PART I

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AL-GHAZĀLĪ’S SOJOURN IN DAMASCUS AND JERUSALEM

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The comparatively numerous studies on al-Ghazālī1 have left an important period of his life as obscure as it has always been. His decision to relinquish the post of chief mudarris at the Nizāmiyyah in Baghdad, his subsequent sojourn in Syria, and his pilgrimage to the Hijaz are, of course, known in general terms, if only from his own very brief autobiographical account in Al-Mungidh min al-Dalāl. But I know of no special study devoted to al-Ghazālī’s visit to Syria. Even the fat volume containing the papers read at the ninth centenary held in 1960/1961 in Damascus strangely lacks a paper on al-Ghazālī’s stay in that city. The references to the visit by some of the contributors to the volume are not only cursory but at times also contradictory.

The aim of the present study is to throw light on that important episode in the life of al-Ghazālī and, in particular, to suggest a connexion between his decision to leave teaching and a desire to commune with a mystic then living and teaching in Damascus.2 This study is also designed as an introduction to the most tangible and authenticated product of the visit to Syria, a tract on dogmatic theology which was composed in Jerusalem and called ar-Riṣālah al-Qudsiyyah. An edited text of the tract itself and an annotated translation thereof form the second and third parts of this contribution respectively.

Al-Ghazālī was thirty-eight years old when he made the momentous decision. He had already examined the various branches of knowledge known in his time and investigated the ways of the learned in each of them, and had come to the conclusion that the ways of the mystics were the most conducive to bliss in this world and salvation in the next. Later

1 Earlier studies and translations by, among others, Asin, Bauer, Carra de Vaux, Frick, Goldscheider, Macdonald, Massignon, Obermann, and Remnick are too well known to be cited here. Nor is there need to cite more than a few of the recent contributions, except some studies by Bouyer, Jarès, and Watt specifically mentioned below. Of the very recent works in Arabic mention may be made of those by Husain Amin, Al-Ghazali (Cairo, 1961), ’Abd al-Karim ’Uthmān, Sirat al-Ghazali (Algiers, 1960) and the ninth centenary volume edited by Zakī Najib Maḥmūd entitled Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (Cairo, 1961). Recent translations from the works of al-Ghazālī have been published by, among others, Bercher, Bouquet, Calverley, Fāris, Jarès, McKane, Šabbāgh, and Watt.

in life he himself described this process of mental and spiritual experience autobiographically in *The Rescuer from Error*.\(^1\) The following passage is reproduced from the admirable translation by Montgomery Watt, with a few suggested corrections, emendations, and explanatory notes:

‘For nearly six months beginning with Rajab, 488, I was continuously tossed about between the attractions of worldly desires and the impulses towards eternal life. In that month the matter ceased to be one of choice and became one of compulsion. God caused my tongue to dry up so that I was prevented from lecturing.\(^2\) One particular day I would make an effort to lecture in order to gratify the hearts of my following, but my tongue would not utter a single word nor could I accomplish anything at all.

“This impediment in my speech produced grief in my heart, and at the same time my power to digest and assimilate food and drink was impaired; I could hardly swallow or digest a single mouthful of food. My powers became so weakened that the doctors gave up all hope of successful treatment. “This trouble arises from the heart”, they said, “and from there it has spread through the constitution; the only method of treatment is that the anxiety which has come over the heart should be allayed.”

‘Thereupon, perceiving my impotence and having altogether lost my power of choice, I sought refuge with God most high as one who is driven to Him, because he is without further resources of his own. He answered me, He who “answers him who is driven (to Him by affliction) when he calls upon Him”.\(^3\) He made it easy for my heart to turn away from position and wealth, from children and friends.

‘I openly professed that I had resolved to set out for Mecca, while privately I made arrangements to travel to Syria. I took this precaution in case the Caliph and all my friends should oppose my resolve to make my residence in Syria. This stratagem for my departure from Baghdad I gracefully executed, and had it in my mind never to return there. There was much talk about me among all the religious leaders of Iraq, since none of them would allow that withdrawal from such a state of life as I was in could have a religious cause, for they looked upon that as the culmination of a religious career; that was the sum of their knowledge.\(^4\)

‘Much confusion now came into people’s minds as they tried to account for my conduct. Those at a distance from Iraq supposed that it was due to some apprehension I had of action by the government. On the other hand those who were close to the governing circles and had witnessed how eagerly and assiduously they sought me and how I withdrew from them and showed no great regard for what they said, would say, “This is a supernatural affair; it must be an evil influence which has befallen the people of Islam and especially the circle of the learned”.

‘I left Baghdad, then.\(^5\) I distributed what wealth I had, retaining only as much

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\(^2\) *Qur’ān* xxvi. 52.

\(^3\) The post of principal *mudarris* in the Kitāb al-Ni‘ām of Baghdad.

\(^4\) This is a quotation from the *Qur’ān* lxi. 37.\(^5\)

\(^5\) A rebuke to those who possess no certain knowledge and follow only surmise.

\(^6\) He did not travel alone; he was accompanied by Abū Tahir 但是 b. al-Muhallab, a friend from his boyhood. Like al-Ghazālī, Abū Tahir was a pupil of Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ma‘shūdi, who was himself a pupil of Abū Nasr Muhammad b. Abī ‘Abbās al-Hasanī. He was killed in the battle of Manzikert in 1071 AD.
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as would suffice myself and provide sustenance for my children. This I could easily manage, as the wealth of Iraq was available for good works, since it constitutes a trust fund for the benefit of the Muslims. Nowhere in the world have I seen better financial arrangements to assist a scholar to provide for his children.¹

¹In due course I entered Damascus,⁴ and there I remained for nearly two years with no other occupation than the cultivation of retirement and solitude, together with religious and ascetic exercises, as I busied myself purifying my soul, improving my character and cleansing my heart for the constant recollection of God most high, as I had learnt from my study of mysticism. I used to go into retreat for a period in the mosque of Damascus,⁵ going up the minaret of the mosque for the whole day and shutting myself in so as to be alone.

¹⁴At length I made my way from Damascus to Jerusalem.⁴ There I used to enter into the precinct of the Rock⁴ every day and shut myself in.

¹⁵Next there arose in me a prompting to fulfill the duty of the Pilgrimage, gain the blessings of Mecca and Medina, and perform the visitation of the Messenger of God most high (peace be upon him), after first performing the visitation of al-Khâlîf,⁴ the Friend of God (God bless him).

¹⁶I therefore made the journey to the Hijaz. Before long, however, various concerns, together with the entertainments of my children, drew me back to my home (country); and so I came to it again, though at one time no one had seemed less likely than myself to return to it. Here, too, I sought retirement, still longing for solitude and the purification of the heart for the recollection (of God).⁵

There are conflicting reports concerning the date of al-Ghazâlî’s return to Baghdad and consequently the length of his stay in Syria. Subki reproduces the testimony of ‘Abd al-Ghaflîr al-Fârisî, a contemporary and an acquaintance of al-Ghazâlî, and this testimony makes the length of the Syrian visit ‘nearly ten years’.⁶ Subki also quotes Dhahabî, who had it from Ibn ‘Asâkir, that the visit lasted ‘about ten years’.⁷ Although Subki adds that he was unable to trace this report in Ibn ‘Asâkir’s Tarîkh or Tabyîn, the report does actually occur in Ibn ‘Asâkir.⁸

¹ Bait al-Maqdîs in the Arabic text means simply Jerusalem. Watt’s literal translation of ‘the Holy House’ has been disregarded.

² . . . enter into the precinct of the Rock is even more ambiguous than *askhâba al-dâr*. This seems to refer either to the cave under the Rock or to the shrine over it, the mosque of the Dome of the Rock. Cf. G. Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems (London, 1890), 114 ff.

³ The prophet ‘Abd al-Mâlik (Abraham) who is, according to tradition, buried in the cave of Machpelah under the mosque in the town of Hebron called in Arabic Al-Khâljî (the Friend). See the Qur’ân iv. 135: ‘And God took ‘Abd al-Mâlik for a friend.’⁷

⁴ Subki, Tabyîn ( Cairo, 1934), iv. 107.

⁵ Ibid. 104.

⁶ Cairo MS. 439 of Ibn ‘Asâkir’s Tarîkh Dimashq, folio 543, reproduced by Badawi, op. cit. 503.
It is clear that al-Fārisī’s report is not a direct one, coming as it does via an author who lived some two centuries after al-Ghazālī. Ibn ‘Asākir’s near-contemporary report would be less assailable if it were not contradicted by the testimony of a pupil of al-Ghazālī who will be quoted presently. The report of ten years’ stay in Syria makes plausible another report that al-Ghazālī visited Egypt and lingered for some time in Alexandria, contemplating a visit to Yūsuf b. Tāshfin in al-Maghrib. But here Subki is dubious; he cites the report of a visit to Egypt under ‘Iṣṭiṣār’s, wa-yuḥkā ‘anhu hikāyāt.¹

There are, however, better reasons for rejecting the ten years report.² In 491 A.H. the Saljūqs, who were al-Ghazālī’s patrons, lost Jerusalem to the Fātimids, who were not his doctrinal favourites, to put it very mildly. There was little in the Fātimid system that could have attracted al-Ghazālī to their dominion in Egypt or induced him to remain on the fringe of it in Syria. Had he been in Syria in 492 could he have failed to feel the shock of the Crusades and their capture of Jerusalem in Sha‘bān of that year?³ But there is more conclusive evidence that al-Ghazālī was not then in Syria. According to his pupil, Abū Bakr b. ‘Al-‘Arabī, he was back in Baghdad, less than two years after leaving it. Abū Bakr, who had, like al-Ghazālī, performed the pilgrimage in 489, states clearly that in Jumādā II, 490 he heard al-Ghazālī expound ‘his book which he called Ḥiyād’ in Baghdad.⁴

The impediment in his speech and the general physical weakness which al-Ghazālī suffered seem to have been no more than contributory factors for his decision to change his mode of life: give up the highest post in the learned profession, abandon family and wealth, and migrate to another land. His motives have long been the subject of speculation. One scholar suggested that he fell from favour with the authorities,⁵ and another that he feared assassination at the hands of the Bāṭīnītes for his fierce attacks against them.⁶

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¹ Tahaqīf, iv. 193. The legend has some basis in fact: al-Ghazālī has provided Abū Bakr b. al-‘Arabī with a fātūd favourable to Yūsuf b. Tāshfin who was anxious for recognition by the Abbasid Caliph.

² The confusion of reports may partly be due to al-Ghazālī’s own words: fa-darītum ‘alā daḥīqa maqūli ṣabīri niʿnūn which should be interpreted as referring to the entire period of retirement and not to the Syrian visit alone. (Al-Maṣūḥ, 42.)


⁴ Cairo MS. 22031 of Ibn ‘Al-‘Arabī’s al-Qudūṣī min al-‘Audūṣ, folio 79, reproduced by Badawi, op. cit. 546. F. Jabra, however, cites a text of the work printed in Algiers as al-‘Audūṣ min al-Qudūṣī. See his article ‘La Biographie et l’Œuvre de Ghazâli reconsidérées à la lumière de Tahaqâfat al-Sabīl’ in Mililanges de l’Institut Dombesien d’Études Orientales du Caire, 1 (1954), 75, 90. Ibn ‘Al-‘Arabī’s work has also been printed at the Salafīyyah Press under the same title as that printed in Algiers. But I have not seen either edition.


⁶ F. Jabra, op. cit. 91–94.
To accept the first suggestion is to cast doubt upon the sincerity of Al-Ghazālī himself who rules it out categorically. The scholar who made this suggestion has himself written in the same article that ‘his [Al-Ghazālī’s] story rings true from beginning to end’ and elsewhere that the account in the autobiography ‘cannot be doubted’.¹ To accept the second suggestion is not only to discredit Al-Ghazālī’s own statement but also to overlook the leisurely and public manner of Al-Ghazālī’s departure from Baghdad, after giving due notice to the authorities, making provision for the support of his dependants, installing his brother Ahmad at the Nizāmiyyah, and leaving in the company of one of his pupils. Nothing in his actions before departure seems to betray a man in fear for his life.

There is no reason to doubt the accuracy and sincerity of Al-Ghazālī’s own statement. His life and his studies confirm his statement that his primary motive was religious. He realized after much study and some scepticism that his way of life, his teaching, and his motives were not conducive to happiness in the life to come and even exposed him to the danger of hell-fire. His decision to renounce worldly glories was made while he was in this frame of mind. His fearless admission of resorting to pretence in the execution of his resolve is further proof of sincerity. For he frankly admits that he made a pretence of going on pilgrimage, whereas his intention was to go to Syria and make it his place of residence.

The autobiographical note has very little indeed to say concerning Al-Ghazālī’s sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalem; nothing beyond mere mention of the visit to Mecca and Medina. Nor is there anything autobiographical in his discussion elsewhere of asrār al-hajj.² What was the attraction of Syria for Al-Ghazālī which made it of such immediate importance? What kept him in Syria for a longer time than he seems to have allowed for the visit to Hijaz? Why did he find something to say about his experience in Damascus and Jerusalem, but nothing at all about the thrill of the pilgrimage in the holier cities of Mecca and Medina? Did he find Damascus and Jerusalem more suitable for the life of an ascetic than Mecca and Medina? Was he really as isolated during his sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalem as the language of his autobiographical note seems to suggest? If not, with whom did he come in contact? Is there any evidence of his being influenced by a particular Syrian scholar or ascetic?

It is of course difficult to give final answers to all these questions. But I am going to suggest some answers. Al-Ghazālī does not mention many names in his autobiographical account. He wrote it when he was over fifty, or some three years before his death. By then he was very famous,

¹  Encyclopedia of Islam, ii/1, p. 146. The reference here and henceforth is to the first edition.
²  Cf. Ḥadīth (Cairo, 1934), i, 214–44.
and was more preoccupied with ideas than personalities. Hence we must search for external evidence in references to his encounter in Damascus with a little-known mystic called Abu'l Fath Naṣr b. Ibriḥīm al-Maqdisī an-Nābulusi.

Let us introduce Abu'l Fath first. When he died on Muḥarram 9, 490 A.H. aged over eighty, Shaikh Naṣr was recognized as the leading scholar of the Shafi’i school in Syria. He spent the last ten years of his life in the city of Damascus, yuhaddithu wa-yuṣṭi wa-yudarrisu. He taught gratuitously and refused to accept any gifts. He led a life of extreme austerity and asceticism. All the biographical notes describe him as az-zāhid. Legend has it that he kept alive on one loaf of bread a day baked in the corner of his brazier. It was made from the produce of a piece of land belonging to him in Nābulus. Clearly it was not the city of Nābulus, but somewhere in the neighbourhood. Yaʿqūt’s statement that Shaikh Naṣr hailed from Ṭārābulus (Tripoli) is untenable. So far as I know, Yaʿqūt is the only author who makes such a statement. Shaikh Naṣr’s ownership of land in the neighbourhood of Nābulus makes it unlikely that Tripoli was the home of his ancestors. I suggest Yaʿqūt or copyists may have encountered Ṭūbās, a village about ten miles north-east of Nābulus, and were puzzled by it, and then decided to read Ṭārābulus. In Arabic script the two place names can easily be confused.

Shaikh Naṣr received a traditional Islamic education at Jerusalem and Gaza in his native Palestine, and then in, among other places, Tyre and Damascus. Later on he himself taught in Jerusalem and Tyre and finally in Damascus. Both Subki and Yaʿqūt quote a story that when Tāj ad-Daulah Tutush b. Alp Arslān passed through Damascus he visited Shaikh Naṣr but the latter did not rise to greet him. Tutush asked the Shaikh what money he had disposed of the sultan was the most lawful, and the Shaikh replied that it was the income from jīzah. Later on, Tutush sent a sum of money to Shaikh Naṣr with a message: ‘This is from the income of jīzah; distribute it among your followers.’ But the Shaikh returned the money with a counter message: ‘We do not need it.’

1 Subki, Tabaqāt, iv. 27–29.
2 Yaʿqūt, Buldān (Leipzig, ed. Wustenfeld, 1866), i. 600.
4 Yaʿqūt and Subki mention that Shaikh Naṣr resorted for study to Amid (modern Diyar Bakr). Al-Hāfīz adh-Dhahabī, Al-Ībar fi Khabar man Ghadar (ed. Fūlā Rashīd, Kuwait, 1967), iii. 359 mentions also Amīd in Tābārīstan. This may be a misreading of Amid; I have not seen any evidence that Shaikh Naṣr travelled so far outside Syria.
5 Subki, iv. 18 mentions a number of his pupils including his favourite and successor, Abu’l Fath Naṣrullah al-Maqṣūṣī, and Jamāl al-ʿĪṣām Abu’l Ḥasan as-Sulami who later became a pupil of al-Ghazālī. Adh-Dhahabī, Al-Ībar (ed. Šalāḥ ud-Dīn al-Muṣafrī, Kuwait, 1967) iv. cites some dozen pupils of Shaikh Naṣr, including the later famous Al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr b. al-ʿArabi of Seville (p. 125). Ibn al-ʿArabi was also a pupil of al-Ghazālī, see p. 68 above.
6 Cf. what al-Ghazālī himself says about public funds above, p. 67, n. 1. For al-Ghazālī’s fuller discussion see Ṯajī, ii. 119–123.
Another legend about Shaikh Naṣr has a closer connexion with al-Ghazālī. An unnamed learned man is reported to have said: 'I was for some time in the company of Imām al-Ḥaramain Abu’l Ma’āli al-Juwaynī in Khurāsān, then I went to Iraq and joined the circle of Abū Ḥishāq ash-Shirāzī. I found his system better than that of Abu’l Ma’āli. Finally I went to Syria and met the faqīh Abūl Fath. I found his system better than their systems.' Now, al-Juwaynī was al-Ghazālī’s teacher and ash-Shirāzī was his predecessor as chief mudarris at the Nizāmiyyah of Baghdad.

Yet another more significant legend has it that al-Ghazālī sought to meet Shaikh Naṣr, but that he arrived in Damascus on the very day of the Shaikh’s death. Clad in the garb of a mystic he sat in the place usually occupied by Shaikh Naṣr in the Umayyad mosque. When some pupils gathered round him he inquired ‘Where is Shaikh Naṣr?’ They told him of his death and that he named as successor a non-Arab (a’jamī) who answered to his description. Subkiī found no confirmation of this story, but that does not discredit it in its entirety.

Early in 490 al-Ghazālī returned to Damascus from the pilgrimage to find the Shaikh was dead, and this fact may have contributed to his decision to leave. It is reported that he named as his successor in Damascus one of the two favourite pupils of the Shaikh, Jamāl al-Islām Abu’l Ḥasan as-Salami, who was also al-Ghazālī’s pupil.7

Thus tradition links the two mystics and strengthens the link through their common pupils. Al-Ghazālī himself was young enough to be Shaikh Naṣr’s pupil. The piety, asceticism, and learning of the old man seem to have attracted the comparatively young al-Ghazālī. But whatever inspiration the latter derived from the former it is safe to assume that it was primarily concerned with mystical experience and ḥadīth. Shaikh Naṣr was noted as a zāhid, faqīh, and muṭaddīb. Now to judge by the first part of the Ḥiyāt, al-Ghazālī did not entertain a very high opinion of those of his contemporaries who studied only faqīh, but was himself positively converted to zuḥd, as a way of life, and by all accounts was not yet well versed in ḥadīth.

Of the writers who state plainly that al-Ghazālī did learn from Shaikh Naṣr mention may be made of three. Ibn Shuhbah4 says that ‘when al-Ghazālī visited Damascus he met Shaikh Naṣr and benefited from him.’ Then immediately after reproducing the story of the comparison with Juwaini and Shirāzī, the author of Shadhrat adh-Dhahab5 states:

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1 Subkiī, iv. 28; Vāqīt, i. 60v.
2 Taḥṣīl, iv. 104.
3 Cf. Murtadā, Ḣalī, i. 45, see also. p. 70, n. 5 above.
4 Taḥṣīl ash-Shāfi’īyah as quoted by F. Wüstendorf, Die Akademien der Araber und ihre Lehrer (Göttingen, 1837), p. 5 of the Arabic text, 33-34 of the German text.
5 Ibn al-Imād al-Ḥanbali (Cairo, 1350), iii. 395.
‘When al-Ghazâlî came to Damascus he met [Shaikh Nasr] and learnt from him.’ The same statement, couched in the same words, is made later by Mujir ud-Din.\(^1\)

These reports are so similar that they may not be independent. But Murtaḍâ\(^2\) has no hesitation in accepting them and listing Shaikh Nasr among al-Ghazâlî’s teachers in hadîth. That is precisely the subject in which al-Ghazâlî’s knowledge was never universally acknowledged, so much so that Subki fills thirty-five pages with traditions of questionable isnâd and yet cited by al-Ghazâlî in the Ihyâ.\(^3\)

As stated above, al-Ghazâlî himself does not mention the encounter with Shaikh Nasr. His succinct words concerning the experience in Damascus and Jerusalem may, however, be supplemented. Under the year 488 A.H., Ibn al-Athîr writes: ‘And in this year the Imam Abû Hâmid al-Ghazâlî went to Syria and visited Jerusalem. He abandoned teaching at the Nizâmiyyah, placed his brother as his deputy [in it], and became an ascetic wearing rough clothes and eating mean food. During this journey he composed Ihyâ’ \(Uthîm ad-Dîn\) which many people heard from him in Damascus. He returned to Baghdad after performing the pilgrimage in the following year, and proceeded to Khurâsân.’\(^4\)

It was too late for al-Ghazâlî to perform the pilgrimage in 488 since he left Baghdad in Dhu’l Qa’dah.\(^5\) His immediate objective was clearly Syria, not Hijaz, as he himself says. That he performed the pilgrimage in 489 and that, as shown above, he returned to Baghdad the following year is, despite reports to the contrary, fairly authenticated. The period of his contact with Shaikh Nasr in Damascus must therefore be counted in months, since the latter died in Muḥarram 490.

It has been stated that Shaikh Nasr and al-Ghazâlî had a few pupils in common. One of them was Abû Bakr b. al-‘Arabi. Adh-Dhahabi says of him: ‘He was born in 468, travelled with his father in 485, and visited Syria and heard from (sami’a min) al-Faqih Nasr al-Maqqdisi … and from Ibn Ṭalhah an-Nâ’îli in Baghdad … and from al Khalî’i in Egypt, and learned from (tafqaqa’a ‘ala) al-Ghazâlî. …’\(^6\) It is not stated where, but Ibn al-‘Arabi has told us it was in Baghdad. Did he learn also from al-Ghazâlî in Damascus at the same time as learning from Shaikh Nasr?

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\(1\) Kiṭâb al-Uns al-Yâlib bi-Târikh al-Quds wa al-Khâlîl (Cairo, 1283), l. 264.  
\(2\) Ibn ‘Abî al-Mâli (Leiden, 1864), x. 172. The wording of the report is somewhat ambiguous: does Ibn al-Athîr date the pilgrimage only or the pilgrimage and the return to Baghdad?

\(4\) The chronology of al-Ghazâlî’s movements after leaving Baghdad in 488 is by no means clear. Thus a report from his contemporary Abî al-Ghaflî al-Farîd mentions the pilgrimage first and then the stay of ten years in Syria (Subki, lv. 107-8). Ibn ‘Askhîr as quoted by Subki (iv. 111) mentions the pilgrimage to Jerusalem only as if it occurred before the sojourn ‘of some time’ in Damascus (cf., however, p. 67, n. 9 above). Again, one of the reports in Subki, reproduced by Murtaḍâ (i. 7), states that al-Ghazâlî’s stay in Damascus in 489 was for a few days only and that he proceeded to Jerusalem where he lived for some time in the vicinity of the holy places (jâimîn) and that later he returned to Damascus where he retired in the western minaret of the mosque. No mention of the pilgrimage to al-Khalîl or al-Hijaz.

\(5\) Al-‘Îbar, iv. 195.
Apart from the probable contact with Shaikh Naṣr, what was the tangible outcome of al-Ghazālī’s sojourn in Syria? The language of Ibn al-Athīr seems to suggest that the whole of the Ḥiyāʾ was written during that period. There is very little evidence to support this deduction. Ibn al-ʿArabi’s testimony is not as categorical as that of Ibn al-Athīr. From Ibn al-ʿArabi we may gather that portions of a proposed book with the title of Ḥiyāʾ were expounded by the author.

There is, however, conclusive internal evidence that at least one tract in al-Ghazālī’s magnum opus was composed not in Damascus, but in Jerusalem, and that the tract was read to the people of that city. That al-Ghazālī took the opportunity of his disengagement to write, as well as meditate and worship, may be safely assumed. It seems, however, that some of this writing was done at Jerusalem and some at Damascus, if not also in Mecca and Medina. Like Ibn al-ʿArabi, Mujir ‘ud-Din is also less categorical than Ibn al-Athīr. He names al-Ghazālī among ‘notable followers [of the Prophet], learned men and ascetics who entered Jerusalem’ and states: ‘He settled in Damascus and then moved to Jerusalem, persevering in his worship and obedience of God, and in his visits to [holy] places and great centres. He began the writing of his famous work in Jerusalem; it is said that he wrote there Ḥiyāʾ ‘ulūm ad-Dīn. He lived in the zāwiyyah over Bāb ar-Rahmah, hitherto known as an-Nāṣirīyyah . . . but [since al-Ghazālī’s stay in it] it was called al-Ghazālīyyah after him. . . .’

Elsewhere Mujir ‘ud-Din describes the Nāṣirīyyah as a madrasah. Here Shaikh Naṣr lived and taught for some time before finally settling in Damascus. It was customary to call such an institution after one of its famous teachers. That al-Ghazālī came to live, meditate, write, and teach at the Nāṣirīyyah while in Jerusalem is yet another clue to his connexion with Shaikh Naṣr. It is conceivable that the Shaikh’s reputation, if not his personal advice, prompted al-Ghazālī to choose the Nāṣirīyyah from among other charitable institutions in Jerusalem for his residence. Indeed the names of al-Ghazālī and Shaikh Naṣr are associated with yet another madrasah or zāwiyyah. While in Damascus, al-Ghazālī made his

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1. Ḥiyāʾ, i. 93 ff.
2. This is one of the main gates of Al-Ḥaram ash-Sharif; it leads to the area from the East. It is associated with the Qurʿān viii. 13: ‘And a wall shall be set up between them, having a door (ḥabūl), in the inward thereof is mercy (ṭaḥmāb) and against the outward thereof is chastisement.’
3. Al-Uns al-Jallī, i. 865.
5. Apparently it continued to be known as al-Ghazālīyyah till it was reconstituted by al-Maṭīk al-Muʿażzam ‘Iṣā as a zāwiyyah for the study of the Qurʿān and Arabic grammar. Mujir ‘ud-Din saw its endowment dated Dhu’l Hijjah 9, 610 A.H., but there was no trace either of the zāwiyyah or the madrasah itself in the time of the author, about three hundred years later. Al-Uns al-Jallī, ii. 386.
residence in another such institution in the north-west corner of the Umayyad Mosque. This institution too is known both as the Nashiriyah and Ghazaliyyah, but Shaikh Nsr was the first to teach (darrasa) in it.

Al-Ghazali specifically mentions his residence in Jerusalem in the Ihya\textsuperscript{7}. In concluding the discussion of the manner of gradual guidance, concerning belief, he writes: ‘We consider this amount of explanation of the creed sufficient for the [uninstructed] public, who need not be burdened with the duty (la yakullafwina) of knowing more than this in the first instance. But should it be necessary on account of confusion arising from the spread of heresy, they must be given glimpses (lawawmi)\textsuperscript{8} of [more advanced explanation of] the creed, in brief and without profundity. Let us therefore mention in this book those glimpses, and let us be satisfied therefrom with what we have written\textsuperscript{9} to the people of Jerusalem, and called it ar-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah f Qawd’id al ‘Aqida.\textsuperscript{10}

By content and method of treatment the Risalah bears the marks of being a complete composition on its own. It begins with the basmalah, and the discussion is prefaced with a lengthy form of prayer usually reserved for beginning independent compositions, books or tracts. Furthermore the Risalah is elsewhere in the Ihya\textsuperscript{7} mentioned by al-Ghazali as Kitab ar-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah.\textsuperscript{11} As suggested above, al-Ghazali did not write all his great work either in Damascus or in Jerusalem or in any other single place. The available evidence justifies the conclusion that he began drafting parts of it during his sojourn in Syria, and that one section of the work, the said Risalah, was completed in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{6}

A manuscript of the Risalah dated 779 AH. and preserved in Doha, al-Kutub, Cairo has a note by a scribe on the title-page which reads ‘... by al-Ghazali ... which he wrote as a separate tract for the people of Jerusalem and later incorporated in Kitab Qawd’id al-Aqida which forms the second part of the Ihya’.’ A colophon, by another hand, put it in other words: ‘And he (i.e. al-Ghazali) finished writing it at the Al-Aqsa Mosque at the request of its people. ...’

\textsuperscript{7} Sukri, iv. 104; Nu’aimi, ad-Dir\textsuperscript{5}r b Taw\textsuperscript{5}bih al-Madris\textsuperscript{5}r (ed. Ja’far al-Hassani, Damascus 1357/1948), i. 413–15.
\textsuperscript{8} Here al-Ghazali is imitating his own teacher, Imam al-Haramain, who wrote Lami and ‘Adilah fi Qawd’id Ali ar-Sunnah. See Murta\textsuperscript{d}, Ihri, ii. 85.
\textsuperscript{9} For the Arabic barran\textsuperscript{d}t; two lines later tariqinabat.
\textsuperscript{10} Ihya’, i. 93. While working on this study and engaged in the translation of the Risalah, Professor Naibah Amin Farsi published a translation from al-Ghazali entitled The Foundations of the Articles of Faith (Lahore, 1963) including the Risalah, pp. 54–98. I have on several occasions below called attention to some of his mistakes. Before doing so, however, I have called his attention privately to ten different instances, and he agreed to the publication.
\textsuperscript{11} Risalah, l. 87, l. 12: ‘If innovation (hid‘a) rife and it was feared that the young (yجبه) might be deceived then it would do to teach the amount we put in Kitab ar-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah.’

Over forty years ago the Rev. W. W. Godle\textsuperscript{r}r in his little book Al-Ghazali (Madras, 1912) p. 111 asserted that the Risalah was not written for the people of Jerusalem, and even conjectured that it was composed during al-Ghazali’s first year at Baghdad. Neither statement is any longer, it tenable.
A similar statement is supposed to come from al-Ghazzâlî himself in a manuscript of a portion of the Ḥiyâ dated 1160 A.H., to be mentioned in the text presently. In this manuscript the text of the Risâlah concludes with this sentence: 'and I completed its composition (taṣnîḥî) in the Aqṣâ Mosque, in answer to the request of its people (aḥîthî). In the margin of the page, in the handwriting of the author, another version of the sentence is written: 'and I completed [the writing of] ar-Risâlah al-Qudsiyyah, which I included in this section, in the Aqṣâ Mosque in answer to the request of its people.'

(4)

The text of the Risâlah has been edited on the basis of three manuscripts and two printed texts. Two of the manuscripts are portions of the Ḥiyâ, the one dated 610 A.H. (No. 26574) and the other 1160 A.H. (No. 45818), and both are preserved at the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. The third manuscript is of the Risâlah itself; it is dated 779 A.H. and is preserved at Dar al-Kutub, Cairo (Majâmi' No. 66). The printed texts used are those of the Ḥiyâ (Cairo, 1334 A.H.) and Murtâda's commentary thereon (Cairo, 1311 A.H.).

Needless to say that, even allowing for inevitable flourishes by pious or reckless copyists, for the usual orthographical defects, and for the grammatical mistakes of scribes, the manuscripts still do not agree with one another, nor do they always agree with the printed text, nor again do these agreements agree with one another. As my edited text, translation, and notes will show, the flaws are often so substantial as to affect the meaning. Furthermore there are important lacunae which only patient comparison and check can reveal. They are often whole sentences or even passages.

Nor is the text of Murtâda's commentary entirely free from such defects. Indeed, it is not rare to find al-Ghazzâlî's text at variance with that printed in the name of his commentator.²

Apart from eliminating orthographical and grammatical mistakes of copyists, modern punctuation has been introduced. Where the text of the Risâlah fragment is unduly long it has been divided into paragraphs. The numbers of pages in MS. 26574 (dated 610 A.H.) are shown in the text inside square brackets. The numbers shown in the left-hand margin are the corresponding pages in the first volume of the 1334 Cairo edition of the Ḥiyâ. Words, phrases, or sentences in square brackets may indicate either lacunae in one or other of the texts used, or an alternative reading preferred by the editor. In both cases the significance of the

1 No. 45818, folio 89b: the pronoun may suggest that the reference is to the whole aldâh and not the Risâlah; hence the current tradition that the whole of the Ḥiyâ was written in Syria.

2 See, for example, Ḥiyâ, il. 92, 104.
change is made apparent in the translation and is often explained in footnotes.

The Risālah is written in a style peculiar to theologians: austere, condensed, and allusive. Although complicated theological questions need not be written in involved language, the fact that this tract was intended for beginners, even for the young, does not seem to have influenced its author towards simplifying his style and language. For it is often particularly obscure and deficient in bayān compared to the prose of its time. Thus its simple meaning is often concealed beneath pedestrian prose in which at times little respect is paid to grammar. Its chief defect on this score is the use or misuse of the pronoun, apart from its general weakness in style.¹

From the days of al-Ghazālī down to our own times, the Risālah was considered either as a separate composition or as an integral part of the first quarter of the Iṭḥād. We have shown that the authority for this statement is al-Ghazālī himself. Actually several sections in his major work can stand, and have in fact been made to stand, on their own as separate tracts. His system is logical, dividing each subject into clearly marked and numbered sections and sub-sections, and beginning each section with the basmalah and ending it with a prayer.

In the list of al-Ghazālī’s works given by Subki² the Risālah is cited as an independent work. It is also cited as an independent work by Ḥāj Khalīfah,³ but he adds that it was incorporated in the Iṭḥād, and quotes it beginning. There are several manuscript copies of the Risālah in public libraries in the East and the West.⁴

The importance of the subject of the Risālah is readily appreciated from the words of Subki. He wrote: ’I have not seen by him (i.e. al-Ghazālī) a work on the fundamentals of religion (ushul ad-dīn) despite great search unless it is Qawād’id al ‘Aqād’id . . . [which with the Risālah forms part of the Iṭḥād’]. But I have not seen a separate work according to the method of scholastics (mutakallimin).’ ⁵

But the method of the Risālah is largely that of the post-Ash’ārī scholastic. Its main purpose is to uphold Sunni orthodoxy against the innovation (bid’ah) of the Mu’tazilah; it does not seem to be greatly concerned with the philosophers. While it adopts syllogism in argument its authors presuppose that his adversary accepts the authority of the Qur’ān. More

¹ ’Abd al-Ghaffār states that contemporaries of al-Ghazālī found his speech occasionally ungrammatical and that he acknowledged the justice of this criticism. Then ’Abd al-Ghaffār adds: ’Let those who find some verbal defects in his writing correct them and excuse him, for his aim was more the explanation of ideas rather than verbal embellishment.’ Subki, iv. 110.

² Tahāqī ḫt. 116.
³ Kadd (ed. Fīlāgh), ill. 436; see also Brockmann, GAL suppl. i. 746.
⁴ See a list in Badawi, op. cit. 26–27; Bouyry, Etude de chronologie des œuvres de al-Ghazālī (Beirut 1950), 108.
⁵ Tahāqī ḫt. 103.
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ined in part on its authority and that of prophetic tradition and only partly on logical deduction. Although in his exposition of the fundamentals al-Ghazālī makes frequent appeal to reason ('aql), his authority is more often the revelation, and the final section of the tract is almost entirely formulated on the basis of oral tradition.
توضيح الرموز

أُسّس تحقيق الرسالة النقدية على ثلاث مخطوطات جاء وصفها تفصيلاً في المقدمة المكتوبة باللغة الإنجليزية. وهذه المخطوطات هي:

1) مخطوطة جامعة لندن (سنة 1100 هجرية); وقد أُعتبرت أصلًا ويرمز إليها بحرف أ
2) مخطوطة جامعة لندن (سنة 1190 هجرية); ويرمز إليها بحرف ب
3) مخطوطة القاهرة ويرمز إليها بحرف ج

وقيمت هذه المخطوطات مع النص الموجود في كتاب احياء علوم الدين (طبعة القاهرة سنة 1345 هجرية); واستعمل شرح السيد مرتضى النهدي (طبعة القاهرة سنة 1311 هجرية) مع غيره من الأصول حاله الغامض وكتابة الهوامش، ويرمز إلى نص الإحياء بحرف د.
Part II

الرسالة القديسة

(1) بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم. الحمد لله الذي ميز عصايان السنة بأنوار البيتين، وآثر حفظ الحق بالبداية إلى دعائم الدين، ونذرهم زين الزائرين وخلال المجهدين، ووقتهم الائتذاء بسيد المسلمين، وسدتهم للتأمل بصبرة الأكرين، وسر لهم اغتيال أثر السلف الصالحين، حتى اعتصموا من متقينات العقول بال حل في النموين، ومن سير الأرسين ووقتلهما بالمنهج المبين، فجمعوا في القبول بين تأثر العقول وقضايا الشرع المنقول، وتحثوا أن التعلق بما تعدوا به من قول لا الله إلا الله محمد رسول الله، ليس له طائل ومحتال، أن لم تتحقت الأحاتوة بما تدور عليه هذه الشهادة من الأقطاب والأصول، وعرفنا أن كمال الشهادة على ايجازهما تتضمن اثبات ذات الإله واثبات صفاته واثابه تعالى واثابه تعالى مدق رسول، وعلوا أن نتأل الأبحان ومن هذه الأركان.

(2) وهي أربعة: ويدور كل ركن على عشرة أصول.

الركن الأول في معرفة ذات الله تعالى? وبدورة على عشرة أصول، وهي العلم يوجد الله، ونبيه وبيانه، وله ليس غيره ولا جسم ولا غيب، وله سبحانه ليس مختصا بوجه ولا متصرفا على مكان، وله كنى? وله واحد.

(3) الركن الثاني في معرفة وتحمل على عشرة أصول، هي العلم يكونه حباً عالياً قادراً مريداً سبباً بصيراً مكيناً، منزلاً عن حلول الحوادث، وله قدم الكلام.

(4) [1003 ب] والعلم والواجب.

(5) الركن الثالث في الفعل والعبارة على عشرة أصول، وهي انفعال العباد مخلوقاً له، وله مكتسبات للعباد، وله مرازة للذات، وله منه منفصل بالخلق [ولا خراعة]; وله كنف ما ليطاق، وله إيلام البريء، ولا يحب عليه رعاية الأصلح، وله لا وجه بالشرع، وله عينه الأبياء جائز، وله نبوة نبينا محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم ثابتة مؤيدة بالمجاريات.

(6) الركن الرابع في السبعات [وبدورة على عشرة أصول]، وهي أثابه الحشر [والبشر] وذات البر، وسراً منك، وذكر، والمعان والصرف، وخلق الجنة والنار، وآلهام الإضاءة، [وله فضل السياحة على حسب ترتيبهم، وشروط الأمامة].

أثر بصب: 2 مري بصب 1 وأج بصب بود 6
منفرد من 1
الذكر الأول من أركان الإيمان بعرفة ذات الله تعالى

وقد صلى على عشرة أصول

الأصل الأول: معرفة وجوده تعالى. وأول ما يستضاء به من الإلوان ، [ويُسمى] من طريق الإعجاز، ما أرض الله القرآن، ليس بعد بيان الله بياناً. وقد قال تعالى:

"إنّم مجعل الأرض بهاءاً، والجبال واداءً، وخلقنا للطاب، وجعلنا النيل ي kapsاً، وجعلنا النهر يسايا، فبِينَا فتِرّكنا نِشأناً، وجعلنا سراجاً.

وهُنا، وأَنزّلنا من المعصرين ماءً نُجِماً، تُرْجَح به حَباً ونباتاً، وحَبَات النَّفَأ.

وقال تعالى: إن في خلق السماوات والأرض وخلقه النور ونهجه التكن الذي
تجرى في البحر بما ينفع الناس وما أنزل الله من السماوات من ماء فتأتي به الأرض بعد
موعته وله فيها من كل دابة وصرف الرياح والسبح السحر بين السماوات والأرض
لايات تقوم بخلقه، والله السميع البصير.

وعلَّمهم كيف نوراً جميل الشمس وسراجاً، وجعل النور عن غير الأرض نبئاً ثواباً;
فيا وخيِّرهم إخراجاً. وقال تعالى: فإنهم ما تُذَوَّرون، أنتم تخلوونهم أم نحن
الخالقون. ألى قوله: نحن جعلناها ذكرى وناناً للمومنين.

وليس ينبغي على من معه أيديه مسكة [سِنَف] إذا [ 91 ] [تأمل بأدنى تكره
مضمون هذه الآيات]، وإدار نظر على إجلاس خلق الله في [الأرض والسموت]، بدأ في
فطرة الجيوان والنبات، إن هذا الإ nguمعج وصرف الرياح والسبح السحر بين السماوات والأرض
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وفي هذا البرهان ثلاث دعاو: الأول أن الأجسام لا تخلو عن الحركة والسكن.

وهذه مدركة بالبديئة والاضطراب، فلا يحتاج فيها إلى تأمل [وانتقار]، فإن من ذاك جسم لا مكان ولا مسرّة كان من الجهل وركا، ومن نهج المنطق ناكباً، والثاني: قولنا إنما حاداثان، ويلد على ذلك تعاقدهما وجود البعض [19: 197] زمناً يبدأ، وذلك مثاب في جميع الأجسام [ما هو] منها؟ وما لم يشاهد، فما من سائر الأجسام والمثل قاض يجوز حركته، وما من متركز إلا والمثل قاض يجوز سكونه، فالطاري، منها حادث لزمانه، والسبق حادث لأنه لو ثبت قدمه لاستحال عده، على ما سيأتي بيانه وبرهانه في التأبق بالناظر تعالى وتعبد، والثالثة قولنا ما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث، وبرهانه أنه لا يمكن كذلك لفظ كل حدث حادث لا أول له، وبا لم تتقض تلك [الحوادث]؟ بجعلها لا تتقي الحوادث الحاضرة في الحال، وانتقاءها، لأنها نهائية له مساح.

وأرائه لا أن تلك دورات لا نهاية لها لأن لا يخلو عنها من أن يكون شيئاً أو ورداً أو شيءنا ووترداً جميعاً، أو لا شيءنا ولا ورداً، وححال أن يكون شيئاً ووترداً جميعاً، أو لا شيءنا ولا ورداً، وفما أن يكون بين النفي والاثبات، إذ في اثبات أحدثها نفي الآخر، وفي نفي أحدثها أثبات الآخر. وححال أن يكون شفاعة لأن الشفاعة يستمر وتردا زيادة واحد، ويكون عن ما لا نهائية له واحد، وححال أن يكون وتردا، إذ التردا يستمر جميعاً واحد مع أنه لا نهاية لأعمادها؟ (فإذا أن يكون لا شفاعة ولا فردا واحده لنهائية) [2: 3]. فحصول من هذا أن العالم لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو إذا حدث، فإن ثبت حدوثه كان افتقاره إلى الحوادث بناء على الكذار الضرورة.

الأصل الثاني: العلم بأن الباري تعالى قد لم يزل، أرز لوجوده أول، بل هو أول كل شيء وقبل كل شيء ومبين. وبرهانه أنه لو كان حادثاً ولا يمكن قيداً لافتقاره هو مساح وثباته إلى مساح، وينبت ذلك إلى غير نهاية، وما تسجل لم تحصل أو ينتهي إلى مساح قد هو الأول، وذلك هو المطلوب

الأصل الثالث: العلم بأنه [مطالع] مع أنه كونه أزل يأبدياً، ليس [2: 3] لوجودهآخر، فهو الأول الآخر والظاهر والباطن، لأن ما ثبت قدمه استحال عده. وبرهانه أنه لو عدم كان لا يخلو إلا ان ينتمي نفسه أو بعدم بيضاء. ولجل أن يتمه شيء يتصور دهان نفسه لجاز أن يوجد شيء، بنفسه، كما ينتمي طبعت الوحدة إلى سبب، فقد ينتمي طبع أنواء القاعدة، فإن ذلك عدم كان قديماً لما تصور وجوده معه. وقد نظر بالأصول السابقين وجوده وقذه، فكيف كان وجوده في القدم ومعه ضده؟ لأن كان الضد المعدم حادثاً كان
نضال، أذ ليس الحادث في مصادفته للقدير حتى يقلع وجوده بأول من القديم في مصادفته للحادث حتى يدقع وجوده بل الدلائل أهون من القليل والقديم أقوى من الحادث.

الأصل الرابع: العلم بأنه ليس بجهر يتعيب، بل يتعيب ويتضاد عن سلالة الجهر. وبرهانه أن كل جهر متعيب فهو متعيب بحجة: ولا يعقل من أن يكون مكانًا فيه أو متراكماً عنه، فلا يعقل من الحركة والسكن وما حاتم، ولا يعقل من الجوادر فهو حادث. ولو تصور جهر متعيب قديم كان يعقل قد جوهار العالم، فإن ساءه سُمَّى جوهاراً ولم يرد به المتعيب كان محتالاً بمن حيث النظير لأن من حيث البعد.

البمعنى.

الأصل الخامس: العلم بأنه تعالى ليس بجسم مؤلف من جوهار، إذ الجسم عبارة عن المثلث من الجوادر. وأذ يذكر كونه جوهاراً محصوراً يتعيب بحجة قانون جسم، لأن كل جسم متعيب يتعيب ويركزي من جوهار ووجه، ويستسلم خلوفي الأعراض والإنتاج والحركة والسكن والشبهات والمصالح، وهذه سمات الجهد، ولوازيف أن يعتقد أن صنع العالم جسم ليجز أن يعتقد الأولية للشم والآخر أو لشيء آخر من أقسام الأجسام. [42 ب] فإن تجاوز تجاهل تعلم تجاهل جسم عن غير إرادة التأليف من الجوادر، كان ذلك ضرراً في الأسم بوجود الإpga في تجاهل الجسم.

الأصل السادس: العلم بأنه تعالى ليس بعرق عام، بجسم أو حال في محل، لأن العرض ما يعقل في الجسم، ورغم أن بعضها وكونه مجهول يقلبه كيف يكون حالاً في الجسم وقد كان موجوداً في الأثر و sublime غيره، ثم استطاع الأجسام والأعراض بعد ذلك، ولم يُقل عن أولياء الكثيرون في الأول، نحن الأصوب تستعمل على الأعراض، بل لا تقول إلا ما موجود قائم بعينه مستقل وذات، وقد تقول من هذه الأعراض أنه موجود، قائم بذاته، ليس بجهر ولا جسم ولا لوعش، فإن العالم كله جوهار وأعراض وأعمال. فأذاً لا يُعتبر شيئاً ولا يُقل عليه شيء، بل هو الذي يقوم ليس كمثل شيء، وأن ما يشبه الحقائق وسائر المصادر المقصودة وصوله، والأعمال والأعراض كلاً من خلقه ومنصبه، فاستحلا القضاء عليها بسماحته وشبيته.

الأصل السابع: العلم بأن تعلم منه الذات عن الإخصاص بالحجاب، فإن الجهة إذا أتى ولا اتأت، ولا يعب ولياً شمال، أو توقيع، أو خلق. وهذه الجهات هو الذي خلقها وحدها بواسطة على الإنسان، إذ خلق له طرفين أخذهما يعتقد على الأرض ويسبيّ رجلًا والآخر يكتبه، ويستسيأ، ما نقول للي جدة الأرض، واسم السمّ الذي يلي جدة الأرض. حتى أن التمثيل الذي تدبّ متكسة تحت

1 كلاً في بوج
السقف تتطلب جهة الفوق في حقها تحياً، وإن كانت في حماة فتوت. وخلق الإنسان البديع، وأوحدها أعوياً من الآخر في الغالب، فتهبط السيد لهلا إلى شك الظلم. وخلق له جنيناً بمرض من إحدما ويجتاز، فقتحت المحاكم لما يقابلها.


العمل على النبي، والعمل، والعدل، فانه تعالى فوق كل موجودي على الأصل، في هذا العصية، في هذا العصية.

الأصل الثاني: العمل باختصار عشبة والمتعه الذي أراده تعالى بالاستواء، وهو الذي لا يفات وصف الكبار، ولا تنتهي الإله سماه الحق والإلهاء، وهو الذي أريد بالاستواء إلى السماوم، حيث قال في القرآن: ثم استوى إلى السماوم هي دخان، ليس ذلك إلا طريقة الفهار والከيلاء، كما قال الشاعر: قدستى يشتر

على الفهار، من غير سيف وسد مهارق. وضعت جملة الحق في هذا التاوي، كما

أعلى أهل الباطن، إلى تأويل قوله تعالى: وهو مكمساً إياها كأنه: إذ عمل [93 ب] جعل

بالإضافة على الأئمة والعلماء، وعمل قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: قلب المؤمن من بين

أصبع من أصاب الرحمن على القدرة والقهور، وحمل قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: الحج الأسود بين الله في أرضه على التشهير والكراهي، لأنه لم يترك على ذكره للزم

منه الباطن. فذاك الاستواء لم يترك على الاستمرار والتمكن للزم منه كون المشتكي جسم

 أمسعا عرشًا، أما مثلاً أو أكبر [منه] أو أسفر، وذلك بأسفر، وما يؤدي إلى المجال

فهو غالب.

الأصلالتاني: العلم بأنه تعالى مع كونه منزلاً عن الصور والاقتراد، مفتاكاً عن

كم في ب و 2 كما في ب "أهل الباطن"، في ب
84

Ar-Risālah al-Qudsyyah

لمهات والاتسار، مرة بالأعين والأصابر في الدار الآخرة، فلوقه تعالى: وجوه يوشده
عمرة إلى ربي ناظرة، ولا يرى في [قد يصدق] لوقته تعالى: لا تدركه
الأصابع وهو يدرك الإصبار، ولوقه تعالى في خطاب موسى [عليه السلام]: إن تراقي!
ولتب عزيز كيف عرف الحكائي من طف لم يكن الأدب ما جهله موسى؟ أو كيف سأل
موسى الروأه عن: كونها محالة؟ وعله الجهلذي البذع والأهواء من الجهلة
الأزغاء أولى من الجهل بالابتهاي! وما وجد فإلا آية الروأه على الظاهر [قهور]! أنه
غير مؤد إلى المجال، فإن الروأه نوع: كشف وعلم، إلا أنه واعث ووض من العلم.
فاذًا جاز تعلق العلم به وليس في جهة، جاز تعلق الروأه [وب ليس في جهة].]، وكم
فيه عند أن يرى الله الجهل وليس في نظرته، جاز أن يرى الجهل من غير مبالية.
وكما جاز أن يعلم من غير كفاءة وصورة: جاز أن يرى كذاك من غير كفاءة وصورة.
الأصل الأول: العلم بان [أعز وجل] واحد لا شريك له، فرد لا يلته، فقد
باتقلت الدلائل، واستبد بالابداع والخروج، لا يلته بساهمه ويساويه، ولا
يُرجى له فينائه وينابه. ويعتبر وقته تعالى: لمكان فيه آية الله الأندلس أبو. وبيان
إلهنا لكونه واردوه امرأة، والذين أن كان منطقياً أن كان الصافي إلى مساعدة [94] أن
هذا الثاني مشوراً عامراً لم يكن لها قادراً. وإن كان قادراً على معاينة ومدافعه
كان الثاني نواه قادراً وأول ضياعاً قادراً، فلم يكن له قادراً.

الركن الثاني [من إركن الإمام] العلم بصفاته الادعاء
ومداه على عشة أصول

الأصل الأول: العلم بان صانع العالم قادراً، وإننا تعالى في قوله: وهو على كل
شيء قدير، صادق. لأن العالم محكم في صنعه مربث في خلقه. ومن رأى ثواب
في ديباج حسن النجاح والتأليف، متاسب التطور والظروف، ثم تفهم صدره
من ميت لا استطاعة له، إن كان ضعفاً عن غريزة المثل، وتشرفت
في سلك أهل الفائدة والجهل.

الأصل الثاني: العلم بأنه تعالى عالم جميع الموجودات ومعطى بكل الخلقات،
فلا يعبث عن علمنه مثل ذرة في الأرض والسماء، صادق في قوله: وهو بكل شيء
على. ويرشد إلى مذهبه بالقول: ألا يعلم مِنْ خلق وهو الطيف العتبر؟ انشئ إلى
الاستدلال بالخلق على العلم، لا ينتمي في دائرة حولاً الطيفي والصوح المدين
التربة، وله في الشيء المثير الطرف، على علم الصانع بكيفية الترتيب والتمييز
فما ذكره تعالى هو المتى في البداية والعدي.

دا اذكروا بـ ۲ كمياً وود
أصل الرأي: العلم يكوَّن حيًا، فإن من ثبت علمه وثبَت في ضرورته حياته.

وهو تَمْثِل قادر عالم فاعل مصدر دون أن يكون حيًا، لأنه يعيش في حياة الحيوانات عند تزدهارها في الحركات والسكنات، في حياة أراب الخوف والصعوبات، وذلك انتماس في غمرة الحياة.

أصله الثالث: العلم يكون حيًا، فإن يوجد إلا وهو مستند إلى مشيئته، وصاصور على ارتدائه، فهو المبدي المصد للجعل مما يرقد. وكيك لا يكون مردًا وكل فعل صدر منه أمكن أن يصدر [94 ب] منه ضده، وما لا له دستوق أن يصدر منه ذلك بعينه قبل ارتدائه. والقدرة تاسب الدين والقوتين وذاتات وناهية، فلا بد من ارتداد عارية للقدرة إلى أحد الهندسون. ولو ألغى العلم عن الأراده في تخصيص المعلوم حتى قال لنا وجد في الوقت الذي سبق العلم يوجوه، لا لازم أن يغني عن القدرة، حتى قال وجد غير قدرة لأنه سبق العلم يوجد.

أصله الثاني: العلم يتأمل معيص بسير، لا يعزب عن رؤيته هواك الضمير وعليا الهم والفكر، ولا يشبه عن سمعه صوت دبيب النعم السدوس في الفئة الظلماء في الصحراء الصاماء. وكيف لا يكون سمعاً بيضاً، والسعوح والبر كمال لا معناه وليس بقصه؟ كيف يكون الخلق أم كل من أطلق، والمصنوع متشابه، وأمن من الصبان؟ كيف تعتدل القصمه مما وقع النقص في [الحلاق] والكامل في خلقه ومعتق؟ أو كيف تستلم حجة إبراهيم عليه السلام على هؤلاء أيسك، أنا أريد الأسبان جهلاً ولاقأ قال له: لم تعلم ما لا يسعى ولا يغطي بك، لا نقل بلغ عليه ذلك في يوهم لا أصبحت حجة دامسة ودالته ساطفة، ولم يدقق قوله تعالى، وكما حديثنا آئتنا أراهم عليه قومه؟ وكما عقل كونه قاعلاً بلا جارحة، وناحية لا جليل ودماغ، فليقل كونه بصيرًا بلا حذفة، وسيماً بلا أذن، إذ لا فرق بينهما.

الأصل السادس: [العلم] بأنه [ تعالى] ستمَّكم بكم، وهو وصيف قائم ذاته ليس يعرف ولاسوت، بل لا يشبه كلام غيره، كما لا يشبه وجوده وجود غيره، والكلام بالحقيقة كلام النسي، وأننا الأوصوات تقلة حرفًا للدلالت، كما يَنَل عليها تأثر بالحركات والأشكال، كيف ينال هذا على طاعرة، والمتأكد على جهيلة الشعراء، حتى قال قائلهم: إن الكلام لفي الفواد ومنا، جعل الناس في الفؤاد دينًا، ومن لم يبقى [95] علة ولا نها تهؤ عز أن يقول لسان محدث، ولكن ما يحدث فيه بقدر في الحالة للفت، فافتد عن علة مطمعة، وكثير من خلقائه لانكر، ومن لم يفهم ما يقبله بغير شيء، وإنياه قبل السين في قولك بسم الله، فلا يكون السين المتأثر عن إباء تذكينا، فاتّبع ما ذكرت هذا في ب.
عن الاختلافات اليها قلقاء، فلا سر في إعداد بعض العباد، ومن يتصل الله فنا لله من

هاد.

ومن استبعد أن يسمع موسى [عليه السلام] في الدنيا كلاما ليس بصوت [ولا يحرف]! فلا
ليست كن يرى في الآخِرة موجودا لا يسمع بصور ولا لون. وإن عقل أن يرى ما ليس
بلون واجسم ولا قدر ولا كمية، وهو إلى الآن لم يبره، فليعقل في حاسة السمع
ما عقله في حاسة البصر. وإن عقل أن يكون له علم واحد هو علم يجمع الموجودات;
فليعقل صفة واحدة لذاته هي كلام يجمع ما دل على البهتان. وإن عقل كون
السموات السبع وكون الجنة وكون النار مكتوبة في وقعة صغيرة، وخفظا في مقدار ذرة
من القلب، ورسوب في مقدار عدسة من الحنفية، من غير أن تحل ذات السماوات والجنة
والنار في الحكمة والوقت، فليعقل كون الكلام مفروض باللسان، محفوظا في القلب;
فكراً في المصادف من غير حضور ذات الكلام فيها، إذ لم حلت ذات الله تعالى
بكتابة اسمه في الورق، لكل ذلك النبى بكتابة اسمه في القرآن واحترق.

الأصل الثاني: [العلم] إن كلامه القطفي بذاته قديم، وكذالك جميع مnatاته، إذ
يسجل أن يكون شكل الحوادث داخلا تحت التغير: بل يجب على الناس من نموت
اللهد ما يلبى لذاته، فلا تحتوي التغييرات ولا تحل الحادثات، بل لم يزل في قده
معونة جامع الصنات، ولا يزال في أنه كذلك متزوج عن تغير الحالات; لأن محل
الحوادث لا يطول عنها، وبالنفخ على المواد فهو [90] حادث. وإنما هي
نعت الحداثة للجسام من حيث تزعمها للتأخير وتقليل الأوصاف؛ كف كونها
بمشاركة لها في قول التغير؟ وبيت على هذا أن كلامه قديم قائم بذاته، وإنما
اللهد هي الأوصاف الدالة عليه. ونها عن قيم طلب العلم وارادته بذات
اللهد لولد قبل أن يخلق وله، حتى إذا خلق وله وعقل، وخلق الله علما بما
في قلب أمه من الطفل، فأما صوراه بذلك الطيب الذي قام بذلك وهدم وجوده
ثم وقت مرحلة وله، فليعقل قيم الطيب الذي علم على قوله [بعلق: اعلم تعلق]
كلمات الله، وسمعت موسى [عليه السلام] على الله، إزالة ما دون وجوده، إذ خلقه الله معرفة
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ذات اللهد وبصبر موسى [عليه السلام] مخالف بعده و
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ورخل الخيل والخمار. فأما الفترة فوصف العباد ووصف للرب وليس يحسب له، واما
فترة الخيل للرب ووصف للعباد ووصف له، فإنها خلقت مقداره يقدر في وجوهه،
وكانت فترة الخيل نسبة إلى الأمة أخرى تسمى فترة قبرة، تسمى باعتبار تلك السنة كسبا، وكيف
ينبغي أن يتم فيه وهو بالضرورة يترك فترة بين الحركة المقدورة والزمن المضري؟
أو كيف يكون خلق العباد وهو يحيط علماً بتفاصيل أجزاء الحركة المقدسة واعدادها؟
وإنما نظرنا إلى كل ذلك نظر عن تكونه مقدوراً في الأوان، وهو أنه مقدور في فترة الله
تعالى اشتراكاً، وفترة اشتراك على وجه آخر من التعلق عبر به بالاكتساب. وليس
من ضرورة تعلق الفترة لمقدور أنه يكون بالاختراق فقط، إذ قدرة الله في الأوان
كانت متصلة بالعالم ولم يكن الاختراق حاسماً بها، وهي عند الاختراق متعلقة به
نوعاً آخر من التعلق، فيه يظهر أن تعلق الفترة ليس مخصصاً يحصل المقدور بها.
الاثنين الثالث: فإن فعل الله معنا لا يذكر عن كونه ما كنا نفكر في الابن، فلما تعلق
فلا يجري في العنكبوت طرفةً، ولا فتنة خاطر، ولا فتنة نظر إلا
بشفاء الله وإفارة قلبه ومنه، ففطر صبر والشر، والقاضي، والبشر، والإسلام
والعمري، والشر، والعدن، والفؤد والشمس، والغراء والرعد، والطاعة والعصاا،
والنجوم والإباء، لا قادر لقضاء، ولا معبث لحكم، يصبر من بشر، ويهدى من
بشائر، لا يسألهم ما يعملون وهم يسألون. ويدعون عليه من القليل قلأ عامل ما شاء
الله كان، وما لم يشاً لم يكن، وقله تعالى: لو شاء الله لنهدي الناس جميعاً،
وقوله تعالى: ولينشن [77] أ أتينا كل نفس هداناً.
وبداء [عليه] من جهة التعلق أن المعاني والزمران أن كان الله يكرمه ولا يربدها
فقال هو خايرته على وقت ارادة الله عليه، مع أن الله على، الأمر على
وقت ارادة العدو أكبر من الباب إذا ارادة. فتلقى شعراً كيف
سيجزي المسلم أن يرد الله على اللواء في بلاده وأكادم الزمان ردة لما
زعم فيها لا يختلف بها، إذ لم يكن ما يستيب لعدو الربيع في الفتره أكبر مما
يستيب له لا يشتفلك مزهف بها ولن يعبر عن ولايته، والعمارة فيه الغالية على اللقب،
وكل ذلك جار عند معدله على خلاف ارادة الحق، وهذا غيابة الصغف والمعجز.
عليه الباب الأرباب عن قول الراحم على كباراً.
ثم ما نطرأ أن افعال العدل مخلوقته تعالى هي结构调整، هي أنها مرادة الله، فإن بالكيف
فليش كل ما يهدد وليه، وليه ما لا يهدد؟ فإننا أمر غير الأرادة، ولكنا إذا ضرب الأمير عليه
تذكير العباد عليه، فاعترض صدره عند عليه، فلكذب السلطان، فأقر أطهار عيده
أن تأمر بهم وعند [وهو يريد أن]؟ يعفف بما يده، فقال له: أسره هذه الدابة
يمهده السلطان، فهو يأمره بما لا يريد إستثناه، ولم يشرك أسره لما كان ذهورا عند
هناك في و و
السليمان مهديا، ولو كان مريداً الامثال لأمره لكن مريداً لهلاك نفسه، وهو المحقق.

الأصل الرابع: إن الله تعالى متفقد بالخلق والأخلاق، ويشتكي كيف العبد، ولم يكن الخلق والكذب علية. وقاتل المعتصم وجب عليه ذلك لما فيه من مصلحة العباد، وهو محاولة لسبق الهم وآمر وناخ، كتبت له نجيب أو يجرب_presses/Superscript/SuperscriptF.png، ولعداد بالواجب أحد أمرهم: إنا الفعل الذي في تركه غبر، إما سج، كما يقال يجرب على العبد، أن يجرب الله [75] ب، وإذا ان بارده به الذي عليه، أشار إلى محاولة، كما يقال وعود العلماء، ويجرب على نفسه. فانه أراد الخصم بأن يجرب على لله تعالى الأول. قد عرضه للضرر، وإنا بعده الثاني فهو سليم، إذ يعد سبق العلم يده من وعود العلماء، وإن أراد به معي ثان أس في غير مهد، لوضع يجرب لمصلحة عبادة نعلان قائد، فإننا إذا لم يشتر بترك مصلحة العباد لم يكن للذوق في حق معنى. ثم [76] مصلحة العباد في أن يحقهم في الحياة، فإننا أن يحقهم في دار البيضاو ويرفعهم للخطاب، ثم يهدفهم خطر العقاب.

وهو الخص والحاسب، كما في ذلك غزية عند ذري الأدباء. والأخير الأصل: إن الله تعالى على الله يعج بعله أن يكفي عباداً لا يطقوه، خلافاً للمتعارضة. ولما لم يجوز ذلك لاستحلال سوء دفعه، وقد سأروا ذلك قنالاً، رينا لا تحملنا ما طاقة لنا به؛ وإن الله تعالى أخبر أنه [علي الله عليه وسلم] عن آباه، لا يقصده؛ ثم أمره بأن يتعهد في جميع أحواله، وكان من جملة فتاواه أنه لا يقصده، في حق صدقته في الله تعالى؟ هؤلاء هذا إلا محاولة وجوده؟

الأصل السادس: إن الله [عذب] الامام الخليل وتطهيرهم من غير جرم سابق، من غير لواب لاحق، خلافاً للمتعارضة، لأنه مصرف في مكة، ولا يصبر أن يعدو تصرفه ملكه. والظلم هو عارياً عن التصرف في مكة، وهو محاولة على الله تعالى، ولكن ذلك محاولة رب نعم الله، ولد على جواص ذلك وجوده، فإن ذبح المهاجرين الامام الامام، وما صب عليها من عواجذ من جهة الدنيا لأجل، لم ينجب الله جريمة، فإن الله تعالى يجربه ويجبه عليها على ما ساقيه من الأمام، وبجرب ذلك عليه: نقول: من زعم أنه يستطيع كل نسبه وابنابل، وكله يقا، حتى يسهم في آلامها، فقد خرج عن الشرع والعدل، إذ [76] يقال [ذالك في] وصف الواب والحط وجا عليه إذ كان المارد به أن يصبر يجربه وهو محاولة.

وإن أريد به فيه فقد سبق أنه غير مفهوم؛ إذ خرج عن المعاني المذكورة بالواجب.
Arsisalah al-Qudsiyyah

الأصل الساع: إنه [ تعالى ] في بلاء يباهي ما يشاء، فلا يجيب عليه رعاية الأصل في بلاء، مما ذكرناه من أنه لا يجيب على شيء، بل لا يفيق في حقه النجوم، لأنه لا سال عما يفعل وهو غيره. ويتغدر به القلمي في قوله: "ثم نفرض منازة في الآخرة بين ضابط مسلمًا وبين ضابط مسلمًا: فإن الله يزيد في درجات الابتلاء، ويفضل عليه الصديق لأنه تعب بالأبينة والطلائع، بعد البلوغ، ويجب عليه ذلك عند العنيف.

فقال النبي: "بَابِلَ لا رفعت منزلته عليه؟" يقول: لأنه بلغ واجته في البداعة.

فقول النبي: "الذي من Они في الصبا، وكان يجيب ان تدين حياة حتى لا ينفعها." 

وقد عدل عن العدل في الفضل على العمل بتطويق العمر دونه، فلم يفسه؟ يقول الله: "لأيمل الله Особ الأشيك، أو عصبة، وكان الأصل في كله الموت في الصبا.

هذا عذر المعتزلة عن الله (ع و ج): عندما يبدأ الكثير من دركات قلي وقيلون،[بابن]: أما علينا أن نبتلها إذا نبتلكم، فهذا أنسى أنسى في الصبا. فما ربا بنا دون

منزرة الصبي المسلم؟ مهما يجاب من ذاته؟ وهل يجيب عند هذا النبت؟...  

الأصول الآلية تجعله يحكم الجهاز عن أن توزع بيضاء العين؟

فإن قيل لهما قدر على رعاية الأصل العبد "ل سال عليه بسباع العذاب" كان ذاك يثبب على القلمي، فنان: معنى القلم بالحكمة، قال: كلاً، يقبل القلم بالعذاب، حتى قد يكون القلم يثبب عند شخص خاص، عند غيره، إذا وافق عذاب أخذها دون الآخر، حتى يستحق كل الشخص أو يخاف ويتسع عنه إغاثة. فأنريد بالقلم لا يوافق عذاب الباري فهو حائر، إذا لا يوافق له، فلا يحسب منه القلم 198[ ب ] إذا لا يوافق له، فلا يحسب منه القلم، كما لا يحسب منه القلم، [تشيئ] شهد بعضهم بدعاء من لاسخة أهل النار. ثم الحكيم معا مع العالم بحقائق الأشياء.

(النادر على الجعلم فعلها على وفق إرادته)؛ هذك هو من كلي رعاية الأصل، وناعم الحكيم لسرع الأصل نظراً لفسقه. لينسفه في الدنيا ثمانية وفي الآخرة ثمانية.

أو يبلغ له عن نفسه [ ناتئة ]؟ كيف ذلك على الله تعالى مال.

والأصل الثاني: إن سمع الله وطاعته وباحة ياباهي الله وصراه لا يعقل، بلا معتزلة، لأن العقل لا يوجب الطاعة، إلا يعلمه إما أن يجيب لها غير القلم، وهو سال، فإن العقل لا يوجب الحب، وما أن يجيب لها نفاده، ورغبة، لأنه لا يعلم إما أن يرجع إلى المعروف، وذلك مالاه فإن يقتضه عن الأراضي الفوائد، بل الكفر والإيمان، والطاقة والصبر في حقه تعالى سبب، وما ان

2 "اذ لا يكتمه" في 3 "تشهي" في 4 وب، تشبيه م 6 كما في 7، رحمة في النص الأخرى
يرجع إلى غرض الجدل وهو [إليك] محاولة للإجابة على الأسئلة التي يطرحها الناس حول الطاقة والمعلقة. لذا لا يجب أن يكون هذا الكلام بالنظر إلى المفتاح في المفتاح في المفتاح.

وقد قيل في النص: "فلذ من أخذ هذا من المفتاح والمعلقة؟ حيث يذكر المفتاح بين الذكر والكلمل؟ لما من الانتهاك والاستغلال والتذذ بثاؤها.

فكان في هذا أن يجب النظر والمعرفة الأعلى بالشرح، والشرح لا يستمر ما لم ينظر المفتاح في النص: فكان المفتاح في النص. ولهذا الإجابة على النكتة: "لا يوجد النكتة إلا بوجود النكتة في المفتاح." ولهذا النكتة في المفتاح: "أنا النكتة، فلذ من أخذ هذا النكتة من المفتاح؟".

وآخر [دغش] على النكتة، والشتاء والشتاء بالشتاء المفرط، إن كل شتاء متاخر في النكتة، ولهذا النكتة في المفتاح: "لذ من أخذ هذا النكتة من المفتاح؟".

وهذا النكتة في النكتة، ولهذا النكتة في المفتاح: "لم يكن النكتة من المفتاح، ولكن النكتة من المفتاح."
الرأسماع: إن الله تعالى قد ارسل مهداً صلى الله عليه وسلم خاتم النبيين، ونصحنا لما قبله من شرائع اليهود والنصارى والصابرين، وأيده بالمجازات الظاهرة والمآت الباهرة، كالشفاعة وصلاة التوفيق، وتسمية المحسوب، وإطلاق العجز، وما تناجر من القرآن، قانون كتابهم بالفسخة، والتلقيحين، إذ لم يكن في قدرة البشر الجمع بين جزاء الفقر ونعمة النفي، كلهامها، هذا مع ما فيه من أمر الأولين، مع كونه إبا غير سمعك نصيب، والأنياب عن الغيب في أمر تحقق صدقه فيها، في الاستقبال، كقوله تعالى: "لندخل السجدة الحرام أن نشاء الله أمين محقيق رؤوسكم ونصرين كقوله: "آمَّنْنا لَهُمْ مِّنَ الرِّيحَانِ...".

علبةكلام الرأسماع، في الذين الأدبي، في مقدم غليلين، في يمضن، ووجهت، كما أن معروفاً تجلي النبي نزل منزلة قوته صدقته، في ذلك مثل الكتاب بين يدي الملك، الدعم على رعبه، إن رسول الملك، كلهامها، كما قال الملك، إن كنت مصداً قلم، أتسرك ثلاثاً وفقم، على خلاف عامتك، ففعل الملك ذلك، حصل للحاضرين علم ضرورياً بأن ذلك نازل منزلة قوته صدقته.

الركن الرابع: من أمرك الإيمان، السمعيات، وتصديقه صلى الله عليه وسلم فيما أخبر عنه، ومداروه على عشرة أصول:

الأول الأول: الحشر والشرع، وقد ورد بهما الشرع، وهو حق وتصديقه، والراجح، لأنه في التشكيل، ومعاهة الإعفاء، وذلك مقرر لل تعالى إبتداء الإضاء، قال تعالى: قال من يحيى، الاعضاء، غليظ، عين وجل، من الله ولي، فاستدل بالتنصي على الإعفاء. وقال [هود 26]: ما لم نكم، ولا بثنيكم إلا كنس وخانتك، والإعدى إبتداء، فإن هو ممكن كالإياب الأول.

الأول الثاني: سؤال مكر وفكر، وقد ورد به الإدراك، يجب التصديقه له لأنه ممكن، إذ ليس يستند إلا الإدراك الذي جزء من الأجزاء الذي يفهم [100] من الأخطاب، فكان ممكن، في نفسه، ولا ينفع ما ذهب من السلوك لعدم اكتمال الأجراء، فإن التأمل لا يكون نياً، ويدرك بشاهد من المكروه، لا يصبح، ومعه هل لا يسمعون كلهام، ولا يبين، كلهام من عقله على السلام وشامه، ومعه هل لا يسمعون كلهام، ولا يبين، كلهام من عقله على السلام وشامه، فإذا لم يكون لهم السمع والرؤية لم يدركوا.
الأصل الثالث: عذاب التبر، وقد ورد الشرع به. قال تعالى: النار يعرض عليها غدرًا وعظيًا. يوم توم الساعة أذن بها آل فرعون أشد العذاب. وانتهى عن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم والرفاء الصحابيين الاستعاذة من عذاب التبر، وهو ما سكن فيجب التصديق به. ولا يتعين من التصديق به تفرق أجزاء البيت في بوتو البيع، وواصل الطبق، فإن الفردك لأخذ العذاب من الحيوان أجزاء مخصصة يقدر الله تعالى على عائد الأركان البهاء.

الأصل الرابع: المدينة (وهو حق). قال الله تعالى: ووضع الموازين النصف يوم القبئ. وقال تعالى: فمن تقل موازينه فإذن بالله كله البلقرون. ومن خُلُق موازينه وأذن بالله كله المستفلون. وجاء أن الله تعالى يتعدى في صاحب الأفعال، ورزق ذريات الأعمال عند الله، تصور مقتدر أعمال العباد معلومة للعباد. حتى يظهر لهم العدل في الغفل، أو الفضل في العفو وقضاء التواب.


الأصل السادس: إن الجنة والأنار بخلقك. قال الله تعالى: وسراوا إلى مغفرة من ركيم وجنة عرضها السماوات والأرض أعتد للثيرون. قوله أعدت [100 ب] دليل على أنها سماواته، وهي ملائكة الفضيلة، فعليه أن الله تعالى لا يسأل عما يفعل، وما يستحسن.

الأصل السابع: إن الأمم الحق بعد رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم أبو بكر، ثم عمر، ثم عثمان، ثم علي، من تمام الله عليهم، ولم يكن من رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم إلامة، إذ لم كانكن أولين بظهور من تمه أحد الناس، وأمراء على الجند في البلاد، ولم يخف ذلك كيف خفي هذا؟ أو ان كان ظهر كيف أدرس حتى لم يُنكر البينة؟ فمن أبو بكر أساسًا بالأخيار والجيدة. وما تقدر الدروس غيرها فهو نسبة للسماوات، كله من خلقه لهم، فيُنسى رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم وفرق الأجماع. وذاك مما لم يجب على اختراعه إلا الروافض. واعتقلهم السنة تركية جمع السماوات، ومنه أتى ابن معاوية وعليه. ولي الله في هؤلاء، كان مبنيًا على الأجهزة، لأنه ساهم في الابادة، إذ ذُكِر أن تسلم ثقة عثمان مع كرة عشائرهم واحتمالهم بالعسكر يؤدي إلى اضطراب أمر الأمة في بداية، فرأى الامرأي أصوب، ونفت معاوية أن تأخر أسرهم مع مظم جانبهم يوجب الإغراء بالائمة، وعرض الدماء للملك. وقد قال العالماء: كل مجهد كما في ب.
لا أخذهم [100] في الله لذمهم ولا يصرفون عن الحق صارفاً.

الأصل الثامن: إن شراط الإيمان بعد الإسلام والتكيف خمسة: الذكر والجهر والورد والكلية ونسب قريش، فلوه على الله عليه وسلم: الأئمة من قريش، وإذا أجمع عدد من المصطفى في الصفات ضرلما من انعقدت له البهجة من أكثر الخلق، والخلفاء الأكبر بالله يشهد إلى الاقتداء للحق.

الأصل العاشر: إنه لا تغادر وجد الورع والعلم فيهم تدفق الإيمان، وكان في صدوقه إثارة تنة لا تطاق، حكماً بالاعتدال إمامهم، لأنا بين من سرته نفس بالعفاح، فما يأتي المسلمون فيه من غير يزيد على ما يقوات من نقصان هذه الشروط التي أثبتت لزمته الصادقة، فلا يُعَدَّ إسلام الصادقة شغقاً بزوراها، كذٍ يبقي قصراً، ويتم صحراً، وبين أن تتحم بعل من الأمام وفيسد الأفضائية، وذلك حال.

فنحن تضييق تبزوح فضاء أهل الله في بلادهم لمسيس حاجتهم، فكِب لتقسي بصحة الإيمان عند الجهة والضروة.

فهذه الأركان الأربعة الحافية لِلأسئلا الأربعين، هي تغزل المئذن. فمن اعتقدها كان معناً لله، ومنجاً لِلجهدة، وتستعمنا بديعلاً، ويهدينا إلى الحق وتحقيقه، ينهي وصة جود. [وقد فرغت من تصنيف في الجهد الأفضائية، شجعة ابنه أهل ورايا] لأن نجال يبركة وبركة دعاء سكانه، فإن يحق للله إننا، ويتم بالمغودة أجلنا، إنه الكريم المختار، [1]

وعلى العالم:

[وقد فرغت من الرسالة القياسية، التي ا🥣هاها في هذا الفصل في السجادة الأفضائية، شجعي لا إنسان أهل ورايا] لأن نجال يبركة وبركة دعاء سكانه، وعاصفة متنازع، فإن الله تعالى أن يحكم لنا بالسماحة، إنه الكريم المختار، الدائم الأخلاق، [1]
PART III

THE JERUSALEM TRACT:

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Praise be to Him who distinguished the followers of the Prophet with the light of certain belief, who favoured the adherents of the true religion with His guidance to its fundamentals, who saved them from following those who deviate from the right path and those atheists who go astray, who guided them to follow the example of the foremost of His messengers, who led them to emulate his noble Companions, who eased their way to follow in the footsteps of the righteous ancestors of the community, so that they found refuge from the dictates of reason in their faith, and from the example and beliefs of the ancient peoples in the well-defined path.

But they freely reconciled the deductions of human reason with the postulates of the divine law, and thus realized that the pronouncement of ‘There is no god but God, and Muḥammad is the messenger of God’ is not enough unless the fundamental principles underlying this formula are fully grasped. They also realized that the two parts of the formula, though brief, enshrine confirmations of the essence (dhāt) of God, of His attributes (ṣifāt), His works (ʿafʿāl), and the truthfulness of His messenger. They further realized that the structure of faith is based upon these four pillars, each of which is based upon ten fundamentals.

The first pillar is concerned with the knowledge of the essence of God most high and has ten fundamentals: that He exists (wujūd); that He is pre-existent (qidam) and everlasting (baqāʾ); that He is neither a substance (jawhar) nor body (jism) nor accident (ʿaraf); that He is not limited by direction (jiḥād) nor settled in a location (makān); that He can be seen; and that He is One.

The second pillar is concerned with His attributes and comprises ten fundamentals, namely the knowledge that He is living (ḥay), all-knowing (ʿalim), all-powerful (qādir), all-willing (murid), all-hearing (sāmiʿ), all-seeing

1 Ar-Risālah al-Qudūsyyah, now forming the third fāṣil of Kitāb Qudūsyyah of the first rūḥ of the Shāfiʿi. According to Murtuza's Ittiḥād, ii. 89, al-Ghazālī wrote tracts to different cities, including one in three folio pages to Mäzān which was also called Qudūsyyah.
2 ʿisāl al-khāṣṣ.
3 rūḥ al-mutūn.
4 The text has al-hab al-mutūn, an allusion to the Qurʾān, iii. 102. Murtuza, op. cit. ii. 87 by considers that there is in this a reference to the Muʿāzzi and the philosophers.
5 The transition from prayer to discussion is rather subtle without a perceptible break. I take ḥaṣāna to be the beginning of the next sentence to mean ‘But they freely reconciled...’.
6 Here al-Ghazālī used the expression asbābāshāhidah, because each part of the formula is strictly preceded with asbābū umma (I bear witness that...).
7 Al-Ghazālī uses wāḥid and wālī for pillars and fundamentals respectively.
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(baṣīr), and speaking (mutakallim), but is exalted above and immune from incorporation in phenomena;¹ and that His speech, knowledge, and will are pre-existent and eternal.

The third is concerned with His works and includes ten fundamentals; that God most high is the creator of His servants’ actions; that these actions are acquired (maktasābāh) by His servants; that they are willed (murādāh) by Him; that He is gracious to create and to create from nothing; that it is His prerogative to impose duties (taklīf) beyond the capacity [of His servants],² and to cause pain (ilām) to the innocent; that it is not incumbent upon Him to do the most favourable [to His servants]; that [man’s] obligations are all laid down in the divine law (sharī’); that His sending of prophets is not impossible (ja’dā); and that the prophethood of our prophet Muḥammad (God bless and save him) is proved, and confirmed by miracles.

The fourth is concerned with beliefs accepted on oral authority (sam‘īyyāt) and contains ten fundamentals: confirmation of the belief in the resurrection of the dead and the reckoning [before despatch to Paradise or Hell]; in the torment of [the dead in] the grave; in the interrogation of [the dead by the two angels] Munkar and Nakir; in [the weighing of the actions of men in] the balance (mīzān); in [the ordeal of passing over] the bridge (ṣīrāt); in [God’s] creation of paradise and hell; in the rules concerning the imamate; in the excellence of the Companions of the Prophet according to their order [in assuming office]; in the qualification necessary in the imam; and in the legitimacy of the imamate even without the imam being endowed with piety and learning.

The First Pillar of the Faith is the Knowledge of the Essence of God and Comprises Ten Fundamentals.

(1). The first fundamental is the knowledge of His existence. This foremost guiding light, and the path most likely to lead to it, is indicated in the Qur’ān, since all guidance (ḥayān) beyond that of God is superfluous:

The most high said: ‘Have We not made the earth as a cradle and the mountains as pegs? And We created you in pairs, and We appointed your sleep for a rest; and We appointed night for a garment, and We appointed day for a livelihood. And We have built above you seven strong ones, and We appointed a blazing lamp, and have sent down our revelations’.

¹ This seems to be the likely sense of the Arabic munāzzahan ‘an baṣīl al-hāshibīk, a denial, in effect, of anthropomorphism (ṣajā‘). The usually verbose Murtada is vaguely laconic: ‘hār mālīdī kā hālā‘.
² Following Murtada, II, 6b. —
³ From ‘the excellence of the Companions’ the end is missing from the oldest manuscripts until Shari‘ al-‘indīnah is in the discussion two, not the fundamentals.
of the rain-clouds water cascading that We may bring forth thereby grain and plants, and gardens luxuriant.1

And the most high said: ‘Surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of night and day and the ship that runs in the sea with profit to men and the water God sends down from heaven there-with reviving the earth after it is dead and His scattering abroad in it all manner of crawling things, and the turning about of the winds and the clouds compelled between heaven and earth—surely these are signs for a people having understanding.2

And the most high said: ‘Have you not regarded how God created seven heavens one upon another, and set the moon therein for a light and the sun for a lamp? And God caused you to grow out of the earth, and He shall return you into it, and bring you forth.’3

And He said: ‘Have you considered the seed you spill? Do you yourselves create it, or are We the Creators? We have decreed among you Death; We shall not be outstripped; that We may exchange the likes of you, and make you to grow again in a fashion you know not. You have known the first growth; so why will you not remember? Have you considered the soil you till? Do you yourselves sow it, or are We the Sowers? Did We will, We would make it broken orts, and you would remain bitterly jesting—‘We are debt-loaded; nay, we have been robbed!’ Have you considered the water you drink? Did you send it down from the clouds, or did We send it? Did We will, We would make it bitter; so why are you not thankful? Have you considered the fire you kindle? Did you make its timber to grow, or did We make it? We Ourselves made it for a reminder, and a boon to the desert dweller.4

It should be apparent to anyone with the minimum of intelligence if he reflects a little upon the implication of these verses, and if he looks at the wonders in God’s creation on earth and in the skies and at the wonders in animals and plants, that this marvellous, well-ordered system cannot exist without a maker who conducts it, and a creator who plans and perfects it. Indeed, human nature itself seems to testify that it is subjected to the Creator’s direction, and directed according to His management. Hence God most high said: ‘Is there any doubt regarding God, the Originator of the heavens and the earth . . . ?’5 Hence also He sent the prophets to call mankind (al-khalq) to the belief in the unity [of God] and to say ‘there is no god but God’.

1 Sūrah lviii. 6-16; I have adopted, with minor changes, Arberry’s translation, but the numbering of the verses is according to the Arabic text.
2 Sūrah ii. 164.
3 Sūrah lix. 15-18.
4 Sūrah lxi. 98-99.
5 Sūrah xiv. 10.

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They were not commanded to say 'we have a god and [the rest of] the world has a god', for [the conception of the Unity of God] is innate in their minds since they were first created and [continues with them] in the prime of their youth. For this reason God most high said: 'If thou askest them, "Who created the heavens and the earth?" they will say, "God".' The most high also said: 'So set thy face to the religion, a man of pure faith—God's original upon which He originated mankind. There is no changing of God's creation. That is the right religion.'

There is then in the nature of man and in the testimony of the Qur'ān enough evidence to make the necessity of [logical] proof (ḥurūhān) superfluous. However, we wish to produce such supporting proofs in emulation of the well known among the learned, as follows: It is self-evident to human reason that there must be a cause (ṣabāb) for the origination (ḥadīth) of anything originated (ḥadīth). Since the universe is originated it follows that there was a cause for its origination.

Our statement that there must be a cause for the origination of anything originated is clear, since everything originated is related to time which human reason can assume to be early or late. The assignment of the originated to a particular time, which is neither before nor after its own, is necessarily dependent upon the one who so assigns it. Then the proof of our statement that the universe is originated is that material objects in the universe are either at rest or in motion, and since both rest and motion are originated, it follows that what is subject to the originated (ḥawwādīth) is itself originated (ḥadīth).

There are thus three propositions in this proof. The first is our statement that material objects are either at rest or in motion. This statement is self-evident and requires no mental reflection for its comprehension. For he who can conceive a material object which is neither at rest nor in motion is both obstinately ignorant and unwilling to follow the path of reason.

The second proposition is our statement that rest and motion are originated. This is proved by their alternate occurrence, as is observable in all material objects, those that can be seen as well as those that cannot.

For there can be nothing at rest which human reason does not decide that it is capable of moving, and there can be nothing in motion which human reason does not decide that it is capable of coming to a standstill. Of the two states of rest and motion that which happens to occur at

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1 Cf. Faris (p. 39), II. 14–16.
2 Sūrah xxx. 85. ‘A man of pure faith’ is Arberry’s adequate translation of ḥumāf’īr; cf., however, the article by Fr. Buhl in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, ii. 258–60.
4 The adoption of syllogism by al-Ghazālī is one evidence of the influence of philosophy on Kāfīrīn. In their strife against the Mu’tazilah, theologians from al-Ash’arī to al-Ghazālī made increasing use of it. They sought to rationalize theology by buttressing tradition (ṣafāt) with reason (ṣafāt).
5 In the three manuscripts ma shāhīda kif id al-maṣūm is missing. It occurs in the printed text.
a time (ṭāri') is originated, because it did occur. The previous state [of an object whether at rest or in motion] is also originated, for were its eternity (qidam) proved, its non-existence ('adam) would be impossible (as we shall show in proving that the Creator, most high and hallowed, is pre-existent and everlasting).

The third proposition is our statement that what is subject to the originated is itself originated. The proof is that were it not so, it would be necessary to assume the existence before everything originated of another so originated, and so on ad infinitum, so that unless all these originated things did come and pass, the turn of the one in question would never come. But this is impossible because there is no end to infinity.

Another proof is the revolutions of the celestial spheres. Were these revolutions infinite, their number would be either odd or even, or both odd and even, or neither odd nor even. But it is impossible that the number could be both odd and even, or neither odd nor even, for this would combine the positive with the negative, so that affirmation of the one would involve the negation of the other, and vice versa. Further, it is impossible for the number of revolutions to be even [only], since even becomes odd by the addition of one to it—and [behold] how the infinite stands in need of one! It is also impossible to be odd [only] since odd becomes even by the addition of one—and [behold] how the infinite stands in need of one! Finally, it is impossible for that number to be neither odd nor even, for this would mean that it is finite.

The sum of all this is that the universe is subject to origination (kawāḍith), that it is therefore originated (badith), that its actual origination (badith) is proved, and that its dependence upon the Creator (al-muḥdith) is ipso facto (bid-darūrath) comprehensible.

(a) The second fundamental is the knowledge that the Creator most high is pre-existent (qadīm) and eternal (azāli), that there is no beginning for His existence, that He is the beginning (awwal) of everything, and that He [existed] before everything dead or alive. And here is the proof: Were He himself created and not pre-existent, His own coming into existence would have required a creator, and His creator another creator and so on ad infinitum, without ultimately leading to one pre-existent, first creator who is the object [of our search], and Whom we called the Creator (ṣāni') of the universe, its Initiator (muḥdī) and its Contriver (muḥdī).3

(b) The third fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is

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1. The printed texts contain what seems to be a superfluous word ḫ-tasūmi before the word fi-annaše. It does not occur in the manuscripts and its omission yields more logical sense. Cf. Farsi, p. 60.
2. "Two manuscripts have ṣāni', hāri, muḥdī, and muḥdī and one has only the last three. The printed text had, in addition, muḥdī.
3. A misprint is noted in the manuscripts. A mistake is likely in the manuscript.”
eternal without a beginning and everlasting without an end. For [according to revelation] ‘He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward’; and [according to reason] it is impossible to imagine the non-existence (‘adam) of that which has been shown to be eternal. And here is the proof: If the possibility of its non-existence is assumed, then this could be self-inflicted or through the action of an opponent. But were it possible for a thing (whose existence is conceivable) to be annihilated by itself, it would be possible for a thing (whose non-existence is conceivable) to come into existence by itself.

Thus the occurrence (tarayān) of existence, like the occurrence of annihilation, requires a cause. But it is absurd and unimaginable to assume His annihilation through an opponent, for that would require the assumption of the latter’s being pre-existent and co-existent with Him. Through the two preceding fundamentals His existence and His eternity were proved. How, then, is it possible to conceive of an opponent with Him in pre-existence? It is also impossible for this opponent to be himself originated, since it is less likely for the originated [to succeed] in its opposition to the eternal with a view to its destruction than it is likely for the eternal in its opposition to the originated with a view to preventing its coming into existence. For prevention is indeed easier than destruction, and the eternal is stronger than and more superior to the originated.

(4) The fourth fundamental is the knowledge that He is not a substance which occupies space and that He is too exalted and hallowed to have any relation to space. And here is the proof: Every substance which occupies a space is conditioned by this space, and is either at rest in that space or in motion away from it, i.e. it is subject to motion and rest which are originated, and what is subject to originated changes (hawādhīt) is itself originated. But if it were possible to imagine [the existence] of a pre- eternal (qadim) substance which is limited by space, the pre-eternity (qidam) of all substance in the universe would be conceivable. Hence if someone should use the term ‘substance’ in reference to Him, without intending to mean substance which is limited by space, he would be verbally wrong but not in meaning.

(5) The fifth fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is not a body (jism) composed of substance. [Its proof is this:] A body is composed of substances. But since it has been disproved that He was a substance limited by space, He cannot be a body, since every body is limited by space and is composed of substances, and since also it is impossible to
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dissociate substance from composition (iijimā'), decomposition (ifṭirāq), motion (harakah) and rest (sukūn), form (haī'ah) and quantity (miqdar), all of which are characteristics of the originated. But if it were permissible to believe that the Creator of the universe is a body, then it would be permissible to believe in the divinity (ilāhiyyah) of the sun and the moon or other parts of the material world. Hence if someone should dare to refer to Him most high as a body, without intending [to mean] His composition of substances, he would be wrong as regards the term, but at the same time right in repudiating its corporeal meaning.

(6) The sixth fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is not an accident inherent in a body or settled in a location. For body is subject to accident and is necessarily originated, and its originator would exist before it. Is it possible then that He could be incorporated (ḥālān) in a body when He existed from all eternity alone, with none besides Him, and then created all substances and accidents afterwards? Besides, He is all-knowing ('ālim), all-powerful (qādir), all-willing (murīd), and creator (khāliq), as will be shown, and these attributes are impossible for accidents. Nay, they are not conceivable except for a Being (muḥīd) who is self-existent and self-dependent.

It was thus established through [the discussion of] these fundamentals that He exists, self-existent, neither a substance nor a body nor an accident, while the whole universe is made up of these. Hence He resembles nothing and nothing resembles Him. He is the Living (al-bay'a), the Everlasting (al-qayyīm), like Him there is naught. How impossible it is for the created to resemble its Creator, the predestined its Predestinator (muqaddir), and the fashioned its fashioner (muṣawwir). All bodies and accidents are of His creation and workmanship, and by His predestination it is impossible for them to be like or to resemble Him.3

(7) The seventh fundamental is the knowledge that the essence of God most high is exalted above (munazzah) the notion of limitation by any direction. For direction is either up or down, right or left, front or behind, and these were created by Him through His creation of man. He created him with two extremities, the one rests on earth and is called foot, and the other, its opposite, is called head. The notion of up (ismu l faq) was originated (hadatha) to indicate what is above the head and the conception down to indicate what is near the location of the foot. [This is true] even of an ant creeping along a ceiling: what is down in relation to its position is still up in relation to ours. Then He created man

1 This is clearly a reference to the Qur'ān, Sūrah iii. 8 with the word order reversed, probably by copyists.

2 This is an exact quotation from the Qur'ān, Sūrah xli. 11.

3 The manuscript and printed texts have ṣoṣfāqā 'al-fuṣl ʿilā bi-mumāšhazahātī mu-

mumāšhazahātī. I take this to mean as translated.

Fāris has avoided the crucial word ṣaṣlā' altogether (p. 65).
with two hands, the one usually stronger than the other, and thus the
notion of right was created and assigned to the stronger, and the notion
of left to its counterpart, and thus what is on the one side is called right,
and on the other left. Then He created man with two sides, the one
within the range of his sight and towards which he moves, and thus [He]
created the notion of front for the direction towards which man advances
through movement, and the notion of behind to the counterpart.

All directions are therefore originated through the fact that man is
originated. But supposing that man was created after a different fashion,
such as round like a sphere, these directions would never have existed.
Is it possible, then, that He was in all eternity limited by direction which
is originated or that He became limited by direction after He had had
none? Is this possible by His creation of the universe under Him (tahtah)? But since the direction of under or down is related to the foot, may
He be exalted above being limited by such direction, and above [the
assumption] that He has a foot! All of this is impossible for the mind to
conceive. For the conceivable is that whatever is limited by direction is
also limited by space like substance, or is limited by substance in the
same way as accidents are.

But the impossibility of His being a substance or an accident has been
proved. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be limited by direction.
But if by direction is meant other than these two meanings it would be
wrong to use the term though helpful for the meaning. Again if [it is
conceivable] that He is above the universe He would be also opposite to
it. All that lies opposite to a body is either equal to it in size or smaller or
larger. But all these are assessments which necessarily require an assessor
to make. May the Creator, the One and Ruler, be exalted above that!

As to raising of hands heavenwards at the time of petition it is because
heaven is the [usual] direction of supplication. It also indicates the
supplicant’s recognition of the majesty (jald) and magnificence (kibrıd)
of the One to whom supplication is made, since the raising of hands
upwards suggests His glory (majd) and most-elevated position (ulad). For
verily the most high is above all beings by His omnipotent power (bilqabri
wa’al istilld).

(8) The eighth fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is
settled upon His throne, in the sense which He most high intended by

1 The following passage is corrupted in the printed text and has, moreover, what appears to be
an interpolation of some twenty words. I have followed the manuscripts as yielding more logical
sense. Paris (p. 66) appears to have followed a text
with a similar or identical defect. I have read:
ub’um khalqa al-ilm tabtahus fa-ta’dla ‘am en
yakhıni... Murtda’s text has tabtahu in the
commentary but faqabha in the text.

2 A parallel additional sentence may be recon-
structed from the corrupted text as follows: ‘And,
since the direction up is related to the head, may
He be exalted above the [assumption] that He has
a head.’

3 Cf. Muslim’s Sahih (Cairo, 1390 A.H.), i. 144.
4 Cf. the Qur’ān, Sūrah vi. 18, 61 wa-sana
qabars fauqa ‘ibdallāh.
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settlement. [This is a sense] which is neither inconsistent with His magnificence nor implies any of the characteristics of [the finite such as] origination and annihilation. It is the sense which He intended by His saying in the Qur'an: 'Then He lifted Himself (istawā) to Heaven when it was smoke.' That was in no other way except by His omnipotent power (as the poet said: Bishr has gained control over Iraq, without sword or bloodshed).²

Such interpretation was forced upon the people [who seek the obvious meaning] of the revelation. Likewise those who seek the hidden meaning³ were forced to resort to interpretation. Thus God's words 'He is with you wherever you are'⁴ were generally interpreted to mean 'by His omniscience'. Similarly the words of the Prophet (God bless and save him): 'The heart of the believer is between two of the fingers of the Merciful'⁵ were interpreted to mean 'subject to His omnipotence'. Again his word (God bless and save him) 'The Black Stone is the right hand of God in His earth'⁶ were interpreted to [enjoin] regard and honour [to the stone.] Otherwise, if the apparent meaning [on all these matters were adopted] it would necessitate the impossible.

So also would His istiwā'⁷ [upon the Throne]. For if taken to mean settlement or possession it would necessitate that He who settles upon the Throne or possesses it, is a substance in contact with the Throne and that He is either equal to it in size, or larger or smaller. But this is impossible, and what leads to the impossible is itself impossible.

(g) The ninth fundamental is the knowledge that, while He most high is exalted above being limited by form (ṣūrah), quantity, direction, and location, He will be seen with the eyes in the everlasting abode. This is proved by His saying: 'Upon that day faces shall be radiant, gazing upon their Lord.'⁸ That He cannot be seen in the life here below is confirmed by His words most high: 'The eyes attain Him not, but He attains the eyes.'⁹ And also in His address most high to Mūsā (Peace be upon him): 'Thou shalt not see Me!'¹⁰

How then could a Mu'tazilite [who denies that God can be seen] presume to know of the attributes¹¹ of God that which Mūsā did not see? Himself upon the Throne...¹²

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¹ Sūrah xlii. 11.
² I suspect this line, ascribed to two different poets, one of whom is al-Akhtal, as an interpolation. The word istawā (gained control) is crucial both in this line and in the preceding Qur'anic verse. A variant reading has it as istumā. For the fine theological and philosophical distinction between the two see Murtaḍā, ii. 106-8.
³ The sense demands the rejection of al-ṣālīn in the manuscript and printed texts used, and reading al-ṣāfiin.
⁴ Sūrah lvii. 4. This verse begins: 'It is He that created the heavens and the earth in six days, then
know? Or is it conceivable that Musa would have prayed to see God if seeing Him was impossible? Ignorance is more befitting heretics and schismatics than prophets!

Even according to its apparent meaning, the interpretation of the verse on seeing God does not lead to what is impossible. For seeing means here a kind of inspiration (kasif) and acquiring knowledge (‘ilm), although it is more perfect and clear than knowing. If it is permissible (jaza) to speak of knowing Him without relation to [space and] direction, it is also permissible to speak of seeing Him without relation to [space and] direction. Again, just as it is conceivable (yaquzu) for God to see His creatures without being in an opposite position in relation to them, so it is conceivable for His creatures to see Him without being in an opposite position in relation to Him. Finally, since He can be known without asking how and without any reference to form, He can be seen under the same conditions.

(10) The tenth fundamental is the knowledge that God (to whom glory and majesty belong) is one (wa‘hid) with no associate (sharik), single (fard) with no equal, unique in creating and creating from nothing, and that He has neither match nor equal, and that He has no opponent to contend or alternate with Him. Its proof is His saying most high: ‘Why, were there gods in earth and heaven other than God, they would surely go to ruin.’ Its explanation is this: Were there two gods and one of them resolved on a course of action (arada amran), the second would be either obliged to aid him and thereby demonstrating that he was a subordinate being and not an all-powerful god, or would be able to oppose and resist thereby demonstrating that he was the all-powerful and the first weak and deficient, not an all-powerful god.

The Second Pillar of the Faith is the Knowledge of the Attributes of God and Comprises Ten Fundamentals

(1) The first fundamental is the knowledge that the Creator of the universe is all-powerful (gadir) and that He most high is truthful in saying: ‘And He is powerful over everything.’ For the universe is thoroughly made and well ordered; and he who would consider a silk garment, well designed and woven with symmetrical embroidery and adornment, and could imagine that it was the work of a dead person or of the philosophers who insisted that, in order to be seen, the visible must be opposite the eye in a certain location or direction. See Murtaḍā, ii. 115.

* This refers to the famous doctrine of belief without asking how (hikmat kafa).

* Surah xxii. 92.

* Surah v. 100.

1 According to Murtaḍā’s commentary (ii. 114), it is impossible to assume ignorance in a prophet of what is possible and what is impossible concerning God. Hence Musa’s prayer to see God presupposes that it was possible.

2 Wajhun jau’din ma‘ighin; iid ribbnah nadzirah. (Surah lxxvi. 22-23.)

3 Contrary to the Mu‘tasilah and the philo-
a person with no power, would be devoid of native intelligence and [must be counted] among the foolish and ignorant.  

(2) The second fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is all-knowing (‘ilm) of all beings, [that His knowledge] encompasses all creatures, that not so much as the weight of an ant on earth and in heaven escapes His knowledge,2 that He is truthful in saying: ‘And He has knowledge of everything’,3 and that He provides a guide to His truthfulness by saying: ‘Shall He not know who created? And He is the All-subtle, the All-aware.’4 He has thus guided you to deduce from [His being the cause] of creation that He is all-knowing. For you could not deny the evidence of subtle and well-ordered creation, even in mean and trivial things, as confirmation of the knowledge of the creator how to design and regulate creation. And the word of God most high is the best in guidance and explanation.5

(3) The third fundamental is the knowledge that He is living (haý). For He who has been proved to be all-knowing and all-powerful is necessarily proven to be living. If it is possible to imagine the existence of one who is powerful, knowing, maker, and manager without being alive, it would be legitimate to doubt life in animals which alternate between motion and rest, or even in those who practice the arts and crafts. That would indeed be a plunge into the deep waters of ignorance.6

(4) The fourth fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is all-willing (muríd). He wills His works, and nothing exists except through His will. He is the originator and the bringer again, and the performer of what He desires.7 [How could He be otherwise, when] it is conceivable that He could have willed [at a given time] the opposite of every work that came into existence through His will; and that which has no opposite could also have come into existence through His will before or after [that given time]. His power (qudráh) encompasses the two opposites and the two times, but there must be a will that directs the power to one or the other. If in the identification of the known, knowledge could do without will so that it would be possible to say that a given thing came into existence at a time prior to the knowledge of its existence, then knowledge could do without power so that it would be possible to say that the given thing came into existence without power because its prior existence was known.8

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1 It will be observed that the arguments in support of this and other fundamentals of this second pillar are less detailed than those offered in support of the fundamentals of the first pillar.
2 This is a close adaptation of the Qur’án, Sûrah xxxiv. 5.
3 Sûrah ii. 19.
4 Sûrah levii. 14.
5 Since the proof of this fundamental is identical
6 With that of the first, the two fundamentals were treated as one by, among others, Abu’l Khair al-Qarawí. See Murtadá, ii. 198.
7 Why the attribute of ‘living’ was dealt with after those of ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ is explained by Murtadá, ii. 199.
8 An adaptation of Sûrah lxxcv. 13, 16.
9 The simple meaning of this sentence is this: if His being all-knowing renders unnecessary His
(5) The fifth fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is all-hearing (sami’), all-seeing (baṣīr). He sees even the innermost and most concealed thoughts, and He hears even the creeping of a black ant in a dark night on a hard rock. Is it conceivable that He is not all-hearing and all-seeing when hearing and seeing are indisputably attributes of excellence not of scantiness? For how then could the created be better equipped than the creator, the fashioned object more perfect than its fashioner? Or how could they ever be equated no matter how much He might diminish, and His creatures and handiwork increase, in perfection? Or how again could Ibrāhīm’s argument (peace be upon him) be valid against his father who in ignorance and error worshipped idols? He said to his father: ‘Why worshippest thou that which neither hears nor sees, nor avails thee anything?’ For were this true of the God Ibrāhīm worshipped, not only his argument would be invalid, but also the truth of the word of the most high would be questioned: ‘That is Our argument which We bestowed upon Ibrāhīm as against his people.’

Now, then, since it is conceivable that He acts (fā’il) without having physical members (billa jāriḥah), and that He is all-knowing without [physical] heart or brain, it must also be conceivable that He is all-seeing without an eye and all-hearing without an ear, since there is no difference between the one conception and the other.

(6) The sixth fundamental is that He most high is speaking (mutakallim) a speech which is sui generis (qa‘īman bi-dhālīhi); it is neither sound nor letter. For His speech does not resemble that of any other, just as His existence does not resemble that of any other. [Human] speech is in reality that of the soul; sounds are formed into letters merely as indicators, just as sounds are sometimes indicated by movements and gestures. How could this [matter] be obscure to a foolish group, and be so plain to ignorant poets? One of them said: ‘Verily the seat of words (kalām) is in the heart, and the tongue is a mere indicator of [what is in] the heart.’

[If you encounter] one whose mind does not restrain him from saying ‘my tongue is created, but what it utters (ma‘ yaḥduthu fihi) through my own created power is uncreated’, do not entertain respect for his mind and restrain your tongue from addressing him. Again [if you encounter] one who does not realize that the pre-existent (al-qādim) has no antecedent, and that in Bismillah the letter ‘b’ comes before the letter ‘s’ and that hence the latter cannot take precedence over the former, free your heart from being all-willing, then His being all-knowing also renders unnecessary His being all-powerful. According to Murtadā, ii. 141, the sentence in the text is by al-Ghazālī’s teacher, Imām al-Harārān, who used it in an argument with al-Ka‘b, the Mu‘tawalli, who maintained that God’s knowledge was independent of His will.

1 Sūrah xi. 42.
2 Sūrah vi. 83.
3 The authenticity of the line has long been questioned; it is ascribed to al-Akhtā but also to Ibn Sāṣān. Another reading has kādīn instead of kalām. See Murtadā, ii. 146.
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any preoccupation with him. For God has His design in removing away some of His creatures [from the truth]: ‘And whomsoever God leads astray, no guide has he.’

Another example is the one who is reluctant to believe that Musâ (peace be upon him) could in this world hear a speech which is neither sound nor letter. Let him [dare] deny seeing in the next world a Being who is neither body, nor colour. If he could conceive the possibility of seeing that which is neither body, nor colour, nor quantity, contrary to his experience so far, let him then allow (fâlma’qil) for the faculty of hearing what he allowed for the faculty of seeing. If he could conceive that He has one attribute of knowledge embracing all existence, let him then conceive that His essence has one attribute of speech embracing all that could be expressed in words.

Again, if he could conceive a small piece of paper on which is written the existence of the Seven Heavens, Paradise, and Hell and [this information could] be preserved in a small particle of the heart and seen through an eyeball the size of lentil seed, without the Heavens, Paradise, and Hell actually existing in the eyeball or the heart or the paper, let him then conceive [His] speech as read through the tongues, preserved in the hearts, and written in the Qur’ân (maṣâḥif) without the speech itself being incorporated into these. For if [it is conceivable that] the speech of God could actually be incorporated into the paper [of the Qur’ân] by the writing of His name on it, then it would be conceivable for actual fire to burn the paper [of the Qur’ân] by writing the word fire on it.

(7) The seventh fundamental is the knowledge that, in addition to being sui generis, His speech has, like all His other attributes, existed from all eternity, and that it is impossible to be subject to creation and change. Indeed, belief in the all eternity of His attributes is just as incumbent [upon the believer] as belief in the eternity of His essence. God then is subject to no change or accident; He is eternal and eternally adorned with the most praiseworthy attributes, and will to all eternity remain above all vicissitudes.

Consider that whatever is subject to change (mahâl al-hawâdîth) is not free from it, and that whatever is not free from change is necessarily originated. Thus material objects are proven to be originated because they are subject to change in their substance and their qualities. Is it confused passage which is differently worded in the manuscript and the printed versions. See Murtaḍâ, li. 168-60.

Contrary to Farsi (p. 74) I take the hidden pronoun in 4:4 as to refer, as the context demands, to the speech of God (as one of His attributes) and not to God himself.
conceivable that their Creator could, like them, be subject to change? On the basis of these [arguments we conclude that] His speech is ancient and sui generis, and that what is created is merely the sounds which indicate the speech.

It is, of course, conceivable for a father to cherish a desire that his not-yet-born son should seek education (ta'allum), and that after his birth and growth God creates in him an awareness of his father's secret desire.\(^1\) It then becomes incumbent upon the son to fulfill that desire which remained a secret in the father's heart till the son knew of it. [If this is conceivable] then let it be so concerning the command to Müsâ (peace be upon him) by the most high: 'Put off your shoes.'\(^2\) Apprehend then that this command coexisted with God from eternity and that it was addressed to Müsâ after his birth and growth when God created in him an awareness of that command and a faculty to hear that eternal speech.

(8) The eighth fundamental is that His knowledge is pre-existent and that He is ever all-knowing by virtue of His essence and His attributes, and [His knowledge encompasses all] which He creates. But whatever creation comes into existence, His knowledge of it is not created; it is simply plain to Him through [His] eternal knowledge. Thus if we were provided with the knowledge that Zâid would arrive at sunrise, and it is assumed that this knowledge remained valid till sunrise, Zâid's arrival at that moment would have been known to us through that foreknowledge alone without need for another new knowledge. This is the manner of comprehending the pre-existence of God's knowledge most high.

(9) The ninth fundamental is that His will is pre-existent and from all eternity it regulates the various creations at the right time and according to His prior eternal knowledge. For were His will created He would be subject to phenomenal change, or were it to reside in other than His essence He would have no control over it. An example: you yourself cannot move if the motive is outside yourself, for then no matter how able (willing) you feel, your will is dependent upon another will, and this will depend upon another ad infinitum. If the existence of one will is conceivable without another, then it is conceivable that the universe could come into existence without the will [of God].

(10) The tenth fundamental is that God most high is all-knowing with His knowledge (alimun bi-'ilm),\(^3\) living with His being (hiya bi-hayâ\(^\text{a}\)) as Fâris (p. 76), to His will. Cf. Murtâdâ's Commentary, II. 153.

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\(^1\) This is an oblique reference to al-Ghazâlî's father who, according to Subkî, iv. 102, prayed to God to grant him a son who would be a learned preacher.

\(^2\) Sûrah xx. 19.

\(^3\) The sense demands that the hidden pronoun in sîra must refer to God and not, as assumed by Fâris (p. 76), to His will. Cf. Murtâdâ's Commentary, II. 153.

\(*\) This attribute is missing from Fâris's translation (p. 76), although al-Ghazâlî's exposition begins with it and the exposition is translated. The meaning of this and the following expression is that . . . through an attribute called . . .
all-powerful with His power (qadrin bi-qudrah), all-willing with His will (muridun bi-iradah), all-speaking with His speech (mutakallimun bi-kalam), all-hearing with His hearing (samii' bi-sam'), all-seeing with His sight (bâsirun bi-basar), and that He has these distinguished characteristics (ausaf) of His eternal attributes.

If one says 'a learned man without knowledge' it is like saying 'a rich man without wealth', 'learning without the learned', and 'learned without learning'. For learning (knowledge), the learned, and the thing known are as inseparable as killing, the killer, and the killed. It is not possible to imagine a killer without killing and killed, or a killed without a killer and killing. Similarly it is not possible to imagine learned without learning, learning without something known, or something known without one learned. The three are inseparable in the mind. He who considers it legitimate to separate the learned from learning, let him also legitimize the separation of the learned from the thing learned, and the separation of learning from the learned, since there is no difference between these analogies (idafa).¹

The Third Pillar of the Faith is the Knowledge of the Works of God and Comprises Ten Fundamentals

(1) The first fundamental: the knowledge that everything originated in the universe is His work, creation, and invention. None other than Him is creator and originator. He created men and created their actions,² and initiated their capacity (qudrah) and their movement (harakah).³ Thus all the actions of His servants are created by Him and dependent upon His power (qudrah), as it is confirmed in His words most high: 'God is the Creator of every thing';⁴ 'And God created you and what you make';⁵ 'Be secret in your speech, or proclaim it, He knows the thoughts within the breasts. Shall He not know who created? And He is the All-subtle, All-aware.'⁶

He commanded His servants to be cautious in their words, deeds, and secret thoughts,⁷ for He knows their tendencies and indicated [this]

theologians invariably affirm His attributes in addition to the conception of His essence, but they are careful not to say that the attributes are identical with or other than the essence. To them the essence and the attributes must be considered as inseparable. Cf. Murtada, ii. 154.

¹ If actually written by al-Ghazali this paragraph is obviously not up to his usual standards. It has very little relevance and does not seem to clinch the previous argument. The comparison between learning and killing is hardly felicitous, but with regard to learning much is lost through translation. The three crucial expressions are 'ilm (knowledge, learning), 'adim (knowing, learned), and ma'silm (the thing known, or the thing learned).
² Farsi translated: 'He created men and made them' (p. 77). We should read re-pan'ahim (and their actions) and not re-pan'aahim (and He created them). Hence the London MS. 45818 and the Cairo MS. 66 both have re-pan'ahim (and their handwork). Cf. Murtada, ii. 162.
³ Murtada, loc. cit., explains this and the previous expression to mean movement in general. There is thus no support for Farsi's translation of qudrah in this context as meaning 'freedom'.
⁴ Sūrah xxxix. 62.
⁵ Sūrah.xxxvii. 96.
⁶ Sūrah livd. 13-14.
⁷ The text has asdr and ahdnd (pl. of damir). Murtada, ii. 164 explains that ahdnd was used, in preference to damir, to agree with asdr. I have taken both to mean one thing.
knowledge [in the verse 'shall He not know who created?' by reminding His servants that He is the] creator. Is it conceivable that He is not the creator of His servant's works when His power is perfect, without any shortcomings, and when upon it the corporeal movements (harakatu abداد) of His servant depend? Such movements are similar in nature, and His power controls them inevitably. What is then [the presumed factor] which can restrict its control to some and not the others of these similar movements (harakât)? Or how [could it be presumed] that animals monopolize creation and invention? For the spider, the bee, and all the animals produce fine works which puzzle the minds of the intelligent; how could they invent such works alone, without the aid of the supreme Lord, and without being aware of the details of their acquired skill (iktisâb)? Away, away [with such thoughts!] Let His creatures be humbled and let Him, the all-powerful, rule supreme in heaven and on earth.

(2) The second fundamental: God is the sole creator of His servants' actions (harakât), but these are also within the capacity (qudrâh) of the servants through acquisition (iktisâb). For God most high created both the capacity and what it can accomplish, the choice and the chosen. Capacity is merely descriptive in reference to the servant, but it is the creation of the Lord and not His acquisition. Action (harakah) is the creation of the Lord but descriptive of the servant and an acquisition by him for it was created by the power (qudrâh) which is one of His attributes. But action is related to another capacity and this relationship makes it an acquisition.

How can human actions be all by compulsion (jabran) when man knows instinctively the difference between his voluntary and involuntary movements? Or how can they be man's creation (khâlqan) when he has no comprehensive knowledge of the minute details of the acquired movements and their number? Now since both propositions have been shown to be false there remains only the golden mean in belief, namely that...

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1. Isâdâlia 'ale'î 'îlmi hi?l khâlq, following Murtadâ, loc. cit., cf. Faris (p. 76): 'He knows the orientation of their works, having arrived at this knowledge through [the act of] creation.'
2. By harakât is clearly meant of 'âl (actions, works), but there is no ambiguity in a literal translation here.
3. On the theological significance of iktisâb see the next note. Al-Ghazâlî's use of the term here has a meaning akin to the strict theological sense. Hence Faris's translation of the sentence in which it occurs must be questioned: . . . are not aware of the benefits they produce' (p. 79).
4. This fundamental is concerned with the problem of kâb or iktisâb (acquisition), recognized by early theologians as one of the most intricate of the arguments of hâlas. 'Finer than al-sâb'qât's kâb', goes the saying. The opponents of al-Âsh'ârî put it down as an impossibility: allowing man's capacity (qudrâh) which cannot be effective. See further Murtadâ, ii. 166.
5. Khulqat maqâlât bi-qudrât hîs nafûtah. Of Faris (p. 79): 'Created voluntarily through His will. . . . The text is clearly concerned with qudrâh, not ilkisîh.
6. This sentence adds very little to the sense, and may have been intended as a vague compromise. The meaning of another capacity (qudrâh) may be elucidated by the argument that follows, but it is also n. 5 above.
7. Al-Ghazâlî actually uses the words al-ilkîsîh fi'l ilqîd which are of course the title of one of his works.
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[man’s actions] are initiated by the power of God most high and, through acquisition, by a relative capacity of man himself.¹

But the connexion of the created with the power of the creator need not be restricted to creation from nothing, since the power of God most high was from all eternity connected with the universe without any such creation taking place through it [as yet], and since at the time when creation from nothing does take place there is between them another kind of connexion. From the foregoing it is evident that the power is not dependent upon the occurrence of creation.

(3) The third fundamental is that, though acquired, the actions of God’s servant are still willed (murād) by God most high. For nothing happens in the seen and unseen universe (al-mulk wa al-malakūt), not even a twinkling of an eye or an unguarded thought, except by God’s predetermined purpose (qaḍā’),² His power, and His will. He is the cause (minhu) of good and evil, benefit and harm, Islam and infidelity, acknowledgement and denial [of God], success and failure, rectitude and error, obedience and rebellion, association of other gods with Him and belief [in Him alone]. There is nothing that can defeat His predetermined purpose, and none to question His dominion. ‘He leads astray whosoever He will, and He guides whomsoever He will’;³ ‘He shall not be questioned as to what He does, but they shall be questioned.’⁴

All of this is confirmed in the traditional unanimity of the community that what God wills comes into being, and what He does not never comes into being. It is further confirmed by the word of God most high: ‘If God had willed, He would have guided men all together’;⁵ ‘If We had so willed, We could have given every soul its guidance.’⁶

It is still further confirmed by [human] reason: if disobedience to God and crime, abhorrent to God and not willed by Him but rather willed by the devil īḥlīs? (God curse him!) it would mean that what takes place in accordance with the will of this enemy is greater than what takes place in accordance with His will most high. I cannot imagine a Muslim permitting himself to reduce the status of the mighty God from His position of majesty and honour to a level which were a village chief reduced to it he would disdain to accept it. For if he found that the writ of his enemy in the village runs further than his own he would disdain his chieftainship and renounce his office.

¹ This is the final position taken by the Summa theologians: That man’s action is influenced by the sum of God’s creation (khalq) and man’s choice (ikhāṣ), nor by the first alone to be (jada), nor by the second alone to be (qaḍā). Cf. Murtuṣā, ii, 167, 168 f.
² According to the Ash‘ari school, His qaḍā’ is related to His inādā; on the other hand His qadar, is related to His khalq. See Murtuṣā, ii, 172.
³ Surah xv. 41; xvi. 93.
⁴ Surah xiv. 93.
⁵ Surahxxiii. 31.
⁶ Surah xxiii. 19.
The prevalence of disobedience among His creatures is explained by the deviators (mubtadi’ah) as contrary to the will of God, thus reducing Him to the most extremes of weakness and impotence. May He the supreme Lord be exalted very high above this essay (qaul) of the unjust (zālimūn).¹ Thus the more it is realized that the actions of His servants are created by God the more it becomes correct that they are willed by Him. If it is asked ‘why does He forbid what He wills, and orders what He does not will?’ we would reply that order (amr) is different from will (irādah).² Hence [the following example]:

A master strikes his slave and is rebuked by the sultan. He offers as an excuse the rebellious conduct of the slave, but the sultan refuses to believe him. Desirous of proving himself right he gives an order which he knows the slave would disobey in the presence of the sultan. ‘Saddle that beast!’ he said, thus ordering what he really does not want the slave to obey. But without giving the order his excuse would not have been apparent to the sultan. On the other hand, if he really wanted obedience he would have wanted his own destruction which is impossible.

(4) The fourth fundamental is that creation, creation from nothing and the imposition of duties (taklīf) upon His servants are by His grace and favour the most high. Neither creation nor such imposition was ever an obligation (muṣābīh) upon Him. The Mu’tazilah maintain that they were obligations upon Him because they are in the interest (maṣlaḥah) of His servants. But this is impossible since it is He who imposes obligation (muṣābīh),³ He who commands and He who prohibits. How can He be liable to any obligation or be subject to any compulsion or command?⁴

Obligation here has two meanings: (a) either [the performance of] an act the neglect of which will result in future or immediate injury—future as in the statement ‘It is the duty of the servant to obey God so that He will not torture him in hell-fire in the next world’, and immediate as in the statement ‘He who is thirsty must drink [water] lest he die’; (b) or anything [the assumption of] the non-existence of which would lead to what is impossible—such as the statement that [recognition of] the existence of what is known is obligatory, since its non-existence would lead to an impossibility which is the conversion of knowledge into ignorance.

If the [Mu’tazili] adversary attaches the first meaning to his assertion that creation is an obligation upon God, he makes Him liable to injury,

¹ The reference is clearly to the Mu’tazilah who were known to their followers as the people of justice and unity ‘albīt’ ‘alā et-taṣādīq’.
² Fara’i missed the point when he translated (p. 81): ‘We would say that the question is not that of will.’ The argument is designed to separate amr from irādah and to establish that the one does not necessitate the other. Thus disobedience is by irādah of God but not by his command (amr).
³ Cf. Murshid, ii. 175 f.
⁴ Translated by Fara’i (p. 81) as ‘the sole cause’.
⁵ Obligation here is for ḥāl and command, ḥaṣbā’il.
if he adopts the second meaning he has lost the argument, for he recognizes that the existence of the known is inevitable after fore-knowledge of it. But if he intends a third meaning he does not make himself intelligible. His assertion that [creation and imposition of duties are] obligatory in the interest of His servants is fallacious. For if no injury befalls Him through neglecting what is in the interest of the servants then obligation would be meaningless. Further, the interest of the servants is for Him to create them in Paradise, and thus those endowed with intelligence find no comfort in that He created the servants in the abode of calamities and exposed them in it to sin, and later He subjects them to the dangers of punishment and the awe of resurrection and judgement.

(5) The fifth fundamental is that, contrary to al-Mu'tazilah, God (glory be to Him) may impose obligations on the servants which are beyond their ability. For were it not so, it would be impossible for them to pray Him not to impose it; and they did in fact pray Him saying: 'Our Lord, do Thou not burden us beyond what we have strength to bear.' Also because God most high informed His Prophet (God bless him and save him) that Abū Jahl would not believe him, and then He commanded the Prophet to call Abū Jahl to believe all God's words which included the [prediction] of Abū Jahl's disbelief. How then could he believe Him by not believing? Is this [proposition] anything but impossible to conceive?.

(6) The sixth fundamental is that, again contrary to al-Mu'tazilah, God (to whom glory and majesty belong) may inflict pain on His creatures or torment them for no previous offence or subsequent reward. For He has absolute control over [His creatures in] His dominion, and any dominion outside it is inconceivable for His control to embrace it. Thus injustice, which is the disposal of what belongs to others without permission, is impossible in God most high, for He encounters no possessions of others besides Him so that His disposal of these possessions could be injustice.

Now the proof that [causing pain for no offence or reward] is permis-
sible (jādīz) is its presence in practice. Thus the slaughter of animals, and
the various kinds of torture they suffer at the hands of man, is for no previous offence they committed. If it is said that God will reward such animals in the next world for what they had suffered, and that this was incumbent upon Him, we would reply as follows: He would go beyond the bounds of religious law and reason who would maintain that it is incumbent upon God to bring back to life every ant killed under the feet and every bug crushed between the fingers, in order to reward it for its suffering. For he would thereby consider bringing to life and rewarding as obligations on Him. But this is impossible if he means it would be harmful for Him to neglect; if he means otherwise we have already shown that it is not intelligible,¹ since it is not in accordance with the meaning of obligation we mentioned [at the end of the fifth fundamental].

(7) The seventh fundamental is that He most high does what He wills with His servants, and it is not incumbent upon Him to do what is most favourable (aslah) for them, because of what we have already explained, namely that nothing is incumbent upon Him, nay, obligation in relation to Him is inconceivable. For verily ‘He shall not be questioned as to what He does, but they shall be questioned’.²

Considering the Mu'tazili contention that it is incumbent upon God to do the favourable for His servants, I wonder what his reply would be to the following question we pose for him: Let him assume a comparison in the next world between two who died Muslims, a minor boy and a mature adult.³ According to the Mu'tazili doctrine it is incumbent upon God to elevate and prefer the adult over the boy on account of his toil in belief and worship after maturity.⁴ Suppose the boy prayed ‘O Lord! why hast thou elevated him over me?’; and God would say ‘Because after maturity he was diligent in worship.’ Then the boy would say ‘Lord! thou hast caused me to die a child; it was incumbent upon Thee to prolong my life till maturity so that I could be diligent; Thou hast deviated from justice by favouring him with long life, but not me; why hast thou [so] favoured him?’ And God would say ‘Because I knew you would take associates with me or disobey me you had attained maturity; it was better for you (al-aslah) to die a child’. Such would be the Mu'tazili's excuse on behalf of God (to whom glory and majesty belong)!

¹ From this word to the end Fariis (p. 84) does not seem to grasp the meaning.
² Sirah xxii. 93.
³ Mundzqadd cannot, as presumed by Fariis (p. 85), mean 'argument' here. Rather it means comparison; there was no argument between the boy and the adult; such an 'argument' was between the boy and God.
⁴ This very subject was argued by al-Jubba'î and al-Ash'arî. It is reported that the former made a reply to the last hypothetical question, and it is well known that in consequence al-Ash'arî repudiated al-Mu'tazilah and became the champion of Sunni orthodoxy.
⁵ I.e. attaining the legal age of puberty (iyâlah), the earliest being twelve, when the Muslim becomes muballigh, subject to the ordinances and duties of the faith.
Hearing this [dialogue with God,] the infidels from the abyss of hell would call: ‘O Lord, hast thou not known that we would have taken associates with Thee on attaining maturity, why hast thou not caused us to die in childhood? We would have been content [in paradise] with a lower status than that of the Muslim boy!’ With what could this question be answered? None except a definite decision that divine questions are too sublime and majestic to be decided by the logic (mizān) of the Mu’tazilah.

If it is argued that it would be [morally] ugly and unworthy of His wisdom, while possessing the power to do the most favourable for His servants, He subjects them to what earns them punishment, we would reply: The meaning of ugly is that which does not suit the desires [of man], so that the same thing could be ugly to one person and pleasant to another according to whether or not it suits his desire. Thus the murder of a person is an ugly act to his relatives but desirable to his enemies.

If [in the above argument] it is meant by ugly that which does not suit the Lord’s desire then it is impossible: He has no desire, and it is inconceivable that anything ugly, or injustice, should proceed from Him, since it is inconceivable that He should dispose of possessions other than His own. If, on the other hand, it is meant by ugly that which does not suit the desire of another [besides the Lord], then why did you [i.e. the Mu’tazilah] maintain that it was impossible for Him? Is this anything but a vain attachment [to a doctrine] disproved by our supposed plea of the [infidels] in hell?

The wise (ḥakīm) [in reference to Him] means the all-knowing (‘alīm) of the realities of all things and the all-powerful (qādir) to perfect their make according to His will (irādah). This being so, in what way could it be made incumbent upon Him to do the most favourable to His servants? On the other hand the wise among us [men] is he who seeks the most favourable for himself so that he will earn praise in this world and reward in the next or to ward off evil from himself—all of which is impossible for God most high.

(8) The eighth fundamental is that the knowledge (ma’rifah) of God and obedience (fā’ah) to Him is a duty imposed [upon man] by God’s command and law (sharī‘), and not as the Mu’tazilah maintain by human reason (’aql). For3 were obedience dictated by reason, it would be either

\[\text{Reference here is to God; hence his translation of the second sentence is inadequate: ‘It is here where the consideration of that which is salutary is imperative’ (p. 87). Cf. Murtada, ii. 189-90.}\]

\[\text{The printed texts, but not the manuscripts, have se-‘in, and the translation would in this case read: ‘For even were obedience...’}\]
for no benefit, which is impossible, since reason does not dictate what is futile, or it would be for a benefit and selfish aim. This [motive] must either refer to God (al-ma'būd) which is impossible since He is inviolably above selfish aims and desires, nay, belief and unbelief, obedience and disobedience are in reference to Him most high indifferently alike; or it must refer to man's (al-ābd) selfish aim which is also impossible since his [expected] benefit is either in this world or in the next;¹ in this world he has none but that which causes him toil and deflicts him from indulging his sensual appetites; in the next he can expect nothing but reward and punishment. But how can [man] know that God most high rewards for obedience and disobedience and does not punish for them, since obedience and disobedience are in reference to Him indifferently alike, and He has no preference to, or identification with, the one or the other?

It is only through God’s Law (sharī') that such matters can be comprehended; and verily he errs who derives his comprehension of them from an analogy between the Creator and His creature, who [unlike the Creator] is not indifferent to gratitude and ingratitude and the amount of satisfaction, excitement, and enjoyment which he derives from the one and not from the other.² Here someone might say this: If the scrutiny and knowledge [of the faith] are obligatory only through the law, and the law cannot be understood by the one called to belief (mukāllaf) without scrutiny, such one might answer the prophet who calls him to belief 'Reason does not dictate scrutiny to me, and I cannot comprehend the law without scrutiny, but I do not wish to undertake scrutiny [unless it has been made obligatory]'—will that lead to silencing the prophet?

We would say in reply that this supposition resembles the following dialogue. One person says to another standing in a certain place: 'There is surely behind you a carnivorous lion; if you do not leave your place he will kill you, and if you look back you will see my truthfulness.' The one standing retorts 'Your truthfulness will not be established unless I look back, and I do not look back to see unless your truthfulness is proven.' This retort indicates the foolishness of the one who made it and his exposure to destruction, but there is no harm in his attitude to the person who gave him the warning.

Such is the case with the prophet of God.⁴ He would say to men 'verily there is behind you death and this side of it carnivorous lions and burning

¹ For the Arabic fī l-hād and fī l-ma’dil, mined by Faris (p. 87) who produced 'since the creature has no desire at the time, but rather he is worried by reason...'.
² Cf. Faris (p. 88): 'from the one or the other'. The text has dibā'il dibār.
³ The words in brackets occur only in the London MS. 49818, the Cairo MS. 66, and in Murtadā, ii. 194.
⁴ Both al-Ghazālī and his commentator insist to refer to any of the prophets and not necessarily to Muhammad.
⁵ Whether it is 'this' or 'that' side of death, a debatable question. See Murtadā, ii. 194.
fires. If you are not on your guard against them, and if you do not acknowledge my truthfulness confirmed by my miracle, you will perish. He who will look round will know, take precautions, and be saved; but he who will not look round and persists [in his folly] will perish. No harm will befall me even if all men perished [in this way]. Mine is merely to give clear warning."

Now the law recognizes the existence of carnivorous lions after death, and reason helps towards the understanding of the prophet's speech and the comprehension of the possibility of what he says concerning the future, and human nature itself takes precaution against what is harmful. It is meant by obligatory (wajib) anything the neglect of which is harmful; it is meant by the law as obligating (majid) that it warns of expected harm [in case of neglect.] But when sensual appetites reign supreme, reason does not warn of harm after death.

This is then the meaning of law and reason and their respective influence in determining what is obligatory. Obligation (wajib) would not be established but for fear of punishment for neglecting what is prescribed. Hence obligatory has no meaning except that its neglect is connected with harm in the hereafter.

(9) The ninth fundamental is that the mission (bi'thak) of prophets is not impossible. This is contrary to the Brahmans who maintain that no benefit could be derived from sending prophets since reason is a [better] alternative to them. But reason is not an alternative because it does not guide to works which earn salvation in the hereafter, just as it does not guide to medicines useful to health [in this world]. Hence the need of God's creatures for prophets is as their need for physicians, but whereas the truthfulness of the physician may be known through trial, that of the prophet is known by miracle.

(10) The tenth fundamental is that God most high sent Muhammad (God bless and save him) as the seal of prophets and as an agitator of the [religious] laws of the Jews, Christians, and Sabaeans that existed before him, and confirmed him with clear miracles and dazzling signs, such as the splitting of the moon, the praise of [God by] the pebbles, the causing of mute animals to speak, the gushing of water from between his
fingers,\(^1\) and the clear sign of the great Qur'ān with which He challenged all the Arabs.\(^2\)

For they defamed the Prophet, asked him to desist, and even attempted to kill him.\(^3\) But despite their distinction in eloquence and rhetoric they failed to confront him with anything like the Qur'ān. The reason is that it is beyond human capacity to imitate its purity of language and style, let alone what it contains of reports about ancient peoples [proclaimed by a prophet] who was illiterate and did not read books, and what it contains of forecasts of the unknown which future events proved true, as in His words the most high: ‘you shall enter the Holy Mosque, if God wills, in security, your heads shaved, your hair cut short’;\(^4\) ‘Alif Lām Mīm. The Greeks have been vanquished in the nearer part of the land; and, after their vanquishing, they shall be the victors in a few years.’\(^5\)

That miracles are proof of the truthfulness of God’s messengers is clear from the fact that what man cannot do must be the work of God most high. Therefore whatever [miracle] the messenger links to his challenge [to the people] amounts to a confirmation of his truthfulness by God. Here is an example. A man standing before the king, with claims that he is the king’s messenger to his subjects, seeks to prove it to those present. He says to the king: ‘If I am truthful, then stand up and sit down three times on your throne contrary to your habit.’ Should the king do that he would thereby furnish those present with certain knowledge that his action amounts to saying ‘you are truthful’.

The Fourth Pillar of the Faith is Beliefs Accepted on Authority and Believing the Prophet’s Reports, Comprises Ten Fundamentals.

(1) The first fundamental is belief in the resurrection (hashr) and reckoning (nashr) [with the dead on the Last Day]. Both are mentioned in the authenticated law (shar')\(^6\) and belief in them is obligatory, since [also] they are mentally possible. Their meaning is restoration to life after death which, like the initial creation, is within the power of God most high who said [of a certain unbeliever]: ‘He says, “who shall quicken the bones when they are decayed?”’ Say [the command is to Muḥammad] “He shall quicken them, who originated them the first time.”\(^7\) Restoration [to life] is thus proven by the initial creation. He

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\(^1\) Bukhārī’s Saḥīḥ, iv. 157; Muslim’s Saḥīḥ, ii. 204.

\(^2\) I have taken the pronoun to refer to God, not to Muhammad. See the Qur’ān ii. 22-23; x. 58; xi. 13-14. See Zamakhshari’s Kashf (Calcutta, 1895) i. 51-54; 584; 605-6.

\(^3\) The texts are all defective: I have read sāliḥi for ṣabīḥi, and ṣabīḥi for sāliḥi as more in accord with historical facts. Faria (p. 90) has evaded these difficulties by writing ‘did everything to checkmate him’.

\(^4\) Sūrah xxviii. 27, forecasting the capture of Mecca by Muhammad.

\(^5\) Sūrah xxx. 1-4, forecasting the defeat of the Persians at the hands of the Byzantines and the recovery of Syria in A.D. 628.

\(^6\) The intention is to say tradition (hadīth). For tradition on hashr see Bukhārī’s Saḥīḥ, iv. 687; Muslim’s Saḥīḥ, ii. 340, 355-6, 359.

\(^7\) Sūrah xxxvi. 78-79.
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also said (to whom glory and majesty belong): 'Your creation and your upraising are but as that of a single soul.' Thus restoration is a second creation which is as possible as the first.

(2) The second fundamental is the interrogation of [the dead by the two angels] Munkar and Nakir. This is covered by traditional reports (akhbār) and belief in it is obligatory since [also] it is mentally possible: it requires no more than restoring life to that part of the body which comprehends speech. This in itself is possible, and cannot be denied by [citing as an example] the apparent helplessness (sukūn) of the members of the body of the dead and by our inability to hear its interrogation. For although a person asleep appears outwardly helpless (sākin) he inwardly feels pain and pleasure and feels their effects on awakening. Thus the Messenger of God (God bless and save him) used to hear the voice of Jibril (peace be upon him) and to see him, while those around neither heard nor saw him. 'And they comprehend not anything of His knowledge save such as He wills.' For unless He created in them [special faculties for] hearing and seeing they would not have been aware of him.

(3) The third fundamental is the torment of [the dead in] the grave, which is mentioned in the law (shari'at). God most high said: '... the fire to which they shall be exposed morning and evening; and on the day when the Hour is come: "Admit the folk of Pharaoh into the most terrible chastisement!' It is also well attested that the Messenger of God (God bless and save him) and the righteous ancestors of the community used to pray God to save them from [future] torment in the grave. It is [also] mentally possible and thus it is obligatory to believe in it. Belief must not be withheld [even] on the ground that the members of a dead body were scattered in the bellies of lions and the gizzards of birds, for pain of punishment is felt only by particular members of the body to which God most high has the power to restore feeling.

(4) The fourth fundamental is [the weighing of the actions of men by] the balance (mizān). It is valid truth. God most high said: 'And We shall set up the just balances for the Resurrection Day'; 'He whose scales are heavy—they are the prosperers, and he whose scales are light—they have according to tradition, immune from being interrogated, let alone punished. Muhammad merely commanded his companions to pray God to save them such experience. See Mūtahā, ii. 217, 218. Buhārī's Sahīh, ii. 94; Muslim's Sahīh, i. 165, 247; ii. 557.

9 This last sentence is missing in Fāra. It is a debatable question whether the soul (rūḥ) will also be restored for the purpose of sharing the pain with a limited portion of the members of the body. See Mūtahā, ii. 218.

10 Surah xxi. 47.
lost their souls. And the manner of weighing is as follows: God most high causes the [record] sheets (ṣahā'if) of His servants' actions to show a weight according to their degree in His estimation, so that they realize the justice of His exacting punishment or His grace in forgiveness and multiplying the reward.

(5) The fifth fundamental is [the ordeal of passing over] the bridge (ṣirāt) which is spread across and over the middle of Hell, finer than a hair and sharper than the edge of a sword. God most high said: 'And guide them [who did evil and worshipped other gods] unto the path of Hell, and halt them to be questioned.' This is [mentally] possible and thus it is obligatory to believe in it. For He who has power to make the bird fly in the air has the power to make man walk over such a bridge.

(6) The sixth fundamental is that Paradise and Hell are created. God most high said: 'And vie with one another, hastening to forgiveness from your Lord, and to a garden whose breadth is as the heavens and earth, prepared for the godfearing.' The word of God 'prepared' proves that it is created. The literal meaning of the verse must be adopted, since it involves no impossibility. Nor is it valid to say [with the Mu'tazilah] that there is no use (fa'idah) in creating Paradise and Hell before the day of reckoning, since God most high 'Shall not be questioned as to what He does, but they shall be questioned'.

(7) The seventh fundamental is that the legitimate imam after the Messenger of God (may God bless and save him) is Abū Bakr, then 'Umar, then 'Uthmān, and then 'Ali (may God be gracious to them.) The Messenger of God never nominated (nasṣa' alā) an imam himself. For had he done so, the fact would have gained more prominence than his appointment of individual administrators (waṣlūtun) or military commanders (umard' un 'ala' junūd) in certain parts. If such appointments were well known, how could [the appointment of Muḥammad's successor as imam of the community] be unknown? Even if it were known [for some time], how could it disappear altogether without being transmitted to us?

Nay, Abū Bakr was not made the imam except by election (ikhtiyyār) and public homage (bā'ah). To assume that there was an explicit injunc-
tion (nasş) designating someone else is tantamount to accusing all the Companions of disobeying the Messenger of God and acting contrary to the consensus (ijma’). Only the Rawâfiqi could be so daring to invent [such insinuation].

To the orthodox (ahl al-sunnah) it is an article of belief to uphold the integrity of all the Companions and to praise them, since God and His Messenger praised them. As to what happened between ‘Ali and Mu‘awiya (may God be gracious to them) it was due to [a difference of honest] opinion (ijtihad), not to a contest on the part of Mu‘awiya [to wrest] the imamate. ‘Ali thought that the handing over of the assassins of ‘Uthmân might cause disturbance to [his] imamate in its early days, since those assassins infiltrated his army which included numerous tribes to which the assassins belonged. Accordingly he considered it more correct (aqwab) to delay. Mu‘awiya thought that, considering the enormity of the assassins’ crime, delay would encourage attacks on the imams and might lead to bloodshed.

The excellent among the learned said ‘Everyone who expresses a considered opinion is correct’—kullu mujahidin musâib. Others said: ‘Only one can be correct’—al-musâibu wâhidun. But no one endowed with learning has ever declared ‘Ali wrong.

(8) The eighth fundamental is that the excellence of the Companions (may God be gracious to them) is according to their order in the Caliphate. For true excellence is that which is excellent in the sight of God, and that is disclosed to no one except the Messenger of God. The praise of the Companions occurs in many verses [of the Qur’an] and many reports [in the Tradition]. But none except eye-witnesses, who were contemporaneous with the revelation [to Mu‘ammad] and knew its contextual circumstances and its minute details, can grasp the fine components of excellence and the hierarchical order respecting it.

But for such understanding the Companions would not have ordered the affair [of the imamate] as they did. For no reproach from any reproacher could deter them from the path of God or could any obstructer deflect them from truth.

(9) The ninth fundamental is the qualifications for the imamate. Next to Islam and taklif the qualifications are five: masculinity (dhukārah),

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1 But the claims on behalf of ‘Ali are not without solid foundation even in Sunni traditions. See Bukhari’s Sahîh, iv. 194; Muslim’s Sahîh, ii. 250–8.
2 On the Râdîdah see article by J. H. Kramers in Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, 466–7.
3 See Murtâjâ, ii. 254.
4 Farsi’s ‘eye-witnesses to revelation’ is hardly possible (p. 96). His translation of this section as a whole is rather loose. For example, he translated laumat id’im as ‘threat and pressure’, not recognising the phrase as coming from a verse in the Qur’an. See following note.
5 Sûrah v. 54.
6 See p. 114, n. 5 above on bulâgh, after which imposition of duties (taklif) is legal. This means that the candidate for the imamate must first and foremost be a Muslim and of age. Another qualification is usually attached to the second, soundness of mind. Al-Ghazâlî does not mention the qualification of freedom (samî’), i.e. from slavery, and
piety (\textit{wara'\textprime}), religious learning (\textit{\textquoteleftilm}), competence (\textit{kafa\textacute{a}th}), and kinship to Quraish. The last because of his words (may God bless and save him): 'The imams are from Quraish.' Should there be several candidates with these qualifications, the imam [from among them] is the one who receives public homage (\textit{bai'ah}) from the majority of the people (\textit{khalq}). He who goes against this majority is iniquitous (\textit{bagh\textprime}) and must be brought back [by force?'] to the way of justice (\textit{haqq}).

(10) The tenth fundamental: If piety and learning should not be possessed by a seeker of the imamate, and if deterring him could lead to inevitable civil strife (\textit{fitnah}), then we must decide that his imamate is legally binding (\textit{in\textacute{t}iq\textacute{a}d}). For in such situation we have only two alternatives: The first is to cause strife in the attempt to replace him, in which case the Muslim community will suffer more damage than from the want of the qualifications [of piety and learning in the imam]. These were stipulated as advantageous for the welfare (\textit{maslahah}) of the community, but obsession with these advantages must not lead to demolishing the welfare itself. [Otherwise we should be] like him who builds a palace but demolishes a metropolis. The second alternative is to decide that there is no [legally constituted] imam in the land and that all legal decisions are incorrect. This is impossible. We acknowledge as indispensable for their needs the authority of the law of the iniquitous (\textit{ahl\textacute{e}l bagh\textacute{h}i}) in their own countries, how then could we withhold recognition of the legality of the imamate [of the less qualified] at moments of need and necessity? These, then, are the four pillars which comprise the forty fundamentals. They are the foundations of belief; he who embraces them identifies himself with the orthodox believers and contradicts the band of innovators.

May God most high direct us aright through His succour and guide us to the truth and its realization through His favour and unlimited bounty. [May He bless our Lord Muhammad and bless his family and every servant He favours.]

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2. I have followed Murtada, ii. 253 in understanding \textit{lt tud\textacute{j}ay} to mean 'impossible to avert', cf. Faris (p. 97) 'unbearable'.
3. Since Judges dispensed justice and made decisions by the authority of the legally constituted imam or caliph.
4. Cf. al-Ghazali's \textit{Kitab al-\textacute{ar}ba'\textacute{n} fi Uf\textacute{a}l ad-Din} (Cairo, 1936 A.H.). The second edition published in 1944 A.H. has four sections (\textit{qa\textacute{m}ir}), each made up of ten fundamentals (\textit{\textquoteleftuff}); it is, of course, part of a larger book entitled \textit{Jami\textacute{b}ir al-Qa\textacute{d}idin}.
5. \textit{al\textacute{a} mu\textacute{m}ah}.
6. \textit{ru\textacute{b} al bid\textacute{a}th}.
7. Immediately after this, and in the body of the text, MS. 45818 contains two and a half lines: 'And I completed its composition (\textit{tau\textacute{n}ih\textprime}) in the Aq\textacute{q} Mosque in answer to the request of its people (\textit{ahl\textacute{h}}), hoping that we will be favoured with the blessings of the Mosque and blessings from the supplication of those in it, and that God will realize our hope and end our life in bliss, for verily He is the Generous and the Benefactor.' In the margin, and by the same hand, there is another version: 'And I completed [the writing of \textit{ar-\textacute{r}isah\textacute{h} al-Qa\textacute{d}iyah, which I included in this book, in the Aq\textacute{q} Mosque, in answer to the request.}
8. The prayer between brackets is not in the manuscript versions.