see things as they see them. He sees and hears as they do. In another individual it may be one that is proper to satans, so that he is affected by them and sees and hears as they do. Character is a great factor in the outcome in this respect, as it is also a result.

2. The faculty of physical desires is the oldest faculty in existence. It is born with the individual and is found in all living things. It is the most difficult faculty to correct as it has greater power over man than the other faculties. It has two branches, (a) appetite of the belly, for the survival of the individual, and (b) concupiscence, for the survival of the race through progeny. Deficiency in either branch leads to destruction, while excess leads to evil attitudes and character (such as greed, injustice, immoral life). Concupiscence, if not checked and led to temperance, tends to destroy religion.
3. The irascible faculty is called a brand of fire from the burning fire of God. Concealed pride produces it from the heart. Grudge and envey are among its fruits. Its excess leads to destruction and perdition, while its deficiency results in the loss of fortitude, courage, zeal for the right, etc. Its moderation results in generosity, magnanimity, gallantry, dignity, etc.

All virtues are related to four main ones, wisdom, courage, sobriety and justice.

1. Wisdom is related to the mental faculty and is expressed in the practical government of the body through the practical intelligence by governing the faculties of irascibility and physical desires, with the result of good management, sound judgment and right thinking. Wisdom is the mean between the two extremes of deceit, and stupidity. The first represents the extremity of excess due to the free use of the faculties of irascibility and physical desires. The second results from its deficiency and shortage of moderation due to doing less with the two faculties.

2. Courage is the virtue of the irascible faculty. Enterprise and restraint issue from it as and where they ought to. Among its virtues are generosity, gallantry and dignity. It is the mean between the two vices of recklessness and cowardice, resulting respectively in (a) unseemly behavior, pride, conceit, quickness of anger, and (b)
meanness and shrinking with fear.

3. Sobriety is the virtue of the faculty of physical desires. It is its submission easily to the rational faculty. Among its virtues are modesty, forgiveness, fortitude and helpfulness. It is bound by two vices, (a) greed, which is the extreme desire for excessive pleasure prohibited by the rational faculty, and (b) extinction, which is the deficiency of the physical desire to seek what intelligence requires. These two extremes result in such vices as bare-facedness, malice, wastefulness, stinginess, hypocrisy, envy, etc.

4. Justice is the occurrence of these faculties in their proper order whether in character or in dealing with others. It is the opposite of injustice. It is the golden mean between the two vices of cheating and defrauding oneself. It includes all virtues, while injustice includes all vices. Everlasting bliss and everlasting perdition (or misery) are their respective results in the life to come.

THE HEART AND KNOWLEDGE

The relationship of the heart to knowledge and to its faculties is stated by way of illustration. By heart here is meant the spirit that orders all the organs of the body and is served by all the faculties. To explain the attainment of knowledge the illustration of the mirror is
used. Just as the image of a colored object is reflected upon the mirror by means of light, so also the object of knowledge is impressed on the human heart by means of the Active Intelligence (or Gabriel). For five reasons forms are not revealed in the mirror; namely, the latter's lack of form, its impurity, its being turned away from the direction of the object, the presence of a screen between it and the form, and ignorance of the direction in which the desired form is found. Likewise the human heart cannot acquire the knowledge of the truth sought if the heart itself is deficient in capacity to acquire such knowledge; if murkiness of disobedience has accumulated on its surface; a wrong belief accepted on authority may stand like a veil in the way of apprehending the truth; ignorance of the right procedure (i.e., procedure of logic) makes it impossible to come upon the knowledge sought. When these obstacles are removed the whole Divine Presence (i.e., the earthly and spiritual worlds) is disclosed to the heart, which is paradise in itself and makes one worthy of Paradise in heaven, the extent of his share of it being according to the extent of his knowledge.

One of the three analogies used to illustrate the relationship of the heart to its faculties is the one in which the human soul is likened to the ruler of a city-state. The body is its kingdom, the faculties and organs its
assistants and laborers. The reflective mental faculty is its sincere counsellor and vizier, irascibility the chief of police, the faculty of physical desires a trouble-making servant carrying provision and food to the city. Now if the soul, by the assistance of its reflective mental faculty, disciplines irascibility to subdue the faculty of physical desires, and seeks the assistance of the one against the other the faculties become moderate, and character becomes excellent.

Now the soul may not always need the assistance of the body and its animal faculties. For conception and belief it seeks their assistance to derive simple universals from particulars, and to acquire traditions that are accepted and believed on account of their uninterrupted repetition. Then it struggles with the faculties which try to distract it. When the soul has reached its fulness, however, it becomes independent in dealing with its action. The faculties then may preoccupy it, but do not turn it away from its action.

A long list of faculties and powers is given in the descending order of importance and excellence, each preceding one being served by the one or ones succeeding, beginning with the acquired intelligence down to the four names.

(6) See n. 2 on p. lxxxvi. above.
SPIRITS, THEIR CREATION AND IMMORTALITY

Now the question of spirits, their creation and immortality is treated. Human spirits come into being when the sperm (nufah) is capable of receiving the soul from its Giver. Each soul has in its substance a natural inclination to be engaged with one specific body rather than another. When the souls are attached and related to their different bodies they acquire different qualifications, both intellectual and moral, and remain different until death. They come from the Divine overflowing bounty by means of secondary causes. Indeed "everything that comes into existence after its non-existence has a primary cause (*illah) and a secondary cause."

The spirits of angels were created before the bodies of the universe (such as the spheres of the higher throne) (fars) and the throne (kursi), the heavens, planets, air, water and earth). The spirit of each angel is unique in its rank. Each angel is a species by itself.

Creation is divided into three categories in order:

(1) In the order of compounds man is the crown. Mankind are

(7) P. 110f below.
(8) Cf. the Christian doctrine of the Logos (Jn.1:1ff; 5:26; Phil. 2:6-7; Tim. 3:16[b]); See p. 125, n. 27 below.
divided into three classes. They are, in their descending order of excellence, the prophet in his time, the saint in every age, and average man. Among the prophets Muhammad is the Perfect Man, the most perfect and excellent among all beings; his soul substance was created first of all. From it the rest was created. For him the spheres have been created. Faith and law began with Adam, attained some perfection with the prophets, but in him, the Chosen One (Muhammad) attained full perfection. Just as creation began with him the return also begins with him. He said, "I am the first of the prophets to be created and the last to be sent" and "I am the first above whom the earth will split open."  

(2) In the order of simple corporeals the first in excellence of substance and magnitude is the higher throne (farāh), followed next by the throne (kurāf) and last of all the other celestial bodies and planets. (3) The order of simple spiritual beings is crowned by the Divine Spirit, or Active Mind, referred to as "the Pen". Next comes Soul, referred to as "the Tablet", and last Prime Matter (havulā) referred to as "the outer darkness".

As to the immortality of the soul, demonstrations are

(9) P. 123 below.
(10) P. 126 below.
brought from recorded authority, both Qur'ān and hadith, to the effect that the soul does not die with the death of the body. The Apostle of mercy was sent to those immortal, not to those who perish. Then there is the belief that the merit of alms reaches the soul. According to rational demonstrations the soul is not an effect of the body in any way. The body and its temperament are an accidental cause for the soul in that, on account of its being fit for the soul to govern it, the latter is created. Its connection in existence is not with the body but with the Divine bounty. Other demonstrations are used to prove that the soul does not perish at all. For instance, actuality to exist and potentiality to perish, which are true of compounds, or simple things in compounds, are not true of simple or unitary things that are immaterial in essence. Unlike the body, the soul is absolutely simple and is not divisible into form and matter, of which the body consists. It is one of the two things of which a compound consists, namely, the indivisible base and substance. It has actuality and potentiality to exist, and not to become corrupt. Potentiality to become corrupt and non-existent applies only to matter.

(11) E.g., 3:169,170 [a]/163,164 [a].
THE ACTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND ITS WORK

After having said so much about the Active Intelligence and other intelligences the author now undertakes to prove or give evidence of the existence of this intelligence and those human intelligences dealing with it. After quoting the Qur'an to that effect, he repairs to rational sources. Among the evidences he brings is one connected with the estimative faculty. When mental forms depart from it, it takes from its place of preservation (khāzin) ideas which it has derived from them. But when they depart from both faculty and its place of preservation it requires a new acquisition. Now mental forms are not self-subsistent; they are in the substance which pours out intelligibles, which is the Active Intelligence. It is to this Active Intelligence that the estimative faculty resorts for the reacquisition of the mental forms that have departed from the soul. Again it is this Active Intelligence that advances the human soul with respect to intelligibles from potentiality to actuality. The primary (potential) intelligence, in relation to it is called "intelligence...that is acted upon" (faql munfa'il), while the intelligence which is between them is called "acquired intelligence" (faql mustafād). When the mental faculty observes the particulars in the retentive imagination and
the light of the Active Intelligence shines upon it, these particulars become free from matter and its effects. That observation then prepares the rational soul to have them overflow upon it from the Active Intelligence. The failure at times of the human intelligence to conceive them is due only to its being occupied by the affairs of the body. When it is free from it the soul has the best, clearest and most delightful kind of understanding of immaterial things.

PROPHETHOOD

The author now proceeds to treat the subject of prophethood and apostleship. Apostleship, he says, cannot be grasped by definition. It is evident by its effects. It is a rank above the rank of humanity, just as humanity is a rank above the rank of animals. It is a heavenly gift from God which cannot be acquired by human effort. Effort is necessary in preparing the soul to receive the effects of revelation through such things as acts of worship, meditation, etc. Similarly work in accordance with the status of prophethood is not free from acquisition and choosing in order that a prophet may prepare and be prepared, and so also other accidental qualities, including such characteristics as "forgiving those who injure one, and doing good to those who
do one evil."

A human being is distinguished from animals by having a rational soul that is superior to theirs in the mental virtue by which he rules over them and directs them. Similarly, though prophets, share with mankind their human form, their souls are distinguished from the souls of men by an intelligence which guides and is guided, which is superior to all other intelligences in the divine virtue which manages and guides them. A prophet's intelligence is related to the Active Intelligence and the other incorporeal intelligences, while his soul is similar to the heavenly souls. He is also distinguished by his nature and temperament which is actually capable of receiving such an intelligence and soul, and by his humanity which is capable of receiving revelation. It is prophets and lawgivers who can give legal definitions to the right and wrong movements of thought, speech and action. Hence men should be under their rule. Just as in the microcosm for its orderly existence there is need for an agent that wills, chooses and commands, so also for the orderly existence of the macrocosm there is need for an agent who possesses a rational will and by imposition commands and prohibits, that is, a prophet.

(12) Another instance of Christian influence. See Mt. 5:44; Lk. 6:27-29ff; cf Mk. 11:25, etc.
Prophethood has three properties related respectively to the faculty of imagination, speculative intelligence, and the soul. (1) With respect to the faculty of imagination the view is based on the theory that every existing thing is preformed with all states existing at present. They are conceived by the movers of the celestial bodies altogether. Before it exists every thing is delineated there. These and mental forms in the incorporeal substances are not concealed by any veil from our souls as far as they are concerned. The veiling is in our receptivity, that is, we are either weak or preoccupied with a direction other than that which leads to their attainment. As has already been mentioned capacities of souls differ in individuals, especially the capacity to receive the particulars from the soul substances. In one class of men, due to its natural disposition, the imagination reproduces and moves from one thing to another, similar to the first, contrary to it or in accordance with it. So a person forgets what he had attained first. But by way of analysis and conjecture he recollects what he had forgotten. In another class of men this capacity is so much stronger that the soul holds firm what it attains and the imagination rests upon it and does not move from it to something else. So a dream vision comes into being which

(13) P. lxxxvii above (cf. p. 57 below); cf. p. xcvii above.
does not need interpretation. In another class of men this
capacity is still so much stronger, and their imagination
is so perfect and strong that the sensory faculties do not
so completely preoccupy it that they may prevent it from
serving the rational soul in its attainment of those princi-
pi which reveal to it the particular things. So the soul
attains to that state when awake and receives those forms.

Stronger than all these classes of men are those whose
imaginative faculty impresses those apprehended forms on
phantasy, so that one sees wonderful divine forms and hears
divine statements similar to those revealed. This is the
lowest grade of prophethood. Still stronger than that is
for the imaginative faculty to continue its reproductive
activity, while the practical intelligence and estimation do
not give up what they have held steadfast so that those forms
become fixed in the recollection. The imaginative faculty
reproduces in phantasy what it has received in wonderful
ways seen and heard, while each one of the other two facul-
ties is performing its function in its own way.

(2) With respect to the property related to the spec-
ulative intelligence it is stated that some men attain
knowledge of the unknown by means of syllogistic thinking,
either by way of learning or by way of intuitive insight
(hads). Intuitive insight differs in quality and quantity
according to the difference in purity, brightness and excellence of the individual soul. The difference between the method of minor inspiration (ilhām) and intuitive insight on the one hand and the method of thought and acquisition (with respect to knowledge itself, the soul that is its seat, and the Active Intelligence that is its causing source) on the other hand is with respect to the removal of the veil. The difference between prophetic and minor inspiration is in the fact that in the first the angel (the Active Intelligence) that provides knowledge is witnessed. The mind of a Saint (Sīdīq) ranks next in capacity and excellence after a prophet’s mind.

(3) The third property is related to the soul. Human souls exercise natural effects on the bodies appointed to them. For example the voluntary forms delineated in the soul are necessarily followed by a compulsory shape in the organs of the body, and movements that are not according to the natural disposition of the body come to being. The soul of a prophet is stronger in its faculties than other human souls. Its effect is not limited to its own body. It brings about changes in the physical world. Prophetic miracles, for example, may result in producing clouds, winds, (24) thunder, rain, earthquakes, flowing fountains, etc.

(14) P. 165 below; cf. Exodus 17:6; I Kings 18:41-45, etc.
Therefore the most excellent human being is the one who possesses these characteristics, that is, a prophet. Next to him in the order of excellence is a Saint. The rest of mankind rank after them in the order of the excellence of the capacity and other characteristics which their souls possess.

ESCHATOLOGY

In the section on eschatology the author treats the question of misery and bliss after death and the real nature of the beatific vision, which he calls "witnessing", "meeting" (15) and "vision", all of which he considers spiritual in nature, and links them with similar experience in this life.

The divine law, he states, has fully explained the bliss related to the body. The condition after death can be learned from the prophets, to whom alone it has been disclosed, and who have been sent only to "drive" men to it, communicating to them the good news about the bliss and warning them against misery. After assuming as established facts a number of statements which he calls "basic" the author holds the following:

The perfection which specifically belongs to the soul is for it to have intelligible things with the form of the

(15) Mushāhadah wa ligā' wa ru'vāh (p. 160-168, esp. 161 below).
intelligible order of the whole delineated in it, so that it witnesses that which is absolute beauty, absolute good, and absolute grace, adorned with its image and becoming so fused in it that it becomes one with it in substance. Yet in view of our existence in these bodies of ours and on account of our preoccupation by low things, we do not feel that pleasure when some of the causes that produce it occur to us, unless we liberate ourselves from our physical faculties. When we awake from this state of affairs we feel the pain of its loss. That feeling is misery and punishment. When the mental faculty has attained a certain degree of that perfection, then when it departs from this body it completes that perfection. The pleasure thus attained is not to be compared with the previous one. That is attainable only by individuals who have made their mental faculty acquire the yearning for its perfection by such means as religious knowledge based on certainty, which makes one never to turn to things of this world, and by self-reformation on the part of the individual. If the soul departs without having obtained those means, then one falls into some kind of external misery, because that bliss is acquired only while still in the body.

The pain the soul experiences on account of its bodily tendency, however, is something accidental and alien to
therefore temporary. Hence the punishment for it is not perpetual. It vanishes gradually until the soul becomes so purified that it finally attains the bliss which belongs specifically to it. Accordingly, the Sunnis are of the opinion that even the punishment of Muslims for major sins (kabūr) is not perpetual, since their basic belief is firm. Their sins, therefore, being accidental, cease and are forgiven. Those who, in addition to the bodily qualities they have acquired and maintained to the end of this life, stick fanatically to corrupt beliefs and deny the truth suffer everlasting punishment. Simple stupid people void of these last qualities and attitude go to the wide mercy of God. Those with good faith and good character are people of Paradise.

The real nature of "meeting" and "vision" is illustrated by sense perception. The difference between imagining the form of an object and actually seeing the object is one of clarity. Similarly with regard to abstract things, the difference, for instance, between your knowledge of God in this world and your actual meeting and beholding Him in the next world is one of disclosure, the second being the utmost revealment and the perfecting of the first. With the

(15) P. 176ff. below.
exception of prophets and saints all other souls are accompanied to the other world by different amounts of the murkiness of this world which pollutes them in this life, but from which they are later purified by exposure to the Fire, by staying in it intervals of various durations as the need may be. The veil thus being removed, they enjoy the pleasure of meeting and witnessing the Real One, Who is fully manifested to them. The enjoyment of Paradise is in proportion to one's love of God, while one's love of God is in proportion to one's knowledge of Him here.

THE SCIENCE OF DIVINITY

The remaining sections of Ḥaḍrat deal with the science of divinity, such as God, His attributes and acts. Negative and positive descriptions of God are given: God is not an accident, nor a body, nor like a form or matter. His existence and being are the same. He is the only One necessary of existence, the unchanging ever-living One. Lord, Creator and Sustainer of all. He is not to be described anthropomorphically; His attributes are not something additional to Himself. He knows Himself in the sense that the Knower, the Known and Knowledge are identical. He knows universals, all detailed particulars, and even possible things which come to existence; and He pours out knowledge.
Yet no one can attain real knowledge of Him. He has will, but is not compelled by any private tendency or purpose to will what He wills. He is powerful (qādir), wise (ḥakīm), and all-bountiful (jawwād). All these descriptions of Him, through the knowledge of the soul are made by way of demonstration; otherwise He is indescribable, for He is above being described.

The order of the actions of God and the appointment of causes and effects are treated by way of analogy. The illustrations are taken from the microcosm. The first analogy illustrates how an act comes into being. The source of man’s action is a will whose effect appears in the heart, then moves from one organ of the body to another until it makes the fingers move with the pen to make a representation of that which is preformed in the seat of imagination. Likewise God’s angels, in obedience to His command, move the heavens and planets, etc., so that a plant or an animal is created. According to other analogies used, Intelligence, being completely perfect, affects but is not affected; universal souls; being perfect in one aspect while imperfect in another aspect, receive the effect of Intelligence and affect universal bodies; universal bodies, being imperfect, do not have any effect.

The concluding climax of the subject starts with
According to the author's sequential theory of causation, by His Divine Command God created first Intelligence and made it perfect. By means of Intelligence He created Soul and perfected it by providing it with the potentiality to turn towards the perfection of Intelligence, which is above it and precedes it only in essence (אַנְשָׁת). By means of Soul He created nature and provided it with the power to move things. Soul precedes it in time. Itself precedes space and spatial things. Intelligence is preceded only by the Command.

The root of creation follows thus: Celestial Souls, which are provided with a particular will from the intelligences, by the command of God move heavens a voluntary movement. The heavens move the elements below the sphere of the moon, which are capable of synthesis.

In addition each one of these four things in the order of creation is assigned a special function: Nature is the guardian of the vegetable soul, Soul the guardian of the animal souls, Intelligence the guardian of the human rational soul, while the Command of the Creator is the guardian of the divine prophetic soul.

(15) P. 203f below.
(16) P. 202 below.
Further, from what has preceded it is evident that in His creational relation to His creatures God is not like someone who, having built a house, set his slaves in it; and having appointed to each one of them his duties, left them to their freedom, so that neither the building is anymore in need of the builder nor its inhabitants are in need of a manager. On the contrary as they needed His creational work for their existence they need His command for their persistence in existence. Therefore, just as angels were appointed to compel Nature so that perfection of bodies may be attained, that men may live in this world, in like manner prophets were sent to manage the divine law so that perfection of the soul may be attained, that men may live in the next world.

At the end the author urges the reader not to disclose to people who are intellectually and spiritually unworthy of these wonderful secrets which he has disclosed to him. Rather he should pass them on to worthy people little by little so as to enable them grasp and master them.
THE ASCENT TO THE DIVINE
THROUGH THE PATH OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE

A Translation
of
MA'ARIJ AL-QUDS FI MADARIJ
MA'RIPAT AL-NAFS
Preface

(1) In the name of God, the Compassionate and Merciful

Praise be to God, Originator of spirits and Creator of bodies, the Unlocker of locks and Untier of knots, the Giver of the finest provisions, the most precious of which are His guidance to the right path and sound judgment. As many praises be to Him as the number of the twinklings of all eyes and as numerous as the breathings of all hearts.

Blessing which is continuous and everlasting, and also peace be to the noblest father and offspring, Muhammad and his family.

You may know that God the Exalted One, has opened the minds of His friends by wisdom and understanding, and has stimulated their interest in the observation of the wonders of His creation among both nomads and settled people, so that in every thing they observe they find a lesson for


(+) In g with the vowel sign kasr means finest of everything. Its plural is A-laq (Arabic Editor, to whom, hereafter will be referred only by the sign (+). Notes in Arabic numbers belong to the translator).

(2) wa-l-salatu wa'l-salāmu 'alā akrami wālid'ān wa wālad.
themselves. For all existing things are mirrors that reflect the Real and Creative Existence. That which is manifest in Reality is God, may He be praised, and all things else are signs of His manifestation, and evidence of His light.

In every thing there is a sign which indicates that He is One.

So whenever a thing occurs to them in the realm of observation and thought, they turn away from that thing to the Divine One until they attain to Him Who is "mighty in power, possessor of wisdom and so is in the right state, Whom circumstances have not changed, but [knowledge of] His wisdom and perfection is obtainable through what He has done although "He is in the highest horizon". If this ascent is made easy for them, they cease not to draw near until they reach the ultimate goal. Then there is poured on them true learning and the secrets of mystical knowledge and the unusual signs that are in the kingdom of earth and heaven. If

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Muhammad wa Jâlihi— it is a chiastic form of statement, in which the last part of a phrase refers to the first in order (lay wa nasr wa watabb). Caff... of Land. [Note: A.J.]

(3) 53:5. The pronoun probably refers to Gabriel (The Divine Spirit), or perhaps to God. - Al-Baydawi, N.A.A.U., Anwâr al-Tanzil Wa Aqrâr al-Tawil (Lipsiae 1846) Vol. II, p. 292 (Hereafter referred to as Baydawi, Anwâr. Cf also p. 124, 136 below.)
they reach this limit, it is "the Lotus Tree of the boundary".  

So they do not pay attention to any thing in the world of falsehood. The Word of Revelation expresses this state by saying, "The One mighty in power taught him [Muhammad], the possessor of wisdom. And so He was in the right state while He was in the highest horizon. Then came He nearer and approached, and was at a distance of two bows' length or even closer. And He revealed to His servant what He revealed. His heart assuredly did not falsify what He saw". [And it goes on to say] "He has assuredly seen the greatest of the signs of His Lord". Therefore every rational person should have God, may He be praised and exalted, as the beginning and the end of every thought of His, and the inner part and the outer aspect of every consideration of His, so that the eye of his soul may be brightened by looking to Him, with his foot standing steadfast before Him, moving in thought in the highest High-dom, and "among the greatest signs of His Lord" there. When he descends to his abiding place on earth, then let him see Him in His works, for He is within and also without, manifesting Himself to all in all. And the clearest

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(4) Sidrat al-Muntaha. Lit. "The lotus tree of the extremity", a tree in the second heaven, its roots in the sixth. Its fruits were like water pots and its leaves like elephants'. *Lexicographers*.

(5) 53:5-11; (See n. 3 above.

(6) 53:18.
of the works, in which the majesty of Him Who is the Real One and the perfection of His attributes are seen, is the knowledge of the soul, as He has said, "We will show them Our signs in all lands and in themselves until it is clear to them that He is the Real One". "And on earth are signs for firm believers, and also in yourselves. Will you not understand"? And Muhammad has said, "Whoever knows himself surely knows his Lord". He has also said, "The one of you who knows himself best knows his Lord best."

Now as for us, we shall assess in this book by the paths of the knowledge of the soul to the knowledge of the Real One, be He glorified. And we shall mention [1] the essence of what evidences lead to of the human soul, [2] the path of what thorough investigation has been able to discover about it, [3] the fact that it is free from the attributes of bodies, [4] the knowledge of its faculties and powers, [5] the knowledge of its creation and eternity, and

(7) 41:53.
(8) 51:20.
(10) Tradition - "Not found in Concordance and Handbook."
[6] its bliss and misery after its separation [from the body] - [we will do all this] in a way to remove the veil, and point to the preserved secrets and the hidden knowledge which are withheld from those unworthy of them. When we are through with the sections on the knowledge of the soul, then we will take up the knowledge of the Real One; since all the sciences are introductions and means to the knowledge of the First and Real One. All efforts exerted for a thing will be lost unless their goal is attained. But "whoever knows himself surely knows his Lord", His attributes and acts; and he will know the order of the world created and formed, and will know the angels with their orders. He will also know the realm of angels and that of Satan as well as successful aid and abandonment, and will know what Apostleship and Prophethood are, the manner of revelation, miracles, and their performance, and information about the unseen world. And he will know the last abode with its bliss and misery, its divisions, and the delightful pleasure in it; and will know the utmost bliss, which is to meet God. Anyone for whom this journey is made easy will continue on with enjoyment in a garden whose extent is the heavens and

(11) Wa caʿafa limmat al-malak wa limmat al-Shaytān, wa-l-tawfīq wa likhdhalān. - Another instance of chiasmic, in which the second part of the phrase is connected in meaning with the first in regular order.

(12) I.e., miracles performed through the agency of a prophet. For the difference between mutʿizah and harāmah see p. 165 below.
the earth, while he remains in the body, staying in his native land. It is a journey in which knowledge is unveiled and the flower buds open. It is a journey in which springs and watering places are not few, nor do crowds, continually arriving, harm. Rather its advantages increase with the increase of the number of travellers; and its fruits and benefits multiply; for its advantages are continuous and uninterrupted, and its fruits increase unceasingly. Whoever is not made worthy of going about in this park and walking about the places of enjoyment of this garden has nothing in hand but husks to eat as cattle eat, and feeds as beasts feed. The exposition of this journey and the explanation of this science of great value is not possible on paper and in books; words and pens fall short of explaining its wonders. But by the help and successful aid of God we shall point to each one of these propositions in a way that a man of understanding can comprehend. But a dull and stupid person who takes his learning blindly on authority is far from understanding sciences like these, since every person is enabled to do easily what he has been created for. So whoever is fitted for eternal bliss and is about to obtain his desire is given, first of all, perfect apprehension, that is, abundant intelligence, a clear mind, sound

(13) Hare Anwar is the plural of naur (=flower), not of tar (=light)
disposition, with the qualities of brilliance and sagacity,
soundness of judgment, and excellence of understanding
All these are a gift from God, a gift that is not attainable by effort. And the use of means to gain it fails.
If anyone is granted this innate disposition, he should exercise his power of understanding, and should stir up his mental power, make use of his power of thought, and utilize his reason by directing his mind to deep things, and to the solution of difficult problems by long meditation, attentive consideration, and seeking the aid of solitude, unoccupied mind, retirement from pressing business, and by performing the prescribed acts of worship, until he attains to perfection in all the religious sciences. We have entitled the book: "The Ascent to the Divine Through The Path of Self-Knowledge" (Ma'ārij al-Qudūs ilā Madārij Ma'rifat al-Nafs). May God give us success in completing it.
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(a) The numbering of pages is not given in the table of contents in the Arabic edition. Reference here is to the page number in that edition (found on the left margin of the present translation).

(b) For the translation "Primary physical" for ḥayūlānī (or ḥayūlaniyyah) see the author's explanation on p. 55; see also p. 54, n. 6 below.
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[2] In the second question it is disclosed that so long as the soul associates

(c) Chapter VII deals only with the second part of the
with the body not all of the intelligibles occur to it. Rather so long as in the body, it has capacity in relation to what has not occurred yet, while it is intelligence in act in relation to what has occurred. Likewise after its departure from the body it becomes intelligence in act only when nothing of the accidental qualities of this world remains in it. Then it becomes one that knows intellectual things adorned with all the intelligibles as the (d) celestial souls (nurūs falakiyyah) (are). 465

(3) In the third question there is disclosed the fact that there are differences between the souls in their reception of the intelligibles; the divine favor comes upon them [the souls] at one time by intuitional insight and at another by thought and speculation. There is also

topic above, while the first and third parts are actually discussed in ch. VI.

(d) They are the heavenly angels which are below the spirits of mankind. See Calverley, "NAPS", E. Islam, Vol.III,
disclosed the fact that the bodily faculties are helpful at the beginning and restraints at the end.

(4) In the fourth question there is disclosed the fact that when the light of the Active Intelligence shines upon the soul the imaginary premises become rational premises. All knowledge is disclosed by means of the first principles. The attainment of the intelligibles is not in our power but "the presentation of ourselves to the breezes of the grace and mercy of God"

(5) In the fifth question it is disclosed that the human soul understands the intelligibles in their order. Every thing in which there is gradation and order is not a unity in every respect. It is also disclosed thereby that the Real One Who is worthy of the term Oneness is God Most High alone. On

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p. 627-630 (Cf p. 18: [51]; 20; 81, n.1 below)
(e) See tradition on p. (68) below.
Question:

this account He does not have any attribute
in expectation. Other than He is not such+ (68)

(5) In the sixth question it appears that when
the intelligible form is united with the
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intelligibles come to it directly follow-
ing an intercession and yearning, or
without intercession and sense of need. (69)

(f) In the Arabic edition the footnote sign is placed over gīfah muntazarah, while it actually refers to the statement
following that.
+ But is composed of substance and form (i.e.,) of pos-
sibility and necessity. [Note the chiasmic form of the
statement in reverse order, possibility relating to form,
and necessity to substance].
(g) The term sakīnah is apparently a loan word from the
Hebrew Shaking. Commentators on the Qur'ān explain it as "the
subjective condition of peace of soul and security"; Hence
later in common use in the sense of calm, quiet, tranquility.
(q) In the eighth question it appears that the soul apprehends ideas free of matter regardless of whether they are universal or particular. It apprehends itself and other immaterial souls even though they are particular, since they are immaterial. A great secret also is disclosed thereby which is that the real nature which we have no other animal shares with us. It appears also that its being intelligible is not something additional to its being an existent thing with the kind of existence it has, but is a condition additional to bare existence, which is that its existence as it is means that it is an intelligible occurring to itself, not to something else. This is a great subject on which the attributes of the Real One, may He be magnified, can be based. (70)

It is also used in the sense of "Holy Ghost", as in later Hebrew when it came upon prophets - in the case of Muhammad when the Qur'an was recited. - See E. Talbim, Vol. IV, p. 78; of Lane, Edward William, An Arabic English Lexicon (London, William and Margate, 1863-1886) Bk I, part IV, p. 1394 (hereafter referred to simply as Lane)

(9) In the ninth question it appears that when we apprehend the incorporeal intelligences the forms of their real natures become the images of their real natures — and such is every apprehension. (72)

(10) In the tenth question it is disclosed that we apprehend our being by our being, and not by any other power [which is] corporeal. (73)

(11) In the eleventh question it appears that (1) what hinders understanding is matter. (74)

(12) In the twelfth question it is disclosed that the pure real nature of a thing does not have its existence as an individual on account of the necessary corollary qualities by which it is distinguished. As it necessarily has various corollary qualities it is distinguished as an individual by means of corollary qualities. (75)

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(1) This is actually treated in problem number 12, not 11. See p. (75) below.
(1) This is actually treated in problem 14, not 12. See p. (77) below.
Question.

(13) In the thirteenth question it is disclosed that by understanding intelligibles it [the spu2] does not become composite as a mirror (does not) (k).

(14) In the fourteenth question there is disclosed the way obedience and disobedience, virtues and vices affect the soul although the soul is incorporeal in contrast with the body. It is an important section upon which the articles of the divine law and the usage of the Chief of the apostles are based.

PART THREE

ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION ABOUT VIRTUES AND VICES, THEIR EFFECT ON THE HEART IN RELATIONSHIP TO KNOWLEDGE, THE FORCES OF THE HEART IN THIS CONNECTION

XII. Next we shall give an additional clarifica-

(k) This is actually treated in a problem numbered in the text 15, not 13. See p. 78 below.

(1) This is actually treated in a problem numbered in the text 15, not 14. See p. 78 below.
tion in which it will appear that the virtues and vices issue from three faculties in man: (A) That of the imagination, (B) the physical desire, and (C) irascibility. We shall mention wonderful mysteries in the faculty of imagination, from which prophetic inspiration appears, with its opposites, augury and divination. We shall also mention the benefit and harm of the faculty of physical desire and the benefit and harm of the irascible faculty. (80)

XIII. We shall give an explanation of the main virtues, their results and fruits; and virtues and vices that come under each of them. (88)

XIV. We shall mention an analogy of the relationship of the heart to knowledge. (98)

(XV. Then an exposition of analogies [of the relationship] of the hearts to their forces, that is their faculties. (105)

XVI. (EXPOSITION OF THE FACT THAT THE SOUL MAY
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XVII. Then we will mention how these faculties govern and serve each other.

(PART FOUR)

THE HUMAN SOUL : ITS CREATION AND ETERNITY;
THE INTELLIGENCES AND THEIR GRADATIONS;

XVIII. We will mention that human spirits are spirits that come into being, they come into being at the time when the sperma has capacity [to receive it]. We shall mention difficulties in connection with this and get rid of them. We will also mention in this chapter the state of the beginning [of the spirit] and its return. We will also mention in it secret knowledge.

(111)

XIX. Then we will mention THE SURVIVAL OF THE SOUL AFTER ITS DEPARTURE FROM THE BODY. (126)

XI. Then we will mention the PROOF OF [THE

(m) This chapter is not mentioned in the table of contents in the Arabic edition but is treated in the text, p. 108-110.
We will mention an article on PROPHETHOOD AND APOSTLESHP, which article will include expositions.

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IN IT [THE SECTION] ALL SORTS OF MIRACLES AND MIRACULOUS WORKS OF SAINTS WILL APPEAR

We will also give a CONCLUSION showing WHO
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THE BEST OF THE HUMAN SPECIES IS.

(PART SIX)

XXV. Then we will mention [the proof of the existence of] BLISS AND MISERY, which is the science of the resurrection [world] (167)

XXVI. Then we will give the meaning of the terms "meeting" and "vision". (160)

(PART VII)

Then we will turn and ascend and rise up [steadily] to the knowledge of the Creator, be He glorified, the knowledge of His attributes and works, and the knowledge of the noble men who put [religious sciences] into writing, and other types of mystical knowledge as we have pointed to at the beginning of the book. (188)

(n) See p. 14 footnote 12 below.
We will cover section by section until we complete the book, while we seek the assistance of God, putting our trust in Him, and asking Him to grant us success; may God give us success out of His abundance and mercy.

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(o) Chapters XXVII and XXVIII are not mentioned in the table of contents in the Arabic edition but are treated in the text, the first with or without a title, the second with one.
[PART I]
[CHAPTER I]

INTRODUCTION


[1]. The term nafs is used without modification in two senses: [a]. In one of them it is used to denote the immaterial entity (mafn̄a) in which the blameworthy attributes inhere, which are the animal faculties which oppose the rational faculties. This is what the Sufis mean by it when they apply it without modification, for they say, "The most excellent warfare is to war against your own soul." And to it our Prophet referred when he said, "Your most immemorial enemy is your soul, which is within your skin".

(1) Tradition - According to 'Iraqi, it is taken from Ibn 'Abayd's traditions. The wording here, however is "The real warrior is he who wars against his soul". 'Iraqi, III, p. 75- hereafter simply 'Iraqi, Ibn Hanbal, A.M., Musnad (Mayma-niyah Press, Egypt, 1313 A.H., Halabi's Ed.) Vol. VI, p. 20, 22 (Hereafter referred to as "Ibn Hanbal".

(2) Literally: "Your soul which is between your two sides" (bayn iJanbar). According to 'Iraqi p. 4, the tradition is taken from Bayhaqi. See also SMZ II, p. 205, 206, 218, where he calls the soul in this connection "that which seeks to become proud" (p. 206).
In the second sense it is used without modification to denote man's real nature and essence. For the soul of every thing is its real nature, which is the substance that is the locus of the intelligibles, and that belongs to the heavenly world and the world of creation, as we shall explain. True, its names differ in accordance with the variation of the states which affect it. For if it turns to the right direction, and the divine influences descend upon it, and the breezes issuing from the divine bounty come upon it without interruption, then it comes to rest in the remembrance of God and dwells on the divine mystical knowledge; and it flies up to the highest horizon of the angelic realm. Then it is called the "tranquil soul" (nafs mutma'inna). God said, "O soul at rest, return to your Lord pleased and pleasing". And if it is at war fighting, quarrelling and disputing with its faculties and powers, and if the war between them fluctuates so that at one time the soul wins, and at another time the faculties are uppermost so that its state is not steadfast, then at one time it inclines towards the intelligences and...

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[4] Rasahîd. In A'sâ'îb the term is used in the sense of "gift" and "manifestation" - A'sâ'îb, p. 221.

takes hold of the intelligibles and perseveres in obedience, and at another time the faculties overcome it, and so it falls down to the lowest stage of beasts. This soul is a self-blaming soul\(^\text{6}\) (nafs lawwamah). This soul-being is the state of most of mankind. For whoever raises himself to the horizon of the angels until he is adorned with knowledge, soul-virtues, and good deeds is a corporeal angel, because he has raised himself above his human nature, and because he does not participate with mankind except in outward form. That is why God said, "This is not a man! This is none other than a noble angel.\(^\text{7}\) And whoever lowers himself until he reaches the lowest stage of beasts, if an erect and speaking dog or donkey were conceivable, then he would be it, on account of his being stripped of human virtues, and on account of his non-participation with mankind except in outward form- his is the soul that is prone to evil\(^\text{8}\) (nafs ammah bi'l-sū\(^\text{a}\)).

For most of them, when you meditate on them, are donkeys, dogs, or wolves.

They are the type of men mentioned in God's word saying,

"Satan of men and Jinn who inspire one another with

\(^{6}\) 75:2. Hughes renders the translation "the self-accusing soul or consciousness". Dict. Islam, p. 60.


\(^{8}\) 12:53 (a)
(9) words of doceit. And the Commander of believers, Ḥabīb, may God be pleased with him, said, "O you who are in the likeness of men but not men!" A soul of this type is ever the slave of a stone, a brick, a beast, or a woman. This is what God told about when He said, "The soul is indeed prone to evil".

(10) The term ga.Select also is used without modification in two senses:

(a): In the sense of the pine-cone shaped organ situated within man on the left side, which is known by means of dissection. It is the vehicle of the black blood and the source of the vapor which is the vehicle of the physical animal spirit. This is common to all animals, and is not peculiar to man alone. It is that on account of which all the senses perish at death.

(b): The second [sense of ga.Select], which is what we are explaining, is the human spirit which bears the trust of God, which is adorned with experiential knowledge, which by natural disposition is the center of religious knowledge, and which

(9) 6:112.
+ Ẓā'īnah is a camel litter, but what is meant by it is the woman in it.
(11) 12:53.
expresses the unity of God by saying "Bala" (yes), for it is the fundamental principle of man and the ultimate phenomenal

(13)

being in the resurrection world. (14) God said, "Say, 'The spirit is the affair of my Lord!". And He said, "Yes, at the remembrance of God do hearts find rest'.

Our Prophet said, "The hearts of mankind are all between two of the fingers of the Compassionate One, etc.

Wherever the term gula is mentioned in the Law it refers to

(12) 7: 171 - Bala is an interjection that is used in an affirmative answer to a negative question. Here it is the answer to God's question "Am I not your Lord?". The shiites and other mystic orders in Islam maintained that they, from the beginning, had professed God as their Lord. For a fuller account, and for the Bektashi's drinking the wine of Bekte (Alastu, i.e., "Am I not") see Birge, John Kinsey, The Bektashi Order of Dervishes (Luzac & Co., 46 Great Russel St., London, W.C.1, and Hartford Seminary Press, Hartford, Conn., U. S. A., 1937) p. 200 (n.4) and 112f.

(13) Lit. "The world of return" (ilam al-Ma'ad). The Muslim mystics believe that man came originally from God in the order of creation through two arcs: (a) Garvat al-nuzul, (i.e., "The power of descending") or Tarik al-ma'ad, (i.e., "The way, or track, of the start") and (b) Sawal al-'Urdi, (i.e., "The arc of ascent") or Tarik al-ma'ad, (i.e., "The way, or track, of return") in a different order of return into the God-head. - Birge, op. cit., p. 116. At death the soul returns into God. For details and illustrations see ibid, p. 114-131.

(14) 17:87.


(16) Tradition : Muslim : hadir 17; Ibn Khabal II, p.168, 173; 171, p. 251, 302. In the last three places there is a slight change of wording. According to the Concordance, it should be found also in Tirmidhi: hadir 7, ba-'I'at 69; Ibn Majah: nanad- dima 13. "Trad." begins the tradition by "the heart of a believer..." (p.17,23,40).
what we are explaining. If it is used without modification in any place for the pine-cone shaped organ, that is because that is its special connection, while its first connection is as the Prophet said, "Within man there is some small thing, which, when whole, renders the rest of the body whole, and if it is corrupt renders the rest of the body corrupt. - that is the heart." (18)

(17) The term ṭūh is used without modification to denote the fine vapor which ascends from the source of the heart and rises to the brain by means of the blood vessels and from the brain it moves by means of the blood vessels also to all the body; and in every place it acts according to its composition and aptitude, for it is the vehicle of life. This vapor is like a lamp, with the life which exists by it as the light, while the way it affects the body resembles the way the lamp illuminates the sections of the house. It is also used without modification to denote the created thing that emanates from the creative command (19) of God, which is the locus of religious sciences, and prophetic and minor inspirations for it is of the genus of angels and is different from the physical world, and is existent according to the explanation.

(17) Lit. "a chewing morsel" (ҙ饫ғә) (18) Tradition: Tayâliq no. 768. According to the Handbook it should be found also in Bukhārī 2 (Fīlān) : ch. 39, but it was not found there. (19) For a full treatment of the term "Command" (of God) (ʿAmm) see p. 203ff, below.
we shall give.

It is also used without modification to denote the spirit that is comparable with all the angels, for it is the first emanation (mubda' awwal), being the Divine Spirit.

It is also used without modification to denote the Qur'an. In short, it is a term which is used generally for anything that has any life.

[4] The term 'aql is used without modification:
[a] to denote the First Intelligence (al-'Aql al-Awwal), which is referred to by al-'Aql ("Intelligence") in the saying of the Prophet, "The first thing that God created was the 'Aql; God said to it, 'Come forward', and it went forward. Then He said, 'Go back', and it went back", meaning, come forward that you may be perfected by Me, and go back that the whole world may be perfected by you. It is to it that God said, "By My might and majesty I have certainly not created a creature dearer to Me nor more excellent than you. By means of you I take, and by means of you I give".

(20) Lit. "The first created thing". It emanated from the command of God by way of creation - See p. 204 below.
(21) Tradition - not found in the Concordance nor in the Handbook, but found in 'Iraqi p. 4. According to SNZ the tradition is referred to Hasan al-Bagri - Ibid., Vol. II, p.209.
(22) Tradition - not found in the above first three sources 'Iraqi says, "It has a weak isnad" - Ibid., p. 14.
It is also that which is expressed by the term *gālam* (pen) as Muhammad said, "The first thing that God created was the *gālam*. He said to it, 'Write'. 'What shall I write?' asked the pen. 'That which exists to the day of resurrection, of religious works and their results, the means of living, and the term of life', answered He. And so it wrote what will be with what exists to the day of resurrection". (23)

(1) The second unmodified usage of the term *sāql* is to denote the human soul.

(2) The third unmodified usage is to denote the attribute of the soul, for its relation to the soul is as the relation of sight to the eye. For by means of it, [the soul] is capable of apprehending the intelligibles (*ma'ṣūlāt*), just as the eye, by means of sight, is capable of apprehending the sensibles (*maḥṣūsāt*). It is about it that the Apostle of God said on behalf of his Lord, "By my might and majesty I will surely hide you in any one whom I love". (24) Whenever in this book, we use without modification the term *nafs*, *rūḥ*, *sālīb*, or *sāql*, we mean by it the human soul which is the seat of intelligibles. This is the introduction.

(23) Tradition - With variation in wording, it is found in Bukhāri VII, p. 398 (Tafsīr, i.e., explanation of Sūrah 68); Ibn Barbak V, p. 317; Tirmidhī, p. 410; Ithbāf 464, 465, 466; Tayzīlīf 3, 577. According to the Concordance it should also be found in the last source, Sūrah 15, but was not found. According to the Handbook, it should also be found in Zayd b. 'Ali 3, 977, which source was not available.

(24) Tradition - It is not found in the Concordance nor in the Handbook, nor is it found in Bukhāri.
[CHAPTER II]

PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL

[A] Proof in a General Way

The soul is too self-evident to need evidence to prove its existence; for all the declarations of the divine law are made, not about something non-existent, but about something existent, living, that understands what is said. Yet we will make an attempt to explain it by saying: It is known without doubt that no matter how much things participate in one thing and differ in another, what they participate in is not the same as what they differ in; for we find that all bodies participate in being bodies in which three intersecting dimensions necessarily exist. Then we find them differing in motion and apprehension. If their motion is real on account of their corporeal nature, then every body ought to be moving, since realities do not differ; for whatever is necessary for one species is necessary for all that participate with it in that species and that reality. But if [its motion] belongs to some ideal reality (maʿnā) beyond corporeal nature, then the existence of a source (mađda') for the act is proved in

+ That is in the qualities that necessarily belong to the same reality.

30
a general way, which is the soul, until it is shown whether
it is substance or accident (farad). An example of that is
that we see the vegetable bodies getting nourishment, grow-
ing, reproducing their kind, and moving in diverse ways, such
as "spreading out branches"; and "extending roots in the
earth". If these ideal realities belong to the corporeal
nature, then all bodies ought to be similar. But if they
belong to something other than corporeal nature, rather to
some additional ideal reality, this latter is called vegetable
soul (nafs nabatiyyah). Now animals too have what plants have.
They have also sensation, they move at will, pursue their
own welfare, seek what is beneficial to them, and flee from
what is harmful. From this we learn definitely that they have
some ideal reality in addition to what vegetable bodies have.
We also find man in possession of all that plants and animals
possess of ideal realities, and is distinguished from them by
his ability to apprehend things outside the external sense,
such as the fact that the whole is greater than the part.
Thus he apprehends the particulars by the five senses, while
he apprehends the universals by the mental faculties (ma'ali
aqliyyah). So he participates with the animal in the external
senses, but differs from it in the mental faculties. For man

(1) The same translation for farad is given by Goichon, A.
M., in her Lexique de la Langue Philosophique d'Ibn Sina(Al-
cenne) (Paris, 1938) § 422.
(2) Tashqib - Lane, V, p. 1555.
apprehends the universal of every particular and makes that
universal the premise (muqaddamah) of a syllogism, and he de-
duces from it a conclusion (natijah), so that the universal
that is apprehended may not be denied nor the apprehender
of it, for no accident, nor the body that possesses and acci-
dent, nor vegetable, nor animal (except man) apprehends the
universal in such a way that the universal may exist by
means of it and be divisible with the division of the body,
since the universal has a unity which is particular to it
as such and is not divisible at all. So, "man" [in its]
"absolute" (5) [i.e., without modification] and universal [sense]
does not have any half or third or quarter. So, that which
receives the universal form [e.g., goodness] is a subs-
tance [which is] not a body, nor an accident in a body. It
(5) (6) (7)
does not have any "position" whatever, nor "place" that it
may be pointed to. Rather its existence is an intellectual
one, too hidden to be apprehended by the physical senses, while
it is more clear than anything else to the intellect. Thus
the existence of the soul is proved; and it is proved in a
general way that it is substance; it is also proved that it
is free from matter and material attributes.

(6) Wade - Ibid § 777; Redhouse, p. 2140.
Section on The Sources of Actions.

We say every source from which an action issues either has perception of its action or does not. If it does not have perception, its action is either identical after a single fashion or is diverse. If it has perception, it either has intellection, or it does not. If it has intellection, its action is either identical after a single fashion, or is diverse. These are five classes:

1. The source whose actions are identical and has no perception is called "natural principle" (mabda tabītī), as in the case of the falling of heavy bodies and the rising of light bodies.

2. If its actions are diverse but it has no perception, it is the "vegetable soul" (nafs nabātī); for plants do move in diverse ways.

3. If it has perfection, but has no intellection, it is the "animal soul" (nafs hayawanī).

4. If it has intellection, and together with that has the choice to act or not, it is the "human soul" (nafs ʿinsānī).

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(9) Taṣawwur - Ibid., § 440.
+1. That which has no perception, but its actions are identical.
2. That which has no perception, and its actions are diverse.
3. That which has perception, but has not intellection.
4. That which has both perception and intellection, while its actions are identical.
If it has intellection, but its actions are after a single manner, and not diverse, it is the "celestial soul" (nafs falakī).

[0] Descriptive Definitions of The Three Souls.

We will give incomplete definitions of the three souls by describing them, for the conditions of a real logical definition (hadd) are impossible here and, indeed, in all existing things.

[1] We say the vegetable soul is the first perfection (kamal awwal) of an organic natural body (jism tabî'ī) from the view point of the fact that it absorbs its nourishment, grows, and reproduces its kind.

[2] The animal soul is the first perfection of an organic natural body from the view point of the fact that it apprehends the particulars and moves at will.

[3] The human soul is the first perfection of an organic natural body from the view point of the fact that it performs its actions by "rational choice" (iḥtiyār) and in-

5. That which has both perception and intellection, but its actions are diverse.


+ Aristotle says, the soul is a First Perfection of an organic natural body possessing life potentially. (For the meaning of kamal awwal see also Goichon, § 276.8

(11) Iḥtiyār. Ibn Sīnā has ḥikmā inti'ī (''reflective choice''). Ibid., 5525. His definition of the human soul,
ferences drawn by thinking, and from the view point of the fact that it apprehends universals.

By "first perfection" we mean "without the medium of another 'perfection'". For a perfection may be first or second.

By "natural body" we mean "not produced", that is, "not in the mind" but "in concrete existence" (fi'l-a'zān).

By "organic" we mean "having organs", by the aid of which that particular first perfection obtains the second and third... perfections. Now, the term "perfection" (kamāl) is preferable to the term "potentiality" (quwāh), for the term "potentiality" is in relation to whatever actuality issues from it, or, in comparison to whatever sensible or intelligible form it receives. So the usage of the term "potentiality" for both of them without modification is because the noun is

however, agrees in spirit with al-Qazālī's: "L'âme humaine... est perfection première d'un corps naturel muni d'organes en tant que l'on lui attribue l'émission d'actes venant du choix réfléchi et de la découverte faîte avec discernement, et en tant qu'il saisit les choses universelles". - Ibid, § 712:4.

According to what is attributed to Hasan Šalbī, "what is meant by 'human soul' is the corporeal spirit inherent in the body, not the rational soul. For the Sunnis do not maintain that" (Al-mufrad bi'l-nefe al-insaniyyah al-rūh al-jismānī al-kālī fi'l-badan, li 'n-nara al-nastigh, li kanna jumāra ahl al-šamākh li vaqūlima bihā) - Al-Baydawī A. 'U., Tawālî, Al-Anwar (Istanbul, 1305 A.H., Al-Iṣra'ā'īlī's ed.) p. 57 margin (hereafter referred to as Baydawī, Tawālî).

homonymous (bi'shtirāk al-īsam), for the complete definition includes a homonymous term (laṣa muṣṭarak). But if only one of the two is meant by the logical definition, this definition would be incomplete.

The term perfection (kamāl) includes the two potentialities by agreement (tawātu'); and so its usage is preferable. If it is said, "It is a form (ṣūrah)", it is said so on account of its relationship to the matter in which it inheres, for a vegetable or animal substance (jawhar) is composed of the two of them.

The term perfection, because of its relation to all the substances, and because the genus becomes complete by means of it, is one species existent among all the species, for it has the relation of the particular to that which is general, and which is not remote from its substance. So it is preferable to the term "form" (ṣūrah). It should be known, however, that if the term "soul" is used without modification for the form of the celestial sphere, and for the form of plants, animals, and men, it is used that way only on account of the

(13) For a detailed treatment of the term see ibid. §299 and 319.
(14) For a detailed treatment of the term see ibid. §654:11,12.
(16) ḫass (=particular, or proper); ḫam (=general or common).
homonymous sense of the noun, for the celestial souls do not act by means of organs, nor is the life in them the life of nutriment and growth, nor is their sensation the sensation of animals, nor is their speech the speech of mankind.
CHAPTER III

PROOF THAT THE SOUL IS A SUBSTANCE

[1]. Proven From The Standpoint of The Divine Law and Reason.

[1]. As to the divine law, all its declarations indicate that the soul is substance. In the same way the punishments after death, mentioned in the divine law, indicate that the soul is substance, for pain, even though it dwells in the body, is on account of the soul. Then, the soul has another punishment which is peculiar to it, such as shame, grief, and the pain of separation. Similarly, it has something which indicated its immortality, as we shall show later on, if God wills.

[2]. As to [the proof by] reason (fāqil), it has two aspects: a general aspect, that can be proved with every one, and a specific aspect that can be understood by religious experts (ahl al-khamsa) and the righteous (ahl al-insāf).

[a]. As to the first, one should know that the real nature of man does not mean his body only; for one is a man if he is substance and has extension in dimensions that require length, width, and depth, and if, together with that, he has a soul, and if his soul is a soul by means of which he gets
nourishment, has sensation, and moves at will, and yet he is such that he can comprehend the intelligibles, and learn crafts, which he can practice if there is no hindrance from outside, [but] not from the standpoint of his human nature (insāniyyah) - if all these factors coincide, there results from the whole one entity, which is the essential man (ḫṭ ḥāt al-ʾinsān). Therefore, it is proved by this that the real nature of man is not an accident, for accidents may change, while reality itself remains unchanged, for indeed realities do not change. So then, that which is unchanged in you since you came to existence is your soul, while things that come upon you, and pass away are accidents.

[2] The second aspect, the specific proof, is of use for the men of quick comprehension, fine understanding, and right judgment. That is to say, if you are in sound condition, free from defects, and clear of the assaults of passions and other misfortunes and defects, so that your members and organs do not affect and interfere with one another, and if you are in a suitable (i.e., temperate) atmosphere - in such a condition you are not heedless of your essential being (inniyyah).

(1) Hawaʾ tilq (ay muʾ tadil)
(2) In the wording of the term inniyyah, Butrus al-Bustānī agrees, in his Muḥti al-Muhīt with this text, deriving it from the affirmative article (ʾanna), which renders the sentence it precedes strongly emphatic - Op.cit., (Beirut,1870)Vol.I,p.47. Goichon renders it anniyyah, deriving it from ʾanna, which,
and your real nature, even when you are asleep. So, every one who has quick comprehension, fine understanding and discrimination, knows that he is substance, that he is free from matter and its concommitants, and that his essential being (dhât) is not out of touch with himself, since the meaning of intellection is the attainment of an abstract substance (mâhiyyah mujarradah) on the part of the intelligent being (‘âqil), and since his essential being (dhât) is abstract to himself (dhât), so that he does not need to be made abstract and freed (from matter). We do not have here a material substance (mâhiyyah) and then an intellectual object (ma‘qûliyyah). Rather his substance is itself the object of his intelligence (ma‘qûliyyah), the object of his intelligence being his substance. This is an invaluable and important point, which you will come to understand more clearly, if God wills.

The evidence of the validity of this specific proof is the fact that if it were not true that what which is apprehended and perceived is your real nature, i.e., your soul, but were it your body with its accidents, it would surely be

though grammatically is equivalent to inna yet in meaning and force it would be equivalent to the English connective "that", e.g., "I knew 'that' you would come", as to the wording of meaning she gives "Mosaicité, l'individu, le réel"—Op. cit., § 27, Ali B. Muhammad Jurjânî in his Ta’rîfî, renders it mâhiyyah, deriving it from ‘în (time), which is beside the point. Op. cit., (Constantinople, 1300 A.H.) p. 25.

(3) Of Godon’s translation "Quiddité, substance seconde, substance = attribut". (Op. cit., § 679), and Lane’s translation of it as "quiddity or essence, or substance of a thing"—Op. cit.,
either that that which is perceived is all your body or some of it. But it cannot be the whole body, for man in the above mentioned assumption may be heedless of the whole body, while he apprehends himself. If [that which is perceived] is some of the body, it will be either external, or internal. If it is external it is apprehended by means of the senses, while the soul is not apprehended by means of the external senses. [And] how [can that be] when we, in the above mentioned assumption have regarded the senses as heedless of their actions, and have assumed that the members do not affect each other? If the soul and the essential being are an internal member, such as a heart or brain, again that is not permissible, for the internal members are attained only by means of dissection. If is proved therefore that that which you apprehend is none of these things. For indeed it may be that you do not apprehend them, while you are of necessity apprehending your soul. But, what you are obliged to apprehend of necessity is never that which cannot be apprehended except by means of sight. By this it is proved that your essential being is not one of the kind of things which you apprehend by means of your external sense; or what resembles them in any way.

VIII, p. 3016).
(3). Additional Explanations from The Standpoint of Apprehension.

We say, you apprehend yourself in all conditions. But by means of what do you apprehend it? For there must be something which apprehends (mdrik), which thing must be either one of your external senses (mshāʿir), or your mind, or some faculty (guwwah) other than your external senses. If it is your mind, then that apprehension has to be either by means of a medium (wasat), or some logical analogy (giyās), or some faculty that is intermediary between apprehension and the soul, or without a medium. But I do not believe, however, that you need a medium for that, for if there were any medium, you would certainly not have apprehended yourself; for indeed there is no medium between yourself and your perception of yourself. So it remains that you apprehend without a medium. If so, that apprehension has to be either by means of your external senses, or by yourself. But it cannot be conceived that it should be by means of your external senses, for the senses do not apprehend anything except bodies and concomitants of bodies, such as colors, sounds, and the like. So it remains that you apprehend yourself by yourself. From this it is proved that you are an incorporeal substance (jawhar

(4) مَهْمَاتٍ Lit., "theses".
(5) Translation after Redhouse, p. 1926.
This specific proof is either useless, or decisive. [It is] useless for the thoughtless who do not consider matters except with impatience, for whoever considers a postulate with impatience hastens to doubt more readily than water flows downward. But for those who desire to perceive, it is decisive.

Someone may say, "I prove my existence only by some medium, which medium is one of my actions, so by means of my actions I get evidence of the existence of my soul." The answer to this is from two standpoints. [In the] first [place] this does not accord with the aforementioned assumption, for we have separated you from actions, and yet you prove your being (dhāt) and essential entity (inniyyah). [In the] second [place] you have to prove that this action is either an independent one, in which case you must prove by it an independant agent that is not yourself, [or you prove it to be your action]. But if you prove it to be your action and give it a specific relationship you have already proved your soul and have apprehended first your essential being. For you have taken your soul to be a part of your action - with the knowledge that the percep-

(6) Lit., "Who do not glance at things except with the eye of indignation.
+ That is, the downflow of water.
tion of the part comes before the perception of the whole - or, at least, together with it. Therefore your essential being is proved along with it (the action) or before it, not by means of it. This is a subtle distinction on which a superior type of mystical knowledge can be founded, as we shall mention, if God wills.
[CHAPTER IV]

PROOF THAT THE SOUL HAS NEITHER QUANTITY NOR MEASURE; NOR IS IT APPREHENDED BY MEANS OF THE SENSE, NOR CAN A BODY APPREHEND IT, AND THAT ITS APPREHENSION IS NOT BY MEANS OF CORPOREAL ORGANS IN ANY STATE OF EXPERIENCE.

This is too refined and difficult for the minds that have strayed from the path associated with mental images and sensible things. We have to attain this goal by means of decisive demonstrations and clear evidences.

[1]. The first proof is to say: It is very well known that we attain the intelligibles and apprehend the things that do not belong to sense and imagination. The intelligible is unified; so if it were to inhere in something divided [this] unified thing would divide, which is impossible. The verification of this is that if the soul were something that possesses quantity, and if an intelligible should inhere in it, it would either inhere in something divided, or undivided. But it is very well known that that which is undivided is only the extremity of a line, which is the end of that which is not distinguishable in position from the line and [from] the measure by which it is connected to it [the line] that there should be in it anything
that has no relation to that line. Rather just as a point does not exist by itself but is only an extremity which is essential to that which is of itself a quantity, likewise it may be surely said in some way or other that there inheres in it [the point] the extremity of something which inheres in the quantity whose extremity it [the point] is and which is measured by width. And just as it [the thing] may be measured by width in the same way it ends in width with the point. If the point were independent by itself, receiving anything at all, it would have some distinguishable essence, and the point would then have two sides, one side toward the line and the other opposite to it, correlative to the former side. So it would be separate from the line; and the line then would have an end other than it, which [end] the line would meet; so that that [point] would be the end of the line not this one. The same thing would be said about it that was said about the first one. This leads to the point's being something contiguous in the line, either finite or infinite, which is something whose impossibility has been made clear in its place.

But we will point to an illustration of it and say: The two


(2) The term muqdar means mainly "measure", "quantity", "amount" - Ibid 554; Lane, VII, p.2495-2496; Redhouse, p.1941. Al-Ghazālī has used it here interchangeably in the first two meanings all through the section.
points which meet one point at its two sides are [1] either separated by this medial point so that they are not in contact with each other, and it follows then intuitively that each one of them is specifically qualified by a part of the medial point with which it is in contact; and then the medial point is divided, which is impossible. Or [2] the medial point does not hinder the two confining points from contact, so then the intelligible form is inherent in all the points, with all the points as one point, which is the one we have assumed to be the one point which is separate from the line. So from the side where the line is separate from it [the point], it [the line] has an extremity, and an end by means of which it is separate from it [the point]. So that point is different from this in position. But all the points have been assumed to participate in position. This is contradictory. Therefore the locus of the intelligibles in the body can not be something undivided. Hence it must be something divided.

Now let us assume an intelligible form in something divided. But if we assume in the divided thing some division, then it would be an accidental quality of the form that it also will be divided. Then the two parts would be either similar or dissimilar. But if they are similar, how can something that is not in them be gathered together from them unless that thing is something that is produced in them with
respect to quantity and increase in number, not with respect to the form. And then the intelligible form will be some figure or other, or some number or other; but every intelligible form is not a figure. The form then becomes imaginative not intelligible.

Still clearer than that is the fact that it cannot be said that each one of the two parts is itself the whole in meaning; for if the second part is not included in the meaning of the whole then we must put at the beginning in the meaning of the whole this one part [the second], not both of them [as separate wholes]. But if it is included in its meaning, it is clear and evident that one of them [the parts] does not alone indicate the same meaning of the whole.

If they are dissimilar then let us consider: How is it possible for the intelligible form to be parts that are dissimilar? For the dissimilar parts can only be the parts of a definition, which are the ultimate genus and the proximate difference. This necessitates impossibilities, such as that every part of a body is divisible too; therefore the genus and the difference are potentially infinite. But it is true that the genus and essential differences of a thing are not potentially infinite. Secondly, it is impossible that the supposition of division should divide the genus and the difference. Rather there is no doubt that if there exist a
genus and a difference that deserve discrimination in a locus, then that discrimination does not depend on the assumed division; for then the genus and difference must be actually infinite too. But the truth is that the genus and the difference, or the parts of the definition of a thing are finite in all respects. If they were actually infinite here, it would be necessary that one body should be divisible into parts that are actually infinite. Again, supposing that the division has taken place from one standpoint, so that it sets apart on one side a genus and on the other a difference, then if we change the division, there would result from it on one side half a genus and half a difference - or it would be reversed and then the seat of the genus and difference would rotate in our imagined assumption. But even that would not be all [that could happen], for we can produce a division in a division. Every intelligible also can be divided into simpler intelligibles; for here are intelligibles which are the simplest intelligibles and the fundamental elements of composition in all other intelligibles. But they have neither genus nor difference, nor are they divided in quantity (kamm) nor in meaning (ma'na). Examples of that are oneness (wahdah), cause (f'illah), and the like. Therefore the assumed parts in it [in the intelligible] can not be parts that resemble one another each of which has the sense of the whole. Rather
the whole is indeed produced only by the union [of all the parts]. Nor can they [the parts] be dissimilar; for the intelligible form cannot be divided. But, if the intelligible form cannot be divided nor inhere in an undivided extremity of quantities, it is clear, therefore, that the seat of the intelligibles is a substance (jawhar) which is not a body (jism) nor a potentiality (quwwah) in a body so that the division which occurs to a body may occur to it; and then all other impossibilities follow.

[2]. The second proof is to maintain that the intellectual faculty is the essence of the intelligibles which are free from finite quantity (kamm), place (ayn), position (wad'i), and all other accidental qualities of body. We must therefore consider the essence of this form which is free from position, and [see] how it is free from it - is it [free] with respect to the thing from which it is taken, or with respect to the thing which receives it? That is, is this intelligible essence free from position in external existence or in existence conceived of in the intelligent substance (jawhar fâqil)? But it is utterly impossible for that to be so in external existence. It follows then that it is free from position and place, when it exists in the intellect. Therefore, if it exists in the intellect it cannot possess position or be such that any indication of
partition and division or any thing of similar meaning can
coccur to it. Therefore it cannot be in a body.

(3). The third proof: If the undivided simple single
form (ṣūrah)ḥadīyyah) that belongs to things undivided in
meaning is impressed on some divisible matter which has
dimensions, either there is no relationship between it, or
(between) any if its parts which it is assumed to have in
accordance with these dimensions, and the one intelligible
which is indivisible and free from matter; or each of its
assumed parts has that relationship, or some of them (the
parts), and not others, have it. If no part of it has any
relationship, then neither some of it nor all of it has any
relationship whatever. Therefore it must be that it is not
apprehended, and there must be no difference between this
and any other intelligible - which is not the case; for we
find a natural and necessary distinction. If some of it
has relationship and some does not, then that which does
not has no connection with it at all; and it follows that
the one thing is both something unknown and a known intel-
ligible in relation to the two portions - which is impos-
sible. If each assumed part has a relationship, then either
each assumed part has a relationship with the whole intel-
ligible, or with a part of the intelligible. If each
assumed part has a relationship with the whole then the
parts are not parts of the meaning of the intelligible, but each of them is in itself a simple single intelligible. But if each part has a relationship to the whole which is different from that of the other parts, it is obvious then that the whole is divided in the intelligible; but we have assumed it to be indivisible. This is contradictory. From this it is evident that the form impressed upon the matter (3) can be nothing but shapes of divisible particular things, each part of which has a relationship, actually or potentially, with a part of it (the form).

If it is said, "The source of the confusion in this proof is your statement that if the intelligible concept (ma'na ma'qūl) has a relationship with some of the whole then the rest will not be any part of the intelligible concept. This is what we say: What is apprehended on our part is something particular (juz') which is not divisible, (4) it being what is called the ultimate atom (jawhar fard)."

We say, You are between two positions: either to maintain that the relation of the intelligible is to some divisible part, or to some indivisible part. If its rela-

(4) It was then considered the indivisible portion of substance.
tionship is with some divisible part, then if we were to divide the part the intelligible must be divided too, and so the first proof itself applies. If you maintain that it is related to a part which is indivisible, well, every part of a body is divisible, as we have already proved. This has other proofs of a geometrical nature which this is not the place to mention.

[4]. The fourth proof: We say, If the mental faculty (quwwah iqlīyyah) were to know by means of a corporeal organ so that its operation can be completed only by the use of that corporeal organ, then it could not know itself, nor the organ, nor that it knows, for there is no organ between it and itself, nor between it and its organ, nor between it and the fact that it knows. But it does know itself, its organ, that which is called organ between it and its organ and the fact that it knows. Therefore it knows by itself not by means of an organ? Also its knowledge of its organ is due either (a) to the existence of the form of its organ itself or another different from it but is also a form in it and in its organ, or (b) to the existence of a form other than the form of its organ which is in it. If it is due to the form of its organ, then the form of its organ is in its organ by participation always. Therefore it must always know its organ which it
knew on account of the existence of the form of its organ. If it is due to the existence of a form other than that form, (this is impossible), for the difference between things which come under one definition is either on account of the difference of material substances and accidents or the universal and the particular, or that which is free from matter and that which exists in matter. But here there is no difference of material substances and accidents, for the matter is the same, and the accidents are the same; nor is there here difference of freedom (from matter) and existence in matter, for both of them are in matter; nor is there here the difference of particular and universal, for the one of them involves particularity only on account of the particular matter and the concomitant qualities which pertain to it on account of the material nature of it. This significance does not belong particularly to one of them and not to the other.

Now the soul itself apprehends always its own existence, not something of the bodies which it accompanies and in which it is. But it is not possible that this apprehension should take place on account of an intelligible form other than the form of its organ, for this is a greater impossibility, since if the intelligible form in-heres in an intelligent substance it makes it know that
[object] whose form it is, or that to which the form is added, so that the form of that which is added enters into this form. But this intelligible form is not the form of this organ, nor is it the form of something itself added to it, for this organ itself is substance. But we take and consider only the form of its essential being, while the substance itself is not added at all. This is a strong proof that that which apprehends the organ, which is its organ in apprehension, cannot [itself] be apprehended. For this reason the sense senses only something external; it does not sense itself, nor its action, nor its organ, nor its act of sensing. In the same way the retentive imagination (khayāl) does not imagine itself, nor its action, nor its organ. Rather, if it imagines its organ at all, it does so not in a way that belongs specifically to it and, unquestionably, not to some other [mental operation], unless the sense brings to it the form of its organ, if that were possible, in which case it would be imitating an image (khayāl) received only from the sense and having no relationship with anything connected with it [the retentive imagination], so that if it were not its organ it would even not have imagined it.

(5). The fifth proof is composed of the sum total of clear demonstrations and evidences. Any one who acquires
a sure knowledge of them will know certainly that the soul is not a body and does not inhere in bodies.

The way to prove this is to say, If the soul were a body, it would either be inherent in the body or would be outside the body. But if it is outside the body, how can it exercise influence and government in this body, and how can the body subsist by it, and how can it (the soul) act freely in the intellectual sciences in this world and in the heavenly world and thus come to know the First Real One, travel in the intellectual mystical knowledge and grasp completely the intelligibles as they are? If it inheres in the body it inheres either in the whole body or in a part of it. If it inheres in the whole body, then if an extremity were cut off from it, it (the soul) should decrease, or retire and move from one member to another, at one time extending with the extension of the members, and at another shrinking with their decrease. But all this is absurd with everyone who has a sound disposition (gharīzah), a sagacity that is right and undefiled by the faults of the retentive imagination. If it inheres in a part of the body, that part (of the body) is divisible either actually or by assumption. Then the soul also should be divisible until it reaches in the parts the smallest and least there is. But the impossibility of this is known intuitively; for how can such be the condition of the soul which is the locus of
mystical knowledges, and by which man is elevated above all animals, being capable of meeting God, and (or) being addressed, rewarded, and punished? If a man keeps it pure he prospers, and if he degrades it he fails and loses. It is the quintessence of existing things and the choicest of all phenomena in the resurrection world. It is that which survives after the death of the body. It is that which, if adorned with mystical knowledge, attains to everlasting bliss, joyful and rejoicing at meeting God. God said, "Alive with their Lord, they are provided for, rejoicing in what God has given them of His favor".

So whoever has the least amount of reason knows that the substance whose locus and rank are these is not inherent in a body and is not a part of a body. It is not blood, nor vapor, nor a mixture nor any other thing. You also know that your soul has not changed since you have come into being, while it is well known that the body and the attributes of a body all change; for if they do not change it would not be nourished, because being nourished mean that a substitute takes the place of what has been dissolved. Therefore your soul is no part of the body and its attributes.

(5) *flam al-*Awd lit. means the world of return, as *flam al-ma*'-Ed.
(6) 3:169(a) - 170/163(b) - 164.
Further, if the human soul were impressed on the body its action would be weakened with the weakening of the body. But it does not become weak with the weakening of the body. It is therefore proved that it is not impressed on it. The evidence of its non-weakening is observation; for after the fortieth year [a man's] physical power begins to decline, while his mental power increases and advances.

It is an unnecessary and untrue supposition to suppose that the soul forgets and does not do its work when the body is ill, or in old age, and that that is because its activity is complete only by means of the body; for after we have found it to be true that the soul acts by itself, the cause ought to be sought in this [fact]. If it is sometimes possible for the soul both to act by itself and to omit action when the body is ill, so that it [the soul] does not act, without contradiction, then this objection had no value. For we say the soul has two activities, an activity in relationship with the body, which is direction, and an activity in relationship with itself and with its principles, which is intellection (wilāya). These two [activities] oppose and hinder each other, so that if it is occupied with one of them it has to give up the other. It is difficult for it to do the two things together. Its hindrances on the part of the body are sensation, imagination (tahayyul), passion, anger, fear, grief and
pain; for you know that if you begin to think about any object of thought (maññū) all of these things are nothing to you, unless you defeat and force the soul to go back to them.

You know also that the sense hinders the soul from intellection when it (the soul) concentrates on the sensory object (maññū), without any defect in any way occurring to the organ of intellection or itself (the soul). As you know, the reason for that is the fact that the soul occupies itself with one activity to the exclusion of some other activity. For this reason the activities of the intellect are not (necessarily) hindered at the time of sickness; for if the intelligible form were nullified and corrupted on account of the organ, then, it would be necessary for the organ, in order to go back to its (normal) condition, to acquire (soundness) from its source. But this is not the case. For the soul may return to its habitual mental power and condition, knowing all that it knew as things were. So, therefore, they were all with it, but it was preoccupied. It is not only the difference of the two directions of the activity of the soul that necessitates the hindering of its activities to each other, but the multiplicity of its activities in one direction may necessitate this same thing. Fear, (for instance), causes one to forget pain, while passion puts a stop to anger, and anger turns one away from
fear. The cause in all that is one: it is the complete
diversion of the soul to one thing. All of these things
are the powers of the one soul, which is their king, while
the powers are its subjects and forces. Therefore, if a
thing does not perform its activity when it is engaged with
the circumstance of something it does not necessarily mean
that it does not perform its activity unless that thing is
present.

We should go into more details in the explanation of
this subject, for it is one of the most difficult subjects
about the soul. Only, after having attained a sufficiency
we attribute anything additional to the imposition of what
is not necessary. For it has been made clear by the plan
we followed that the soul is not impressed on the body nor
does it subsist by means of it. Its connection with the
body, therefore, must be to manage and direct it. May God
guide us and give us success.
CHAPTER V

EXPOSITION OF THE ANIMAL FACULTIES

The animal faculties are divided into motor (muharrakah) and apprehending (mudrikah).

[A. The Motor Faculties] (QuwalMuharrakah)

They are motor either because they motivate action, or are active themselves. The motivating [faculties] either attract benefit or repel harm. The [faculty] that motivates the attraction of benefit is expressed by the term "physical desires" (shahwah). Whenever an idea [ma'an] is formed in the retentive imagination which is known, or supposed, to be useful, it [the faculty of physical desires] motivates the active faculty to attract that benefit.

The motivating [faculty] which repels harm is called the "irascible faculty" (ghadab). When something known, or supposed, to be harmful is formulated in the retentive imagination, the [irascible] faculty motivates a motion by means of which that harm or injury is repelled, with the desire for vengeance and conquest.

The faculty which is motor in that it is active is a faculty that springs up in the nerves and muscles, its work
being to make the muscles contract, thus pulling the tendons and ligatures that are attached to the members to the direction of the source, or letting them (muscles) loose, and so the tendons and ligatures move in a direction contrary to that of the source. This faculty is known by the term "power" (qudrah), while the faculty that motivates is the "will" (irādah).

The explanation of this is that every voluntary action comes into existence. But it does not do so as long as the messenger of the "power" does not come to it, which is that immaterial reality (ma'na) deposited in the muscles. But the "power" does not issue from its home and hiding places, [where] it is as though it is at rest and ease, as long as the messenger of the will does not come to it - which is either the will to attract benefit or to abate and repel harm. The will does not arise from its place nor does it come out from its hiding places as long as the messenger of knowledge (rasūl al-film) does not come to it. When [the knowledge] comes and gives its decisive order the will springs into action, for it does not find any escape from submission and obedience. When the will gives its decisive order the "power" issues to move the members, for it does not find any refuge or deliverance from obedience and conformity to its rule. When the "power" gives its decisive order the members move, for they do not find any refuge from
movement. So as long as the messenger of knowledge is hesitant, the will is hesitant; and as long as the will is hesitant, the "power" is hesitant, and as long as the "power" is hesitant, the actions do not come into existence and are not manifested in the members. But when the order becomes decisive the actions come into existence.

Additional Verification

You should know that the voluntary movement (harakah ikhtiyyāriyyah), which is the property of animals, has a beginning, a middle stage, and a completion (kamāl). The beginning is the need of the incomplete for completion, and the longing of the seeker. Completion is the attainment of what is sought. Between these two is a middle stage, which is the quest [for perfection]. The voluntary movement animals have are active, spacial movements (harakāt makāniyyah fiʿliyyah) in diverse directions "proceeding from knowledge, feeling and desire", contrary to the movements of plants, which, not being voluntary, proceed in diverse directions without knowledge, feeling, or desire for good; for their movements are growth and decay, while the free movements of man are movements of thought (harakah fikriyyah), speech (harakah qawliyyah) and act (harakah fiʿliyyah). The aspects of their difference are in contrast to the movements of animals. They lack two classes of them, name-
ly, the movements of thought and of speech. The vegetable movement (harakah nabātiyyah) is in need of good care and pruning, so that it may reach its desired perfection, which is fruit and the reproduction of its kind.

Fruit is to give benefit by itself, while the reproduction of its kind is to give benefit by means of its species, so that its existence has a particular benefit by itself and a general benefit by its species.

The animal movement (harakah hayawāniyyah) also needs good care and domestication, so that it may reach its desired perfection, which is to give benefit by itself as a beast of burden, or as a riding animal, or an animal to be eaten or for plowing, and to benefit by its kind by pasturing and reproduction, so that its existence has a particular benefit by itself and a general benefit by its species.

The human movement (harakah insāniyyah) needs good care and imposition of responsibility by strengthening, direction and instruction; for right and wrong may enter the movement of thought; and so the right must be chosen, not the wrong. Truth and falsehood may enter the movements of speech; and so truth must be chosen, not falsehood. Good and bad enter the movements of action; and so the good must be chosen, not the bad. The choice will never be right without strengthening, direction and instruction.
The effect of strengthening is manifested in actions, so that of the movements of actions the good is chosen and evil is avoided. The effect of direction is manifested in words, so that of the movements of speech truth is chosen and falsehood is avoided. The effect of instruction is manifested in thoughts, so that of the movements of thought what is real is chosen and what is unreal is avoided.

These three classifications, however, are based on the three heavenly classifications which are expressed at one time by the term "strengthening angels" (mَلَفِيكَةَ ﻣَوْارِيذُانَ), at another time by the term "spiritual ancestors" (جُواَدُ ﺭَﺣْمَيْيْنِ), and at another time by the terms "letters and words in the heavenly book" (بَعْرُ fj al- kāl-māt ﻣَأَلِإِلِيْيْيِنَ). As the vegetable movements need pruning, and the animal movements training, in the same way the human movements need disciplining.

He whose choices in his three movements are clear of the defect of unreality, falsehood and evil in every way has the right to say, "My Lord has disciplined me well".

(1) 83:18-20. The word ﻣَأَلِإِلِيْيْيِنَ, or ﻣَأَلِإِلِيْيْيِنَ is given different meanings by different commentators, e.g., a place in the seventh heaven, the highest place in paradise, a book in heaven in which the names of the pious are registered. Some see a relation between this word and the Hebrew word ﻷيَوَنَ in Gen. 14:16- Weir, T.B., "Kil İyyın", (S. Islam), Vol. II, p. 469; Lane, V, p. 2125, 2147. Verse 20 of the above surah.
It is he who deserves to discipline, train, sanctify, purify, teach and remind others on account of God's word, "As we have sent among you a messenger of your own people to recite to you Our signs, to sanctify you, and to teach you the Book and wisdom - to teach you what you did not know".

[3]. Exposition of The Apprehending Faculties

(Qwâ Mudrikah)

According to the first division, they are divided into two classes of apprehension, external and internal. The external are five kinds, which are the five senses (hawâss khams). We will mention them, and will mention how they lead to the common sense (hiss muhtarâk).

[4]. The External Senses]

[a. The sense of touch]: You should know that the sense that comes first in connection with animals, most common among all animals and most extensive in the body of an animal is the sense of touch (hâssat al-lams). It is a faculty spread all over the skins, flesh, blood vessels, and nerves of animals. By means of it they apprehend heat and cold, moisture and dryness, hardness and softness,

in the Qur'ân explains the term as meaning "an inscribed book".

(2) 2:151/146.
smoothness and roughness, lightness and heaviness. That which bears it is a subtile [or vaporous] body in the network of the nerves, called "spirit" (روح), which arises from the heart and the brain. The condition for its apprehending [any thing] is that the state of the skin should change to what is contrary to that which is apprehended, whether it is heat or cold, or anything else, so that it may apprehend. That is why it apprehends only what is colder or warmer, rougher or smoother than itself, while similar things are seldom apprehended. The apprehended things are various; but with all their variety they rely upon one apprehender. According to some people, the faculty of touch is a genus for four species "of faculties": The first judges the difference between warm and cold, the second between moist and dry, the third between hard and soft, and the fourth between rough and smooth. They often add to that. It is the first power of the soul that appears. No part of the skin is void of the faculty of touch, and no animal exists without his having the faculty of touch.

The wisdom[of God is seen] in the faculty of touch. That is when the Divine Wisdom deemed it necessary that there should be an animal moving at will, composed of elements, not

+ That is the faculty of touch.
safe from the dangers of the places to which it successively would move, He strengthened it by the faculty of touch, by means of which it may escape from an unsuitable place and go to a suitable one.

[b. Sense of smell]: After that comes the sense of smell (hāṣṣat al-ḵamm). As the constitution of such an animal cannot do without nourishment, as its acquisition of food is by means of voluntary activity, and as certain foods are not suitable for it, while others are, it was aided by the faculty of smell. So the odors give the animal a strong guidance to suitable foods.

The sense of smell is a faculty that is spread all over the two protruberances of the brain (zādatay'1-di-ḵāy), which are like the nipples of the breasts. By means of it [the animal] apprehends the various odors, pleasant and unpleasant. That which bears it also is a subtile body in the two protruberances, while that which carries it is a subtile [vaporous] air, [which does its function] not only by carrying the odors from its source to the sense but also by itself becoming odorous on account of proximity, just as it becomes hot or cold by proximity. On account of its lightness the air receives odors more quickly than it receives heat and cold. This faculty is stronger and more extensive in animals. The first thing that reaches the foetus after the faculty of touch is the faculty of smell.
This is why a mother is kept away from bad odors and is not allowed to smell any food unless she eats it [after having smelled it], so that no defect may appear in the foetus.

It is sometimes thought that an ant senses by means of the sense of smell a grain of cereal, and so goes out of the house to seek it, and reaches it even though it may be behind a wall. That is not merely a smell, but is a sense and a faculty in a sense. How can it be otherwise while the thing sought may not have odor? "Sense" is often expressed by the term "smell". In the tradition, "spirits are armed forces that smell one another as horses do, so that those of them that recognize each other gather together, while those that do not, stay separate". What is really meant [here] by "smelling one another" is "to sense" [one another].

(6). The sense of taste (hāssat al-dhawq): [This] also is a power which knows tastes that are agreeable and those that are disagreeable. It is a faculty set in the nerves that are spread over the body of the tongue. It apprehends the flavors that come from the bodies that are in contrast with it and mingle with the sweet moisture that is in it in a mixture that changes; for it [the sense of taste]

(3) Tradition: Bukhārī, V, p. 325 ("Anbiya") and Ibn Hanbal, II, p. 259, 527. The clauses "that smell one another as horses do", however, is lacking in these sources. According to the Concordance it should also be found in Abū Dāwūd: Adab 15, which source was not available, and in Muslim: Al-bir 159, 150, but was not found in the edition available, the edition referred to not being available.
takes the taste of that which has taste and changes into it, or else changes it to itself. Whenever the taste reaches those nerves, they apprehend it. It succeeds the sense of smell. This faculty reaches the foetus after the faculty of smell, and so appears in it at birth. So the foetus moves, and moves its tongue and of itself it licks itself.

(d). The sense of sight (hāssat al-bāsar) and its value: - As the movement of the voluntary moving animal to such places as fireplaces, or from such places as the tops of mountains and seashores might lead to its harm, Providence deemed that most animals should be given the faculty of sight. This is a faculty set in the hollow optic nerve (sagabah mujawwafah). It apprehends the form of what is imprinted of the figures of colored bodies upon the crystalline humor of the eye (rutubah jalidiyyah), which actually appear on the surfaces of polished bodies in the translucent bodies.

Do not think that any part of the colored object becomes separated and goes to the eye, nor that any ray becomes separated from the eye and extends to the colored object. Rather [the colored object] produces an image in the polished thing which is capable of receiving the image on condition of a proper juxtaposition and a translucent medium.
If the image is produced in the crystalline [humor] it proceeds to the hollow optic nerve—in which there is a spirit, which is a subtile [or vaporous] body—just as an image is cast on still water, and so proceeds to the meeting place of the two optical cones (unbūbatayn) [i.e., unbūba-
tay'īl-bāṣar] attached to the eyes in the anterior part of the brain. From the two united images the common sense apprehends one image. Otherwise it would have to see two things, since there are two images on the crystalline [humor]. The crystalline humor is spherical in shape, and what meets the surface of a sphere in truth meets it at the center along imaginary lines proceeding from the surface to the center. So the nearer the distance between the seer and the object seen, the greater becomes the number of lines, and the shorter the conic shape from it to the center, and the larger the angle. The further the distance, the smaller in number are the lines, the longer the conic shape from it to the center, and the smaller the angle. That is so because what is remote is seen smaller, while what is near is seen as it is.

[3] The sense of hearing (ḥassat al-samā'): [This] is a faculty set in the nerves that are spread over the surface of the auditory canal (ṣimakh). It apprehends the representation of what comes to it through the waves of the air that are compressed forcibly by pounding or pulling.
This gives rise to a sound that goes to the still air which is confined in the hollow of the auditory canal, moving it according to its movement, and so the various waves come in contact with that nerve, by means of which they reach the common sense.

Some say that nerve is spread over the farthest part of the auditory canal stretching as the skin stretches over a drum, but it is as fine as a cobweb and as tough as tanned leather.

Others say they are nerves like the strings of a lute stretching over the sides of the auditory canal, moving with the movement of the still air in it, thus causing a sound. It moves only according to the order of the succession of letters and sounds and their difference in loudness and lowness, lightness and heaviness, and fineness and coarseness. As light is a condition for sight, so is air for hearing.

The hearing [faculty] assuredly hears from the surrounding circle, while the sight sees only along a straight line, with the understanding that those straight lines rise from the circumference of the round sphere and

(4) Lit., "That which surrounds the circle".
move to the center [of the eye]. Some have thought that those lines are rays sent from the sight to the point of departure [i.e., the object], or that they are forms brought from the object to the sight. But both views are wrong as we have mentioned.

The faculty of hearing comes next to that of sight in value. The way it gives its value is in [the fact] that harmful and useful things are sometimes indicated by their peculiar sounds. So Divine Providence deemed it necessary that the faculty of hearing should be placed in most animals. The value of this faculty in the rational animal, however, almost excels the [last mentioned] three.

[2. The Internal Faculties]

According to the first classification the internal apprehending faculties (quwā mudrikah min bātin) are divided into three classes: [a] those which apprehend but do not retain, [b] those which retain but do not reason, and [c] those which apprehend and direct at will. Then the apprehending [sense] apprehends either the "form" (ṣūrah) or the "idea" (matbah). The retaining [sense] retains either the form or the idea. The directing [sense] at one time directs the form and at another the idea. The apprehending [sense] at one time has primary apprehension (iḍrāk awwall) without a medium, while [at another] it may have apprehen-
ension, but by means of some other apprehending medium.

The difference between the "form" (ṣūrah) and the "idea" (ma'na) is that by "form", in this case, we mean that which is apprehended [first] by the external sense and then by the internal sense. The idea is that which is apprehended by the internal sense without the mediation of the external sense. These are the classes of the apprehending [senses] in general.

As to the details, [first, we will give] the exposition of the proof of their existence and their seats. The [sense] which apprehends the form is the common sense (hiss mush- tarak), which is called phantasy (bintāsyā), and whose seat is the retentive imagination (khayāk). The [sense] which apprehends the idea is the faculty of estimation (guwwah wahmiyyah), whose seat is the memory (hāfizah) and recollection (dhākirah). That which apprehends and reasons is the faculty of imagination (guwwah mutakhayyilah). That which does not reason is what we have mentioned of estimation (waḥm) and sense (hiss).

[Exposition of The Proof of The Existence of The Internal Faculties]:

Our exposition of the proof of their existence is according to mystical experience (wijdān).
[a]. Proof of the existence of the common sense:—
You see the falling rain as a straight line, while [you see] the fast turning drop as a curved line—all of this by way of observation, not imagination. If the apprehending medium were the external sight, it would see the rain as it is, and the drop as it is, for it apprehends only what descends in front of it, which is not a line. So we learn that there is another faculty in which is delineated the appearance of that which it saw first; and before that appearance was erased it was followed by another and another, and so it saw them as a straight line or a curved line. The evidence for that is that if the drop did not turn fast, it would be seen as separate drops. Therefore you have a faculty [that comes] before the sight, to which the sight carries what it sees, and at which the objects sensed meet, and are thus apprehended by it. Similarly, man feels within himself that if he sees a person, or hears a speech he apprehends the one seen as one person, and apprehends that which is heard as one speech, while what he has in the medium of sight is two persons, that is, two images in the eyes and two speeches in the ears. So one knows of a certainty that the seat of apprehension is something behind the eyes and ears. The faculty that apprehends them is one faculty at which meet the two forms, that is, the two images in the eyes in conformity, and the two apprehended things, that is,
the object seen and the object heard, even though they differ. That faculty is the meeting place of similar and different things. So we have called it the common sense (hisn mushtarak), since the soul does not apprehend except by means of this faculty. We have also called it the tablet (lawh), as the things that are sensed do not meet except in this faculty. It has nothing except apprehension, while delineation and memorizing belong to another faculty. Among the properties of this faculty are [1] first to call up the sensory objects in the senses, and second to apprehend them, [2] to apprehend individual particulars, but not rational universals, and [3] to feel the pleasure and pain arising from the things belonging to the imagination, just as it feels the pain and pleasure arising from external objects of sense.

[b]. Exposition of the faculty of retentive imagination (quwwah khayāliyyah): - We know that if we see an object and then are absent from it, or it is absent from us, its image remains within us as though we witness it and see it. It retains the images (mithul) of the sensory objects after they have disappeared. By means of these two faculties you can determine that this taste does not

+ Muthul is the plural of mithāl.
pertain to this object (ṣāhib ṣāḥib 'l-kawn)', and that that taste pertains to that object. The one who makes these two decisions cannot do so unless the two objects to be decided upon are present.

[0]. Exposition of the faculty of estimation (qvwGH wabhmiyyah): - Animals, rational (nātig) and non-rational (ghawr nātig), apprehend of the particular individual sensibles, particular non-sensible ideas, just as a sheep apprehends that this wolf is its enemy. Now enmity and love are not sensibles; yet it forms judgment about them, just as it forms judgment about the sensible. So we know that this is indeed another faculty. The faculty of estimation in man has special activities. Among them are [(1)] to induce the soul to reject the existence of things not imagined nor delineated in the retentive imagination, such as intelligible substances which exist neither in space (ḥawīz) nor in place (makān), [(2)] to affirm the existence of the void (khalā'), surrounding the world, and [(3)] to agree with the demonstrator [of a proposition] in the granting of the premises, and then to oppose him about the conclusion.

+ According to another copy ṣāḥib 'l-lawn (this color)
Some say the faculty of estimation is the deciding authority in animals whose rule is not as decisive as that of reason, but is an imaginative rule connected with the particular things and sensible forms. From it issue most of the animal actions (af'āl hayawāniyyah).

[d]. Exposition of the faculty of memory (quwwah hāfizah) : - We know that if we apprehend the particular ideas, they do not depart from us completely; for we remember them and recall them with the least meditation. So we know that these ideas have a seat that preserves them, which is memory (hāfizah), so long as they remain in it; but if they depart and return it is the recollection (dhākātah). The relation of the memory to the ideas is as the relation of the image-forming [faculty] (musawwirah) to the sensibles which are imaged in the common sense.

[e]. Exposition of the faculty of imagination (quwwat al-takhayyul) : - We know that we can apprehend a form, then analyse and synthesize, increase and decrease, and we apprehend a meaning [thereby], which we attach to the form. This free action belongs to a faculty other than those that we have mentioned. It is the province of this faculty naturally to work systematically or unsystematically in order that the soul may use it in whatever way it desires. If it were not so, then it would be something
natural void of any art. As mankind should learn the diverse crafts, marvellous designs and calligraphy in order to do naturally some one activity just as other animals have [one natural activity], the soul[of man] uses this faculty in synthesis and analysis at one time according to the practical reason (faql 'amal), and at another according to the theoretical reason (faql nazar), while in itself it synthesizes and analyses but does not apprehend. If the soul uses it in intellectual matters it is called reflective faculty (mutakkirah). If it is occupied with its natural activity it is called imagination (mutakhayylah). The soul apprehends what it synthesizes and analyses of images by means of the common sense; and[it 'apprehends] what it synthesizes of ideas by means of the faculty of estimation.

The Seats of These Faculties

You should know that these are corporeal faculties, and so they must have specific corporeal seats, with a specific name for each. [a]. The organ and seat of the common sense is the spirit flowing in the tips of the nerves of the sense, particularly in the anterior ventricle of the brain.
[b] The organ of the image-forming faculty (guwwah musawwirah), also called retentive imagination (khayāl), is the spirit flowing in the anterior ventricle of the brain, but in its posterior part.

[c] The seat and organ of the estimative faculty is the whole brain, but most particularly the middle ventricle, especially in its posterior part.

[d] The dominion of the imaginative faculty is in the anterior part of the middle ventricle. It is as though it were some power or other for the faculty of estimation, and, through the medium of the latter, for the intelligence.

[e] The dominion of the rest of the faculties, which are recollection and memory, is in the space of the spirit which is in the posterior ventricle, which is their organ. Men have been indeed [divinely] guided to judge that these are the organs, that they occupy diverse seats in accordance with the diverse faculties, and that if decay affects particularly some ventricle it produces defect in it. It was the thought of Him Who is Necessary of Existence in His wisdom as the All-Wise Creator to place in front [the faculties] that grasp physical things best, to place in the rear [the faculties] that grasp mental things best, and to put between them their governor in order to govern and to recall
images that have been erased on both sides. May His power be illustrious.
CHAPTER VI

EXPOSITION OF THE SPECIFIC HUMAN FACULTY

The faculties of the rational human soul also are divided into a practical faculty (quwwah ṣamilah), and an intellectual faculty (quwwah ṣalimah). Each of the two faculties is called "reason" (aql) by the homonymity of the noun.

A. Practical Reason

The practical [or active] faculty is the source of the movement of the human body to the particular actions belonging specifically to reflection according to views that belong to them technically. [It has three aspects]:


[1] Its relation to the appetitive animal faculty is in that out of it states peculiar to man arise in it

[i.e., the appetitive animal faculty], by means of which he is prepared to quick actions and emotions such as feeling ashamed, bashfulness, laughter, weeping, and the like.

[2] Its relation to the imaginative and estimative animal faculty is in that it uses it in discovering proper ways of managing worldly affairs (ṣumūr kā'īnāh wa fāsidah), and in discovering human crafts.

[3] Its relation to itself is that from it and the speculative reason together are produced the wide spread and well known opinions, such as that lying is evil, injustice is evil, truthfulness is good and justice is fair. In short all the particulars of the divine law are the explanation of these well known opinions produced from the speculative reason and the practical reason together. It is this faculty that should govern all the other faculties of the body according to what the activities of the above mentioned faculty deem necessary, so that it may not be acted upon by them, but that they may be acted upon by it, and be overcome by it, lest on account of the body, and resulting from natural matters submissive characteristics occur in them, which are called vices. It ought not to be

(2) things which come into existence and degenerate", or "existing things which degenerate".
acted upon at all nor be overcome, but rather governing and ruling so that it may have virtues.

It is possible to relate the ethical qualities to the bodily faculties also. But if the latter are dominant they will have an active expression (hay'ah fisāliyyah), while the ethical qualities will have a passive expression (hay'ah infiṣāliyyah), so that there will be one thing out of which one [kind of] ethical quality will result in one case, and another [kind of] ethical quality in another case. But if they [i.e., the physical faculties] are dominated they will have a passive expression while the ethical qualities will have an active expression, which is not strange. In that case the ethical character will be one with two relationships. But [in reality] according to investigations these ethical qualities are found to belong to this [rational] faculty; for the human soul, as has appeared, is a single substance which has relationships in two directions: one below it, and another above it. And in accordance with each direction it has a faculty by means of which the connection between it and that direction is regulated.

This practical faculty is the faculty which [the human soul] has in relation to the direction below it, which is the body and its government.
[B. Speculative Reason]

The faculty of speculative reason (quwwah nasariyyah) is the faculty which is related to the direction above it [the soul], in order that the latter may be acted upon by and benefit from it and receive from it. It is as though our soul has two aspects, one towards the body, which aspect ought to receive no impression whatever of the kind which the nature of the body requires; and another aspect towards the supreme principles and the active reasons. (3) This aspect ought always to be receptive of what is there, and be influenced by it; for by it comes the perfection of the soul. Therefore, the faculty of speculative reason is for the perfection of the substance of the soul, while the faculty of practical reason is for the government and management of the body in a way that will lead it [the soul] to the perfection of speculative reason (kamāl nasariyyah), "To Him rise the good words, and He exalts the good deeds". (4)

The faculty of speculative reason is a faculty whose concern it is to be stamped by the immaterial universal forms. If they are free [of matter] of themselves,

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(3) Lit. "intelligences in act" (quqūl bi-l-fil'il).
(4) 35:10(b)/11(b)
well and good. If they are not, then it [the faculty of speculative reason] will render them such by its freeing them, so that nothing of the associations of matter remains in them. We will explain this later on.

This faculty of speculative reason has relationships with these forms, in the sense that the thing whose concern it is to receive something may be recipient of it potentially (bi'il-quwwah) or actually (bi'il-fi'il). The term power (quwwah) is used to denote three meanings in order of precedence [as follows]:

[1]. The term quwwah is applied to the absolute capacity (isti'dād mutlaq) from which nothing has actually proceeded, nor has anything appeared by which the things comes into being, such as the power of the infant to write.

[2]. The term quwwah is also applied to this capacity when nothing has come to existence [as yet] except that by means of which one can attain to the acquirement of the act without a medium, such as the power to write of the boy who has grown up and has known the inkstand, the pen, and the simple letters.

[3]. The term quwwah is also applied to this capacity when it is accomplished by means of an instrument, and with it has occurred also perfect capacity to act at will.
without the need of acquiring [the act], but it suffices him that he should only intend (to act), such as the power of the writer who has perfected the art when he is not [actually] writing.

The first power is called "absolute physical power" (quwwah muqālah hayālānīyyah). The second power is called "potential power" (quwwah māmkinah) and "habitude" (malakah). The third power is the "power in perfection" (kamāl al-quwwah). Therefore the relation of the faculty of speculative reason to the forms free of matter, which we have mentioned, sometimes is [1] the relation of that which exists "absolutely". This is the case when the power of the soul has not yet received anything of the perfection which it produces. It is then called "primary physical [or potential] intelligence" (aql hayālānī). This faculty which is called primary physical intelligence is found in each individual of the species, but [is it found] in equal measure, or are there grades and superiority in it? Philosophers differ on this [point].


(6) Lit. "the relation that is of the type of 'absolute power' (or potentiality)."

(7) In her Lexique, Goichon translates the term as "intel-
It is called primary physical to resemble the primary matter (harūla ẓūlā), which in itself has no form whatever, but is posited for every form.

[2]. At another time [its relation] is the relation of that which exists potentially. This means that some of the primary intelligibles (ma’qūlāt ẓūlā) exist in the primary physical [power], by means of which intelligibles one can attain to the secondary intelligibles (ma’qūlāt thānī-yah). By the "primary intelligibles" I mean the propositions (muqaddamāt) by means of which belief takes place, but not by acquisition [by traditional authority], nor by the believer's feeling that it is possible for him not to believe in it at any time at all. This is like our belief that the whole is greater than the part, or that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. This is what is called necessary [or intuitional] sciences (kalima qar‘ūriyyah). As long as this much of intelligence has occurred in him [the believer], it is called possible, or potential intelligence, (faql bi‘l-malakah). It may also

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ligence matérielle, correspondant à l'intelligence potentielle des scolastiques Latins". Ibid., §439:11. In her "Introduction à Avicenne" she simply calls it "intelligence matérielle [potentielle]". - p. 32.
(8) Lit. "the relation that is of the nature of 'possible power' ".
be called intelligence in act (faql bi'il-fi'il) in relation to the first [absolute power or intelligence]. Sometimes it is stronger than that, when some intelligibles of the speculative reason exist for him, so that by means of them he can attain to the secondary intelligibles.

[3]. It may also be the relation of that which exists in perfection. This is the case when the acquired intelligible forms also exist in it after the primary intelligible forms. Only [the individual] does not actually note them or revert to them, but they are as though they were stored with him, so that whenever he desires he notes that form actually, and he knows it and knows that he knows it. It is called "intelligence in act" (faql bi'il-fi'il) because he knows at will without trouble or difficulty; although it is also possible to call it potential intelligence (faql bi'il-quwwah) in relation to what comes after it.

[4]. Its relation is sometimes the relation of that which exists by the "absolute action" (fi'il mutlaq), in the sense that the intelligible form is present in him [the individual] and he actually notes it, actually knows it, and he knows that he actually knows it. It is then an acquired intelligence (faql mustafad); this is the divine intelligence (faql qudsi). It is called "acquired" only because it will become clear that the potential intelligence
comes into actuality on account of an intelligence which is ever actual [or active], and that when the potential intelligence comes into contact with it in one way or another, some kind of form will be actually imprinted on it, which is acquired from outside. This also is the classification of the faculties which are called "[ intelligences of] speculative reason" (ṣuqūl nasariyyah). With the acquired intelligence the animal genus and the human species are made complete. There it is that the human faculty comes to have affinity with the first principles of all existence. Additional explanation of the divine acquired intelligence will appear in the [section on] Prophecy.

(10) The Arabic text has 'aqīla sąrasīyyān', which is grammatically incorrect. It should be either 'aqīla nasariyyān' (= speculative reason or [intelligences of] speculative reason), or 'ṣuqūl nasariyyān' (= speculative reasons, or [intelligences of] speculative reason), as translated above.
CHAPTER VII

EXPOSITION OF THE DIFFERENCE AMONG MEN IN
THE QUALITIES OF THE PRIMARY PHYSICAL INTEL-
LIGENCE (WHICH IS MAN'S ABSOLUTE OR ORIGINAL)
CAPACITY) (ISTI'DAD MUTLAQ)

You should know that philosophers differ as to
whether this capacity is similar in all the individuals of
the species or is different. Some say they are similar in
this capacity, the difference being due to the use of that
potential thing in one kind of knowledge rather than an-
other, which then comes out to actuality, and so the dif-
ference appears.

Others say they differ in capacity according to the
difference in their temperaments. And what comes out of them
[the temperaments] into actuality does so only on account
of that capacity. Their status is not the same as that of
the "prime matter" (hayülā) in that they are capable of
receiving every form; for the "primary matter" (hayülā
*ülā) is capable of receiving the "primary form" (puhān
*ülā), which is the bodily one, and which is similar in all
bodies. By means of it it [the primary matter] receives

+ That is, the individuals.
one form or another according to their composition of the "secondary form" (gūrah thāniyah) and the "secondary matter" (hayūla thāniyah). This is why the primary matter does not have existence in itself independent of the primary form. Nor does the "absolute body" [or "corporeality"] (jiṣm maṭlaq) have any existence without being fire, or air, or something else [i.e., earth or water]. But the case here is different from that; for the soul has positive existence and capacity for that existence. [This capacity] therefore must be different in accordance with the difference of the located [soul].

If it is maintained that the human soul is similar in the species, and that is granted, yet there is no doubt that it differs in the individual and in itself in accordance with the difference of the individual accidental qualities. So the capacity in [i.e., cf.] the primary physical intelligence differs accordingly; for the soul issues from the first principles only in accordance with its capacity. So the more balanced the temperament is, the more excellent is the soul. To it are added the ascensions of the planets and the heavenly bodies. So then,

(1) Or "the locus", or "the soul in which it is]located" (mawdūʿ)
(2)Lit., "the ascending planets, etc." (tawāliʿ al-kawā- kib wa al-ʿam al-samāwāt) = an astrological doctrine. Cf. tālīʿ in Redhouse, p. 1226.
just as the soul, even though identical in the species, differs in superiority and gradation, likewise capacity is coordinate in grade with the excellence of the soul; for often the soul of a prophet, who is in no need of an act of thought, may have "its oil on the point of giving light, even though no fire touched it"; while often [too] the soul of a stupid person may not derive any benefit from thought. This opinion is stronger and nearer to the ideas of the divine law.

(3) 24:35.
[CHAPTER VIII]

EXPOSITION OF EXAMPLES OF THE GRADES OF
INTELLIGENCE TAKEN FROM THE DIVINELY
REVEALED BOOK

You should know that God mentioned these grades in one verse, saying, "God is the light of the heavens and the earth. His light is like a niche in which there is a lamp; the lamp is in a glass; the glass is like a brilliant star that is lighted from a blessed tree, an olive tree which is neither eastern nor western, and whose oil is on the point of giving light even though no fire touched it. [It is] light upon light. God guides to His light whom He wills. And God gives parables to men; for God knows everything." (1)

Now the niche is a metaphor for the primary physical intelligence; for as the niche is capable of having the light placed in it, in the same way the soul, by its natural constitution (biih- fitrah), is capable of having the light of intelligence overflow upon it. Then when it gets the least bit stronger and receives the first principles of the intelligibles, it is the glass; if it reaches

(1) 24:35.

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the stage where it is capable of receiving the intelligibles by an act of right thought, then it is the tree; for the tree has boughs. In the same way thought has arts. Then if it comes to be stronger and reaches the stage of habitual mental power (malakah), and if it receives the intelligibles by means of intuitional insight, it is the oil. If it is stronger than that, so that its oil is on the point of giving light, then, if it receives the intelligibles as though it sees them and notes them, it is the lamp. Then, if it receives the intelligibles, it is "light upon light" - the light of the acquired intelligence upon the light of the innate intelligence (faql fitri). Then these lights are acquired, because these lights, in relation to it (i.e., the innate intelligence), are like the lamp in relation to a great fire that spread all over the earth. That fire is the Active Intelligence (faql fa'al) which makes the lights of the intelligibles overflow upon the human souls.

If the verse is taken as an illustration for the prophetic mind (faql nabawi), that is permissible. Because the latter is a lamp that is lighted from a prophetic

(2) The author here is playing on Arabic words, fanun (arts) has two forms of plural, afnan and funun, while the plural of fanun ("boughs") is afnan too. So he says, "the tree has afnan ("boughs"). In the same way thought has funun ("arts"). (3) Cf. p. 122 below.
blessed created tree, an illiterate olive tree which is neither eastern by nature nor western in its humanness, and "whose oil is on the point of giving light" - the light of natural constitution - "even though the fire of thought did not touch it". [It is a] "light" from the Divine Command (Amr Babūbi) "upon a light" from the prophetic mind. "God guides to His light whom He wills".

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(4) Reference to Muhammad. See p. 125, n. 26 below.
[CHAPTER IX]

EXPOSITION OF THE CORRELATION OF THE RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (אセンター) AND THE DIVINE LAW, AND THEIR NEED OF EACH OTHER

You should know that the rational intelligence (אセンター) will never have the right guidance except by the divine law, while the divine law became clear only by means of the rational intelligence. The rational intelligence is like the foundation, while the divine law is like the building. But a foundation will not suffice unless there is a building, and no building will stand firm unless there is a foundation.

Further, the rational intelligence is like the sight, while the divine law is like the ray. The sight will not suffice unless there is a ray from without, and the ray will never benefit unless there is sight. This is why God said, "A light has come to you from God, and a clarifying Book by means of which God guides those who follow His pleasure in the paths of peace, and brings them out of the darkness to the light with His permission". (1)

(1) 5:15(ו) - 16(ו)/18(ו).
Furthermore, the rational intelligence is like the lamp, and the divine law like the oil which feeds it. So, as long as there is no oil there is no lamp [light], and as long as there is no lamp the oil does not give light. To this God called attention in saying, "God is the light of the heavens and the earth, etc" to "Light upon light".

So the divine law is a rational intelligence from without, while the rational intelligence is divine law within. They are collaborators, or rather made identical. As the divine law is a rational intelligence from without, God deprived the name of the rational intelligence from the unbeliever, in another place in the Qur'ān as when He said, "Deaf, dumb, blind, therefore they do not understand". Because the rational intelligence is divine law within, God said, in describing the rational intelligence, "The natural constitution [or creation] in which God created mankind. There is no substituting at all for the creation of God. That is the permanently authentic religion." Thus He called

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(2) 24:35.
(3) 2:171[6]/166[6]. Among the different interpretations of the significance of the term Fitrah here, and on account of the first part of the verse not quoted here, which reads, "Set your face as a faithful believer (ḥanīf) towards religion, the constitution [or creation]..." a dominant interpretation is that it means the original religion, Islam (the ḥanīf religion), in which man was created originally.
For more details see Macdonald D.E., "FITRA", E. ISLAM,
Vol. II,p. 115f; SMZ, Vol. VII,p. 233f. Al-Ghazālī, however,
the rational intelligence religion. Because they are made identical, He said, "Light upon light", that is, the light of rational intelligence and the light of the divine law.

Then He said, "God guides to His light whom He wills." (5) Thus He made them one light. So if the divine law loses the rational intelligence nothing will appear by means of it, and becomes lost*, as the ray is lost when the light of sight is lost. If the rational intelligence loses the divine law** it becomes incapable of comprehending most things, as the eye is impotent when light is missing.

You should know that the rational intelligence in itself is of little use and attains almost to nothing but the knowledge of the universals of things, not of their particulars. For instance, it knows in a general way the virtue of adhering to the right, speaking the truth, doing good, and the excellence of practising what is just, adhering to chastity, and the like, without knowing all that in

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as seen, considers it here as standing for "aqil or "aqil fitri ("rational, or innate intelligence") considered by God as identical with religion, it being "divine law within". Hence its importance.

(5) Probably due to misreading of the manuscript, or misprinting, the word in the Arabic text reads, "He made it (ja'ala ha); it should read, "He made them" (i.e., the two) (ja'ala huma).

* That is why the truth is lost among the ingorant.
** That is why all men are in need of divine law.
detail; while the divine law knows the universals of things and also their particulars, and shows what ought to be observed in detail, and also what is just in detail.

In brief the rational intelligence does not find the way to the details of the divine laws; while the divine law at one time will confirm what the rational intelligence has settled upon; at another will call the heedless to attention, and will disclose the evidence that he may pay attention to the truths of mystical knowledge; at another time it will remind the rational person so that he may recall what he has lost; and at still another time it will offer instruction which will be in things pertaining to the divine law, and by explaining the states of the future life. So the divine law is the system of the true beliefs and the right deeds, and leads to what is good for this world and the world to come. Therefore anyone who deviates from it has surely missed the right path. It is to the rational intelligence and the divine law that God pointed by the terms "grace" and "mercy" in His saying, "Ware it not for the grace and mercy of God towards you, you would have certainly followed Satan, (7) except a few", meaning by "a few" the chosen and elect.

(6) Lit. "the states of the "return" (i.e., "the world of return") (ma'ṣūd), for a detailed account of which (from the surf view point), in addition to p. 14, n. 12 above, see Birge, Op.cit., p. 129-131.
(7) 4:83[4:85][6].
[CHAPTER X]

EXPOSITION OF THE REAL NATURE OF APPREHENSION
AND THE GRADATIONS OF ITS ACTIVITY IN ABSTRACTION

You should know that apprehension takes the form of the apprehended object. In other words, apprehension takes the image of the real thing, not the thing as an external object. The external form does not inhere in the apprehending organ, but an image of it [does so], for in reality that which is sensed is not itself the external object but is that which takes form in the sensory organ. So the external object is that object from which the sensed thing is derived, while the object sensed is that which affects the sensory organ so that the latter feels it; for the feeling of it has no meaning at all except the effect of it upon it [the sense], and its being imprinted on it.

In the same way the intelligible object is the image of the real object which is impressed upon the soul; for the intelligible frees it from all accidental qualities and alien concomitants if it has need of that.

As to the gradation in the different kinds of apprehension in forming abstractions, you should know first
that the object of apprehension which needs abstraction is not without alien concomitants and enveloping accidents in its external existence, such as quantity (qadr), quality (kayf), place (ṣayn), and position (wad). Man, for instance, has a real nature, which is living and being rational. That real nature is common [or generic] to the individuals of the species. But that real nature does not come into existence either specifically or generically without alien concomitants; for, if Man were generic [only], then the specific individual (Zayd) would not be a man, while if he [i.e., Man] were specific [only], in that Zayd is himself Man because he is Zayd, then Āmr would not be a man; for if a thing exists on account of itself only, then it does not exist for any other thing.

When you understand this, then you should know that the gradations of apprehension differ in their freeing action from these enveloping and concomitant qualities. They are of four gradations [in ascending order of perfection].

[1]. The first is the external sense, which performs one kind of abstraction; for what inheres in the sensory organ is not that form but an image of it. But that image comes into existence only when the external object has a specific quantity and a specific dimension, and [the
sensory organ) receives it together with that state and position. If it becomes absent from it, or is veiled from it, it does not apprehend it.

[2]. The second grade is the apprehension of the "retentive imagination", whose abstracting activity is a little more complete, and greater in reception; for it does not need to see [the object]; rather it apprehends even when [it is] absent. Only its apprehension includes those concomitant and enveloping qualities such as quantity (kamma), quality (kaya), etc.

[3]. The third grade is the apprehension of "estimation", whose abstracting activity is more complete and more perfect than the above, for it apprehends the idea apart from the concomitant and enveloping qualitites of bodies, such as enmity and love, opposition and agreement. Only it does not apprehend enmity and love as universals, but rather apprehends a particular enmity, in that it knows that this wolf is an enemy to be avoided, and that this child is a friend to be loved.

[4]. The fourth grade is the apprehension of the intelligence. That is the perfect abstracting action from every enveloping accident, and from all concomitant qualities of bodies. Moreover its grade of apprehension
is too clear to have the concomitant qualities of bodies affect it, such as quantity, condition, and all physical accidental qualities. It apprehends a universal idea which does not differ with the individual instances. To it the existence and the non-existence of the individual instances are the same, and so are nearness and remoteness. Rather it penetrates into the parts of the earthly and spiritual worlds, and draws out from them real natures, freeing them from what does not belong to them. This is the case, if the object of apprehension needs abstraction. If it is free from the concomitant qualities of bodies, and clear of their attributes, however, that will do; for then it [i.e., the object of apprehension] does not need to have it [i.e., the intelligence] act upon it at all; it [i.e., the intelligence] rather apprehends it as it is.


[PART TWO]

[CHAPTER XI]

QUESTIONS AND DISTINCTIONS CONTAINING VALUABLE KNOWLEDGE

1. If it is said, you have said before that the soul may have pure capacity in relation to the intelligible object. You have also said every thing that is free from material concomitants is intelligence in act.

I think this is contradictory, for if the soul is free from matter then it is intelligence in act, but if it is not free from matter it is not intelligence. If you say it is intelligence in act, only it does not apprehend the intelligible object because of its being occupied with the body, how can the body then be subject to it, serving it in many things? And how can it be an assistant to it in its recourse to the orderly use of premisses and the deduction of conclusions from past mental operations? And how can it [the body] be both follower and restrainer [at the same time]?

We say: Not every thing that is free of matter of whatever kind is intelligence in act, in the sense that the
intelligibles occur to it instantly. Rather the thing that
is completely free of matter is that for whose existence
matter is not a secondary cause (sabab) in any way, nor is
it a secondary cause for any one of its qualities, nor for
its individualization. As to your question, how can it be
follower and restrainer, [I reply:] This is not extraordina-
ry, for a thing may enable (another) to do something and
also restrain it from doing [it]. The body, for instance,
may assist the soul in many things, as shall be shown to
you, and it may restrain [it] from doing many[other] things,
such as when it [the soul] is disposed towards the passions
and the things which the attributes of the body require,
and occupies itself with the external and the internal senses.

2. If it is said, It has been said that when the
intelligible form is attained by the soul, the capacity of
the latter does not become inactive; for it is well known
that capacity and actual attainment of the form do not
coexist.

We say this is a kind of sophistry and [intentional]
blindness, for capacity exists only in relation to what does
not exist, not in relation to what exists; for what we
receive of intelligibles is indefinite, and is not received
instantly so long as the soul is occupied with the body, or
with the accidents of the body that accompany it [the soul],
but is rather received only as much as can be acquired and as much as flows upon it [the soul] from God's guidance and the lights of His mercy.

It is true that souls sometimes differ in expression and capacity, for one soul may be like olive oil "that gives light even though no fire touched it". It understands clearly innumerable intelligibles all at once, for the favor bestowed upon it is uninterrupted, continuous, without a break or a miss. Another [soul], even though it reflects much, is not benefitted by the thought at all. Still another [soul] is in between these two. Among those souls in the middle class there are numbers [of qualities], and degrees without limit. It is in them that men differ in eminence, rank, power, fame, and nearness to God.

3. If it is stated, It is well known that the soul comes to understand the intelligibles by means of an angel called Intelligence, from which the intelligibles emanate upon the human soul; that it [the soul] attains to it only by observing the forms in the retentive imagination, that is, thought, speculation, and placing some premises before others; and that this is done only when the body continues existing with the retentive imagination. Then if the retentive imagination ceases through death, how can it [the soul] attain to it [the angel called Intelligence] so that...

(1) 24:35[b]; and ch. VII p. 55-58 above.
the real intelligibles may come to it? Since you have said
the body is a restraint, then, when it [the soul] leaves the
body, it understands the intelligibles, and attains to it
(the angel) as long as the favor (of God) continues upon it.
How can this be?

We reply: You should know that souls differ. [a].
One [type of] soul may be bright, free from turbidities, the
light of knowledge shining on it, strengthened by God, and
having keen intuitive insight and brilliant mind, and not
needing thought or speculation; rather of the light of
knowledge there comes to it by means of "the heavenly host"
(2) whatever it may will of intelligibles with their proofs, or
even without willing. It is as if, due to the abundance of
intelligibles that invade it, it [the soul] shines upon its
retentive imagination and external sense. This picture of
the intelligible comes to the object sensed and imagined,
and makes appropriate images of it, and thus gives informa-
tion about it. This [the soul does], while clothed in the
body, as though it had already left the clothes of the body
and attained to the Divine World; for it is just the same
to it to be separate from the body and to be clothed with
it, because it used the body, the body does not use it; the

(2) 37:8; 38:59.
body benefits by it, it does not benefit by the body. It makes the intelligences active, it is not itself made active. This is the Divine Prophetic Intelligence.

[b]. Another [type of] soul attains knowledge and the real intelligibles only by means of the body and its faculties. Its acquisition of knowledge is by means of the imaginative premisses. But this happens only so long as it [the soul] is clothed with the body. Then, when it leaves the body and becomes independent of it and in control, and has obtained mature capacity, while its oil has been made pure, and itself has been disciplined, then - when it leaves [the body] - it attains [knowledge and real intelligibles]. It does not need the retentive imagination and thought. That rather restrains [it]. Often that which assists becomes something that restrains when there is no further need of it. The differences in this medial class of soul are numerous. There are differences in the degrees of bliss, rank, and closeness to God.

[c]. Another [type of] soul clings to weak persuasions and insecure mental images. So when it leaves the body these images cling to it. Then it either remains in them or gets rid of them after a time.

4. If it is said, It is said that the soul may
understand the imaginative forms, which are in bodies, while the soul is incorporeal and is neither opposite the bodies nor parallel to them. How can this be?

We reply: This is a difficulty only if it should grasp them in an imaginative and corporeal state. But when it grasps them free of matter, then there is no difficulty. Your statement that it is incorporeal, while the forms are corporeal, is true. But it is well known that there is an intelligible relationship between the soul and the body so that the two are affected by each other. This is why when the soul recalls the divine presence the body trembles and the hair stands on end. In the same way the soul is affected by the natural bodily results of irascibility, physical desires, physical sensation, and the like. So no matter how well the soul understands the imaginative forms as they deserve, it feels an effect from them. When it is thus affected by them it becomes capable of having the desirable divine favor come to it as mercy and kindness from God to it. This is why Muhammad, upon him be the blessing of God, said, "Truly in the days of your present life your Lord has gentle breezes. So present yourselves to them."

(3) Shahwah used as a collective noun.

(4) Tradition by Abī Hurayrah and Abī Sa'īd - 'Irāqī p.8.
The soul, therefore, ought to present itself to the gentle breezes of the grace of God that it may flow upon it, since there is no parsimony in the generosity of the Real and Generous One; for the attainment of the intelligibles is not in our power, but the presentation of ourselves to those gentle breezes is. Furthermore the capacity of [such] self-presentation is a divine gift that cannot be acquired by effort.

5. If it is said, it is well known that the soul understands the intelligibles in their order and detail, although it has been said also that that which understands the intelligibles in their order and detail is not a simple unit in every respect. But it has been proved that that which apprehends the intelligibles in any way is free of matter without any assumption of division in it. The soul then is either [a] a material form and therefore corporeal, and so should not apprehend the intelligibles, or [b] it is free of matter and incorporeal, and so its apprehension is not according to order and detail. There is no stage between these two.

We reply: You are right in what you say. The soul apprehends the intelligibles in detail and order. Now, whatever apprehends the intelligibles in detail and order has no pure unity and does not perform abstraction
simply, since in its relation to some of the intelligibles it is potential, for there is something potential in it and something actual. The One Reality is God, may He be praised. There is undoubtedly nothing still to come in respect of His being and His attributes. So composition is untrue of Him in every respect, in word, intelligence and power. All other than God is not free from composition of some kind or other, even though in regards to intelligence there is neither corporeal nor imaginable composition. Even Intelligence, which is the First Emanation (Mubda' Awwal) is not a pure unity, but has two aspects. That is why more than one emanated from it.

6. If it is said, When the intelligible form occurs to the soul, the latter pays attention to that form. Does it have need of any other apprehension? It has apprehended or received the immaterial intelligible form.

We reply: No. Rather the apprehension itself is only the occurrence of the immaterial form to the soul. If it occurs, [the soul] surely apprehends it; otherwise it is reckoned not apprehending, for there is no medium between the two, and there is no need of any other apprehension, for that would be an endless chain (Yatarsal-

(5) See p. 15, n. 19 above.
(6) sal).

7. If it is said, in obtaining the intelligibles the soul has recourse to the reflective faculty and uses it in arranging premisses and drawing conclusions. This is so when [the soul is] awake, and it confronts them [the intelligibles]; while in sleep, the imaginative faculty ceases activity, and likewise after death. How can the intelligible be obtained after that?

We reply: in the first place it is not admitted that

(6) The term 'endless chain' (tasalsul), used without modification, according to philosophers, as well as scholastic theologians, is the arrangement of things without end. The impossible endless chain, however, according to them, is the arrangement of endless things which occur together in existence. In brief, the impossibility of the endless chain, according to philosophers, is bound by two conditions, [a] the occurrence together in existence of things endless, and [b] the existence of order among them conventionally or naturally. According to scholastic theologians, it is not bound by the two conditions mentioned. Rather, the endless chain is impossible in everything which is subject to existence. This is supported by what is stated in the commentary of Ḥikmat al-ʿAyn.

There are four kinds of endless chain, because either [a] the parts of the chain do not occur together in existence, or [b] they do. The first is the endless chain in events. In the second, either [1] there is a natural order among those parts, such as the endless chain in causes and effects and the like (such as adjectives and nouns which are arranged and exist together), or [2] a conventional order, such as the endless chain in bodies, or [3] there is no order among them, such as the endless chain in human souls. All these kinds of endless chain, according to scholastic theologians are false, while according to philosophers, the first and fourth are not [false]. - Tāhirāwī, M.A.A., Kashāḥāf Iṣṭilāḥt al-Fumūn (Calcutta, 1862) Vol I, p.390 (hereafter referred to as Tāhirāwī, Kashāḥāf).
the reflective faculty ceases activity in sleep, and that
the soul ceases activity on account of that. Rather often
the soul exercises dominion over the imaginative faculty
when it [the soul] is free from the affairs of the senses,
commandeers it, and uses it for its own desires. That is
why many intelligibles are disclosed in sleep.

It is true that most often the imaginative faculty
exercises dominion during sleep and does not obey the soul,
and, finding the common sense unoccupied, imprints a form on
it. That is why most dreams have need of interpretation.
Furthermore, the soul sometimes does not need the reflective
faculty for [the attainment of] the intelligibles. It may
rather have strong intuitive insight and clarity, and so
attain the intelligibles directly. If it does not attain
them directly, then [it does so] after a yearning to obtain
an intelligible, and so the intelligibles come to it. If
it is incapable of that and does not have the power of
divine intuitive insight, then it has recourse to thought
and the use of the imagination in producing the intelligibles.

8. If it is said, It has been mentioned before
that the soul apprehends the abstract universal ideas, and
apprehends itself, which is a particular. How can this be?

We reply: It apprehends [things that are] free of
the concomitants of bodies and the accidental qualities of material things, whether universal or particular. Your soul, however, though particular, is free of the attributes of bodies, and you are aware of it. Only, your soul does not apprehend bodies except by means of a corporeal organ. But your soul is not corporeal. So your soul's apprehension of yourself is nothing but its real nature attaining to itself, for its abstract reality occurs to it, and that not twice, since its real nature is one, and does not exist twice. We have explained that an intelligible has no meaning but something abstract attained by the rational person, for not every object of thought occurring to something as it is is an intelligible. But it should come with an additional condition, which is its being abstract. We do not mean by what we say that our real nature is attainable by us on account of existence, for everything has existence.

From this you become aware of a great secret, which is the fact that no other animal shares with us our real intrinsic nature, for our immaterial intrinsic nature does not belong to them. Further, we do not mean that the real nature of our intrinsic being, in relation to itself, is something existent with the kind of existence that it has, and then, in relation to itself again is an intelligible through the addition of some item, for [the fact is that]
nothing occurs to the real nature of our soul at one time that does not at another, since it is one at any one time. So its being something intelligible is not an additional condition to its being something existent the kind of existence that it has, rather an additional condition to existence in general, which is that its existence and its being are its being intelligible and occurring to itself, not to something else.

This is the best I have come to know about these subjects and their explanations. It needs to be conceived (tasawwur) and firmly fixed in the soul, for things that have to be believed (ummr tasdiqiyah) cannot be told about unless they are conceived and firmly fixed in the soul. When the soul is able to form the conception (tasawwur) it hastens to believe (tasdiq).

The knowledge of all the Divine attributes can be based upon this section, for all His [God's] attributes are logical inferences, relationships, and negative definitions.

They are not additional to His Being, nor do they necessitate plurality in His Being.

9. If it is said, If rational knowledge is that the rational person should attain to the real nature of an intelligible, then, when we obtain rational knowledge, the Deity and the intelligences occur to us in the forms of their real natures. Therefore each of them has two realities. Why, then, should not our beings also have two realities, when it is possible there?

We reply: When we can have rational knowledge of the incorporeal by means of the forms of their real natures in ourselves, they have two realities, (a) realities within themselves for themselves, by means of which they (the incorporeals) are incorporeal, and (b) realities conceived within us, which belong to us, and which are accidents and images of those realities; for the knowledge of substances is not substances. They are rather accidents in the minds, while, in themselves, they are substances. Further, we have physical and emotional knowledge of our own beings; but this knowledge of ours is nothing but our attainment of our real nature without a medium, or else, a vicious circle (dawr).

(8) "A vicious circle (dawr) is the dependence of a thing for its explanation upon a second thing, which itself depends upon it (the first thing)" - Ta'rifat, p. 110.
results. That means when we say we understand our being, meaning by that an apprehension and a mental image other than the occurrence of the real nature, that would be understanding only if its real nature were attained by us, while the real nature occurs only if we understand. What we say does not pertain to rational knowledge or physical and emotional knowledge, but rather to every apprehension whatever it may be, for it is an observation of the real nature of a thing, not as something external (for if the apprehended objects were external, things non-existent externally would not be understood), but as something within us. Our observation [of our being] is not a second existence for it, but is rather its very impression in us; otherwise, the endless chain would result. Only by way of accommodation we say, We observe

"There are three kinds of circular arguments (dawr):
"1. Evident circle (dawr qarib), in which the thing [to be explained] depends [on itself] by one step, such as explaining a by b and vice versa.
"2. Hidden circle (dawr mudmar), if its dependence is by two steps or more, such as the explanation of a by b, of b by c, and of c by a.
"3. Interrelated circle (dawr mafras), as [in the case of] two things related to each other, where the one cannot be understood except in connection with the other, such as fatherhood and sonship. This circle is permissible, but the first two are not." - Bayâni, Op.cit., p. 24 marginal gloss. Cf. Mafras, p. 110f. For a complete treatment of the subject see Tabânawi, Kashšāf, Vol. I, p. 467-469.
its realities as we observe sensory objects, in accordance with custom, while strictly speaking, the observation of the sensory objects too is the occurrence of their real natures by means of which they are sensed by us, so that the external objects are observed by means of them.

10. If one says, Suppose we understand our beings, but it has not been shown yet whether it is possible for us to understand by means of a corporeal organ or not, and whether the mental faculty is in a body or not. Why, then, is it not possible for the mental faculty to be in a body so that the estimative faculty may be aware of it, just as the mental faculty is aware of the estimative faculty, so the mental faculty itself does not occur to itself but to something else, just as the estimative faculty does not occur to itself, but, for example, to the mental faculty?

We reply: First of all we have a faculty by means of which we apprehend universal ideas, and another by which we apprehend particulars. The faculty by which we apprehend universals is apprehended by that by which the universal is apprehended, which you may call whatever you wish. But we call it the mental faculty (quwwah tahlīyyah). It should be considered to be either physical perception or mental apprehension. As for the mental apprehension, what necessarily produces it is known. As for perception, you per-
ceive your entity (muwiyyah) by your being (dhat), not by some of your faculties, since, if you perceive your being by some of your faculties, such as external sense, imagination, or estimation, that which is perceived would not be the one that perceives; while, along with your perception of your being, you perceive that you perceive only by yourself, so that you are both perceiver and perceived.

Further, if that which perceives yourself were a power other than your being, it would subsist either in yourself or in some body. If it subsists in yourself, the existence of your soul would be on account of the power of your soul, and so goes back to itself together with the power, and would not be on account of something else. If that power subsists in a body, while your soul does not subsist in that body, the perceiver would be that body [perceiving] by that power something incorporeal. There would be no perception of your being in any respect, nor any apprehension by your being of its specific being. There would be rather some body sensing something other than itself; just as you sense your body, although the apprehension by the physical faculty of an incorporeal substance is something impossible. If your soul, by means of that power, subsists in that body, we have shown the impossibility of that, for it makes the existence of the soul and
its power to belong to something else. The soul, then, by that power, would apprehend neither its being nor that body, for the entity of the power and the soul together would belong to something else, which is that body. If the substance of the soul is the power by means of which it apprehends, then they are not separate.

11. If it is asked, how do we know that our perception of our being is our understanding of it? It may be some other apprehension, which does not require that the real nature of our being occur to us. Rather it is an impression of some kind which occurs to us from our own being, so that that impression is not itself the real being. It is not impossible for us, then, to have a real existence from which there comes to us some impression, and so we perceive that. In that case the impression is not itself the reality, and therefore, it does not mean that we have our being occurring to our being.

We reply: Anyone who does not conceive the reality of his entity does not understand his entity, for apprehension is nothing but the verification of the reality of the thing as apprehended, which is the meaning of the thing in relation to the name it has.

As to his saying, "There comes to us an impression
and we perceive that", it either makes the perception the very occurrence of the impression or something that follows the occurrence of the impression. If it is the very occurrence of the impression, then his saying, "So we perceive that impression" has no meaning. It is rather another name and another saying synonymous to it. If the perception is something that follows it, then it is either the occurrence of the idea of the entity of the thing or something else. If it is something else, the perception is the attainment of what is not the entity and the idea of the thing. If it is it, it follows that the entity of the being, in order that the entity of the being may occur to it, has need of another impression by which the entity of the being is attained - some impression producing it. So it is not something that is impressed but something that comes into existence. If the entity of the being occurs a second time in another state of abstraction, or of detachment of what is accidental and additional qualities related to it, then the intelligible thought object is that which is in another state, while what we say is about the entity itself and its constant substance in both cases.

12. If someone says, You have mentioned that which prevents understanding is matter and being occupied with the body. What is the evidence that the
obstacle is matter and limited to matter?

We reply: Whoever knows intelligent being really, knows that its obstacle is matter, for the being in which the real nature of things is manifested is substance, which is free from enveloping corporeal qualities, and which does not contain what exists potentially (mā bi' l-quwwah). This is the real nature of every substance, for it is not affected nor is it acted upon by alien enveloping qualities. If it is affected by an alien enveloping [corporeal] quality, it is on account of matter, for it is matter which alien and accidental qualities envelop. Therefore all that is intelligence is self-subsistent, free of matter, not acted upon, nor affected, with nothing existing potentially in it; and all that exists for it is immediate and direct.

13. If it is said, What you have mentioned overthrows a great article of faith, for the trend of this statement requires that our soul be a material substance, since it is well known that it receives the intelligibles gradually, and is affected and acted upon by alien enveloping qualities. If it were not a material substance, it should not be affected, and ought to attain the intelligibles directly. But it is well known that the case is contrary to that.
We answer: You miss a fine point. We said, All that is intelligence is self-subsistent and is not acted upon, which [fact] is a universal affirmative proposition. Its contrary is a particular affirmative proposition, which is, that some of what is self-subsistent and not acted upon is intelligence. So it is not necessary that our soul should be a self-subsistent substance, free of material concomitants and corporeal attributes.

It is true that it receives the intelligibles only little by little, because with many intelligibles most souls need the assistance of the body. But the body does not obey it and does not share in its purpose. So its purposes and desires are cut off from it. If it obeys it in an instant it is like a flash of lightning, for that is followed by what confuses its thought and ruins its time. We ask God for support, direction and guidance to the right path.

14. If it is said, You have said: When your being occurs to you it is an intelligible for you. The proof of this is that the being occurs either to someone other than you or not to some one other than you. If it does not occur to some one other than you then it occurs to you. But how do we know [that]? Perhaps it occurs neither to someone else nor to himself [i.e., yourself].
We answer: This is the desire for some step between negation and affirmation, for which there is no expedient. Further if your being were not yours you would not say, "My being and myself", for if it belonged to someone else it would not accept this relationship. Furthermore, the confirmation about this, which is a great secret and the opening of a chapter in the treasures of knowledge, is that the pure real nature of a thing does not exist as an individual without necessary qualities, by means of which it is an individual, for with respect to its real nature it is one thing, while with respect to the corollary qualities which it necessarily has it is something else. In brief, if the real nature is taken together with the corollary qualities, it is one thing, for it exists as an individual, not only because it is a reality but rather because it necessarily has corollary qualities, for by those corollary qualities it exists as an individual. Therefore the real nature of the being in itself (not by some other condition) is something, while as an individual existent it is something else; for there is a differentiation that accepts possessive and other relationships.

May God be our guide.

15. If it is said, You have mentioned that the soul has a mental power by means of which it is capable of
attaining the intelligibles. If this mental power by which it attains the intelligible forms is a power that comes upon the soul, then the soul is composite, while you have demonstrated that it is one, not composite. Then the demonstration after that to the effect that it is not corrupted by death is not valid. If it [the mental power] is not a power that comes upon it, but is a perfection[ of the soul], [the soul] therefore is affected just as it affects; and just as it acts it is acted upon. Further, what is the proof that it is not a power that comes upon [the soul] but is perfection? Then, if it is perfection, how is this problem to be solved?

We reply: You should know that the soul in itself is a substance, and is not of a composite nature when it is considered with that mental power which exists; while its perfection comes only from outside. So it is not affected as it affects; nor is it acted upon as it acts. It is as if this perfection produces forms in the substance of the soul. So with respect to the fact that it conceives the soul by them, it is a perfection; while with respect to its being capable by them of understanding other forms that are intelligible, it is a power. But as a corollary quality it [the power] is neither a perfecting quality nor an accident.
16. If it is said, You have defined with proofs that the soul is one of the incorporeals: how then does it benefit by the body with its external sense and retentive imagination? How does it acquire knowledge by means of the faculty of imagination and obtain virtues and acquire vices by means of the bodily faculties? How do obedience and perseverance in worship have effect in enlightening and refining [the soul]? How can disobedience [to God] and indulgence in lusts have effect so that there arise from them up to the soul darkness by means of which the innate capacity becomes worthless?

We reply: This is a very noble question, but keeping away from it is more noble still; for to prove it is very difficult. The way to [solve] it is only through ecstasy and sure mystical knowledge (al-wijdān wa'la'ırfān yaqān). By natural constitution the soul is created capable of knowledge, which knowledge comes to it gradually. So the use of thought and imagination and the utilization of the faculties are indispensable for it, as we have already said, and as we shall mention later on.

As to the effect of obedience and disobedience on enlightening and darkening [respectively], that is so be-

(9) Another case of regular chiasmus.
cause the happiness of the soul and the perfection of its substance lie in its turning its face in the direction of the Real One, turning away from the external senses, entering on the divine path and seeking continuation of the shining of the light of the Real One upon its inner self. Everything that prevents [it] from that lowers it in rank. In the measure that it turns away from the presence of the Divine Majesty and from looking in the direction of the Divine One, by following lusts, to that extent the Divine lights turn away from it. The more disciplined it is in dealing with the intelligibles the nearer it is to happiness, for the soul has nearness and remoteness. Its nearness is in proportion with religious sciences and the attainment of virtues, while its remoteness lies in its ignorance and the vices acquired.

By this appears the secret of the lights resulting from following the Apostle of God in what he did and what he forbore to do, in his words and deeds, as he has a great

+ (Adrab) from tadrīb. [The adjective derived from tadrīb is mudarrab, whose comparative degree is akthar or a'ızam tadrīb , while adrab is the comp. deg. of darab (from darab) which is practically the same in meaning as mudarrab.- Ma'lıf,L., Al-Munjid, (Beirut, 1949) p. ( ) in the introduction about al-al-tadrīb, esp. point 1; cf. p. 201(a). Cf. also Redhouse, p. 834, 1785.]

(10) Harakat wa sakānāt - Lit., "movements and quiescences", idiomatically, "whatever one does", Redhouse, p. 1067 (Sakānāt), cf. p. 778 (harakāt)
specific quality in enlightening the heart; for the evident realities are disclosed in the heart only by the latter being put in the right condition, burnished and enlightened. Its being made radiant is by its turning towards the Divine One, and by turning away from the requirements of passions. Its being made right is by good character conformable to Muslim usage (sunnah). Its enlightenment is by means of devotional exercises and the [various] offices of worship. There is no stronger proof whatever in this regard than experience and ecstasy. Whoever has no way to it by mystical knowledge nor by ecstasy should [nevertheless] believe in it, for it is the stage of faith; and God gives success.
PART THREE

THE SOURCES OF VIRTUES AND VICES

You should know that most of the virtues and vices issue only from three faculties in man; the faculties of imagination, physical desires and ire. These three both assist and obstruct the soul.

CHAPTER XII

ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION

[A] The imaginative faculty has two aspects:

[1] One of them follows the external sense, from which it receives sensible forms, as the sense transmits to it, [either] (a) really, or (b) apparently.

(a) The real [form] is the form which in itself is such [i.e., real]. (b) The apparent one is like the form that is not in itself such [real] but seems to be such, such as mirage, echo, the[seemingly] moving object that is still, or the [seemingly] still object that is moving, with the retentive imagination imagining them to be such.

[2] The second aspect follows the intelligence, by means of which it receives the intelligible forms [a]
truly, or \( b \) falsely, as the rational thinking leads thereto.

\( a \) The true [form] corresponds to the form which is such in itself. \( b \) The false [form] corresponds to the form which is not such in itself but seems to be such, such as dubieties, errors, magic, divination. Minds stray from the straight track; so they see error as right, and right as error. That is why it was said, "Show us the truth, as truth, and grant us to follow it". The right thing is not to depend upon them so long as one has not weighed them by the laws of logical and clear proofs. Further, the forms may fall upon the imagination immediately, as when a mirror faces another mirror and the form falls upon one of them instantaneously just as it does upon the other. That happens when the form falls upon the already sentient sight.

The sounds heard by the sense of hearing fall upon it in order and gradation according to the succession of the letters and words. With regard to intelligence, the intelligibles may fall upon it all at once as \( b \) the case is with \( a \) the mirror facing each other. That is so because knowledge is imprinted upon the beings of the heavenly souls (\textit{mu'fus samawiyyah}). If the human soul comes in

\( 1 \) Also called \textit{faliqyyah} and \textit{malakiyyah}. They are
contact with it [i.e., the intelligence] forms of them [i.e., intelligibles] come upon it [the soul] in accordance with its brightness and capacity. The explanation of this will come later in the [section about] prophecy and Apostleship. Furthermore, if that is truth it is prophetic inspiration (waḥy), minor inspiration (iḥlām) and intuitive insight (ḥaḍa). Prophetic inspiration is to see the form of the angel [of revelation], while in minor inspiration and intuitive insight he is not seen. If it [the intelligible] is false, it is magic, divination and augury. It may fall upon it, that is upon the soul, in order and gradation in accordance with syllogistic premisses, that is, if they [the premisses] are absolutely certain the case is one of demonstration and proof. If they are popular and acceptable to people, it is [the case of] a logical probability. If they are convincing arguments against an opponent it [i.e., the case] is incontrovertible. If they are false, the falsehood being apparent, it is sophistick. If they are imaginative, it is poetical.

angelic souls that move the celestial bodies. They also know particular things. - Goichon, Lexique, § 712, nos. 6-8.

(2) Lit., [a case] of argumentation, controversial (jadali).
Furthermore, if the retentive imagination is dominated by sense, it likens every intelligible to a sensory object, while if it is dominated by the intelligence it likens every sensory object to an intelligible. Thus the retentive imagination of the prophets, may blessing and peace be upon them, sees in the sensory object an intelligible idea, which [idea] is that from which it [the sense perception] emanates, or upon which it comes and to which it returns. So it [the retentive imagination] sees a person in this world and judges him to be an apple of paradise; and it sees a person whose hand has been cut off for God's sake with two wings having grown for him, with which he flies in paradise, and a person killed for God's sake living, subsistent, happy and joyful for what God had given him out of His bounty. And contrariwise it sees in an intelligible a sensory object, and in the spiritual a corporeal thing. Behold Gabriel came to you to teach you the question of your religion, "and he appeared to her [Mary] in the form of a normal human being". (3) Still more, from the strength of the shining of the light of his [the prophet's'] retentive imagination and that of his spirit he shines upon anyone who is comparable to him

(3) 19:17. Hence Mary belongs to the class of prophets.
in that power and capacity, and so sees him as the prophet saw. The [faculty of] imagination is that which makes a distinction between the two worlds and which is a screen between the two seas and distinguishes between the two realms. Without it there would be left no sensory object or intelligible for man, neither would the form and idea be apprehended by the apprehending sense and reason.

The faculty of imagination is not similar in the various classes of people, but it has degrees and superiorities; it may perhaps be contradictory. So [1] there is that [imagination] which is proper to angels that are spiritual. They descend to him [a person], come down upon him, appear to him, affect him and take his form, so that the person speaks with their speech, while they speak with his tongue; he sees with their sight, while they see with his eyes; he hears with their [sense of] hearing while they hear with his ears. They are "angels who walk on earth with tranquility". Truly those who say, 'Our Lord is God, and then live uprightly have the angels constantly descend upon them". (6)

(4) Meaning the spiritual and our own.
(5) The point where the Divine and created existences meet, and through which God and man communicate - Redhouse, p.343.
(6) An adopted quotation of surah 17:95/97(a), which reads, "Say, 'If there were on earth angels walking about in tranquility..." (=
Qil, 'Law kānā ḫīl-qālīhā maš'īkatūn yamashūna mutma'innūn..."
(7) 41:30[a].
[2]. There is that [imagination] which is proper to devilish satans. They descend upon him [a person], affect him and take his form, so that when they overcome him he speaks with their words while they talk with his tongue; he sees with their sight while they see with his eyes; he hears with their ears while they hear with his ears. They are "human satans" who walk on earth flaming. "Shall I tell you upon whom the satans constantly descend? They descend upon every guilty liar. They listen, but most of them are liars." Wherever there is uprightness in the condition of the retentive imagination, there is the dwelling of the angels; but wherever there is crookedness in the condition of the retentive imagination, there is the dwelling of the satans.

(3). The faculty of physical desires also has harm and benefit. It is more difficult to correct than the rest of the faculties, for it is the oldest faculty existent in man, clinging more to him, and has a greater control over him, for it is born with him. It exists in him and in animals, to whose genus he belongs, and even in plants, whose genus is like his. Then there is in him the power of seal[for the right], and finally there is in him the power of thought, utterance and discrimination. Man is not distinguishable

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(8) 6:112[b].
(9) 26:221-223.
from the class of beasts and free from the bondage of carnal desires except by mortifying the passions, or by conquering and subjugating them, if he cannot mortify them, for they harm him, deceive him, delay him, and turn him from the path that leads to the other world and obstruct him. When man subjugates them or mortifies them, he becomes free and clear, indeed, more than that, godly and god-like; his needs decrease, and he is in no need of what others have, is generous with what he has and beneficent in his dealings.

The benefit of the physical desires is in that the more they are disciplined the more they lead to bliss and to proximity to the Lord of glory, so much so that were they conceived as being removed it would not be possible for us to attain to the next world. That is so because attainment to the next world is by worship; but there is no way to worship except through earthly life, and no way to earthly life except by taking care of the body; but there is no way to take care of it except by restoring what it has lost; and there is no way to restore what is has lost except by taking nourishment; but no nourishment can be taken except through physical desire.

Further, the world is the seed plot of the next world, for the subsistence of the well-being of the world and the progress of living are [realized] by means of this
[faculty of] physical desires. So, if it were conceived as being removed, the order of religion and the world would be damaged; practical dealing would be removed from among men; and law and government would be removed too. Therefore this faculty of physical desires is like an enemy whose harm is feared on the one hand, and on the other hand his benefit is desired, and whose assistance must be sought in spite of his enmity. So, the right thing for a rational person to do is to get his [the enemy's] Benefit, without trusting in him or relying upon him except in so far as he benefits by him. How true is what al-Mutanabbi says in this connection:

"Among the bitter things of this world
for a wise man is to see
That he must seek the friendship of an enemy". (11)

One of the effective methods in subjugating these physical desires is to govern them by means of the power of zeal [for the right], so that they may be subjugated and may not tend towards blameworthy and low character—just as the way to subjugate anger with its ferocity is to govern the irascible faculty by the grasp of [the faculty of] physical desires until its burning or excess subside—for it is sub-

missive to greed and to arising needs. Among the ways to
treat the excess of physical desires in order to break them
and check them well are to acquaint oneself with the virtues
of abstemiousness from the traditions and records, and to
learn about the benefit of abstemiousness, such as purity of
heart, the kindling of the mental power, keenness of mind,
the gift of thought that leads to mystical knowledge and
insight into the truths about the Real One, and the tenderness
and purity of heart by means of which it [the heart] is made
ready to apprehend the pleasure of communion and being affected
by devotional exercises; and such as brokenness of spirit and
humility, and cessation of insolence, mirth, enjoyment, and
conceit which [conceit] is the source of rebellion against
and neglect of God; and not forgetting the punishment and
torment to be inflicted by God, nor forgetting those who
deserve punishment.

Among the advantages of abstemiousness are: [1] the
breaking of the physical desires that call for disobedience,
(12)
and the conquering of "the soul that is prone to evil", [2]
the driving away of sleep, continual watchfulness and facilita-
tion of perseverance in worship, [3] the health of the body,
repelling the diseases that make life wretched, prevent wor-

(12) 12 : 35(a); p. 13, n. 8 above.
ship and confuse the power of thought, [4] the decrease of provisions, being clothed with the dignity of contentment and being independent of men, which is the seat of sincerity and dignity, and [5] the ability to give out constantly, to be generous and distribute alms to orphans and the poor.

In brief, the key to ascetic, chaste and scrupulous living is eating little and subjugating the physical desires, while the key to worldliness and the door to yearning for it is the free flow of physical desires according to nature.

This faculty of physical desires has two branches:
[1] One of them is the appetite of the belly [for food and drink]. [2] The second is concupiscence [i.e., sexual desire].
The appetite of the belly is for a person's individual survival, while concupiscence is for his survival through his line, descendants and species. But it contains defects that tend to destroy religion and the world unless it (concupiscence) is governed, conquered, and checked by means of

+ If you excite the soul to become desirous [or greedy] it becomes such. But when it is restored to little it becomes content. [from an elegy, that starts with the verse, "A min al-sanûni wa raybihâ tatawaija?"..." composed by Abu Dhu'ayb al-Hudhayli about his eight sons who were killed, or, according to another story, ten sons who died in a plague. He himself died in Egypt in the time of Uthmân the Caliph, probably in the year 28/649. - Al-Kifahânî, A.F., Al-Ichânî (Cairo, 1336) Vol. 5, p. 264; Al-Qârashî, A.Z.A.Kh., Samharat Ashfâr al-Îrab (Egypt, 1330 H.) p. 254ff. Cf Lane, p. 40 [Col. 21].]
the reins of piety, and turned to the bounds of temperance.
Were it not for this concupiscence women would not have au-
(13) thority over men, nor "would they be snares of satan". All
abominations come from this concupiscence when it is in excess,
as all shameful qualities come from it, when it is exting-
guished and deficient, as in the case of the impotent and
unmasculine.

It is praiseworthy that it should be temperate and
obedient to the intelligence and the divine law in its use
and restraint. However excessive it may be, it can be broken
by hunger, marriage, lowering the gaze, lack of attention to
it, along with occupying oneself with religious sciences and
acquiring the virtues, for in this way it is repelled.

[6]. The Irascible faculty is a brand of fire
derived from the burning fire of God which is on the watch,
except that it only watches over the heart, for it is hidden
within the heart as the fire is hidden under the ashes. Con-
celled pride produces it from the heart of "every proud and
(14) perverse [person]" as fire is produced from iron. It is
revealed to men of understanding with the light of certainty
that man has a temperament derived from the stoned and ac-
cursed satan. So whoever is aroused by the fire of anger has

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(13) Tradition attributed to Khalid ibn al-Juhayn with
weak authority - FIraqi, p. 86.
(14) Nulli jabbārīn ānīū. The statement is taken from
Surah 11:59/62.
his relationship to satan strengthened, since he has said,

"Thou hast created me of fire, and hast created him of clay",  
for the characteristic of clay is inertia, stillness and  
acceptance of impressions, while the characteristic of fire  
is to flame, burn, move, to be troubled, to ascend and to  
refuse impressions. Some of the fruits of anger are holding  
a grudge, envy and many other evil qualities, whose seat and  
source are "some small thing, which, when corrected, the rest  
of the body is made whole thereby".

In this faculty there is [the possibility of] excess  
and dominance which lead to destruction and perdition.  
There is also [the possibility of] deficiency and extinction  
that come short of praiseworthy qualities, such as fortitude,  
forebearance, zeal [for the right], and courage, while from  
moderation there issue most of the praiseworthy qualities,  
such as generosity, courageous aid, magnanimity, endurance,

Satan said this when he refused to bow down to Adam after  
all the angels bowed to him. — Wensinck, A.J., "Iblis",  
II. Islam Vol. II, p. 351f. According to Wensinck’s Con-  
gordance, Tirmidhi has, in his Sahih, the tradition, "Satan  
was created of clay" (inna ‘l-shaytanah khuliga min turab"),  
which source was not available. The tradition was not  
found in his Sunan (Cairo, 1356/1937).  
(16) See p. 14, n. 16 above.  
forebearance, steadfastness, gallantry and dignity. The causes that arouse anger are vanity, conceit, mirth, jesting, mockery, contention, opposition, injustice and strong ambition for excess of wealth and reputation, all of which are bad and blameworthy qualities according to law and reason. There is no deliverance whatever from anger as long as these causes remain. So its causes must be removed by their opposites so that anger may be conquered and returned to the state of moderation. This is the method of treatment for both passions and mind.
CHAPTER XIII

EXPOSITION OF THE MAIN VIRTUES

Although the virtues are many in number they can be included under four which include all their branches and kinds. They are: [A] Wisdom (hikmah), [B] Courage (shajā'ah), [C] Sobriety (ra'ah), and [D] Justice (ta'dilah). Wisdom is the virtue of the mental faculty. Courage is the virtue of the irascible faculty. Sobriety is the virtue of the faculty of physical desire. Justice consists in the occurrence of these faculties in their proper order, for by means of it all things are brought to completion. That is why it has been said, "It is by justice that heavens and earth subsist." Let us now comment on these main virtues and what proceeds from them and the kinds of virtues they include.

[A]. By wisdom (hikmah) we mean what God has magnified by His word, "He who is given wisdom has been given much good," and what the Apostle of God meant by saying, "Wisdom is what the believer seeks." It is related to the

(1) Probably not a tradition. Not found in the Concor-
danee nor in the Handbook.
(2) 2:269[b]/272[b].
(3) Tradition. Not found in the sources available.

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mental faculty. You have come to know in the foregoing that the soul has two faculties, (1) one directed upwards, by means of which it [the soul] receives the truths of the necessary religious sciences, universal and speculative, from the "Heavenly Host". They are the sciences that are certain and true from and unto all eternity. They do not change with the change of times and nations. Such are the knowledge of God, His attributes, angels, books, Apostles, the classes of His creation, His ordering of His earthly and spiritual worlds, the states of the beginning and return by way of creation and command respectively, and the states of the resurrection [world], such as bliss and misery - in short all the truths of religious knowledge.

(2) The second faculty is the one directed downwards, that is, the direction of the body, its administration and government. By means of it the soul apprehends what is good in religious works. It is called practical intelligence. By means of it one can govern the faculties of his soul, his household and his fellow citizens.

The term wisdom is applied to it from one aspect

(5) i.e., in the last day. See ma'ād on p. 14, n. 12 above.
figuratively, for the objects of its knowledge are transformed like mercury, and are not permanent but change with the change of circumstances and individuals. Among the things it knows is the fact that the free bestowal of money is a virtue, but that it may become a vice at certain times and in the case of certain persons. That is why the term wisdom is truer of the first even though it is more common with the second, which is like the perfection and completion of the first. This is moral wisdom (ḥikmah khulqiyah), while the first is speculative religious wisdom (ḥikmah 'ilmiyah nazarīyyah). By moral wisdom we mean a state and virtue of the rational soul by means of which it governs the faculties of irascibility and physical desire, and measures their movements according to the bounds proper in restraint and use. It [the moral wisdom] is the knowledge of right actions. The management of the affairs of this world is received from the speculative reason (ʻaql nazari). The speculative reason receives from the angels universals, while the practical reason receives from the speculative reason particulars, and governs the body as the law requires. This is according to the example of the Intelligence, the Soul and the Heavenly Bodies, for the Intelligence apprehends the universals, and has in itself nothing potential. From it [the Intelligence] the Soul apprehends the universals, and by means of the universals it apprehends the particulars, and so moves heav-
ens, on account of which motion the elements (fanāṣir) move, from which [elements] the composite objects are formed. In like manner our intelligence receives from the angels the universals, which universals overflow upon the practical reason. The practical reason, by means of the body and the faculty of imagination, apprehends the particulars of the bodily world and motivates them by the obligation of law, and so good moral qualities are brought into being.

This moral virtue has at either extreme two vices, 1 deceit (khībah) and 2 stupidity (balah). 1 Deceit (khībah) forms the extremity of abundance and excess. It is a state in which man becomes the possessor of deluding activities and cunning devices by using freely the faculties of irascibility and physical desire so that they may move more than they should towards the objective.

2. Stupidity (balah) results from its deficiency and shortage of moderation. It is a state of the soul in which it does less than is necessary with [the faculties of] irascibility and physical desire. Its source [stupidity] is

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slow understanding and little comprehension of right action. Under the virtue of wisdom come excellent management, good mind, keen judgment and right thinking. Under the vice of desit come cunning and shrewdness, while under the vice of stupidity come ignorance, dullness and insanity.

[3]. Courage (ṣaḥā'ah) is the virtue of the irascible faculty in that it is strong of zeal (for the right), but along with its strong zeal it inclines towards the reason which has been disciplined by divine law in what it induces to and refrains from. It is the mean between two vices bounding it, namely, [1] recklessness and [2] cowardice.

[1]. Recklessness is at the extremity which is above moderation, which is the state in which a man undertakes dangerous things from which one ought in reason to refrain.

[2]. Cowardice lies in the direction of deficiency, which is the state in which the movement of the irascible faculty is withheld from what is obligatory. So it turns one from undertaking where that is obligatory. Whenever these qualities are found these actions issue from them, that is, from the quality of cowardice issues restraint that is not

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in place, while from recklessness [there issues] enterprise that is not in place. Both are blameworthy qualities.

From courage, enterprise and restraint issue where and how they should. This is the praiseworthy good quality. It is it what God meant when He said, "Strong against unbelievers; merciful among themselves." So neither strength nor mercy are praiseworthy in every situation. Rather what is praiseworthy is that which accords with the touchstone of reason and law. Given that, one should consider: if his temperament tends towards deficiency, which is cowardice, then he should engage in deeds of courage as an imposed duty, and continue doing them until by constant practice they become natural and characteristic of him. After that, deeds of courage will come from him naturally. If it [his temperament] tends towards the extremity of excess, which is recklessness, then let him make himself perceive the consequences of things and their great danger, and let him impose restraint upon himself until he returns to moderation or what approximates to it, since it is hard to achieve a true moderation. If that were conceivable, the soul would leave the body and have no connection with it. So it [the soul] would not suffer at all by grieving over any of it that [the body] misses, nor

(8) 48 : 29 [a].
would the soul be grieved over it [the body], on account of its joy in what is manifested to it [the soul] of the beauty and glory of the Real One. But since that is difficult, it is said, "There is no one of you but will enter it. [That] was a decreed judgment with your Lord".

Muhammad said, "The surah of Hûd and its sisters have made me old", meaning by that God's word that says, "Be upright as you have been commanded"; for continuance upon the straight path in search of the middle way between these extremes is difficult, since it is finer than a hair and sharper than a sword, as the state of the bridge in the next world is described. Whoever is upright on the path in this world will be upright on it in the next world too. Indeed he will be upright in the next world since one dies according as he lived, and is raised according as he dies. That is why in every cycle of the worship (rak'ah) one must repeat surat al-Fâtihah [Surah 1], which includes God's words, "Guide us in
the straight path"; for that is the most precious of all things and the hardest for a seeker. If that were imposed as duty in one moral quality only, our difficulty in it would be great. How much greater is that difficulty since that is imposed on us in all moral qualities, which are innumerable, as will follow. There is no escape whatever from these dangers except by success and mercy from God. That is why the Apostle said, "All men will surely perish except those with knowledge; all those with knowledge will perish except those who act; and all those who act will perish except those who are sincerely devoted, and even those who are sincerely devoted are in great danger". We ask God Who is great to aid us with success from Him that we may pass over the dangers in this world without being deceived by the things that cause self-deception. So much for this.

Next, the virtues that are classed under courage are generosity, courageous aid, magnanimity, fortitude, forbearance, endurance, nobility, gallantry and dignity.

Under the vice of recklessness come haughtiness, boldness, unseemly behavior, quickness of anger, pride and conceit.

(13) 1: 6/5.
(14) Tradition - not found in the Concordance, the Handbook and Ṭaḥāfī.
Under the vice of cowardice come meanness, shrinking with fear, meanness of spirit, dismay, feeling of defeat, (15) baseness and shamefulness.

(c). Sobriety (ṣaffah) is the virtue of the faculty of physical desires, which is its submission easily and smoothly to the rational faculty, so that its restraint and activity may be according as the direction of this faculty. Two vices bound it: [1] Greed (ṣahrah), and [2] extinction of the physical desires (khumūd al-ṣahwah). [1] Greed is extreme desire for excessive pleasure, of which the rational faculty disapproves and which it prohibits. [2] Extinction is the deficiency of the physical desires to seek what intelligence requires [one] to obtain. Both are blameworthy just as sobriety, which is the mean, is praiseworthy. A man should watch over his physical desires, for they often tend to excess, especially in the case of sex and appetite, in the case of wealth and power and love of praise, excess in which things is imperfection; for perfection is only in moderation, whose touchstone is reason and law. This means that one should know the purpose intended in the creation of physical desire

(15) The term takhāsus actually means taking, or treating a thing in turn, e.g., takhāssūl-shayr'a baynahum (Muhīṭ al-Muḥīṭ, Vol. I, p. 539). It is wrongly used here for ḍhussah or ḍhussah = "vile", "baseness", "ignobility", "meanness", "contemptibility". — Ibn Mānsūr, A.F., Līsān al-ʿArab (Egypt, 1300-1308 A.H.) VII, p. 365 (hereafter referred to as Līsān al-ʿArab); Al-Zabīdī, S.M., Tāʾ al-ʿArūs (Egypt, 1306 A.H.), IV, pp. 137ff (hereafter referred to as Tāʾ); Lane, II, p. 736.
and power of anger; to know for example that the desire for food is created only to induce one to take nourishment to replace the components of the body which are dissipated through natural heat, so that the body may continue to live and the physical senses may remain sound, and that by means of the body one can obtain spiritual knowledge, and apprehend the realities of things, and become like those of the exalted rank in relation to it [the body], who are the angels. By means of it [sobriety] it [the soul] attains its perfection and bliss. If any one knows this, his purpose in [taking] food will be to be strong for worship, rather than to derive pleasure from it. So he will be content and will be moderate in eating, without doubt, and so his greed for it will not be great.

He will also know that sexual desire is created in him to urge him to the sexual act, which is the cause of the survival of the human species. So he will seek marriage for the sake of children and for the protection of character, not for amusement and enjoyment. And if he enjoys it and amuses himself with it, it will be as a means to companionableness and inclination towards fine friendship, which leads to the continuance of marriage. Thus he will limit his marriages to the number whose duties he will not be incapable of fulfilling. Whoever knows that will find limitation easy. Then he will not compare himself with the law-giver (Muhammad), for
his numerous marriages did not keep him too preoccupied for devotional remembrance of God. It did not force him to seek after the world for the sake of marriage. Whoever thinks that what did not hurt the law-giver will not hurt him resembles him who thinks that the impurities that do not affect the deep sea will not affect a little jug that has been filled from the sea. Yet how many a fool deems himself shrewd and compares himself with him [Muhammad], comparing angels with blacksmiths; and so he perishes without knowing why. We seek refuge with God from blindness of insight. All this belongs to the field of sobriety. Things classed under the virtues and vices of sobriety are as follows:

[1]. Virtues: These include modesty, forgiveness, fortitude, generosity, excellence of judgment, good spirit, gentleness, orderliness, contentment, poise, scrupulousness, cheerfulness, helpfulness and excellence of appearance, I mean the adornment which is obligatory without any foppishness in it.

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[2]. Vices, which are greed and the exhaustion of the physical desires: These include bare-facedness, malice, wastefulness, stinginess, hypocrisy, dishonor, niggardliness, revelry, worthlessness, aloofness, stubbornness, flattery, envy and rejoicing at others' misfortunes.
(D). Justice (fädàlah) is the state of the three faculties in their proper arrangement according to the order necessary for their superiority along with their subordination. So it (justice) is not a particular one of the virtues but is a term for the totality of the virtues; for whenever there is praiseworthy order between a king and his army and subjects in that the king is wise and dominant, his army strong and obedient, and his subjects weak and submissive, it is said, "There is justice in the land". Yet justice will never be established if some, but not all of them, possess these attributes. Similarly the just state in the realm of the body is found [in a balance] between these attributes. Justice in the moral qualities of the soul is undoubtedly followed by justice in practical dealing and in government, which justice is a derivative of it; [the first]. Justice means approved order either in character or in right dealings, or in the particulars of that by which a community exists. Justice in dealings is the golden mean between the two vices of (17) cheating others (ghabn) and defrauding oneself (taghábun),


(17) Taghábun means "mutual injustice or fraud". The author has used it in the sense of inghibân, or ghabn al-nafs (= defrauding, or doing injustice to oneself). Muhît al-Muhît, Vol. II, p. 1515; Lane, VI,p. 2227. See also 64.19 in Saydhâwî, Anwâr II, p. 331.
which justice is for one to take what he should take and to
give what he should give. Cheating (ghabn) means to take what
does not belong to him, while defrauding oneself (taghabun) in
business is to give away what does not bring back praise or re-
ward in return. Justice in government is to arrange the parts of
the city in a way that is similar to the arrangement of the
particular parts of the self, so that the city - in its com-
position, in the mutual relations among its parts and in the
cooperation of its basic elements about the objective desired
from their union - may be like one individual. Thus every
thing is put in its place, its inhabitants may be divided
into those to be served and not to serve, those that serve
and not to be served, and a class that serve from one aspect
and from another aspect are themselves served. This is similar
to the faculties of the soul; for some are served without serv-
ing, such as the acquired intelligence ('aql mustafad), some
serve but are not served, such as the faculty that repels
excess, while still others both serve and are served, such as
the internal faculties. Justice is not bounded by two vices
but by the vice of injustice, which is its opposite, since
there is no middle [state] between order and disorder. It is
by order such and justice such as this that heavens and earth
subsist, so that the whole cosmos is like one individual
whose faculties and parts cooperate, and in whom precedence
and succession are in order, by putting first what rightly
precedes and putting last what rightly comes after. May His
greatness be exalted and His power magnified.

The explanation of that order of absolute spiritual and absolute corporeal, of what is between the spiritual and the corporeal, and the division of the world into what affects but is not affected, such as the Intelligences, what is affected but does not affect, such as Bodies, and what is both affected and affecting, such as Souls, which receive from the Intelligences and pass [what they receive] to the heavens - all that is done by means of the decree of the Omnipotent and Omniscient One, may His glory be exalted, His (18)

Reality magnified, and His authority held complete. So, justice includes all virtues, while injustice includes all vices. God is the One Who gives successful aid in reaching the straight path, which is the mean between the two extremities of excess and deficiency, so that when all that comes to pass he [man] obtains perfection that brings him near to God in rank in accordance with the nearness of angels, that are allowed to approach God. To God belong the greatest splendor and the most complete perfection. Every existent object yearns for the perfection that is possible for it, for that is its desired goal. If it obtains it [perfection], it joins the dominion of the world which is above it; but if it is

deprived of it, then it is cast down to the perigee that is below it. So, man is between [two things]: either to obtain perfection, and so join the dominion of the angels in nearness to God, which is his bliss; or to turn to the vices of the faculties of physical desires and irascibility, that are common to him and beasts, and then descend to the rank of beasts and perish forever, which is his misery. May God be our refuge from it by His grace.
[CHAPTER XIV]

EXPOSITION OF AN ANALOGY OF THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THE HEART TO
KNOWLEDGE

You should know that the heart, which is another term for the spirit that orders all the organs [of the body] and is served by all its faculties and members, in relation to the realities of objects of knowledge, corresponds to a mirror in relation to the forms of colored objects. Just as a colored object has a form with an image for that form that is reflected on the mirror and produced in it, in the same way every object of knowledge has a reality, which is its form that is reflected on the mirror, I mean the mirror of the heart, and becomes clear in it. Further, just as the mirror is one thing, the form of the individuals another thing, and the occurrence of its image in the mirror is another thing, so that they are three things, and have need of a fourth thing, namely light by means of which the form is revealed and appears on the mirror, likewise here are four things: the heart, the realities of things, the occurrence and presence of the impression of the realities on the heart, and a light by means of which the realities are revealed in the heart,
which light in the divine law is a term for Gabriel, peace be upon him. In the terminology of philosophers it is a term for the Intelligence, by means of which knowledge comes upon the human spirits. So, the knower is a term for the heart in which the mental image of the realities of things inheres. Knowledge is a term for the occurrence of this image in the mirror. The fire and the rays of light are a term for the angel whose duty it is to pour out knowledge upon human hearts.

For five reasons the forms are not revealed in the mirror: (1) because of the lack of form, such as the substance of iron before it is twisted, put into shape and polished, (2) because of impurity, rust and murkiness, even if the shape is complete, (3) because [the mirror] is turned aside to some other direction than that of the form [desired], as when the form is behind the mirror, (4) because some screen is placed between the mirror and the forms, and (5) ignorance of the direction in which the desired form is to be [found], on account of which ignorance it is impossible to turn the mirror in the direction of the form and make it face towards it. Similarly, the heart is a mirror capable of having the reality of all things manifested in it. The hearts are empty of it [the reality of things] only on account of these five reasons:
(1) A deficiency in itself (i.e., the heart), such as the heart of a boy, for the realities of the objects of knowledge are not manifested in it because of its deficiency, or such as a human spirit that is deficient in its original constitution, for, although the souls are of one species, yet in this species there are great differences and wide range.

(2) Because of the murkiness of disobedience and evil which accumulated on the surface of the heart on account of the many physical desires; for that prevents the heart from being clear and bright, and consequently prevents the appearance of the truth in it, just as the sun that is in part eclipsed loses its light and brilliance in proportion to its darkness. To this Muhammad referred when he said, "Whoever draws near to sin has his intelligence go away from him, never to return", that is, a murkiness has occurred in his heart, whose effect will never cease. Since his aim is to follow it up with a good deed which would wipe it out, if he performed that good deed, and the bad deed had not preceded it, the light of the heart would increase no doubt. But as the bad deed did precede, the benefit of the good deed dropped off. The heart, however, on account of it, returned to the

(1) Tradition - not mentioned in the Concordance, nor in the Handbook; nor is it found in Ithafat. "Iqra" says, "I have not found any basis for it". (Hab fala huy as-sag) -Ibid p. 11, where garafa (to commit) is substituted for garaba.
state in which it was before the bad deed took place, and so did not improve by it [the good deed]. To undertake to obey God and to turn away from the demands of physical desires, that is what renders the heart bright and clear. That is why God said, "Those who have struggled for Our sake, We shall surely guide in Our paths". Muhammad said, "If anyone acts according to what he knows, God will surely make him inherit the knowledge of what he does not know".

(3) Its turning aside from the direction of the truth which is desired, for even though the heart of him who is obedient and good is clear, yet the real truth is not manifested in it because he does not seek the divine truth, and does not cause his "mirror" to face in the desired direction. It may rather be that he is occupying his attention with details of bodily act of obedience, or with securing the means of living and so does not spend his thought in meditation upon the Divine Presence and hidden truths. Nothing is disclosed to him except details of defective religious works that he is thinking of, or hidden defects of the soul, if they are what he is thinking of, or matters of living, if they are

(2) 29:69(a).
(3) Tradition - not found in the Concordance, nor in the Handbook, nor in Ittibāf. According to ʿIraqī, it is quoted by ʿAbd Naʿīm from Anas - Ibid, p. 12,20.
what he is thinking of. If the limitation of attention to obedience and its details is a hindrance to the revelation of real truth, what of devoting attention to the worldly lusts and pleasures, and their attendant vanities? How would not all this prevent revelation (kashf) of the unseen?

(4) The veil (hijab): An obedient person, who has defeated his physical desires, and has devoted himself exclusively to reflection upon some truth may not have truth revealed to him, because it is veiled (mehijub) from him by some previous belief contrary to the truth, which belief he has maintained since childhood by way of blind acceptance of authority; for acceptance of a belief on account of good opinion stands between him and the real truth, and prevents the revelation to his heart of anything contrary to what he has accepted from external authority.

This also is a great veil, by means of which are veiled most theologians, those firmly attached to some doctrines, and even most righteous people who think about the kingdom of the heavens and the earth, because they are veiled by traditional beliefs which have hardened in them, and firmly established in their hearts, and have become a veil

(4) According to Durries kashf signifies revelation [of the truth of God to man]. Its opposite is hijab (=veil, curtain) which signifies the impressions made by the visible world phenomena on the heart, thus preventing it from admitting the revelation of truth, etc. (kashf)-cf. Redhouse, p.764,1552; for more details see E Islam Vol.II,p.300,787f.
between them and the apprehension of truths.

(5). Ignorance of the direction in which it is possible to come upon the knowledge sought, for the seeker after knowledge cannot possibly obtain knowledge by means of what is unknown, but rather by recalling the knowledge that accords with that which he is seeking. So when he recalls it and arranges it within himself in a special way known by the learned, he produces what he is in quest of by the method of logical inference (i'tibār) and obtaining what is unknown from what was previously known. This is the procedure of logic (qānūn mantiqī).

Logic (mantiq) is a system of laws, the observance of which preserves one from going astray in his thinking. So when he lets these laws and the method of syllogistic thinking (tafakkur) rule, then he comes upon the direction where the thing sought is, and consequently the truth of the thing sought becomes evident to his heart. For the knowledge sought is not something innate which has no need for painful seeking for evidence (istidlāl), speculation (nazar), and logical inference (i'tibār). On the contrary, it is not captured except by the net of existing knowledge. So all speculative knowledge is obtainable only from two previous propositions of knowledge which are coordinate and are paired in a special manner and according
to a certain one of the syllogistic figures, categorical (hamli) or conditional (ghartfi), conjunctive or disjunctive. From their pairing a third proposition of knowledge results, which, when obtained, is called conclusion (matijah), while before it is obtained it is called inference (matlib). Ignorance of those things, i.e., those premisses, the method of pairing [of the terms], and the syllogistic arrangement that leads to the inference, whether by conception (tasawwur) or belief (tadil), prevents knowledge.

This is also similar to the case of a mirror, where if you do not face it towards the form, the form does not fall upon it. The same would happen if there were any deviation from the direction of the forms. In the pursuit of knowledge strange ways are to be followed, for these are hidden distortions and perversions which are more strange than what we have mentioned in connection with the mirror. Rare upon the surface of the earth are those who find the right course to pursue in dealing with those distortions.

These are the causes that prevent hearts from acquiring knowledge of the realities of things. Otherwise, every heart is by natural constitution good for the knowledge of the reality [of things], even though there are great differences among them [the hearts], because it is a noble divine matter that, as we have mentioned, differs
from the rest of the substances of the world in this special property and nobility [i.e., the knowledge of the reality of things]. To it God referred in saying, "We have surely offered [the obligation of] trust to the heavens, the earth and the mountains, and they refused to take it upon themselves and were afraid of it, but man took it upon himself", indicating that he [man] has a special property, by means of which he is distinguished from the heavens, the earth and the mountains; and by means of it he became capable of taking the trust of God upon himself. That trust is knowledge and the doctrine of unity (tawḥīd). The heart of every human being is originally capable of taking the trust upon itself and able to bear it. But the causes we have mentioned hinder it from taking upon itself its obligations and attaining to its realization. That is why Muhammad said, "Every child is born in accordance with natural disposition (fitrah), but his parents make him Jewish, Christian or

(5) For al-Ghazālī the word of importance in this verse is hamala (pr. yahmilu, here yahmilna), which means both "to bear", "to undertake" and the like, or "to betray", "to be unfaithful to", and the like. Commentators on, and translators of the Qurʾān are divided as to the sense in which the word is used here. Lane gives both views, basing each one of them on Baydawī (q.v.) (in both cases), and on other authorities - Lane I, p. 102; II, p. 647. Al-Ghazālī gives the word the first meaning, "to bear", "to undertake".

(6) 33 : 72.

(7) For a full significance of fitrah see p. 60, n.4 above.
Magian”. He also said, "If satans did not hover about the hearts of men, they would see the kingdom of heavens, referring to some of these causes which are a veil between the heart and the spiritual world.

In the traditions (khabar) God said, "My earth and my heaven have not contained me, but the gentle and meek heart of my believing servant has contained me". It is also said in the traditions, "Who is the best of men? He answered, 'Every believer whose heart is warm'. Then he was asked, 'But what is the meaning of 'whose heart is warm'? He replied, 'He is the God-fearing and pure man in whom there is no guile, nor wickedness, nor malice, nor envy'. That is why ‘Umar, may God be pleased with him, said, 'My heart saw my Lord’, when the veil had been re-

(9) Lit. "Children of 'Adam".
(10) Tradition - According to ‘Iraqi, it is taken from Abu Hurayrah by Ahmad - Ibid, p. 8, 13; Ibn Hanbal, vol. II, p. 353, 363 (but here the term 'eyes' (al-wan) is used instead of "hearts" (qalb)).
(11) Tradition - not found in the Handbook nor in the Concordance. ‘Iraqi says, "I have not found any basis for it" - Ibid, p. 13.
(12) Tradition - not found in the Handbook nor in the Concordance. In the latter the author refers 'ghil' and 'hasad' to Ibn Majah’s Zuhd 24, but nothing could be found there, not even these two words. ‘Iraqi, on the other hand, refers this tradition to ‘Abd-Allah ibn ‘Umar with a true chain of authority (isnad).
(13) Tradition - not found in the Concordance nor in the Handbook, nor in Ikhāfāt.
moved [from his heart] by piety. If anyone has the veil between himself and his heart removed, then the form of the earthly and spiritual worlds become clear in his heart; and so he sees Paradise, which is as wide as the heavens and the earth, but rather wider than the heavens and the earth. Now, even though Paradise is wide in boundaries, and has distant borders, it is limited, while the spiritual world, which is the knowledge of truth and secrets beyond the vision which is the special property of apprehension of sight, has no limit.

True, what appears to the heart of it [the spiritual world] also is a limited thing, but in itself, in relation to the knowledge of God, it is without limit. The whole earthly and spiritual world taken together is called the Divine Presence (Hidrah Rabūbiyyah), for the [Divine] Presence encompasses all existing things, since there is nothing in existence except God, His works, His Kingdom, and His servants among His works. So all of that which is manifested to the heart is, according to some people, Paradise itself, while according to the people of God (Ahl al-Haq) it is the cause of Paradise being deserved. The extent of one's part in Paradise is propor-

tionate to the extent of his knowledge, and the measure of the manifestation to him of God and His attributes and works. What is sought by acts of obedience and the actions of all the organs is only the clearing, purifying and brightening of the heart. What is sought by its purification is the securing of the light of knowledge in it. That is what God meant when He said, "If God wishes to guide any one He opens his heart for [the acceptance of] Islam", and when He said, "Do you ask about him whose heart God has opened for [the acceptance of] Islam? He has light from his Lord".

This has degrees in which the learned and philosophers differ, for each one has an amount that is known, the utmost of which is the degree of the prophets, in whose hearts the lights of truths shine, and to whom the secrets of the earthly and spiritual worlds are revealed on the plates of their spirits in most complete and evident clarity. May God help us succeed in following them in all their works, states and character.
[CHAPTER XV]

EXPOSITION OF ANALOGIES OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE HEART TO ITS FORCES

There are three illustrations:

(1) The soul of man in its body is like a ruler in his city and kingdom. The body is the kingdom of the soul, its world, its seat and city. Its faculties and organs are like craftsmen and laborers. The reflective mental faculty is to it as a sincere counselor and wise vizier. The physical desires are to it as a bad servant who brings food and provisions to the city. Irascibility and meal [for the right] are to it as the chief of police. The servant who brings the provisions is a cunning liar, and a wicked deceiver. He appears in the form of an advisor, while behind his advice are dreadful evil and deadly poison. His habit and custom are to quarrel with the sincere vizier in every plan he makes so that he may have no respite for an hour from his quarreling and opposition in his advice.

A ruler in his kingdom seeks the advice of his vizier about his plans; he turns from the advice of his
wicked servant, indeed; inferring from his comments that what is right is contrary to his advice; and he instructs his chief of police, subordinates him to his vizier and makes him obedient to him, empowered with his authority over this wicked servant and his followers and supporters, so that the servant becomes governed not governing, commanded and managed not commanding and managing. Then order rules his land, and justice is established on account of it.

Similarly the soul seeks the assistance of the intelligence, disciplines the irascible faculty and gives it authority over the physical desires, and seeks the assistance of one of them against the other sometimes by diminishing the pride and excess of irascibility by making the physical desires charm and gradually overcome it, and sometimes by subduing the physical desires and conquering them by giving authority over them to the irascible faculty, and by disapproving its demands. Thus its faculties will become moderate, and its character excellent. Whoever turns from this path is like one about whom God said, "Have you considered him who takes his passion for his god and whom God leads astray for all [his] knowledge?" God also said, "He followed his passion; he is like a dog which lolls out

(1) 45 : 23[a]/22[a].
its tongue panting, whether you attack it or leave it alone.\(^2\) We have mentioned how to discipline these forces in the preceding chapter.

\(^{(2)}\) The second illustration is that the body is like a city. Intelligence, I mean the apprehending faculty,\(^3\) is like a king that administers it. Its apprehending faculties, both external senses and internal faculties, are like his forces. Its assistants and members are like subjects. "The soul that is prone to evil", which is the physical desires and irascibility, are like an enemy that opposes with him in his kingdom and endeavors to destroy his subjects. So the body has become like an outpost and a frontier pass with its soul residing in it as a frontier devotee.

\(^{(2)}\) 7 : 176[b]/175[b].
\(^{(3)}\) 12:53[b]/57[b].

\(^{(4)}\) Ribāṭ : "A fortified Muhammadan monastery" as a fortress at an exposed point on the Muhammadan frontier, "originally the place where the mounted are assembled and hobbled to be kept in readiness for an expedition", the term was later applied to a Muslim establishment at once religious and military connected with Islamic warfare (jihad). Still later it came to mean a monastery for only religious purposes, especially of the Sufi type. Hence the Murabitūn (= warrior devotees inhabiting a ribāṭ), who were volunteers for Islamic warfare. Later the term came to be applied to devotees of mystical (Sufi) orders in North Africa. They are not to be confused with the Murabitūn (Almoravides) of the Sanhajā tribe in Africa who invaded Magrib in the eleventh century and later Spain. - Larøyes, Georges, "Ribāṭ" E. Islām, vol. III, p. 1150-1153. (For "Almoravides" see Bel., A., "Almoravides", E. Islām, vol. I, p. 318-320).
guard. If it fights its enemy and routs and conquers it as he should, then, his work will be praised when he returns to the Divine Presence as God said, "God has given preference in rank to those who carry on warfare with their goods and person over those who sit [at home]."

If it loses its frontier pass and neglects its subjects, its work will be blamed, and vengeance will be exacted when it meets God. On the day of resurrection there will be said to it, "O bad shepherd, you have eaten the meat and drunk the milk, yet you have not sheltered those astray, nor have you restored the broken: today I will take vengeance of you", as has been related in traditions. It is to this warfare that men refer by saying, "We have returned from the minor warfare to the major warfare".

(3). The third illustration: Intelligence is like a horseman hunting. His physical desires are like his horse, and his irascibility is like his dog. When the horseman is skilful, his horse broken in, and his dog disciplined and trained, then he is able to succeed. But when he himself is stupid, the horse unmanageable, and the dog is one that

(5) 4:95b.
(6) Tradition - Not found in the Handbook nor in the Concordance. Bayhaqi, quoting it from Jātir, has said, "There is a weakness in the chain of authority". - "Iraqi", p. 6.
wounds, then neither does his horse move smoothly under him, nor does his dog follow his directions obediently. So he is fit to be destroyed, to say nothing about not receiving what he seeks. The stupidity of the horseman only illustrates the ignorance of a man, his lack of wisdom and weakness of insight. The unmanageableness of the horse is an illustration of the dominance of his physical desires, especially the appetite of the belly and concupiscence. The viciousness of the dog is an illustration of the dominance of his irascibility, its assumption of control, its excess and depravity.
CHAPTER XVI

EXPOSITION OF [THE FACT] THAT THE SOUL MAY AND MAY NOT NEED THE BODY

You should know that the animal faculties may assist the rational soul in certain things. The physical sense, for example, may bring to it particulars on account of which four things happen to it.

(1). The soul derives simple universals from particulars by freeing their ideas from matter and the derivatives and concomitants of matter. It also observes the qualities that are common and those that are diverse. It also observes that whose existence is essential and that whose existence is accidental. From all that and the use by the soul of the retentive imagination and estimation the principles of conception occur to it, such as genus and difference, common and specific accidents.

(2). The soul provides relationships between these simple universals on the model of negative and positive [propositions]. So those in which the accord is essential and clear in itself it accepts, while those in which there is not such [accord] it rejects until it comes upon the
medium [to classify them].

(3). The acquisition of categorical propositions: this is finding by sense observation [1] a predicate necessary to be declared for any subject, whether the declaration is positive or negative, or [2; a] the consequent of a conjunctive [hypothetical sentence], whether positive or negative, or [b] the consequent of a disjunctive [hypothetical sentence], whether positive or negative. This is not to be equally true at some times and untrue at other times, but rather to be so always, so that the soul may be tranquil because established on the fact [(1)] that it is of the nature of this predicate to have this relationship to this subject, and [(2)] that [it is the nature of ] this consequent to follow this antecedent, or not to follow it, on its own account not by chance. So, that becomes a belief resulting from both sense observation and logical reasoning, from sense because that [fact] is observed, and from logical reasoning because if it were a chance occurrence it would not occur constantly or frequently. Take for example the statement that scammony, by nature, is a laxative for jaundice, on account of our observation of that [fact] frequently, and on account of our logical reasoning that if that were so not by nature but by chance, then [that] would be true only at certain times.

(4). Traditions, in which there is belief, due to
the force of uninterrupted repetition:

The human soul seeks the assistance of the body to acquire these principles for both conception and belief. Then when it acquires these principles, it returns within itself. Then if some one of the faculties which are under it come to it to distract it, it [the soul] distracts it [the faculty] from its action and thus destroys its effect, except in matters in which the soul has need of them [the bodily faculties] particularly in the sense that it returns to the faculties of the retentive imagination another time to derive [a] some principle other than the one already acquired, or [b] some assistance, by calling up some mental image. This happens often at the beginning. Later it happens only rarely.

When the soul has reached its fulness, however, and has become strong, it becomes absolutely independent in dealing with its actions, while the faculties of retentive imagination and sense and the rest of the bodily faculties do not turn it away from its activity, but only preoccupy it. For example, a man sometimes has need of a beast and means by which to attain to his goal. When he attains it, and then some of these means come in the way which deviate him from associating with it, then the very means whereby he attained become a hindrance.
CHAPTER XVII

EXPOSITION OF HOW THESE FACULTIES GOVERN
AND SERVE EACH OTHER

You find the acquired intelligence (ṣaql mustafād) as an absolute governor served by all, which is the ultimate goal. The intelligence in act (ṣaql bi'l-fiṣl) is served by the potential intelligence (ṣaql bi'l-malakah), while the primary physical intelligence (ṣaql hayūlānī), on account of what it has of potentiality, serves the potential intelligence. The practical intelligence (ṣaql qamalī) serves all these, since the bodily relationship is for the perfection of the speculative intelligence or reason (ṣaql nazarī).

It is the practical intelligence that orders that relationship. The practical intelligence is served by estimation (wāhm), while estimation is served by two faculties, one faculty succeeding it and the other preceding it.

The faculty that succeeds it is the faculty which retains what estimation provides, while the faculty that precedes it consists of all the animal faculties (quwā ḥayā'-wāniyyah). The imaginative faculty (mutakhayyilah) is served by two faculties derived from different sources: the ap-
petitive faculty (guwah musā'īyyah) serves it by obeying its commands, for it [imaginative faculty] urges it to move; the faculty of retentive imagination (guwah kmaylīyyah) serves it by accepting the synthesis and analysis [i.e., combining and dividing] among the forms in it. Then these two are the heads of two groups [of faculties]: the faculty of retentive imagination is served by phantasy, while phantasy is served by the five senses (al-hawās al-khamās); the appetitive faculty is served by the physical desires and irascibility, while the physical desires and irascibility are served by the active motor faculty (guwah muharrikah bi'l-īfā'ī). At this point the animal faculties cease.

The animal faculties, as a whole, are served by the (1) vegetative [powers] (al-quwā al-nabāṭīyyah). The first and chiefest is the reproductive [power] (muwallidah). The fostering [power] (murabbiyah) serves the reproductive [power], while the nutritive [power] (ghādhiyyah) serves all of them together. The four natural powers (al-quwā al-tabi'īyyat al-arba') serve these three, which [four] are the digestive [power] (hādimah), which is served on the one hand by the retentive [power] (māṣikah), and on the other hand by the

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attractive [power] (jādhibah), while the expulsive [power] (dāfi'ah) serves all of them together. All of these are served by the four primal natural properties (al-kayfiyyāt al-'arba') : but heat (harārah) is served by cold (burūdah), while both are served by moisture (ruṭūbah) and dryness (yubūsah). Here end the various faculties [and powers].

(2) Translation following Redhouse, p. 634, § jāzīb.
PART FOUR

CHAPTER XVIII

EXPOSITION OF [THE FACT] THAT THE HUMAN SPIRITS ARE [THINGS THAT] COME INTO BEING

They come into being when the sperma (mutfaḥ) is capable of receiving the soul from its Giver, as God said, "So when I have made him and breathed into him of My Spirit, just as the form occurred on the mirror on account of the existence of the polish, even though that which has the form existed before the polished surface. The proof, briefly, is that if the spirits existed before the bodies, they would be either many or one. But their being one or many is invalid, and hence their existence is invalid. Their being one is impossible only because after their attachment to the bodies they should either remain one or multiple, but their being one and multiple is impossible, and therefore their existence is impossible. Their being one after their attachment to the

(1) Lit. mutfaḥ (= dot, speck). Probably it was written here thus by an error of printing. Elsewhere in the book it is correctly written mutfaḥ - Cf. p. 10, 131, 145.
(2) 15:29[a]; 38:72[a].

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body is impossible only because we know of necessity that what Zayd knows ‘Amr may be ignorant of, while if the rational substance of the two of them were one, the union of the two contradictory things [knowledge and ignorance] in it would be impossible, just as it is impossible in Zayd by himself. We mean by rational spirit what we have mentioned.

Their multiplicity is impossible because it is certainly not impossible for a unitary things to become two, and divide, if it has quantity, like bodies; for a unitary body is divisible because it has quantity. Because it has constituent parts it is divisible. As to what does not have constituent parts nor quantity, how can it be divisible?

To assume their multiplicity before their attachment to the bodies is absurd, for then they would be either similar or different, all of which is impossible. Similarity is impossible because the existence of two similar things is originally impossible. That is why the existence of two blacknesses, or of two bodies in the same place is impossible since duality demands difference, while there is no difference here. The [existence] of two blacknesses in two places is permissible, for the one differs from the other in locus, since one of them belongs specifically in a place in which the other does not belong. Likewise it is permissible to have two blacknesses in one place at two [different] times,
since one of them has a qualification which the other one does not have, namely, the sole possession of their specific time. So no two things exist that are absolutely similar, but rather in relationship, such as when we say, "Zayd and ‘Amr are similar in humanity and corporeality", and "the blackness of ink and of crows are similar in being black".

Their distinction [i.e., of the human spirits] is impossible because difference is of two kinds:

[1]. One of them is in the difference of species and nature (al-nawz wa’l-māhiyyah), such as the difference between fire and water, and between blackness and knowledge.

[2]. The second is in accidental qualities which do not come under the nature [of things], such as the difference between hot water and cold water. If [it is maintained that] distinction between the human spirits is in species and substance, that is absurd, for the human spirits agree in definition and real nature, as they are one species, since the definition, namely "the rational animal", covers them all. If it is [maintained that] they differ in accidental qualities that also is absurd, for the accidental qualities of their one real nature are differentiated only when they are attached to their bodies and related to them in some way or other. But they have no attachment to the bodies
before the existence of the latter. Therefore difference is impossible, since difference occurs of necessity in the parts of a body, even though the difference may be in the nearness and remoteness [of the body] with respect to the heavens for example. If the situation is not such, then difference is impossible. Perhaps the verification of this needs additional explanation. This much, however, calls attention to it.

If it is asked, "How will the condition of the spirits be after their separation from the bodies? And, since they have no attachment to the bodies, how did they multiply and become different from one another?

In answer we say: After they were attached to bodies they acquired different qualifications, such as knowledge and ignorance, clearness and murkiness, good character and bad character. On account of these qualifications they remained different; and so their multiplicity is understandable, contrary to their state before [joining] the bodies, for then there was no cause for their difference.

It is clear now that the soul comes into being just as a corporeal matter suitable for its [the soul] use of it comes into being. The body becomes an instrument and realm for it, while the soul that comes into being has in
its substance a kind of natural inclination to be engaged with that body specifically, to be concerned with its affairs, and to be attached to it. These qualifications demand its belonging specifically to that body. It is inevitable that it should have a specific relationship for the good government of a particular body solely, even though that relationship in itself is hidden from us; for those relationships are innumerable and not obvious, for it is God who rules over their decrees and mysteries.

Someone may say: "[a] We do not admit that human souls accord in species and idea; nor do we admit that species are multiple only with respect to their relation to matter, place, and time. Rather material things indeed are multiple in their quantity and their temporal phenomena. [b] Human souls are not material in themselves. Their relationship to matter is only with respect to administration and control, not with respect to receiving their natural characteristics from matter, that it may call for a distinct place and a distinct time; for administration and control do not necessitate a multiplicity in essence; for one single thing may be in control of one thing. So this relationship by itself does not necessitate multiplicity in essence".

We reply: [a] The proof that human souls are of one species is what we have already mentioned, that is, that
the definition of man covers them, which definition is, "that he is a rational living being". But what is comprehensible under the same definition is of one kind. The proof that the causes of multiplicity are what I have mentioned is [the fact] that the things whose essences are realities only have their multiplicity in their bearers, their recipients, and things on which they act (bi’l-hawāmil wa’l-qawābil wa’l-munfa’ilāt fānhā), or in some of the relationship they have to them and to their times. When they are free of matter they have no connection with those things. So it is impossible for them to have difference and multiplicity.

[5] As for their statement that the human soul is not material, and so is distinguished by matter, that is granted. But it has some relationship to matter, whatever that relationship may be. If it is not the relationship of receiving its natural characteristics, then it is the relationship of administration and control. This relationship is sufficient to cause distinction, so that it is said, "The human soul is the king of that noble city".

It may be said, "We do not grant that the causes of multipication are confined to what you have mentioned, such as the classes of bearers, recipients and things acted upon by them, or in relationship with them. What is the
proof of this limitation? Are not the incorporeals different in their essence and real nature? They have neither bearers nor recipients, neither place nor time. They are distinguished and they differ only in their essential realities, while their species is surely in their individual nature; I mean in their essence. Why not say about the human souls that they differ in their properties or in some other thing than their bearers? Do not souls, after their departure from their bodies, differ in number? You also say: They differ in character and knowledge which they have acquired from their bodies. It is enough for it [the soul] to be distinguished in quality that it should be the soul of such and such a body. If that much were enough for distinguishing, would it not be enough for the distinguishing of its quality that it will become the soul of such and such a body, since the receiving of natural characteristics from the body is not a condition?

Our answer is that it has been proved that they are of different real natures, while the human souls are covered by one definition, as we have already mentioned. But their existence and multiplicity after they depart [from the body] are possible only through qualities and characters acquired from their bodies, while before their attachment to the body they cannot acquire anything from the bodies, since
there were no bodies [as yet], for what does not exist has no effect. We know decisively that after their attachment to the body they become perfect only by the help of the body, and acquire virtues and vices from their attachment to the body. But before [joining] the body there is no attachment and so no acquisition [of qualities], and therefore no difference. It is proved therefore that they [the souls] come into being together with the bodies.

It may be said, "You have maintained the impossibility of the existence of the human souls before [the existence of] the bodies with the explanation of what you have mentioned, to the effect that they are not conceivable before the [existence of the] bodies. We put forward two difficulties that would act against any thing like their existence jointly with their bodies and their coming into being along with the creation of their bodies:

[1]. "That is so because it is agreed between us that the human souls are not material and that they do not receive their characteristics from matter. But anything whose condition is such does not come into being gradually, little by little or a little at a time. Rather its existence is solely by creation, while the existence of the body is solely by creation, but is gradual, little by little, with the change of one part after another. During the change
it may be the turn of any definite part for the soul to come into being along with it and be joined with it (although the soul is not itself a part) but that the existence of the soul is possible a moment before, or a moment after it [that part]. If you were to maintain that it comes into being when the body has perfectly attained to the capacity [to receive the soul], the answer would be that that capacity does not become perfect suddenly and all at once, but rather gradually, one perfection following another, while it is clear that it [the soul] is one perfection that takes place by creation, in which there is nothing gradual.

[2]. "Further, capacity and perfection of capacity are stipulated only in what is a material form, that is, receiving its nature while in matter, so that its capacity becomes some kind of a cause in some way or other for the reception of the form in it from the Giver of forms. That is not stipulated with the souls, which do not receive their natural characteristics from matter at all; nor is there any relationship between them and the material faculties, except the relationship of administration and control in a state. How then can controlling it be a cause for the necessary existence of its controller and administrator, when it is more proper that the administrator should be prior in existence to the state? The stipulation of capacity [for the body] to receive a form in order that the form may exist in
that which has capacity is one thing, while the stipulation of capacity to receive the government of the soul is another thing; for the first [type of] capacity can be a secondary cause for the existence of the soul in some way or other, while the second [type of] capacity cannot be such a cause for the existence of the soul in any way, but is rather a secondary cause for its receiving the government [of the soul] over it either to provide it with some perfection, or to draw some benefit from it. This is a great problem."

The answer to that is one word, for knowledge is a wise remark which ignorance multiplies. We say: There is no doubt whatever about the fact that souls are created and that they do not receive their natural characteristics from matter. They come into being from their Creator only when capacity is perfect, which is expressed in the Word of Revelation (3) in His saying, "So when I have made him". Their Creator knows best about the perfection of the capacity [of the body]. It is not within the ability of human powers to comprehend the details of capacities. But in general we know that the forms come from the Creator and Giver just as the pure bounty of the Most Bounteous One requires, according to the perfect knowledge of Him Who comprehends all details of what may be known. So He gives every person what he

(3) 15:29[a]; 38 : 72[a] - see n. 2 above.
deserves, and every deficient one what will make him perfect. Indeed the entities of things and their capacities come from His overflowing bounty, by means of secondary causes to specific capacities, such as elemental bodies and their complexions. Also the motions of the heavens, their bodies, shapes, and their properties, and the coming of intelligences upon souls, and the outpouring of the souls in search of perfection and moving the heavens - all these come from the bounty of the Real and Most Bounteous One, Who gives every reality its existence, for He knows best the perfection of capacity and which capacity deserves which form. Human knowledge falls short of apprehending that. When the discussion is about God, the question "Why"? ceases just as the questioning ceases of Him "Who will not be questioned about what He does, but they [men] shall be questioned".

[2]. The second difficulty: - Since souls are similar in species and outpouring from the Giver of forms, in Whose outpouring there is no difference, how then must each soul that comes into being be characterized by a natural inclination to be occupied with a particular body, and to be concerned with its affairs? Also, how must it have a particular relationship suitable for the government of one

(4) 21: 23.
particular body rather than another? If this characteristic is a necessary characteristic of that [soul] which possesses it, then it has this characteristic as its property before the existence of the body. But if this characteristic is acquired from the body, how then can that which is made necessary precede that which makes necessary? Also, how can that characteristic be a natural inclination?

In short, if it is not a particular characteristic why should it belong particularly to one body rather than another? If the characteristic is a natural one ordinarily, then it gives a specific quality to the soul which possesses it after the conformity in species. If it is acquired from without, that is [from] one body or another, then let existence be verified for it [the soul] so that it may acquire the specific characteristic. All that is absurd. Further, the difference in relationships and characteristics calls for difference in secondary causes, while the Giver of forms (Wāhīb al-Suwar) is One in Himself, and One (ahadī) in His outpouring, for there is no difference there, nor does the difference in temperaments have any effect on the difference in the characteristics of souls, since there is no acquisition of natural characteristics and no inherence, nor any union between abstract realities and temperaments, contrary to the vegetable and animal souls, and contrary to corporeal
forms and physical forms, for the difference of [these] souls
and their forms is on account of the difference of their kinds
of matter; and the forms [of these kinds of matter] are de-
termined according to their capacities.

To solve this difficulty you should say: It is
true that the different relationships and characteristics
call for different secondary causes. The secondary causes
of capacities are the complexions, while the secondary causes
of the complexions and all that occurs in the elemental world
are dependent upon the heavenly motions. Even choices and
desires are, without doubt, things that come into being after
non-existence. Every thing that comes into being after being
non-existent has a primary cause (fillah) and a secondary
cause (sahab) that comes into existence. That goes back to
motion, and from motion to the encircling motion, for all
capacities follow the heavenly motions. Then, the encircling
motions are dependent upon the choices of the celestial souls,
while all depend upon the Divine Intelligence that rules over
all, and from Whom all divinely preordained things are derived.
So, by means of intelligences and souls, and heavenly motions,
the Divine bounty gives each kind of matter its capacity for
a specific form. Souls do not come into being by means of
specific capacity, but rather along with specific capacity:
there is a difference between their coming into being along
with it and by means of it.

Further, the characteristic of inclination in the soul comes into being only after the joining [of the soul] with it [the body]. Therefore the coming of the soul into being has an attribute in the agent (ṣifah fi’l-fā’il) and an attribute in the recipient (ṣifah fi’l-qābil). The ṣifah of the fā’il is the Divine bounty, which is the source of existence and which pours out of itself upon all that has receptivity of real existence. That attribute is expressed by the term "power" (qadrah). If you annex this pouring out to the means, then it is the Giver of forms (Wāhib al-suwar).

An illustration of it is the outpouring of the light of the sun upon all that is receptive of being lightened when the veil is removed from between them. Things which are receptive of light are the colored objects, not air, which has not color.

\[21\] The ṣifah of the qābil is being in the right state (istiwa’), as a result of being made such, as He said, "I have made him right, as he should be". An illustration of (5)________________________________________________________ (5) Lit. al-istiwa’ wa-l-i’tidāl, from istawā’ and i’tadāla respectively, which words are synonymous to each other and are used as such here. Cf. Al-Munīd, p. 376,377. Cf. also surah 82:7 in the following note.

(6) This is another meaning of the term istiwa’ which the author here has applied to the statement sawayximu in surahs 15:29[a] and 38:72[a]. Baydawi gives it the same interpretation. Anwār, I, p. 501. Cf. also 62 : 7 : "Who has created thee
the gīfah of the gābil is the polish of the iron [of a mirror], for the mirror whose surface is covered by rust cannot receive the form [i.e., image] even though it may be facing it. When the polisher works on polishing it, then the greater the polish, the more the form occurs on it from that which has the form placed opposite to it. In the same way, when the right state and capacity exist in the spēmma, the soul comes to be in it from its Giver and Creator without any change taking place in the Giver. Indeed the spirit has come to being now, not before, only on account of the change of the locus by the attainment to the right state now, not before, just as the image came upon the mirror from its possessor, without, as it seems, any change taking place in the image. But the image was not produced before, not because it was not ready to be impressed on the mirror, but because the mirror was not polished.

It may be said, "If spirits come to being along with the bodies, what did Muhammad mean by saying, 'God created the spirits two thousand years before the bodies", and, 'I am the first of the prophets to be created and the


(7) Tradition - Not found in "Iraqī nor in the Handbook, nor in the Concordance, nor in Ithāfāt."
last to be sent", and, "I was a prophet while Adam was still between water and clay."

We reply: Nothing of this gives evidence of the prior eternity of the spirit, but rather of its coming to existence and its being a created thing. It is true that it may, as it appears, give evidence of the priority of its existence to the body, as a school of the ancient philosophers have supposed. But the case of appearances is easy, since an allegorical interpretation of them is possible, while a decisive proof can not be refuted by apparent explanations but takes authority over the allegorical interpretation of apparent explanations, just as in the case of the apparent explanations of the ambiguous passages about God.

As to the Apostle's saying, "God created the spirits before the bodies", by spirits he meant the spirits of angels, and by bodies he meant the universe, such as the sphere

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(8) Tradition - According to the Handbook, p. 163[a], it should be found in Ibn Sa'd, II: 96, but was not found in the edition available. It is not found in "Iraqi nor in Ithbat.

(9) Tradition - Fug hit, p. 267. Ibn Hanbal gives it in different wordings: "... while Adam was still in his clay" - ibid, IV, p. 127; "... while Adam was still between spirit and body" - ibid, V, p. 59, 379.

(10) For a detailed account of the decisive and ambiguous passages (Sayat mukkaman wa mutashabihan) see al-Suyuti, J., Kitab al-I'tisan fi l'ilum al-Qur'an (Egypt, 1317 A.H.) Part II, chapter 43.
of the higher throne (al-ṣārah), that of the throne (al-kūr-
sī), the heavens, the planets, the air, water and earth.
Just as the bodies of human beings all together are small
compared with the globe of the earth, the globe of the earth
is much smaller in size than the sun. In the same way there
is no comparison [in size] between the ball of the sun and
its sphere, nor between its sphere and the heavens which are
above it. All of those are encompassed within the throne,
since "His throne encompasses the heavens and the earth".
The throne is small compared with the higher throne. So when
you consider all that, you deem the bodies of the children of
Adam to be insignificant, and you do not understand them by
the mere term "bodies" (aṣād). In the same way you should
know and be sure that the spirits of mankind (arwāh al-bashar)
in relation to the spirits of angels (arwāh al-mašî`ikah) are
as their bodies are in relation to the bodies of the universe
(aṣād al-ṣālam). If the door of the knowledge of the angelic
realm were opened to you, you would surely see the human
spirits like a lamp lighted from a great fire that has
spread all over the world. That great fire is the last of
the spirits of the angels; for the spirits of the angels have

(11) 2 : 255[f]/256[f].
(12) Cf. p. 59 above.
degrees, each being unique in its degree, so that no two
share the same degree, contrary to the human spirits that are
multiple while identical in species.

The angels, on the other hand, are each one a
species by itself, and he is the entirety of that species.
To this God referred in his saying, "There is not one of us
[angels] but has a known position". Muhammad also said,
"Surely the one of them who bows does not prostrate himself,
while the one of them who stands does not bow. Surely there
is not one but has a known position". So, then, do not
understand by the unmodified terms, "spirits" and "bodies"
(arwāḥ wa aṯsād muṭlaqāh) anything but spirits of angels and
the bodies of the universe.

Muhammad said, "I am the first of the prophets to
be created and the last to be sent". He also said, "We are
the last [in creation], and we precede [in virtue, rank, etc]".
He further said, "The first thing that God created was the
pen;" and he said, "The first thing that God created was

(13) 37:164.
(14) Tradition - Not found in Ṣaḥīḥ, Handbook, Concordance,
and Ithārat. Al-Ghazālī has used the first part of this tra-
(15) See n. 8 above.
(16) Tradition - Bukhārī vol. II, p. 155, 169; vol. X, p. 56,
(17) Tradition - Ithārat, nos. 464, 465, 466 (with some dif-
ference in the wording of the second part of the tradition).
Cf. p. 15, n. 20 above.
the higher throne"; and he said, "The first thing that God
created was the substance of Muhammad," and similar things.
The removal of the veil from all this has different aspects.
Each aspect has fine benefits and niceties of wisdom which are
seldom written in books.

[1]. The first aspect: We have observed all
existing beings by means of the senses and intelligence with
gradation and priority in rank in the species and in the in-
dividual.

In compounds, which are nearer to our external
senses, minerals, plants, animals and man are arranged ac-
cording to their excellence, ending in man, and man ending
in the one individual who is the most excellent of all, such
as the prophet in his time and the saint in every age.

The simple corporeals, that is, those of similar
parts, are also arranged according to their excellence in
substance, space, magnitude, and motion, the most excellent
of all being the furthermost [heavenly] body, which is ex-
pressed in the Word of Revelation by the terms "higher throne",
and "throne" which "encompasses the heavens and the earth".

(18) Tradition - not found in ʻIraqī, Handbook, concordance
and Iḥāfah.
(19) Tradition - not found in the above mentioned sources.
See n. 26 on p. 125 below.
As for the simple spiritual beings, I mean those (20)
immaterial and incorporeal, unconditioned by place and time,
these also have gradation and excellence. The one greatest
in power, broadest in knowledge and comprehension, most per-
fct in unity, and most like Divine Perfection occupies the
highest position and the uttermost degree, and must end in
one; for if things that are arranged in order of preference do
not end in one, then that predicament necessitates an endless
chain, which is impossible. So things arranged in order in
every division come to an end in one who is their beginning.

The prophetic language often refers to that one as
being that created first by God. The spiritual beings end (21)
in the "Divine Spirit", or the Active Intelligence, or in him
who is "mighty in power, possessor of wisdom, and so is in the
right state". It is the first of those created. Then it
descends in order of preference, as it is said, "The first
that God created is the Intelligence, then the Soul, and then (22)
prime matter (hay'ūlā)", or what is reported in the traditions,
"The first that God created is the pen, then the tablet, and
(23) then the outer darkness."

(20) Lit. "free from matter" (majarradah 'an al-mawadd). Cf
p.6, point 8, above.
(21) F, 3, n. 3 above.
(22) 2: 87[a]/81[α], 253[b]/254[b].
(23) Tradition—not found in the Handbook, the Concordance and
Ithafāt.Iraqi mentions only the first part of it, Awwal ma
(24) Tradition—not found in "Iraqi. For the first part of it
cf. p. 15, n.20; p. 123, n. 17 above.
The corporeals* end in the uttermost body which is
what traditions reported, to the effect that "the first that
(25) God created is the higher throne, then the throne". The
compounds end in the substance of prophethood, the most per-
fact and excellent of which being the substance of Muhammad.
(26)
That is what is reported: "God created first the substance of
(26) Muhammad". Thus you have found every statement has its place,

+ According to one edition, "as to the bodies" (ajrām)
instead.
(25) Tradition - Not found in the Concordance, the Handbook,
"Iṣrā", and Ihšāf.
(26) The Muslim doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul of
Muhammad goes back to the third century A.H. According to it
the predestined soul substance of Muhammad was created first
of all, "in the form of a dense and luminous point", (E. Islām, III
p. 961) from which all the other predestined souls emanated.
The author of this doctrine derive it from the Qurʾān (e.g.
Ayat al-Nūr, 24:35; and the connection between the two terms
of the shahādah, etc., which are interpreted to prove that
Muhammad is first and last). But the influence of the Christi-
án Gnastics on its birth and development is evident (cf. the
doctrine of the Logos in Jo. 1:1ff; 5:26; Phil. 2:6-7; I Tim.
3:16 [b]). For further details see Masségon, L.; "Nur Mu-
al-Kamī (Egypt, 1334 A.H.) p. 115-133f. The following quota-
tions are taken from this last source : - "The form of Muhammad
is the light from which God created Paradise and Hell, and the
pure origin from which misery and bliss came into existence," (ibid., p. 115). "When God created Muhammad from His perfection
and made him an expression of His beauty and majesty He created
in him the real nature of every one of His Names and Attributes.
Then He created his soul from His [own] soul, which soul is
nothing other than the essential being (dhāt) of a thing.
Then He created Adam, may peace be to him, a copy of the soul
of Muhammad" (ibid., p. 123f). "When God, may He be exalted,
created the soul of Muhammad from His [own] dhāt, which dhāt
of the Real One contains [in itself] two opposites, He created
from the soul of Muhammad the angels above, with respect to
the attributes of beauty, light and right guidance, while with
respect to the attributes of majesty, darkness and misguidance,
He created from the soul of Muhammad Satan" (ibid., p. 124).
every expression has its meaning and validity. Then, is the priority in every one of their clauses, priority in time, priority in place, or priority in essence? I mean [is it] the active or perfect cause? That is another question which is easy to reach, grasp and take in.

[ii]. The second aspect: The first things are led to perfection, so that if there were no perfection there would be no first thing, just as there would be no perfection if there were no first thing. The intelligibles are expressed through sensory objects. Just as the perfect majesty of the Real One is expressed only through His deeds and works, in the same way the Divine Command is expressed only through His creation, Intelligence through the Soul, the Soul through Nature, and Nature through the universal body. Likewise all existing things are expressed only through man, so that his body and nature may be the expression of Body and Nature, his soul and intelligence the expression of Soul and Intelligence, and his submission the expression of the Divine Command, so that the majesty and honor of the Creator may be expressed through it [submission].

"Muhammad... therefore is the Perfect Man, while the rest of the perfect prophets and saints, may God bless them, are associated with him as that which is perfect is associated with that which is most perfect and are related to him as that which is excellent is related to that which is most excellent" (ibid, p. 131). "Surely the Perfect Man [Muhammad] is the pole (mush) on which rotate the spheres in existence(wujud) since
It is right to say, "Were it not for you [Muhammad] (27) the spheres would not have been created", for he is the quintessence of creation and the choice of mankind. He is the perfection and the goal and "the lotus-tree of the boundary"; (28) and "he is the first to be created and the last to be sent", as Muhammad has mentioned. (29)

(iii). The third aspect: Nature, which is under compulsion, has effect upon the preparation of matter to receive the issuing of the command [to matter], intelligence, and soul, so that by the selection of elements and the extraction of the core of matter, and by the testing of the composition of the temperaments there may occur in the compounds one stage after another, and one refining after another until there results in the particular compounds an individual corresponding to the Universal Intelligence. Rather it is the personality of the Intelligence or intelligence personalized. That one is the prophet of his time.

**(its beginning to its end, while he is one and the same since existence came into being [and will continue to be so] for ever and ever" (ibid, p. 133).**

(27) Tradition - Fiqh, p. 276. The tradition is mentioned in prayers said in "the ceremony of the New Year (Yevrus)" by the Bektashis -Birga, Op.cit., p. 222. It is not found, however, in 'Iraqi, the Handbook, the Concordance and Ithārāt.

(28) 53:14.

(29) Tradition - See p. 121, n. 8 above.

(30) Of **Mutaffin amshajin** - 76:2.
So the "return" takes place through him, just as the "beginning" was to him. So the one with the beginning resembles the one with the perfection; and the end becomes itself the return to the beginning. The first thought becomes the last deed. Now appears the meaning of the words of the Prophet, "We are the last [in creation] and precede [in virtue, rank, etc]."

(iv). The fourth aspect: Just as faith and law began with Adam and attained some perfection with Noah, some with Abraham, some with Moses, some with Jesus, and some with the Chosen [Muhammad], so the "return" begins with the Chosen in the world of recompense. That is why he said, "I am the first above whom the earth will split open"; and he said, "I am last [of prophets], and I am the gatherer; at my feet will men be gathered".

[CHAPTER XIX]

PROOF OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

[A]. We will show that it does not die with the death of the body, [B]. Then we will show that it does not perish at all. We will bring the demonstration from recorded authority and from reason.

[A. Demonstration that the soul does not die with the death of the body]:

[A, a]. Recorded authority: God said, "Do not reckon those killed for the sake of God to be dead, but rather alive with their Lord, provided for, and delighting in what God gave them of His bounty". It is well known that he who is alive, provided for, delighting and rejoicing in Him cannot be dead and non-existent. God likewise said, "Do not say about those who are killed for the sake of God [that they are] dead, rather they are alive". The Apostle of God said, "The spirits of the martyrs are in the crops of green

(1) 3:169, 170[a]/163,164[a].
(2) 2:154/149. Cf. Tradition according to Muslim VI, p. 381; Ibn Majah, p. 206; Tirmidhi, p. 362.
birds going about feeding in the gardens of Paradise". This has been well established in all the articles of faith of the Muslim people, for the Apostle of forgiveness and mercy [was sent] to those who are immortal, not to those who perish. Similarly with regard to the giving of alms, their belief is that [the merit of it] reaches the soul. Similarly dreams. All that is proof that it [the soul] is immortal.

We have mentioned that the soul does not receive its natural characteristics from the body. Rather its relationship to the body is through control and administration. Death is the cutting off of that relationship, that is its control and administration, from the body. Only the animal spirit dies, which is a fine vapor that issues from the heart and ascends to the brain; and from the brain, through the veins, it goes all over the body. In every place it reaches it gives benefit from the external senses and internal faculties. That spirit is not immortal. When that spirit stops living, what is related to it dies also, such as external and internal senses and motor faculties.

[A.b.j. The rational demonstration: Every thing

(3) Tradition - Muslim, VI, p. 39; Tirmidhi, p. 362; Ibn Majah, p. 106,206; Ibn Hanbal, vol. VI, p. 386. The wording in each source varies from the others. Al-Qâshâni says, that by "birds" is meant the heavenly bodies- Fusûs, p. 269.
which becomes corrupted through contact with the corruption of some other thing has some kind of connection with it. Now this kind of connection of one thing with another thing is either [1] the connection of being equivalent to it in existence, or [2] that of succession to it in existence, or [3] that of preceding it in the existence which is prior to it in essence, but not in time. So [1] if the connection of the soul to the body is that of equivalence to it in existence, which is something essential, not accidental, then each one of them is connected in essence to its companion, and, therefore, neither the soul nor the body would be a substance; but they are substances. If that connection is something accidental, not essential, then if one of them becomes corrupt the other accident ceases the relationship, but does not become corrupt in essence through the corruption of the first.

[2]. If its connection to it is that of being successive to it in existence, then the body is a cause (*illah) for the existence of the soul. Now the causes are four in number: [(a)] the body may be an active cause (*illah fi-iliyyah) for the soul, giving it its existence. [(b)] It may be a material cause (*illah qabiliyah) for it by way of composition as the elements are for the bodies, or by way of simple constitution as brahs is for an idol. [(b)] It may be a formal cause (*illah
[(d)] It may be a final cause (خمسة خاتم.

[(a)]. It is impossible that it should be an active
cause, for the body as such does not perform any function.
It functions only by means of its faculties. If it functioned
through its own nature and not by means of its faculties, then
every body would perform that function. Besides, all physical
faculties are either accidents or material forms. But it is
impossible that accidents or forms subsisting in matter should
produce the existence of an essential being subsistent by
itself not in matter, nor the existence of an absolute sub-
stance.

[(b)]. It is impossible also for it to be a material
cause, since we have demonstrated and proved that the soul does
not receive its natural characteristics from the body in any
way. Therefore the body cannot be conceived of as the form
of the soul, neither by way of simple constitution, nor by
way of composition, in that it is one of the parts of the
body, which becomes composite and so produces the soul.

[(c);(d)]. It is impossible also for it to be either
[(c)] a formal cause for the soul, or [(d)] a final cause. It
is indeed more fitting that the contrary be true. Therefore
the connection of the soul with the body is not that of an
effect with an essential cause.
It is true that the body and its temperament are an accidental cause for the soul; for if a body is created which is fit to be an instrument and kingdom for a soul, the immaterial causes bring the particular soul into being, or the soul comes into being on account of them. Its coming into being without a secondary cause which specifies one particular production rather than another is impossible. Yet it [the body] prevents the occurrence of multiplicity of the soul on account of what we have explained and [the following reasons] also:

[(1)]. It is inevitable that every thing that comes into existence after its non-existence should be preceded by matter, so that the latter may have readiness to receive it or to have relationship with it, as has been made clear in the other sciences.

[(2)]. If it were possible for a particular soul to come into being without there being created for it an instrument by means of which it would attain perfection and function, it would be useless of existence. But there is nothing useless in nature, which is under compulsion and which leads every elemental thing to its perfection and ultimate goal.

Now if there occurs readiness for relationship, and capacity to be an instrument, then it is necessary that there
should come into being from the outpouring Divine bounty by means of the immaterial causes, something which is the soul. It is not true that if the creation of something is necessary along with the creation of something else it is necessary that it should cease with the cessation of the other thing. That happens only when the essential being of the thing [the soul] subsists on account of that other thing [the body] and in it.

Things come into being on account of other things, which other things cease to exist, while these persist if their essential being does not subsist in them [i.e., the things that cease to exist]. This is especially true when that which provides them with existence is something else, not that only along with whose [the body's] existence the preparation of the provision of its [the soul's] existence takes place. That which provides the existence of the soul is something other than the body as we have shown. Otherwise it is a power in a body. Rather it is without doubt also a substance not body. If its existence comes from that thing [i.e., the substance which is not body], while from the body it gets only the proper time of its existence, then it has no connection with the body in the matter of its own existence itself, nor is the body a cause for it except by its accidental quality. So it is not permissible to say the connection
between them is such that the body must have priority in essence over the soul.

[3]. The third part of what we mentioned at the beginning, namely, that the connection of the soul with the body is that of priority in existence. Such priority is either [(a)] in time, which makes any connection of its existence with it [the body] impossible, since it precedes it in time, or [(b)] the priority is in essence and not in time, since in time it is not separate from it. This kind of priority means that as long as the preceding essential being exists, the essential being of that which succeeds in existence must be derived from it. But then again this preceding [essential being] cannot be existing when the succeeding one is assumed to have ceased to exist. [This is so] not because the assumption that the succeeding one has ceased to exist has required that the preceding one should cease to exist also, but because the succeeding one cannot have ceased to exist unless there has come first naturally to that which precedes something that caused it to cease to exist; for then that which succeeds ceases to exist. So it is not the assumption of the non-existence of that which succeeds which causes the non-existence of that which precedes, but rather the assumption of the non-existence of that which precedes itself, because the succeeding one has been assumed to be non-existent.
only after it has occurred to the preceding one to have ceased to exist itself.

If that is so, then it must be [i] that the cause of the non-existence should occur in the substance of the soul and then the body becomes corrupt along with it, [ii] that the body should not at all become corrupt through a cause which belongs specifically to it. But the corruption of the body is indeed on account of a cause that belongs specifically to it, namely, the change in temperament or composition. Therefore it is entirely invalid that the connection of the soul with the body should be that of that which precedes in essential being and then become corrupt through the body. So then this is not a connection between them. If this is the case then all kinds of connections have become invalid. There remains that the soul has no connection with the body in existence. Rather its connection in existence is with the Divine bounty by means of the other principles which are neither impossible nor invalid.

[B]. Demonstration that it [the soul] does not perish at all:

We say: Passing away, becoming non-existent, corruption, and destruction do not happen to the soul. That is so because every thing which becomes corrupt through some
cause or other has potentiality to become corrupt, while before corruption it has the actuality to persist. But it is impossible that there should be from the same aspect and in the same thing both the potentiality to become corrupt and the actuality to persist, but rather its readiness for corruption is not on account of any actuality that it persists; for the meaning of potentiality is different from that of actuality. The relationship of this potentiality is different from the relationship of this actuality, for the relationship of the one [potentiality] is with corruption, while the relationship of the other [i.e., actuality] is with continuance of existence. Therefore, in the one thing these two meanings exist for two different things. This exists only in compound things or simple things in compounds. In simple things that are immaterial in essence, however, these two things are not permissible.

We maintain absolutely that it is not permissible to have these two meanings meet in a thing whose essence is unitary. That is so because everything that persists and has the potentiality to become corrupt has the potentiality to persist, because its persistence is not something obligatory and necessary. But if it is not obligatory it is possible, since possibility is of the nature of potentiality. Therefore it has in its substance both a potentiality and an actuality.
to persist. But any actuality on its part to persist, no
doubt, is not potentiality on its part to persist. This is
evend. Therefore the actuality on its part to persist is
an accidental quality of the thing which has potentiality on
its part to persist. That potentiality does not belong to
any essential being that exists in actuality, but rather to
the thing which has for an accidental that it persists in ac-
tuality, not on account of the existence of its essential
being.

It follows that its essential being is composed of something by means of which its essential being existed in
actuality, which thing is the form of every thing, and of something to which this actuality has occurred, and in
whose nature lies the potentiality it has, which is its matter.
So, if the soul is absolutely simple it is not divisible into
matter and form. If it is compound, then let us leave the
compound and consider the substance which is its matter and
turn our discussion to its matter itself and speak about it.

We say: (a) Either that matter is divisible thus
always, and we prove the validity of the word always, which
is impossible, or (b) the thing which is substance and base
does not cease to exist. Now our discussion is about this
thing which is the base and origin, not about something that
is composed of it and of something else. It is evident,
therefore, that every thing which is simple and not compound, or which is the origin and source of a compound, does not have both the actuality to persist and the potentiality to be non-existent in relation to its essential being. If it has potentiality to be non-existent, then it is impossible that it should have the actuality to persist, while if it has the actuality to persist and be existent, then it does not have potentiality to be non-existent. It is evident, therefore, that the substance of the soul does not have potentiality to become corrupt.

As to the phenomena which become corrupt, that which becomes corrupt in them is the compound which is brought together; while the potentiality to become either corrupt or to persist is not in the sense in which the compound is a unity, but rather in the matter which is potentially receptive of both opposites. Therefore in the corruptible compound there is neither potentiality to persist nor potentiality to become corrupt. So they do not meet in it.

As to matter, it either persists not by means of a potentiality by which it has the capacity to do so, as some people suppose, or it persists by means of a potentiality by which it does so. It has no potentiality to become corrupt, rather a potentiality that something else in it should become
corrupt, which thing comes into being along with the simple things in matter; for its potentiality to become corrupt is in its matter, not in its substance. The demonstration which affirms that every phenomenon is corrupt from the standpoint of the cessation of its potentiality, which potentiality is one of negation and destruction, makes that affirmation only because it is composed of matter and form. There is in its matter potentiality, for this form to persist in it, and potentiality that it should itself [the potentiality] in the two of them together [matter and form] become corrupt. It is clear therefore that the soul does not become corrupt at all. It is to this conclusion that we have led our discussion, with God the Giver of success.
CHAPTER XX

PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE INCORPOREAL ACTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE THAT IS ACTED UPON IN HUMAN SOULS; AND THE GRADATIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCES

The proof of the existence of the Active Intelligence from the viewpoint of religious law is too self-evident to need to be proved; for it has been clearly mentioned in the texts of the Qurʾān, such as God's saying, "One mighty in power taught him, the possessor of wisdom, and so He was in the right state" (1), and also, "It is indeed the saying of a noble Apostle, powerful and firmly established with the Lord of the higher throne", and also, "There has been no human being ever to whom God spoke except through revelation, or from behind a veil, or by sending an apostle". (2)

From the viewpoint of reason the proof of its existence has many aspects:

[1]. What we have mentioned before of the classification of...

(1) 53:56. See p. 3 above.
(2) 31:19,20.
(3) 42:51/50-51[3].

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cation of existing things, their superiority over each other and that they, in the case of simple bodies, go back to the higher throne, while in the spiritual realities they go back to the Intelligence and the Soul, and in the compounds, to the substance of Muhammad. We have explained that part of the subject; so we will not repeat it.

[2]. The second aspect: It has become clear to you that that which is delineated with the mental form is neither a body, nor in a body, for the body is divisible, and so also is that which is in the body, while the mental forms are universal, unitary, and indivisible. If they inhered in a body, they would be divisible; but their divisibility is impossible, and so it is impossible that they should inher in a body or in what is in a body.

You know [a] that those which are delineated with the form that precedes it\(^*\), I mean estimation, retentive imagination, and external sense, are faculties having seats in bodies, [b] that when the form comes to exist in the faculties, it does not disappear from them, and [c] that man apprehends mental forms, which later depart from him. If he wishes to go back to them, he does so readily without

\[\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\text{See p. 125 with n. 26 above.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{+} That is the one preceding the mental form.}\]
the trouble of regaining them; rather he needs merely to attend to them.

Those mental forms which have departed have either ceased to exist, or have not ceased to exist. If they have ceased to exist, then it must be that they need to be re-acquired as at first. If they have not ceased to exist, they must be either in the soul, or in the body, or outside. If they are in the soul, then the soul ought to be aware of them and have knowledge of them, since intelligible knowledge is nothing but the existence of a form in the soul. It is not possible that they should be in the body, on account of what we have mentioned, namely, that the intelligibles do not inhere in bodies or in what is in bodies. If they are outside, then they are either self-subsistent or are in some other substance whose function it is to pour out intelligibles upon human souls. But it is impossible that they should be self-subsistent, for the ideas exist in substance. So they are not self-subsistent. Therefore it follows that they are in the substance which pours out intelligibles. By this then the existence of an angel is proved, whose function is what we have mentioned. That is the Active Intelligence, which is the Divine Spirit.

There is also the proof that intelligible understanding is nothing but the formation of images. If they
[the forms] depart from it [the soul], then return to it, nothing would take place except the forming of images. If this forming of images were permanent for the soul, it [the soul] would be aware of them and having knowledge of them [continually]. So it must be that the form has disappeared from the soul somewhat. This is contrary to what happens when the faculty of estimation apprehends something which later departs, for the estimative faculty has a seat (khāsin) which preserves what it apprehends. So when they depart from the faculty of estimation, and the latter turns to them, it takes from it [the seat] the ideas which it has derived from the forms.

It is true we do not deny that the cessation is of two kinds: [a]. At one time [the form] departs from the apprehending faculty, and it is preserved in some other faculty which is as it were a place of preservation for it. [b]. At another time it departs from both the faculty and the place of preservation. In this second kind [of departing] there is need to undertake the trouble of a new acquisition, while in the first there is no need for acquisition, but rather to turn and give attention to the place of preservation without the trouble of acquisition. With the intelligibles both kinds [of departing] are possible; but we have shown that they have a place of preservation neither in the
soul nor in the body. So it follows that it must be something outside [them], such that when any contact occurs between our souls and it there are delineated from it in them [the souls] mental forms peculiar to that capacity, on account of particular rules.

If the soul turns away from it towards the physical world or to another form, what was formed at first becomes erased as though the mirror that is placed facing in the direction of the Divine One has been turned away from Him towards the physical sense, or to some other divine thing. This also happens only when the habitual power of contact with the Active Intelligence is acquired.

[3]. The third aspect: The human soul can be an intelligent agent potentially and then become an intelligent agent actually. Every thing that advances from potentiality into actuality advances only through a cause which actually advances it. So here is a cause which advances our souls, with respect to the intelligibles, from potentiality to actuality. Since it is the cause in giving mental forms it is intelligence in act having the principles of the mental forms free from matter. This thing, in relation to the intelligences which issue from it, is called Active Intelligence, just as the primary physical [potential] intelligence, in relation to it, is called intelligence that is acted upon
(ْغَلْيِنِفُرْتُل), while the intelligence which is between them is called acquired intelligence.

The relationship of the Active Intelligence to our souls is like the relationship of the sun to our sight. Just as the sun itself is seen actually, and what is not visible actually is seen by its light, so is the state of the intelligence with our souls. When the mental faculty observes the particulars in the retentive imagination, and the light of the Active Intelligence shines upon it, they become free from matter and its concomitants, and become impressed upon the rational soul not [in the sense] that they themselves move from our imagination to our intelligence, nor [in the sense] that the idea which is covered with the concomitant qualities, while in itself and in its worth is free from matter, is to be understood as it really is, but rather in the sense that the observation of them prepares the soul to have that which is free of matter overflow upon it from the Active Intelligence. For thoughts and meditations are movements that prepare the soul to receive the overflow just as the middle terms prepare [it] in a surer way to receive the conclusion. If the first [term] has one sense while the second has another, then, when some relationship or other with this form occurs to the rational soul through the shining of the Active Intelligence, something of
its own genus from one aspect and not of its own genus from another aspect occurs in it [the soul], just as when light falls upon objects of color, it produces on the sight from them an effect which is not like them in every respect.

The mental images, which are intelligibles potentially, do not themselves become intelligibles actually, but rather what is picked out from them, just as the effect which is left by means of the light from the sensible forms is not those forms themselves but something else related to them which is generated through the mediation of the light in the recipient facing them. In the same way, when the rational soul observes those imaginative forms, and the light of the Active Intelligence makes some kind of contact with it, it [the soul] becomes capable of having the parts of those forms which are free from impurities occur in it by means of the light of the Intelligence. The first thing to be distinguished by the human intelligence is the question of their essential and accidental elements, that in which they resemble each other and that in which they differ. So, with respect to similarity the ideas become intelligence itself in one idea, while in respect to that in which they differ they become many ideas. So intelligence has the power to make the one of the ideas to be many, and to make the many to be one. The making of the many to be one has two aspects:
(1). To have the multiple ideas in our imaginings which differ in number become one idea when they do not differ in definition.

(2). That you should compose from the ideas of ultimate genera and proximate differences an idea which is one by definition. The aspect of multiplicity is contrary to these two aspects. All this is included in the properties of the human intelligence, not of the other faculties, for they apprehend what is multiple as it is, multiple, and the one as it is, one. They can not apprehend the one as simple but the one as a whole compounded of many things and their accidental qualities. They cannot divide off the accidental things and separate them off from the essential things. When the external sense presents a form to the retentive imagination, and the retentive imagination presents that form to the intelligence, the intelligence abstracts from it an idea. If another form of that species is presented to it, which is another only numerically, the intelligence does not abstract from it any other form than that which it abstracted at first, except with respect to the accidental quality which belongs specifically to this as that accidental quality, in the sense that at one time it abstracts it [from accidental qualities], and at another it conceives it together with that accidental quality. That is why it is said, "Zayd and "Amar
have one idea in respect to humanity; I mean that when the first of them gives the soul the form [idea] of humanity, the second does not add anything to that idea. Rather, the idea impressed from them upon the soul is one which is [derived] from the first mental image, while the second image has no effect. When the intelligence apprehends things which involve priority and subsequence, it has of necessity to understand time along with them. That happens not in time, but rather in any present instant, for the intelligence understands time in any present instant.

Its combining the definition and syllogistic reasoning without doubt takes place in time. Only the conception of the conclusion and the defined object takes place all at once. The failure of intelligence to conceive things which are completely intelligible and free from matter is not due to something lying in those things themselves, nor in the natural disposition of the intelligence, but rather because the intelligence is occupied with the body, and in many things it has need of the body; so the body keeps it far from its highest perfection. When this obscurity departs from it, the soul has the clearest and most delightful kind of understanding immaterial things. We have already mentioned the grades of intelligence, namely, primary physical, potential, and acquired intelligence. As to the Divine Intelligence, we
will mention it, if God wills, in connection with the properties of prophethood.
[PART FIVE]

AN ARTICLE ON PROPHEThOOD AND APOSTLESHP

This includes several expositions:

[I]. Exposition of the question whether or not apostleship can be grasped by definition.

[II]. Exposition of the question whether apostleship is something acquired or a Divine product.

[III]. Exposition of the proof of apostleship by demonstration.

[IV]. Exposition of the properties of apostleship, which are miracles, and of how the Divine call takes place, and what is obtained and not obtained by audition.
CHAPTER XXI

EXPOSITION OF THE FACT THAT APOSTLESHP CAN NOT BE GRASPED BY DEFINITION, NOR ITS REAL NATURE MERELY BY MENTIONING ITS GENUS AND DIFFERENCE

The experiential knowledge of things does not depend upon mastering their definitions, and their genus and difference. How many existent things have neither genus, nor difference, nor a logical nor a descriptive definition, while even the genus and difference of what has a genus and a difference may not be mastered. Most things are like that, for to give definitions, is hard and difficult for the minds.

Indeed its existence and real nature are evidenced by its effects. Intelligence, the soul, and many of the incorporeal things are conceiviable, and yet they have neither logical nor descriptive definitions. They are inferred only by means of some demonstration or other. If someone were to ask any one of the prophets about the properties and nature of prophethood, and to show forth its definition by means of its genus and difference, how would he answer that? Would he start to verify that, give its logical and descriptive
definitions, and enumerate its special properties so that his apostleship would become dependent upon his knowledge of all of that? But if the one giving the answer did not know all that then he [the inquirer] would not believe him. Or should he immediately believe whether he knows the definition of apostleship or not? If apostleship is a rank above the rank of humanity just as humanity is a rank above the rank of animals, then to follow the apostle does not depend upon the knowledge of apostleship just as the compulsory service of animals does not depend upon the knowledge of humanity. It would be rather foolish on the part of man to try to explain to the animal the properties of humanity, and it would mean the imposition [on the animals] of what they are incapable of. In the same way if an apostle tried to explain to man the properties of apostleship he would be imposing [upon man] what he is incapable of. So neither is the question binding upon him, nor is the answer to it necessary.

This is like Pharaoh's question to Moses to tell him about the nature of the Lord of the universe. He asked, "What is the Lord of the universe?" He [Moses] answered, 'The Lord of the heavens and the earth and what is between them, if you are true believers'. He asked him the second

(1) 26:23,24/22,23.
time and the third time, but he [Moses] did not give any logical or descriptive definition, nor did he give any ultimate genus or proximate difference in telling him of what he asked, except pure Divinity, for defining realities is [to give] their space and time properties, and what is generated between space and time.
[CHAPTER XXII]

EXPOSITION OF WHETHER APOSTLESHP
IS AN ACQUIRED STATUS OR A DIVINE
PRODUCT

We say: You should know that apostleship is a heavenly product, a standing in Divine favor and a gift of God which can not be acquired by effort, nor reached by acquisition. "God knows best where to place His [gift of] apostleship". "Thus We revealed to you by a spirit something of our affair". You did not know [before that] what the Book and the Faith were". Effort and attainment, however, are among the things necessary in preparing the soul to receive the effects of revelation by acts of worship coupled by meditation and exercises free from hypocrisy and love of fame. So the matter of apostleship is not something accidental and haphazard so that anyone who creeps and walks can obtain it, nor is it based on effort and acquisition so that anyone who meditates and keeps awake the first part of

(1) 6:124[b].
(2) For this and other possible meanings see Anwar, II, p. 234.
(3) 42: 52[a].

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the night should procure it.

The humanity that belongs to the human species and the angelic nature that belongs to the species of angels are not acquisitions of the individuals of these species. Also work in accordance with one's species is not free from acquisition and choice in preparing and becoming prepared. Similarly prophethood in the case of prophets is not an acquisition of the individuals of that class; and work in accordance with the status of prophethood is not free from acquiring and choosing in order to prepare and be prepared.

Thus it was revealed to him [Muhammad], "Ta Ha; surely We have not sent down the Qur'ān upon you that you may become miserable", when his feet became swollen from much worshiping. Nevertheless he said, "Shall I not then be a very grateful servant?" (4) Muhammad was wont to give himself up to devotion in Mīrās before the first revelation. Seclusion appealed to him. He was wont to see visions, which came to him like the break of day. These, however, are ac-

(4) 20:1,2/1.
(5) Tradition - Bukhārī, II, p. 314; VI, p. 346; Muslim, VIII, p. 41,42; Tirmidhi, p. 57; Idrīsī, I, p. 244; Ibn Hanbal, IV, p. 251,255, VI, p. 115; of surah 17:3:[b]; "He was surely a very grateful servant".
cidental states and qualities which occur to the species as a kind of response and recompense for his perfect temperament, excellent form, complete equanimity, pure growth and stock, good disposition, noble character, right conduct, patience, respectfulness, gentility, meekness, mercy, benignity toward friends, severity and hardness toward enemies, truthfulness of speech, proper performance of duty, keeping oneself from all vices, adorning oneself with all varieties of virtues, pure avoidance of all that is base, forgiveness of those who injure one, doing good to those who do one evil, affection for relatives, protecting of the rights of the absent, good treatment of one's neighbor, aiding the oppressed, helping the distressed, loving kindness, hating what is unlawful, etc.

"Most assuredly your friend has not erred, nor has he strayed in this world. "Surely his eye has not turned aside nor has it trespassed" in that other world. The souls of the universe submit to his soul voluntarily or by compulsion. Yet he is neither proud nor oppressive, neither rough nor rude. He is respectful when he is silent, and is not ashamed when he speaks. He is of refined manner when moving and at rest. He has fulfilled the requirements of the apostleship which he

(7) 53:2.
(8) 53:17.
bore, and so carried it out in its proper time, and poured forth his mercy upon the universe fully. May God bless him and his good and pure family.
[CHAPTER XXIII]

EXPOSITION OF THE PROOF OF APOSTLESHIP
BY DEMONSTRATION

The exposition of its proof has two methods: One
of them general, and the other detailed.

[A]. The general method: — Just as the human
species is distinguished from the rest of the animals by a
rational soul which is superior to them in mental virtues,
and exercises compulsion over them, rules over them and
directs them, similarly the souls of the prophets are dis-
tinguished from the souls of men by an intelligence which
guides and is guided, and which is superior to all other
intelligences in the Divine virtue which manages them, rules
over them and directs them. Further, just as the movements
of man are evidentiary miracles for animals, since no animal
has his movements of thought, speech and action, similarly
all the movements of a prophet are evidentiary miracles for
man, for no man has a prophet's movements of thought, speech
and action.

Just as a prophet is distinguished from other men
by his intelligence, which is related to the incorporeal in-

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telligences and the First Intelligence, he is also dis-
tinguished by his soul, which is similar to the heavenly
and the celestial souls. He is also distinguished by his
nature and temperament, which is actually capable of receiving
such an intelligence and soul. Just as it is inconceivable
in the Divine economy of creation that there should be from
the sperma of any animal a human being, similarly it is in-
conceivable in the economy of creation that there should be
from the sperma of any man a prophet. "God creates what He
(1) wishes", and "He selects....". "God selects apostles from
(2) among the angels and from among men too". So he [a prophet]
(3) is the one chosen for his nature and temperament, and selected
for his soul and intelligence, which none of mankind shares
with him.

From another aspect, while the prophet shares with
mankind their humanity in form he differs from them in ideal
reality, since his humanity is superior to that of mankind
on account of the capacity of his humanity to receive revela-
tion. [The clause], "Say, 'I am only a human being like you'"
(4) points to the aspect of similarity in form. [The clause]

(1) 3:47[b].
(2) 3:179/174[b].
(3) 23:73[a]/74[a].
(4) 18:110[a].
"It is revealed to me..." points to the aspect of difference in ideal reality.

[1]. The detailed method: This has a number of aspects:

[1]. The first aspect is a demonstration based upon the voluntary movements, which are three kinds, [a] movement of thought, [b] of speech, and [c] of action. [a] The movement of thought includes right and wrong; [b] that of speech includes truth and falsehood; and [c] that of action includes good and bad. These terms are technical, and their meaning is straightforward and understandable.

There is no doubt that on account of their contradictory and different qualities their practice and acquisition, as a whole, are not obligatory. Anyone who gives such a legal opinion†† deserves, in accordance with his opinion, to be killed, for killing him is one of the movements, and its practice is obligatory. Also, it is not obligatory to forsake them all. Anyone who gives such a legal opinion ought not to breathe, for breathing is a movement which it is obligatory to forsake. It is clear now that some of them

+ That is, this is the proof in general. The proof of apostleship in detail, however, has many aspects.
†† That is, that the acquisition of all these practices is obligatory.
must be forsaken, while others must be practised. When this
is proved, it is proved also that these movements have defi-
nitions so that some of them are good and must be practised,
while others are bad and must be forsaken.

So the distinction between one movement and another
is determined by their definitions. This is either known by
every one, or is not, or is known by some and not by others.
But it is clear that not every one knows it. It is also
false [to assume] that every one knows this. It is clear
then that some know it while others do not. By the first
classification it is proved that there are definitions for
the movements. By the second classification it is proved
that there are those who give legal definitions which they
know. These are the prophets and law-givers. When a man
thinks within himself, he knows that if he does not know
legal definitions he must be under the rule of those who give
them. So the existence of prophethood is proved as a ne-
cessary result of movements.

[2]. The second aspect :- We say : The human
species is in need of a common agreement upon what is good
in his voluntary movements and beneficial dealings. Were
it not for that common agreement, he would surely not have
survived as an individual, nor would his species be preserved,
nor would his property and womenfolk be protected. The way that common agreement takes place is called creed and law (millah wa shari'ah).

The explanation of this is that in order to continue living, preserve his species, and protect his property and womenfolk, he needs cooperative aid and defense. Cooperative aid is needed to procure what he does not have of the things he needs for food, clothing, and shelter. Cooperative defense is needed to preserve what he has: of his life, his children, his womenfolk, and his property. Similarly in preserving his species he needs cooperative aid by marriage and partnership. [He also needs] cooperative defense to preserve all that for himself. This cooperative aid and defense must be according to definite limits, just decisions, and rules which include and exclude. It is well known that not every intelligence can help build these rules upon a code which will embrace the interests of the species generally, and apply to the state of each individual specifically, unless it is an intelligence supported by revelation, decreed for apostleship, and receiving help from the

(5) Or simply, "religious law", the term millah being synonymous to shari'ah. Al-millat al-shari'ah wa al-din-mu'tah al-Duhayn, II, p. 207; cf. Lane VIII, p. 3023 (8 in art. mulla); IV, p. 1535 (8 in art. shar'a). Taha'awi makes the term synonymous to tarigah, which he in turn makes synonymous to shari'ah- Kashshaf, II, p. 1346; I, p. 919. At present the term millah is commonly used to denote "a religious community". Cf. Wortabet, p. 656.
spiritual beings who are decreed to keep the order of the world; "for they perform His command", and abide by His rules in the whole creation, and govern by His ordinance. So the outpouring grace reaches them from amounts decreed in [divine] ordinances. From them it outpours upon the individual who bears that trust [of apostleship] and is the recipient of the mysteries of religion. He follows the right in all things, and is followed by men in every movement. He speaks to men according to the degrees of their intelligence through his intelligence, which knows those degrees, and he imposes obligations upon all men according to the measure of their ability through his powers, which comprehend those measures.

[3. The third aspect]: These evidences are branches of one and the same root, namely, the proof that command belongs to God. This is the third aspect of the proof of the existence of prophethood. Whoever does not acknowledge His command does not acknowledge the existence of prophethood at all; for a prophet is the mediator of the command just as an angel is the mediator of creation and command. Just as it is obligatory to believe in God with regard to creation and command, similarly it is obligatory to believe in the mediator of creation and command. "Every single one of them believed

(6) 21: 27[1].
in God, His angels, His Books and His apostles”.

There are two ways of proving the existence of Command:

(a). All possible existences have need of that which disposes them to existence rather than non-existence. Just as a movement in its renewal requires a mover to sustain it, movements which deviate to some different direction, and movements which go in directions other than their natural ones require that the mover be one that wills and chooses.

(b) Further, those of them which are inclined towards the order of good rather than corruption and evil have need that the mover be a commander who makes that arrangement. That is what God said, “And in each heaven He revealed the command applying to it”.

Just as the human movements need a rational will in their diverse directions, likewise they need an imposer who commands and prohibits in their different spheres, so that the one charged with them may choose the right, not wrong, in movements of thought; truth not falsehood in movements of speech, and good not evil in movements of action.

(7) 2:285[a].
(8) 41:12[a]/11[a].
The order of arrangement applies to all creation in general for the orderly existence of the whole macrocosm. To this God refers when He says, "The sun, the moon, and the stars are under compulsion by His command. Indeed to Him belong creation and command. May God, the Lord of the universe, be blessed". Similarly, the order to impose obligation applies to the specific members of the creation for the orderly existence of the microcosm. To that God refers when He says, "O people, worship your Lord Who created you". The same thing applies to all commands and prohibitions addressed to mankind. Just as "in each heaven He revealed the command applying to it" by means of an angel, similarly in each period of time He revealed the command applying to it by means of a prophet. The former applies to God's decree, while the latter is His imposition of obligation.

(b). The second way of establishing the existence of the First Command:

We say: This is proved and found true, by demonstrations, that the First Emanation is an angel who is obeyed.

(9) 7:54[b]/52[b].
(10) 2:21[a]/19[d].
(11) 41:12[a]/11[a]. See n. 7 above.
He has all creation as possession and dominion. Each angel has in his dominion the authority to command and to prohibit, to produce desire and fear, to promise and to threaten. It is not permissible that his command should be something brought into existence and created, for what is created since it is such does not give evidence except of a creator. It does not give evidence of command in the sense of general decree, requirenent, imposition, information, urge, restraint, inspir- ing, desire and fear. Whoever does not recognise a command that is God's to be obeyed renders all these commands, prohibitions, reminders, and warnings on the part of any one who claims prophethood merely his with no basis beyond him. What he attributes to God of [clause-like] "God said", "God reminded", "God commanded", "God prohibited", "God promised", and "God threatened" becomes metaphorical not factuals, and a way of commending what is said to the public not affirming it. "And who is more wicked than he who forges a lie against God, or says, 'It has been revealed to me' when nothing has been revealed to him?" Some have attributed to the prophet, who is in the highest ranks of mankind, the greatest wickedness, which is the lowest thing in degree, and perfidy, which is the worst of evils. May the office of prophethood be aloof from that.

(12) 6:93[a].
CHAPTER XXIV

EXPOSITION OF THE PROPERTIES OF PROPHETHOOD

It has three properties: The first is connected with the faculty of imagination and practical intelligence, the second with the faculty of the speculative intelligence, and the third with the faculty of the soul.

[A]. The first property:—You should know first that it is impossible to demonstrate the principles and premisses of religious sciences by the sciences themselves. What follows here is granted to us:

Everything caused by a primary cause is caused and therefore it is obligatory that it should necessarily follow from its primary cause in order that it may come into existence. But so long as it has [only] potentiality of existence from it as yet it does not exist. The celestial movement is voluntary. The voluntary movement necessarily follows only choice which is perfect and requires the action. The choice of the universal thing does not necessitate any particular thing, for a particular thing itself necessarily follows only from a particular choice which applies speci-
ically to it. The movements which exist actually are all particular; and so, if they are voluntary they must be from a particular choice. Therefore their mover must be one that apprehends particulars. It [the mover] cannot be at all mere intelligence. Rather, it is a soul that makes use of a bodily organ by means of which it apprehends particular things with an apprehension which is either imagination or practical intellection which is superior to imagination. It has also a universal intelligence receiving assistance from the incorporeal intelligence which apprehends universal sciences. All this is explained in the divine sciences.

These things being granted it is clear that each one of the celestial movements is moved by a substance which has soul which intellects the particulars in the way that belongs specifically to them, and in which are delineated their forms and every one of the forms of the movements which it chooses; and it [the substance which has soul] goes beyond that, so that the appearances of the movements may be reiterated in them continually so that the movements are renewed. It will be conceiving without doubt the objectives

(1) *Ulūm Ilāhīyyah* - Probably this is not the title of a special book, it has not been available or known as yet. It is not found in Brockleman, nor in Râshî al-Zumîn, (Istanbul, 1941), nor in the list in Munqidh. See p. 164 below.
to which the movements lead in this world. It also conceives this world in its details and gist, and none of its parts escapes it.

All that leads to the necessary conclusion that it conceives the things which happen in the future, since they are things whose existence necessarily follows from the relationship existing between the movements individually due to them, the relationships which exist between the things here and the relationships which exist between these things and those movements. So there is nothing at all whose future happening is not something which necessarily follows the existence of these relationships as they are now, since all things come to be either [1] by nature, or [2] by choice, or [3] by chance.

[1]. Things that come to be by nature do so only by necessity from that nature, as existing here originally, or coming into existence here from some other nature here, or a nature which comes into existence here from some celestial nature.

[2]. Voluntary things necessarily follow choice, which choice is something that comes into existence. But everything that comes into existence after its non-existence has a cause. Its coming into existence is on account of its
necessity. Its cause is either something that exists here in some respect, or something celestial, or something common to both.

(3). Chance happenings are frictions and clashes which these natural and voluntary things have with each other in their courses of activity.

Therefore, possible things, so long as they are not obligatory, do not exist. They are obligatory, however, not of themselves but only in relation to their causes and the combinations of various causes. Therefore every existing thing is conceived with all states existing at present due to nature and earthly and celestial will; and with respect to the method and course of activity of each one of them in the present, whatever of existing things becomes obligatory on account of the continuance of these [nature and earthly and celestial will] in their method of activity is conceived, since there are no existing things except what is obligatory on account of them as we have already said.

The things that exist, therefore, are apprehended before their coming into existence, but not with respect to their being possible, rather with respect to what is obligatory. Only we ourselves do not apprehend [them] because either all of their causes which make for them are concealed
from us, or some of them appear to us while some others are concealed from us. So in the measure of what appears to us of them we have insight and thought about their existence, while in the measure of what is concealed from us of them doubt comes to us in regard to their existence.

With respect to the movers of the celestial bodies, all the afore mentioned states occur to them altogether. Therefore all the succeeding states become necessary altogether. So the appearance designed for the world together with what is going to exist in it are delineated there. Then not only those forms but the mental forms which are in the incorporeal substances also are not concealed from our souls with any veil at all so far as they are concerned. The veiling is only in our receptivity either on account of our weakness, or on account of our preoccupation with a direction other than the one at which they can be reached for and attained to. When neither of the states of things exists, contact with them is freely available. They are not of the things for whose apprehension our souls need anything else besides contact with them and observation of them. Cognizance of mental forms, however, takes place by means of the speculative intelligence.

The soul conceives these forms we are talking
about only by means of another faculty, the practical intelligence. In this case it is served by the imagination. So the soul, by means of its faculty called practical intelligence receives the particular things from the highest substances, while by means of its faculty called speculative intelligence it receives the universal things from the highest mental substances, in which particular forms cannot exist at all.

The capacities of all souls differ in individuals, especially the capacity to receive the particulars by attaining to these substances. In some individuals this capacity weakens and diminishes because of the weakness of the imaginative faculty. Other individuals do not have this capacity at all for the same reason. In still others this capacity is so strong that when the external sense ceases to use the imaginative faculty and to work with what forms are brought to it, the practical faculty draws it to that direction so that those forms are impressed on it.

The imaginative faculty, however, on account of the natural disposition it has to reproduce and move from one thing to another, leaves what it receives and produces something similar to it, something contrary to it, or something in accord with it, such as happens to a person awake when
he sees something, but the imagination diverts him to other things presented from the context in some sense so causing him to forget the original thing. Then he returns again to the first thing by way of analysis and conjecture by taking what is present of that which the retentive imagination has attained. So he comprehends that it has occurred in the retentive imagination following such and such a form which preceding it, and that that [form] followed such and such other form, and so on until he finally ends at the beginning and recollects what he had forgotten. The same thing is true of the interpretation of dreams, which is a retrospective analysis of the action of the imagination until it finally ends at the thing which the soul had witnessed during its contact with that world, and from which the imaginative [faculty] started to move to other things.

This is one class [of men]. There is another class where the capacity of the soul gets so much stronger that it holds firm what it has received there; and the retentive imagination rests upon it without overwhelming it and moving from it to something else; and so a dream vision comes into being which has no need of interpretation.

There is still another class stronger still in capacity consisting of people whose imaginative faculty has
attained so much perfection and strength that the sensory faculties do not so completely preoccupy it in bringing to it what has been brought to them as to prevent it from serving the rational soul in its attainment to those principles which reveal to it the particular things. So it [the soul] attains to that [state] when awake and receives those forms.

Further, the imaginative [faculty] acts as it does in the case of the dream vision that needs interpretation: It takes those cases and reproduces them. It also rules over the sensory faculties so that what is imagined of those [cases] in it may affect the faculty of phantasy by the forms occurring to it becoming impressed on the common phantasy. So one witnesses wonderful divine forms seen, and divine statements heard, similar to those apprehended things belonging to revelation. These are the lowest degrees of the ideal reality called prophethood. Still stronger than this is [for one] to hold steadfast those cases and the forms as they are, thus preventing the imaginative faculty from giving itself to their reproduction in some other things.

Still stronger than this is to have the imaginative [faculty] continue in its reproducing activity while the practical intelligence and estimation do not give up what they
have held steadfast so that the form of what it takes becomes fixed in the recollection. The imaginative faculty comes to phantasy and reproduces in it what it has received in wonderful ways heard and seen, each one of the two performing its function in its own way.

These are the classes of prophethood connected with the faculties of practical intelligence and of retentive imagination. Notice how the stories of the Qurān came in their details as though the prophet had seen and attended them, as though they were within sight and hearing of him. Notice how they were so true that not one of the deniers of Muhammad's prophethood denied them. Indeed no one should be surprised at our statement that what is imagined is sometimes delineated in phantasy and so witnessed. Insane people may witness what they imagine. That has a cause connected with the explanation of the reason why people who suffer from gall-bladder trouble happen to give information about phenomena, and are often correct in what they say. That has an antecedent, namely, that the imaginative faculty is as though it were placed between two faculties using it,

[1] one below it, [2] the other one above it.

(2) No mention of this matter has been found in Ibn Sinā's Ṣānah, nor in Arabic-Arabic dictionaries.
[1]. The lower one is the physical sense. This brings to it sensible forms that engage its attention.

[2]. The higher one is the rational intelligence, which, by means of its power, turns it from imagining false forms which the senses do not bring upon it, and in which the intelligence does not use it. The union of these two faculties in their use of it prevents it from the possibility of producing its special activities completely, in order that the form it presents becomes such that it is impressed upon phantasy so completely that it is sensed. When one of the two faculties forsakes it, it is not improbable for the other one to be set up in many cases, and is not hindered from its activity, and so prevents it [the imaginative faculty] [from its proper working]. At one time it gets rid of the tug of war with the physical sense and thus becomes capable of resisting the rational intelligence and so deals energetically with what is its specific activity without paying attention to the obstinate resistance of the rational intelligence. This is so in the state of sleep and when it presents the form as what it witnessed is presented. At another time it gets rid of the domination of the rational intelligence when the organ [the intelligence uses in the management of the body becomes degenerate]. So it goes against the physical sense, and is rendered unable to perform its work,
but rather energetically indulges in producing its proper actions, so that what is impressed upon it of forms becomes like that which is witnessed due to its being impressed upon the senses. This occurs in the state of insanity.

A similar thing may happen at the times of fear on account of the weakness and defeat of the soul that takes place and the dominance of estimation and supposition which assist the imagination against the rational intelligence. Then one witnesses fearful things. For this reason it happens that those with gall-bladder trouble and insane people imagine things that have no external existence.

Most of the information they give about the unseen comes to them only under certain circumstances, such as fits of epilepsy and swooning which cause the degeneration of the movements of their sensory faculties. It may happen that their imaginative faculty also may become fatigued on account of their many troubled movements, since it is a bodily faculty. Their attention becomes diverted from sensory objects, and so their rejection of the physical sense increases. When that takes place, then it may happen that this faculty may not become occupied with the physical senses completely; and no rest from its troubled movements may come to it. Its tractability to the rational soul becomes easy. So there occurs
to the practical intelligence an ascent to the horizon of
the afore mentioned world of the soul and so witnesses what
is there. What it witnesses reaches the retentive imagina-
tion and appears in it as something which is witnessed and
heard. Then when the one with the gall-bladder trouble tells
of that, and that comes out true, he will have foretold
future phenomena. Now we must bring to a close this exposit-
tion, as we have given hidden secrets their due, with God
as the giver of success.

Some one may say, When people possessed by jinn,
soothsayers, diviners, and some insane people sometimes give
information about the unseen, which information may be true,
and when they warn of signs, and their effect comes true,
then the specific characteristic of prophethood is nullified.

In answer we say: In the preceding expositions
we have explained before that [the power of] imagination in
animals differs in degree, excellence, kind and order so much
that some philosophers say: Its highest degree is for the
soul to attain to the soul which is the director of the
sphere of the moon, and which is itself the one that gives
the forms. If the particulars of the degenerating worldly
things were not conceived and imagined in the being of the
celestial soul, it would not pour out upon every material
substance what it deserves of forms, for there is nothing whatever that prevents it from conceiving, among things that come into existence on account of it in the world of elements, the particular qualities necessary for their particular movements. By this ideal reality it is as though the celestial bodies come to have an ideal reality additional to the incorporeal intelligence on account of the collabora-
tion of a particular idea (ra'ay juz'ā') and another which is universal, even though this universal idea (ra'ay kullī) is derived from the intelligences. When you understand this, then [you will realize that] the human souls have to receive their characteristics from that world according to their capacity and the removal of the obstacle. They will then be like a mirror facing the celestial soul so that all that is in the celestial soul falls upon it. To this extent they [the philosophers] have given importance to the question of imagination.

On the lower side [of the imagining power, the soul goes down] to [the stage of] an animal without imagination,

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(3) I.e., the human soul receives its characteristic from the lunar soul to the extent that matter ceases to interfere. (See p. 158 above.)
(4) Lit. "retentive imagination" (khayāl), while the subject actually under discussion is the imagination (takhayyul), imaginative faculty (mukhayyilah). See p. 156 above, and n. 7 below.
or weak of imagination, quick to forget and unable to hold the form for an hour or an instant. Rather images are renewed for it as the movements [of the objects] are renewed. This is so from the view point of the difference in excellence. With regard to the difference in kind, it is like a mental image and imagining all real and issuing from a soul which is habitually good, or like an image and imagining all false and issuing from an evil soul, or like an image and imagining in between the two; so that if it [the soul] turns towards the good it cleaves to good, while if it turns towards the evil it cleaves to evil.

Here is another way of stating the case: It is the affirming of the existence of a [kind of] reasoning free from all imagining, the affirming of the existence of a [kind of] imagining free from all reasoning, the existence of a [kind of] reasoning which is all imagining, and the existence of a [kind of] imagining which is all reasoning. Here is a sensing of an act made up of imagining, and an imagining of an act made up of sensing, a reasoning of an act made up of imagining, and an imagining of an act made up of reasoning. Here is a [kind of] knowing which is of the nature of supposing, and a [kind of] supposing which is of the nature of knowing. "And that they thought as you thought that God will
not raise up any one from the dead", indicating the first
[type of] supposing (zann). "And that we knew that we can
never frustrate God on earth, neither can we frustrate Him
by flight", indicating the second [type of] supposing (zann).
The special use of the term "supposing" in connection with
the jinn in the Qur'ān is indeed a mystery of the special
characteristics of the jinn, which is that their existence
is [something] imaginative, and the conception of them is
imaginative, for their forms do not appear except to the
imagination. Just as the imagination is intermediary
between physical sense and intelligence, likewise every
thing that is imaginative is intermediary between the corporeal and the spiritual, such as the jinn and the devils.
Intermediary things are always admixed with two extremes, or
free of both extremes.

[3]. The second property of prophethood, which
is connected with the faculty of speculative intelligence:--

We say: It is well known and obvious that the
intelligible things which are acquired by obtaining the

(5) 72 : 7.
(6) 72 : 12.
(7) See n. 4 above and the position of the imaginative
faculty (quwwah mutakhayyilah) between these two faculties
as described on page 1561 above.
middle term after [previous] ignorance [of them] are acquired only by means of logical reasoning. This middle term may be obtained in [one of] two ways: [1] At one time it is obtained by means of intuitive insight, which intuitive insight is the activity of the mind, and itself discovers the middle term, while brilliance is the power of the intuitive insight. [2] At another time it is obtained by means of instruction, which instruction leads to [the acquisition of] intuitive insight, for the beginning [of it] of necessity leads to insights acquired by men possessing those insights and then transmitted to those who receive instruction from them. It is possible, therefore, for a man to acquire intuitive insight by himself and to have logical reasoning settled in his mind without [the help of] a human teacher. This differs in quantity and quality. [It differs] in quantity because some people have stronger insight with respect to middle terms. [It differs] in quality because some people have quicker insight, and because this difference is not confined within limits; rather it is possible to abound [with some] and to be deficient [with others]. Some people are so stupid that they do not profit by thought. Others have some degree of comprehension and so profit by [their] thought. Still others are so much more brilliant that they can grasp intelligibles. That brilliance, however,
is not equal in all people. Rather it may be deficient [with some], while it may abound [with others], for just as the deficient side [of it] reaches a point where one lacks all intuitive insight, in the same way you must be sure that the side of abundance is possible to reach a point where in most cases one is in no need of instruction or syllogistic thinking. He obtains knowledge all at once together with the mediums and evidences. It is possible therefore for a human individual to have his soul so much [divinely] assisted on account of its purity and perfect contact with the mental principles that it becomes kindled with intuitive insight in every thing, so much so that the form which is in the Active Intelligence becomes delineated in it all at once, or nearly so - a delineation which is based not on authority but on absolute certainty - together with the middle terms, evident demonstrations and clear evidences.

The difference between intuitive insight and thought is that [1] thought is a movement of the soul in the [realm of] ideas, seeking in most cases the assistance of imagination, in quest for the middle term and things running its course, which bring it [the soul] nearer to a knowledge of the thing unknown [to it] in case it has lost it, seeking to exhibit that which is stored within [in the subconscious] and whatever runs that course [of activity]. But it may
attain its objective, and may fail in that. [2]. Intuitive insight, on the other hand, is to have the middle term formed in the mind all at once. That happens when [the soul], having known the cause, understands the effect, or having known the evidence, comes to know all at once or nearly so that which it indicates. This attainment [of knowledge] at one time occurs after a quest and yearning. But it may also occur without there being any quest or yearning, if it is a soul which is noble, strong and shining. It then attains knowledge right away as though it never devoted itself to the choice of it, "its oil being on the point of giving light", the light of natural constitution, "even though the fire" of thought "did not touch it". With respect to knowledge itself, its seat and causing source, the way of minor inspiration (ilmām) and intuitive insight does not differ from that of acquisition and thought, for the seat of knowledge is the soul, while its causing source is the Active Intelligence or the Angel that is nigh [unto God]. But it differs with respect to the removal of the veil, for that is not by the choice of man. Prophetic inspiration (wahi) does not differ from minor inspiration in any of these things, but [it does so] in that [here the prophet being inspired] witnesses the

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(8) 24: 35 [c]. See p. 59 above.
(9). Cf 4:172/170.
angel that provides knowledge.

A question: Someone may say: If this power of intuitive insight is found in individuals other than prophets, then man may find in himself this intuitive activity (tahaddus) in many cases, for every one has intuitive insights in his occupation. If it is made a condition that a prophet should have [intuitive insight] with respect to all intelligibles, that condition is one that has no existence, since it is possible that he may fail to have intuitive insight in one or more cases. Moreover if that condition holds true, his intelligence will be such that there will be nothing whatever concealed from it [whether pertaining to the invisible world, or to the visible one. So itself becomes intelligence in act, in which case he does have need of a medium, and therefore does not have intuitive insight. But you have proved that he has it. This is contradictory. On the other hand if he has intuitive insight in some cases only, then, and since others share that with him, it is not a special characteristic of his. Further, there are no cases [in this connection] which deserve [intuitive insight] more than some others, while [intuitive insight] itself does not have a determined definition which belongs specifically to prophethood. Hence no special characteristic of prophethood has been specified [as such].
Furthermore, you have classified intelligence in four grades, namely, primary physical, potential, intelligence in act, and acquired intelligence. In which one of these grades does a prophet have a special property by which he is distinguished from the rest of mankind?

In answer we say: Any one who does not admit [the existence of] differences in opposition and in order [of rank] among human minds can not prove [the existence of] this specific characteristic [of prophethood]. [An example of] the difference in opposition is [the difference between] a prophet's mind and that of a soothsayer. [An example of] the difference in order of rank is that [which exists] between a prophet's mind and that of a Sincere (giddiq). Those that differ in opposition are two opponents who are in need of a ruler above whom there is no [other] ruler. Those who differ in order [of rank] culminate in a mind above which there is no [other] mind. In both cases a prophet's mind is above all [other] minds. It rules over |

(10) See p. 54-56, and 140f above.
(11) They are the Saints. Cf. Baydawi on 4:69/71 and his classification of men who have received the blessing of God, and have attained certain degrees of religious knowledge, the Siddiqun being second after prophets. They have attained the highest degree of religious knowledge, self-purification, and exercises of devotion—Anwer, Vol. I, p. 217. Cf. "The pure in heart" in Matt. 5:8.
them, directs them and brings them out of potentiality into actuality, and makes them perfect by imposing upon them the highest degrees of perfection proper to each one of them. It is not possible to investigate [into this] in a limited way. If it is possible, however, to maintain that this [mental] power is liable to abound [in some individuals] while it becomes deficient [in others], the mind of a prophet is [found to be] superior to all other minds.

[C]. The third property of prophethood, which is connected with the soul:—

We say: It has been clear to us in the divine sciences that with respect to their existence, the forms which are in the universal bodies are connected with the forms which are in the universal souls and intelligences, and that this matter is subject to receive what is preformed in the world of intelligence, for those mental forms are the sources of these sensible forms on which [sources:] account the existence of these various [sensible forms] is made obligatory to occur in the physical worlds.

[In this respect] the human souls have close similarity to those substances. We may find for them a

(12) p. 151, n. 3 above.
(13) Lit. "form" (surah), in the singular.
natural effect in the body which every soul has; for the voluntary forms which are delineated in the soul are of necessity followed by a compulsory shape for the organs, an unnatural movement, and an unnatural tendency, to which things nature submits. [Thus, for instance], on account of the form of fear which is delineated in the retentive imagination a temperament comes into being in the body without [this] change being brought about by a natural agent itself similar to it; on account of the irascible form which is delineated in the retentive imagination another temperament comes into being in the body without a similar agent; when the form of the object of passionate love (ṣūrah mašṣūqīyyah), which is connected with the faculty of physical desire, flashes in the retentive imagination, on account of it a temperament comes into being which produces a rume from the humad matter in the body and sends it down to the organ which is set as an organ for the concupiscent act that it may be prepared for that function. But the nature of the body is only derived from the element of the physical world. Therefore, if these temperaments were not existent in the substance of this element they would not be existing in this body. We do not deny that there are some [human] souls whose faculties are so much stronger and more effective than [those of] our

(14) Lit. "soul faculties" (qūwā nafṣānīyyah).
own souls that their effect is not limited to the matter which is delineated for them, which is their body. Rather, when they desire they produce in the material substance of the world what they conceive within themselves. That producing action [cf. the verbs](iḥdānā) does not begin by putting into motion or stilling, cooling or warming, condensing or loosening, as they do in connection with their body. It results in there coming into being of rainy clouds, winds, thunderbolts, and exciting sounds, followed by waters, flowing fountains, and similar things. All that happens in the world by the will of this man. The one who has this perfection in his natural constitution (jablaḥ) and who, in addition, is habitually good, adorned with virtuous conduct, praiseworthy character, and [walking in] the ways of spiritual men, refraining from vices and base things [-such a man-] is one possessed of [the power to perform] evidentiary miracles which belong to prophets (dūḥ muʿāṣirūn min al-nabiyyūn), i.e., one who claims prophethood and challenges by it; for these things are connected with the claim to prophethood, or [he is endowed with the power to perform] wonders which belong to saints (karāmah min al-awliyā'). His purification

(15) A muʿāṣirah is a miracle performed by divine power usually through the agency of a prophet (nabi), while a karāmah is worked through the agency of a saint (wali) - Redhouse, p. 1533[5], 1905[2]; cf. Al-Munjid, p. 723.
of himself and his mastery and subordination of his faculties add to this state of affairs of his in accordance with the demands of his natural constitution. On the other hand the one who is wicked and uses it [his perfection] for wicked purpose[- such one-] is a malicious magician.

You should know that to maintain these things and give testimony in favor of them is not {something based on mere} suppositions of [their] possibility arrived at only by way of rational processes, even though that would be something reliable if that were the case. It is rather something based upon experiences which, on being proved true, led to the quest of their causes. It is good coincidence that these conditions occur to those who love to seek a clear understanding[of things] themselves, or they witness them in others so often without interruption that it becomes a discerning power (dhawq) in proving the existence of wonderful things which are existent and valid, and an incentive for them to seek their cause. Indeed when discerning power and knowledge are combined that [combination] yields most beneficial and advantageous results, while God is the giver of success.

CONCLUSION TO THIS SECTION

[1]. The most excellent [individual] in the human
species is the one [a] whose faculty of speculative reason is endowed with such a perfect insight that he is in no need of any human teacher, [b] whose imaginative faculty is endowed with such uprightness and energy that he does not tumm to the sensible world and what it contains, and so he witnesses the world of the soul together with what it contains of the affairs of [this] world, which things he holds while awake, so that the world and what goes on in it becomes formed in and impressed upon it [his imaginative faculty], and [c] the faculty of whose soul becomes so effective upon the physical world that he reaches the rank of the heavenly souls.

[2]. Next in order of excellence comes the one who possesses the first two qualities but not the third, [3] the one whose faculty of speculative reason has this natural capacity, while his [faculty of] practical reason does not, [4] the one of the [group] of philosophers mentioned who attains this perfection in his faculty of speculative reason by way of acquisition, but has no share in [the capacity of] the faculty of practical reason, and [last of all] [5] the one who has neither a natural capacity nor acquisition through effort with respect to the faculty of speculative reason but has capacity with respect to the faculty of practical reason.
The absolute governor and real king who deserves himself to be ruler is the first one of those mentioned [above]. If he relates himself to the world of intelligence he finds as though he contacts it all at once. If he relates [himself] to the world of the soul he finds as though he were one of the inhabitants of that world. And if he relates himself to the physical world he is [finds himself] most effective in it at will. The one who succeeds him [in rank] is also a great governor next to him in rank. The rest are the distinguished nobility of the human species.

Those who have not attained perfection in any one of the faculties, yet they reform character and acquire superior habitual powers are the righteous ones of the human species. They do not belong to [the category of] the men of high ranks. Nevertheless they are distinguished from the rest of the classes of mankind.
[PART SIX]

[SCIENCE OF THE RESURRECTION WORLD]

[CHAPTER XXV]


You should know that the prophets, may the blessing and peace of God be to them all, have explained and made clear the state of affairs in the next world in the most complete way, for they have been sent only to drive men to it by producing [in them] desire and inspiring fear, and by encouragement and warning while communicating [to them] good news [about the bliss] and warning [them] [against misery] lest after the Apostles' departure men hold a pretext against God. [This has been treated] in a special way in the divine law given last [i.e., through Muhammad], where the state of the future life is referred to by the use of [such terms as] "spiritual" (rūhāni) and "corporeal" (jasadāni), "present", and "future", and by illustrating and demonstrating them. The state of the life after death is known only from the

(1) Title taken from the table of contents, p. 10 above.
prophets, because they are the ones to whom its affairs have been disclosed by [divine] revelation and information. Else how can incorporeal intelligence attain certain degrees of spiritual knowledge and moral qualities so that it prescribes for each [kind] of knowledge and religious work a compensation in the next world according as is decreed for them and is proper to them? It is well known that sciences differ in order and excellence. Their excellence is dependent only on the excellence of the information they offer, for the degree of excellence in them is dependent on the degree of the excellence of the information they offer and of the degree of bliss to which they lead. Recompense for them also is dependent on the degree of excellence in them. Likewise moral qualities and works differ in quality, excellence and distinction according to the degree of good and/or evil in their practice and in the recompense they lead to. [These are] things only attainable by the intelligence of any rational person, when assisted by God through revelation and [prophetic] information, and acquainted with the different kinds of recompense in that world. The divine law has so thoroughly and clearly explained the bliss which is connected with the body that it does not need any further explanation. As to the bliss and misery which are connected with the spirit and heart it has pointed to them and informed
of them in a few places. We shall explain that as much as [our] incapable minds in this world can grasp.

We say: It should be known that every faculty of the soul has a pleasure and good, or a pain and evil belonging specifically to it. For example the pleasure of [the faculty of] physical desires lies in deriving from its sensory objects an agreeable state of physical sensation. Similarly the pleasure of the irascible faculty is to be victorious, the pleasure of estimation is to have hope, the pleasure of memory is to remember the agreeable things of the past, while the pain of each one of them is the opposite of that. All of them [faculties] participate in a way in that the feeling of what is agreeable to them is the good and pleasure obtainable by means of them, while what is agreeable to each one of them in essence and reality is its attainment of perfection, which in relation to it is actual perfection. This is basic.

Now, even though these faculties participate in these ideal realities, yet in reality they differ in rank. The one whose perfection is more excellent, more complete, more permanent, more accessible and attainable, and in itself has greater ability to apprehend, derives a more effective

(2) Lit. " In the abode of temporary residence (Fi dār al-
ghurbah)."
and abundant pleasure. This is basic.

The advance into actual perfection may be such that Zayd knows that it belongs to him but he does not feel the pleasure of it unless he [actually] attains it. But if he does not feel it, he does not yearn for it nor has he any inclination to it. An example [of that] is the impotent. He knows for sure that sexual intercourse is pleasant; yet he does not have for it the desire and yearning which are proper to him. He has some other [type of] desire similar to that which one has who tries a desire which produces some sort of apprehension, even though it may be a painful one. Similar also is the case of the blind man with regard to beautiful pictures, and of the deaf man with regard to superb sweet melodies. That is why a rational person should not imagine that every pleasure is similar to that which an ass derives from its [appetites of] belly and concupiscence, and that [therefore] the first principles nearest to the Lord of the universe lack pleasure and happiness.

Surely the [kind of] majesty which belongs to the Lord of the universe is not found in His dominion or had by those who are nearest to Him. His infinite power is

(3) Lit. Khassiyah (= special property or quality). Most probably knassah. Due to misprint or some other factor the letter ya (ي) has been inserted right after the sad (س).
something so exceedingly high in virtue, excellence and
goodness that we exalt it above being called pleasure.
What relation can there be between it and this sensuous
[pleasure] ? Of certainty we know that, but we do not feel
it, since we lack that state [of perfection]. Our case [in
this respect] is similar to that of the deaf man and of the
blind man. This also is basic.

Furthermore perfection and the agreeable thing
may be possible for the apprehending faculty, but if there
is something that hinders or preoccupies the soul, it
detests it and prefers the opposite, just as a sick person
detests honey and has desire for bad foods that are in
themselves detestable. Or perhaps it is not a case of
detesting but one of lack of taste for the object, such as
when a person who is afraid discovers the [existence of]
pleasure but does not feel it. This too is basic.

Again, the apprehending faculty may be afflicted
with what is contrary to that which is its perfection, but
is neither aware of that nor has an aversion for it. When
the obstacle is removed, however, it returns to its natural

rendering it khāssiyyah. Cf. Muḥīṭ al-Muḥīṭ, I, p. 548; Lane,
II, p. 747; Redhādse, p. 821.
disposition and so feels the injury it suffers from it, such as happens to the one with gall-bladder trouble. He may not feel the bitter taste of his mouth until he recovers his health, and his organs get purified. Then he has an aversion for the condition which had occurred to him. Likewise an animal may have no appetite, whatever, for food, though food is the most useful thing for it. It may even detest it, and remain so for a long time. But when the obstacle is removed it returns to that which is requisite by its nature. Then its hunger and appetite for food become so strong that it cannot endure without it, and if it does not find it it perishes. Likewise the cause that produces great pain may occur, such as burning caused by fire and cold caused by intense cold (zamharifr). Yet if the physical sense is afflicted with some damage the body does not feel pain until the damage disappears. Then it feels it.

These basic principles being established we say:

The perfection which belongs specifically to the rational soul is that it should become intellectually aware and cognizant of the form of the whole, the intelligible order in the whole, and the good residing in the whole, beginning with the first principle of the whole, and going on to the

(4) Cf. p. 1574158 above.
excellent absolute spiritual substances, and to the spiritual beings linked in some sense with the bodies, the celestial bodies with their characteristics and powers, and so on until it receives into itself an expression of the whole existence. Thus it becomes one that knows intellectual things, corresponding to the whole existent universe, perceiving that Absolute Beauty (Rūsn Mutlaq), Absolute Good (khayr Mutlaq), and Absolute Grace (Jamāl Mutlaq), and becoming identical therewith, stamped with its image and characteristics, conforming to its course, and becoming one with it in substance.

When this is compared with the perfections that are the object of mystical love and belong to the other faculties, it is found to belong to such a [higher] rank that it is unseemly to say that it is more excellent and more complete than they. Rather, there is no comparison whatsoever between them, whether with respect to excellence, completeness, abundance, or duration; for ḍhār can an everlasting duration be compared with the duration of that which is transitory and corrupt? Likewise, with respect to full attainment [of perfection], of what significance is that

(6) Lit. "strung (as beads) in its thread" (munkhārūf il silāḥi).
whose attainment is accomplished by [simply] meeting external surfaces and bodies as compared with what attains its goal by flowing into the substance of the thing as though it were the very thing itself inseparable from it? Thus the rational intelligence and the object of intelligence become one and the same, or nearly so. That the apprehending medium [here] itself is more perfect [than the above mentioned faculties] is something that does not escape observation. That it has a greater ability to apprehend is also something capable of being demonstrated by the least investigation. Surely it can apprehend a greater number of objects, and is more thorough in its pursuit of the object of apprehension, in freeing it from the accidental qualities, which have no connection with its ideal reality except in an accidental way, and in penetrating it from within and from without. How then can this [type of] apprehension be compared to that? Or, how can we compare the sensual, the animal and the drasible pleasures to this bliss and these enjoyments? Yet in this world of ours, due to these bodies of ours and to our indulgence in vices, we do not feel that enjoyment when any of the causes producing it occur to us, as we have already indicated in connection with some of the basic
principles we put forth. That is why we neither seek them nor yearn for them, unless, we have rid ourselves of the name of lust, and anger and their sister faculties, and have come to know something of that enjoyment. Then we may perhaps imagine of it a faint and partial mental image, particularly so when problems have been solved, and the desired objects which are absolutely certain have been made clear to us. The enjoyment we derive from that is similar to the pleasure physical sense derives from the odors of delicious foods from a distance.

When we are separated from the body, and the soul, while still in the body, had its attention roused to that perfect object of its [mystical] love, but did not acquire it, (although when it actually knows that it is present, by its own nature it yearns for it. How be it its preoccupation by the body, as we have said, makes it forget itself as well as its object of love, just as illness makes one forget the need for a substitute for what has dissolved [of the body], and just as it makes the one with gall-bladder trouble forget both the pleasure which is derivable from sweet things and his desire [for food], and diverts his desire to detestable things), then in reality, due to its loss, as much pain occurs to it as would otherwise
occur of the enjoyment whose existence we have shown to be obligatory and whose great significance we have pointed out. That [feeling of pain] is the misery and punishment whose attainment [by the soul] is no more hindered by [such things as] fire or intense cold with their [effect in] changing the temperament [of the body]. Our case in this respect becomes similar to that of the person rendered insensible, as we have indicated before, who has been so much affected by fire, or intense cold, that the physical matter with which he is clothed has prevented all sorts of physical sense from feeling, and so he could not feel pain. Then when the obstacles happened to be removed he felt the great misfortune.

If, however, the mental faculty of the soul has attained a certain degree of perfection, then when it departs from the body it can attain its full perfection. If it attains it its case will be similar to that of the person rendered insensible who was made to taste the most delicious food, and was exposed to the most pleasant circumstance, but could not feel them. But the cause of insensibility being removed, he could experience the great pleasure at once. That pleasure is not at all like the sensuous animal pleasure. Rather it is a pleasure which resembles the
pleasant state of affairs belonging to the pure living substances. It is higher and nobler than any other kind of pleasure. This bliss and that misery are not available to those who have fallen short [of attaining their perfection], but rather to those who have made their mental faculty acquire a yearning for its perfection. That happens when they are brought to realize that it is the business of the soul to apprehend the nature of the whole by gaining the unknown from the known, and so coming actually to perfection. This, however, is not naturally there, nor in the rest of the faculties. Rather awareness by most faculties of their perfection only happens when there are factors to cause it.

The pure simple souls and faculties resemble prime matter which has just been deposited. They have not acquired all this yearning; for this yearning is something which is actually produced and becomes impressed upon the substance of the soul only when it is proved to the faculty of the soul that here are things which are requireable by the knowledge of middle terms and well-known specific principles. Before that it does not exist, for

(7) Lit, mental pleasure (ladhddhah aqliyyah) - Prob. an error of pen or of print.
yearning follows an idea which is not an original idea but an acquired one. When such [individuals] acquire this idea then of necessity this yearning cleaves to the soul. But if [the soul] departs [from the body] without having obtained the means by which it can acquire [this yearning] after its complete separation [from the body] it falls into this kind of eternal misery because that bliss was acquirable only by means of the body, which body has now been departed from. Such [people] are either those who have failed to make effort to acquire human perfection, or they are obstinately resistant unbelievers, fanatically supporting corrupt views which are contradictory to the right ones. Now the unbelievers are in a worse case than those who fail, while the condition of the latter is worse than that of the pure simple individuals.

How far the conception in the soul of man of the intelligibles ought to attain in order to pass beyond the point where this misery belongs, I can only indicate in an approximate way. I think, in this respect, that [as] the human soul should have a real conception of the incorporeal principles and accept them on the basis of absolute

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(8) I.e., in connection with the bodily faculties by means of which it acquires knowledge, etc. (See p. 177-178 above).
certainty, having received [the fact of] their existence on the basis of proof. [b] It should also know the ultimate causes of things which occur in the universal movements rather than the particular ones, which are infinite. [c] It should be certain of the characteristic of the whole, the relationship of its parts to each other, and the order that issues from the First Principle to the uttermost existing things located in its order. [d] It should conceive [the Divine] Providence which encompasses the whole and its method [of action]. [e] It should further know for a certainty the kind of existence and unity which specifically belong to the Real One, the Creator of the whole, as it should know how He is to be described so that no multiplicity or change may be ascribed to Him in any way, and how the ascription of existence to Him is established. Thus the more the spectator can perceive [of these things] the greater becomes his capacity for [the attainment of] bliss. It is as though man can not free himself from this world and its associations unless he has so established his relationship with that world that he has a yearning for things there, and a passion which wholly prevents him from turning to things behind him.

We further say: this real bliss cannot be fully attained except by reforming the practical aspect of the
soul, for "to Him rise the good words, and He exalts the good deeds". By way of introduction in this respect we say: Ethical character is a habitue by means of which certain actions issue freely from the soul without any initiating thought. Praiseworthy character is intermediary between the two blameworthy extremes, for both extremes in approaching things are blameworthy. We have explained that fully before. The gist of that is that the relationship with the bodily faculties should not be strengthened intentionally. Rather the practical intelligence should have dominance, while the animal faculty should be submissive and obedient [to it].

Intelligence ought not to be affected by the animal faculties. Rather it ought to have effect [upon them], for the animal faculties ought to be affected, not affecting. When that takes place the soul is according to its natural constitution, with the additional characteristic of exaltation and loftiness, [a state] not contrary to its substance, nor inclining it towards the body. Furthermore, the soul is simply overwhelmed by the body which diverts it from and makes it neglectful of the yearning belonging

(9) 35: 10[b]/11[b]; p. 53 above.
(10) P. 88-98; cf also p. 80-88 and 51-53 above.
specifically to it, of seeking the perfection belonging to it, and of feeling the pleasure of [attaining] perfection, in case it attains it, or feeling the pain of the absence of perfection, when it has failed to attain it. That is so not because the soul is impressed on it [the body] or plunged in it, but on account of the relationship between them, of the [soul's] natural yearning to control it and its being occupied with its impressions and the accidental qualities it conveys. If it departs [from it] and still retains the faculty of contact with it, and is still in the like state as before, then its unawareness of the pull of its yearning after perfection diminishes proportionately to the deficiency of that [state]. It also shrinks from pure contact with the seat of its happiness proportionately to its retaining it [that earlier state]. Disturbing consequences also occur to do serious harm.

Furthermore, that bodily condition militates against its [the soul's] essence and harasses it. Yet the body and its [the soul's] complete involvement in it diverts its [the soul's] attention. When it departs it [the body] it becomes aware of that great militating - for men are asleep, but when they die they awake [from their sleep]- and feels its harm greatly. This harm, however, an
pain, are not due to something essential, but to something accidental and alien. But an alien accidental thing does not persist or continue to exist. It ceases to be when [the soul] abandons the actions which, by repetition, made that condition persist. Therefore it necessarily follows that the punishment which results therefrom is not perpetual. It ceases and becomes obliterated little by little until the soul becomes purified and attains the bliss belonging specifically to it. That is why the Sunnis (ahl al-Sunnah) are not of the opinion that [the punishment of] Muslim believers who have committed great sins (karar)


Muslim theologians differ as to the nature and number of these sins. According to Baydawi, however, Muhammad has named them seven in number, namely, associating other gods with God (al-shirk bi'llah), killing the soul with God has forbidden (gati al-nafs al-aswâf haram Allâh), accusing falsely a chaste woman with adultery (gadht al-muhâjanah),
is perpetual, [on the basis that] since their fundamental belief remains [such] accidental things cease and are pardoned and forgiven.

Stupid souls have not acquired [this] yearning and so do not yearn for the knowledge knowing persons possess. When they depart the body without having acquired corrupt qualities they arrive at the wide mercy of God and some kind of rest. That is why Muhammad said, "Most of the people in Paradise are the stupid, while the highest place in it (šilliyûn) is for men of understanding" (13). But if they have acquired bodily qualities and are stained with disobedience and the murkiness of physical desires, and have no qualities other than these, nor an ideal reality contrary and opposite to it, then of necessity they will have a yearning for that which [their state of affairs] requires. Thus on account of the absence of the body and its requirements they undergo great suffering without attaining the object of yearning since the organ of remembering and thinking has ceased to exist, while the characteristic of cleaving to the body remains. If they maintain false beliefs and corrupt views and still fana-

robbing the property of the orphan (akl mâl al-wžûf), usury (al-rîhû), deserting the army (al-rîhû min al-lâhû) and being undutiful to parents (budûq al-wâlidayn) - Anwar, vol. 1, P. 206: 35.

(13) Tradition - 'Iraqî, p. 20. Not found in the other
tically support them, while they obstinately deny the
truth, that will surely be followed by pain and perpetual
torment.

(14) The gist of this section is that after its departure
[from the body] if the soul has made its departure before
acquiring either truthfulness or falsehood, it is among
the safe ones, neither at ease and comfort nor in a state
of torment - a state similar to that of children and the
insane. If it adheres to beliefs which are illusory and
corrupt and contrary to the truth, and if it adds to them
works which are against the divine law it is in a state of
perpetual torment. If it adheres to beliefs which are
sound but not based on absolutely certain proofs, and adds
to them good works it is among the people of Paradise. If
it adheres to beliefs which are sound but occupies itself
with the vanities, pleasures and lusts of this world, it
is in a state of torment. It turns to what it has left
behind, but cannot attain that as the organ by means of
which this world is sought has ceased to exist. This state
of torment, however, does not last. Rather it ceases when

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sources. In the Concordance only the phrase "ahl al-jannah"
is mentioned. For the term "jilliyyah" see p. 40, n. 1 above.
(14) Lit. "That is the confederate of pain and the com-
rade of perpetual painful torment" (fa dhul-likha banna halfa
alamin wa raftu 'adhin alamin muqtin).
a period of time has elapsed. If it has attained a perfect degree [of knowledge] in the religious sciences and maintains sound beliefs based on absolutely certain proofs, but does not follow the plain ways of the law nor walks in the path of good actions nor acts according to the religious knowledge it has, it is in a state of torment for a while. But that state will cease and not last. At the end it will attain some degree of bliss on account of the knowledge [it has acquired], for these accidental things follow the requirements of physical desires, which things cease. If [one] attains sciences which are absolutely certain, whether by way of intuitive insight or by way of the power of thought, purifies and makes good his character, and follows the requirements of the law, he attains the highest degree of bliss, and an uninterrupted access to God, namely, the sight of the Real Grace, Pure Majesty and Pure perfection, as God said, "On that day there shall be radiant faces looking unto their Lord". Therefore the right thing for a rational person to do is to endeavor to seek that bliss and to avoid things which are contrary to it and hinder its attainment. And God will facilitate that and render it successful.

(15) The adverb of negation lam is missing but it is clear that it should be there.
(16) 75 : 22-23.
A [SPECIAL] SECTION

When the human soul becomes free from the body and has no more connection except with its own world it is certainly possible that it should attain things attainable by means of reason and judgment, and all other things understandable by the same means, of the things proper to that world - the world of permanence and actual existence. It is the world where the soul comes into contact with the principles in which are found all the characteristics of existence, so that it receives its own characteristic from it. There is no deficiency there or interruption in the outpouring of the perfecting grace. So in order to attain perfection it [the soul] does not need to produce an act or utter a word, such as thinking, remembering and the like, for it becomes so characterized with the characteristic of the whole existence that it does not need to seek any other characteristic. So it does not engage itself in any of the things existing in this world, or in acquiring them with their particular characteristics, seeking them as such. A purified soul turns away from this world while still connected with the body, and does not retain things inflicted upon it while in it [this world], nor does it like
to remember them. [If the case here is such] what then about that [soul] which has won a pure freedom [from the body] together with contact with the Real One, Pure Grace and the Highest world, which is in the space of eternity? That is a world of permanence not one of change in which thinking and remembering are likely to occur; indeed the world of change is the world of motion and time. The pure intelligible ideal realities and the ideal realities which [later] become particularized and subsist in matter are all there [in the Highest World] in actuality. The same is true in the case of our souls.

The argument [here] is that it is not valid to say the images of the intelligibles are produced in the substances which are in that world by way of [the substances'] moving from one intelligible to another, for there is no change from one state to another. There is even no precedence for a universal idea over a particular one as there is here [in this world], where one attains the universal first and then follows the state of time when one particularizes. [There] rather the knowledge of the general as such and of the specific as such is [the knowledge of them] both together; no time separates between them. If that is true of the substance which corresponds to a seal, it is true also of the substance which corresponds to the wax;
for the relation of the substance corresponding to the wax [when the obstacles are removed] to that corresponding to the seal is one and the same relation so that no impression precedes or succeeds. Rather the whole takes place together [at the same time]. This is a section which has received the utmost verification.
EXPOSITION OF THE REAL NATURE OF
"MEETING" AND "VISION"

You should know that the objects of apprehension are divided into two classes: (1) Those which enter the retentive imagination, such as imagined forms and colored bodies, which consist of individual animals and plants, and (2) those which do not enter [the retentive imagination], such as the Being of God (Dhāt Allāh), praise be to Him, and everything that is not a body, such as knowledge, power, will, etc.

If someone sees a man then closes his eyes he finds his image present in his retentive imagination as though he were looking at it. But when he opens his eyes and sees he perceives a difference between the two. The difference is not due to a difference between the two forms, for the form seen corresponds to the one imagined. The difference is only with regard to the greater degree of clarity and disclosure. Indeed by sight vision the object of sight becomes more completely revealed and clarified. It is like a person seeing at the time of dawn before the
spread of light, and later when there is full light. The two situations do not differ from each other except with regard to the degree of disclosure. Therefore imagining is the beginning of apprehension while vision is the perfection of the imaginative apprehension, and the utmost limit of disclosure. It is because it is the utmost limit of disclosure that it is called vision, and not because it is attained by means of the eye. If God created this unveiled perfect apprehension in the forehead or the bosom, for instance, it would still deserve to be called vision.

If you understand this about the objects of imagination then you should know also that there are two steps which lead to the knowledge and apprehension of the objects of knowledge which are not formed in the retentive imagination, a first step, and a second one perfecting it. Between the second and the first there is as much difference in the greater degree of disclosure and clarity as there is between the imagined form and the one seen. [Here] also in relation to the first one the second is called witnessing (muḍāḥadah), meeting (liqā'ah) and vision (ruḍyāh). It is rightly so called since vision is so called because it is

(1) Lit. "in the eye" (ff'əl-ɬayn)
the utmost limit of disclosure. It is according to the
Divine economy that closing the eyelids prevents disclosure
by vision, for it becomes a veil between sight and its
object. Therefore it is necessary to have the veil removed
in order to have vision, for unless it is removed the ap-
prehension which is attained is mere imagination. Likewise
it is the requirement of the Divine economy that so long as
the soul is veiled by the accidental qualities of the body,
the demands of physical desires and the human qualities
which predominate over it, it certainly cannot come to
[the goal of] witnessing and encounter with the object of
knowledge outside [the province of] the retentive imagina-
tion. Rather this life is a veil inevitably precluding it
from that, just as the veiling of the eyelids prevents sight
vision. That is surely why God said to Moses, "You shall
(2) not see me". He also said, "Sight does not attain Him",
that is, in this world.

When the veil is removed by means of death the
soul remains polluted with worldly muckiness which does not
depart from it completely, although [souls] differ in [the
extent of] that pollution:

(2) 7: 143[a]/139[a].
(3) 6: 103[a].
(1) Some have so much impurity (khabath) and rust (ṣada) accumulated upon them that they have become like a mirror whose substance, on account of long accumulated rust, has become so corrupted that it cannot be restored to its proper state or polished. These are the ones who are concealed from their Lord forever. We seek refuge in God from it [such a state of the soul].

(2) Some others have not reached the point of rustiness (rayn) and pollution (ṭābṣ or ṭib), and so have not gone beyond [the point of] receptivity to purification and polish. So they are exposed to the [effect of] Fire in a way that will root out from them the impurity with which they are polluted. [The duration of] their exposure to the Fire is in accordance with their need for purification, its minimum being a slight twinkling of the eye, while its maximum for the faithful, according to tradition, is seven thousand years. No soul will depart from this world without being accompanied by some dust and muck, no matter how little. That is why God said, "There is no one of you but will enter it. [That] was a decreed judgment.


(5) The two terms rayn and ṭaba (or ṭib) are actually synonymous to each other. In Koran 83:14 the verb rāma (from rayn) is given the religious sense of rusting and pollution (ṣada ṡ wa danas) of the heart - Muhit al-Muhit, vol. I, p. 846; Arwa, vol. II, p. 392; Lane, III, p. 1204.

(6) Tradition-not found in Ṣa'di, nor in the Concordance.
from your Lord."

Exceptions to the above are persons who have plunged themselves in meditation upon the Divine Majesty (jabarūt), and have entered on the Divine path, constantly seeking the continuous shining of the light of the Real One upon their inner selves. The start (mabda') and return (ma'ād) of these are the same. Indeed among the human souls with their intelligence are some which are created with a disposition to become free and purified from the concomitant qualities of matter and the envolvments of this world, such as potentiality and capacity. They enter on the path of incorporeal intelligences, make contact with the First Intelligence, and seek assistance from "the Exalted Word (of God)" being strengthened by His command. They are sent to the physical world not that they may attain perfection on account of it and of its physical powers - the way primary physical intelligences become perfected - that they may proceed from potentiality into actuality. Rather [they are sent] in order that they may bring potential intelligences

or the Handbook.

(7) 1971/72. See p. 92, n. 25 above.
(9) Cf. in 9 : 4(c), "The word of God is exalted" (kalimat Allāh hiyā'ī-'ilāhiyā)
out of potentiality into actuality, and that they may lead
rational souls which have plunged themselves into the affairs
of this world to the utmost limits of perfection decreed for
them. The beginning of these [persons] is created in ac-
cordance with the nature of their return. They are "the
Heavenly Host", as they are also the First Principles.

They have the right to say, "We were [God's] special servants
at the right side of [His] Throne. We sang [His] praises,
and the angels joined in our song of praise." And rightly
did He say to them, "Say, 'If the Compassionate One had a
son, I would be the first to worship him'." Truly also did
Muhammad say, "I was a prophet while Adam was still between
water and clay". Any one who understands the difference in
opposition and in [order of] rank among existent things, and
[the difference] between a "vacated" case and an "appealed"
one in judicial decisions will not find this difficult to
understand.

Most souls, however, know for sure that they will
be present [in the Fire] as long as their pollution with sins

(10) 37:8; 38:69; see p. 89 above.
(11) Lit. "shadows" (agilla) which pl. form is not found
in any of the dictionaries and lexicons used. For the above
meaning and other significations of גיל see Muhit al-Muhit,
vol. II, p. 1316f; Lane, V, p. 1915f.
(12) Statement not found in any of the four sources on
tradition used, nor in the Qur'ān.
(13) 43:81.
(14) Tradition - p. 121, n. 9 above.
requires. When God has completely cleansed and purified
them, the prescribed space of time has come to an end,
all that divine law promised (e.g., judgment, reckoning,
etc.) has been fulfilled, and the attainment of Paradise
has fallen due (which time is unknown, since God has not
informed any of His creatures of it, although it will
surely take place after the Resurrection [day], the time
of which resurrection is also unknown), then [a soul]
having become so purified and cleansed from murkiness that
"no dust nor blackness cover its face" it will become
capable of having the Real One manifest Himself to it.
He makes His self-manifestation to it such that its dis-
closure in relation to what [knowledge] the soul already
has [of Him] corresponds to the revealing and manifesting
of the object of sight in relation to what it imagined of
it.

It is this witnessing - and - divine-manifestation
which is called vision (ru'yah). Therefore [the use of]
the term vision is right on condition it is not understood
to mean the perfection of the image of an object of imagina-

(15) 2:235(4)/236(a) - Reference in the Qur'an is actually
made to the time when a divorced woman can cohabit with a
new husband. See also Anwâr, vol. I, p. 124.
(16) Of 80 : 40-41.
tion conceived with specific dimensions and space. The Lord of the universe is greatly exalted above that. Rather just as one attains real and full mystical knowledge of Him in this world without conceiving, imagining and/or implying any shape or form [for Him], in like manner one sees Him in the other world. Rather I should say that it is this very same knowledge attained [of Him] in this world which becomes so perfect that it attains perfect disclosure and clarity and turns into witnessing. So there is no difference between witnessing in the other world and mystical knowledge attained in this world except with regard to the greater degree [of the first over the second] in disclosure and clarity. Therefore if this knowledge does not give evidence of the existence of any form or dimension, then this same knowledge, when it is made perfect, and has advanced in clarity to the point of unveiling, will not include any dimension or form either, since it is the very same [knowledge] with the exception of a fuller disclosure, just as the image seen is the same one imagined with the exception of a fuller disclosure. That is why no one succeeds in attaining to the point of observation (nasar) and vision (ru'iyah) except men of mystical knowledge in this world; for mystical knowledge is the seed which turns in the next world into witnessing, just as a fruit stone
turns into a tree and seeds into seed plants. How can one who does not have a palm stone obtain a palm tree? In like manner, how can one who does not know God in this world see Him in the next? Now just as knowledge is of different degrees so also is divine manifestation. The difference in divine manifestation in relation to the difference in knowledge corresponds to the difference of plants in relation to the difference of seeds, for they of necessity differ in multiplicity or scarcity, in quality, and in strength or weakness. That is why Muhammad said, "Surely God manifested Himself to men in a general way, but to Abū Bakr in a special way, because he excels men in a secret resting in his breast". No wonder, then, he was unique in [the attainment of] divine manifestation. Every one who has not known God in this world will not see Him in the next, for there will be nothing initiated for anyone in the next world which has not accompanied him from this world, just as no one reaps save that which he has sown. Thus a man will not be raised to life [on the Resurrection

(18) Tradition - not found in any of the sources on Tradition used here. According to Lane, however, the statement, "rested in his bosom" (waqāfa fi saddīhi) occurs in a tradition in different relations - Lane, VIII, p. 2960.
Day] but in that state wherein he died, and does not die but in that state wherein he lived. So it is only that same knowledge which has accompanied him that he enjoys. Only it turns into a witnessing by the removal of the cover from it so that his enjoyment multiplies just as the enjoyment of a lover multiplies when in place of the mental image of the form of his beloved one he has a sight vision thereof. Surely that is his ultimate enjoyment. Therefore the comfort of Paradise is in proportion to the love of God, while the love of God is in proportion to the knowledge [one has of Him]. So the source of bliss is this knowledge which is expressed in the divine law by [the term] faith (Imān).

You may say: If the enjoyment [derived] from vision is linked with the enjoyment [derived] from mystical knowledge, then it must be a limited one, even though it may be many times as great, since the enjoyment derived from knowledge in this world is [itself] limited and meager. Its multiplicity to a limited extent does not reach in magnitude a point where the other enjoyments of Paradise are deemed worthless.

You should know that the source of this contempt for the enjoyment of mystical knowledge is lack of
knowledge; for how can anyone who lacks knowledge apprehend the enjoyment of it? If he possesses some meager knowledge, while his heart is loaded with worldly affections, how can he enjoy it? Men of mystical knowledge obtain such enjoyments from their knowledge, meditation and fine secret discourses with God that if it were proposed to grant them Paradise in this world instead, they would not give them in exchange for it. Yet no matter how perfect this enjoyment may be it is not to be compared at all to the enjoyment of meeting and witnessing [God], just as the enjoyment of the mental image of the beloved one is not to be compared to [the enjoyment of actually] seeing him. It is impossible to show the great difference between them except by giving an example:

We say: The enjoyment of looking at the face of a beloved one in this world differs [in intensity] according to the factors [involved]. [For instance], [1] how perfect or deficient the beauty of the beloved one is, [2] how perfect the power of love is, [3] how perfect the apprehending ability is, and [4] how strong the pressure is of the confusing obstacles and of the pains preoccupying the heart. Consider [for instance] a lover who is weak in his love looking at the face of his beloved one from behind a thin screen from a distance that prevents his real form
from being revealed, while at the same time he is in a state where scorpions and wasps have gathered upon him injuring and stinging him and preoccupying his heart. Under such circumstances he does not lack some enjoyment on account of witnessing the beauty of his beloved one. Now if suddenly such a situation arises that the screen is rent away, the light shines, and the injurious objects are driven away from him so that he is left free from hurt and unoccupied. He is also assailed by such excessive strong passion and love that he attains the utmost limits [of them]. Consider now how his enjoyment so multiplies that his first enjoyment has no comparison of any significance to it.

Likewise you should understand the enjoyment of observation as compared with that of knowledge: The thin screen is an example of the body and preoccupation by it. The scorpions and wasps are an example of the physical desires which exercise authority over man, such as hunger and thirst. Anger, anxiety, sorrow, weakness of passion and of love are an example of the failure of the soul in this world, its deficiency in yearning for the Heavenly Host, and its turning towards "the lowest of the low".

(20) "Asfāl al-sāfīla" - 95:5. The definite article al placed here before the term sāfīla is missing in the Qurʾān.
It is like [the case of] a child who fails to see the enjoyment of being governor, and so gives himself to playing with a sparrow.

No matter how great his knowledge in this world may become, a man of knowledge is not free from these physical desires, nor is it conceivable at all that he should be free from them. It is true that in some cases these obstacles may become weak and do not persist with him. No wonder then if he appears [to possess] knowledge which is so perfect that it amazes the mind, the enjoyment of which is so great that his heart reaches the point of being unable to contain it. Yet that [state of affairs] is like a lightning that takes away the sight, for it seldom lasts. Rather some diverting factors, some thoughts and impressions recur to him which disturb and trouble it. This is a permanent necessary condition in this transitory life. Enjoyment continues to be troubled till death. Comfortable life comes only after death, as real life is life to come, "for surely the world to come is the world of real life, if they [only] knew this". Every one who

(21) Lit. "splitting asunder" (yanfatir).  
(22) 29 : 64[5].
has reached this stage of knowledge surely like to meet God, and therefore likes death and does not hate it, except for [the fast] that he looks for further perfection in knowledge; for indeed knowledge has no bounds, and so it is impossible to comprehend the real majesty of God. Yet the more abundant and greater becomes one's knowledge of God, of His attributes, deeds, and the mysteries of His Kingdom, the more abundant and greater becomes his joy of meeting Him.

O God, do not take us out of this world except as those possessed with knowledge, who seek perfection in it, wholly taken up with [Thy] Oneness and separated from the affections and vanities of this world; by Thy mercy, O Thou Most Merciful One!

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(23) Lit. "The ocean of knowledge has no shore (bahr al-ma'rifah la sharila lahu)."
PART VII

A CONCLUDING SECTION [ON
THE SCIENCE OF DIVINITY]

Its benefit has bearing upon the preceding
sections about the knowledge of the soul and its fa-
culties, by which [knowledge] we proceed gradually to the
knowledge of the Real One and His attributes and deeds;
for beginnings lead up to conclusions, and conclusions
refer back to beginnings. Every science which does not
lead to the knowledge of the Creator is of no use or
benefit, yielding but little profit or return.

CHAPTER XXVII

[GOD, HIS ATTRIBUTES AND DEEDS]

To proceed, we have proved the existence of the
soul in a general way by the knowledge of its actions and
(1) deeds. Thus we know the vegetable soul by its actions,
namely, absorption of nourishment, growth, and the repro-
duction of its kind; the animal soul by its actions, such

(1) Cf. p. 19 above.

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as, sensation and voluntary movement (harakah ikhtiyāriyyah); and the human soul by its movement (tahrīk) and its apprehension of universals. We have also learned that these actions are connected with a source which is called soul. Their subsistence and specific property are due to that source, which is the soul. Likewise you should know that an existent being is either one whose existence is contingent upon some other thing, the termination of which as an existent would involve the termination of the other, or one not so dependent. If it is contingent we call it one that is possible (mamkin); if it is not we call it necessarily existing in itself (wājiib bidḥāthīhī). The knowledge of the following things concerning the One Necessary of Existence (Wājiib al-Wujūd) necessarily follows:

(1). That He is not an accident since an accident is dependent upon a body, whose cessation to exist necessarily results in its becoming non-existent.

(2). That He is not a body, since by its quantitative nature a body is divisible into parts, in which case the whole becomes dependent upon the parts, which [fact] makes it something caused. Besides, a body is composed of matter and form, both of which are in a way
interdependent upon each other.

(3). That He is not like a form, since a form is connected with matter; nor is He like matter since matter is the seat of a form, and does not exist except together with it.

(4). That His existence is no other than His being (māhiyyah), which being is something other than entity (inniyyah), for an existence of which entity is the expression is an accident of being. But every accident is something caused; for if it were something existing by itself it would not be an accident of some other thing, since that which is an accident of some other thing is dependent upon that other thing. Now, if its cause is something other than being, then it [its cause] cannot be the One Who is necessary of existence, upon Whom all existing things depend. If its cause is being, being cannot be such before existence, as a cause is something which has full existence; so before existence it does not exist. By this is proved that the entity (Anniyyah) of the One Who is necessary of existence is His being (māhiyyah), and that necessity of existence (wujūb al-wujūd) in relation to Him is as being is in relation to others. From this it becomes evident that the neces-
sarily Existing One is not similar to any other than Himself at all, and no one can attain a real knowledge of Him.

(5). That He does not depend upon some other thing the way that other thing depends upon Him, in the sense that each one of them is the cause of the other, so that they correspond. This is indeed impossible.

(6). That He is not connected with some other thing in the way that other thing is connected with Him by way of correlation (tadāyur), for then He becomes one that is possible of existence.

(7). That it is not possible that there should be two things each of which is necessary of existence. Just as each single body can not have but one soul the universe can not have but One Lord Who is the Creator of all, and upon Whom the whole is dependent, for existence and continuance. Besides, if there were two that are necessary of existence how should the one be distinguished from the other? If by some accidental quality then each of them would be something that is caused, while if by some essential quality then it would be of a composite nature and therefore would not be necessary of existence.

(8). That every thing other than the One necessary
of existence ought to be emanating from the One necessary of existence. Just as the soul is the perfection of an organic natural body, likewise the Lord is the Creator of the whole, to Whom is due the perfection of the whole, the continuance of existence of the whole and the beauty of the whole. We have already mentioned that there can be only One Who is necessary of existence. All else is not necessary but possible [of existence]. So it is in need of One Who is necessary of existence.

Now it may be asked: What evidence is there that there is a Creator Who is necessary of existence upon Whom the whole is dependent but Whose existence is not dependent upon any other than Him, and Who therefore is the source of existing things from Whom requests are obtainable.

In answer we say: An existing thing is either one that is necessary of existence or one that is possible of existence. The one that is possible of existence is of necessity dependent upon some other one for existence and persistence therein. But the whole universe is one that is possible of existence. Therefore it is dependent upon the One Who is necessary of existence.

As to the conclusions that can be drawn from the proof that the soul is a substance which has neither
measure nor quantity, as we have established by demonstrations, you should know first that the soul is a substance, while the Creator is not a substance; for substance is that which exists but not in a place, i.e., when it comes into existence its existence does not occur in a place, which is a mark of its being a created thing. Now substance is an expression of real existence. Likewise the real being of the One Who is necessary of existence is His existence, and His existence His real being. Having followed thus far you will know that by a proof based on specific propositions and another one based on approximate propositions we have proved the existence of the soul and that it is a substance. The specific proof showed that the soul is not out of touch with itself. But if among the things of His creation there is one with such a qualification what would you say about an Existent One from Whom it receives all its real existence? Now [if] every real thing, which with respect to its real being that makes it real is one and the same unity, cannot be plainly indicated, how [much less] then the Self-Subsisting One [Who has dom- minion] over the spiritual world? Further, if the soul is

(2) See p. 24ff above.
(3) See p. 20-23 above.
(4) See p. 21f above.
not out of touch with itself while it is not a single
unity, then the Real One around Whose oneness no multi-
plicity, divisibility, or duality hovers is more fit that
He should not be out of touch with Himself. So He is One
Who knows Himself as well as all that He has created, and
brought into being and existence; "no slumber seizes Him
nor sleep". This is the meaning of the term "ever-liv-
ing" (hāví); for the ever-living One is the One Who knows
Himself. We have shown that the soul is one unity which
has neither quantity nor measure. Likewise you should
know that the Real Creator has neither quantity nor measure.

By this it is known that all the delirious talk
of the Mushabbihah, who set out to prove [that God has]
dimensions, high location, form, space, and that He moves,
is altogether false; for the Creator is not a substance
(jawhār), which is susceptible of opposites, that He may
change; nor is He an accident (kamād) that His existence
may be preceded by substance; nor can He be described in
terms of quality (kāfjr) that He may be resemblable or
comparable; or quantity (kamm) that He may be measurable

(5) 2 : 255/256[a]; (cf Ps. 121:4).
(6) Al-Mushabbihah are Muslim thinkers (not a sect)
accused of the heresy of tashbīh, the anthropomorphite
doctrine of God in Islam. For details see Strothman, R.
or divisible; or possessive relationship (idāfah) for any one to be equal or like Him in existence; or place (āyn) that He may be encompassed or contained; nor time (matā) that He may move from one period (of time) into another; or position (waqf) that He may assume different postures and be circumscribed by bounds and limits; or possession (jidah) that He may be comprehended in any thing; or emotion (inni- (7) 3āl) that His existence may be altered by an active agent.

Now that it is established that there is no plurality in the being of Him Who is necessary of existence, and since it is indispensable that He should be described with attributes, it is also indispensable to determine these attributes in a way that will not lead to [the idea of] plurality. Thus we hold Him free from having any ultimate genus or proximate difference, for any one who

+ Al-jidah is the predicament of milk, e.g., wearing a signet ring, a turban, etc.

(7) This is a complete list of the ten predicaments. Cf. al-maqālāt al-fāshur in Lane, Sup., p. 2995, where instead of fāṣad and jidah, fi’il (action) and milk (possession) are given respectively. Tahānawi and Bustānī agree with the Arabic editor that jidah is a synonym of milk, which is a state of affairs that accidentally occurs to a thing on account of what surrounds it; and changes as the surrounding agent changes. ("Al-milk... ʿind al-hukmā ʿayn al-ṣawāda ʿalā ʾl-shayʿ bi-ṣabtabbī ʿma yubīʿ bihi, wa yantaqilu bi-ʿnaqilu bihi, wa yusamā ʿbiʿl-jidah... ").- Kashshāf, p. 1336; Muḥit al-Muhitt, vol. II, p. 2005 (where instead of ṣawāda ʿalā it has ṣalāḥ).
has nothing in common with others does not have any
proximate difference to distinguish him from them. From
this it is known that all His names (i.e., attributes),
including existence, are [applied] in a homonymous sense,
not in the sense of agreement. Besides, His attributes
are not determined in the sense that they are accidental
things, such as color, which exists in a [particular]
place, or our knowledge, which the soul attains in an ac-
cidental way, for that leads to the idea of priority and
subsequence, and multiplicity. Rather we determine the
attributes by way of their relationship to actions or by
way of their primary and secondary causes in relation to
their material effects.

From this it becomes evident that He is ever-
living (kawwāl), for He is One Who knows Himself. We know
assuredly that He is One Who knows because He is incor-
porereal and exists in and by Himself. But that which is
one unity and incorporeal attains itself. So it knows
itself and is not out of touch with itself. Its know-
ledge of itself is not something additional to itself

(8) All the paragraph and the following conclusions are
based on the orthodox Muslim doctrine of tanzīkh and taabhīkh
in connection with God, His being and attributes. For
that it may necessarily cause plurality in it. That is so because when a man knows himself, that which he knows is either himself or someone other than himself. If it is someone other than himself, it follows that it is not himself that he knows but someone else. But if that which he knows is his very self then he himself is the knower and the known. Therefore the knower and the known are one and the same. You should understand that it is even so with regard to the Creator. Now just as the knower is the same as the one known, knowledge also is the same as the one known, just as sensation is the same: as that which is sensed, since the latter is that which is impressed upon that which senses, not something external. Similarly knowledge is that which is known, the difference being only in the terms of expression, such as knowledge (*ālim), knower (*ālim) and known (*maqālim). From this it becomes evident that He [the Creator] is One Who knows all the kinds and genera of existent things. "Not an atom's weight [of what there is] on earth or in heaven escapes His knowledge, nor what is smaller or greater than that", for

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since He knows Himself He ought to know it as it is, being Himself an abstract reality. But He Himself is the Source and Creator of all existent things, and is an outpouring One pouring out existence upon all. He therefore knows that which He causes to exist and submit itself to Him. But the multiplicity of the numerous things He knows does not lead to a multiplicity in Himself; for His knowledge is not based upon the presentation of premises and turning about of thought and reflection. He Himself pours out knowledge upon mankind, and does not acquire knowledge from men. It is His knowledge that is the cause of existence, not existence the cause of His knowledge, for He has the treasures of the unseen world, which no one knows except Him. Furthermore, just as He knows the genera and kinds (of things) He also knows possible things which come into existence even though we do not know them, for so long as that which is possible is known to be such it is impossible to know whether it will occur or not; for what is known of it is its quality of being possible. That means that there is a possibility that it should come into existence and a possibility that it should not. But every thing

(12) Lit. "... as His being is abstract to Himself" (dhātubhāva mujjeradān liddhātiki) (i.e., free from material envelopments, etc. as a universal form is something abstract, or abstracted to the human intelligence).
which is possible in itself is necessary [of existence] on account of its cause. If its cause is known to be existing then its existence is necessary. Thus if we become acquainted with all the causes of one [particular] thing and know that they exist we decisively conclude that that thing exists.

The First Real One knows things that come into existence and their causes, for all things ascend to Him in the ascending chain [of order]. Now as He knows the causes in order of occurrence He knows also all, both causes and effects. So His knowledge is free from physical sense, imagination, multiplicity, and change. Now then you should understand His knowledge. When you do that you should know that He is One Who wills, for indeed He wills and cares. But His will and care are not something additional to His being. The proof of His being One Who wills is that an active cause acts either by [its own] nature, may He be exalted above that, or at will. A natural action is one which is without any knowledge of its effect, it being one of the natural actions in existence, acting by way of compulsion. An active cause which acts

at will is one that has knowledge of its effects. Hence He [the First Real One] has knowledge of the things He makes and creates. He does so by choice, not under any compulsion. This may be expressed by the term will (irādah).

In short the specific assignment of actions and their distinction from each other are evidence of the existence of will. His providential care is His conception of the order of the whole and the quality of His effects in this order in the best and most perfect manner, without having any defensive or motivating purpose compelling Him to will what He wills, for there is nothing more worthy of it than He. He does not act to escape blame or receive praise.

Likewise, just as He is One Who knows and wills, He is also powerful (gādir), the term gādir meaning he who does what he wills and does not do what he does not will.

(14) This is the orthodox (Ash'ari) Muslim view concerning the actions of God, who, contrary to the Mutasilah, maintain that it is not permissible to ascribe His actions to some motivating purpose. The Mutasilah, on the other hand argue that it is unbecoming to think of God as acting without such a purpose, such an action being in vain (‘Gūd al-Ash'ārīyeh, "10 vajibu ta‘līhu an ‘ālihi Ta‘ālī bi-shay’ an al-qarad, ilā bi-jall bi-shay’ an al-qarad; wa annahu gabhā vajibu tanzihmu Ta‘ālī ‘anhu.’)
The Powerful One is such in the sense that He does if He so wills, not in the sense that He must. So every thing He wills comes into existence, what He does not will does not exist. The First One is also wise (hakīm), the term "wisdom" (hikmah) meaning either knowledge of the real nature of things (and there is no one whatever more knowing than He), or an act which one produces, that is in order, sound, possessing all that it needs of perfection and beauty. His [the First One's] action is most sound, perfect, graceful and beautiful. "He gives every thing its form, then He guides it in the right path".

He is also bountiful (jawwāl), the term "bounty" (jûd) conveying the meaning of favor (khayr) and its bestowal without any private end in view. The First One has poured out favors upon all existing things as is fitting and where it is fitting to, not sparing any possible [demands of] necessity, need or beauty - all that - without having any private end or benefit in view, for He is the Real Bountiful One, Who freely gives. The application of the term "bounty" to other than Him is in a figurative sense. The First One is also One Who rejoices in Himself (biddāthihi) in the sense that He possesses perfect

knowledge of perfect objects of knowledge, or that He pours out perfect bounties and favors upon existing things (as He, who is free from the nature of possibility and matter, is the greatest apprehender of the most perfect things), and that He is perfectly free from matter and its necessary corollary qualities, and from the nature of possibility and its necessary concomitant qualities.

CONCLUSION AND APOLOGY

You should know that even though we proceeded by degrees to the knowledge of His being and attributes through the knowledge of the soul, we have done so by way of demonstration. Otherwise God is free from the attributes of created things. He is not to be described, for He is magnified above all description, and above all our magnifying of Him, more glorious than our glorifying of Him; and greater than our ascription of magnitude. "When a discourse reaches a point that deals with God you should refrain". "I shall not repeat any praise of You, for You are just as You have praised Yourself". He is above all description made of Him. "To You belong the highest exaltation above everything exalted, and the most glorious majesty

(16) Statement not found in any of the four sources on Muslim tradition, nor in al-Da`awāt in the First Quarter of Ihyā'.
above all majesty. Attributes cannot reach You, and the holiest of them are below You, while the finest imagination is puzzled by Your grandeur. These are the words of the righteous, the chosen, the elect.

This goes to prove that it is not permissible to speak of Him in terms of things which attract profit, keep away harm, produce pleasure, enjoyment and rejoicing, cause joy and laughter, or passionate love and affection. Highly exalted is He above these things! All such terms occurring in the Qur'an and Tradition are to be interpreted by their fruits and ultimates, not by their accidentals and beginnings.
[CHAPTER XXVIII]

A WORD ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF
THE ORDER OF THE WORKS OF GOD
AND
THE TRACING OF CAUSES TO THEIR
EFFECTS

This also is known only by the ordering of the
knowledge of the soul's influence upon its powers and its
body.

You should know that the source of the action of
man is a will, whose effect appears first on the heart.
By means of the animal spirit, which is a fine vapor in
the ventricle of the heart, the effect extends to the brain.
From there it extends to the nerves proceeding from the
brain, and from the nerves to the tendons and ligatures
attached to the muscles. By means of it [the effect] the
tendons are drawn and so the fingers move. By the fingers,
for instance, the pen moves, and by the pen the ink, pro-
ducing on the surface of the paper the representation of
what one wishes to write in the manner preformed in the
seat of imagination; for indeed if the form of that which
is to be written is not preformed first in the retentive imagination it cannot be produced later on white.

Any one who investigates the works of God and how He brings into being plants and animals on earth by the movement of heavens and planets, which movement is brought about by the angels moving the heavens in obedience to Him, will know that man’s control of his world, I mean his body, is similar to the Creator’s control of the greater world, which is analogous to it. It will also be revealed to him that the shape of the heart in relation to his controlling activity is analogous to the higher throne (*áresh*), and the relation of the heart to the brain is as that of the higher throne to the throne (*kûrê*) (1), and that the physical senses are to him [man] as the angels are to [the Creator], who by their own nature are obedient to Him, and can not disobey His command. The nerves correspond to the heavens, the power of the finger to nature which is under compulsion and located in the physical bodies, material substances to the elements, which are the origin of compounds, with respect to their liability to unite and separate, combine and mix, and the seat of imagination to

(1) Cf. p. 122 and 124 above.
"the Preserved Tablet". In fact the more one understands this analogy the better he will know the order of the works of God in the earthly and spiritual worlds, which fact needs detailed treatment, while this [here] is a brief allusion to it.

(2) 85 : 22.
CHAPTER XXIX

CLASSIFICATION OF THE WORKS OF GOD,
MAY HE BE PRAISED AND EXALTED

[A. First Classification].

We have mentioned that faculties are divided into motor (muḥarrikah) and apprehending (muḍrikah). The apprehending [faculties] are divided into external, such as the five senses, and internal, such as the internal faculties (mašā'ir būtinah), namely, imagination, estimation, etc. Intelligence, which belongs specifically to man, is divided into speculative and practical reason. Likewise you should understand that all the works of God are divided into [1] incorporeal intelligences, which witness the glory of God, for they look at the most exalted glory to which they have access without interruption, [2] souls which move heavens, and [3] bodies.

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(1) See p. 36ff above.
(2) See p. 40ff above.
(3) See p. 46ff above.
(4) See p. 51ff above.
(5) Lit. raunaq, pl. of raqaq (= "a look").

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A body (*jism*), i.e., the human body (*badan*) is affected by the faculties located in it, but itself has no effect. The practical reason affects the animal faculties, while itself is affected by the speculative reason. The animal faculties, which are affected by the practical reason, affect the body and its organs. Likewise you should understand that all the works of God are divided into these categories: (1) those which are affected but do not have any effect, and (2) those which affect but are not affected. Those which are affected but themselves do not affect are the universal bodies, while those which are affected and have themselves also affect are the souls. They are affected by the intelligences, while they themselves affect the celestial bodies by moving them, and by thus moving them they affect the elemental world. The intelligences affect but are not affected, for their perfection is present with them, and so are not in need of becoming perfect, even though that perfection is from their Lord, Creator and Originator. In the physical world nature is compelled to serve the soul, producing an action, regardless of whether it knows or does not know what it does, just as the soul turns towards the intelligence in quest of learning, regardless of whether it seeks knowledge or not. Thus by compulsion nature follows the course of that which,
in view of its ordering power, is superior to it. The Word of Revelation has expressed that by saying, "We have built up the heaven with might, and have surely made it ample. We have stretched forth the earth, and how well have We spread it out! And We have created every thing in pairs, that you may be reminded". 

So all things, small or great, intelligible or sensible, are created in pairs. Thus compounds, as well as simple things, are in pairs. Between simple things and compounds there is a pairing relationship. By means of spheres souls give while elements receive, the results and outcomes [of the relationship] between such giver and receiver being minerals, plants, animals and mankind. There is also a pairing relationship between Intelligence and Soul as well as between "Pen" and "Tablet", whose outcome is intelligences and souls. But He to Whom "belong creation and command" is exalted above pairing relationship, whether in the sense of giving or of receiving. "Far be it from Him, may He be praised, that He should have a child", for

(6) i.e., "of every thing two kinds" (naw-yu)- Anwar, vol. II, p. 286. 
(7) 51:47-49. 
(8) Cf. p. 16, 124 above. 
(9) Cf. p. 124 above. 
(10) 7:54[4]/52[4]. 
(11) 4:174[4]/169[4].
He has no consort"; "and He has created every thing and decreed its destinies".

[B]. Another Classification.

In relation to the physical body (jism al-badan) the animal and human faculties differ in eminence and perfection, in excellence and completeness. You should likewise know that with respect to perfection or imperfection existent things are divided into the following:

[1]. Those which are not in need of the assistance of some other thing for the acquisition of some characteristics. They have every thing possible present with them. These are called perfect (rāmm).

[2]. Those which do not have every thing that is possible for them. They must of necessity attain that which they have not attained. Before attaining perfection they are called imperfect (māṣīq). The imperfect ones are again divided into [a] those which are not in need of something outside themselves for attaining what they ought to attain, and are called self-sufficient (muktafī̇n), and

(12) 6 : 101 [b].
(13) 25 : 2[d].
those which have such a need, and are called the absolutely imperfect (nāqis mutlaqān). That which is perfect is Intelligence; the imperfect are the physical bodies; and that which is imperfect in one respect while perfect in another is the Soul. The human body and every thing composed of elements is imperfect. That which is perfect is intelligence, while those that are imperfect 'in one respect, perfect in another are the spiritual faculties, such as imagination, estimation, etc.
CHAPTER XXX

ANOTHER TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE

The movement of a body gives evidence of a mover. If the moving object is not such by its own nature it gives evidence of something apprehending moving it a wall, which may be external or internal, and may belong to [the realm of] speculative, or practical reason. You should likewise know that the bodies existing under the sphere of the moon are susceptible of composition, like mud, for instance, which is composed of water and earth. This witnessed composition gives evidence of the existence of a straight movement (harakah mustaqīmah), which, with respect to the distance, gives evidence of the existence of two specific directions opposite in nature. The differing directions give evidence of the existence of a surrounding body, such as heaven. This movement having come into existence gives evidence that it has a cause, and that its cause has also a cause, and so on ad infinitum. That is not possible except by a rotatory movement (harakah dawriyyah) brought about by heaven, which movement cannot be but voluntary. Now a particular will cannot but be derived from
a universal will. The particular will belongs to the Soul, the universal to Intelligence.

This proves the existence of elements, which are capable of synthesis, and of heavens, which move and make the elements move. The moving heavens give evidence that they have movers, which are the heavenly souls, which receive assistance from the intelligences, all owing to God their origin, composition, creation, production, formation, existence, start, return and quickening. To Him belong all the earthly and spiritual worlds. He is First, without there being any other first before Him, and He is the Last, without there being any other last after Him. Human sight falls short of seeing Him, Whom no imagination can describe. With His own power has He created mankind, and according to His own will has He fashioned them.

The most excellent created thing is Intelligence. He [God] created it by His Divine Command without any matter or time having preceded, for it is not preceded except by the Divine Command. But the Divine Command is not

(1) Malik which is synonymous with mulk. (See Ṣahīḥ al-Bukhrā, vol. II, p. 205). Prob. a confusion on the part of the writer of the Arabic Edition in the use of the terms mulk, milk and malakūt. (See also p. 203 below).
(2) Cf. p. 151 above.
spoken of as being preceded by the Creator, nor even merely as "being preceded". The terms "precedence" (tagaddum) and succession" (ta'sakhhur) apply only to existing things which are subject to [the law of] opposition. The Creator is the First (Muqaddam) and the Last (Mun'akkhar), not the one preceding (mutaqaddim) and succeeding (muta'akkhir).

That which comes next below Intelligence is the Soul, for it is preceded by Intelligence, which precedes it in essence (bi'il-dhat) and not in time (zaman), or space (makan), or matter (maddah). Precedence in essence started only with Intelligence, precedence in time with the Soul, while precedence in space with Nature (tabl'ah); Nature, therefore, has precedence over space and spatial things (makaniyyat). Space does not affect it; it proceeds from its movement (tahrik) or motion (harakah) in the body. The Soul has precedence over time and temporal things (zaman'iyyat). Time does not affect it, time and prospective eternity (dahr) proceed from it, that is, from its yearning for the perfection of Intelligence. Intelligence has precedence over essences (dhawat) and essentialities (dhah-

(3) The difference between zaman and dahr is that the latter is endless. According to al-Bustani, when preceded by the definite article al dahr means prospective eternity (al
dahr mu'arrafan al-jabad bila khilaf) - Muhitt al-Muhitt, vol.I, p. 688. For further details see also Lane,III,p.923.
tīyyāt). It is not affected by essence and/or substance property (jawhariyyah); substance property proceeds from it, it (Intelligence) is the source of substances and has precedence over essences and substances, prospective eternity and time, space, body, matter, and form. It cannot be described by things below it except metaphorically.

The One "to Whom creation and command belong", to Him also belong the earthly and spiritual worlds. He is the First and Last; so we should know that He is not in time. He is both visible and invisible; so we should know that He is not in place, may He be magnified and His attributes sanctified! By Command we mean the Divine Power. By saying that Intelligence has emanated from it having created it we do not claim that [Command] itself is the creator. No, never! But we hold the First Real One free from acting directly, for the Real Creator is He "to Whom creation and command belong", may His name be blessed!

Now, the soul is one but has [several] faculties, on account of which it shines upon the body and the animal spirit producing in each place a different effect. Thus in one place [it produces] sight, in another place

(4) 7:54[4]/52[a].
hearing, while in other places smelling, common sense, (5) imagination, estimation, etc. Likewise the Command of the First Real One, with respect to the existence of intelligence, it is creation, with respect to its continuance in existence, it is actual perfection, with respect to the soul, it is perfecting and directing from potentiality to actuality; with respect to nature, it is movement (tahrīk), with respect to physical bodies it is free control, with respect to temperaments and elements it is adjustment, with respect to compounds it is formation, with respect to things formed it is animation, with respect to animals it is observation and guidance, with respect to human intelligence it is imposition and explanation, while with respect to the prophets, blessing and peace be upon them, it is a command, a speech, words, a telling, a Book and messages. "It is not fitting for a human being that God should speak to him except by way of revelation, or from behind a veil; or He sends a messenger to reveal, by His permission, that which He wills. Indeed He is exalted and wise". (7)

Thus with respect to the phenomenal order the

(6) Cf. 96:1; 3:74:1-3; 7:144; 14:2; 37:35; 4:171[b]; 16:89[c]; 91[c]; 29:51/50; 17:2; etc.
(7) 42:51/50-51.
Most Exalted Command denotes formation and creation, while with respect to the particulars of those charged with it, it denotes an order which entails a command or prohibition, a promise or threat, an information or inquiry. The outer aspect of the Creative Command consists of the positions of angels and their leading existing things to perfection; perfection means obedience to the Divine Command, while the perfection of those charged with it is their reception of the divine recompense. The one who does not obey the Divine Command is expelled from the World of Reality (عالم الهمگ), which expulsion is a curse (الن). Such was the case of the first Satan, who, having disobeyed the Divine Command, was expelled from the garden of Intelligence (جنازت الامام), with the words, "Be gone from it; for you are indeed a stoned one". That is the meaning of cursing. The one who obeys the command is ushered into the World of Recompense (عالم الثواب) and the angelic nature (ملاكية) becomes realized in him. Such was the case of the angels, who, being ordered to bow down, obeyed, and entered the World of Recompense.

(8) I.e., the Command to bow down to Adam. For a full account see 7:11-13/10-12; 15:28-35; also p. 87, n. 14 above. (9) 15:34; 38:77/78.
CHAPTER XXXI

ADDITIONAL SECTIONS

SECTION 2

As the vegetative [powers], and animal and human faculties cannot do without the soul's assistance for one moment, for it is indispensable that it should continually shine upon them and assist them in the effect they produce for the orderly running of the microcosm, we, likewise, say concerning the macrocosm that with respect to the "start" (mabda'), every one of rank even though empowered over what has been appointed to it and prepared for it to do, cannot do without the assistance the one above it in rank gives it, the favor and benefits it pours upon it, and its support of it. With respect to the "return" (fawd), again every one of rank, even though its function is transferred to the one above it, it will not completely cease functioning within its own sphere of action. Thus, for instance, if nature ceases functioning the vegetative powers would cease, and the animal faculties

(1) See p. 110, n. 1 above.
(2) Cf p. 126 above.
would cease with them. Similarly if the soul ceased to function the animal faculties would cease, and with their cessation the human faculties would cease. Likewise, if intelligence ceased functioning the human faculties would cease, and prophethood would cease with it.

Thus nature is the guardian of the vegetable soul, the Soul the guardian of the animal souls, Intelligence the guardian of the human rational soul, while the Command of the Creator is the guardian of the prophetic divine soul. "Every soul has indeed a guardian over it". This is so in general; while in particular "each one has a succession of angels before him and behind him, guarding him on account of the Command of God", that is, by the Command of God. Indeed, just as the First Real One created the First Intelligence He also brought it to actual perfection; as by means of it He created the Soul He also made it perfect [by providing it] with the potentiality to turn towards the perfection of Intelligence; as He created by means of it [i.e., the soul] nature He also provided it with[the power] to move (taḥrīk); as He brought the physical bodies into existence He assigned for them free move-

(3) 86:4.
(4) 13:11/12. For the other various interpretations of the last phrase in the verse see Anwār, I, p. 477.
ment; as He combined the elements together He also set their right balance; as He adjusted the [generative] compositions and temperaments He gave them visible form; as He formed them He gave them souls and caused them to live; as He subjected them to compulsion by the souls He also ordered them by intelligences; and as He ordered them by intelligences He drove them to their future life (ma'aṣād) by charging them to keep the law, commanding and prohibiting, giving good tidings and warning, and promising and threatening by the mouth of the prophets.

In brief His creation of the universe is not as if He built a house and sent forth into it many of His slaves, having assigned to every one of them his portion, and then withdrew from them His supervision and ordering together with His knowledge, power and will, so that, having once been created, they labor in what concerns them, and, having received His ordinances, they now act as they please; the house does not need one to uphold it in order to survive, since the building does not need the

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(5) Lit. "ordered the intelligences" (dabbara'ī-l-ṣuqūl) in stead of (dabbarahā bi'l-ṣuqūl), probably a mistake of the copyist, or a misprint.
(6) See p. 61, n. 6 above.
(7) Cf. p. 204 above.
(8) Lit. "that for which He created him" (mā khalaṣahu li'saṣālīhi).
(9) Wa hum bikhalqihī ya'madū ma'lam li'l-jamr. Cf. Wa hum bi'amrijī ya'ma'aṣīn (24:32).
builder any more, as some people think; neither do its inhabitants need one to order and dispose, since with natural disposition they can do without a builder or restorer, as some imagine. On the contrary, just as they needed His work of creation for their existence, even so do they need His command for their continued existence; and just as they did not come into existence by themselves, even so can not continue to exist by themselves, for He is the self-subsisting One [Who has dominion] over the spiritual world.

SECTION [II]

Just as a man attains perfection of body by nature to live in this world, even so is it necessary that he should attain perfection of soul by divine law so that he may live in the other world. Angels were therefore appointed to keep nature under compulsion so that perfection of body is attained, while prophets were sent to manage the divine law so that perfection of soul may be attained. Again, just as purity of temperament is attained only by the testing of the [generative] compositions and the refining of material substances so that there is one born

(1) Cf p. 126 with n. 30 above.
"capable of hearing and seeing" (sāmītan basītan) in this world, even so is purity of soul attainable only by the testing of duties and the refining of souls so that he may become capable of perfect hearing and seeing (sāmītan basītan kāmilan) in the next world. Were it not for that [first] refining work no angel would have ever been sent to the world of physical birth (ṣālām al-yarham); and were it not for this [latter] refining work no prophet would have ever been sent to the world of divine ordinances (ṣālām al-yahkam).

How wonderful are these spiritual beings [angels] who mediate in [the world of] creation, and the corporeal ones [prophets] mediating in [the world of] command. The angels gather mankind together from earth into complete human constitution for this world, and the prophets gather them out of ignorance into full angelic natural disposition for the next world. In the world of creation and the world of command angels and prophets respectively are performers of the Most Exalted Command, for they all "act in obedience to His command" and "tremble with fear of Him". They praise Him night and day without ceasing."
Someone may say: In attempting to prove the existence of these ascents [to God] and comparisons between the soul on the one hand and God and His attributes and deeds on the other, all that you have mentioned points to the existence of likeness and resemblance between man and God, while it is well known by divine law and reason that "there is nothing like Him, Who is the Hearer, the Seer\(^{(5)}\). For He does not resemble anything, nor does any thing resemble Him.

In answer we say: While proving these points of knowledge we pointed out things which necessarily imply that the Creator is far removed from all the attributes of His works both created and phenomenal. And yet the more you understand the meaning of similarity, which has no connection with God, the better you will know that there is nothing similar to Him. Besides, we should not think that the participation [of things] in any attribute necessarily means that they are similar. Do you think, for instance, that two contraries are similar with a great difference between them, beyond which no greater difference is conceivable? Yet many qualities are common to them both. Black and white, for instance, share alike in being an accidental quality, in being a color, in being apprehended by sight,

\(^{(5)}\) 42:11[c]/9[c].
etc. Similarly if someone says, "God is One Who exists but not in a place, One Who lives, hears, sees, knows, wills, speaks, and is powerful and active, but so is man", would you think that he holds them to be alike, and has proved that they are similar? Far from it! That is not the case. If it were so, then all creatures would be alike, since existence at least is common to them all. This may lead one to suspect similarity among them. No, similarity implies participation in species and nature (fîl-nawâ' wa'l-mâhiyyah). Thus, no matter how capable of discrimination a horse may be, it is not similar to man, since it differs from him in species. It resembles him only in discrimination, which is an accidental quality that is not part of species or of nature, which sustains the essence of humanity.

The Divine property is His existence in and by Himself on account of Whom exists, in the best order and perfection, every thing possible of existence. This property is one in which no participation [by any one] is conceivable. Therefore there can be no similarity with respect to it. Thus a man's being merciful, forbearing and grateful (shâkîr) does not necessarily imply similarity, just as his

(6) With respect to God, the term shâkîr can only mean "rewarding", etc. Lane, IV, p. 1585.
being one hearing, seeing, knowing, powerful, living and active does not. Divine property does not belong except to God, and no one knows it except Him, for it is not conceivable that any one should know it except Him. That is why He gave the most illustrious of His creatures [i.e., Muhammad] nothing but names which veiled him. Thus He said to him, "Praise the name of your Lord the Most High". By God, no one other than Himself, in this world or the next, ever knows Him, that is, in a comprehensive and perfect way. "He is God" - without nature (māhiyyah), "the One" (al-

(8) (9) (10) (10) (11) (12)

Ahad) - without quantity (kammayyah), "The Everlasting One" (al-Samad) - exalted above quality (kayfiyyah), Who "does not beget", for He is the Creator, "and is not begotten", for He is eternally existent; "and there is not one like Him" in His being, attributes and actions.

This is all we wanted to mention in this book.

I have removed the cover from treasured secrets, and the veil from the treasures of knowledge. I have pointed out these treasured secrets, and exhibited the hidden knowledge

(7) 87:1.
(8) 112:1.
(9) 112:2.
(10) 112:3[a].
(11) 112:3[b].
(12) 112:4.
which is generally withheld. [I have done that] to make it available to friends who possess a strong mental power (ṣarīnah), a sound mind, a pure soul and clearness of insight; being convinced that this age lacks men who have received these secrets by word of mouth, and men who have obtained these things by inference alone, with the hope that the one who has the desire to perpetuate learning and transmit it to others after him will find in it a way to record it and commit it in book form without relying upon the whim of a learner for investigating it in its proper manner, preserving it and transmitting it to others after him; and also without relying upon the efforts of contemporaries and people like them coming after them for investigating, searching out, removing difficulties, solving problems, and probing the depth of sciences. For how can a crow have the manner of a hawk in its swoop upon its prey? And how can mist pour forth rain as the clouds do? Moreover, I forbid every one who reads this book - friends who have superior fitness and clear mental power - to give

(13) Lit. َFILE, ending in a straight َALIF (اَلْيَاء māṣēt) meaning "to", "for". But this form can be read َFILE also (= except, but). Evidently it ought to be َFILE with a round َALIF (الْيَاء maghārah). It is written with a straight َALIF only when it is followed by the interrogative ما - See مُحَبْتُ، vol. II, p. 1940; Lane, I, 56; cf. Redhouse p. 179.
it freely to a wicked and obstinate soul, to disclose it
to him, or misuse it in any way.

If one makes a free gift of knowledge
to fools wastes it,
While if he keeps it from those who deserve it
transgresses against them.

(211) If, however, you find some one who is confident that his
heart is pure and his conduct upright, that he refrains
from that to which "the whisperer" (waswas) hastens, and
that he looks to the Real One with satisfaction and sin-
cerity, then give it to him piecemeal in stages seeking to
establish Him in the things which he learns first and those
which are to follow after. Get him to promise by God and
by oaths from which there is no escape whatever that in
passing it on to others he will pursue your method, follow-
ing your example. Then whether he publishes this science
or wastes it God will judge between him and me, "for God
is a sufficient reckoner". "God is sufficient for us;
He is most excellent Protector", "Most excellent Patron
and most excellent Helper is He".

(14) I.e., Satan, who by whispering suggests doubts,
evil thoughts, sin, etc. Cf. 114:4-5.
(15) 4:6[h]/8[b]; 33:39[b].
(17) 8:40[b]/41[b]; 22:78[c].
NOTICE

In the colophon of the copy from which we printed this book this statement is found:

Ahmad b. Sha‘bān b. Yahyā the Andalusian, known as Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Amīr, finished the labor of transcription of this book Wednesday, Rajab, 15, 1066 of the hijrah [1656 A.D.] best of blessings and greetings be upon him.

If you find any blemish repair the defect, For He in Whom there is no blemish at all is the Illustrations and Sublime one.

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+  
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With the help of al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Khamīrī of Tūnis I have compared this book with another manuscript in Tūnis, dated 923 A.H. [1517-18 A.D.], during my stay there 1345 A.H. [1926 A.D.]. Thanks be to God, the book is now complete and perfect.
GLOSSARY-INDEX

References below are to the page number in the Arabic edition of Ma’ārīj, found on the left margin of the present translation.

A, أ, آ

Abad, Eternity, 89.
Abādān wa asāldān, From eternity to eternity, 89.
Abādī, Everlasting, 171.
Abda’ā, (yubdi’u), Create, 192.
Originates, 206.
Absara, (yusbiru), (from basirah, q.v.), to understand, 4.
ēAdam, Becoming non-existent or ceasing to exist, 131,189.
Non-existent, 63,131,148.
ēAdamī, A human being, 11,14,122,198.
ēAhrāb, Punishment, 20.
Adraka, (yudrīku), To apprehend, 8,9,17,19,22-25,29,34,41,
43-50,63,64,68-70,73,74,89,90,135,136,139,140,
151,186.
To attain, 182. (See idrāk)
Afṣada, (yuṣṣidu), To cause degeneration, 157.
Abādī (fem. ahdiyyah), One, 119.
Simple, single, 29.
Unitary, 132. (See wahdāniyyah)
Abasse, (See hasse).
Abdatā (yuḥdithu), To bring into being or existence, 129,
164,165.
To produce, 164,165,197,206. (See ihdāth)
Ahl al-ṣināf, The righteous, 21.
Ahl al-khumsa, Religious experts, 2.
Ajsam al-samawat, Celestial bodies, 200.
"Ajibah (pl. fajlub), a wonder, 2,5.
Akmal (from kamal, q.v.), More perfect, 171.
Akmala, To complete, 184.
"Ala haratiba, As they are, 155,156.
"Alah (pl. fālīt), means, 109.
Organ, 19,20,24,31,32,35,50,51,70,73,151,157,164, 177,178.
"Alah gamūniyah, System of law, 102.
"Alam (pl. fawālim), Cosmos, 97.
Universe, 122,171,190,191,206.
World (see the following combinations).
See "Alam al-"arham.
- akbar, Great world, 198. (See "Alam kābir).
- al-"amr, World of command, 208.
World of creation, 12.
- al-"anāsit, Elemental world, 200. (See "Alam „unsuri").
- al-"aqil, World of intelligence, 167.
- al-"arham, World of physical birth,208.
See "Alam al-ajsād.
- al-fawd, "Alam al-ma‘ād, Resurrection world, 14,34.
See fawd, ma‘ād.
- jasānī, "Alam jismānī, Physical world, 137,164.
- kābir, Macrocasm, 149,205.
- al-malakūt, Spiritual world, 104. (See malakūt).
- al-ma‘ād, (See "Alam al-fawd).
Ilam al-nafa, Ilam nafsani, World of soul, 158, 166, 167.
- al-Quds, Divine World, 66.
- Sahir, Microcosm, 149, 205.
- al-tabii'ah, Physical world, 166, 167.
- al-thawab, World of Recompense, 205.
- 'ungsuri, Elemental world, 119, 159.

See Ilam al-anasir.

Ilam (fem. Ilaamiyyah), Universal, 164. (See kull).
IlamIn, Universe, 142, 144, 149, 169, 184.
Ilf, Organic, 19, 191.
Ilm, Intellectual, 51.
Ilm 'aqil, One who knows intellectual things, 7, 170.
Ilm maqul, One who knows intelligible things, 171.
Amal, (pl. awamal), Function, 205, 206.
Amal, Practical, 6, 50, 89, 150-158, 175, 201.
Aml (fem. Amilah), Practical, 51.
Amm, Common, generic, 62, 108.
General, Universal, 20, 21.
Amr (pl. awamir), Command, Divine Command, 148, 150, 198, 203-207.
Amr Awal, First Command, 149.
Amr kain (pl. umur kainah), Phenomenon, 156. (See kain).
- Rabubi, Divine order, 59.
- takwini, Creative command, 205.
Amri (fem. amriyyah), Ibrahat, 59.
'Agala, To have rational knowledge, 72.
To know, Ilf, 36, 56, 72.
To reason, 46, 47.
To understand, 7, 59, 68, 73, 75, 133, 138, 140, 179.
"Aqil (fem. "Aqilah), Intelligent, intelligent agent, 22,
29,76,137.
Rational, 3,61,70,72,85,90,111,168,169,178.
"Aql (pl. "Aqūl), Human soul, 16.
Intelligence (see the following combinations).
Rational intelligence, 6,59-61,156,157,171.
Reason, 6,7,11,20,21,34,49,50,51,88,90-94,179,
199,208.
Reasoning, 159,160.
- "amanūl, Practical reason or intelligence, 50,52,89,
90,110,150,153-158,175,199,201.
- awwal, First Intelligence, 15,145,183,206.
- bi'īl-fī'īl, Intelligence in act, 7,53,55,56,64,110,
141,163.
Intelligence in actuality, 137.
- bi'īl-malakah, Potential intelligence, 55,110,141,
163. (See "Aql mumkin).
- bi'īl-qawwah, Potential intelligence, 56,183.
- fa'īl, Active Intelligence or Reason, 7,59,124,134-
141,161,162.
- fitrī, Innate intelligence, 59.
- hayūlānī, Primary physical (or potential) intelligence,
6,54,55,56-61,110,137,140,163,183.
- Ilāhī, Divine Intelligence, 120.
- kullī, Universal intelligence, 126,151,164.
- mufāraq, Incorporeal intelligence, 8,134-141,145,151,
159,183. (See "Aql mujarrad).
- mujarrad, Incorporeal intelligence, 167 (See "Aql mu-
fāraq).
- mumkin, Possible or potential intelligence, 55
(See "Aql bi'īl-malakah).
"Aql munṣafīl, Intelligence that is acted upon, 10, 137, 221.
- mushahhakhās, or shakhs al-‘aql, Personalized intelligence, 126.
- mustarād, Acquired intelligence, 56, 59, 97, 110, 137, 141, 163.
- mustarād quḍā‘, Divine acquired intelligence, 56.
  (See "aql mustarād and aql quḍā‘).
- al-nabī, A prophet's mind, 163, 164. (See aql nabawī).
- nabawī, Prophetic mind, 59. (See aql al-nabī).
- nasawī, Intelligence of speculative reason, 56.
  Speculative intelligence or reason, 52, 90, 110, 150, 153, 154, 199, 201.
  Theoretical reason, 50.
- quḍā‘, Divine Intelligence, 6, 56, 67, 140.
- qudr Nabawī, Prophetic Divine Intelligence, 67.
  Intelligible, 26, 49, 179.
  Pertaining to reason, 49, 201.
  Rational, 11, 19, 48, 81, 128, 149.
"Agalla, (yu‘aqlīlu), To obtain rational knowledge, 72.
  (See faqala).
  Accidental quality, 63, 130, 139, 140, 143, 208.
"Arad, fāmm, Common accident, 108.
  - khāss, Specific accident, 108.
"Irād, Accident, 65, 72, 128.
  Accidental, 170, 177, 178, 190.
  Accidental quality, 2, 28, 57, 62, 70, 75, 76, 112, 113, 176, 177, 182, 197, 209. (See ‘arad).
أريد *الا*، Affecting, 12.
Coming in an accidental way, 193.
أريف (pl. أريفع)، A man of mystical knowledge, 185,186.
أصاب (pl. أصابب)، Nerve, 37,41,43,45,50,198.
أسابح مهجوفة، Hollow optic nerve, 44.
أضمار (yuṣiru)، To make to perceive, 92.
أصل، Basis, 169,170,177.
Basic or fundamental principle, 14,170,172.
Origin, source, 133,186.
Real nature, 71.
أثر (pl. أثار)، Action, 189.
Effect, 100,135,141,143,158,198.
Impression, 53,74,75,87,176.
Record, 85.
Result, 15.
Work, 3,107.
أثبتهِ (yuṣbītu)، To establish, 150,191.
To know for sure, 193.
Proving, 209.
To prove the existence of, 189,192,193.
أثثريهِ (yuṣthīthīru)، To affect, or have effect, 78,79,97,126,155,166,176,199,200.
اتلاق (yuṭligu)، To use without modification, 11-16,20.
أعود، Return, 126,205. (See*size* al- أحمد*).
أوها (yuḥā)، To inspire, 13.
To reveal, 3,143,149,150.
أولاد (yūlidu)، واعدة (yuwaładu) (q.v.) To reproduce, 16.
أواو (fem. yūlā)، First One, first, 33,195,196,204,206.
Original, 173.
الأووال الأصل، The First Real One, 33,195,204,206.
أووالِ (fem. awwaliyyah)، First, 56,169.
Original, 152,174.

\( ^3 \text{Ayah} \) (pl. \(^3\text{Ayāt}\)), Sign, 2;3,4.

\( ^\text{Ayn} \), Concrete existence, 19.

\( ^\text{Ayn} \), place (a predicaments), 17,28,29,62,193.

\( ^\text{Ayn} \) (pl. \(^\text{Ayn}\)), External, or concrete existence, 19.

Very self, 185,194.

\( ^\text{Asal} \), Eternity, 89.

B

\( ^\text{Badanīf} \) (fem. \text{badaniyyah}), Bodily, (pertaining or according to the body), 7,58,79,101,109,110,116,158,168, 175-176.

Corporeal, 113.

Physical, 34.

\( ^\text{BadThah} \), or \( ^\text{badThah} \) \( ^\text{aqlīyyah} \), Intuition, 26,33.

\( ^\text{Rā}^\text{ith} \) \( ^\text{Fulā} \), Motivating, 36.

\( ^\text{Bāl} \), Mind, 6.

\( ^\text{Baqā}^\text{a} \), Continuance of existence, 132,190,191.

Eternity, 4.

Immortality, 21,126.

Persistence in existence, 134.

Survival, to survive, 10,95,207.

\( ^\text{Bāqī} \), Immortal, 127.

Persistent, 134.

\( ^\text{Bagīva} \) (\text{yabqa}), To be immortal, 127.

To be continuous, 3.

To continue (e.g., to live, or exist), 94,176.

To last, 178.

To persist, 132,134.

\( ^\text{Bārī} \), Creator, 115,125,188,191,192,194,203,206,208.

\( ^\text{Bāsar} \) (pl. \( ^\text{Bāsar} \)), Sight, 45,47,59,60,81,83,104,137,138, 182,202,204,208. (See \( ^\text{hasil al-bāsar} \).)
Bashāy, Sample constitution, 128,129.
Basharah, Skin, 41.
Bashāriyyah, Humanity, mankind, 415.
Bashīr, Capable of discerning, of seeing, 207.
Wise, 96.
Bashīrah, Insight, 95,107.
Mind, 2,6,85.
Bashīt, (fem. bashītah), Simple, a simple unity, 68,132-134,139,200.
Bata'ala (yabtulu), To cease, to cease to exist, 130,133,177,178.
Bāṭīl (fem. bāṭīlah), False, falsehood, 81,82,159,178.
Invalid, 131,192.
Unreal, 40.
Wrong, 39,146,177.
Bātin, Inner aspect, 171.
Inner part, within, 3,162.
Internal, 97,127,199,201.
Invisible, 203.
Bātn, Ventricle, 50 (See tāwjīr).
Bi‘l-‘ūl, Actual, 69,159,173,179,206.
In act, 7,55,56,110,137,163,204.
In actuality, 132,133,180,206.
Bi‘l-malakah, Potential (potentially), 163.(See ‘anl bi‘l-malakah).
Bi‘l-shakhsiyyah, Individually, 151.
Bil-Tab, Naturally, 49.
Bintāsya, Phantasy, 46,110,155,156,157 (See hīsā mushtarak).
Bintāsya mushtarakah, Common phantasy, 155.
Butā (pl. abād), Dimension, 16,21,62.
Bukhār, Vapor, 34,127,198.
Burdah, Cold (coldness), 41,111.
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Mā'ād, Future life, 61, 157, 206.

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- awwal, or awwalā, First principle, 56, 169, 175, 183.

- tabīt, Natural principle, 18.

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Maddī (fem. maddīyyah), Material, 68, 76, 114-117.

Subsisting in matter, 128, 180.

Maʿdūm, Non-existent, 72, 127, 131. (See ʿadam)

Mafrūʿ, Assumed, 28.

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Maball, Locus, 12, 14, 16, 26, 27, 34, 112, 121.
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   - thaniyyah, Secondary intelligibles, 55.
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- bātinah, Internal faculties, 97,106,127,199.

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Maslūb, Negative, 108.

Mātā, Time (a predicament), 193.

Mathā, To act naturally, 50.

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Mawjūd, Existent, existing, 2,8,16,19,24,31,34,69(2.6),71,98,104,111,123,125,133,134,141,152,163,165,171,172,175,183,189-192,194,196,201,203,205,209.

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Muhassal, Existent, 20.
Muḥdāth, Brought into existence, 149.

Muḥdir, Creative, 2.

Miḥī, One that reveals, 155.

Mujāh, Affirmative, 76. (See mujābah kulliyah, mujābah fusūliyyah).

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Mukawwan, Formed, 4, 205.
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Murābī, Devotee front guard, 107.
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MurJ, One who wills, 195, 196.
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- fālakī or fālakīyyah, Celestial soul, 7, 18, 20, 120, 145, 159.
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- hāyawānī, or hāyawāniyyah, Animal soul, 18, 19, 119, 189, 206.
- insāniyyah, Human soul, 15, 18, 19, 34, 51, 53, 57, 81, 109, 114-116, 134-141, 164, 179, 189, 206. (See nafs bashariyyah).
- kulliyyah, Universal soul, 164.
- lawwāmah, A blameworthy soul, 12.
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- malakīyyah, (See nafs fālakīyyah, nafs sammāwiyyah).
- nabātiyyah, Vegetable soul, 17-19, 119, 189, 206.
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Nagar, Consideration, 5.

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Qawf, Pertaining to speech, 38-40, 145.
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Al-Qiwā'īs-tabāsīyyat al-arba', The four natural powers, 111.
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- ʿamaliyyah, Practical faculty, faculty of practical reason, 51-53,154,166.
- ʿamdilah, Practical faculty,51-53.(See q. ʿamaliyyah)
- ʿaqliyyah, Mental faculty, 31,73,88,89,105,138,173.
  Rational faculty, 94.
- ʿaqliyyah ʿamaliyyah, Faculty of practical reason, 156. (See ṣaq ʿamal).
- badaniyyah, Bodily (or physical) faculty, 7,52,79, 175.
  Physical power, 34.
- bāʿithah ʿalāʿl-fiʿl, Motivating faculty,36,37.
- dāʿiḥah, Expulsive power, lll.
- darrākhah, Apprehending faculty,170.(See q.mudrikah).
- ṣālilah, Active faculty, 36,37.
- ghādirah (or q. al-ghadab), The irascible faculty, 9,80,85,87-88,90,91,106. (See ghadab).
- ghādhiyyah, Nutritive power, lll.
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- ḥadisuyah, Power of intuitive insight, 162.
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- hayawanīyyah, Animal faculty, 51,52,108,110,175,176, 199,201,205,206.
- hayawanīyyah mutakhayyilah, wa mutawahhimah, Imaginative and estimative animal faculty.51, 52.
- hayawanīyyah musūʿiyyah, Appetitive animal faculty,51
- hayūlāniyyah, Primary physical power, 55.
- hīsliyyah, Sensory faculty,109,155,157.
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- jādhibah, Attractive power, lll.
- jismāniyyah (or jismiyyah),Physical faculty,74,128.
Quwwah kamāliyyah, Power in perfection, 55 (See kamāl al-quwwah).
- khayāliyyah, Retentive imagination, 48, 50, 109, 110, 156. (See khayāl).
- lamsiyah, Faculty of touch, 42. (See q. al-lams).
- màsikah, Retentive power, 111.
- mubṣirah, Faculty of sight, 43, 46. (See hāsas al-basar).
- mudrikah, Apprehending faculty, 40, 45, 46, 106, 199.
- mutfakdirah, Reflective faculty, 50, 69, 105.
- munharrikah, Motor faculty, 36, 37, 110, 127, 199.
  - bi'l-fiq', Active motor faculty, 110.
- mukhayyilah (or mutakhayyilah), Imaginative faculty, 47, 50, 80-84, 110, 154-156, 158, 166. (See q. al-takhayyul).
- murabbiyyah, Posturing power, 111.
- mumkinah, Potential power, 54, 55.
- müsalwirah, Image forming faculty, 49, 50. (See khayāl).
- muṭlaqah, Absolute power, 54.
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- muwwalidah, Reproductive power, 111.
- nabatiyyah, Vegetative power, 110, 205f.
- nafsāniyyah, Faculty of the soul, 165, 166, 168, 174.
- nazarīyyah, Faculty of speculative reason, 53-56, 160, 166.
- nuṣūriyyah, Appetitive faculty, 110.
- sāmyah, Faculty of hearing, 46.
- shahwāniyyah (or shahwiyah), Faculty of physical desire, 9, 80, 84-87, 88, 90, 91, 94, 154. (See shahwah).
- shawmiyyah (or q. al-shamm), Faculty of smell, 42-43.
- tabfīyyah, Natural power, 111.
Quwwah wahmiyyah, Estimative faculty, 46, 47, 48-49, 50, 51, 73, 136. (See wahm).

Quwwat al-dhākirah, Faculty of recollection, 49, 51. (See q. hāfīzah, hāfīzah wa dhākirah).
- al-hāfīzah, Faculty of memory, 49, 51.
- al-fikr, Power of thought, 84, 86.
- al-hāmiyyah, Power of seal for the right, 84, 85.
- al-lams, Faculty of touch, 41ff. (See ḥāssat al-lams).
- al-nafs, Faculty of the soul, 150. (See q. nafsāniyyah).
- al-nuq, Power of utterance, 84.
- al-takhayyul, Faculty of imagination, 9, 49ff., 78, 80-84, 90, 150. (See q. mukhayyilah).
- al-tamyīz, Power of discrimination, 84.

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- Thinking, 19.
- Raʿy juzʿ, Particular idea, 159.
- Raʿy kullī, Universal idea, 159.
Rūḥāt, Ligature, 37, 198.
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- ṭaqīl, Rational spirit, 111.
- basharīf (or basharīyyah), Human spirit, 99, 111-126.
- hayawānī, Animal spirit, 127, 198, 204.

Rūḥānī, Mental, 51.
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Spiritual reality, 135.

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Rūṭūbah jāli’diyyah, The crystalline humor of the eye, 44.
Rūṭḥyāh, Dream vision, 155.
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Sarādah, Bliss, eternal bliss, 4, 5, 10, 67, 84, 89, 94, 98, 167-179, 186.

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- al-farj, Concupiscence, 86, 87, 107, 169.
- al-jimā', Sexual desire, 95.
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Shakhs al-`aql, Personality of the intelligence, 126. (See faqal mushakhkhd).
Shakhṣiyah, Individuality, 151. (See bi'il-shakhṣiyah).
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Shaqaq, Misery, eternal misery, 4, 5, 10, 89, 98, 167-179.
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- ḥijāmāniyiyah, Corporeal form, 119.
- ṭabī'iyiyah, Physical form, 119.
- thāniyiyah, Secondary form, 57.
- ẓāliq, Primary form, 57.

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Ta'abbada ( yatā'abbadu), To be everlasting, 2.
Ta'aqqala ( yatā'aggalū), To understand, 72,151. (See
aqla, aqqala);
Ta'aqqul, Intellection, 18,22,35,151.
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Knowledge, Rational knowledge, 31, 72.
Understanding, intelligible understanding, 9, 72, 74, 75, 136, 140.
Tā'aththara (yata'aththaru), To be affected, 67, 68, 76, 78, 97, 176, 199, 200.
Tā'aththur, Being affected, influenced, 53, 86.
Tā'ayyana (yata'ayyana), To exist as an individual, 9, 77, 163. (See muta'ayyin).
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Tafahhama (yatafahhamu), To comprehend, 21.
Tafakkur, Syllogistic thinking, 8, 102, 161.
Tafattana (yatafattānu), To understand, 21.
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Tāghāyara (yataghāyara), To differ, 113, 115.
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Tāhaddus, Intuitive activity, 162.
Tahayyu, Capacity, 155, 166. (See isti'dāq).
Tahāq, Affirmation, 150.
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Tahrīk, Movement, 110, 189, 198, 203, 204.
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Tajarrada (yatajarradu), To be, or become free from matter, 29, 159, 179.
Tajarrud, Abstraction, 28.
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Takhayyulf, Imaginative, 49.
Takhīf, Perpetuation, 177.
Takhmin, Conjecture, 154.
Takhīfī, Outword, 12, 13.
Takwin, Formation, 202; 205.
Takwīfī, Creative, 205.
Tāfī, Consequent, 108.
Tamān, Being complete, 208.
Completeness, perfection, 201.
Tamaththala (yatamaththalu), To be formed, to take form, 137, 162, 166.
Tamaththul, Formation of images, 136.
Tamthil, Forming, 136.
Tanwil, Word of Revelation, 117, 124, 200.
Taqlid, Based on authority, 161.
Traditional, 101.
Taraq, An extreme, extremity, 25, 26, 28, 91-93, 98, 160.
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Taqdis, Belief, believing, 55, 71, 102, 109, 142, 174.
Taqdisi, Being believed, 71. (See iwmur taqdisqiyah).
Tawfir, Formation, 204.
Thabbata (yuthabbityu), To determine, 193.
Ta'athur, Being affected, 83.
Effect, 205.
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Tawahhum, Assumption, 27.
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Tawatu, Agreement, 20, 193.
Tawhid, Unity, 14.
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Tawlid, Reproduction, 189.
Tasahar, Collaboration, cooperation, 6, 59, 159.
Thubut, Existence, 16,202. (See ithbät).  
Tubbī, Physical, 13.

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Ufūq al-malā'īkah (or al-malakiyyah), Angelic sphere, Dominion of angels, 12,98.  
'Ulūm darūriyyah, Necessary sciences, 55,89.  
'Ulūm yaqīniyyah, Absolute certain sciences, 89,178.  
Umm (pl. ummahāt), Origin, 199.  
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Umūr kā'inah wa fāṣidah, Wordly affairs, 52.  
Umūr taṣīqiyyah, Things that have to be believed, 71.  
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Medium, 23, 24, 163.
Wasit, Attribute, 193, 208.
Characteristic, 201.
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Watar, Tendon, 37, 198.
Widān, Ecstasy, 79, 80.
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Wajīb, Necessary existence, 117.
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Gāmānī, Temporal, 114, 203.
Zann (pl. zumūn), Supposing, supposition, 157, 160, 165.
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Sāwiyah (pl. sawāyā), Angle, 44.
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