

حواء لازاروس - يافه

دراسات في الغزالي

## STUDIES IN AL-GHAZZALI

By

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*To Immanuel*

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This book is the result of more than fifteen years of study devoted to the Arabic writings of Al-Ghazzālī (1058-1111 C.E.), one of the greatest thinkers Islam ever produced. His personality and manner of writing fascinated me to begin with while I was still a student and even now they do so no less. His ideas about religion, faith, the relationship between God and man and between man and man have always seemed extremely "modern" to me and are expressed so convincingly that they cross the barriers of time and religion, and lend deeper meanings to any research into his writings.

At a rather early stage of my work, while translating his autobiography into Hebrew, I felt that there was a specially close connection between Al-Ghazzālī's personality and doctrine and between his language and style; I have, therefore, tried to isolate the characteristics of his expressive style in order to study his writings more effectively. Yet, since this study was almost a pioneer of its kind in Arabic literature, many difficulties emerged, and the first chapter in my book deals with these difficulties in detail. Chapters II, III and IV show the results of this pioneer study, which should be considered neither as a linguistic nor as a stylistic study, but rather as a twin study of language and content, the relationship of these to one another, their interaction and mutual influence. Though this study certainly does not exhaust the material, it sheds much new light on Al-Ghazzālī's writings, and adds both new information to the vast amount of studies hitherto published about him, and new methods of approaching the subject. This may be especially helpful in trying to solve problems of authenticity (cf. Ch. III) and of variant readings both for critical editions and for translations of Al-Ghazzālī's books.

Chapter IV starts (and is continued in Ch. V) to deal with more important problems concerning Al-Ghazzālī, such as: Did he cherish a hidden esoteric truth? What was his real attitude to Neoplatonism, Mysticism and Ismā'īlite Shī'ism? How can we explain the great differences between his various books, and how should we characterize his main works such as the "Iḥyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn" and others?

My conclusions may be summed up briefly as follows: Al-Ghazzālī certainly was a real mystic, and his authentic writings attest to this, not only in books such as "Mishkāt Al-Anwār", but, paradoxically, especially so in his "Iḥyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn". This book should not be considered as an almost orthodox, though Ṣūfī-flavoured, religious compendium, but rather as the expression of Al-Ghazzālī's mystical re-evaluation and interpretation of traditional Islam, consciously devoted to its preservation and intensification and therefore of enormous historical and social importance to Islam.

Chapters VI and VII should be considered as two separate monographs on different problems in Al-Ghazzālī's doctrine, which seem to be quite crucial. Chapter VI is part of my larger yet unpublished M.A. thesis on Al-Ghazzālī's exegesis of the religious commandments, which could not be integrated in this book. This chapter should therefore be regarded only as a general essay on these problems. Three appendices follow at the end of the book. In the first appendix an attempt is made to use effectively the criteria mentioned mainly in Chaps. II and III in order to prove that the well known "Al-Radd Al-Djamīl li-Ilāhiyat 'Īsā bi-Sarīḥ Al-Indjīl" was not written by Al-Ghazzālī.\* The other two appendices deal briefly with the concepts of "Taqīd" and with the doctrine of cosmology in Al-Ghazzālī's writings respectively.

The first five chapters as well as the last two appendices are based on my Ph.D. thesis (in Hebrew) called *The Literary Character of Al-Ghazzālī's Writings* which was approved with 'summa cum laude' by the Senate of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1966. The thesis was written under the supervision of my late teachers, D. H. Baneth and M. Plessner, to whom I owe much gratitude. I take this opportunity to express also my deepest gratitude to my teacher S. D. Goitein to whom I owe most of my academic training. Only two, rather small, parts of the Ph.D. thesis have been published so far (Ch. III and Appendix B). Chapters VI and VII of this book as well as Appendix A were written separately at different times and published as independent articles on Al-Ghazzālī. The reader will certainly be aware of the fact that this book grew out of various constituents and that the greater part of it was translated from Hebrew into English, facts which may make a fluent reading in the book somewhat difficult, in spite of a very serious attempt to unify methods of quotation, translation etc., and to avoid repetitions.

I may as well mention here some other faults in this book, for which I alone am responsible. The translations of Arabic examples are somewhat free translations, the aim being to help bring home the point I wish to make. (Whenever I quoted one of the existing translations of Al-Ghazzālī's books I mentioned this translation explicitly). Usually I have added only two or three translations to a whole series of examples — often either to the first or to the most difficult

\* Some of my students have tried to apply the same methods to other Arabic writers: Mrs. O. Shaltiel proved, successfully I believe, that the "Tartīb Al-Sulūk" cannot be considered as having been written by Al-Qushayrī (cf. F. Meier -- *Oriens*, 1963); Mr. B. Abramov has proved in the same way that the "Kitāb Al-Ilm" was not written by Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī; in the same way others have studied literary influences upon Al-Ghazzālī or the influence of Al-Ghazzālī upon others. I hope that their papers, written in Hebrew, will be published.

ones. I have tried to present the quotations in chronological order, but for technical reasons have not always been able to keep to this arrangement. Some of the shorter examples are given in transliterations, but most of them appear in Arabic. (All these examples constitute only a small part of my collection.) The examples are usually quoted in full because of the great difficulty in locating quotations in the various editions of Al-Ghazzālī's many books. The chapters which have been published before in the form of articles contain only translations and no passages in Arabic.

The editions of Al-Ghazzālī's books I used (see Ch. II below) are sometimes old and untrustworthy in comparison with new and better ones which have appeared recently, but, again, for technical reasons I could not always use the recent editions, although I have mentioned most of them and, whenever possible, have tried to quote from them too (Atay-Çubupçu's "Al-Iqitsād" Afifi's "Mishkāt Al-Anwār", Badawi's "Fadā'iḥ Al-Bāṭiniyya", Chelhot's "Al-Qustās Al-Mustaqīm", Suleiman Dunya's "Faiṣal Al-Tafriqa", "Mizān Al-'Amal", "Mi'yār Al-'Ilm", Na'sani's second edition of "Miḥakk Al-Nazar" etc.). Similarly, I could not use F. Jabre's *Essai sur le Lexique de Ghazālī* (Beyrouth 1970), which I saw only when this book was already in print. Jabre's book (arranged alphabetically) and my Chapters II and III are in some respects complementary to each other, as both study the vast field of Al-Ghazzālī's language, but from completely different angles.

The book contains no bibliography of the voluminous literature about Al-Ghazzālī. (Such a bibliography, if ever published, would constitute a book in itself.) Usually I have quoted in full, at least at the first occasion a book or article is mentioned, the relating bibliographical details. Three indices conclude the book: one general, one of Al-Ghazzālī's books and one of the Arabic words or terms dealt with.

I wish to thank all those who so kindly helped me to prepare this book for publication — the late Sarah Landau, Mr. Dora Camrass, Mr. Avner Giladi and especially Mrs. Dinah Gibton. My deepest thanks are due to my husband to whom the book is dedicated. Without his help and advice I would never have finished this book.

Finally I hope that in spite of many technical and perhaps more serious faults, this book will add its modest contribution to the study of Al-Ghazzālī, thereby bringing the reader nearer to a better understanding of Islam.

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- 1) "Place of the Religious Commandments in the Philosophy of Al-Ghazzālī", *The Muslim World* 51, 1961, pp. 173-184.
- 2) "Jews and Judaism in the Writings of Al-Ghazzālī" (in Hebrew), *Tarbiz. Quarterly of Jewish Studies*, 33, 1964, pp. 157-166.
- 3) "Philosophical Terms as a Criterion of Authenticity in the Writings of Al-Ghazzālī", *Studia Islamica* XXV, G-P. Maisonneuve et Larose Paris 1966, pp. 111-121.
- 4) "Étude sur la Polémique Islamo-Chrétienne: Qui était l'auteur de *al-Radd al-ġamīl li-Ilāhiyat 'Īsā bi-sarīḥ al-Ingīl* attribué à al-Gazzālī?" *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 1969, pp. 219-238.
- 5) "Some Notes on the Term 'Taqlīd' in the writings of Al-Ghazzālī", *Israel Oriental Studies* 1, 1971, pp. 249-156.

## TRANSCRIPTION

dh	-	ج
h	-	ح
kh	-	خ
dh	-	ذ
z	-	ز
s	-	ص
d	-	ض
t	-	ط
z	-	ظ
'	-	ع
gh	-	غ
q	-	ق
k	-	ك
y, ī	-	ى

## CHAPTER I

Methodological Introduction

The greater part of this book is an attempt to introduce into the study of Arab literature the literary stylistic method of research used in the study of European literatures, mainly English, French and German. The study was carried out in the writings of Al-Ghazzālī (1058-1111/450-505 Hg.) one of the most prolific writers of Islam. Of course an attempt such as this gives rise to manifold questions, concerning principal as well as lesser points. I shall mention forthwith some of these questions, and try to answer them, as far as possible. But I can state right at the beginning of this book, that although many of the problems concerned with such a study still remain unsolved, the attempt as a whole has proved to be most encouraging in the study of Al-Ghazzālī's numerous writings, and has perhaps lent a new dimension to the study of Arab classical language and literature as such.

It has also proved again the deep relationship which exists between form and content, namely between words and ideas, and how much insight into a great man's doctrine can be gained from the study of his style and the literary character of his writings.

So far as I know there is as yet no basic research into the writings of any Arab writer and no study of word frequency, images, metaphors and the like in a given genus of Arab literature of a specific time<sup>1</sup>. This fact certainly diminishes the value of my study of Al-Ghazzālī, but

then every 'pioneer' work faces the same problem. I hope that forthcoming studies of the same kind will attain higher levels of achievement since it is comparison which lends reliability to research work of this nature<sup>2</sup>. In the meantime I have attempted to make certain comparisons, but since any one individual can barely manage the study of the bulk of Al-Ghazzālī's work, it would be hopeless to undertake the study of the enormous literature preceding him, or that which stems from his contemporaries as well as the first generations after him - to which his work should be compared. Therefore the first and most basic problem facing my study will be the statistical problem of comparison which will become less and less disturbing as more studies of this kind are published. I have tried therefore to be even more careful than would usually be required, always remembering that a given linguistic phenomenon might be typical of the Arabic language in general, or of the spirit of the age, or of the subject under discussion, with Al-Ghazzālī adhering to the custom. However, due to the random material which I have collected for comparison, and which could be atypical, I may have identified such a phenomenon as typical of Al-Ghazzālī. This is all the more dangerous as it is safe to assume that the contention, currently held in the West, that a writer's style reflects to a large extent both the spirit and the ideas of his age in various fields<sup>3</sup>, holds true also for Arab literature, which is almost devoid of a personal character.

This brings me to a second difficulty. The science of style has developed extensively both in Europe and the

United States during recent decades, and its natural corollary was the sub-specialization in various fields, with barely visible distinctive lines. Anyone who undertakes a scrutiny of elementary and advanced studies in this science will realize that it has become almost impossible to combine the study of language, style and literature, and that each one of these affords extensive opportunities for research and different methods. All these separate lines do, however, join at the end, thus giving a more comprehensive idea of the writing of a specific author<sup>4</sup>. Specialization, however, is possible only in one, at the most two, fields. By way of an example let us take a closer look at the statistical method of vocabulary examination. This method presupposes a number of years of training in mathematics - rarely undertaken by students of philology<sup>5</sup>. If therefore the use of this method is quite difficult for the ordinary philologist of European languages, it becomes even more complicated for the orientalist. So far no study of the Arabic language from this point of view has been made and it seems most probable that facts which could be a yardstick for a statistical survey of European languages (such as the ratio of nouns and adjectives to propositions and verbs; classes of nouns and verbs; grammatical phenomena such as the genitive) would be of no help in a semitic language. In the latter we must first of all determine what the individual characteristics of a writer's style are. Moreover, even if we assume that it is possible to determine these linguistic characteristics in Arabic, would it be



permissible to draw the same inferences? An eminent psychologist<sup>6</sup> has proved that the correlation of the general number of a given set of tokens (let us say 1000) and the number of different word-types included, is consistent in the writings of any one person (TTR), and that there is a fixed correlation between this ratio and the writer's character and his intellectual ability. The frequent use of nouns and adjectives, for example, shows a static, inactive attitude to life. Would it be fair to draw a similar conclusion with regard to a semitic language like Arabic, in which the verb plays a very limited part? My efforts in this field have failed so far, since it seems preposterous to attribute to Al-Ghazzālī a static, inactive attitude to life, even in his years of wandering and seclusion. And yet, any superficial statistical survey would immediately reveal that there are more nouns in his language than verbs<sup>7</sup>.

This point, raised with regards to statistics, holds true in a more general way for any examination of the language and style of the writers of Arabic. Could European standards and tools be used for such an examination? Or should we rather go back to the rhetorical canons of classical Arabic fixed by men like Ibn Qutaiba, Abū Hilāl Al-ʿAskarī, Ibn Rashīq, Al-Khafādjī, Al-Djurdjānī, Ibn Al-Athīr and the like, in the same way that some scholars believe that European research should go back to the laws of rhetoric in Greek and Latin? Personally I believe that this is impossible, mainly because the doctrines of writers and scholars like those

mentioned above are very subjective and deal mainly with poetry. I have therefore decided that their approach would be unsuitable for a linguistic-literary academic research study, especially in the writings of Al-Ghazzālī, and I have adopted the European methods and attitudes (with certain necessary adaptations) for the purpose of this study, but of course this may be regarded as a very personal ad hoc decision only<sup>8</sup>.

Before proceeding to deal with the difficulties specific to the study of Al-Ghazzālī, I should like to add a general remark. Conclusions drawn on the basis of linguistic, stylistic and literary data, are always unsatisfactory in any discussion of the chronological order of a series of books, or their degree of authenticity and should never be used as a sole criterion. This, because of the fact that in spite of its development and break-up into sub-divisions, this science is still affected to a large extent by the intuition and considerations of the scholar and by the extent of the latter's general and specific familiarity with the subject, or with the writer in question, etc. Moreover, even when conclusions are acceptable to everybody, there is still a difference of opinion with regard to the use to which they should be put. Thus for instance Caroline Spurgeon undertook an exhaustive and important study of the images in Shakespeare's language<sup>9</sup>. She has brought many interesting facts to light which have become an important factor in the controversy regarding the authenticity of the plays (as compared to Marlowe and Bacon) and which deepen our

insight into motives and associations in Shakespeare's writings. She has also discovered subconscious associations which reveal different attitudes from the ones which Shakespeare attempted to show on certain subjects. However, her inferences drawn on this basis with regard to Shakespeare's personal history and personality - as well as to his physical appearance - has raised severe, and probably justifiable, criticism<sup>10</sup>.

Let us now deal with the difficulties specific to Al-Ghazzālī's writings. Here too, we still lack some of the most basic preparatory work necessary for a thorough research, such as scientific editions of Al-Ghazzālī's major works, in particular of the "Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn" and related works. One can get an idea of how great the difference between two editions can be by comparing A. Badawi's full edition of the "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya" to Goldziher's Streitschrift des Gazālī gegen die Bāṭinijja Sekte (Leiden, 1916), which was incomplete and based on one manuscript only, which had undergone a great number of changes. (See *ibid.*, the German introduction by Goldziher, pp. 34-35.) A comparison with Goldziher's own manuscript in the National University Library in Jerusalem (Phot. Ar. 1. 8<sup>o</sup>) has proved that, even referring to this manuscript only, certain corrections of the edition are called for (often Goldziher himself expressed his doubts)<sup>11</sup>. But of course not always are the new editions better than the old ones.

Since I have been unable to re-examine thousands of notes in scores of mss., the lack of reliable editions of Al-Ghazzālī's elementary books was one of the factors which deterred me at times from drawing final conclusions, or from discussing certain subjects which were, nevertheless, relevant to my main theme. I have, for example, avoided the discussion of a syntactic-stylistic analysis of Al-Ghazzālī's writings. This subject, which is comprehensive in itself and which requires closer scrutiny of Al-Ghazzālī's writings from a syntactical point of view, cannot be dealt with on the basis of the existing material. There is much doubt as to whether it is possible to determine the phenomena of sentence construction, grammatical precision, distinction between adjunctives like 'wa' and 'fa' etc., on the basis of the existing editions. I have therefore confined myself to notes on the subject at different stages of my study<sup>12</sup>. The problem, however, applies also to Al-Ghazzālī's vocabulary. There are, for example, many similar passages both in "Mīzān Al-'Amal" and "Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn". I found it difficult to determine who had caused the very small discrepancies between the passages: Al-Ghazzālī himself, the copyists or the editors. I tend to regard most differences as resulting from defective editing or bad printing of the text<sup>13</sup>, since contemporary editors (like the mediaeval copyists who preceded them), have in most cases copied errors without commenting on the possible existence of different versions<sup>14</sup>.

In view of the above-mentioned pitfalls, I have

decided, in dealing with Al-Ghazzālī's vocabulary, to stress in particular the recurrent expressions and idioms which, by virtue of their frequency in his works, can be considered typical of his style, even under contemporary research conditions. (Hence the great importance accorded in this book to the large number of examples for each word or idiom.) We may well say that research in this case moves in a vicious circle: the better we become acquainted with Al-Ghazzālī's style, the better shall we be able to bring out scientific editions; the more scientific editions we have, the better will we know his style.

Another important hindrance to the study of Al-Ghazzālī is the fact that there is no available concordance for any part of Al-Ghazzālī's work - not even for the "Ihyā"<sup>15</sup>. Such a concordance would, of course, not suffice, and it would be necessary to make use of concordances of other contemporary writers or of those preceding Al-Ghazzālī and immediately following him - who have dealt with similar subjects. Nevertheless such a concordance, like many other non-existent technical aids, would have been most helpful in the study and research of various aspects of both linguistics and style (vocabulary, syntax, images and metaphors, parables, terminology etc.), as well as of literature and even contents (structure of writings organization of material, methods of debate, means of addressing the public, methods of persuasion, names etc.) On such research it would eventually be possible to base studies of chronological authenticity and comparison. The study of Plato's language and style is a good example of

the lengthy process of preliminary research necessary for the understanding of his personality and ideas. This study has been going on for many years, during which scholars have been preparing a multitude of bricks which may finally be used in the ultimate, conclusive structure<sup>16</sup>.

The large number of Al-Ghazzālī's books, not all of which have been published so far, and the fact that he was a prolific writer during many years (covering a large number of subjects, and writing for different sections of the reading public), make it especially difficult to deal with his style. One may try to distinguish between his styles as used in books dealing with different subjects. Yet, characteristic features of his style should be, and in fact are, obvious in all his books. Alternatively, one might try to build up an outline of his stylistic development, since stylistic discipline today does not maintain that a person's style remains unchanged from early childhood to old age<sup>17</sup>, particularly when his way of life has undergone considerable changes. But here again - static elements of his style should be, and are, revealed in all his books, of all periods. Moreover, at the present stage of research, such a study is quite difficult, possibly even not feasible with regard to Al-Ghazzālī's work. It requires a systematic follow-up of isolated phenomena in different books on the assumption that we are, today, in possession of information regarding the chronological order of Al-Ghazzālī's writings<sup>18</sup>. Here we are up against another kind of vicious circle: it is probable that the more we know of Al-Ghazzālī's stylistic development, the

more we shall be able to determine the chronological order of his books; conversely, the more we know of the chronological order of his books, the closer we shall be to determining his linguistic-stylistic development. Yet the static elements in his writings are also important for the discussion of the authenticity of his books (with which I have mainly dealt), especially in his religious-moral works. The fixed nucleus of style is considerable in Al-Ghazzālī's work, and its linguistic consistency for decades is most surprising.

Another difficulty which is typical of Al-Ghazzālī - and many other mediaeval writers - is the abundance, in his works, of his predecessors' writings, usually introduced without mention of the sources. This is, of course, related to the wider question of Al-Ghazzālī's sources in general, which presents a most complicated methodological problem. No scholar can achieve here much more than random success, regardless of the pains he takes to go through the vast amount of relevant material. Yet every detail discovered will bear directly not only on the study of Al-Ghazzālī's language and style but on the question of his originality and uniqueness. The evaluation of his work, is, of course, possible only if we can determine the extent of originality of his approach and the manner in which he differs from his predecessors and has absorbed their doctrines into his. Al-Ghazzālī does, indeed, mention certain sources, but it is likely that they cover only a small part of those which he used for his work. The most important of these sources seems to be the "Qūt Al-Qulūb"

by Abū Tālib Al-Makkī (d. 996/386 Hg.) However, in view of contemporary research conditions, there is no way of determining the extent of the latter's influence on Al-Ghazzālī and especially on the "Ihyā". The Egyptian edition of the "Qūt Al-Qulūb" (1932/1351 Hg) is anything but scientific; it is incomplete and abounds in technical errors<sup>19</sup>. It seems that Al-Ghazzālī copied extensively from other predecessors too, much beyond the customary copying habits of his period, which practice may account also for the extent of his writings and certainly makes their study most difficult<sup>20</sup>.

Even in places where Al-Ghazzālī apparently related genuine autobiographical facts, he did nothing but copy his predecessors' personal experiences and decisions. A case in point would be the famous opening of his "Al-Munqidh" (pp. 56-58) in which he tells of his adolescent craving for knowledge. He mentions the famous Ḥadīth of Islam's seventy two factions and tells the parable of the deep sea of knowledge into which people have to dive, classifying people according to categories - all of which bears a remarkable resemblance to the opening pages of the "Kitāb Al-Waṣāyā" by Al-Ḥārith Al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857/243 Hg.) which has not yet been published<sup>21</sup>. Such a similarity not only exemplifies the difficulty in determining Al-Ghazzālī's sources in addition to putting the "Munqidh"'s biographical reliability in question<sup>22</sup>; it also completely shatters our faith in the veracity of the numerous personal remarks scattered throughout the whole of Al-Ghazzālī's work, thus considerably detracting from the

study of his work and personality. Al-Ghazzālī evidently copied not only ideas, images, proverbs, quotations and such like; he copied whole parts of books without mentioning the authors' names, and all my efforts to distinguish between the authentic and the copied parts, by using stylistic or linguistic criteria, were of no avail. The copying was done most cleverly, with no traces left in the places where the parts were put together. Small stylistic amendments were made so that no great variations in style were left if we consider the number of differences one would expect to find in a book of the size of "Ihyā", or in the bulk of one writer's work. We must, therefore, remember that we are today aware of only a small part of the copied parts, and that the study of Al-Ghazzālī's style and personality is accordingly quite probably based, in part at least, on books which contain passages he did not write, even if they do form part of his presumably authentic work<sup>23</sup>.

It is also quite possible that Al-Ghazzālī's works contain later additions. Goldziher even believed that one has to consider additions which accuse Al-Ghazzālī of copying from his predecessors, a contention which seems to me somewhat far-fetched. Thus, for instance, Al-Ghazzālī 'confessed' in the "Ihyā" (II, 4, p. 900, 4-5) that in his "Al-Mustazhirī" ("Fadā'ih Al-Bātiniyya") he made use of a book called "Kashf Al-Asrār wa-Hatk Al-Astār" by the Qādī Abū-l-Tayyib.

According to Goldziher this confession is a later interpolation, of which there were many: '... und es ist nicht

darán zu zweifeln, dass wir es dabei mit einem der zahlreichen Einschübe zu tun haben, die (in unserem Fall mit unfreundlicher Absicht) in den Text des Ihyā geschmuggelt und durch Abschreiber weiter ueberliefert worden sind'<sup>24</sup>.

Though Goldziher's arguments are not very convincing, a final answer must be left pending until such time as we find the above-mentioned book against the Bātiniyya and compare it to Al-Ghazzālī's. We must also accept the fact that for the time being—generally any assertion based on Al-Ghazzālī's writings must be considered as temporary.

In addition to the above, there is another difficulty, apparently peculiar to Al-Ghazzālī. Al-Ghazzālī copied himself, and repeated his own sayings in different books, sometimes even in the same book. Entire excerpts from the "Ihyā" appear in other books, some of which were to prepare the ground for the "Ihyā" and were later on worked into it. Others were written at later dates in order to abridge the "Ihyā" and sum it up for different sections of the public. Usually both phenomena make it very difficult for us to trace the development of Al-Ghazzālī's style. Sometimes, however, these repetitions, shortened or with minor alterations, become a very useful tool in tracing the differences in Al-Ghazzālī's attitude towards different sections of his public. Of course there is also the question of attributing whole books to Al-Ghazzālī, and I will deal with this problem several times later on in this book. Doubtless one of the criteria for the determination of authenticity of spurious books should be the style. Here we come up against our third vicious circle: as long

as we are uncertain of the authorship of the books, it will be difficult to identify Al-Ghazzālī's style, while, conversely, as long as we remain oblivious of the characteristics or peculiarities of his style, we shall be unable to examine the authenticity of these books. This question becomes most complicated in our case, since scholars who have compiled the enormous amount of scientific studies on Al-Ghazzālī have used doubtful writings as reliable sources for the study of Al-Ghazzālī's doctrine, expressions, style etc.<sup>25</sup> F. Jabre suggested a 'textus receptus', a tentative list of books accepted as authentic works of Al-Ghazzālī and based his studies upon such a list. This was accepted, with some reservations, by W.M. Watt<sup>26</sup>, but is an emergency expedient, which may be of use for some time, but cannot serve as a well-established basis for the study of Al-Ghazzālī in the future. No unanimous acceptance of such a 'textus' can be assured among scholars until more thorough studies of isolated books and subjects have been made. I have tried to do my best in this direction, suggesting the restriction of the number of authentic writings of Al-Ghazzālī on the basis of thorough examinations of both style and content<sup>27</sup>. If my contentions are accepted, and several books, hitherto attributed to Al-Ghazzālī are rejected, I feel certain that research on his writings and doctrines would take another step forward.

I should give another warning with regard to the study of Al-Ghazzālī's writings. Al-Ghazzālī's quotations from the Qur'ān and the Hadīth, as well as his interpretations etc. cannot be regarded as a reliable source for the

understanding of his original ideas, indeed not even for his personal taste according to which he picked certain choice items out of his predecessors' material. Thus for example the fact that Al-Ghazzālī did, at times, leave out some parts of a passage the rest of which he had copied out in its entirety, does not enable us to draw more than a very temporary conclusion regarding his intentional choice; it could more often than not just be an arbitrary oversight or random decision. Thus it happens quite often that one and the same Hadīth, omitted by him apparently because of ostensibly personal or ideological reasons, will appear somewhere else in his numerous writings without any reservations<sup>28</sup>.

I would sum up this introduction as follows: the literary-stylistic side has hitherto been neglected almost completely in the study of Al-Ghazzālī's writings. Worse than this neglect, however, is the practice of making non-committal generalizations or unfounded contentions in this matter. The scientific literature on Al-Ghazzālī abounds in vague footnotes and indefinite phrasing with regard to his style and manner of writing, without research, detail or exemplification, upon which the disqualification of the authenticity of writings, or the establishing of chronological order was based<sup>29</sup>.

Thus, for instance, writes Carra de Vaux:

Le style de Gazali est abondant, facile, souple et clair. Sa manière est aisément accessible. S'aidant volontiers d'images et ne perdant jamais de vue le côté pratique, il prend le lecteur et ne le fatigue pas. C'est un esprit assez équilibré;

il garde en tout une certaine mesure: S'il cite des traditions, il le fait sans lourdeur et n'en abuse pas; il divise et subdivise avec soin et netteté, mais sans pédanterie. Comme casuiste ou psychologue, il ne tombe pas dans ses excès de subtilité; le mysticisme même n'est pas poussé chez lui à ses extrêmes limites. On peut le rapprocher de certaines pères grecs, en particulier de S. Jean Chrysostome dont il a le tour aimable, l'aisance de style et la luminarité<sup>30</sup>, en notant toutefois qu'il est plus théoricien et moins mêlé à la vie politique. (Carra de Vaux, Le Penseurs de L'Islam IV, Paris 1923, p. 160.)

Three scholars have gone especially far in this respect, namely M. Smith, W.M. Watt and F. Jabre. M. Smith has devoted an entire chapter of her book to Al-Ghazzālī's style and his manner of writing<sup>31</sup>. This undoubtedly contains certain acceptable generalizations, though they have not been scientifically checked by her. However, she also included some far-fetched statements such as:

His Al-Ghazzālī's knowledge of Persian is perhaps the reason why he uses the Arabic with freedom and lack of formality which is unusual among Arabic writers. (Ibid. p. 67.)

Moreover, his writings everywhere and his choice of words and images is that of the poet, whose

eyes and ears are open to the world of experience which lies behind the world of senses but is approached by means of them. (Ibid., p. 82.)

She distinguishes the differences in style between Al-Ghazzālī's larger and smaller books, and it is probably by the scope of the books that she determines the public for which they were meant<sup>32</sup>.

W.M. Watt also dismisses as unauthentic<sup>33</sup>, or tries to establish the chronological order of, certain books on the basis of unacceptable assumptions, and sometimes even admits that he has based his contentions on a description of the manuscript by a third party<sup>34</sup>. In matters of style he settles for general remarks such as:

In general the matter of the veil section in the "Mishkāt" is dull and second rate compared with the rest of the book; and the style is also inferior<sup>35</sup>. (JRAS 1949, p. 22.)

Or:

The whole tenor of the book Al-Risālah Al-Laduniyyah is different from what we should expect of al-Ghazzālī at an earlier period. (JRAS 1952, p. 33.)

While F. Jabre makes also many vague assertions, such as:

La pensée du Maître chemine avec assurance et clarté dans le Mishkāt et elle s'exprime avec un style d'une limpidité de crystal - son style

habituel ...<sup>36</sup>.

La, Ghazālī, touche la concret, le psychologique, sa phrase s'allonge, se gonfle, devient vivante et traduit fidèlement la sorte de la satisfaction intérieure qu'il éprouve<sup>37</sup>. Ghazālī a du goût et parle en homme 'éduqué,' dans le sens humaniste du terme; il est bien au courant de toutes les nuances de la langue qu'il emploie et il en tire des effets surprenants. Il est remarquable que, cherchant à développer une idée fondamentale, il ait supplié à ce but le génie de cette langue qui d'ordinaire se prête mieux aux images et aux métaphores. D'où chez lui, entre la clarté dans l'exposé et la facilité dans l'expression, cette coexistence qui charme et étonne tout à la fois. On dirait qu'il 'laisse la bride à sa plume' et qu'il improvise en écrivant<sup>38</sup>.

Of course generalizations like these cannot lead us very far. The study of Al-Ghazzālī (and other Arab writers) still lacks many detailed studies and monographs (in addition to the larger projects of editing, compiling of concordances etc. mentioned above), which are necessary to promote further studies of authenticity and chronology in his writings. I shall mention some of these in this book, but cannot go into details pertaining to each of them, such as the concepts of time and place, or colours, sounds and numbers in his writings; his attitude towards

prose and poetry and the transition from one to another; his use of images, parables and symbols; his methods of quoting the Qur'ān and the Hadith and other sources; his ways of interpretation; his technical terminology (e.g. Ṣūfī, theological, legal, even Shī'ī and other terms in his writings); his manner of associative writing, his autobiographical indications etc.

To these one has to add more technical (statistical or other) research into his use of nouns, adjectives, adverbs etc. in his books; or into the syntactical structure of his style, as well as into the structure of his books (his plans as well as their actual structure), his methods of debate and persuasion and many other aspects. Monographs should of course also contain a study of many items in the content, such as prophecy and dream in Al-Ghazzālī's writings; Angels and Devils in Al-Ghazzālī's writings etc.; Al-Ghazzālī as mystic and as theologian; his attitude towards the Shī'a etc.

The above-mentioned papers are in part short or 'technical' in nature. Some require a systematic follow-up of the subject, its form and content in all of Al-Ghazzālī's books which are considered as authentic, according to an accepted chronological order, and/or in comparison with other writers. Not one of them could achieve any far-reaching results when taken on its own. Together, however, in addition to what was suggested earlier in this study they could furnish a suitable background for a comprehensive study to be based on them. Only a comprehensive study of this nature could help towards the formation of a



reliable outline of Al-Ghazzālī's work and doctrine and become the beginning of comparative studies of this kind in Arabic literature as a whole. It would, therefore, be fitting to regard this present study of mine as merely part of the numerous preliminary studies necessary to pave the way for a thoroughly comprehensive understanding of Al-Ghazzālī and of Arabic classical literature as such.

Notes to Chapter I

1 There exist, of course, some important studies such as: G. Bergstraesser - Hunain ibn Ishāq u. seine Schule (Leiden, 1913); H. Ritter - Ueber die Bildersprache Nizāmīs (Berlin, 1927); H. Ritter - Das Meer der Seele (Leiden, 1955); G.E. von Grunebaum - "The Nature of Arab Literary Effort" (JNES 7, 1948, pp. 116-122); G.E. von Grunebaum - Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation (Chicago, 1953), Chs. 7, 8. (Although Ritter's books deal mainly with Persian writers they contain much relevant material on Arab writers too.)

I have been unable to locate the following book, which seems to deal with the authenticity of Al-Djāhīz' writings according to linguistic criteria: O. Reşer (Rescher) - Exzerpte und Uebersetzungen aus den Schriften des ... Gāhīz aus Baçra (Stuttgart, 1931) I, pp. 255-257.

2 See f.i. A.H. Hatzfeld - A Critical Bibliography of the New Stylistics, applied to the Romance Literatures 1900-1952, Chapel Hill, N. Carolina, 1955, p. 25: 'The transition from any appraisal of literary art to the truly philological and scientific approach is reached as soon as the comparative method is used.'

3 See *ibid.*, p. 47, and also H. Seidler - Allgemeine Stilistik (Goettingen, 1953), p. 69 ff, as well as the following quotation, though dealing with a Persian poet, from H.H. Schaefer's review of Henri Massé's Essai sur le poète Saadi (Paris, 1919):

Dass M. den Dichter isoliert ist das Hauptgebrechen seines Buches: immer wieder zeigt er sich geneigt, typische Gedanken, Bilder, Rede- und Stilformen, die Sa'dī aus einer Jahrhunderte alten Tradition geschöpft und mit allen anderen persischen Dichtern gemein hat, als individuelle, fuer Sa'dīs Persönlichkeit Aufschluss gebende Äusserungen anzusehen. (H.H. Schaefer, Der Islam 14, 1926, p. 185.)

4 See Hatzfeld's above-mentioned book as well as general studies like - S.E. Hyman - The Armed Vision: A Study in the Methods of Modern Literary Criticism (Vintage Books, New York, 1955); R. Wellek and A. Warren - Theory of Literature (London, 1953.)

5 Cf. G.V. Yule - The Statistical Study of Literary Vocabulary (Cambridge, 1944), who used the statistical method in order to prove that the famous De Imitatione Christi was in fact written by Thomas à Kempis. Recently, computers have been used in studies of this kind of certain books of the Bible. See also below Ch. II, n. 13. Cf. also G. Herdan - Language as Choice and Chance (Groningen, 1956.)

6 D.C. McClelland - Personality (New York, 1951), p. 151: Speech and Personality.

7 I have made such counting surveys in passages of the

"Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn", "Kitāb Al-Arba'īn" and "Mishkāt Al-Anwār". The same feature (e.g. the use of an especially large number of nouns) seems to be characteristic of Al-Ghazzālī's book - "Kitāb Al-Hikma fi Makhluqāt Allah" - as compared with the "Kitāb Al-Dalā'il wa-l-I'djāz 'alā-l-Khalq wa-l-Tadbīr", wrongly attributed to Al-Djāhiz. As both books deal with the same subjects in an almost identical way this stylistic feature may be very important both in trying to establish the authenticity of the book as well as in the study of Al-Ghazzālī's language and style. (In this case it seems that Al-Ghazzālī, as well as the Jewish author Bahyā ibn Paqūda, used the "Dalā'il Al-I'djāz", which seems to have been written by an earlier Christian author. Cf. D.Z. Baneth - A common source to Bahyā ... and Al-Ghazzālī [in Hebrew], in the Magnes Anniversary Book, Jerusalem, 1938, pp. 23-30.)

8 See a short summary of Arabic Rhetoric in Nāsīf Al-Yazīdjī's "Madjmū' Al-Adab fī Funūn Al-'Arab". Cf. also A.F. Mehren - Die Rhetorik der Araber (Wien, 1853). It must be stated that European research also deals mainly in belles lettres - prose as well as poetry - and only a relatively small part is devoted to the works of theologians and philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, Calvin, St. Theresa, Descartes, Pascal and others (cf. Hatzfeld, *ibid.*)

9 Caroline F.E. Spurgeon - Shakespeare's Imagery (Cambridge, 1952.)

- 10 Cf. S.E. Hyman - *ibid.*, Ch. 6 (Hyman used the 1927 edition of C. Spurgeon.)
- 11 See (in the Hebrew typescript of this book) the long list of my corrections based on a different reading of the same Ms. or on the common usage in Al-Ghazzālī's language. Having seen A. Badawi's whole edition of the book - wherein almost all these (and many other) corrections are already incorporated (mainly by using more mss) - I feel it quite superfluous to repeat the list here, even though Badawi does not always mention in the notes where he diverges from Goldziher's version.
- 12 One of the basic problems to be solved in this connection is Al-Ghazzālī's relation to classical and middle Arabic. Cf. J. Fueck - 'Arabijja (Berlin, 1950); T. Noeldeke (A. Spitaler) - Zur Grammatik des Klassischen Arabisch (Darmstadt, 1963) (see esp. appendix p. 123, b.)
- 13 Cf. f.i. literally the parables in "Ihyā" III, 1, pp. 1355-1357 to "Mīzān", pp. 57-61 (see also "Ma'āridj Al-Quds", Cairo, 1927, p. 105 ff.) For details about editions etc. see below Ch. II.
- 14 Cf. f.i. "Al-Munqidh", p. 119, 1 - (with regard to the famous magical quadrat called after Al-Ghazzālī) to Al-Subkī, "Tabaqāt" IV, p. 142. It may well be that Al-Subkī keeps the beginning of the more ancient and correct version ('khazaf' - pieces of clay - instead of 'khirqa' - patch - which was accepted by all available printed

- versions of the "Al-Munqidh"), whereas the end of the sentence is more intelligible in the "Munqidh" versions. A Persian version seems to have the best meaning: to be written on two pieces of clay, which were not wet by water. Cf. O. Pretzl - Die Streitschrift des Gazālī gegen die Ibāhija (Muenchen, 1933), text p. 19 (translation p. 41.)
- 15 Of course we have G.H. Bousquet's Analyse et Index ... of the "Ihyā" (Paris, 1955) as well as a helpful booklet by 'Abd Al-Salām Hārūn "Tahdhīb Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn" (Cairo, 1379 Hg.) but these do not suffice.
- 16 Cf. W. Lutoslawski - The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic (Bombay, 1905), Ch. 5.
- 17 Cf. f.i. Hatzfeld - *ibid.*, p. 78 ff., and Wellek and Warren - *ibid.*, p. 186. See also below, p. 50.
- 18 In spite of some excellent studies we still cannot draw up an exact chronological list of Al-Ghazzālī's authentic writings. Cf. especially M. Bouyges - Essai de Chronologie des Oeuvres de Al-Ghazālī, ed. par M. Allard (Beyrouth, 1959); A. Badawi - Les Oeuvres d-Al-Ghazālī; étude bibliographique (in Arabic, Le Caire, 1961) which follows Bouyges' work but adds new material, especially with regard to mss. See also G.F. Hourani - "Chronology of Ghazālī's Writings" (JAOS 79, 1959), pp. 225-233. I have used these publications very often and found much guidance and help in them, although I have not always accepted the

authors' conclusions and made my own statements about the chronology of many of Al-Ghazzālī's writings.

19 Thus there is no correlation between the table of contents and the actual headings at the beginning of the chapters! (Cf. for example, Vol. I, pp. 3-6 to Vol. II, p. 122, 183, 308 etc.) Al-Ghazzālī mentions Abu Tālib Al-Makkī among other Ṣūfī authors in the "Munqidh" (p. 95, 7 at the beginning of the chapter on Ṣūfism.) He mentions him also in the "Ihyā". See "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2104, 1; p. 2110, 5. Already Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) mentioned Abū Tālib's influence on Al-Ghazzālī (see his "Djawāb Ahl Al-Īmān" ed. Na'sani, p. 76) and many modern scholars stress the similarity as well as the differences between the "Qūt" and the "Ihyā". Cf. for instance A.J. Wensinck's statement:

On ne saurait nier que le Kūt al-Kulūb de Abū Tālib al-Makkī (+ 996) ait servi d'exemple à l'Ihyā. Mais celui-là est un manuel de piété, tandis que l'Ihyā se propose d'effectuer une révision foncière de l'attitude musulmane en matière de religion. L'Ihyā est l'oeuvre d'un homme de génie, d'un esprit également profond dans les domaines de la philosophie, de la psychologie et de la théologie. (A.J. Wensinck - La Pensée de Ghazzālī, Paris 1940, p. 128.)

So far no detailed study has been devoted to discover the exact relationship between the "Qūt Al-Qulūb" and the "Ihyā", yet certainly such a study (parts of which are

carried out by some of my graduate students at the Hebrew University) will reveal many differences between the two authors and bring towards a better understanding of both Al-Ghazzālī and Abū Tālib Al-Makkī. If we look for example at the first book in both the "Qūt Al-Qulūb" and the "Ihyā" we can discern immediately the extent to which the latter depends on the former. Cf. f.i.:

"Ihyā" I, 1, p. 32, 3rd passage	"Qūt" I, 2, p. 9, 9 ff
"Ihyā" I, 1, p. 37, 3rd passage	"Qūt" I, 2, pp. 34-35
"Ihyā" I, 1, p. 41, last passage	"Qūt" I, 2, p. 17, 7 ff
"Ihyā" I, 1, p. 45, 13	"Qūt" I, 2, p. 27, 12
"Ihyā" I, 1, p. 55	"Qūt" I, 2, p. 28, 12
"Ihyā" I, 1, p. 61, 2	"Qūt" I, 2, p. 32, 1
"Ihyā" I, 1, p. 75, 5	"Qūt" I, 2, p. 18, 2
"Ihyā" I, 1, p. 101, 3 ff	"Qūt" I, 2, p. 10, 6 ff
"Ihyā" I, 1, pp. 104-105	"Qūt" I, 2, pp. 14-15
"Ihyā" I, 1, p. 120, 3	"Qūt" I, 2, p. 11

Yet if we look at the English translation of this part of the "Ihyā" we get a completely different idea about Al-Ghazzālī's originality. Cf. N.A. Faris - The Book of Knowledge, being translation with notes of the "Kitāb Al-'Ilm" of Al-Ghazzālī's "Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn" (Lahore, 1962.) Faris does not mention how much Al-Ghazzālī was indebted to Abū-Tālib in this book and therefore creates among the English readers a wrong impression.

20 Which fact is in no way to be taken as a judgement on Al-Ghazzālī's ethical attitudes. The attitude towards

plagiarism in mediaeval times was quite different from modern ones. Cf. M. Plessner, RSO 31, p. 255, and also G.E. von Grunebaum - "The Concept of Plagiarism in Arabic Theory" (JNES 3, 1944), pp. 234-253; F. Rosenthal - The Technique and Approach of Muslim Scholarship (Rome, 1947), Ch. 3, para. 2.

21 See the Introduction to the Egyptian edition of "Al-Munqidh" (Cairo, 1955), pp. 35-38. Cf. also GALS I, p. 351, 353 and M. Smith - An Early Mystic of Baghdad (London, 1935), pp. 18-20; A.J. Arberry - Sufism (London, 1950), p. 47; J. van Ess - Die Gedankenwelt des Ḥarīṭ al-Muḥāsibī (Bonn, 1961), pp. 2-6. Cf. also M. Smith - "The Forerunner of al-Ghazzālī" (JRAS, 1963), pp. 65-78, and her book Al-Ghazzālī the Mystic (London, 1944.) (M. Smith still accepts as authentic several books definitely not written by Al-Ghazzālī such as the "Al-Durra Al-Fākhira fi Kashf 'Ulūm Al-Ākhira".) See also Ch. IV, n. 38.

22 This has been stressed already by several of Al-Ghazzālī's biographers, such as Gosche, Macdonald and Carra de Vaux. Cf. also H.H. Schaefer, OLZ, 1926, p. 54; F. Jabre - "La vie et l'oeuvre de Ghazzālī reconsiderées à la lumière de Ṭabaqāt de Sobki" (MIDEO, 1954), pp. 73-102; J.M. Abd-el-Jalil - "Autour de la sincérité d'al-Ghazzālī" (Melanges Massignon I, Damas, 1956), pp. 57-72. See also G. Misch - Geschichte der Autobiographie III, 2 (Frankfurt, 1962), pp. 1040-1076 and cf. G.E. von Grunebaum - Medieval Islam (Chicago, 1953), Chs. 7, 8. Schaefer and Hodgson mention also the similarity between

"Al-Munqidh" and the autobiography of Nāṣir Khusraw, 'Umar Al-Khayyām and others. Today we should add to the list of autobiographies to be compared with "Al-Munqidh" Al-Ḥakīm Al-Tirmidhī's recently edited "Risālat Badw Sha'nī" together with his "Khatm Al-Awliyā" ed. by Othman I. Yahya (Beyrouth, 1965). It would therefore be worthwhile to deal again with the autobiographical data of "Al-Munqidh", while bearing in mind that quite often personal statements as it were are nothing but "literary fiction" in Arabic Literature. Cf. J. van Ess - "Neue Literatur zu Gazzālī" (Oriens 20, 1967), especially pp. 300-301; W.M. Watt - Muslim Intellectual. A Study of Al-Ghazzālī (Edinburgh, 1963), p. 50 ff; B. Lewis - The Assassins (London, 1967), p. 28 (about Ismā'īlī "search for truth".) Special reference should be given also to the chapters on 'Tawba' (penitence) in Ṣūfī manuals, according to which Al-Ghazzālī may have reconstructed his personal experiences as related in the chapter on Ṣūfism in "Al-Munqidh". From the linguistic point of view there is a close affinity between "Al-Munqidh" and the "Faisal Al-Tafriqa baina-l-Islām wa-l-Zandaqa" by Al-Ghazzālī, which is also worthwhile a further study. Cf. also below Ch. V, n. 32.

23 Cf. M. Plessner - Der Oikonomikoc des Neuphytagoraers Bryson (Heidelberg, 1928), p. 131, 134 (see also: EI<sup>2</sup> Akhlāq, p. 328b.) Plessner showed that a great part of "Thyā" III, 2 ("Kitāb Riyādat Al-Nafs") is part of Miskawaih's "Tahdhīb Al-Akhlāq". See also A.J. Arberry's

introduction to his edition of Al-Muḥāsibī's "Kitāb Al-Tawāḥḥum" and his Revelation and Reason (London, 1957), p. 64, about Al-Ghazzālī's indebtedness to Al-Muḥāsibī, especially with regard to the last book of his "Iḥyā". Cf. also J. van Ess - Die Gedankenwelt ..., p. 30.

24 Cf. Goldziher - Streitschrift, Introduction, pp. 15-16 (Cf. also the text *ibid.*, 1, l. 12). Goldziher identified the Qādī Abū-l-Tayyib mentioned here and elsewhere in Al-Ghazzālī's writings with the famous Ibn 'Abd-Al-Tayyib Al-Bāqillānī (see GAL I, p. 197; GALS I, p. 349) who died in 1012/403 Hg. Goldziher certainly did base his identification on two facts, though he did not state this explicitly. (1) The name of one of Al-Bāqillānī's books (see Streitschrift, p. 15 and *ibid.* n. 6.) Yet according to Al-Subkī, "Ṭabaqāt" IV, p. 192, 7, the name of Al-Bāqillānī's book was slightly different: "Kashf Asrār Al-Bāṭiniyya". (See also Ibn Kathīr, "Al-Bidāya wa-l-Nihāya" 11, p. 346.) Books with this and similar names were quite numerous (see GALS III, index p. 886 b.) (2) The fact that Al-Bāqillānī was well-known by the title Al-Qādī in wide circles, especially among Al-Djuwayni's pupils, who included also Al-Ghazzālī (Cf. Al-Subkī, "Ṭabaqāt" III, p. 177, 5.) But this title was a most common one and numerous people in different regions and periods were known as 'Al-Qādī' without any addition. See Ibn Khallikān (Būlāq edition, 1299 Hg.), p. 182, 7, and De Slane's note in his translation I, p. 418. According to Ibn Khallikān, Abū 'Alī

Al-Ḥusain b. Aḥmad Al-Marwarūdi was also called among the Shafi'ites 'Al-Qādī' only and therefore M. Schreiner identified him with the one mentioned in Al-Ghazzālī's books (see M. Schreiner - Geschichte des Aś'aritentum, p. 23, n. 1.) Yet both identifications seem to be wrong as Al-Ghazzālī apparently mentions the same 'Qādī' with his full name too: Al-Qāḍī Abū-l-Tayyib Al-Ṭabarī ("Iḥyā" II, 8, p. 1128, 7; 1128, 7) and I would therefore suggest to identify him with Ṭāhir b. 'Abdallah Al-Ṭabarī Al-Baghdādī, a well-known Shafi'ite scholar who was also known by the title 'Al-Qādī' only (Cf. Al-Subkī, "Ṭabaqāt" III, p. 176 ff., especially 177, 4-5 and Ibn Khallikān, p. 182, 18, as well as De Slane's translation, p. 419, 10.) We do not know whether this Qādī wrote also a book against the Bāṭiniyya, but he lived in Baghdad and died there in the year Al-Ghazzālī was born (1058/450 Hg.) and dealt with several theological topics, in which Al-Ghazzālī was most interested. One may therefore assume that his ideas and books were well known to Al-Ghazzālī and perhaps used by him during his stay in Baghdad, where he wrote his "Mustazhirī". The same Qādī is mentioned with his full name and in the same context as in "Iḥyā" III, 8, by Ibn Al-Djawzī in his "Talbīs-Iblīs", pp. 221-222. Cf. also Ibn Ḥadjar Al-Haithamī, "Fatāwā Ḥadīthiyya", p. 151, 9; "Fatāwā Al-Subkī" (Cairo, 1356), p. 269, 14. As for Al-Bāqillānī - see "Iḥyā" IV, 7, p. 2727, 11, where he is mentioned with his full name. H. Laoust seems to accept Goldziher's wrong identification of the 'Qādī' with Al-Bāqillānī (see his La Politique de Gazālī (Paris, 1970), pp. 78, 127.

25 Thus A.J. Wensinck for example used in his studies on Al-Ghazzālī books like "Ma'āridj Al-Quds", "Al-Madnūn Al-Saghīr", "Al-Durra Al-Fakhīra" etc. M. Smith added to these also "Al-Risāla Al-Laduniyya", "Rawdat Al-Tālibīn", "Tahsīn Al-Zunūn" and others. Several articles in both editions of the EI do the same. See 'Allah' (EI<sup>1,2</sup>), 'Faid' (Suppl.) and 'Khalk' (EI<sup>1</sup>.)

26 Cf. J. Jabre - La Notion de la Certitude selon Ghazali (Paris, 1958), p. 86 and W.M. Watt - "The Study of Al-Gazālī" (Oriens, 13-14, 1961), pp. 121-124. Bouyges' and Badawi's studies (mentioned in note 18) are the most important and comprehensive works in this field.

27 See especially Ch. III and Appendix A.

28 An example: Al-Ghazzālī copied from Abū Tālib several Hadīth sayings with regard to the importance of prayer (Cf. "Ihyā" I, 4, pp. 262-263 to "Qūt Al-Qulūb" II, 3, p. 149) with the only difference that Al-Ghazzālī brought all these sayings together in one of his opening chapters of the book on prayer, as is usually with him, unlike Abū Tālib who dispersed these sayings all along his book on prayer. Yet one eccentric Hadīth does not appear in the "Ihyā". This Hadīth says that the whole difference between unbelief and belief is the omission of prayer. ('Baina-l-kufr wa-l-īmān tarku-l-ṣalāt', "Qūt", ibid., p. 149, 13.) To another Hadīth of this kind Al-Ghazzālī adds an especially mild explanation which is not to be found in the "Qūt" (Cf. "Ihyā", ibid., p. 263, 5-6.) One

is tempted to see in these facts signs of the Al-Ghazzālī's well-known tolerance, which was especially stressed by I. Goldziher (Vorlesungen, Ch. IV, par. 17-18.) Yet any conclusion of this kind is definitely wrong as the missing Hadīth is to be found elsewhere in the same book of the "Ihyā" (see ibid., p. 161, 3; 267, 8)! Obviously Al-Ghazzālī did not remember what he omitted elsewhere and attached no importance to this omission.

29 Cf. Bouyges - Essai, pp. 121-122 (especially his quotations of Gardner) and p. 16, no. 6, p. 124, no. 193 etc. Because of such unfounded generalizations one and the same book could be regarded both as being typical of Al-Ghazzālī's manner of writing and style as well as being typical of spurious books attributed to him! Cf. Bouyges, ibid., p. 84, 5, as well as J. Pedersen - "Ein Gedicht des al-Gazālīs" (Monde Oriental 25, 1931), p. 248, with regard to the "Minhādj Al-'Ābidīn".

30 Others compared Al-Ghazzālī i.a. to St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas etc. Cf. H. Bauer - Die Dogmatik Al-Ghazzālīs (Halle, 1912), pp. 1-2; H. Frick - Ghazālī's Selbstbiographie: Ein Vergleich mit Augustinus Konfessionen (Leipzig, 1919); Laugier de Beaurecueil - "Ghazālī et saint Thomas d'Aquin" (Bull. de l'Inst. Fr. d'Arch. Orientale du Caire, XLVI, 1947).

31 Cf. M. Smith - Al-Ghazālī the Mystic (London, 1944), Ch. 5, especially pp. 67-68.

32 Of course even the scope of a book can be a criterion of purpose, but this has to be studied in detail separately with each author. Evidently this criterion is unacceptable with regard to Al-Ghazzālī's writings (Cf. the small esoteric "Mishkāt Al-Anwār" to the voluminous "Ihyā".)

33 Cf. W.M. Watt - "A Forgery in al-Ghazzālī's Mishkāt?" (JRAS, 1949) pp. 5-22; W.M. Watt - "The Authenticity of the works ascribed to al-Ghazzālī" (JRAS, 1952) pp. 24-45. See also his Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al Ghazzālī (Edinburgh, 1963).

34 See JRAS, 1952, pp. 33-34.

35 W.M. Watt tends to label as spurious parts, especially the last chapters, of authentic books. See JRAS, 1952, pp. 38-40, 45 (but cf. also JRAS, 1949, pp. 18-21.) Yet a detailed study of the end of the "Mishkāt" and its other chapters showed no important differences between them. Cf. the examples in the following chapters of this book as well as above n. 7. It may be worthwhile to note here that the great Qur'ān commentator Fakhr Al-Dīn Al-Rāzī (d.1209/606Hg.) already knew that Al-Ghazzālī's "Mishkāt" included the last section, considered as spurious by Watt. Cf. his "Mafātīḥ Al-Ghaib" (Cairo, 1324 Hg.) VI, p. 274 ff. and especially p. 280 ff., where he discusses Al-Ghazzālī's "Mishkāt" in detail. See also Dr. A. Afifi's Introduction to his edition of the "Mishkāt" (Cairo, 1964/1383 Hg.) p. 27 (he considers this section to be the "natural end" of the book).

36 Cf. F. Jabre - La Notion de la Ma'rifa chez Ghazālī (Beirut, 1958), p. 107.

37 F. Jabre - La Notion de la Certitude selon Ghazālī (Paris, 1958), p. 86.

38 F. Jabre - Al-Ghazālī: Al-Munqidh min adalāl (sic); Traduction française avec introduction et notes (Beyrouth, 1959), p. 52. These generalizations come very close to the Arabic Introduction of Djamīl Ṣalība and Kāmil 'Iyād of the "Munqidh" (see their 5th edition, Damascus, 1956/1376 Hg.), p. 7. As to Watt's and Jabre's general approach to Al-Ghazzālī's Doctrine cf. below.



CHAPTER II  
The Vocabulary of Al-Ghazzālī

In the present chapter I have assembled the words and idioms which seem to me to typify Al-Ghazzālī's Arabic writings, thus distinguishing them from those of other authors in his own and in the preceding generations. Words and expressions have mainly been chosen by merit of their frequency in his books written at various periods, as opposed to the writings of other authors<sup>1</sup>, and on the basis of their particular combinations in his writings, which lend them special meanings within his doctrine. I prefer, therefore, to talk about 'guiding' or 'leading' words<sup>2</sup> in Al-Ghazzālī's language, not only to discuss his vocabulary technically; and I shall list in this chapter not only nouns, verbs etc., but also stylistic-syntactical compounds (adverbs, conjunctions), and different combinations (a noun with recurring adjectives, possessives, adjunctive sentences and exclamations.) This will also clarify the peculiar construction of the present chapter: had the purpose been lexical or philological, it would have had to be set up alphabetically or according to parts of speech. However, since the purpose is to determine the connection between Al-Ghazzālī's thought and his means of expression in his writings, I have chosen the thematic division of this chapter, both in the division into principal sections and in the order of the internal sub-divisions (excepting the last paragraph.) The reader will thus be enabled to ascertain the varied manner and shades of expression typical

of Al-Ghazzālī's writings, as well as follow the development of one characteristic feature of his style (such as the wish to stress the certainty of things, or mockery of the opponent's arguments); but he will search in vain in this chapter for a descriptive, historic-philologic illustration of Al-Ghazzālī's language.

The first condition for determining the fixed and unchanging part of Al-Ghazzālī's vocabulary is to establish a list of authentic books which should form the basis of this study. I have already, in Ch. I, dwelt briefly on the multitudes of difficulties confronting a scholar in this respect, as well as on the doubtful possibility of determining a line of unquestionably authentic books, at the beginning of such a research. However, such a basis is indispensable for this kind of research, and there is no doubt that this study will contribute in the future towards the establishing of a valid canon of Al-Ghazzālī's writings. After much deliberation, I have chosen as basic books for my research all those books by Al-Ghazzālī about which no controversy has been raised in scientific literature (including, however, some important books, certain parts of which have caused some doubt) and about which I myself have no doubts whatsoever. I have not included short epistles, which have a special style nor any book written in Persian. This list, which includes more than forty books (of which twenty-five form part of the "Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn") is comprised mainly of religious-moral books, but there are also some books which deal with other subjects, such as philosophy and polemics, and books dealing with special legal

or theological problems. The list therefore reflects Al-Ghazzālī's work on different subjects, at different periods of his life and it undoubtedly constitutes a valid nucleus of his literary work. The following is a list of the books according to their assumed chronological order, together with a listing of the editions I have used (unfortunately I could not always use the best or most recent editions), and the abbreviated names, which will be used henceforth. (I have not chosen any book written by Al-Ghazzālī prior to his arrival in Baghdād because of the assumption that such books are only resumés or renderings of his teachers' works<sup>3</sup>):

I. Al-Ghazzālī's stay in Baghdād (1091-1095/  
484-488 Hg.)

- "Kitāb Al-Wadjīz" (n.d., n.p.)<sup>4</sup> - "Al-Wadjīz"  
 "Maqāsid Al-Falāsifa" ed. Suleimān Dunjā,  
 Cairo 1961 - "Maqāsid"  
 "Tahāfut Al-Falāsifa" - ed. M. Bouyges,  
 Beyrouth 1927 - "Tahāfut"  
 "Mi'yār Al-'Ilm" - Cairo 1927/1346 Hg.<sup>5</sup> - "Mi'yār"  
 "Mihakk Al-Nazar" - ed. Na'ṣānī, Cairo (n.d.) - "Mihakk"  
 "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya wa-Fadā'il Al-  
 Mustazhiriyya" - ed. I. Goldziher, Leiden  
 1916<sup>6</sup> ("Al-Mustazhiri") Streitschrift  
 "Mizān Al-'Amal" - Cairo 1328 Hg. - "Mizān"  
 "Al-Iqtisād fi-l-I'tiqād" - Cairo (n.d.) - "Iqtisād"<sup>8</sup>

Quoted as:

Quoted as:

II. Al-Ghazzālī's period of vagrancy (including his temporary stay at Tūs) 1095-1106/  
468-499 Hg.

- "Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn" - Cairo 1356/57 Hg.<sup>9</sup> - "Ihyā"  
 (I have examined most parts of this book, and shall supply examples from all its parts, but shall mention here only those parts of the "Ihyā" which specifically furnished a basis for my work):  
 "Kitāb Al-'Ilm" - "Ihyā" I, 1  
 "Kitāb Qawā'id Al-'Aqā'id" - "Ihyā" I, 2  
 "Kitāb Asrār Al-Tahāra" - "Ihyā" I, 3  
 "Kitāb Asrār Al-Ṣalāt" - "Ihyā" I, 4  
 "Kitāb Asrār Al-Zakāt" - "Ihyā" I, 5  
 "Kitāb Asrār Al-Siyām" - "Ihyā" I, 6  
 "Kitāb Asrār Al-Hadjjd" - "Ihyā" I, 7  
 "Kitāb Ādāb Tilāwat Al-Qur'ān" - "Ihyā" I, 8  
 "Kitāb Al-Halāl w-Al-Harām" - "Ihyā" II, 4  
 "Kitāb Ādāb Al-Safar" - "Ihyā" II, 7  
 "Kitāb Al-Samā' wa-l-Wadjd" - "Ihyā" II, 8  
 "Kitāb Al-Amr bi-l-Ma'rūf wa-l-Nahy 'an Al-Munkar" - "Ihyā" II, 9  
 "Kitāb Ādāb Al-Ma'īsha wa-Akhlāq Al-Nubuwwa" - "Ihyā" II, 10  
 "Kitāb Sharh 'Adjā'ib Al-Qalb" - "Ihyā" III, 1  
 "Kitāb Āfāt Al-Lisān" - "Ihyā" III, 4  
 "Kitāb Dhamm Al-Dunjā" - "Ihyā" III, 6  
 "Kitāb Dhamm Al-Ghurūr" - "Ihyā" III, 10  
 "Kitāb Al-Tawba" - "Ihyā" IV, 1  
 "Kitāb Al-Ṣabr wa-l-Shukr" - "Ihyā" IV, 2  
 "Kitāb Al-Faqr wa-l-Zuhd" - "Ihyā" IV, 4

	<u>Quoted as:</u>
"Kitāb Al-Tawhīd wa-l-Tawakkul"	- "Ihyā" IV, 5
"Kitāb Al-Mahabba wa-l-Shawq wa-l-Uns wa-l-Ridā"	- "Ihyā" IV, 6
"Kitāb Al-Niyya wa-l-Ṣidq wa-l-Ikhlās"	- "Ihyā" IV, 7
"Kitāb Al-Tafakkur"	- "Ihyā" IV, 9
"Kitāb Dhikr Al-Mawt"	- "Ihyā" IV, 10
"Kitāb Al-Maqṣad Al-Asnā wa Sharḥ Asmā Allah Al-Ḥusnā" - Cairo (n.d.)	- "Al-Maqṣad"
"Djawāhir Al-Qur'ān" - Cairo 1329 Hg.	- "Djawāhir"
"Kitāb Al-Arba'īn fī Usūl Al-Dīn" - Cairo 1328 Hg.	- "Al-Arba'īn"
"Al-Qustās Al-Mustaqīm" - (n.d., n.p.)	- "Al-Qustās"
"Faiṣal-Al-Tafriqa baīna-l-Islām wa-l-Zandaqa" - Na'ṣānī's Madjmū'a, Cairo 1907/1325 Hg.	- "Faiṣal"
"Mishkāt Al-Anwār" - in Na'ṣānī's Madjmū'a	- "Mishkāt"
III. <u>Al-Ghazzālī's last period in Nīshāpūr and Tūs, 1106-1111/499-505 Hg.</u>	
"Al-Munqidh min Al-Dalāl" - Djamīl Ṣalībā wa-Kāmil 'Iyād (eds.), Damascus 1956/1376 Hg. (Fifth edition)	- "Al-Munqidh"
"Kitāb Al-Mustasfā min 'Ilm Al-Uṣūl" - (n.d., n.p.)	- "Al-Mustasfā"
"Kitāb Al-Imlā fī Ishkālāt Al-Ihyā" - at the end of the above mentioned ed. of the "Ihyā"	- "Al-Imlā"
"Kitāb Ildjām Al-'Awāmm an 'Ilm al-Kalām", Madjmū'a - Cairo (n.d.)	- "Ildjām"

In addition I have used (and quoted examples of) many other books of Al-Ghazzālī (see special Index at the end of the book) but I have not included them in this basic list of authentic books, either because of doubts with regard to their authenticity or because of their having a special linguistic or stylistic character. Some of these books will be dealt with in Ch. III.

A closer look at the present chapter will show that the words and expressions included here are not typical of Al-Ghazzālī's style only, and most certainly are not original in his writings,<sup>10</sup> except for a small part of them which is actually rare in the work of other authors. Their uniqueness in Al-Ghazzālī's writings stems therefore from different reasons, such as the following:

- a. The obvious frequency of each expression. (Some expressions, in particular the adverbs, appear obvious to the reader at a most percursorial glance through Al-Ghazzālī's books, whereas they are much less frequent in other authors' writings.)
- b. The fixed combination of certain words or expressions which lend them special meanings in Al-Ghazzālī's writings. (This is what I have termed above 'leading words'.)
- c. The frequent appearance of all these expressions together in his writings, so that we may regard them as the central part of his basic vocabulary.

The main conclusions to be inferred therefore from the material presented in this chapter are:

- a. The chapter sets out to demonstrate and prove that Al-Ghazzālī's language was remarkably consistent throughout his life - a phenomenon most interesting both as relating to the man and to the study of language in general (see above p. 15), since this would mean that violent changes in a man's life, such as occurred in the life of Al-Ghazzālī, do not necessarily entail changes in his language<sup>11</sup>. Yet such consistency makes the establishment of the chronological order of Al-Ghazzālī's writings most difficult. It is, of course, possible to point out a certain word or linguistic compound as more frequent in one book and non-existent in another, or to ascertain that there is a linguistic tie between certain books which sets them apart from others, but nothing whatsoever can be deduced therefrom with regard to the order of composition of the books<sup>12</sup>. It is, however, possible to use the consistent element in Al-Ghazzālī's language as a help in the attempt either to discard or to ascertain the authenticity of books attributed to him<sup>13</sup>. Yet vocabulary, or style, should always be only one of the many means of attributing a book to a given author. Therefore the system of using the material in this chapter as a tool can only be the following: We may regard the consistent vocabulary as an additional proof that a certain book was or was not written by Al-Ghazzālī. Any book in which this vocabulary does not appear, and about which there are other grave doubts, may be accepted as spurious. However, if a book is found which shows

- some of Al-Ghazzālī's stylistic characteristics, this does not necessarily prove it to be authentic, since similar use of language may also be accidental, or typical of the times, as well as results of influence and copying etc.
- b. The vast number of examples I have collected call for some linguistic corrections in the editions of Al-Ghazzālī's books, as well as corrections in the existing translations of his works. I shall make such suggestions for the correction of texts at the end of sections or in the notes (unless they are obvious printing errors, which I have corrected next to the quotation from the printed editions as they are.) Such corrections both in themselves and as examples, as well as the description of the consistent and recurring elements in Al-Ghazzālī's writings, may be of help to any potential editor or translator, although there still remains much to be done in this field.
- c. The better part of the material in this chapter will call for important psychological conclusions regarding Al-Ghazzālī's doctrine, manner of writing and influence. The examples show that Al-Ghazzālī both looked for and found linguistic as well as emotional means of persuasion in addition to the rational argumentation on which he based his ideas. His great influence on the following generations may have been due to his style even more than to his argumentation, a fact to which almost no one has paid attention so far. His language

is rich in expressions of stress and emphasis which convey to his readers his feelings of religious certainty. Expressions of mockery, vituperation, surprise and fright abound, and are meant to shatter the confidence of his enemies and that of his indifferent readers. He was indeed an artist-pedagogue, and his books prove that his strength lay not only in religious thought but also, and perhaps mainly, in explaining and illustrating it to the reader.

- d. I also hope that this chapter will contribute to the study of the Arabic language and the history of Arabic style, which are both still in their infancy, and may therefore benefit by any preliminary study such as the present.

The structure of the following chapter and the examples quoted therein may be described thus: In spite of its large scope, this chapter contains only a small part of a vast card index which I possess, and fewer examples than the Hebrew edition of this book. In order not to render the scope and construction of the chapter too cumbersome, I have selected from the card index only fifty typical expressions, and have commented on additional ones in accompanying notes. After a general linguistic explanation of each expression with the help of different kinds of dictionaries (although these of course do not usually include the special typical meaning of expressions in Al-Ghazzālī's style) I have quoted a few examples of every phenomenon. I have translated some examples in every case

and usually brought these at the beginning of the paragraph whereas the following examples appear generally in the assumed chronological order of the books with some more translation of difficult or obscure passages. The translation is as broad as possible and therefore a somewhat free translation at times in order to convey to the reader the subject and idea dealt with. I have tried to shorten the quotations, which accounts for their being mostly fragmentary, though their abridged meaning should always remain intelligible. I have also tried to avoid repeating the same example in different parts of the thesis, but could not avoid this entirely. It often happens, therefore, that a certain paragraph, presented in one place for an expression used therein, contains other expressions discussed elsewhere. It also happens sometimes that the number of a footnote is given in Arabic numerals in the Arabic quotations.

#### Expressions of Stress and Emphasis

- a. 'Alā-l-Taḥqīq, Taḥqīqan, fī-l-Ḥaḥqīqa
- b. Bi-l-Ḍarūra, Ḍarūran
- c. Relative clauses
- d. Other adverbs
- e. Conditional sentences
- f. La'amrī

As I have already pointed out the division of the material in the present chapter is somewhat arbitrary, its main object being to facilitate the organization of the material and its study. The sections are, however, inter-related, and some of the following sections are also

connected with the subject of 'Stress and Emphasis' in Al-Ghazzālī's writings, for example the expressions of wonder and surprise, exaggeration, intimidation etc.

I have embodied in this chapter certain phenomena which, though very different in respect to their syntactic functions, are remarkably frequent in Al-Ghazzālī's work. They are intended to inspire in the reader a feeling that that is obviously what is meant and cannot be understood in any other way. It sometimes seems that Al-Ghazzālī chose these expressions and repeated them so often with the clear psychological purpose of persuading the reader by emotional means, in addition to actual reationalistic polemics<sup>14</sup>. It may well be that Al-Ghazzālī was so very convinced of his faith that he repeated this conviction of his incessantly, since the achievement of certainty (Yaqīn) was evidently the main achievement of his search. (Cf. f.i. "Al-Munqidh", p. 58, 1.)

a. Ala l-Taḥqīq, Taḥqīqan, fī-l-Ḥaqīqa

The above words, which denote certainty, are most frequent in Al-Ghazzālī's language and are closely connected with the meaning of the work 'Taḥqīq'. However, this word and the use of it are not typical of Al-Ghazzālī alone, and are a heritage of earlier Ṣūfī and other philosophy<sup>15</sup>.

'Taḥqīq' means verification by research and study, and its opposite is therefore the guess, the conjecture ('Zann', 'Takhmīn') or the blind following of predecessors ('Taqlīd')<sup>16</sup>. The verb connected with this word (meaning to determine the certainty of a matter), usually appears

in the fifth conjugation whereas it rarely appears in the second conjugation (in the latter it means the very process of research and study which precedes the determination of certainty)<sup>17</sup>. 'Al-Muḥaḥiqūn' refers both to the philosophers whose proofs are accurate and to the Ṣūfīs who know the truth and speak the truth<sup>18</sup>. The Ṣūfī are also called 'Ahl Al-Taḥqīq', but I did not find this term in Al-Ghazzālī's writings<sup>19</sup>. The combination 'Ala-l-Taḥqīq' should probably be translated as 'truly' (the same applies to 'Taḥqīqan', 'bi-l-Taḥqīq') or 'as a matter of fact', 'actually'. However, it does not appear in the dictonaries as an idiom, and is apparently quite rare in the writings of other authors. The word appears often in Al-Ghazzālī's writings to express controversy, for instance: "It is customary to think this way, while actually, as a matter of fact, things are different."

'Alā-l-Taḥqīq

فلما رأيت ... انتدبت لتحرير هذا الكتاب ردا على ...  
وكاشفا عن غوائل مذهبهم واوراثه التي هي على التحقيق مضاحك العقال ...  
(تهافت ٦٦ - ٧٨)

(and when I saw ... I girded up my loins and wrote this book in order to answer ... and to uncover the dangers inherent in philosophy and its faults, which actually do cause the derision of intelligent people.)

وكرامات الاولياء ( هي ) على التحقيق بدايات الانبياء  
( المنقذ ٣٠٣ - ٣٠٤ )

(The miracles of the saints are actually but the beginning of the actions of the prophets.)

ولكن مع ذلك نذكر مسلكا واحدا هو على التحقيق قاصم الظهير يعني (أ)  
في ابطال مذهبهم ( المستظهرى ١١١ - ١١٢ )

فكلما زاد سنة نقص يقية عمه فزيادته نقصانه على التحقيق  
( المستظهرى ١٧٩ - ١٨٠ )

فان من قهر شهواته فهو الحر على التحقيق بل هو الملك  
( ميزان ١١٥ - ١١٦ )

ولكن ... اتخذوا التعصب عادتهم وآلتهم وسموه ذبا عن الدين ...  
وفيه على التحقيق هلاك الخلق ( احياى ١٠١ - ١٠٢ )

والفقر قد يكون من الشواغل كما ان الغنى قد يكون من الشواغل (عن الله)  
وانما الشاغل على التحقيق حب الدنيا ( احياى ١٩٦ - ١٩٧ )

فكان حاصل ما ذكره شيئا من ركيك فلسفة فيثاغورس وهو المحكي في كتاب  
" اخوان الصفا " وهو على التحقيق حشو الفلاسفة  
( المنقذ ٩٣ - ٩٤ الخ )

واما من اثبت النبوة بلسانه وسوى اوضاع الشرع على الحكمة فهو على التحقيق  
كافر بالنبوة وانما هو مؤمن بحكم (بحكم) له طالع مخصوص يقتضي طالعه  
ان يكون متبوعا ( المنقذ ١١٧ - ١١٨ )

(Yet he who admits the fact of prophecy, but compares the basis of traditional law to human wisdom, actually denies prophecy and believes in a kind of human legislator whose horoscope makes people listen to him)<sup>20</sup>.

Tahqīqan, fi-l-Haqīqa, bi-l-Haqīqa

صادف عالما مستقلا بالعلم تحقيقا لا اسما وحسبة لا رسما  
( ميزان ٢٥٠ - ٢٥١ )

(And he met a truly independent scientist, whose science goes deeper than name and appearance)<sup>21</sup>.

ولكن تعيين طريق واحد من طرق التقسيمات الممكنة لا يمكن الا بظن  
وتخمين فلا ندري تحقيقا انه<sup>٢٢</sup> الذى اراده رسول الله صلعم ام لا  
( احياى ١٦٤ - ١٦٥ - ١٦٦ الخ )

اذا انكشف له الحق كما هو عليه ولا يرى فاعلا بالحقيقة الا واحدا  
( احياى ١١٦ - ١١٧ - ١١٨ )

فانه لا يعني به انه هو تحقيقا بل كانه هو ...

( المقصد ١٠٦ - ١٠٧ انظر ايضا ٦ )

(... and he does not mean to say that truly he is HE  $\bar{m}$ an is God $\bar{z}$ , but that man, as it were is like Him.)

معرفة بالحقيقة لا بالتقليد عن الغير ( المنقذ ١٠٨ - ١٠٩ )

This last example clearly illustrates the importance of the words in question, which are opposed to the expression 'Taqlīd' and its parallels. The words thus become 'guiding words' in Al-Ghazzālī's work, and must be understood as such also when they stand by themselves. They express independent thought and the correct, true and certain conclusion following it, as opposed to a blind following of fathers and teachers.

There follow additional examples of this repetitive contrast, sometimes as two different positive systems, and not necessarily as a contrast of good and bad:

الى ان يتحقق ذلك لا عن تقليد الجماهير بل عن تحقيق لحقيقة العلة  
( ميزان ١٨٠١ الخ )

وهذا لا بد من حصوله اما عن تحقيق او تقليد وكلاهما من جملة الايمان  
( احياء ١٤٠٦١٥٩٦ )

هذا هو الحق فصدق به تقليدا فيعز على بسيط الارض من يعرف ذلك  
تحقيقا ( احياء ١٤٠٦٢٩٤٣٦ )

فاية رتبة في عالم الله اخس من رتبة من يتجمل بترك الحق المعتقد تقليدا  
بالتسارع الى قبول الباطل تصديقا دون ان يقبله خبرا وتحقيقا  
( تهافت ١٤٠٦٢٥٠ )

(... and is there a lower grade in God's universe than that of him who adorns himself<sup>23</sup> by forsaking the true traditional faith yet hastens to believe blindly in falsehood without any inquiry and verification?)<sup>24</sup>.

Sometimes we encounter the combination 'min ghair tahqīq', meaning an assumption, or meaning 'Taqlīd' without verification, as opposed to 'Tahqīq' (with recurrent use of words from the same root):

قلنا ولا غرض من هذه المسألة الا بيان انكم تتجملون بهذه الاسماء من غير  
تحقيق وان الله عندكم ليس فاعلا تحقيقا ولا العالم فعله تحقيقا وان اطلاق  
هذا الاسم مجاز منكم لا تحقيق وراءه وقد ظهر هذا  
( تهافت ١٤٠٦١٠٩١٤ )

... لانه لا يجوز نسبة مسلم الى كبيرة او صغيرة من غير تحقيق ... فلا  
يجوز ان يرمى مسلم بفسق او كفر من غير تحقيق  
( احياء ١٤٠٦٣٠٦٣٦١٥٧٣٦ الخ )

In this connection we have a scale of values according to which human beings and sciences can be judged: The lowest grades on this ladder of values are the blind following of inherited tradition ('Taqlīd'), and the grade of conjecture ('Takhmīn') and guesswork ('Zann'). Higher up is the search for truth ('Tahqīq') which leads to certainty ('Yaqīn')<sup>25</sup>. Indeed, only to the prophets is it given to achieve substantial certainty as to the true reality of things ('Haqā'iq Al- Umūr'). Yet every man must aspire to reach this level and not be satisfied with the level of conjecture and guesswork<sup>26</sup>. Furthermore, 'Fih' is a science of guesswork and conjecture<sup>27</sup>, and, wherever there is no explicit tradition regarding any detail of law, every man must make up his own mind, and judge independently, in details of law<sup>28</sup>. Therefore, no harm is done if he has made a mistake in his judgement, but his reward in the World Beyond will be smaller than that of him who judges rightly<sup>29</sup>. However, where matters of faith are concerned we must seek for true certainty ('Yaqīn') in all possible ways<sup>30</sup>. This is the axis around which Al-Ghazzālī's entire autobiography revolves. This also constitutes his most important and reiterated accusation against the philosophers - that their science of metaphysics



is based on assumptions only, which is in complete contrast to their assertions in the exact sciences<sup>31</sup>. It is not surprising, therefore, that Al-Ghazzālī set himself an important aim in his work: namely, to inspire his readers with the confidence and certainty that matters as he represents them in the framework of his religious Weltanschauung are actually as he depicts them. In this he invests his entire writing skill - in the very contents of his books, but also in emphasizing his doctrine between the lines, as it were, by using auxiliary aids such as the adverb 'Alā-l-Tahqīq'. Therefore the frequency of this adverb in his work can be understood only as part of this doctrine, and his doctrine alone can explain the reason for its frequency in his writings.

b. Bi-l-Darūra, Darūratan

Here again we have a word which is very frequent and well-known as a simple noun, meaning necessity<sup>32</sup> (or vital need). Al-Ghazzālī again uses it as an adverb, for the same purpose we have mentioned in the preceding section - in order to stress the truthfulness of his words, to convince the reader that things are necessarily this way, and not any other way, and that any different attitude is inconceivable.

Al-Ghazzālī accordingly uses this word not only where it is customary to employ it<sup>33</sup> in philosophy or theological polemics: namely, 'to denote a logical necessity, which cannot be doubted and which therefore needs no further proof (Burhān)', but also - and this is what makes

for the linguistic-factual uniqueness of this word in his writings - when he talks of empirical or emotional phenomena, and when he puts forward theories based on assumptions or feelings only. It is of course possible that in such cases the addition 'necessarily' would cover up for the lack of factual proofs. However, in spite of Jabre's contention, (see above, note 14) I do not consider this expression a camouflage, denoting a lack, as it were, of the ability to debate, since we all know that Al-Ghazzālī did have such an ability, as is revealed repeatedly in his books. Therefore we here again witness the echo of the 'necessary' religious certainty which Al-Ghazzālī acquired for himself and which he tried to convey to others in his writings. Yet, this certainty is based on religious experience and cannot be proved in a rational-logical manner, though it does not fall short of it - and sometimes even supersedes it in becoming a mighty and forceful conviction in the heart of those who understand.

Linguistically we must stress the fact that Al-Ghazzālī prefers the use of the expression 'Bi-l-Darūra' in spite of the fact that 'Darūratan' seems more commonly used and is usually the only expression given by the dictionaries. This is borne out by the relative number of examples given for each form which follows. As for the combination 'Alā-l-Darūra', I found it only twice in "Al-Munqidh" and it could have originated in a later error. There follow several examples, chosen from scores in which Al-Ghazzālī uses the expression 'by necessity' as commonly accepted:

Bi-l-Darūra

إذا الإرادة تتضمن العلم بالضرورة فكذلك الفعل يتضمن الإرادة بالضرورة  
(تهافت ٩٦٩٩ - ١٠)  
(Will-power by necessity includes knowledge, and action by necessity includes willpower)<sup>34</sup>.

ومهما ثبت أنه مريد عالم بعل إرادته فهو حي بالضرورة  
(تهافت ٩٦٢١٠)

إذا صدقت أحدهما (القضيتان المتنافيتان) كذبت الأخرى بالضرورة  
(معيار ١٦٢٦ - ١٦٢٧)  
فإن أجزاء المركب تتقدم على المركب بالضرورة  
(محك ١٢٦٨)

الجوهر بالضرورة لا يخلو عن الحركة والسكون  
(الاقتصاد ١٥٦١٥)

فإذا اجتمعا قام القتال بينهما بالضرورة (الشهوة والعقل) ٠٠٠ ومهما  
غلب أحدهما أزعج الآخر بالضرورة (أحياء ٤٤، ٤٤، ١١٦٢٠٩٠٦ الخ)

Darūratān

وهو أيضا محال يعرف بطلانه ضرورة (تهافت ٤٤١، ٢-١)

(This, too, is impossible, its nullification being known of necessity.)

٠٠٠ وكل مفرد فهو معنى ويدل عليه لا محالة بلفظ فيجب ضرورة أن ينظر  
في المعاني المفردة وأقسامها (محك ٨، ٣ - ٥)  
وكان من المعلم أن الولي يتمنى لقاء وليه وكان من المعلم أنهم لا يتمنون

الموت الذي هو سبب اللقاء فلزم ضرورة أنهم ليسوا أولياء الله  
(القسطاس ٤٤٣، ٣ - ١)

The most common contrast of the logical necessity, which complements it in certain respects, is the intellectual discussion of the matter (Nazar)<sup>35</sup>. A combination of the two is most frequent in the Streitschrift and includes all possible ways of proof of an assumption which has been made.

If we assume that it is impossible to follow either of these two ways, the assumption itself falls through.

وعلى الجملة لا يعرف (استحالة صدور الاثنين من واحد) بالضرورة أو  
بالنظر (تهافت ١٢١، ٥ - ٧)

(To sum up, you can never tell if two may originate from one - by the necessity of logic or by intellectual speculation.)

بضرورة العقل<sup>٣٦</sup> أو نظره

استحالة إرادة قديمة متعلقة بأحداث شيء ٠٠٠ تفهمونه بضرورة العقل  
أو نظره (تهافت ٩٦٢٩، ١٠)

وبما إذا عرفتم صحة كونه معصوماً ووجود عصمته بضرورة العقل أو بنظره أو  
سماع خير متواتر عن رسول الله صلعم (المستظهرى ٦٣٩، ٧ - ٩)

إن قولكم إن هذا لا يتصور، عرفتموه ضرورة أو نظراً؟ ولا يمكن دعوى  
واحد منهما (تهافت ٦٣٩، ٧ - ٨)

(You said that such an idea was inconceivable - are your words based on the logical necessity or on the intellectual speculation? In this case you can argue neither this way nor the other.)

عن ضرورة او عن نظر

من اين عرفتم ما ذكرتموه عن ضرورة او عن نظر او عن نقل عن الامام المعصم وسماع؟ فان عرفتموه ضرورة فكيف خالفكم فيه ذو العقول السليمة؟ ومعنى كون الشيء ضروريا مستغنيا عن التأمل، اشتراك (اشترك؟) العقلاء في دركه ولو ساغ ان يهذى الانسان بدعوى الضرورة في كل ما يهواه لجاز لخصومهم دعوى الضرورة في نقيض ما ادعوه (المستظهرى ١١، ١٣ الخ)

ضروريا او نظريا

... فكيف تدعيه ضروريا وان كان نظريا فما البرهان عليه؟

(تهافت ٢١٢، ١١، ١٢)

(How can you argue that such a thing is proved by logical necessity? And if it is proved by intellectual consideration, what is the proof?)<sup>37</sup>.

I have presented the above examples in order to show the reader Al-Ghazzālī's particular use of the adverb 'bi-l-Darūra'. He uses it while debating and preaching things which seem to him to be proved, though he can most certainly not argue the primordial logical necessity with regard to them, and he is therefore, acting in a way similar to that of the Bāṭiniyya, whom he attacked for that very reason. Sometimes, however, Al-Ghazzālī uses this adverb at the end of a long discussion even after supplying the accepted theoretical arguments. In such cases there is some justification for the use of this adverb, because he ostensibly claims that the arguments furnished are as convincing as a logical necessity<sup>38</sup>. See, for example "Al-Munqidh" p117, 2-3, following the chapter on the

veracity of prophecy:

فقد ذكرنا حقيقة النبوة ووجودها بالضرورة بدليل وجود (علم) خواص الادوية وغيرها ...

('We have already dwelt upon the veracity of prophecy and its existence by necessity, and have proved this by the fact that there exists the science of medicine, etc.')

The adverb does, however, often appear in connection with matters which Al-Ghazzālī does not prove, nor can prove logically, and where his references are only religious insight or religious experience, which have for him an absolute certainty. In such cases it closely resembles the concept 'Yaqīn' which we have mentioned above, and replaces it; and it seems that here Al-Ghazzālī has chosen the adverb 'bi-l-Darūra' instead of 'Yaqīn',<sup>39</sup> on purpose, since he tries to furnish a form of objective logical proof conveying matters of feeling and emotions. This is especially obvious in the examples from the "Al-Munqidh", and I shall therefore start with those:

وما بان لي بالضرورة من ممارسة طريقتهم (طريقة الصوفية) حقيقة النبوة  
وخاصيتها (المنقذ ١٠٤، ٣)

(... and by following the Sūfīs I have understood by necessity and with certainty both the truths of prophecy and its properties.)

فهذه (ان الانبياء اطباء القلوب) امور عرفناها بالضرورة الجارية مجرى  
المشاهدة<sup>٤٠</sup> (المنقذ ١١١، ٢)

ثم اني ٠٠٠ بان لي في اثناء ذلك على الضرورة ٠٠٠ ان الانسان خلق  
من بدن وقلب (المنقذ ٣٦١٠ - ٥)

فكذلك بان لي على الضرورة بان ادوية العبادات لا يدرك وجه تأثيرها  
ببضاعة عقل العقلاء بل يجب فيها تقليد الانبياء  
(لنقذ ٦١١٠ ٢ الخ)

ودل بالمجاهدة بالاموال على العفة والجود اللذان هما تابعان بالضرورة  
لاصلاح الشهوة (ميزان ٧٦٥٧ - ٨)

فالعاصي بالضرورة ناقص الايمان (احياء ٤٦٤ أ ٢٥٢٠٨٧)

الناس ينقسمون في الآخرة بالضرورة الى اربعة اقسام  
(احياء ٤٦٤ أ ٦٢١١٥ ١)

فنعوذ بالله من دواعي الجهل والشك والارتياح السائق بالضرورة الى  
سوء المنقلب والمآب (احياء ٤٦٤ أ ١٠٦٢١٥٢ - ١١)

ومن لم يدقق نظرفيه (في اسم السميع) وقع بالضرورة في محض التشبيه  
(المقصد ٩٦١٤)

انظر ايضا :

احياء ٤٦٤ و ٣٦١٠٦٢١١٠ ٣٦١١٠٦٢١١٠ ٤٦٤ ٣٦١١٠٦٢١١٠ ٤٦٤  
٣٦٥٩٦٣٦٥٧ ايها الولد

#### Note

Of particular difficulty in "Al-Munqidh" is the sentence:

فرد الخلق الى الاجتهاد ضرورة الانبياء والائمة مع العلم بانهم (قد)  
يخطئون (المنقذ ١٦٩٠ - ٢)

It may be translated as: 'Prophets and religious leaders must orientate the people to rely on their free decisions even though they know that man is likely to err.'

It might, however, be possible to read the sentence in a different way, starting from the assumption that it is badly constructed<sup>41</sup> and translate it thus: 'Prophets and religious leaders have by necessity guided the people to rely on their free decisions though they knew that they were likely to err.'

Conjectures referring to the right version are of course of little value as long as we do not have a reliable manuscript or edition. I shall, however, quote the following parallel in order to bear out the first suggestion:

والسير بسير الضعفاء ضرورة الانبياء والاولياء والعلماء

(احياء ٤٦٤ د ٦٦٢٤٠٤)

(Other examples for the use of 'Darūra' in the constructive state see in "Tahāfut", p. 10, 15; 277, 5; 299, 8.)

On the other hand, the common use of 'Darūratān' as an adverb in Al-Ghazzālī's writing could strengthen the second suggestion of reading this sentence.

#### c. Relative clauses

A different kind of syntactical form of stress and emphasis in Al-Ghazzālī's work, which is related, both textually and linguistically, to the above mentioned 'by

necessity', is the relative clause which Al-Ghazzālī uses very often. These relative clauses do not contain real description and their main purpose is to stress something which was stated previously. This function is fulfilled mainly in the negative with words expressing logical necessity, certainty etc., such as in the recurring version, especially in the Streitschrift, of the relative sentence 'Lā yutamāra fīhi' (about which no one has any doubts.)

ويعرف ذلك في المنطق معرفة لا يتماهى فيها  
(تهافت ٤٦١٨٦)

(... and this is known in the science of logic with certain knowledge which cannot be contended. [Cf. also "Tahāfut", p. 9, 87.]

فان الناظر في الهندسة اذا احضر المقدمات ورتبها على الشكل الواجب حصل العلم بالنتيجة ضرورة على وجه لا يتماهى فيه

(المستظهرى ١٨٠١٥ - ١٧)  
(If the man who deals in geometry supplies the primary conjectures and arranges them correctly, he will of necessity achieve knowledge of the result in a manner which cannot be contended.)

فان المقدمات النظرية اذا رتبت على شروطها افادت العلم بالنتيجة على وجه لا يتماهى فيه ، ويكون العلم المستفاد من المقدمات بعد حصولها ضروريا كالعلم بالمقدمات الضرورية المنتجة له<sup>٤٢</sup>

(المستظهرى ١٨٠١٨ - ٢٠)

وقد ثبت بهذه المقدمات الضرورية واجب الوجود صار العلم بعد حصوله ضروريا لا يتماهى فيه  
(المستظهرى ٤٣٠ - ٥)

وكذلك النظريات فانها بعد حصولها من المقدمات تبقى ضرورية لا يتماهى فيها  
(المستظهرى ١٧٥٣١ - ١٨)

انظرا ايضا :

بل بالفاظ صريحة لا يتماهى فيها (المستظهرى ٢٠٥٤٦ - ٢١)

ولكن مجموع الوقائع يورث علما ضروريا ثم لا يتماهى في تواتر القرآن  
(احياء ٥٦٢ ، ٩٥٦٣٤٥٦)

بل اقول : ظهر لنا بالبصيرة الواضحة التي لا يتماهى فيها ان ...  
(جواهر ٤٣١ - ٤)

In "Al-Munqidh" the combination is repeated while addressing the reader:

فاذا جربت ذلك ( صدق النبي ) في الف والفين وآلاف حصل لك علم ضرورى لا يتماهى فيه  
(المنقذ ٢٠٨ - ٢١)

(... and when you have thus examined a thousand, two thousand and thousands of cases, you will have acquired the necessary knowledge of certainty, which you will not doubt.)

بل عرفتها ( شفقة الاب ) بقرائن احواله وشواهد اعماله في مصادره وموارده علما ضروريا لا تتماهى فيه (المنقذ ١٢٠ ، ٢٠٢ - ٢١)

In contrast to these negative relative sentences, which are negative in form but positive in meaning, there follow a number of relative sentences of a different kind, with the opposite function. These should destroy the

reader's confidence and belief. Fixed linguistic associations recur here as well:

ونبين ان كل ذلك تهويل ما وراءه تحصيل  
(تهافت ٨٥٧)

(... and we shall make it clear that all these things are only meant to frighten the reader with unreal fright.)

فان هذه الامور تقم عليها براهين هندسية حسابية لا يبقى معها ريبه  
(تهافت ٨٥١١ - ٩)

وهو هوس لا يتخيله عاقل ولا يغتر به الا جاهل  
(تهافت ١١٥٢٦٤ - ١٢)

(... and this is a madness<sup>43</sup> which the understanding cannot even conceive and to which only a fool might be tempted.)

فدل ان هذه خيالات لا حاصل لها  
(تهافت ٥٥٢٥٢)

وفيها عبارات هائلة (في الشطحات) ليس وراءها طائل  
(احياء ١١٥٦١٥ - ١١٥٦١٥)

Al-Ghazzālī is rather fond of the expression 'without proof' in this connection ('Lā Mustanad lahu'):

فالحكم على السماء بانه حيوان تحكم محض لا مستند له  
(تهافت ٨٥٢٤٦ - ٩)

(... and the assertion that the skies are animals, is arbitrary and has no proof.)

وذلك حكم لا مستند<sup>٤٤</sup> له (فيصل ١٥٢٦)

### Note

This combination often appears outside the relative sentence as well<sup>45</sup>.

ولا مستند لكفرهم غير تقليد سماعي الفبي كتقليد اليهود والنصارى  
(تهافت ٩٥٤)

(... and their heresy has no proof but the blind following of an inherited tradition in the manner of the Jews and the Christians.)

فان قلتم ... كتم متحكمين فيه من غير مستند  
(تهافت ٣٥١٠١ - ٥)

وهل لهذا الانكار مستند الا الاستبعاد المجرد  
(تهافت ١١٥٣٧١)

ان لا مستند للشرع الا قول سيد البشر ...  
(الاقتصاد ٣٥٢)

وكم رأيت من يضل عن الحق بهذا العذر ولا مستند له سواء  
(المنقذ ٣٥٧٤)

(... and I have seen many who strayed from the path of truth due to this excuse and with no other proof.)

وذلك عين الجهل ان لا مستند لهم الا انه طور لم يبلغه (ه)  
(المنقذ ٨٥١٠٦)

(... and this is stupidity itself, as they have no proof, but it is a grade [of development] which he [e.g. they] did not reach.)

d. Other adverbs

There are three adverbs, which complement one another and which must be mentioned among the expressions of certainty and stress typical of Al-Ghazzālī:

'Aslan'- to stress the negative, meaning: not at all, certainly not.

'La Mahālata'- to stress the positive, meaning: doubtlessly.

'Qat'an'- for both, meaning absolutely.

All three are often used and common to all kinds of Arab literature<sup>46</sup> though the last expression is less common than the first two. They are typified in Al-Ghazzālī's work by their great frequency. It is impossible to leaf through any one of his books without coming across the first and second words scores of times, in a few pages. It may even be stated that a book which does not include those two words must be subjected to close scrutiny for possibly there may be additional reasons to doubt its authenticity.

Aslan

This word appears generally at the end of the sentence. Its frequency is demonstrated in "Ihyā" IV, 1 ("Kitāb Al-Tawba"), pp. 2078-2174. It appears in this book at least 15 times as follows<sup>47</sup>:

فان العالم بالسم لا يتناوله اضلا (احياء ٤٥٢٠٨٦٥٤)

(He who knows the drug will certainly not partake of it.)

فاعلم انه قد سبق ان الانسان لا يخلو في مبدأ خلقته من اتباع الشهوات  
اصلا (احياء ٨٥٢٠٩٢٥٤)

والثوب المغسول كالذى لم يتوسخ اصلا

(احياء ٦٥٢١٢١٥٤)

(Washed clothes are like clothes which have never been soiled at all.)

ان تركه بعض الذنوب لا يفيد اصلا (احياء ١٠٥٢١٤١٥٤)

(... and forsaking some of his sins will not help him at all.)

فما وصفهم (الله تعالى) بعدم السيئة اصلا

(احياء ١٠٥٢١٤٩٥٤)

This is only a sample of illustrations, because the word is most common in Al-Ghazzālī's work. There follow examples from different books, and not more than one example per book:

الفقير وهو الذى لا يملك شيئا اصلا ...

(الوجيز ١١٥٢٩٢)

واما حيلة التعليق فبان يطوى عنه جواب هذه الشكوك ... ولم ينفس عنه  
اصلا بل تركه معلقا ومهولا للامر عليه

(المستظهرى ٢-١٥٥)

ولو تصور ذلك لا رحلت النفس عن البدن وليس معها علاقة منه (!) فكانت  
لا تتعذب اصلا بالتأسف على ما يفوتها منه<sup>٤٨</sup>

(ميزان ٥-٦٥٨٦)

فرفضوا هذا القطب من الدين اصلا (احياء ٢٥٥٢ هـ ٣٤٨١٠٦)  
والامور الموجودة تنقسم الى ما لا يرتبط حصولها بقدرة العباد اصلا  
كالسماء والكواكب . . . (المقصد ١١٦٣٥) ٤٩

فان كان ينتظر يوما يسهل فيه قمع الشهوات فهذا يوم لم يخلق اصلا  
(الاربعين ٣٤٢٢٥-٣٤٢٢٥)

وتبطل به الدعوى العامة بانه لا يتزل كتاب على بشر اصلا  
(القسطاس ٥٦٤٦)

. . . علم انه وما له ملك لملكه على المنفرد لا شريك له اصلا ٥٠  
(مشكاة ٣٤٢٩)

وان جوز هذا فقد اثبت ان ههنا امورا تسمى خواص ولا يدور تصرف  
العقل حوالها اصلا (المنقذ ٣٤١١٧)

(... and he who assumes that such a thing is possible has confirmed the existence of the things called properties, which the human intellect cannot understand at all.)

وقد يستعار هذا اللفظ اعني اليد ، بمعنى آخر ليس ذلك المعنى بهجس  
اصلا (الجام ١٦٤ - ٢)

#### La Mahālatā

Al-Ghazzālī is fond of this combination and uses it to emphasize his arguments when he discusses intellectual proof as well as his own conjecture-beliefs, or emotions and experiences. The combination appears in equal proportion in the middle of the sentence and at the end. It is also especially frequent in "Ihyā" IV, 1, "Kitāb Al-Tawba"

(see the sixth example below where it appears three times in one sentence) and in "Al-Maqṣad"<sup>51</sup>. I have, however, failed to find it in "Al-Munqidh". The following are examples from various books:

ومهما كان العالم موجود واستحال حدته - ثبت قدمه لا محالة  
(تهافت ٦٤٢٥)

(... and if the world exists and its being created is impossible - then the fact of its being primordial has been proved without doubt.)

فان كان موجود فهو من الواحد الى العشرة فما فوقها لا محالة  
(المستظهرى ٤٤١٤)

والعدل في اخلاق النفس يتبعه لا محالة العدل في المعاملة والسياسة  
(ميزان ٢٤٨٨-٣)

. . . ويقرر عنده ان الموت آت لا محالة  
(الاقتصاد ١٠٤٥)

ثم تختلف العلوم كما سيأتي بيانه وتتفاوت لا محالة فضائلها بتفاوتها  
(احياء ٩٤٢٢٤٤١)

انهم عن ربهم لمحجوبون لا محالة ، فكل محجوب عن محبوبه فمحول بينه  
وبين ما يشتهي لا محالة ، فهو ، لا محالة ، يكون مخترقا نار جهنم بنار  
الفرق (احياء ٤٤٤٤١١٧٠٢١)

ومثاله ان الحرارة تفنى الرطوبة وتجففها لا محالة  
(المقصد ٩٤٥٣)

التوبة اذا اجتمعت شرائطها فهي مقبولة لا محالة  
(الاربعين ٣٤٢٢١)



(When the prerequisites of repentance are found together, [God] will doubtlessly accept it.)

### Qat'an

This expression is especially frequent in the early books<sup>52</sup> of Al-Ghazzālī, though it can be found in later books too, such as the "Ildjām", as we shall see further on. This too is an expression denoting stress and emphasis (negative and positive) and sometimes it complements the previous expressions or becomes a synonym for 'Yaqīnan'. There follow some examples:

فان اهل الشرع— لم يفهموا من اللوح والقلم هذا المعنى قطعاً  
(تهافت ٤٢٦١-٥)

وقد علم قطعاً انه لا احد في عالم الله يدعي انه الامام الحق . . . الا  
المتصدى للامر في مصر (المستظهرى ٧٥١٦-٩)

. . . ولم انه لا مبعث من لقاء الله الا اتباع الشهوات . . . والاكباب  
على حب ما لا بد من فراقه قطعاً (احياء ٤٤٤ أ ١١٥٢٠٨٢٥-١٢)

وذلك مما انقسم الى ما علم انه لا تكفره قطعاً والى ما ينبغي ان تكفره  
(احياء ٤٤٤ أ ٧٥٢١١١٥)

فهبان قوتان تدل المجاهدة عليهما قطعاً  
(احياء ٤٤٤ أ ٢٥٢١٤٣٥)

وهذا الازدواج من اصلين ، احد همة قوله انه في احد البيتين قطعاً  
والثاني انه ليس في هذا البيت اصلاً

(القسطاس ٦٥٧-٨)

(... and this conclusion stems from two principles: one, his saying that he is certainly present in one of the two rooms, and the other, that he is not in this room at all)<sup>53</sup>.

وهي (الموازين) التي لا يتصور الخلاف فيها بعد فهمها اصلاً بل  
يعترف كل من فهمها بانها مدارك اليقين قطعاً

(فيصل ١٢٦١٢ - ١٤)

كالذي ينكر حشر الاجساد وينكر العقوبات الحسيات في الآخرة بظنون  
واوهام واستبعادات من غير برهان قاطع فيجب تكفيره قطعاً  
(فيصل ٥٦١٤ - ٦)

وهذا القول باطل قطعاً<sup>٥٤</sup> (فيصل ٨٦١٤)

فتأمله لتعلم انه حق وانه يرفع الخلاف قطعاً

(المنقذ ١٥٩٠)

وان لم تجربته فيقضي عقلك بوجوب التصديق والاتباع قطعاً  
(المنقذ ١٠٥١٢٠)

(... and even if you have not experienced this, your brain is sure to decree that this must be believed in and followed unhesitatingly.)

واللمس قاصر عن الالوان والاصوات قطعاً بل هي كالمعدم في حقه  
(المنقذ ٦١٠٥-٧٦)

(... but the sense of touch cannot grasp the colours and sounds at all and those things are non-existent for it.)

وعلى العامي وغير العامي ان يتحقق قطعا ويقينا ان الرسول عليه السلام  
والصلاة لم يرد بذلك جسما

(الجام ٤٤٣-٤)

وهوانه يعلم قطعا ان هذه الالفاظ أريد بها معنى يليق بجلال الله  
وعظمته

(الجام ٤٦٦-٥)

على القطع

وقد تبين على القطع ان ... (ميزان ٦٦١٣)

Qāti', Qat'i

The first example (where 'Qat'an' is parallel to 'Yaqīnan') from "Ildjām" has already shown how closely interconnected things are. Indeed, at times 'Qat'' even replaces 'Yaqīn' as a noun and denotes absolute certainty in the same way. (See first example below.) The adjectives derived from the same root must be understood in the same way<sup>56</sup>.

ولكننا نقول ما اوردوه دليلا لا يصلح الا لافادة ظن فأما ان يفيد قطعا  
فلا ... (تهافت ٦٦٢٤٠-٧)

(... but we say that the proof which they have brought  
'[the philosophers]' suffices for conjecture only but does  
not convey certainty'.)

علما قطعيا لا ظنينا (المستظهرى ٩٦١٦)

(... certain knowledge and not conjectured knowledge only.)

وليعتقد الحق في الاشياء على ما هي عليه من براهين قاطعة مفيدة  
لليقين لا عن تقليدات ضعيفة ولا عن تخييلات مقنعة واهية  
(ميزان ٨٦٧٤-١٠)

e. Conditional sentences

I should like to dwell on one kind of conditional sentence of which Al-Ghazzālī was particularly fond, and which he also used to stress his words and their veracity, instead of, or in addition to, using subjective polemic. The conditional form in those sentences is simply a stylistic framework for the expression of the idea that "things are by necessity thus, and not otherwise."

This holds true mainly for a genuine conditional sentence in the affirmative, and more rarely for a conditional clause in the negative. In the first instance, Al-Ghazzālī seems to say: "If things are as I have described them, then by necessity other things will be as follows ..." and superlatives such as 'Awlā', 'Aḥaqq' are very frequent in the main clause of a conditional sentence of this kind. Alternatively he might open with 'Fa-bi-l-ḥarā', meaning 'seemly', 'fitting'<sup>57</sup>. In the second instance Al-Ghazzālī seems to say: 'if it could have been like this (as you seem to think), then it could also be...' (and he carries the argument ad absurdum.) The first kind of conditional sentence is especially frequent in "Mishkāṭ" (see the interpretation of the verse of light - Sūra 35, 24) together with the expression 'Fa-bi-l-ḥarā'. Sometimes the main clause opens with 'Fa-mithāluhu' only. However, this word is merely an abbreviation of 'Fa-bi-l-ḥarā' an

yakūna mithāluhu', as we shall see from the following examples.

Let us start with three examples from the "Mishkāt"<sup>58</sup>.

فأقول إن كان في عالم الملكوت جواهر روحانية شريفة . . . منها تفيض  
الأنوار على الأرواح البشرية . . . فبالحرى أن يكون مثالها في عالم  
الشهادة الشمس والقمر والكواكب (مشكاة ٦٤٤٦ الخ)

(... and I say: if there be in the supreme World of Royalty divine spiritual bodies ... from which light pours on men's souls ... then it is most fitting that their equals in the lower Visible World should be the sun, the moon and the stars)<sup>59</sup>.

وإذا كانت ثمراتها مادة لتضاعف المعارف وثباتها وبقاؤها فبالحرى أن لا  
تمثل بشجرة السفرجل والتفاح والرمان وغيرها من جملة سائر الأشجار إلا  
بالزيتونة خاصة (مشكاة ١١٥٤ - ١٢)

والمعج الثاني موج الصفات السبعية الباعثة على الغضب والعداوة . . .  
وبالحرى أن يكون مظلما . . . وبالحرى أن يكون هو المعج الأعلى  
(مشكاة ١٢٥٥ - ١٤)

The same phenomenon appears in "Al-Maqṣad" and in "Al-Munqidh" in the same form but much less frequently:

ولو قدرنا إنسانا وحده مطلوبا من جهة أعدائه . . . لا يقدر أن يحرك  
عليه أعضائه لضعفه وأن تحركت فلا سلاح معه . . . فجاء من عالم ضعفه  
فقواه . . . فبالحرى أن يسمى . . .

(المقصد ١١٦٣ - ٧)

ومن بيده مفاتيح الغيب ومفاتيح الرزق فبالحرى أن يكون فتاحا  
(المقصد ٤٣٩ - ٥)

فإن كان الذي أعطى فائتي شكور (شكورا) فالذي أعطى فائتي على  
المعطى فهو أحق بأن يكون شكورا (المقصد ٥٥٠ - ٦)

القوى الحساسة أسباب الإدراك فمن لا يدرك الأشياء مع وجودها  
وحضورها فبأن لا يدرك مع ركودها أولى وأحق  
(المنقذ ١٠٦ - ٧)

(The sensory powers are our means of grasping things and he who does not grasp things while these senses are functioning will most certainly not grasp them when they are dormant.)

فنقدر الكل ماء وترابا (الافيون) فلا يوجب هذا الإفراط في التبريد  
فإن انضم إليه حاران فبان لا يوجب ذلك أولى  
(المنقذ ١٦١٨ - ٣)

Conditional sentences of another kind<sup>60</sup>:

وإن جاز أن يكون (العلم) زيادة حجة عليه فهو يجوز أن يكون زيادة  
درجة له (المنقذ ٥١٢٢ - ٦)

وإذا جاز ذلك (الوحي) للنبي صلعم جاز لغيره . . . بل يجوز أن  
تكون المجاهدة سبيلا إليه (أحياء ٥٣، ١٠٦٣٨٩)

(... and if a revelation is possible to the prophet, may he be blessed by Allah, then it may be possible that revelation comes also to other men ... and self control

[suppression of desire] might be the means to achieve it)<sup>61</sup>.

Hypothetical conditional sentence

ولو جازان يسوّى بين الانسان والحمار في الغريزة والادراكات الحسية  
... لجازان يسوّى بين الحمار والجماد في الحياة  
(احياء ١٥٦، ١٣٦١٤٥٥ - ١٥)

ولو تصور صوفي فاسق لتصور صوفي كافر وفقه يهودى!  
(احياء ٦٢، ١٥٦١٠١٥٦ - ٧)

A stylistic-syntactical note

The conditional sentences in Al-Ghazzālī's language are long, elaborate and connected in many ways. The isolation of the natural subject, which seems to serve the purpose of stress as well, is particularly worth mentioning. However, this is a common feature of Middle Arabic which shows negligence in writing and which is typical of people who 'do not arrange their ideas beforehand but put down that which comes into their minds first and somehow fit it within the frame of the sentence'<sup>62</sup>. The following are some examples (three of them from the same page of "Al-Munqidh" and expressing the same idea):

وان ذلك (تغيير الخلق) لو لم يكن ممكنا لما أمر به  
(ميزان ١٠٦٧ - ١١)

(... and this thing - change of character - would not be a commandment if it were impossible.)

وكما ان المميز لو عرضت عليه مدركات العقل لا باها واستبعدا فكذلك ...  
(المنقذ ١٠٦، ٧ - ٧)

والاكمه لو لم يعلم بالتواتر والتسامع الالوان والاشكال وحكي له ذلك ابتداء  
لم يفهمها ولم يقربها (المنقذ ١٠٦، ٩١ - ١١)

وهذا لو لم يجربه انسان من نفسه وقيل له ... لا نكره  
(المنقذ ١٠٦، ١١ - ٩)

f. La'amrī

This is an ancient oath which is also meant to confirm and emphasize that which was said, and to convince the reader by its being an oath:

ولعمري انه لا سبب لاصرارك على التكبر الا الداء الذي عم الجهم الغير  
(احياء ٢٦٦، ٣٦٢٦ - ٣)

(I swear that there is no cause for your stubborn insolence, except for the illness which has contaminated many.)

ولعمري ان الفقه والفهم في اللغة اسمان بمعنى واحد<sup>٦٣</sup> وانما يتكلم في  
عادة الاستعمال به قديما وحديثا (احياء ١٣٦٥٤٦، ١٣٦٥٤٦)

ولعمري تأدب اللسان والظاهر مما يقدر عليه الاكثرون فاما تأدب السر...  
فلا يقوى عليه الا العلماء الراسخون في العلم  
(احياء ١٣٦١١٦٢٦، ١٣٦١١٦٢٦ الخ)

ولعمري الاثم على الفقهاء اشد لان ...

(احياء ٢٥٦٢، ٣٦١٢٥٥٦ - ٣)

ولعمري لما غلب على اكثر الخلق ظنهم بانفسهم الحداقة والبراءة ...  
وجب حسم الباب في ... (المنقذ ٥٨٢، ٥٨٢ الخ)

(I swear that since most men are confident of being experts ... it is a duty to lock the gate ...)

#### Expressions of Mockery and Vituperation

1. Language of folly and stupidity
  - a. Ḥamāqa, Aḥmaq
  - b. Da'īf-Al-'Aql, Al-Da'īf
  - c. Djahl, Djāhil, Al-Ṣadīq Al-Djāhil
  - d. Takāyus
2. Expressions of vituperation
  - a. Rakīk, Mustaghathth
  - b. Turrahāt, Ṭammāt
  - c. Tahakkum, Tahakkumāt
  - d. Al-Mutarassimūna, Al-'Ilm Al-Rasmī
  - e. Tadjammul

A number of scholars have gone into the matter of Al-Ghazzālī's sharp mocking tongue. A few have regarded it as "humorous sarcasm", among them D.B. Macdonald, who assumed that quite possibly this characteristic has turned Al-Ghazzālī into a much-feared linguistic tyrant. (See his "Life of Al-Ghazzālī", Journal of the American Oriental Society XX, 1899, p.107.) Others regard this phenomenon in a different light. In his usual manner, F. Jabre suggests that Al-Ghazzālī covers up his incapacity to prove his arguments and his refusal to understand others by the use of mockery and vituperation. In this way he tries to achieve his main aim - namely to win over the enemy and opponent, and

to draw the reader along with him. It seems as if Al-Ghazzālī's special attitude to the religious life of man, especially his wish to place it beyond and apart from the domain of the ratio within man's spiritual life - are unintelligible to F. Jabre as to other contemporary writers<sup>64</sup>, who grew up on the worship of rational and precise sciences, so typical of periods of enlightenment and revival. Thus Jabre's negative approach to Al-Ghazzālī colours his approach to his studies and he finds a multitude of things in Al-Ghazzālī's books - which I for one fail to see; moreover, I find his quotations translated in a tendentious manner.

In this context he puts emphasis on Al-Ghazzālī's language of mockery and vituperation. Consider, for instance what he has to say about the "Tahāfut":

On sent derrière la discussion serrée et haletante, l'homme passionné qui vibre de tout son être et veut triompher de l'adversaire. Il veut jeter sur lui le discrédit et la ridicule, pour lui enlever tout ascendant sur les autres, pour le confondre devant eux.

C'est dans leur langue originale qu'il faut lire ces textes pour saisir dans la houle tumultueuse des discussions l'âme passionnée de Ghazzālī, cherchant à produire l'effet psychologique sur ses lecteurs, tentés par les nouveaux courants de pensée. Phrases denses, serrées, volontairement obscures parfois. Mais un certain effet magique, dirait-on, se produit au fur et à mesure que la

discussion se développe. La concision de l'énoncé dans chaque proposition renforce, elle aussi, l'impression produite; conclusion accentuée encore par le caractère synthétique des vocables et de la construction arabes, qui permet de donner à tout ces raisonnements une vivacité et une rapidité d'allure qui n'est peut-être pas du pur hasard. Il y a des éclats qui étonnent, qui déroutent. On n'a pas le temps de se ressaisir, de rectifier. Les répétitions ne manquent pas, mais loin d'être le fait de la négligence elles ont leur bonne part d'influence dans la production de l'effet psychologique recherché; elles sont un image fidèle de l'auteur qui derrière son text, vit et vibre, se donne et se reprend ...

Par tout cela, le maître semble dire alors: 'Vous croyez que ces gens-là (les philosophes) sont des grands esprits? Ils vous en imposent par des théories qu'ils vous représentent comme difficiles et mystérieuses pour mieux abuser de votre crédulité et de votre naïveté. Voyez, je connais comme eux les mathématiques, je jongle, bien mieux qu'eux avec les concepts, avec les principes vides de la métaphysique, je manie avec plus d'habileté qu'il ne le font, l'art de logique, qui ne leur appartient pas en propre, mais qui est bien commun de tous ...

Et pourtant voyez en quel état je réduis leur vaines constructions, en quel mépris je les tiens, et quel grand respect je garde pour les traditions et les enseignements de 'peres' ('Ābā')<sup>65</sup>.

It would seem that Jabre misinterpreted Al-Ghazzālī's attitude towards philosophy as well as the core of his doctrine. Al-Ghazzālī does indeed try to get his readers away from the paths of philosophy and convince them of the veracity of his course. However he does not despise the philosophers and does not treat them with insolence. On the contrary he appreciates, for instance, the exact sciences and fights for their promulgation; moreover, he despises the 'foolish disciple' (see below, p. 95 ff.) who thinks that religion and faith require a negation of those sciences, abstention from any study of them and a pursuit of inherited traditions only. Al-Ghazzālī's manner of persuasion must be examined from a different angle altogether. As an educator, and a man who feels that he has a prophetic mission, he uses every means in order to convince his readers of the truth of his teachings, firmly believing that if they follow him they will find real happiness. He wants to save them from the ways of heresy and doom to which philosophy may lead, and tries to prove to them that the only path to salvation and spiritual happiness is the path of faith and moral virtue. Therefore he uses not only rational ways of persuasion but also many other means of linguistic persuasion - including surprise and mockery at man's refusal to see things as

they are, his stupidity in following temptations of body and soul and his great blindness with regard to the truth. Al-Ghazzālī knows that no man wants to be thought a fool and that few want to be told that they have made a 'bad deal' and have failed in 'commerce' when selling 'the two for one' or the world of eternity for this transitory existence. He uses man's natural frailty, in order to persuade his readers to follow him on the right path to God.

We must therefore regard the expressions of mockery and vituperation as one of Al-Ghazzālī's means of emphasizing and stressing his teaching and doctrine.

#### 1. Language of folly and stupidity

Al-Ghazzālī often uses contemptuous language, mainly expressions of stupidity and folly, directed especially against two kinds of people - his opponents in a debate on the one hand, and his innocent readers on the other. We have said above that by using such language he wants to enforce his teachings and convince the reader - sometimes by the use of beautiful proverbs and sometimes by the use of popular rhetoric language ('will you sell both for one?') - that his opponents' words are just nonsense and that it would be folly not to take the path his, Al-Ghazzālī's doctrine, indicates. The frequent expressions in this connection are many and varied and I shall content myself here with one general remark: The stupidity hinted at in the majority of the following expressions is not, as a rule, simple stupidity but is mainly stupidity and folly in matters of religion and faith. The expressions appear

frequently therefore with reference to a heretic philosopher or to a boastful Faqīh, though they may also be directed against a literal fool (see also below the term 'Āmiyy'<sup>66</sup>.) The opposite of these expressions usually therefore does not designate learned or wise people but those whose faith is strong and was not acquired by tradition only ('Al-Aqwiya', e.g. see "Ihyā" I, 4, p. 293, 9.) To Al-Ghazzālī these are also the wise men. These expressions are not original to Al-Ghazzālī and occur in the Hadīth, in the Ṣūfī literature, in Jewish-Arabic literature and elsewhere<sup>67</sup>. In the polemics against the Shī'a, a system called 'Tashkīk Da'afat Al-'Uqūl' or 'Istidrāj-Al-Du'afā' is attributed to the Shī'a, or more especially to the Bāṭiniyya, meaning to arouse doubts among the 'poor in mind', thus tempting them towards Shī'ite doctrines<sup>68</sup>. It is quite possible that the use of this language, like several other expressions of the 'Bāṭiniyya', or of the polemics against them, was taken over by Al-Ghazzālī while he was dealing with their writings, or with the polemic literature against them. However, Al-Ghazzālī uses these expressions not only to classify the methods of the 'Ta'limiya' people, but quite frequently also in a more independent and extensive way and together with other expressions which appear frequently in his writings as well as in religious literature as a whole.

#### a. Ḥamāqa, Ahmaq

فلما رأيت هذا العرق من الحماقة نابضا على هؤلاء الاغبياء انتدبت لتحرير  
هذا الكتاب

(تهافت ٤٦٦ - ٥)

(... and when I saw this vein of folly pulsating in these fools I started to write this book.)

وهو حماقة (تهافت ١١٤٠هـ؛ ٢٤١٨٣-٣)

وهذه حماقة (تهافت ١٢٤١٣١)

فاردنا ان نخوض فيه (العمل) ونبين ان الفتور عن طلب السعادة حماقة (ميزان ٢٤٢)

وفرة رابعة وهم جماهير من الحمقى لا يعرفون باسمائهم ولا يعدون في زمرة النظارة، ذهبوا الى ان الموت عدم محض (ميزان ١٤١-٢)

ومن تكبره على المعلم ان يستنكف عن الاستفادة الا من المرموقين المشهورين وهو عين حماقة (احياء ١٤١هـ؛ ٢٤٨٤٤ الخ)

فما اشد حماقة من دخلت الافاعي والعقارب تحت ثيابه وهمت بقتله وهو يطلب مذبة يدفع بها الذباب عن غيره! (احياء ١٤١هـ؛ ١٤٦٧-٢)

(How great is the folly of him who has asps and scorpions in his cloths and while they are out to kill him he is looking for a fly swatter to chase the flies off his neighbour!)

See the examples on the following page and cf. also "Ayyuhā Al-Walad" (ed. T. Sabbagh, Unesco, Beyrouth, 1959), p. 49, 8-10 and the Persian Streitschrift of Al-Ghazzālī against the Ibāhiyya (ed. O. Pretzl), p. 2, 9.

فيثور الملحد الاحمق ويكذب ويستدل على كذب الانبياء ويقول . . . ولكن الله تعالى عزل هؤلاء الحمقى عن معرفة اسراره (احياء ١٤٤هـ؛ ٢٤١١٤ الخ)

وما مثال المسوف الا مثال عن احتاج الى قلع شجرة فآها قوية لا تتقلع الا بمشقة شديدة فقال : أواخرها سنة ثم اعود اليها . . . فلا حماقة في الدنيا اعظم من حماقته ان عجز مع قوته عن مقاومة ضعيفه فاخذ ينتظر الغلبة عليه اذا ضعف هو في نفسه وقوى الضعيف<sup>٦٩</sup> (احياء ١٤٤هـ؛ ٢٤١٧٢ الخ)

(انظر س ٣ : ولكنه في غاية حماقة والجهل)

فلا اعرف لترك السنة من غير عذر وجهها الا كفر خفي او حمق جلي بيانه ان النبي صلعم ان قال : تفضل صلاة الجماعة على صلاة الفرد (بسبع وعشرين درجة . فكيف تسمح نفس المؤمن بتركها من غير عذر ؟ نعم يكون السبب في ذلك اما حمق او غفلة بان لا يتفكر في هذا التفاوت العظيم ومن يستحق غيره اذا آثر واحدا على اثنين كيف لا يستحق نفسه اذا آثر واحد (واحدا) على سبع وعشرين ؟ لا سيما فيما هو عماد الدين ومفتاح السعادة الابدية . . . فما اعظم حماقة من يصدق المنجم والطبيب في امور ابعد من ذلك ولا يصدق النبي المكاشف باسرار الملوك الاربعين ١١٠هـ؛ ٣٤١١٠ الخ)

وهذا اشد مغلطة الحمقاء . . . فهذه حماقات . . .

(مشكاة ١١٤٥٠هـ؛ ١١٤٥٠)

ما لك تقصر فيها (في متابعة الشرع) فان كنت تؤمن بالآخرة ولست تستعد لها وتبيعها بالدنيا فهذه حماقة فانك لا تبني الا اثنين بواحد فكيف تبني ما لا نهاية له بايام معدودة ؟

(المنقذ ١٠٦١١٢-١٢)



b. Da'īf Al-'Aql, Al-Da'īf

وانهم ( الفلاسفة ) يحكمون بظن وتخمين من غير برهان ويقين ويستدلون على صدق علومهم الالهية بظهور العلوم الحسابية والمنطقية ويستدرجون به ضعفاء العقول ( تهافت ١١٤٨ الخ )

(The philosophers rule by conjecture and guesswork but without definite proof or certainty and use the convincing sciences of arithmetic and logic as proof of the truth of their metaphysics, by which means they attract the weak-minded.)

فان تشكيك الضعفاء بادنى خيال ممكن<sup>٧٠</sup>

(تهافت ١١٤٢٢)

ولقد ثار من التباس المشتركة بالمتواطئة غلط كثير في العقليات حتى ظن جماعة من ضعفاء العقول ان السواد لا يشارك البياض في اللونية الا من الاسم (محك ٥١٣ الخ)

ولهذا نظائر في النظريات لا تحصى ، تاهت بسببها عقول الضعفاء (محك ٤١٦٦ - ٣)

وعرفوا ان من ظن من الحشوية وجود الجمود على التقليد واتباع الظواهر - ما اتوا به الا من ضف (ضعف) العقول وقلة البصائر (الاقتصاد ٨٤٢ - ٩)

... وهذا حال الضعفاء فلا جرم<sup>٧١</sup> البغض للمال والهرب منه في حقهم كمال . وهذا حكم جميع الخلق لان كلهم ضعفاء الا الانبياء والاولياء (احياء ٥٤٤ د ٤٤٦٠٤٦٤ الخ)

فلما رأيتك ورأيت رفقائك من اهل التعلم ضعفاء العقول لا تخدعهم الا الظواهر - نزلت الى حدك فسقيتك الداء في كوز الماء (القسطاس ٣٦٠ - ٣)

هيهات ما اشبه ضعف عقولهم في خلافهم الا بعقل مريض به مرض اشرف على الموت وله علاج متفق عليه بين الاطباء وهو يقول ... (القسطاس ٧٦٩٠ الخ)

فاني اظنك تستضعف عقلي فتلبس علي (القسطاس ٣٥١ - ٣)

ان ظنت طائفة<sup>٧٢</sup> من الضعفاء ان ذلك الكلام ... ينبغي ان يهجر ولا يذكر ... فسبق الى عقولهم الضعيفة انه باطل (المنقذ ٦٤٨١ الخ)

وانما نشأ الفساد من جماعة من الضعفة ، ناظروهم ولم يشتغلوا بالقلب<sup>٧٣</sup> بل بالجواب (المنقذ ٦٤٩٢)

فرجع حاصلهم (حاصل التعليمية) الى استدراج العوام وضعفاء العقول ... (المنقذ ٢٤٩٤)

Those weak-minded people recognize the truth in a most unreliable manner:

وهذه عادة ضعفاء العقول يعرفون الحق بالرجال لا الرجال بالحق  
والعاقل يقتدى بسيد العقلاء على رضي الله عنه حيث قال : لا تعرف  
الحق بالرجال ، بل اعرف الحق تعرف اهله و(العارف) العاقل يعرف  
الحق ثم ينظر في نفس القول . . . ( المنقذ ٢٠٨٢ الخ )<sup>٧٤</sup>

c. Djahl, Djāhil

These expressions are often synonymous with the former expressions (see examples above, and also "Al-Munqidh" 2,75.) However, the root 'Djāhil' means ignorance more than it means stupidity, and its opposite in this connection is, therefore, 'Ilm<sup>75</sup>; the opposite of 'Djāhil' in this connection is 'Ālim', 'Ārif', Baṣīr', etc. Of particular importance is the repeated contrast between 'Al-Djahl bi-(A)llah' as opposed to 'Ma'rifat-Allah' and Al-Ghazzālī's explanation that heresy is nothing but ignorance.

فلا كبيرة فوق الكفران الحجاب بين الله وبين العبد هو الجهل والوسيلة  
المقربة اليه هو العلم والمعرفة وقربه بقدر معرفته وبعده بقدر جهله .  
ويتلو الجهل الذي يسمى كفرا الأ من من مكر الله والقنوط من رحمته فان  
هذا ايضا عين الجهل . فمن عرف الله لم يتصور ان يكون آمنا ولا ان  
يكون آيسا . ( احياء ٤٤٠٨٠٨٤٢١ الخ )

و(بان لي) ان الجهل بالله سم مهلك وان معصية الله بمتابعة الهوى  
داه الممرض وان معرفة الله تعالى في تربيته المحيي وطاعته بمخالفة  
الهوى دواؤه الشافي ( المنقذ ١١٠٩٦١١ - ١١ )

انظر ايضا :

فان كل فاسق فهو احمق وجاهل ولولا حقه لما عصى الله تعالى  
( احياء ٦٢٦٢ ط ٦٢٣٥٦١٢٣٥ - ١٠ )

Al-Sadīq Al-Djāhil

I should like to mention another of Al-Ghazzālī's favourite expressions in this connection. Goldziher has already mentioned this<sup>76</sup> and translated it as 'die Hilfe eines toerichten Freundes.' I mean the expression 'Al-Sadīq Al-Djāhil', the foolish disciple, the stupid friend of religious faith, who sets out to defend it in a wrong way and therefore causes it more harm than good. This foolish disciple, for example, claims that in order to defend religious faith it is much better to deny and reject all sciences and their conclusions; this proceeding will not only cause scholars and scientists to sneer and mock but will draw them even farther away from religious faith. The expression probably originated in a common proverb as we can see from the first example. (Cf. also "Al-Maqṣad", p. 27, 7-8.)

وضرر<sup>٧٧</sup> الشرع ممن ينصره لا بطريقه اكثر من ضرره ممن يطعن فيه بطريقه  
وهو كما قيل : "عدو عاقل خير من صديق جاهل"  
( تهافت ١١٦١١ - ١٣ )

(... and the damage caused by religion through the help of him who serves it wrongly is greater than the damage caused by him who tries to wrong it in the right manner, for it is said that 'a wise enemy is better than a foolish friend'.)

فأسأل الله تعالى ان يكفيني شره عن الدين فان للدين صديق جاهل وهو شر من عدو عاقل (القسطنطيني ١٦٤٦-٤)

الآفة الثانية نشأت من صديق للاسلام جاهل ، ظن ان الدين ينبغي ان ينصر بانكار كل علم منسوب اليهم . . . فلما قرع ذلك سمع من عرف ذلك (العلم) بالبرهان القاطع لم يشك في برهانه ولكن اعتقد ان الاسلام مبني على الجهل وانكار البرهان القاطع . . . ولقد عظم على الدين جنائياً<sup>٧٨</sup> من ظن ان الاسلام ينصر بانكار هذه العلوم (المنقذ ٨٤٧٥ الخ)

ولولا سوء نصرة الصديق الجاهل لما انتهت تلك البدعة (التعليمية) مع ضعفها الى هذه الدرجة (المنقذ ٣٤٨٨ - ٤)

#### d. Takāyus

The adjective derived from this noun, 'Kayyis', usually denotes a clever and wise man as opposed to the stupid fool. Yet Al-Ghazzālī likes especially the use of the sixth conjugation, which denotes posing as a wise man, and thus acquires a negative sense<sup>79</sup>. This verb accompanies the fool and the idiot in Al-Ghazzālī's writings and describes their actions which are nothing but folly. Therefore the adjective too appears only rarely in a positive sense in Al-Ghazzālī's writings (cf. F. Jabre, Certitude, p. 149) as in the following examples, whereas the use of the sixth conjugation in the negative sense is quite frequent in his language.

بل كل من ليس يكيس فهو احمق والكيس من شهد له رسول الله صلعم بالكياسة حيث قال : الكيس من دان نفسه وعمل لها بعد الموت والاحمق من اتبع نفسه هواها وتمنى على الله تعالى

(احياء ٤٢ ط ١٠٦١٢٣٥٥ - ١٢)

(انظر ملاحظة الحافظ العراقي هناك ، وانظر ايضا : الاربعين ٢٢٥ - ٦)

فالاكياس هم الذين اراد الله ان يهديهم فشرح صدورهم للاسلام والهدى (احياء ٤٣ ص ٥٦١٢٦١٢٥)

انظر ايضا :  
الكيس العاقل

(احياء ٤٣ ص ٥٦١٤٧٧٥)

The following are some examples of the use of the sixth conjugation in Al-Ghazzālī's writings:

فلما قرع ذلك سمعهم تجملوا باعتقاد الكفر . . . ظنا بان اظهار التكايس في التزوع عن تقليد الحق بالشروع في تقليد الباطل - جمال (تهافت ٨٤٥ الخ)

(... and when they heard those things ... they donned the religion of heresy ... [Cf. below p. 110] purporting that it is fine to seem clever by rejecting the tradition of truth and accepting the tradition of lying.)

فليس في سجيتهم ( سجية العوام ) حب التكايس بالشبه بذوى الضلالات  
( تهافت ١٦٦ )

وكم من احمق يتكايس فيقيس نفسه بصاحب الشرع مقياسه الملائكة  
بالحدادين<sup>٨٠</sup> فيهلك من حيث لا يدري  
( ميزان ٧٦٨٩ الخ )

ولقد رأيت جماعة من الحمقى والعوام يتكايسون في التصوف بأرائهم  
ويزعمون ان ٠٠٠ ( ميزان ١٦٩٠ - ٢ )  
طوائف من المتكاسين ( المتكاسين )  
( جواهر ٣٦٤٤ )

وليس فيهم ايضا داعية الجدال بخلاف المتكاسين في العلم مع قصور  
الفهم عنهم ( القسطاس ٥٨٧ - ٤ )

بان تحمله غلبة الهوى والشهوة الباطلة وحب التكايس على ان يصرعلى  
تحسين الظن بهم ( بالفلاسفة ) في العلم كلها  
( المنقذ ٥٦٧٥ - ٦ )

(His vanity will have the better of him and the wish to  
seem clever will make him worship the intelligence of the  
philosophers in all the sciences together.)

انظر ايضا :

وبالجملة في كل امر متفام خطر فان كان الامر هينا حقيرا سمي كيسا  
ولم يسم تدبيرا ( ميزان ٦٩٢ - ٥ )

والجهل ادنى الى الخلاص من فطنة بتراء وكياسة ناقصة  
( جواهر ٤٥٤٥ - ٣٦ )

ثم قال لي هذا الرفيق الكيس من رفقاء اهل التعليم ٠٠٠  
( القسطاس ٣٦٢٧ )

## 2. Expressions of vituperation

### a. Rakīk, Mustaghathth<sup>81</sup>

Al-Ghazzālī uses different expressions for the description of the faith and doctrine of fools. The first two, which we shall deal with presently, appear together<sup>82</sup> and separately; 'Rakīk' means weak and powerless, while 'Mustaghathth' describes that which is considered worthless ('Al-Ghath wa-l-Samīn' - hay and straw!) However, those adjectives (especially when they come together, following one another) are not the only favourites of Al-Ghazzālī. He also uses verbs derived from these roots in the tenth conjugation ('Istarakkā, 'Istaghaththā), which means that a certain expressed opinion is considered weak-minded and objectionable. Another favourite expression seems to be the noun 'Rakāka', especially with the combinations 'Rakākat-Al-'Aql', 'Rakākat-Al-Dīn', which means weakness of mind and waning of faith and religion; this complements and runs parallel to, 'Du'f-Al-'Aql', 'Du'f-Al-Īmān', though tending rather to mean more worthless and useless. The root is mainly found in the "Tahāfut" but the following examples will show that it appears frequently in other books as well:

وهي هجر من الكلام مستغث عند كل عاقل  
( تهافت ١١٦١٥ )

(... and these are words of folly which the wise consider of little worth.)

وبالجملة كلامهم في سائر مسائل الالهيات ارك من كلامهم في هذه  
المسألة (تهافت ٧٦٢٥ - ٨)

وقد عرضنا عن ايراد ادلة كثيرة من هذا الجنس يسترگها العقلاء  
(تهافت ٧٦٨٤)

وهذا كلام وعظي في غاية الركاة (تهافت ١٦١٧١)

فنقول ناهيك خزيا بهذا المذهب ولولا انه في غاية الركاة لما استنكف  
المتأخرون عن نصرته (تهافت ١٢٦١٨١ - ١٣)

فهذا الآن من سوء المزاج وركاة العقل ويعد مثل هذا الاحق عن  
قبول العلاج (ميزان ٨٦١٤ الخ)

ولكن لا يفقهون تسبيحها لانهم لم يسافروا من مضيق سمع الظاهر الى  
فضاء سمع الباطن ومن ركاة لسان المقال الى فصاحة لسان الحال  
(احياء ٦٢٠٨٨٦ - ٥٦١)

(... but they will not understand nature's praise  $\sqrt{\text{of the}}$   
Lord $\sqrt{\text{ because they have not soared above the level of}}$   
hearing, which is limited to the external sense, to the  
breadth of internal hearing, nor have they soared from  
worthless talking to the purity of the language of  
ecstasy.)

وهو اعترافه على نفسه بركاة الدين

(احياء ٦٢٠٩٦٦ - ١٠٦١)

حتى تنبه الشاعر عليه مع ركاة عقله فقال ٠٠٠

(الاربعين ٤٦٢١٥)

فكان حاصل ما ذكره شيئاً من ريك فلسفة فيثاغورس وهو رجل من قدما  
الوائل ومذهبه ارك مذاهب الفلسفة وقد رد عليه ارسطاطاليس بل استرك  
كلامه واسترذله ٠٠٠ فالعجب ممن يتعب طول العمر في طلب العلم ثم  
يقنع بمثل هذا العلم الريك المستغث  
(المنقذ ٥٦٩٣ الخ)

#### b. Turrahāt and Tāmmāt

These expressions of vituperation, much stronger than  
the previous ones, are aimed at the opinions of fools and  
ignoramuses and they denote folly and lies. They are quite  
often directed at the Ṣūfī extreme cries of ecstasy, with  
Al-Ghazzālī following the common use in this case. How-  
ever, in Al-Ghazzālī's writings they also become general  
and most derogatory expressions of disrepute, the first of  
the two in particular.

Turrahāt - Stupidities (nonsense)<sup>83</sup>

لو ٠٠٠ لقل انها ترهات لا تفيد غلبات الظنون

(تهافت ٢٦١١٦)

(If ... one would say: this is nonsense which does not  
even convey a reasonable conjecture ...)

وتطويل بنقل المقالات التي اكثرها ترهات وهذا يانات تزديها الطباع

(احياء ٦٦٣٨٥٦١)

والعجب ممن يسمع مثل هذه الاقوال من صاحب الشرع صلوات الله وسلامه

عليه ٠٠٠ ويزعم انه من ترهات الصوفية

(احياء ٦٦٣٨٥٦١ - ٣)

وهذا اشد مغلطة الحمقاء من الاباحية الذين تأخذهم ترهات كقول بعضهم ان الله غني عن عملنا (مشكاة ٨٦٥٠ - ٩)

Tāmmāt (lies, imaginary exegesis)<sup>84</sup>

واما الطامات فيدخلها ما ذكرناه في الشطح وامر آخر يخصها وهو صرف الفاظ الشطح عن ظواهرها المفهومة الى امور باطنة لا يسبق منها الى الافهام فائدة كدأب الباطنية في التأويلات وهذا ايضا حرام (احياء ٤٦٢٥ أ٦١ الخ انظر ايضا س ٩)

(What we said about the 'Shath' applies to the 'Tāmmāt' as well, while another feature is peculiar only to 'Tāmmāt': the explanation of comprehensible ecstatic cries as meaning mystical secrets in a way which is of no use to the intellect, as the Bātiniyya people do in their allegoric interpretations and this too is forbidden.)

... الى ما ترى اكثر العاظم في هذا الزمان يواظبون عليه وهو القصص والاشعار والشطح والطامات (احياء ٤٦٥٨ أ٦١ - ٥)

وربما تلقفوا<sup>٨٥</sup> الفاظا مزخرفة من اهل الطامات (احياء ٦٦٢ ز ٦١٠٩٤٥ - ٦)

وهذا قد يظن الفقيه الرسمي<sup>٨٦</sup> انه طامات غير معقولة (الاربعين ٥٦٦٠)

ولا تظن ان هذه الالفاظ طامات غير معقولة عند ارباب البصائر (مشكاة ٨٦٤٦)

انظر ايضا :  
وينبغي لك الا تغتر بالشطح وطامات الصوفية لان سلوك هذا الطريق يكون بالمجاهدة ... لا بالطامات والترهات  
(ايها الولد ٤٦٢٢ - ٧)

فاحترز من خصلتين : الاولى من التكلف في الكلام بالعبارات والاشارات والطامات والابيات والاشعار (ايها الولد ٥٦٥١ - ٤)

#### c. Tahakkum, Tahakkumāt

This is an expression of vituperation used apparently only in the "Tahāfut" (Cf. Index D, p. 421 ff., *ibid.*), and it means an arbitrary-imaginary verdict<sup>87</sup> without proof or foundation. Al-Ghazzālī means the metaphysical doctrine of the philosophers, who present their teachings as factual and proven, while their arguments are based only on conjecture and supposition (see above p. 59). He attacks them as follows:

لوز هبت اصف ما نقل عنهم في معرض الادلة وذكر في الاعتراض عليه لسودت في هذه المسألة اوراقا ولكن لا خير في التطويل فلنحذف من ادلتها ما يجرى مجرى التحكم او التخيل الضعيف الذي يهون على كل ناظر حله (تهافت ٦٦٢٢ - ٩)

( Had I but tried to describe the order of proof handed down by them, and the counter-arguments - I would have blackened many pages with ink on this matter<sup>88</sup>, but it is useless to prolong it. We shall therefore leave out of their arguments that which is an arbitrary verdict or result of a weak imagination, which might easily be answered by anyone.)

قلنا ما ذكرتموه تحكمات وهي على التحقيق ظلمات فوق ظلمات  
(تهافت ١٦١١٦)

قولكم ان هذا النوع من التركيب محال في المبدأ الا اول تحكم محض<sup>٨٩</sup>  
فما البرهان عليه ؟ (تهافت ٨٦١٤٨٦)  
فهو تحكم بارد فاسد (تهافت ١٢٦٦٤)

فان البرهان لم يدل الا على . . . فدعوى غيره تحكم  
(تهافت ٩٦١٦٧)

وكل براهينهم تحكمات مبناهما على اخذ لفظ واجب الوجود بمعنى له  
لوانه (تهافت ١٦٩٧-٢)

فقد استأصلناه وبيننا تحكمكم منه (تهافت ٨٦٢٠١-٩)  
قلنا وهذا تحكم فما الدليل عليه ؟  
(تهافت ٢٦٢١٤)

فقد بينا ان ذلك تحكم لا برهان له  
(تهافت ١٢٦٢٢٠)

قلنا هذه تحكمات فانا نقول . . .

(تهافت ٤٦٢٢١)

والحكم على السماء بانه حيوان تحكم محض لا مستند له<sup>٩٠</sup>  
(تهافت ٩٦٢٤٦)

التحكم البعيد جدا قولهم انه . . .

(تهافت ١٢٦٢٦٣)

والى هذا يرجع هذا التحكم (تهافت ١٢٦٢٦٤)

فانه تحكم بان من عرف الشيء عرف لوازمه

(تهافت ٥٦٢٦٥)

والجواب ان التسوية بينهما تحكم بل هما يفترقان من وجهين  
(تهافت ٩٦٣٥٥)

d. Al-Mutarassimūna, Al-'Ilm Al-Rasmī

This expression recurs in Al-Ghazzālī's writings to denote degradation, and could be an innovation by him. He applied it to the religious sages whose religion was an external affair only and whose entire religious knowledge was simply superficial science with no influence on their souls and deeds and was therefore the opposite of truth ('Haqīqa'). The expression is taken from 'Rasama', meaning to draw lines, and is well-known from the 'Nasīb' of the ancient 'Qasida', where it denotes ruins of tents

etc., left over from the camp of the Beduin tribe, who once lived there<sup>91</sup>. It appears in Al-Ghazzālī's writings as a parallel expression to combinations such as 'tasammā bi'sm al-'ilm' or 'Ittasama bi-wasam al-'ilm', expressions which denote also the outward assumption of the title of 'sage' by people who are really devoid of religion. The parallel expression 'Rasm-Isim' is especially frequent in his writings, possibly also because of the similarity in sound.

Goldziher<sup>92</sup> mentioned the expression 'Ulamā-Al-Rusūm' to denote the formalist 'Fuqahā' as an expression (original?) special to Al-Ghazzālī from whom others (for example Ibn 'Arabī) acquired it. According to Goldziher the opposite is 'Faqīh-Al-Nafs' a 'Sage of the Soul', meaning of true religion (see below). Yet it seems to me that the expression 'Ilm Rasmī' is more frequent for the Kalām than for the Fiqh. (See for example 'Kitāb Al-Arba'īn', p. 27, 7; 352, 8.) It is also worth mentioning that the expression 'Al-Mutarassimūna'<sup>93</sup> is much more frequent than the expression 'Ulamā Al-Rusūm' mentioned by Goldziher. It seems, moreover, that the expression did not originate in the personal relationship between Al-Ghazzālī and the religious scholars of his time, but was taken over (by Al-Ghazzālī?) from the domain of logic, as is shown by the following excerpt from "Miḥakk Al-Nazar" (p. 92, 7 ff.) where Al-Ghazzālī explains three

ways of understanding a word: the linguistic (by supplying a synonym), the external (by giving a technical definition) and the true one (by understanding the real meaning of the word.)

He calls the first method of definition 'Ḥadd Lafzī' and the third 'Ḥadd Ḥaqīqī', while half way between the two there is the 'Ḥadd Rasmī', which is accepted by those who ostensibly wish to understand the meaning of the word, but in fact content themselves with an external description only, 'Ṭalab Mutarassim' (ibid., p. 93, 4, see correction of errors on p. 6 at the end of the book), and do not look for the real meaning (Ḥaqīqa). (Those three definitions recur also in "Al-Mustasfā", p. 22, 6.)

The differences sometimes come down to two: 'Rasm' as plainly external like 'Lafz', and contrasted by the internal, true contents - the idea. (See "Djawāhir", p. 44, 5-4.)

The following examples give us additional facts regarding the meaning of 'Mutarassim', such as its being the opposite of 'Muḥaqiq', or a synonym of 'Da'īf' (see above p. 92.)

فرأيت ان اسلك المسلك المقتصد بين الطرفين ولا اخلى الكتاب عن امور  
برهانية يتفطن لها المحققون ولا عن كلمات اقلعية يستفيد منها  
المترسومون  
( المستظهرى ٣ - ١٦ - ٣ )



(I wish therefore to follow the middle way between the two extremes and to furnish intellectual arguments which will convince those people who are precise in their arguments [e.g. the philosophers, see above note 187] as well as use words of persuasion which will be of help to the people who are satisfied with external matters.)

فادلة الطريق هم العلماء الذين هم ورثة الانبياء وقد شغرتهم الزمان ولم يبق الا المترسمون (احياء المقدمه ٨٤٢٦ - ٩)

(... and the sages who are the prophets' successors are the guides, yet nowadays they are no longer to be found, and there remain only those who appear externally to be wise.)

انما الذي تسمعه من المترسمين حديث يلفقونه<sup>٩٤</sup> بالسنتهم (احياء ١٨٤٩٦٤١)

وما اكثر المتسمين باسمهم والمترسمين برسومهم (احياء ٧٤٩٩٦٤٤)

لكننا لم نظهره (بعض التصانيف) فانه يكل عنه اكثر الافهام ويستضربه الضعفاء وهم اكثر المترسمين بالعلم (جواهر ٥٣٠ - ٤)

انظر ايضا :

استعارات رسمية (جواهر ٣٤٣٤)

التكلف والترسم (جواهر ٢٤٣٤)

وهذا يظنه الفقيه الرسمي انه طامات غير معقولة (الاربعين ٥٦٠)

### رسم العلم ورسم الدين

وصادف عالما مستقلا بالعلم تحقيقا لا اسما<sup>٩٥</sup> وحسبة لا رسما كما ترى اكثر العلماء... (ميزان ٢٥٥٠ الخ)

كيف اندرس من الدين رسمه كما اندرست حقيقته

(احياء ١٣٦١٢٦٦٤١)

وقد اندرس من هذا القطب عمله وعلمه وانحق بالكلية حقيقته ورسمه

(احياء ٥٦٢٣٨٥٢)

حتى لم يبق من الخيرات الا رسمها

(احياء ٣ ١٠٦١٣٩٧٤٥٣)

ولا تزن الامور الالهية بالموازين المختصرة الرسمية

(فيصل ٤٦٢٤٤)

ولكنه ابلغ في التحقيق واقرب الى قرع ابواب المعرفة من الكلام الرسمي

الذي يصادف في كتب المتكلمين (الاربعين ٥٦٢٧ - ٧)

and in a more 'technical' manner:

فاما الكلام المحرر على رسم المتكلمين...

(فيصل ٥٦٢١)

جرى الرسم في "الاحياء" بتقسيم التوحيد على اربع مراتب

(الاملاء ١١٦٣٠٤٩)

اهود ليل حقيقى اورسمى او اقناعي...

(الجام ٩٤٤٣)

(... whether this is real proof or a superficial-technical argument - of the Kalām - or words of persuasion.)

See also: 'Tālib al-'Ilm al-Rasmī' in "Ayyuhā-l-Walad", P. 9, 1, and Cf. Ibn Ḥadjar Al-Haithamī, "Fatāwā Ḥadithiyya", P. 41, 6: 'Ulūm Rasmiyya'.

Note

On the basis of the above examples a correction of one or two versions of "Al-Munqidh" may, perhaps, be called for:

وسبب من معاملة الموسومين بالعلم  
(المنقذ ٧٦١١٢)  
اعنى ( طرق ) الصوفية والفلاسفة والتعليمية والمتوسمين من العلم  
(المنقذ ٦٥١١٤ - ١٠)

In the second example, the expression 'Al-Mutarassimūna bi-l-'ilm' is probably preferable to the erroneous, printed version (see the preposition!); and the use of the fifth conjugation may also bear out this contention. (Yet cf. also Sūra 15, 75.) It may therefore be worthwhile considering such a correction in the first example too. On the other hand, the first example could be original, though the use of this expression is not frequent in Al-Ghazzālī's work.

e. Tadjammul

This expression is close to the one mentioned above and it means something like 'the donning of strange feathers'. However, while the former expression was mainly aimed at a religious sage, whose wisdom is only superficial, the expression before us now is addressed to any believer who pretends to be converted to Islam and to honour it, while his faith is in reality nothing but external ornament and

has no essential internal roots in his soul. Al-Ghazzālī applies this expression mainly to the philosophers who seek to be considered Muslim believers while they are at heart really heretics.

The expression must originally have meant 'to beautify oneself' (also to beautify, to honour) in the positive sense, and probably acquired the derogatory shade of meaning later on. This accounts for 'Tadjammulāt' which has come to mean luxury<sup>96</sup>. The expression can be found in Al-Ghazzālī in this sense as well, with reference to a life of luxury and riches (e.g. in "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 3, 3; 113, 2; 115, 9; ibid. I, 6, p. 400, 6, 9; ibid. III, 1, p. 1405, 2; ibid. IV, 1, p. 2132, 1)<sup>97</sup>. However, the use of this root in the above sense of 'donning a strange faith' (or heresy) seems to be particular to Al-Ghazzālī.

Tadjammala bi-l-Islām, bi-l-Īmān

وقد نفيتم حقيقة معنى الفعل ونطقتم بلفظه تجملا بالاسلاميين ولا يتم  
الدين باطلاق الالفاظ الفارغة عن المعنى فصرحوا بان الله لا فعل له  
حتى يتضح ان معتقدكم مخالف لدين الاسلام  
(تهافت ١٠٦١٠٢ - ١٢)

(You deny the real meaning of the verb 'make', 'create' - and use it only in order to appear a Muslim. But faith is not satisfied with empty words. Therefore you must declare that God has no action, so that it becomes clear that your faith is opposed to the religion of Islam.)

قلنا ولا غرض من هذه المسألة الا بيان انكم تتجملون بهذه الاسماء من غير تحقيق وان الله عندكم ليس فاعلا تحقيقا ولا العالم فعله تحقيقا وان اطلاق هذا الاسم مجاز منكم لا تحقيق له وقد ظهر هذا

(تهافت ١١٠٩ - ١١٤)

ويدخل في جملة هؤلاء جماعة يقولون بلسانهم "لا اله الا الله" ولكن ربما حملهم (حملهم) على ذلك خوف او استظهار بالمسلمين او تجمل بهم او استمداد من مالهم (مشكاة ١٠٧ - ٣)

وهؤلاء (الفلاسفة) هم المتجملون بالاسلام

(المنقذ ١١٣ - ١١٦)

(... and the philosophers are only donning themselves with Islam as an ornament.)

وانظر ما سبب كفر الخفي الذي هو مذهبك باطنا وهو سبب جرثك ظاهرا وان كنت لا تصرح به تجملا بالايمان وتشرفا بذكر الشرع (المنقذ ١١٢ - ٣٠٦ - ٩)

(therefore go and seek the cause for your hidden heresy, for it is in the depth of your heart and is the source of your outward insolence, even if you do not admit it, because of your wish to wear faith as an ornament and treat the Shari'a respectfully.)

#### Tadjammala bi-l-Kufr

The expression occurs in Al-Ghazzālī's writings in this combination as well, that is, to adopt heresy as if it were a luxurious fad, which people tend to follow and are proud of without understanding its meaning. I found the verb in

this combination only in the "Tahāfut". (However, see also the last example below from the Streitschrift.)

فلما قرع ذلك سمعهم ووافق ما حكي من عقائد هم طبعهم تجملوا باعتقاد الكفر تحيزا الى غمار الفضلاء (تهافت ١٠٥ - ٩)

فاية رتبة في عالم الله اخس من رتبة من يتجمل بترك الحق المعتقد تقليدا بالتسارع الى قبول الباطل تصديقا دون ان يقبله خبرا وتحقيقا (تهافت ١٣٥ - ١٥)

انظر ايضا :

ظنا بان اظهار التكايس في النزوع عن تقليد الحق بالشروع في تقليد الباطل جمال (تهافت ١١٥ - ١٢)

ليكف عن غلوائه من يظن ان التجمل بالكفر تقليدا يدل على حسن رأيه ويشعر بفطنته وذكائه (تهافت ١٠٧ - ٣)

انظر ايضا :

ولكن يعتزى الى بعد الفرق عن المسلك المستقيم واطوعهم لقبول الخرافات ويتستر (?) بهم ويتجمل بحب اهل البيت وهم الروافض (المستظهرى ٦٥٧ - ٧)

Rhetorical Questions and Exclamations of Wonder and Surprise

1. Rhetorical questions
  - a. Fa-Laita Shi'rī, Thumma Laita Shi'rī
  - b. Fa-Kaifa
  - c. Min Aina, Fa-Aina ... min
  - d. Other rhetorical questions without special linguistic characteristics
2. Exclamations of wonder or surprise
  - a. Wa-l- Adjab anna, Wa-l-'Adjab min
  - b. Haihāt
  - c. Wahaihāt an Tuqāsa-l-Malā'ika bi-l-Haddādīn

It goes without saying that the abundance of rhetorical questions and the various kinds of exclamations denoting wonder and surprise are an important stylistic means of persuasion. Al-Ghazzālī uses them often, together with the expressions of mockery and vituperation which we have treated in the preceding section. He addresses his readers and says between the lines, as it were: It is quite impossible to believe that you are stupid enough not to notice these things, not to understand them ...

These expressions per se are widely known, and again, it is only their considerable frequency in his books which makes them one of the hallmarks of Al-Ghazzālī's style.

I shall treat the various kinds of rhetorical questions first, and follow with some expressions of wonder.

1. Rhetorical questions

a. Fa-Laita Shi'rī, Thumma Laita Shi'rī

This exclamation - meaning 'I wish I knew', 'It defies my comprehension' etc. - can be found frequently in polemic literature<sup>98</sup>. It is a favourite of Al-Ghazzālī who uses it to express surprise at his opponent and his curious stand in the debate. 'Fa-Laita Shi'rī' is the most frequent of all these expressions in general, and in Al-Ghazzālī's writing as well. I found 'Fayā Laita Shi'rī' only once in his writing ("Al-Munqidh", p. 119, 6) and 'Wa-Laita Shi'rī' only twice. (Of course these expressions may be the result of an error in copying or typing only.) Al-Ghazzālī generally opens a sentence with this combination, but there are few examples in which the combination appears within the sentence also.

فليت شعري اينا اشبه بصحابة رسول الله صلعم ، امن يدعو الى النبي  
المؤيد بالمعجزة او من يدعو الى من يدعي العصمة ؟  
( المستظهرى ١٢٦٣٥ - ١٤ )

(I wish I knew which one of us resembles the friends of the prophet most: is it he who calls [on the people] to follow the prophet whose word was borne out by a miracle, or he who calls [on people] to follow him who claims to be infallible?!)

فليت شعري من فتح باب النظر ... هو اقرب الى موافقة الصحابة واهل  
السنة والجماعة او من يؤسس الخلق عن النظر في الادلة بالتكذيب ؟  
( المستظهرى ١١٦٣٥ الخ )

فليت شعري هل عجز في الحال الا لغلبة الشهوة ؟

( احياء ٤٤٤ أ ١٧٢٦١٧٢٦ )

فليت شعري اى هذه البراهين اوضح عندك وقلبك بايها اشد تصديقا ؟

( القسطاس ٥٨١ - ٤ )

فليت شعري الآن يا رفيقي ( ! ) بما يعالج امامك هؤلاء الاصناف

الثلاثة ؟ ( القسطاس ٨٩٧ - ٩ )

فليت شعري متى نقل عن رسول الله صلعم او عن الصحابة رضي الله

عنهم ٠٠٠ ( فيصل ٦٢٠ الخ )

فان كانت في الاعين عين مترهة عن هذه النقااض كلها فليت شعري هل

هو اولي باسم النور؟ ( مشكاة ١١٦٣٣ - ١٢ )

فليت شعري بماذا تجيب ؟ اتجيب بان تقول ٠٠٠

( المنقذ ١٣٦٩١ - ١٤ )

فيا ليت شعري من يصدق بذلك ثم لا يتسع عقله للتصديق بان تقدير

صلاة الصبح ٠٠٠ هو لخواص غير معلومة بنظر الحكمة

( المنقذ ٦١١٩ الخ )

فليت شعري اى الامرين احزم واحوط

( الجام ٦١٠ - ٧ )

فمن يخالف ، ليت شعري اىخالف في قولنا الاول ٠٠٠ او في قولنا

الثاني ؟ ( الجام ٧٦٢٦ - ٨ )

فليت شعري من يتسع عقله لقبول هذه البدائع ويضطر الى الاعتراف بانها

خواص ، معرفتها معجزة لبعض الانبياء ، فكيف ينكر مثل ذلك فيما يسمعه

من قول نبي صادق مؤيد بالمعجزات ؟

( المنقذ ١٢٠ - ٣ )

(I fail to understand how a man who agrees with such out-landish ideas, and who feels compelled to admit that they are special properties, the revelation of which is a miracle of the prophets - should deny things which he heard from a true prophet, whose sayings were proved by a miracle and who was never known to lie!)

### ثم ليت شعري

ثم ليت شعري اذا عينت الكثرة هل يوجد الحق في جانب الفقيه او

الافقه او جانب غيرهم ؟<sup>٩٩</sup> ( ميزان ٣٦٤٢ - ٣ )

ثم ليت شعري هل يمنع هذا القائل من شد الرجال الى قبور الانبياء

عليهم السلام ؟ ( احياء ٥٦١ - ٥٦٤٤٧٦ )

انظر ايضا :

فلا ادري كيف يدعي الاقتداء بمذهبه ( مذهب الشافعي ) جماعة صار

العلم بينهم عداوة قاطعة ( احياء ٥٦١ - ٥٦٧٨٤ )

### b. Fa-Kaifa

This common opening starts many rhetorical questions which express surprise. It also comes in answer to conditional sentences, meaning: moreover, nonetheless, etc. Al-Ghazzālī often repeats it a number of times consecutively (see the first example).

فإن من لا يعرف حقارة الدنيا وقد ورتها... فهو فاسد العقل... فكيف يكون من العلماء من لا عقل له؟! ومن لا يعلم عظم امر الآخرة ودوامها فهو كافر مسلوب الايمان فكيف يكون من العلماء من لا ايمان له؟! ومن لا يعلم مضادة الدنيا للآخرة وان الجمع بينهما طمع في غير مطمع... فهو جاهل بشرائح الانبياء كلهم... فكيف يعد من زمرة العلماء؟! ومن علم هذا ثم لا يؤثر الآخرة على الدنيا فهو اسير الشيطان... (احياء ١٤٦١٠١٦ الخ)

(He who does not know the baseness and the shallowness of this world ... has a defective brain ... and how can a brainless man rank with the wise?! and he who does not realize the importance of the World Beyond and its eternity is a faithless heretic, and how can a faithless man rank with the religious sages? etc.)

ونحن مع ذلك نرجوان لا يكون حال الغافل في جميع صلاته مثل حال التارك بالكلية فانه على الجملة اقدم على الفعل ظاهرا... وكيف لا والذي صلى مع الحدث ناسيا صلته عند الله تعالى ولكن له اجر ما... ومع هذا الرجاء فيخشى ان يكون حاله اشد من حال التارك وكيف لا والذي يحضر الخدمة ويتهاون بالحضرة اشد حالا من الذي يعرض عن الخدمة (احياء ١٠٦٢٨٨٦٠٦٦ الخ)

بل الغرض بها (بآيات القرآن) الاعتبار والاستبصار لتعلم ان الانبياء عليهم السلام لم يتجاوز عنهم في الذنوب الصغار فكيف يتجاوز عن غيرهم في الذنوب الكبار؟ (احياء ١٠٦٢١٦٤٦٠٦٦ الخ)

ولو لم يكن للمطيع جزاء على عمله الا ما يجد من حلاوة الطاعة وروح الانس بمناجاة الله تعالى لكان ذلك كافيا فكيف بما يضاف اليه من نعيم الآخرة (احياء ١٠٦٢١٧٤٦٠٦٦ الخ - ١٢ انظر ايضا س ٨)

ولا سبيل الى الأمن من الخطأ للانبياء... فكيف يطمع في ذلك؟! (المنقذ ٤٦٩٠ - ٥)

(... and if the prophets are not immune to errors ... how can others wish for it?)

فمن الاحكام النجومية ما لا يقع الا في كل الف سنة مرة فكيف ينال ذلك بالتجربة؟ (المنقذ ٤٦١٠٧ - ٥)

### c. Min Aina

This, too, is an opening for a rhetorical question which is intended to convey that there is no basis to the opponent's argument, such as the following: 'And how pray?', 'on what grounds?'. This question abounds mainly in "Tahāfut"<sup>101</sup> where, as we have already seen, Al-Ghazzālī wants to prove to the philosophers that there is no certain proof of their arguments on metaphysics. However, it appears in its rhetorical connotation in other books as well.

ومن اين عرفتم هذه الدلالات؟ (فضائح الباطنية، تحقيق بدوي ٣٦٦٩)

فازا لم يحرم الآحاد فمن اين يحرم المجموع؟ (احياء ٦٠١١٣٤٦٠٦٦ الخ)

(... and since no one of these forbidden, on what ground, pray, will they all together be forbidden?!)

ومن اين للقوة البشرية ان تسلك في صفات الربوبية سبيل الفحص والتفتيش!  
(المقصد ٩٦٢ - ٨)

فمن اين يعلم انه يبقى الى ان يتوب!  
(الاربعين ٢٦٢٢٤ - ٢)

ومن اين يلزم ان من قدر على فعل عجيب ينبغي ان يكون حافظا للقرآن؟!  
(القسطاس ١٥٨٢ - ٢)

وهو فعل غريب ولكن من اين يلزم منه صدق فاعله؟!  
(القسطاس ١٥٩٧ - ٢)

فاسأله من اين ثبت له ان كون الحق وقفا عليه (على الاشعري) حتى  
قضى بكفر الباقلاني؟! (فيصل ٦٥٣)

(I shall therefore proceed to ask him from where he draws the conviction that truth was given to him [to Al-Ash'arī] only<sup>102</sup> so that he may rule that Al-Bāqillānī is a heretic?)

#### Fa-Aina\_min

This is another kind of rhetorical exclamation, which resembles the above superficially, but means: 'how great the difference between ...'

واين لذة اللعب بالعصفور من لذة الملك والوزارة!  
(ميزان ٧٦٨ - ٨)

(... and how great the difference between joy in playing with a bird and the joy of being the ruler or vizier!)

كمن عرف ان زيدا متميز عن غيره بكونه ناظم ديوان ومصنف كتاب ، واين هذا من اعتقاد من تصقح الشعر فرأى فيه عجائبه وطالع التصنيف ...  
فرأى فيه غرائبه!  
(ميزان ١٥٣٨ - ٤)

... ذلك فروع وهو كلام في حيض النسوان فاين ذلك من الكلام في صفة الرحمن!  
(احياء ٦٥١ أ ٦٥٩٦٦ - ٦)

#### d. Rhetoric questions without special linguistic characteristics

فمن استشعر عقوبة نازلة بولده او ببعض اعزته طال عليه مصيبته وبكاؤه واى عزيز اعز عليه من نفسه واى عقوبة اشد من النار ، واى شيء ادل على نزول العقوبة من المعاصي ، واى مخبر اصدق من الله ورسوله؟!  
(احياء ٦٥٤ أ ١٣٦٣٢٦ ١٣٦٢٦ الخ)

واى تعلق لهذا ( للمنطق ) بمهمات الدين حتى يجحد وينكر؟!  
(المنقذ ٥٥٧٧)

(But what has it [the science of logic] to do with religion that it should require denial?)

See also rhetorical questions following each other in order to elaborate on a theme or close a debate: "Faṣal", p. 3, 6 ff; "Iḥyā" I, 1, p. 49, 2-4; "Al-Munqidh", p. 91, 2.

2. Exclamations of wonder or surprisea. Wa-l-'Adjab Anna

(How wondrous! it is surprising that ...)

العجب ان اكثرهم جوزوا اثبات تلك العلاقة مع جسد آخر  
(فضائح الباطنية ، تحقيق بدوى  
( ٥٦٤٩ )

والعجب ان الروافض زادوا على هذا فقالوا ...

(احياء ٥٦٢ ط ١٢٠٧٥٠١٢٠١٢)

(How wondrous that the 'Rawāfiḍ' Shī'ites, should have gone to say ...)

والعجب انهم (التعليمية) ضيعوا عمرهم في طلب العلم وفي التبجح  
بالظفر به ولم يتعلموا منه شيئاً اصلاً  
(المنقذ ٩٦٩٣ - ١١)

103  
(How wondrous that they should have spent their lives  
looking for a teacher, and once found, they rejoice in the  
discovery without learning anything from him!)

ووراء هؤلاء قوم جهال هم المنكرون لاصل ذلك المتعجبون من هذا  
الكلام يستمعون ويسخرون ويقولون : "العجب انهم كيف يهذون"  
(المنقذ ١٠٣٠٣ - ٣)

والعجب انا لو غيرنا العبارة الى عبارة المنجمين لعقلوا اختلاف هذه  
الاقوات  
(المنقذ ٩٦١١٩ - ١٠)

Wa-l-'Adjab min - more frequent with the same

meaning.

والعجب ممن يدعي الحدق في المعقولات ... ثم يشاهد ما في العالم  
من العجائب والآيات ثم تضيق حوصلته عن قبول ذلك في قدرة الله  
(فضائح الباطنية ، تحقيق بدوى ،  
(٤٦٥٠)

وجميع ما ذكره من صفات الاول او نفوه لا حجة لهم عليها الا تخمينات  
وظنون ولا غرو لو حار العقل في الصفات الالهية ولا عجب انما العجب  
من عجبهم بانفسهم وبادلتهم ومن اعتقادهم انهم عرفوا هذه الامور معرفة  
يقينية مع ما فيها من الخبط والخبال

(تهافت ٧٥٢٢٢ - ١٠)

(... and anything they might have said about the attributes  
of the First Principle or denied is unfounded - and they  
have no proof for it but conjecture and supposition. It  
is not surprising that men should be confused with regard  
to God's attributes: what is indeed surprising is that  
they should only worship themselves and their arguments,  
and believe themselves to possess well-based knowledge  
regarding these things, in spite of the fact that this  
knowledge contains both madness and confusion<sup>104</sup>.)

فالعجب منك انك لا تحيل عثرتك على عماك وانما تحيلها على تقصير  
غيرك  
(احياء ١٠٣٧٥٠ - ٢)



(... and it is most surprising that you should not see the reason for your failure in your own blindness but in the imperfection of others.)

والعجب من عقل هذا المعتوه<sup>١٠٥</sup> وترويج حماقته في صيغة حسنة اذ  
يقول (احياء ١٠٤ أ ٧٤٢١٥١٦)

والعجب كل العجب ممن يرى . . . ثم ينظر الى هذه العجائب في  
نفسه وفي غيره ثم يغفل عن صانعه ومصوره . . .  
(احياء ١٠٤ ط ٢٦٢٨٣٠٥ - ٥)

فالعجب ممن يتعب طول العمر في طلب العلم ثم يقنع بمثل ذلك العلم  
الركيك المستغث (المنقذ ٦٩٣ الخ)

انظر ايضا :

وليس هذا بعجب وانما العجب من هذا التدبير المحكم والنظام المتقن  
ولعمري ان من لا يهتدي الى سر الحكمة فيه يتعجب منه لقصور هدايته  
(المضنون به على غير اهله  
١٢٦١٦ - ١٤)

#### b. Haihāt

This common exclamation of surprise, which appears quite often together with the 'Mā' expressing wonder, means: 'How remote this idea is from truth, from reality', 'impossible', 'God beware'. Al-Ghazzālī likes using this exclamation especially from the "Ihyā" on, and afterwards (but see also "Al-Iqtisād", p. 3, 1) in order to make the reader aware of his lack of understanding. Sometimes he begins his answer with this expression and sometimes ends with it, often using it twice running as is common usage

in Arabic. (Cf. Al-Muhāsibī, "Kitāb-Al-Ri'āya", p. 16, 10.) Usually this exclamation appears in sentences containing rhetorical questions or other exclamations, such as 'Fa-Laita Shi'rī' etc. mentioned above.

فلا ادرى كيف يدعي الاقتداء بمذهبه ( مذهب الشافعي ) جماعة صار  
العلم بينهم عداوة قاطعة فهل يتصور ان ينسب الانس بينهم مع طلب  
الغلبة والمباهاة ؟ هيهات هيهات !  
( احياء ١٠٤ أ ٤٧٨٥١٦ - ٢ )

(I fail to understand how these people to whom science has become a source of strife, nevertheless maintain that they follow him [Al-Shāfi'i]! Is it possible to attribute to them both friendship and the quest for superiority and vain glory? Such a thing would seem inconceivable!)

ولذلك قال صلى الله عليه وسلم : اشد الناس عذابا يوم القيامة عالم لا  
ينفعه الله بعلمه فلقد ضره مع انه لم ينفعه وليته نجا منه رأسا برأس  
وهيهات هيهات فخطر العلم عظيم . . .

( احياء ١٠٤ أ ٣٤٨٠٥٦ - ١ )

فهيهات ما بعده ( طالب علم ، ردى الاخلاق ) عن العلم الحقيقي  
النافع في الآخرة الجالب للسعادة  
( احياء ١٠٤ أ ٥٨٣٥١٦ - ٥ )

فتفتن ذوا البصائر بهذه الطواهر ان اهم الامور تطهير السرائر ان  
يبعد ان يكون المراد . . . عمارة الظاهر بالتنظيف بافاضة الماء والقائه  
وتخريب الباطن وابقائه مشحونا بالاخبار والاقذار هيهات هيهات  
( احياء ١٠٤ أ ٤٦٢٢٢٥ - ١ )

فرفضوا هذا القطب من الدين اصلا ولم يدركوا بين الاموال فرقا وفصلا  
(سجع!) وهيئات هيئات فالحلال بين والحرام بين وبينهما امور  
متشابهات (احياء ٥٦٢ ذ ٣٥٨١٠٦)

وانما ذلك لان عجزه في نفسه خيل اليه نقضا في الدين وهيئات وانما  
مثاله مثال الاعمى ١٠٦٠٠٠ (احياء ٥٦٣ ذ ٣٥١٣٧٤٦٣-٣)

فقال : من انا حتى اعرف الصديق ، هيئات هيئات ! لا يعرف الصديق  
الا صديق هو مثله او فوقه ومن اين لي ان ادعي معرفته او اطمع فيها !  
(المقصد ٦٥١٩ - ٨)

ويتوهمون ( المتصوفة ) ان المشاركة في الظواهر توجب المساهمة في  
الحقائق وهيئات فما اغزر حماقة من لا يميز بين الشحم والورم  
(احياء ٥٦٢ ذ ٣٥١٠٩٤٦٣-٣)

(They who consider themselves to be 'Ṣūfī' imagine that the partnership in external things necessarily leads towards partnership in truth too. Yet, how far-fetched is this idea! And how great is the folly of him who cannot distinguish between being fat or being swollen.)

فتعرف ان الصورة ليس في المرأة بل تجلت لها ، ولو حلت فيها لما تصور  
ان تتجلى صورة واحدة بما رايا كثيرة في حالة واحدة بل كانت اذا حلت  
في مرآة ارتحلت عن غيرها وهيئات ! فانه يتجلى لجملة من العارفين  
دفعة واحدة ( جواهر ٣٥١٥ الخ )

فهؤلاء ( قوم الههم هواهم ) من اين تتميز لهم ظلمة الكفر من ضياء  
الايمان ابالهام الهي ٠٠٠ او بكمال علمي ٠٠٠ هيئات هيئات ! هذا  
المطلب انفس واعز من ان يدرك بالذنى  
( فيصل ١٠٥٣ - ٨ )

فان قيل فالعارفون محيطون بكمال معرفة الله سبحانه ٠٠٠ قلنا  
هيئات ! فقد بينا بالبرهان القطعي ٠٠٠ انه لا يعرف الله كنه معرفته  
الا الله (الجام ١٣٥٢٣ - ١٥)

This exclamation is particularly frequent as the opening of an answer to an opponent in a polemic; cf. e.g. in the *Qustās*:

هيئات راجع القرآن فقد علمت ٠٠٠

( القسطاس ٥٥٧٩ )

هيئات لا ادعي اني ٠٠٠ ( القسطاس ٩٦٨٤ )

هيئات لا اقدر عليه ( القسطاس ٧٥٨٥ )

هيئات فيها انا اشرح ما اریده ( القسطاس ١٥١٠١ )

هيئات انك لا تستطيع معي صبرا ووكيف تصبر على ما لم تحط به خبرا  
( القسطاس ٦٥١١٠ - ٧ )

c. Wahaihāt an Tuqāsa-l-Malā'ika bi-l-Haddādīn

The exclamation 'Haihāt' is sometimes repeated by Al-Ghazzālī with a favourite proverb, in which he expresses the idea: how incredible, how could such a notion be considered?! Literally it means: Can blacksmiths be compared to angels? Goldziher has already discussed this proverb in Al-Ghazzālī's work (see *Streitschrift*, Text p. 31, 1, and note 3) although giving only a few examples, some of them taken from a book, the authenticity of which is doubtful

("Fātihāt-Al-'Ulūm", see Bouyges, Essai, pp. 126-127.)

I have already mentioned above that Al-Ghazzālī uses proverbs sparingly and that this constitutes a marked contrast to the great variety of metaphors and images in his work<sup>107</sup>. I did find, however, a few proverbs scattered here and there, such as :

- فخير الكلام ما قل ودل وما املّ (الوجيز ٦١٠٦٤)  
 المستظهرى ١١٦٣ - ١٢)
- عد وعاقل خير من صديق جاهل (تهافت ١٣٦١١)
- والجنون فنون (المستظهرى ٦ مقدمة المانية ١١١  
 ملاحظة ١)
- فاني اسمع جمعجة ولا ارى طحنا (القسطاس ٥٦٢٩ - ٦)
- الغضب غول العقل (احياء ٦٣٠٠٦١٤٠٠٦١١ مشكاة  
 ١٦٤٩ ٦١٦٥٠ ٦١٦٥٥)
- ولا يبعد ان يقع الحافر على الحافر (المنقذ ٤٦٨٣)

Yet, only the following proverb recurs in many of Al-Ghazzālī's books. To begin with there are a number of examples with the above exclamation; these are followed by examples without it:

- وهيئات ان تقاس الملائكة بالحدادين  
 (احياء ٣٦٤٢٥١٦١)
- هيئات ما ابعد عن التحصيل وما اخلى عن الدين من قاس الملائكة  
 بالحدادين - (الجام ٢٦٢٩ - ٨)
- قلنا بئس ما شبهتم الملائكة بالحدادين  
 (المستظهرى ٢٢٦٣٢ - ٢٣)
- وكم من احمق يتكايس فيقيس نفسه بصاحب الشرع مقيسة الملائكة  
 بالحدادين فيهلك من حيث لا يدري<sup>١٠٨</sup>  
 (ميزان ١٠٦٨٩ - ١٢)
- فما افلح من قاس الملائكة بالحدادين  
 (احياء ٣٦٨٧٦١٦١)
- فلا تقاس الملائكة بالحدادين (الجام ٤٦٢٢)
- انظر ايضا :
- وهيئات فلا تقاس الملائكة بالحدادين  
 (فاتحة العلم ٧٦٣٠)
- فلا تشبه نفسك بهم فلا تقاس الملائكة بالحدادين  
 (فاتحة العلم ٣٦٤٩)

Expressions Giving Warning of Dangers and Expressions  
Designed to Frighten

- a. Ghawr wa-Ghā'ila
- b. Mazallat Qadam
- c. Labbasa Talbīsan
- d. Istidrādj

A recurring group of expressions in Al-Ghazzālī's work denotes that great dangers are inherent in the different phenomena of life. Most people seem to disregard these dangers and therefore fall into the traps set for them. Yet those who want to achieve an understanding of religious truth and the beatitude which accompanies it, must be alert to these dangers (traps) and beware of them. Al-Ghazzālī often calls these dangers 'Ghawā'il' (sing. 'Ghā'ila') and this expression, which is not very common in classical Arabic literature, appears in different combinations in his writings. He also describes the dangers awaiting the careless, innocent, in expressions of a different character, which are commoner such as: 'Mazallat Qadam'. In order to describe the act of fraud or the setting of traps, as it were, he uses verbs such as 'labbasa talbīsan'. All these expressions and others of a similar kind are repeated often in his writings. This method of 'frightening' man with unknown perils, lurking in his way, may be a stronger means of persuasion than any rational argumentation. Al-Ghazzālī evokes in his reader a fear of perils and snares lurking at every step, as well as lack of confidence in the opponent's words, a suspicion that all his words are but a web of lies

destined to get him (the reader) off the well-trodden path. He thus draws the reader closer to him, and the expressions of certainty on the one hand, and mockery on the other, as we have seen above, complete the process in the reader's heart.

a. Ghawr wa-Ghā'ila

The word 'Ghā'ila' (signifying an imminent danger)<sup>109</sup>, is doubtless a favourite of Al-Ghazzālī and could be regarded as a part of his personal vocabulary. Sometimes, mainly in "Al-Munqidh", this word is joined by 'Ghawr' (pl. 'Aghwār')<sup>110</sup>. The combination of the two seems to become a 'Hen Dia Duoin' with Al-Ghazzālī regarding hidden spiritual and religious phenomena. It creates an image of a deep abyss gaping at the feet of the innocent traveller, and of this one should make him aware. I have preferred to translate the expression in the genitive - 'the depths of peril' - instead of giving the literal translation (with a conjunction): 'perils and depths'. There are also other recurring synonyms for 'Ghā'ila', such as the word 'Āfa' (fault or lack), which comes most frequently on its own in general religious literature, as well as in Al-Ghazzālī's writings<sup>111</sup>.

فكل نظر لا يتزن بهذا الميزان ولا يعاير بهذا المعيار فاعلم انه فاسد  
العيار غير مأمون الخوائل والاغوار

( معيار ٥٦٦ - ٦  
انظر ايضا ٢٦٨ )

(... and know that every consideration which will not be weighed on these scales and will not be judged according to this criterion, will be a useless consideration, exposed to the depths of perils.)

...و (مشمول على) ايضاح غوائلهم (غوائل الباطنية) في تلبيسهم  
وخدايمهم وانسلالهم عن ريقه الاسلام بما يفضي الى هتك استارهم وكشف  
اغوارهم (المستظهرى ١٠٦١ - ١٢)

فقد سألتني ايها الاخ في الدين ان ابث اليك غاية العلوم واسرارها  
وفائلة المذاهب واغوارها (المنقذ ٥٦٥٥ - ٦)

فلا بد من احكامها (احكام الجليات) اولاً لا يتيقن ان<sup>١١٢</sup> ثقني  
بالمحسوسات من جنس امانى ... ام هو امان محقق لا غدر فيه ولا غائلة  
(المنقذ ٣٦٠ الخ)

فيطلع على ما لم يطلع عليه صاحب العلم من غور وفائلة  
(المنقذ ٤٦٩ - ٥)

اعاوده وارده واتفقد غوائله واغواره (غوائل علم الفلسفة) حتى اطلعت  
على ما فيه من خداع وتلبيس وتحقيق وتخيل اطلاقاً لم اشك فيه  
(المنقذ ١٦٧٠ - ٣)

#### سر وفائلة

فليبحث المتعلم المسترشد عنه ليعرف سره وفائلة  
(ميزان ٢٦١٦٥ - ٣)

#### عاقبة وفائلة

وما احوج الى هذا من ركب متن الخطر ... عن حضيض التقليد ...  
الى يفاع الاطلاع والا استبصار مع خطر عاقبته وتفاقم غائلته  
(محك ٤٦٣ - ١)

#### غوائل وعورات

فلما رأيت هذا العرق من حماقة ... انتدبت لتحرير هذا الكتاب ردا  
على ... وكاشفا عن غوائل مذاهبهم (مذهب الفلاسفة) وعوراته التي هي  
على التحقيق مضاحك العقلاء (تهافت ٤٦٦ - ٧)

#### Note to the last example

The parallel which probably appears and exists only here ('Ghawā'il' and 'Awrāt') is, of course, possible, but it is also likely that a fault has occurred (of which no trace was left in the different versions) and that the copyist who misunderstood 'Ghawr' chose to use 'Awra' in the plural.

#### Āfāt wa-Ghawā'il

We have already said that this synonym is very common and that both words are interchangeable without any change of meaning (see, for example, "Ihyā" II, 6, p. 1044, 2, 6; 1032, 9; 1080, 8, in different combinations in the headlines of the book and in the summary). Cf. also the 'Tadjnīs' between 'Āfāt' and 'Fā'ida' ibid. (see also Streitschrift, p. 3, 2) and 'Āfāt-Fawāt' ("Ihyā", ibid., p. 1069, 5, 7).

#### Examples:

وهو (علم الخلافيات) الذي رد الفقهاء كلهم الى طلب المنافسة  
والمباهات على ما سيأتيك تفصيل غوائلها وآفاتها  
(احياء ١٦٦٩٥١ - ٢)

وقد تساهل الخلق في الاختراzen آفاته وغوائله (آفات اللسان)  
(احياء ٥٥٣ ٤٥١٤٥٣٤٥٣)

ونحن بتوفيق الله وحسن تدبيره نفضل مجامع آفات اللسان ونذكرها واحدة  
واحدة بحدودها وأسبابها وغوائلها

(احياء ٥٥٣ ٥٥١٥٤٣٥٥٣ - ٦)

وعلاجه ان يتفكر في آفات المال وكثرة حقوقه وعظم غوائله

(احياء ٥٥٣ ط ٥٥٣ ١١٥٢٠٠٨٥٥٣)

فهذا مقدار ما اردنا ذكره من آفات الفلسفة وغائلتها

(المنقذ ٥٨٥٥٨٥)

Sometimes 'Ghā'ila' appears alone, without a synonym:

فاذا نبغت نابغة<sup>١١٣</sup> تقدم (السلطان) على الفور بازالتها قبل ان  
تستحكم غائلتها وتستطير في الارض ثائرتها  
(المستظهرى ١٥٤١ - ٢)

(... and should a new movement come into being he [the  
ruler] will hasten to eradicate it before the perils  
inherent in it take root and its dangers spread over the  
earth.) فليس تفي شرة صوابه بغائلة خطئه

(ميزان ٨٥١٢٨٥١٢)

وسلوك طريق الآخرة مع كثرة الغوائل من غير دليل ولا رفيق متعب ومك  
(احياء ٥٥٣ ٧٥٢٥٥٣٥٥٣)

وقد يكون سببه التفاوت في العلم المعرف لغائلة تلك الشهوة  
(احياء ٥٥٣ ٧٥١٤٩٥٥٣)

الاولى ان تأخذه (مال السلطان) ان امت ثلاث غوائل : الغائلة الاولى  
ان يظن السلطان بسبب اخذك ان ماله طيب ٠٠٠ الغائلة الثانية ان  
ينظر اليك غيرك من العلماء والجهال فيعتقدون انه حلال ٠٠٠ الغائلة  
الثالثة ان يتحرك قلبك الى حبه (احياء ٥٥٣ ١٢٥٩١٣٥٥٣ الخ)

ومن لا يخاف الله لا تؤمن غائلته ولا يوثق بصداقته

(احياء ٥٥٣ ٩١٣٥٥٣ ١٢٥٥٣ الخ)

(One cannot be safe from the dangers of one who does not  
fear Allah, and his friendship cannot be relied upon.)

ومن عرف هذه الحقيقة لزمه لا محالة ان لا يأكل الا من كسبه ليامن من  
هذه الغائلة (احياء ٥٥٣ ٩٦٥٥٣ ٩٦٥٥٣ - ١٠)

ان يكون قد انكسرت شهوته وامنت غائلته ٠٠٠

(احياء ٥٥٣ ٤٥١١٨٤٥٥٣)

فلا يطلقه (الانسان لسانه) الا فيما ينفعه في الدنيا والآخرة ويكفه عن  
كل ما يخشى غائلته في عاجله وآجله

(احياء ٥٥٣ ٤٥١٥٤٢٥٥٣ الخ)

وارفع منه ان يكون طالبا له (للفقر) وفرحا به لعلمه بغوائل الغنى

(احياء ٥٥٣ ٤٥١٥٤٢٥٥٣)

#### Ghawr, Aghwār

The meaning of this word is 'depths', and it is there-  
fore frequent with regard to the depth of the sea and to  
the common image of the 'sea of knowledge' or the 'seas of  
the heart'<sup>114</sup>. In Al-Ghazzālī's work there is a significant

connection between this word and certain recurring esoteric remarks (see below Ch. V).

وقد ذكرنا في كتاب تهافت الفلاسفة ما ينبه عن غوره  
( محك ١١٦٥١ )

(... and I have already mentioned in the "Tahāfut Al-Falāsifa" such things as would let [the reader] into the depth [of this matter].)

فانه ( العلم المحمود ) البحر الذي لا يدرك غوره  
( احياء ٦١٦٥٦٥٦ )

وتحت هذا غورا لا يحتل مثل هذا الكتاب كشفه  
( المقصد ١٦٦٤ )

اعلم ان الذي ذكرناه مع ظهوره تحت غور ، بل تحت كل الغور  
( فيصل ٦٥٥ )

وقد افدناك بهذه الترييدات التنبيه على اعظم الغور في هذه القاعدة  
( فيصل ٣٦٦٦٣ - ٢ )

وهذا الآن له غور عميق ومن اطلم على كنه حقيقته انكشفت له حقائق امثلة  
القرآن على يسر ( مشكاة ٤٦٣٧ - ٣ )

وبحر معرفة الله ابعد غورا واكثر معاطب ومهالك من بحر الماء  
( الجام ٥١٠ - ٤ )

انظر ايضا :

هذا محل غموض عجز اكثر الخلق فيه عن النهوض ( سجع ! ) وذلك لبعده  
غوره ودقة مسلكه ( معراج السالكين ٦٥٧ - ٥ )

Aghwār wa-Asrār

واما ربع العبادات فاذا ذكر فيه اسرار المعاملات الجارية بين الخلق واغوارها  
( احياء ٦٦٤٦٤٦٤ )

(... and in the section dealing with everyday life I shall mention the secrets of the relationships between men and their depths.)

كل عبد راقب حتى اشرف على اغواره واسراره ٠٠٠ فهو مهيمن بالاضافة الى  
قلبه ( المقصد ١٠٦٣١ )

b. Mazallat Qadam, Mazallat Aqdām

This is a milder expression to describe danger, and it mainly refers to a place full of obstacles, over which a careless person may stumble and fall. Al-Ghazzālī takes care to warn travellers of the pitfalls to be met with on the road indicated by him. Since a recurrent parallel of this expression seems to be 'Mawdi' Ghurūr' (the verb 'Gharra' is a most common one in Arabic religious literature), this combination came to mean also temptation and pitfalls. The verb 'Zalla' which denotes stumbling is also very frequent in itself but since I did not find any special interest in it, I have not given examples pertaining to it. (see for example "Ihyā" IV, 5, p. 2499, 7, a sentence which is repeated verbatim in "Kitāb Al-Arbā'in" (end of p. 7, and "Mishkāt", p. 60, 4-3.)

الحمد لله الذي عصمنا من الضلال وعرفنا مزية اقدم الجبهال  
(مقاصد ٢٤٣١)

(... and praise be to the Lord who has preserved us from mistakes and errors and who has told us where fools stumble!)

فلما كثرت المعقولات مزية الاقدام ومثارات الضلال ٠٠٠ ربنا هذا  
الكتاب معيارا للنظر والاعتبار ( معيار ٣٤٢٥ الخ )

وهذا الآن مزية قدم فك من انسان يظن انه نال هذه الرتبة وهو في  
الحقيقة شيطان مرید ٠٠٠ وهي نهاية الحمق والغرور  
( ميزان ١٤٦٣ الخ )

فاياك ان تغفل عن امثال هذه الدقائق فانها مزية اقدم العارفين فضلا  
عن الغافلين ( احياء ٤٤٤، ٤٤٥، ٤٤٦، ٤٤٧ - ٤٤٨ )

فان تساويا فيه تساوت درجاتهما الا ان ههنا مزية قدم وموضع غرور  
( احياء ٤٤٤، ٤٤٥، ٤٤٦، ٤٤٧ - ٤٤٨ )

وهذه مزية قدم فان من ليس له قدم راسخ في المعقولات ربما لم يتميز  
احدهما عن الآخر ( المقصد ٨٤٧٥ - ٨٤٧٦ )

اعلم ان هذا المقام مزية الاقدام ولقد زلت فيه اقدم الاكثرين  
( الاربعين ٥٤٧ - ٥٤٨ )

See also the following passage from the "Risālāt Al-Wa'z" (which I did not include among the basic books used for this study) which abounds in expressions and images typical of Al-Ghazzālī:

ومنع الكلام للعوام يجرى مجرى منع الصبيان من شاطيء نهر الدجلة خوفا  
من الغرق ورخصة الاقوياء فيه تضاهي رخصة الماهر في صنعة السباحة  
الا ان ههنا موضع غرور ومزلة قدم وهو ان كل ضعيف في عقله ٠٠٠ يظن  
انه يقدر على ادراك الحقائق كلها وانه من جملة الاقوياء، وربما يخوضون  
فيغرقون في بحر الجهالات حيث لا يشعرون  
( رسالة الوعاظ والاعتقاد ١٠٤٣٠ الخ )

According to the above it may be wise to correct a printing error (?) in the "Ihyā", the origin of which is, probably, due to the frequency of the root 'Dhalla' in the lines preceding the sentence quoted:

ومثال هذا المحتسب مثال من يخلص غيره من النار باحراق نفسه وهو غاية  
الجهل وهذه مذلة عظيمة وفائلة هائلة وغرور الشيطان يتدلى بحبله كل  
انسان ( احياء ٢٤٤، ٢٤٥، ٢٤٦، ٢٤٧ - ٢٤٨ )

It seems that we should read 'Mazalla' here, though of course the printed version may also be admissible. The whole passage abounds in expressions typical of Al-Ghazzālī.



c. Talbīs

This expression which means: confusion, legerdemain, fraud<sup>115</sup> is frequently used by Al-Ghazzālī to denote hidden perils. It occurs mainly with regard to the handiwork of the devil and that of his emissaries.

It is quite well known that Ibn Al-Djawzī (597/1200)<sup>116</sup> wrote a book entitled "Talbiīs Iblīs". Although it contains some acrimonious attacks on Al-Ghazzālī, it contains also many passages deeply influenced by Al-Ghazzālī's attitude and doctrine and sometimes Ibn Al-Djawzī even quotes "Abū Hāmid Al-Tūsī" almost literally. It is therefore quite feasible that Ibn Al-Djawzī took both the title and possibly the idea for his book from Al-Ghazzālī<sup>117</sup>, who said in the "Ihyā" that if ever he found the time he would write a book on that subject:

وسنذكر جملة من مكاييد الشيطان في كتاب الغرور في آخر هذا الربع .  
ولعلنا ان امهل الزمان ، صنفنا كتابا على الخصوص نسميه " تلبيس  
ابليس " . فانه قد انتشر الآن تلبيسه في البلاد والعباد لا سيما في  
المذاهب والاعتقادات حتى لم يبق من الخيرات الا رسمها ، كل ذلك  
اذعانا لتلبيسات الشيطان ومكايده

( احياء ٢ ، أ٦٤١٣٩٧٦ - ١١ )

Al-Ghazzālī's book is not available (though it does indeed appear in some of Al-Ghazzālī's bibliographical lists<sup>118</sup>). It is indeed doubtful if he ever had the time to write it.

However, Ibn Al-Djawzī's book, with the same name, was found and published (Cairo 1340). Words derived from this

root (l-b-s) figure as 'guiding words' in it (see Table of Contents) as he describes in the book all the devil's ways of temptation ('Talbiīs') as he sees them (including the Ṣūfī movement). He even defines the expression 'Talbiīs' as follows (cf. p. 40, 3):

Al-Talbiīs Izhār al-Bāṭil fī Ṣūrat al-Ḥaqq  
(Talbiīs means to proclaim falsehood as truth).

The expression 'Talbiīs' is frequently used by Al-Ghazzālī (as well as the verb from the same root in the second conjugation). It is most frequent in the "Tahāfut"<sup>119</sup> though it may be found in other books as well.

فلا يبقى الا حمل الكلام على التلبيس بتخييل نقيض الحق لمصالحة الخلق  
مما يتقدس عنه منصب النبوة ( تهافت ١٦٣٥٦ - ٣ )

(... and there is nothing left but to understand the text as a bluff, causing people to imagine the reverse of the truth for the welfare of the people - yet the state of prophecy is above such means!)

والعبد الجالب للميرة مكار خداع خبيث ملبس يتمثل بصورة الناصح وتحت  
نصحه الداء العضال ( ميزان ٤٦٥٨ - ٥ )

(... and the slave who brings the provisions is a rascal, a liar, a wicked impostor who acts under false pretences, appearing to advise correctly, yet actually spreading an incurable disease<sup>120</sup> as it were.)

فكل ذلك من تلبيس علماء السوء بتبديل الاسامي  
(احياء ٥١ ٥٦٤٤٣)

واحتراز عن الاغترار بتلبيسات علماء السوء  
(احياء ٥١ ٥٦٤٤١٢)

بيان التلبيس في تشبيه هذه المناظرات بمشاورات الصحابة ومفاضات  
السلف (احياء ٥١ ٤٦٧٤)

ويطلعك على هذا التلبيس ما اذكره  
(احياء ٥١ ٥٧٢٥٥)

فلا بأس بسياحتهم ما كفووا عن الناس شرهم ولم يلبسوا على الخلق حالهم ،  
وانما عصيانهم في التلبيس والسؤال على اسم التصوف والاكل على الاوقاف  
التي وقفت على الصوفية (احياء ٢ ٥٦١٠٩٥ - ١٣)

والعبد مأمور بان يطلب اعلى المراتب ، ان قدر عليه ، ولكن بالاستحقاق  
كما هو حقه ، لا بالباطل والتلبيس  
(احياء ٥٤ ٥٦٤٤٣٦ - ٧)

#### Al-Kashf 'an Al-Talbīs

Al-Ghazzālī likes to describe his work as the exposition of the hidden fraud or the spiritual trap of others:

ومقصود هذه المسألة الكشف عن هذا التلبيس فقط  
(تهافت ٣ - ١٥١٠٣)

(... and the purpose of discussing this subjects is but to expose this web of lies.)

الباب السادس في الكشف عن تلبيساتهم ( تلبيسات الباطنية ) التي  
زوقوا بزعمهم ... ( المستظهرى ، مقدمة المانية ،  
١٦٥٢ - ٩ )

مثل ما اودعنا " معيار العلم " اذ به ينكشف التلبيس عن الحق  
( ميزان ٦٦٤ - ٧ )

فانشأ الله طائفة المتكلمين وحرك دواعيهم لنصرة السنة بكلام مرتب يكشف  
تلبيسات اهل البدع الحادثة على خلاف السنة الماثورة  
( المنقذ ٦٦٦ الخ )

(... and God raised a group of scholastic scholars and spurred them on to fight the battle of tradition in an orderly speech, which would expose the trickery of those heretics who make innovations and go against the inherited tradition.)

I shall repeat here a passage which contains some of the expressions mentioned so far (and others which will be mentioned later on.) The very combination of these common expressions is a distinguishing sign of Al-Ghazzālī's vocabulary and his manner of writing (cf. also "Al-Munqidh", p. 70, 1 ff.):

... في تصنيف كتاب في الرد على الباطنية مشتمل على الكشف عن  
بدعتهم وضلالتهم وفنون مكرهم واحتيالهم ووجه استدراجهم عوام الخلق  
وجهاهم وايضاح غوائلهم في تلبيسهم وخداعهم وانسلاخهم عن رقة  
الاسلام وانسلاخهم وانخلاصهم وابرار فضائحهم بما يفضي الى هتك  
استارهم وكشف اغوارهم ( المستظهرى ١٦٥١٦ الخ )

Iltabasa, Mahall Al-Iltibās

This root often comes in the eighth conjugation, meaning 'the matter is unclear, confusing and misleading'<sup>121</sup>. The following common combinations should bear this out: 'Iltabasa Al-Amr', 'Iltabasat Al-Haqīqa', 'Mawdi' Al-Iltibās', 'Mahall Al-Iltibās', 'Mathār Al-Iltibās', (the latter resembles the above-mentioned 'Mazallat Al-Qadam' to some extent.)

ثم نقول هذه المناقضة تبين انهم غفلوا عن موضع تلبيس في القياس ولعل موضع الالتباس قولهم ان ... (تهافت ٧٦٣٠٨ - ٨)

(We say that this contradiction illustrates that they did not pay attention to a misleading point in the deduction. This point may perhaps be that they say ...)

فمن التباس عليه هذا كيف يتضح له امر من الغوامض  
(محك ٢٦٢٣)

فان كان في العالم مدعيان التباس علينا تمييز الحق عن المبتل وان لم يكن الا مدع واحد في محل الالتباس كان ذلك هو المعصم قطعيا  
(المستظهرى ١٦١٦ - ٢)

ولا يلتبس عليه شيء من ذلك مع انه الامر الملتبس على اكثر الخلق  
(ميزان ١٦٥٦ - ٢)

فقد عرفت العلم المحمود والمذموم ومثار الالتباس واليك الخيرة<sup>١٢٢</sup> في ان  
ان ... (احياء ٥٦٤٦٦١)

والمغرور الجاهل بنفسه اخرى بان يكون جاهلا بامر دينه فان اقرب  
الاشياء الى قلبه قلبه فاذا التبس عليه امر قلبه فكيف ينكشف له غيره  
٩ - ٧٦١٠٩٦ (احياء ٥٢٦٥٢)  
انظر ايضا س٣: تلبيس

اعلم ان هذا امر غامض وقد وردت فيه آيات واخبار متعارضة يلتبس طريق  
الحق بينها الا على سمسرة العلماء  
(احياء ٦٠٣ أ ٦١٤١٦٦٦ - ٦)

وذلك في غاية التعارض والالتباس

(القسطاس ١٦١٥)

Note:

The question of correction of a version arises here as well: Goldziher corrected, justifiably I believe, the manuscript of the Streitschrift from 'Mumkin Al-Talbīs' (a place which may cause confusion) (see p. 15, n. 1), to 'Mukman Al-Talbīs' in the following sentence:

وطريقنا ان نرتب شبههم على اقصى الامكان ثم نكشف عن مكن التلبيس  
(المستظهرى ٢٦١٥، انظر ايضا فضائح  
الباطنية، تحقيق بدوى ٦٥٧٣)

It seems that Goldziher based his version on that found in a different place (Makāmin Al-Talbīs, *ibid.*,

Introduction, p. 43, note 1, 2-3) and a similar correction on the margins of the manuscript in the same place (see note *ibid.*, l. 4 - 'Mukman Tadrīsihā', and see the whole passage in Badawi's edition, p. 36).

It may be worthwhile, therefore, to reexamine also "Tahāfut", p. 167, 6 ff.:

فليطرح لفظ واجب الوجود فانه ممكن التلبس فيه فان البرهان لم يدل الا  
على . . . فدعوى غيره تحكم (تهافت ١٦٧، ٦ الخ)

According to the editor's note here, there were other versions of the combination quoted here, and there is no confidence in the version selected by Bouyges. (The use of the fifth conjugation of this root, meaning 'confusion', is also rare!) Although no manuscript has 'Mukman' it may nevertheless be feasible to correct the text here as well, as did Goldziher in the Streitschrift, perhaps according to the rule of 'DIFFICILIOR LECTIO POTIOR', in spite of the fact that the more difficult version is non-existent. Al-Ghazzālī certainly was aware not only of the possibility of error, but also of the possibility of being secretly misled! To bear this out, see also: 'Makāmin Al-Ghalat' ("Mihakk", p. 2, 4-3), 'Makman Al-Ghurūr' ("Ihyā" IV, p. 2950, 3) and 'Makaminihā' (*ibid.*, II, 8, p. 1162, 6).

#### d. Istidrādj

This word, which means to draw gradually, often appears in relation to negative things, and some of this derogatory

connotation has therefore been attached to it. Goldziher discussed this meaning of the word while linking it up with sayings of the Jewish sages, namely that 'God showers the villains with benefits in this world in order to draw them gradually downwards to hell' (Babylonian Talmūd, Kiḥūshīn, p. 40, B), much in the same vein as: 'I gave him his wages and dismissed him from my world' (Jerushalmī, Talmūd, Soṭa, 5, end of Chapter six)<sup>123</sup>. It is indeed with the meaning of temptation and false appeal that this word appears in different and various kinds of literature in Arabic, such as in the exegesis to the Qur'ān (see Al-Baiḍāwī to Sūra 7, 181, and to Sūra 68, 44), or in different versions of 'Principles of Faith' such as in the "Al-Fiqh Al-Akbar", wrongly attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa<sup>124</sup>. The word appears with the same meaning also in different kinds of the Ṣūfī literature (see for example, Al-Qushayrī, "Risāla", p. 5, 1-2)<sup>125</sup>, but I found only one place in Al-Ghazzālī's writings where this word appears in this connection, of God's confusing his enemies:

فان ابتلي (العبد) بشيء كان عقوبة له . . . وان اصابته نعمة كانت  
استدراجا له (احياء ١٦٤، ٦٦٦، ٧٦٢ - ٩)

This example seems to be another case of the many borrowings of Al-Ghazzālī from Abū Ṭālib's "Qūt-Al-Qulūb". (See *ibid.*, I, 2, p. 73, 5ff.) However, this verb 'Istadrādja' is generally reserved by Al-Ghazzālī for the philosophers' hidden act of attraction. He also uses it for the Bāṭiniyya people who try to lure the common people and the weak-minded, and ensnare them by false pretences.

The verb also appears in referring to popular preachers of religion whom Al-Ghazzālī abhorred, and with reference to all those religious scholars who err and who cause the people to err and stray from the right path. In most cases we may find other expressions, such as the ones we have mentioned above, in close proximity to this verb: Ḥamqā, Du'afā Al-'Uqūl, 'Awāmm, Talbīs, Zann<sup>126</sup>.

Istidrādj - as the action of the philosophers or the Bāṭiniyya missionaries or the religious scholars.

وانهم يحكمون بظن وتخمين من غير تحقيق ويقين (سجع!) ويستدلون على صدق علومهم الالهية بظهور العلوم الحسابية والمنطقية ويستدرجون به ضعفاء العقول (تهافت ١٥٨ الخ)

من عظام حيل هؤلاء في الاستدراج ... (تهافت ٥٦٤)

... في تصنيف كتاب ... مشتمل على الكشف عن ... وجه استدراجهم عوام الخلق وجهالهم (المستظهرى ٨٦١ الخ)

فرجع حاصلهم الى استدراج العوام وضعفاء العقول ببيان الحاجة الى المعلم (المنقذ ٢٦٩٤ - ٣)

(They simply tempt and gradually lure the masses and the weak in mind by proving that there is need of a teacher.)

... او سجع مزخرف يتوسل به الواعظ الى استدراج العوام (احياء ٥ مقدمة ٢ - ٣)

اعلم ان هؤلاء قد يستدرجون الناس الى ذلك بان غرضنا في المناظرة المباحة عن الحق ليتضح (احياء ٥١، ٦١، ٧١، ٨٢)

فلو فتحنا هذا الباب ... للزمنا ان ... نهجر جملة آيات من آيات القرآن ... لان صاحب كتاب " اخوان الصفاء " اوردها في كتابه مستشهدا بها ومستدرجا قلوب الحمقى بواسطتها الى باطله (المنقذ ٧٨٣ الخ)

Istidrādj - as the action of criminals or of man's desires.

الصف الثامن : طائفة استولت عليهم الشهوات واستدرجتهم متابعة اللذات (المستظهرى ٥ مقدمة المانية ٦٤٣٦ ملاحظة ٢)

ويستدرج ( بعض الفسقة ) السامع بان معرفتك لا تزيد على معرفتهم (ميزان ٥٨ - ٤ - ٣)

Sometimes 'Istidrādj' denotes also a gradual pull towards the good, especially when it is accompanied by the verb 'Talattafa bil-ilā', which means essentially 'kind and gentle behaviour'<sup>127</sup>, or: "employer les moyens subtiles", according to Dozy, in order to attract man to that which is desirable or good. This verb appears frequently on its

own in Al-Ghazzālī's works and he uses it to define the activity of the prophets and his own methods<sup>128</sup>. There follow two examples of the combination 'Istidrāj-Talattafa'.

... وغب فيه تلتفا باستدراجه الى ما فيه سعاده  
(ميزان ٩٤٨)

فلم ابعده ان يكون تصوير الكتاب بصورة الفقه تلتفا في استدراج القلوب  
(احياء، مقدمة ٥٥٥ - ٤)

(... and I did not reject the assumption that compiling this book in the same way as the books of "Fiqh" are built up is a gentle way of attracting the readers.)

#### Expressions of Possibility and Relativity

##### Expressions of possibility:

##### Lā Yab'udu An, Ab'ada, etc.

Al-Ghazzālī firmly believed that every man must seek throughout his life that personal religious experience, which grants those who are blessed by it absolute certainty in the truth of inherited faith. Yet he knew only too well that many areas within the realms of religion will always remain beyond any positive knowledge. Man's mind is limited by his body and cannot grasp the entire meaning of religious truths; even prophecy can reveal to him only a small part of these truths. Therefore, man must often accept religious traditions and assumptions on the basis

that reason does not reject them, that they may probably be such. In other words, Al-Ghazzālī accepted them because there is no certainty that things are not as they are handed down by tradition. Every rational discussion of religious problems is a discussion of conjecture and supposition, and with this Al-Ghazzālī includes metaphysical philosophy and a large part of his own doctrine, since he believes that the 'religious sciences' are by their very nature a separate category outside the domain of reason<sup>129</sup>. One of the recurrent means of persuasion used by Al-Ghazzālī is therefore a supposition of the fact that things are possible, probable, not impossible intellectually, and that in any case there is no certainty that they are not as depicted by tradition. Therefore he repeatedly demands that we believe in the traditions ('Sum'iyāt') which were handed down by the prophets regarding the resurrection of the dead, punishment after death, the scales, the bridge, paradise and hell etc. - literally, because there is no logical reason not to accept them as such<sup>130</sup>. Even more than that, I do believe that Al-Ghazzālī never really departed from this simple conception of tradition at any time of his life or in any one of his books. He only added, at times, symbolic meanings of these traditions for those who could understand them, but repeatedly reiterated his warning that the literal meaning of these traditions should never be neglected, as was done by the Bāṭiniyya, for instance. We must therefore regard scholars' hints at his alleged inconsistency, or his belief in a double truth, etc., with the greatest reserve. Most differences in his

books originate from his attitude that not all the truth can be divulged to everyone<sup>131</sup>.

This method of stressing possibility and probability recurs in Al-Ghazzālī's work also with reference to other most important problems, such as proof of the veracity of prophecy, the meaning of the commandments etc. For instance, we know that man from infancy to death goes through various stages of development, one higher than the other. If so, is it not possible that there is beyond the stage of the understanding of every adult a higher level of prophetic revelation which only very few attain? If medicines, amulets etc. have hidden and special healing properties ('Khawāṣṣ'), is it not possible that the details of the commandments have the same properties<sup>132</sup>?

The root 'Ba'uda' discussed below may perhaps bear out this method. The root is most frequent in Al-Ghazzālī's books in different combinations, all of which express the idea of probability, possibility, or supposition, the feasibility of things, etc. The root is repeated in "Tahāfut" in the debate with the philosophers<sup>133</sup>, but can easily be detected in Al-Ghazzālī's other books as well; and though it has not, in itself, any linguistic uniqueness, its frequency in Al-Ghazzālī's writings may be considered somewhat unique.

#### La Yab'udu An

ولا يبعد ان يفسد الشيء بغتة وهو على حال كماله  
(تهافت ٥٦٨٣)

(... and we cannot discard the possibility that the thing will end abruptly while in the state of perfection.)

فان النفس تتأثر بما يرد عليها لا بما مرت عليه فلا يبعد هذا  
(الاربعين ٦٤٤٢ - ٨)

ولا يبعد ان يقال ايضا ...

(فيصل ٤٦٨)

ولا يبعد ان يخطر لمن سيكون نبيا في صباح مثل هذا الخاطر  
(فيصل ١٣٦١٣ انظر ايضا س ١٤)

ولا يبعد ان يقع الشك والنظر في بعض المسائل  
(فيصل ٣٦٢٦)

... وزعمت ان تلك الكلمات من كلام الاوائل مع ان بعضها من مؤلّفات  
الخواطر<sup>١٣٤</sup> ولا يبعد ان يقع الحافر على الحافر  
(المنقذ ١٦٨٣ - ٤)

(... and they argued that these things were taken from the words of the Greek philosophers though some of them are the issue of my spirit and it is quite possible for step to follow step.)

Ab'ada (rejected, considered inadmissible)

فان قيل فنحن لا نبعد صدور حادث من قديم ، اي حادث كان ، بل  
نبعد صدور حادث هو اول الحوادث من القديم ...  
(تهافت ٥٦٤٧ - ٦)

(... and if someone were to say: we do not reject [the possibility] that any being should spring forth from the primordial; we do, however, reject [the possibility] that the being who was created first sprang forth from the primordial.)

See also: *Falam Ub'id an yakūna ...*, ("Ihyā", General Introduction, p. 5, 5-4); *Walā Ub'idu an yakūna* ("Al-Munqidh", p. 68, 1-2).

#### Istab'ada, Istib'ād

In the tenth conjugation the root means to consider a matter to be too far-fetched, inconceivable. As opposed to the first and fourth conjugations, the tenth comes mostly without the negative; it therefore generally means the opposite of the above, which usually come together with a negation and therefore suggest the possibility that a thing is possible, that it is not inadmissible.

استبعدتم صدور حادث من قديم ولا بد لكم من الاعتراف به  
(تهافت ٩٦٤٦ - ١٠)

(You consider the assumption, that originating from the primordial is remote, yet you will have to admit its truth.)

ومن استقرأ عجائب العلوم لم يستبعد من قدرة الله ما يحكى من معجزات  
الانبياء بحال من الاحوال (تهافت ١٣٦٢٩١ الخ)

ولكن (النظار) استوعروا هذا الطريق واستبعدوا افشاءه الى المقصود  
(ميزان ٦٤٤٦)

ولا ينبغي ان تستبعد بالطبع في مبدأ الفطرة من العلوم ما يحصل  
بالجهد والاكساب كما يكون ذلك في الاخلاق  
(ميزان ٧٦٤٦٢ الخ)

وكما ان المميز لو عرضت عليه مدركات العقل لا باها واستبعدها ، فكذلك  
بعض العقلاء ابوا مدركات النبوة واستبعدوها وذلك عين الجهل اذ لا  
مستند لهم ... (المنقذ ٦٤١٠٦ - ٩)

(... and just as the child, should he be presented with matters which can be grasped by the intellect, would reject them as unacceptable, so do some of the sages reject matters conceived by prophecy, and regard them as unreasonable, but this is nothing but a folly, with nothing to support it ...)

واعلم انه كما يطلع الطبيب الحاذق على اسرار المعالجات ، يستبعدها  
من لا يعرفها ، فكذلك الانبياء اطباء القلوب<sup>١٣٥</sup> . . . فلا تتحكم على  
سنتهم بمعقولك فتهلك فكم من شخص يصيبه عارض في اصبغه فيقضي عقله  
ان يظليه حتى ينيبه الطبيب الحاذق ان علاجه . . . فيستبعد ذلك  
غاية الاستبعاد (احياء ٥٢٤٥٢٤٦١ الخ)



الاستبعاد المجرد، مجرد الاستبعاد، غاية الاستبعاد، استبعاد محض

وأما الاستبعاد المجرد فلا يكفي من غير برهان  
فغاية المستبعد ان يقال ... (تهافت ٨٤٣٠ انظرا ايضا س٦)

(تهافت ٢٤٣٧)

وهل لهذا الانكار مستند الا الاستبعاد المجرد؟  
(تهافت ١١٤٣٧١)

Ba'īd (unreasonable, far-fetched), Ab'ad

المقدمة الثالثة وهي التحكم البعيد جدا قولهم انه ...  
(تهافت ١٢٤٢٦٣)

وتسمية هذا النمط تذكرا ليس بعيد

(احياء ١٠٤١٤٨٤١)

وهذا غير بعيد بل هو الغالب على كافة الخلق  
(احياء ٥٤٤٠٩٧٤٤٠٥)

وانذا كان ذلك محالا او بعيدا ...

(احياء ٧٤٤٢٤٢١٤)

(المقصد ١٠٤١٥ - ١١)

وهذا غير بعيد

ما ابعد هذا القلب (فضائح الباطنية، تحقيق بدوي  
٦٤٥٣)

Note:

Only once (in "Tahāfut", p. 325, 5) did I find the combination 'lā bu'da'. (See also the defective version 'Ab'ad', *ibid.*) This could be a faulty rendering of the usual use of the verb in the fourth conjugation, but 'bu'd' appears also in other combinations, as for instance

in 'wa-ayyu bu'd an'... ("Tahāfut", p. 371, 9.)

Expressions of relativity:

a. Bi-l-Iḍāfa ilā

b. Fī Haqq

Several scholars<sup>136</sup> have already dwelt on the subjectivity and relativity in Al-Ghazzālī's work. Al-Ghazzālī is an exception in this respect to the rule proved by the Ṣūfī writers who preceded him. He does not decree, absolutely, as do most of his predecessors, that the values of the Ṣūfī are good and that the principles of the society from which they have departed are bad, or that the yearning for the world beyond is better than the yearning for the vanities of this world; that poverty, asceticism and self-castigation are better than riches and an easygoing social life. All this is accepted by Al-Ghazzālī as being true in general, but not absolutely so. Everything is dependent on man and his behaviour. A Ṣūfī, who has become enslaved to his escape from the world, from money, pleasures and desires, is not much better than a wantonly rich man who is the slave of his desires, of his craving for this world, for mammon and for power; both paths distract the human mind from what is really important - the search for true faith and for religious certainty<sup>137</sup>. Al-Ghazzālī does not regard this world as evil in itself, just as he does not consider man's body, money and even long life as evil in themselves - everything is relative, and both measure and purpose determine the value of deeds. He who follows

the right path in search of his God can find in the world, in the body and in mammon help on his way, if he uses them judiciously, as this world is after all a place wherein to prepare for the world to come. Indeed, there is a trap laid for man in all of these. The world, mammon and man's body are like a serpent which contains venom as well as healing serum. Man must choose a suitable measure of each and use it for his own ends so that the venom will become for him a serum. Moreover, what is a blessing for one is a curse for another. The same holds true for the observance of certain commandments: the practice of charity is of great importance to the miser, while it is not so to the generous man, for everything is relative<sup>138</sup>.

This 'relativity' in Al-Ghazzālī's attitude to life is borne out by two common linguistic expressions which are so frequent in Al-Ghazzālī's writing that we may identify them as personal linguistic idiosyncracies. These expressions are 'bi-l-idāfa ilā', and 'fī ḥaqq'.

The first combination is more frequent in Al-Ghazzālī's work, but the second may be considered as more typical of his style since it is not so frequent elsewhere. They are synonymous, and there is no difference between them, though Al-Ghazzālī tends to use the first expression oftener for matter, while he uses the second for man. Both should be translated as 'regarding' - 'in connection with' 'in comparison with'<sup>139</sup>, and should be regarded as an expression of Al-Ghazzālī's above-mentioned 'relative' attitude. The following two excerpts from his "Mīzān Al-'Amal" will show this:

والحق الذي يلج لي ، والعلم عند الله فيه ، ان الحكم بالنفي والاثبات في هذا على الاطلاق خطر ، بل يختلف بالاضافة الى الاشخاص والاحوال ( ميزان ٤٤٩ ، الخ )

وانا عرفت ان معيار العمل فيه مأخوذ من مقدار الصفات والاخلاق لم يخف عليك ان الطريق في هذا تختلف باختلاف الاشخاص وتختلف في حق شخص واحد باختلاف الاحوال ( ميزان ٢٨٢ ، الخ )

To be translated:

The truth seems to me to be that an absolute decision either positive or negative in this matter<sup>140</sup> is a mistake, and that it is different for (different) people and (different) situations, but Allah alone knows the truth.

And when you are aware that in this the criterion of actions is determined by the amount of qualities and properties, then you understand that in this matter ways are different according to the difference in people, and change even for the same person with circumstances.

a. Bi-l-Idāfa ilā

الفوائد كلها مستحقة بالاضافة الى السعادة الابدية ( مقاصد ١٠٤٣٦ )

(All advantages are to be regarded as worthless when compared to the eternal happiness.)

فلا يخفى انه نادر بالاضافة الى الخير ( مقاصد ٥٢٩٩ )

وهذه اللذات حقيرة بالاضافة الى اللذات الروحانية العقلية<sup>١٤١</sup>  
(تهافت ٦٣٤٦ - آ)

ان اللفظ بالاضافة الى خصوص المعنى وشموله ينقسم الى ...  
(محك ٦١٠ - آ)

بيان حال القلب بالاضافة الى اقسام العلم  
(احياء ٦٣٤٦ - آ)

وكل واحد من المذهبين عندنا حق ولكن بالاضافة الى حالين  
(احياء ٦٤٤ - آ)

وهذا نقصان بالاضافة الى الهمة (احياء ٦٤٤ - آ)

بيان درجات الزهد واقسامه بالاضافة الى نفسه والى المرغوب عنه والى  
المرغوب فيه (احياء ٦٤٤ - آ)

فقير صابر ليس يحريص على الطلب بل هو قانع او راض بالاضافة الى غني  
متفق ماله في الخيرات ليس حريصا على امساك المال  
(احياء ٦٤٤ - آ)

(What is preferable:) a patient poor man who does not  
pursue money and is content (with what he has) as compared  
to a rich man who spends his money on good deeds and is not  
eager to keep it?

والعبد انما يكون واحدا اذا لم يكن له نظير من ابناء جنسه في خصلة  
من خصال الخير وذلك بالاضافة الى ابناء جنسه وبالاضافة الى الوقت ،  
ان يمكن ان يظهر في وقت آخر مثله بالاضافة الى بعض الخصال دون  
الجميع فلا وحدة على الاطلاق الا لله تعالى  
(المقصد ٦٤٦ - ١٥)

(Man is unique only when he is distinguishable from his kind  
by one property, and that only in relation to his kind and  
his generation, for in another generation there may come  
someone who resembles him with regard to one or more of  
these properties, not all of them. Therefore only Allah is  
really unique.) Cf. also "Ihyā" IV, 5, p. 2496, 4.

والظهور امر اضافي ان يظهر الشيء لا محالة لغيره ويبطن عن غيره فيكون  
ظاهرا بالاضافة ، باطنا بالاضافة ، واطرافا بالاضافة الى الادراكات لا محالة ،  
واقوى الادراكات واجهلها عند العوام الحواس ومنها حاسة البصر ،  
والاشياء بالاضافة الى الحس البصري ثلاثة اقسام  
(مشكاة ٦٣٢ - الخ)

بل معناه "اكبر" من ان يقال له اكبر بمعنى الاضافة والمقايسة  
(مشكاة ٦٤٠ - آ)

فاقول ان الله تعالى متجل في ذاته بذاته لذاته ويكون الحجاب بالاضافة  
الى محجوب لا محالة (مشكاة ٦٥٦ - آ)

وتسمى هذه الحالة ، بالاضافة الى المستغرق فيها ، بلسان المجاز  
"اتحادا" و بلسان الحقيقة "توحيدا"<sup>١٤٢</sup>

(مشكاة ٦٤١ - ١١ - ١٢)

فبما تأمن ان يكون جميع ما تعتقده في يقظتك بحس وعقل هو حق  
بالاضافة الى حالتك ... لكن يمكن ان تطرأ عليك حالة ، تكون نسبتها  
الى يقظتك كسبة يقظتك الى منامك وتكون يقظتك نوما بالاضافة اليها ؟  
(المنقذ ٦٦٢ - ٤)

(What did you trust in, then, seeing that everything you  
believe in when you are awake, in sense and mind, is true  
only when related to your condition at this very same hour?

You might be surprised by a situation whose relation to your wakefulness will equal the relationships of your wakefulness to your sleep, and the state in which you are awake will seem like sleep in relation to it?!)<sup>143</sup>.

b. Fī Haqq

... فالإرادة موضوعة باللغة لتعيين ما فيه غرض، ولا غرض في حق الله (تهافت ٣٤٠)

(Will is determined in language to distinguish that which has a purpose, yet there is no purpose in relation to Allah - i.e. he has no purposes)<sup>144</sup>.

فدلّ ان التوبة فرضين في حق كل شخص (احياء ٤٤٠، ٣٠٩، ٣٠٢ - ٢)

(... and the proof is that repentance is a positive commandment which concerns every man.)

فلا يتصور الخلو في حق آدمي عن هذا النقص (احياء ٤٤٠، ٣٠٩، ٣٠٢ - ٣)

(... and it is inconceivable with regard to [any] man that he should be innocent of this blemish.)

فكان الرجوع عما سبق اليه على مساعدة الشهوات ضروريا في حق كل انسان نبيا كان او غيبيا (احياء ٤٤٠، ٣٠٩، ١٦٤)

وهذا حال الضعفاء فلا جرم البغض للمال، والهرب منه حقهم كمال (احياء ٤٤٠، ٣٠٩، ١٦٤ - ٢)

ومن اسماء الله ما يكون نقلها الى العبد مجازا وهو الاكثر ومنها ما يكون في حق العبد حقيقة وفي حق الله تعالى مجازا كالصبر والشكور (المقصد ٦٣٥ الخ)

فتولد من مزجهم كلام النبوة وكلام الصوفية بكتبهم آفتان: آفة في حق القابل وآفة في حق الراد (المنقذ ١٢٦، ١٢٣)

واللمس قاصر على الالوان والاصوات قطعاً بل هي كالمعدوم في حق اللبس (المنقذ ١٠٥، ١٠١ - ١١)

نعم لست انكر انه يجوز ان يكون ذكر ادلة المتكلمين احد اسباب الايمان في حق بعض الناس (فيصل ٣٦٢ - ٤)

(Indeed, I do not deny that the bringing of proof by the theologians may be one of the reasons for belief with regard to certain people.)

... الا انه طور لم يبلغه ولم يوجد في حقه (المنقذ ٨٦٠، ٨٦١ - ٩)

فاعلم ان للظن متعلقين احدهما ان المعنى الذي انقذ عنده هل هو جائز في حق الله تعالى ام هو محال والثاني ان ... (الجام ٥١١ الخ)

بالإضافة الى مع في حق

كل فاقده المال فانا نسميه فقيرا بالإضافة الى المال الذي فقده اذ كان ذلك المفقود محتاجا اليه في حقه (احياء ٤٤٠، ٣٠٩، ١٦٤ - ٢)

تصوير الذنب وذكره ٠٠٠ كمال في حق المبدئ ٠٠٠ فهو بالاضافة الى  
سالك الطريق نقصان (احياء ٤٤٠٦، ٤٤٤٦، ١٠٦٤٤٦ الخ)

فاذا قد ظهر ان الزهد في الدنيا ان اريد به عدم الرغبة في وجودها  
وعدمها فهو غاية الكمال ، وان اريد به الرغبة في عدمها فهو كمال بالاضافة  
الى درجة المستغني ، بل الكمال في حق المال ان يستوى عندك المال  
والماء ( احياء ٤٤٠٦، ٤٤٤٦، ١٠٦٤٤٦ الخ )

#### Expressions of Exaggeration

- a. Ghāya, Fī Ghāyat
- b. Aqallu-l-Daradjāt

Al-Ghazzālī uses many expressions of exaggeration and generalization in order to make things explicit to his listeners and to convince them of the truth of his words. In this practice he much resembles the contemporary preachers ('Wu'āz')<sup>145</sup> whom he hates. Indeed, Al-Ghazzālī's brother was a famous preacher (see Al-Subkī, "Ṭabaqāt", IV, p. 102), and it seems that Al-Ghazzālī himself had indulged in preaching for some time. He gave it up because he did not consider himself 'worthy' of this (Al-Subkī, *ibid.*, p. 112, 8 ff.), or perhaps because he was afraid of losing his principles in this practice which he believes to have corrupted many contemporaries; only the really pure and

those steady in their faith are fit for this vocation. It is, however, doubtful whether we should attribute the anthology of sermons called "Al-Madjālis Al-Ghazzāliya" to Al-Ghazzālī (as did Macdonald, see Life, p. 101, following Murtadā Al-Zabīdī "Ithāf" I, p. 42, 87.) We can assume that this anthology included his brother Ahmad's sermons (see Bouyges, Essai, pp. 150-151.) However, the character of a preacher can be discerned in Al-Ghazzālī's manner of writing, as is proven by many of the expressions mentioned above, as well as by the tales, sayings, images and proverbs which he introduces into his various books. Expressions of exaggeration are just one detail from all this tissue of persuasion by preaching ('Wa'z Iqnā'ī'), and we shall present only two of them here:

Exaggeration to the maximum (Fī Ghāyat ... Al-Ghāya Al-Quswā fī ...)

Exaggeration to the minimum (Aqallu-l-Daradjāt)

Although these expressions have no special linguistic traits, and are common to Arabic in general, one may nevertheless discern some peculiarities as they appear in Al-Ghazzālī's works, as will be shown in the following examples:

- a. Ghāya<sup>146</sup>, Fī Ghāyat (entirely - completely) (usually in exaggeration)

(تهافت ١٩٧، ٨٦)

وهذا غاية الضلال

(... and this is a complete error.)

فان قيل لو قضينا بانه لا يعرف الا نفسه لكان ذلك في غاية الشناعة  
(تهافت ٢١٦ هـ الخ)

... حتى ان ابغض الشيء الى المناظران يظهر على لسان خصمه  
الحق ، مهما ظهر ، تشمر لجحده وانكاره باقصى جهده وبذل غاية امكانه  
في المخادعة والمكر والحيلة بدفعه  
(احياء ٥١ هـ ٧٩٦ هـ الخ)

وهذا غاية الذل (المقصد ١٤١)

وهذا غاية المحول للجناية (المقصد ٧٦٨)

غاية المطلب ... غاية السعادة ...

(مشكاة ٤٥٦ هـ الخ)

فيستبعد ذلك غاية الاستبعاد (احياء ٥١ هـ ٢٥٣ هـ)

وهو غاية الضلال (المنقذ ٩٨٤ هـ)

بل تساهلوا غاية التساهل (المنقذ ٦٧٧ هـ)

وانما غاية سعيه ان يغلب خيره شره ... فاما ان تخلو بالكلية كافة  
السيئات فذلك في غاية البعد (احياء ٥٤ هـ ٢١٤٨ هـ ١٠ -)

(The purpose of his endeavours is [to achieve that] his  
good deeds exceed his bad deeds ... but it is entirely far-  
fetched to assume that the scale of the bad deeds [in the  
balance] will be completely empty.)

Al-Ghāya Al-Quswā, Aqsā-Al-Ghāyāt

('The most remote purpose', in the sense of 'absolute  
perfection'.)

فان كمالهم (كمال الملائكة) في الغاية القصوى بالاضافة الى ما سوى  
الله (تهافت ٢٤٩ هـ ٣ - ٤)

(... and therefore the perfection of the angels is absolute  
perfection when compared to anything other than God.)

واما المقام الاول فالخوض في الغوص والتحقيق والتعمق في اسرار المعاني  
الى اقصى الغايات ازراء المحققين وقدح الغواصين  
(المستظهرى ٦٥٣ - ٧)

الى ان صنفنا ... "وكتاب المبادئ والغايات" رابعا وهو الغاية  
القصوى في البحث<sup>١٤٧</sup> (معيان العلم ٤٦٧ هـ)

واما القسم المحمود الى اقصى غايات الاستقصاء فهو العلم بالله تعالى  
وصفاته وفعاله ... (احياء ٥١ هـ ٦٥٥ هـ)

والرابع هو الشرة الاخيرة وهي الغاية القصوى  
(احياء ٥١ هـ ٦٤٦ هـ)

وهذه هي الغاية القصوى في التوحيد

(احياء ٤ هـ ٢٤٩٥ هـ ٩٦)

ولكن لما لم يكن ذلك مقصود علمهم لم يبلغ كلامهم فيه الغاية القصوى  
(المنقذ ٦٧٧ هـ ٣ - ٣)

انظر ايضا :	
( المستظهيرى ١٧٦١٠ )	السعادة القسوى
( مشكاة ١١٦٣٧ )	المبلغ الاقصى
( المقصد ٣٦٣ )	المقاصد والغايات
( المنقذ ٤٦٧١ )	غايات الامور ومقاصدها

b. Aqallu-l-Daradjāt, (Adnā-l-Daradjāt)

The 'lowest level', 'the minimum.

Al-Ghazzālī is fond of dividing his subject into different sub-sections and in them a further division into 'levels' recurs. See, for example, the different levels of faith ("Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1384), the levels of poverty (ibid. IV, 4, pp. 2400-2399), the levels of asceticism (ibid. pp. 2458-2459) and levels of 'Zandaqa' ("Faiṣal", p. 14, 7 ff.), and many more. Those who occupy the lowest level are always those most likely to deviate from the framework in question, and they are required to achieve first of all the necessary minimum<sup>148</sup>.

وادنى درجات الراغب فيه صيغته عن التصنيع

( المستظهيرى ١٥٦٥ )

(... and the minimum required from the one who wants to know [this secret] is to keep it from becoming known.)

فان اقل درجات العالم ان يدرك حقارة الدنيا	
( احياء ١٥١٠١٦٠١ )	
فان قلت اقل الدرجات في اظهار البغض الهجر والاعراض وقطع الرفق	
والاعانة ٠٠٠ فاقول ٠٠٠	( احياء ٥٦٢ هـ ٧٦٩٤٩٦ )
اقلهم ( اقل المستمعين للسمع ) درجة هو الذى لم يدرك من الطريق الا	
الاعمال الظاهرة	( احياء ٦٢ هـ ٣٦١١٨٣٦ )
واقل درجات التكفير ان يدفع العذاب ان لم يدفع الحساب	
( احياء ١٥٤٠١٢١٦٠١ ) انظر ايضا	
( ١٣٦٢٥٦٠٦٢٥٩٩٦٦٦٤ )	
واقل درجات الادراك ان يشعر المدرك بنفسه	
( المقصد ١٢٦٦٣ - ١٣ )	
فاقل درجات حسن الصحابة كف الاذى عنهم	
( الاربعين ٦٨٥ الخ انظر ايضا	
( ١٠٦٣٠٥ )	
واقل درجات العالم ان يتميز عن العامي الغمر فلا يعاف العسل وان	
وجده في محجمة الحجام	( المنقذ ٦٨٣ الخ )

(... and indeed the lowest level of wisdom is to be able to distinguish the wise man from the ordinary ignoramus, and not to loathe honey even if it is found in the receptacle used by the blood-letter.)

Other Words and Expressions

There follows a list of additional expressions which are typical of Al-Ghazzālī's language and which cannot be classified in the above-mentioned categories. The larger part of these does not express an idea typical of Al-Ghazzālī or of one of his methods of writing and persuasion. However, these expressions are typical of his language and manner of writing, either because of their great frequency in his writings or their special combinations, which sometimes do not even appear in dictionaries; these might be of interest even as linguistic phenomena or stylistic combinations in themselves. This chapter is arranged in alphabetical order since there is no conceptual link between the different expressions.

In the case of word-combinations, the combination will come under the first letter of the principal root, or of the rare root in the combination.

ʿAlā Aṣḥlikum  
 Djarā Madjrā  
 ʿAlā-l-Djumla  
 Ḥasm-l-Bāb  
 Khatb ʿAzīm  
 Amr Mukhtir  
 Dark Al-Ḥaqāʿiq  
 Adlā bi  
 Taṭarraqa ilā, Bi-tariqihī  
 Lā Matmaʿ fī  
 Ṭāʿil

Mizanna  
 ʿAzala ʿan  
 Taʿassub  
 Inqadaha  
 Qarāʿin Al-Ahwāl  
 Kunh  
 Talāfā  
 Waqafa ʿalā

ʿAlā Aṣḥlikum, ʿAlā Aṣḥlihim

The word 'Aṣl' meaning 'root', 'principle', 'basis', is very frequent in Arabic in general, and its frequency in Al-Ghazzālī's work cannot be regarded as typical of him. Yet one of the many combinations including this word, may be considered typical: ʿAlā aṣḥlikum, ʿalā aṣḥlihim.

This typical combination apparently appears in "Tahāfut" only (not mentioned, however, in Bouyges' Index) and means: according to your (their) system, according to your (their) way of reasoning:

وهو على خلاف اصلكم (تهافت ١٤٤) . . .

الوجه الثالث في استحالة كون العالم فعلا لله على اصلهم . . .  
 (تهافت ٢٦١٠)

قلنا كل واحد من القسمين غير محال على اصلكم  
 (تهافت ٢٢٥٦)

وهذا على اصلهم النعم ، حيث جوزوا . . .  
 (تهافت ٨٢٢٨ - ٩)



Djarā Madjrā (To be translated: like, following, and so on, and such like.)

This expression is also very common<sup>149</sup>, and its singularity in Al-Ghazzālī's work stems from its great frequency, as well as its use in the present tense, whereas it is elsewhere more frequently used in the future. The combination comes mainly in images and metaphors which abound in Al-Ghazzālī's work, and is at times repeated over and over again in this connection. There is no doubt that Al-Ghazzālī prefers this expression to others of this kind (though he used also other expressions in his books<sup>150</sup>.)

فهؤلاء ومن يجرى مجراهم هم الذين عدوا التوفيق

(المستظهرى، مقدمة المانية ٤٣٦

ملاحظة ٢٥٢)

(احياء ٥١٤٥٥٦١

ط ٢٥٦١٢٣٥٦١)

(احياء ٤٥١٢٣٤٥٦٢

ط ٤١٦٤١٥٦٤)

(المقصد ٣٥٧٥٦٢٥٦١

ط ١١٥٦٢٥٦١)

وانما تكليف الجوارح في حق من يجرى بجهله مجرى الحمر التي لا يمكن

رياضتها الا بالاعمال الشاقة (المستظهرى ١٠٦١٥٦١٨ - ١٩)

(For the commandments [are destined] only [for those] whose folly resembles that of the asses<sup>151</sup>, which cannot be tamed by other than strenuous means.)

اعلم ان الادلة التي نحررها في هذا العلم تجرى مجرى الادوية التي يعالج بها مرض القلوب (الاقتصاد ١٠٦٦)

فنعني بعلم المكاشفة ان يرتفع الغطاء حتى تتضح له جليلة الحق في هذه الامور اتضاحا يجرى مجرى العيان الذي لا يشك فيه

(احياء ٥١٤٥٦١٣٥٦١٣ - ١٣)

العلم يجرى منه (من العقل) مجرى الثمرة من الشجرة

(احياء ٥١٤٥٦١٣٥٦١٣٥٦١٣)

The following are two excerpts in which the combination recurs many times in one parable<sup>152</sup>:

ويجرى القوة الخيالية المودعة في مقدم الدماغ مجرى صاحب بريد اذ تجتمع اخبار المحسوسات عنده، ويجرى القوة الحافظة التي مسكنها مؤخر الدماغ مجرى خازنه، ويجرى اللسان مجرى ترجمانه ويجرى الاعضاء المتحركة مجرى كتابه، ويجرى الحواس الخمس مجرى جواسيسه (احياء ٥١٣٦٠٥٦١٣٦٠٥٦١٣٦٠ الخ)

واعلم ان الصلاة صورة صورها رب الارباب كما صور الحيوان مثلا، وفروجهما النية والاخلاص وحضور القلب، وبدنها الاعمال واعضائها الاصلية الاركان واعضائها الكمالية الابعاض، فالاخلاص والنية فيها يجرى مجرى الروح، والقيام والقعود يجرى مجرى البدن، والركوع والسجود يجرى مجرى الرأس واليد والرجل، واكمال الركوع والسجود والطأينة وتحسين الهيئة يجرى مجرى حسن الاعضاء وحسن اشكالها والوانها، والاذكار والتسبيحات المودعة فيها تجرى مجرى آلات الحس المودعة في الرأس والاعضاء كالعينين والاذنين وغيرها ومعرفة معاني الاذكار وحضور القلب عندها يجرى مجرى قوة الحس المودعة في آلات الحس وقوة البصر والشم والذوق واللمس في معانها (الاربعين ٣٢٢٥٦١٣٦٠ الخ)

Al-Djārī Madjrā

As, like, similar to (less frequently used by others, and therefore perhaps more characteristic of Al-Ghazzālī's language.)

الفن الثاني من المقاصد في بيان المقدمات الجارية من القياس مجرى الثوب من القميص والخشب من السرير ، فان ما ذكرناه جرى مجرى الخياطة من القميص وشكل السرير من الخشب  
( محك ٤٤٤ ، ٧ - ٤ )

وقد ضرب للقوى المذكورة مثال يقرّبها الى افهام العوام فقول : القوة المفكرة مسكها وسط الدماغ بمنزلة الملك يسكن وسط المملكة ، والخيالية مسكها مقدم الدماغ جارية مجرى صاحب بريد ، ان مجتمع الاخبار عنده والحافظة التي مسكها مؤخر الدماغ جارية مجرى خادمه والقوة الناطقة جارية مجرى ترجمانه والعاملة جارية مجرى كاتبه والحواس جارية مجرى الجواسيس واصحاب الاخبار الصادقة اللهجة فيما يرفعونه من الاخبار . . .  
( الميزان ٢٦٣٥ ، الخ )

فالقلب جار مجرى العين ، وغريزة العقل فيه جارية مجرى قوة البصر في العين وقوة الابصار لطيفة تفقد في العمى وتوجد في البصروان كان قد غمض عينيه او جن عليه الليل ، والعلم الحاصل منه في القلب جار مجرى قوة ادراك البصر في العين ورؤيه لاعيان الاشياء ، وتأخر العلم عن عين العقل في مدة الصبا الى اوان التمييز او البلوغ يضاهي تأخر الرؤية عن البصر الى اوان اشراق الشمس وفيضان نورها على المبصرات والقلم الذي سطر الله به العلم على صفحات القلوب يجري مجرى قرص الشمس وانما لم يحصل العلم في قلب الصبي قبل التمييز لان لوح قلبه لم يتهيأ بعد لقبول نفس العلم  
( احيا ٤٣ ، أ ١٣٧٣ ، الخ )

لكنا نشير الى الابواب العظيمة الجارية مجرى الدروب التي لا تضيق عن كثرة جنود الشيطان  
( احيا ٤٣ ، أ ١٠٤٥٥ ، الخ )

ومفتاحها ( مفتاح الصلاة ) الجارى منها مجرى التحريم من الصلاة -  
استغراق القلب بالكلية في ذكر الله  
( المنقذ ١٠١ ، ٢ - ١ )

وليس فيه الا ايها لفظ النزول عند الصبي والعامي الجارى مجرى الصبي  
( الجام ١٢٦١٥ - ١٣ )

'Alā-l-Djumla

Al-Ghazzālī uses the common combination 'bi-l-djumlati' frequently<sup>153</sup>, in order to sum up his ideas in the sense of: 'generally', 'in general', 'to sum up', 'in short' etc. However, not less frequent in his work is the rarer combination 'alā al-djumlati' with exactly the same meaning - at times together with 'bi-l-djumlati', and parallel to it<sup>154</sup>. A few examples follow in which the sentences begin with this combination:

وعلى الجملة لا يعرف ( استحالة صدور الاثنين من واحد ) بالضرورة ولا بالنظر  
( تهافت ١٣١ ، ٤ - ٥ )

(To sum up - you cannot understand this  $\bar{\Delta}$  that it is impossible for two to result from one $\bar{\Delta}$  by force of logic or by intellectual consideration.)

وعلى الجملة فكل هذا لا يرجع الا الى فساد احوال الذات  
( المقصد ٢٩٩ ، ٤ )

وعلى الجملة دليلهم في هذا يرجع الى دليل . . .  
( تهافت ١٩٧ ، ٤ )

وعلى الجملة نحن نعلم اشياء ولا نقدر ان . . .  
( تهافت ٣٠٥ ، ٧ )

وعلى الجملة لا ينكران . . . (تهافت ٢٥٣٠٩)

وعلى الجملة فالأخذ في المبدأ والرد في السر - أحسن المسالك وأسلمها  
(أحياء ٥١ هـ ٧٦٤١٩٦)

وعلى الجملة الأدرأكات الحسية والخيالية تشاركه البهائم فيها  
(المقصد ٤٥٢٩ انظرايضا ٧٦٤٨)

وعلى الجملة فكل ما يتمثل في محل الخيال فيتصوران يتمثل في محل  
الابصار (فيصل ٧٦٨)

وعلى الجملة فالنور عبارة عما يبصر بنفسه ويبصر به غير  
(مشكاة ٨٥٣٢)

وعلى الجملة ينتهي الأمر الى قرب يكاد يتخيل طائفة منه الحلول . . .  
(المنقذ ٤٥١٠٢ انظرايضا :

٣٥١٠١ و ٢٥١٠٣ بالجملة)

وعلى الجملة فالانبياء عليهم السلام اطباء امراض القلوب  
(المنقذ ٧٥١١١)

انظرايضا :

كتاب معارج القدس (مصر ١٣٤٦/١٩٢٧) : ٤٥٣١٥ و ٥٥١٦٥ و  
١٥١٨

وعلى الجملة من جهل نفسه فهو بخيره اجهل  
(ميزان ٨٥٢٣)

(In short - he who does not understand himself certainly cannot understand anybody else.)

When 'Alā-l-Djumla' comes in the middle of a sentence, or at the end, the combination expresses more the general aspect of things (sometimes as opposite to the preceding details) than the above mentioned idea of summing up<sup>156</sup>. Some examples follow:

والصوفية والفلاسفة الذين آمنوا بالله واليوم الآخر على الجملة . . . كلهم  
متفقون على ان السعادة في العلم والعبادة  
(ميزان ٩٥١٨ - ١١)

(The Ṣūfīs, and the philosophers, who believe in Allah and in the Judgement Day in general, all agree that the only happiness is in knowledge and worship of the Lord.)

ومن لم يؤمن بالله على الجملة فليس من العقلاء  
(ميزان ٢٥٣٧)

بيان العجب على الجملة (أحياء ٥٣ ط ٦٥١٩٨٥)

الاول ان يصدق على الجملة بان للمرض والصحة اسبابا  
(أحياء ٥٤٤ ط ٥٥٢١٥٩ انظرايضا :  
س ٩٥٢)

(He must first believe in general that there are reasons for illness and for health.)

فليس من يعلم انه تعالى عالم قادر على الجملة كمن شاهد عجائب آياته  
في ملكوت السموات والارض (المقصد ١٢٥٢٢ - ١٣)

وهو ان يثبت للعبد من هذه الصفات امور تناسبها على الجملة وتشاركه في الاسم ولكن لا تماثلها مماثلة تامة  
(المقصد ١٠٧٣ الخ )

فكذلك من سمع الاستواء على العرش فهم على الجملة انه اريد بذلك نسبة خاصة الى العرش  
(الجام ١٠٦٦ - ٩)

Note:

Considering the frequency of the appearance of this combination in Al-Ghazzālī's writings, I suggested that an obscure combination in Goldziher's edition of the *Streitschrift* (p. 4, 2) be corrected. Badawi's edition proves this suggestion to be correct.

وان كان الخوض فيه عن الجملة ذبا عن الاسلام  
(المستظهرى ٢٦٤)

وان كان الخوض فيه على الجملة ذبا عن الاسلام  
(فضائح الباطنية، تحقيق بدوى ١٥١٠)

Hasm Al-Bāb (Al-Sabīl)

'Closing the gates' or 'blocking the road' is an image which Al-Ghazzālī particularly favours (as well as its opposite - 'opening of the gates')<sup>157</sup>. It appears mainly when Al-Ghazzālī discusses esoteric subjects, such as the ban on the promulgation of philosophy or of 'ilm-Kalām, the explanation of a certain allegoric exegesis, or a discussion of the dangers of sinning. This idiom always accompanies the negative, the prohibition.

ويأطل تجويز خلوه (خلو العالم عن الامام المعصوم) لانه اذا ثبت انه مدرك الحق ففي اخلاء العالم عنه تغطية الحق وحسم السبيل عن ادراكه  
(المستظهرى ١٠٦١٥ - ١١)

(The contention that there may not always be  $\sqrt{\text{an infallible Imām}}$  in this world, is obsolete, because if it has been proved that he is the source of truth, his removal from the world would mean hiding the truth and blocking the road to its acquisition.)

فاقول هذه مسألة محتملة من حيث الفقه يتجاز بها اعلان احدهما ان الخلوة بالاجنبية والنظر اليها حرام سواء خفيت الفتنة او لم تخف لانها مظنة الفتنة على الجملة فقضى الشرع بحسم الباب ٠٠٠ وصوت المرأة دائر بين هذين الاصلين فان قسناه على النظر اليها وجب حسم الباب ٠٠٠  
(احياء ٦٢ ح ١١٤٩٦ الخ)

ولاجل فقد مثل هؤلاء العواظ انحسم باب الاتعاظ وغلقت المعاصي  
(احياء ٥٤٤ أ ٢١٦٩٦ - ٨)

وقال الحسن البصرى: يريد ان لا يظفر الشيطان منكم بهذه الخصلة وهو ان لا تأمروا بالمعروف حتى تأتوا به كله يعنى ان هذا يؤدى الى حسم باب الحسبة، فمن ذا الذى يعصم عن المعاصي  
(الاربعين ٢٠٢ - ٨)

والحق فيه الاتباع ٠٠٠ والحذر عن ابداء التصريح بتأويل لم تصرح به الصحابة وحسم باب السؤال رأسا والزجر عن الخوض في الكلام  
(فيصل ٣٦١٢ - ٦)

(... and in this matter the right course [is] to follow [the elders] and to avoid revealing the allegorical exegesis which has not been revealed by the 'Ṣaḥāba' of the prophet, and also to lock the gate of the question at the start and to warn [people] from studying the Kalām.)

ولعمري لما غلب على أكثر الخلق ظنهم بانفسهم الحداقة والبراعة ...  
وجب حسم الباب في زجر الكافة عن مطالعة كتب اهل الضلال ما امكن  
(المنقذ ٣٥٨٢)

فنحن بين ان نحسم الباب احتياطا ... وبين ان نفتح الباب ونقحم عموم  
الخلق ورطة الخطر ... فليت شعري اى الامرين احزم واحوط ...  
(الجام ٥١٠ هـ الخ)

#### Khatb ('Azīm, Djidd)

The meaning of this ornate combination is 'a matter of importance, of consequence'<sup>158</sup>, and Al-Ghazzālī likes to open or close a discussion with it (sometimes in an ornate 'Sadj'). He may perhaps have intended to inculcate in the reader the feeling that the matter under discussion is grave and serious and must be considered carefully and deliberately.

فانه الخطب الجسم والامر العظيم

(المستظهرى ٥٣٥ - ٦)

(For this is an enormous and a huge subject.)

فعلى ماذا نتكل والامرأت والخطب حدّ (جدّ) والسفر طويل والزاد  
قليل والشان خطير والعمر قصير (حك ٨٥٣ - ٩)

والخطب في هذا عظيم والمدى طويل

(ميزان ٦٢١)

والجهل بان الامرات والخطب جدّ والآخرة مقبلة والدنيا مدبرة  
(احياء ٤٤٢ - ٥)

فاعلم ان هذا السؤال يحرك خطبا عظيما وينجر الى علم المكاشفة  
(احياء ٦١٣٥٦ - ٦١٣٥٦)

#### Al-Amr Mukhtir

The adjective in the fourth conjugation of this root is rare (yet see dictionaries<sup>159</sup>), and the combination is therefore strange and infrequent. It is a favourite with Al-Ghazzālī and means 'the matter is serious, grave, difficult, dangerous'.

فاذا تعارض اسباب الخوف والرجاء وصار الامر مخطرا في نفسه فاليك  
الخيرة<sup>١٦٠</sup> بعده في الاحتياط والتساهل ...  
(احياء ٤٤٨٨ - ٤٤٨٨)

(... and when the reasons for fear and the reasons for hope are placed on the scales, and the matter itself becomes grave - you yourself have the choice between care and neglect.)

وان مات قبل التوبة فهذا امر مخطر عند الموت

(احياء ٤٤٢١٢١ - ٤٤٢١٢١)

والحكم في هذا برجم مخطر ولم ينكشف لنا فيه بعد ما يوثق به  
(احياء ٦٦٣٠٥ - ٦٦٣٠٥)

فان الامر في ذلك مخطر ( فيصل ١٣٦٢٥ )  
 فليت شعري اى الامرين احزم واحوط والمنظور فيه ذات الاله وصفاته وما  
 عندى ان عاقلا متدينا لا يقربان هذا امر مخطر  
 ( الجام ٦١٠ - ٨ )

And in the feminine gender with different nouns: Muhlika  
 Mukhtira ("Ihyā" IV, 5, p. 2526, 3), 'Āqiba Mukhtira'  
 (ibid., IV, 3, p. 2373, 12); 'Asbāb Mukhtira' (ibid., IV,  
 3, p. 2375, 3.)

ووراء ذلك فى النظر فى العقليات عقبات مخرطة يعجز فى العقل من  
 يتخطاها فيسلم منها ( معيار ٢٦٣٣ - ١ )  
 واما صلاة الغافلين فهى مخرطة ( احيا ٣٠٤٦٥٦١ )

Dark (Al-Ḥaqq, Al-Ḥaqqīqa, Ḥaqqīq Al-Umūr)

The fourth conjugation, which is derived from this root,  
 meaning 'to grasp', 'comprehend', 'understand' is most  
 frequent in its different forms in Arab literature,  
 especially in philosophical treatises<sup>161</sup>. Yet I wish to  
 point out here one striking linguistic trait, namely, Al-  
 Ghazzālī's preference for the 'Maṣdar' of the first conju-  
 gation of this root ('Dark') in cases where he should have  
 used it in the fourth conjugation ('Idrāk'). This is  
 especially so in the construct with words derived from the  
 root 'Ḥaqq'.

However, he uses it also with words signifying the  
 power of comprehension and not the comprehended subject

(such as 'Dark Al-Hiss', 'Dark Al-'Aql'.) Some dictionaries  
 (e.g. "Al-Bustān") explain that 'Dark-Idrāk' are synonymous,  
 but it seems that the frequent use of the first conjugation  
 may be considered typical of Al-Ghazzālī. In addition, he  
 also uses the fourth conjugation, in the usual way, even in  
 combinations which resemble the above<sup>162</sup>.

فان النفس فى هذا البدن مصدود عن درك حقائق الاشياء  
 ( تهافت ٩٦٣٤٩ - ١٠ )

(For the soul in this body cannot comprehend the real truth  
 of matters.) (See the variants of Mss. there and cf. also  
 ibid., p. 181, 3; p. 212, 13.)

فان وفقت لدرك حقيقته سعدت سعادة عظيمة  
 ( المستظهرى ٥٦٦ )

ثم درك الخلق لا يخلو اما ان ... او ...  
 ( المستظهرى ٧٦١٥ )

اعلم وتحقق ايها المقصور على درك العلم حرصه وارادته ... الموقف  
 على درك السعادة بالعلم والعبادة جده وجهده  
 ( معيار ٤٦٢٤ الخ )

وقد كان التعطش الى درك حقائق الامور ابي وديني  
 ( المنقذ ٢٦٥٨ )

فان شد الحق عنهم فلا يبقى فى درك الحق مطمع ان لا مطمع فى الرجوع  
 الى التقليد بعد مفارقتة ( المنقذ ٥٦٦٤ )

(... and if the truth is not to be found with them, there  
 is no hope of attaining it, for there is no road of return  
 to 'Taqlīd' after the severance from it.)

وانما فائدة العقل وتصرفه ان عرفنا ذلك وشهد للنبوة بالتصديق ولنفسه  
بالعجز عن درك ما يدرك بعين النبوة  
( المنقذ ( ١١١ ٧ - ٥ ) )

الاصل الثالث ان اعرف الناس لمعنى الكلام واحراهم بالوقوف على كنهه  
ودرك اسراره<sup>١٦٣</sup> الذين شاهدوا الوحي والتنزيل . . .  
( الجام ( ١٠ - ٩٦٢٥ ) )

الثالث ان يجب عليه الاعتراف بالعجز عن درك حقيقة تلك المعاني  
( الجام ( ١١ - ١٠٦٢٦ ) )

In this connection it may be worth mentioning that Al-Ghazzālī likes to quote a widely known ancient Greek saying which is mainly a play of 'Tadjnīs' with this root. He quotes it, as other Arab authors do, as a Ḥadīth by 'Alī, considered to be father of Wisdom, or as a Ḥadīth by Abū-Bakr<sup>164</sup>:

" العجز عن درك الادراك ادراك " :

ولذلك قال الضديق الاكبر: العجز عن درك الادراك ادراك  
( مقاصد ( ٧٦٢٥٢ ) )

فارجع الى الصديق الاكبر فاقتد به . . . اما سمعته يقول: العجز عن  
درك الادراك ادراك ( احياء ( ١١ - ٩٦٢٥٠٦٤٥٦٤ ) )

وهو الذى اشار اليه الصديق الاكبر حيث قال: العجز عن درك الادراك  
ادراك ( المقصد ( ٣ - ٢٦٢٢ ) )

قال سيد الصادقين: العجز عن درك الادراك ادراك  
( الجام ( ٥٧ - ٥ ) )

### Tadallā bi-Ḥabl Al-Ghurūr

Al-Ghazzālī likes to use this idiom, the source of which is 'the pail hanging by a rope'<sup>165</sup>; it means 'he who clings to the rope of temptation and vice as a pail clings to its rope but in vain'. (The image is rare with a positive meaning: Ḥabl Al-Nadjāt, "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2100, 13.)

فان قلت فاذا كمالا نأمن مثل هذا التلبس والخذاع بتزوير الشيطان  
والتدلي بحبل الغرور . . . فما نميز بين اشارة العقل و اشارة الهوى ؟  
( ميزان ( ٥ - ٢٦٦٤ ) )

والملاحظ بالعين العور لاحدهما ( العقل والشرع ) على الخصوص  
متدل بحبل الغرور ( الاقتصاد ( ٧٦٣ ) )

ومثال هذا المحتسب مثال من يخلص غيره من النار باحراق نفسه وهو غاية  
الجهل وهذه مذلة ( مزلة )<sup>١٦٦</sup> عظيمة وغائلة هائلة وحرور للشيطان  
يتدلى بحبله كل انسان الا من عرفه الله عيوب نفسه  
( احياء ( ١١٦٢٣٤٦٤٥٦٤ ) الخ )

واما الظالم المغرور . . . فاسعف الشيطان وتدلى بحبل غروره  
( احياء ( ٩٦٢١٥٧٦٤٥٦٤ ) )

واما ما ذكرناه فهو ككبوة جواد وهفوة<sup>١٦٧</sup> سالك صده الشيطان فدلاه بحبل  
الغرور ( مشكاة ( ١٢ - ١١٦٥٠ ) )

ان المنخدعين بخداعهم وزورهم ( زور الباطنية ) والمتدلين بحبل  
غرورهم في عصرنا هذا لم يسمعوا هذا منهم  
( المستظهرى ( ١٦٦٨ ) )

(Those who were misled by the lies and deceits of the Bātiniyya and who cling in our time to their rope of temptation - have not heard this from them.)

فقد عرفت العلم المحمود والمدموم ومثارات التباس واليك الخيرة في ان تنظر  
لنفسك فتتدلى بالسلف او تتدلى بحبل الغرور وتتشبه بالخلف  
(احياء ٥١، ٥٦٤، ٥٦٤ - ٤)

(Now you know which science is praiseworthy and which is blameworthy, and what the origin of the confusion is, and you have a choice between searching in your soul and following the early generations, or clinging to the rope of temptation and resembling the latter.)

#### Taraqa

I should like to mention certain expressions, derived from this root, which are typical of Al-Ghazzālī's style:

'Ṭaṭarraqa ilā'<sup>168</sup> - following the direction of, arriving at, finding a way to ...

'Biṭarīq' ... in the manner, according to the methods, by means of ... (also very frequent) and hence:

'Biṭarīqihi' ('lā bitarīqihi') on the right road, which fits the case (and the opposite)<sup>169</sup>.

#### Ṭaṭarraqa ilā

وعلى الجملة لا يتكران ما ذكره مما يقوى الظن ويغلبه وانما ينكر كونه  
معلوما يقينا علما لا يجوز الغلط فيه ولا يتطرق اليه الشك  
(تهافت ٢٦٣٠٩ - ٤)

(... and in short - it cannot be denied that [the arguments] which [philosophers] have used strengthen the

conjecture and reinforce it. Yet one must refute the assumption that these matters are known with certainty, by a knowledge which leaves no room for error and is not within the reach of doubt.)

وكل علم يتطرق اليه التصديق فمن ضرورته ان تتقدم عليه معرفتان  
(محك ٢٦٦)

واقبل ما ينتظم منه قياس، مقدتان - اعنى علمين يتطرق اليهما التصديق  
والتكذيب  
(محك ٢٦٧ - ١)

في الايمان والاسلام ٠٠٠ وما يتطرق اليه من الزيادة والنقصان ٠٠٠  
(احياء ٥١، ٥٦٣، ٥٦٣ - ٤)

فهذه الآفة ايضا متطرق اليه (الى الكفر)  
(المنقذ ٣٥٧٧)

فلو فتحنا هذا الباب وتطرقنا الى ان يهجر كل حق سبق اليه خاطر مبطل  
للزمن ان نهجر كثيرا من الحق (المنقذ ٧٥٨٣ الخ)

وحصل به العلم ايضا باخبار آحاد لا يتطرق الشك الى مجموعها  
(الجام ١٣٥٢٨)

لانه يعلم ان الكبائر اعظم عند الله ٠٠٠ والصغائر اقرب الى تطرق العفو  
اليها  
(احياء ٥٤، ٥٤٠، ٥٤٠ - ١٠٦٢١٤)

(Because he knows that the greater crimes are graver in the eyes of the Lord ... while the lesser sins are within the reach of forgiveness.)

وقد وصح ذلك عن الصحابة بتواتر النقل عند التابعين من نقلة الآثار وسير  
السلف حجة لا يتطرق اليها ريب وشك

(الجام ١٠٦٢٨ - ١٢)



Bitarīqi

In the (right, suitable, correct) method or system:

وكل من اراد ان يعرف القياس بغير هذا الطريق فقد طمع في محال  
( محك ٨٦٨ - ٩ )

(... and he who wishes to study the deduction in a different way, is aspiring to the impossible.)

فمن رزق البصيرة تتبع العلة والجها بطريقها  
( ميزان ٦٨٢ )

(He who was given inner sight observes [the cause of] illness and heals it in the suitable manner.)

وما طريقه ( طريق السر ) ؟ ( المستظهرى ١٣٦٥ )

... وان من استعمل الجدال مع اهل الجدل لا بالطريق الاحسن ،  
كما تعلم من القرآن ، كان كمن غدى البدوى بخبز البر وهو لم يألف الا التمر  
( القسطاس ٥١٧ - ٧ )

فمن هذا الطريق اطلب اليقين بالنبوة لا من قلب العصا شعبانا وشق القمر  
( المنقذ ١٠٩ - ١٠٩ )

فاغتر بذلك جماعة وظنوا ان ذلك من قوة مذهبهم وضعف مذهب المخالفين  
لهم ولم يفهموا ان ذلك لضعف ناصر الحق وجهله بطريقه  
( المنقذ ٩٨٨ - ١١ )

See also in the feminine (which is possible linguistically, though it may also be a printing error, since the phenomenon is quite rare):

وما وراء ذلك طلب لكشف حقائق الامور من غير طريقتهما  
( احياء ٦٦٨٦١ - ٦٦٨٦١ )

See also the use of pronominal suffix without any related subject in the following example, meaning 'the wrong way':

هذا ما اردت ان اذكره في ذم الفلسفة والتعليم وآفاتهما وآفات من انكر  
عليهما لا بطريقه ( المنقذ ١٢٢٥ - ٤ )

(These were the things I wished to tell in order to blame philosophy and the 'Ta'lim' and the evil they cause, and in order to blame [the shortcomings] of those who revile them in the wrong manner.) (See F. Jabre's misleading translation of this sentence: ... pour révéler les dangers auxquels s'expose celui qui veut les réfuter par d'autres voies que les leurs [Al-Munqidh", ed. F. Jabre, p. 122, 1-2.)

It is possible that in the following example also (as well as in the example from "Al-Munqidh", p. 88, 9-10 above) we have the same pronominal suffix which is not related to any possible grammatical subject.

وضرر الشرع ممن ينصره لا بطريقه اكثر ممن يطعن فيه بطريقه  
( تهافت ١١٦١١ - ١٣ )

Lā Matmā' fī, Tama' fī ghair Matmā'

These combinations are common to Al-Ghazzālī and may perhaps be considered a typical linguistic trait. This

does not, however, apply to the great frequency of the verb 'Tami'a' - to desire (mainly in the negative connotation) in Al-Ghazzālī's writings - since this verb is common in religious literature in general and especially in Sūfī treatises. The first of the above combinations, which does not appear as such in the dictionaries, often recurs in Al-Ghazzālī's writings and it may be translated thus: 'there is no hope for ...', 'there is no chance of ...', 'we may not aspire to ... any longer'. The second combination appears in the dictionaries as an idiom and means aspiration to that which we should not aspire to, that which cannot be reached<sup>170</sup>.

Lā Matma' fī

ولا مطمع في اسعافك الا بعد تعريفك مذهبهم  
(مقاصد ٦٦٣١)

(... and there is no chance that you may be able to give a helping hand unless you teach their doctrine first)<sup>171</sup>.

ومع هذا فلا مطمع في مخالفة الفقهاء فيما افتوا به من الصحة مع الغفلة  
(احياء ٤٦٢٨٨٦٥٦)

(... and yet there is no chance that one may disagree with the decision of the Fuqahā that [prayer is prayer] in spite of distraction.)

وكان قد ظهر عندى انه لا مطمع (لي) في سعادة الآخرة الا بالتقوى  
(المنقذ ١٦٩٨)

(... and it has already been revealed to me that there is no hope of achieving the pleasures of life in the

World Beyond unless it be through piety.)

فكل علم لا يستولى الطالب في ابتداء نظره على مجامعه ولا مبانيه فلا  
مطمع له في الظفر باساراه ومباغيه (المستصفي ٨٤٤ - ٩)

اما الواقع من هذه الاقسام فلا مطمع في معرفته يقينا الا ببرهان عقلي او  
بتواتر خبر او سمع قاطع (المستصفي ١٦٣٢٠ - ٢)

فان شذ الحق عنهم فلا يبقى في درك الحق مطمع ان لا مطمع في الرجوع  
الى التقليد بعد مفارقتة (المنقذ ٥٦٦٤ - ٤)

ومثل هذه المشاهدة لا مطمع فيها لغير الانبياء والاولياء الذين تقرب  
درجتهم منهم (احياء ٥٤٤ - ٧٦٢٩٤٦٦)

ولا مطمع في العلم بتفصيلها (تفصيل افعال الله) فانه لا نهاية لها  
(المقصد ٥٦٤٦ - ٤)

ولو كان فيه (في عداوة من عاداتك من حسد) مطمع لاحد من الناس لماتلى  
على اجلهم رتبة آيات الياس (فيصل ٣٥١)

ولا مطمع في استئصال الغضب والشهوة

(مشكاة ١٠٦٥٠)

الآن بعد حصول الياس لا مطمع في اقتباس (حلّ؟) المشكلات الا من  
الجليات (المنقذ ٣٦٦٠ - ٤)

فان اليقين عبارة عن معرفة مخصوصة ومتعلقة بالمعلومات التي وردت بها  
الشرائع فلا مطمع في احصائها (احياء ٤٦١٢٦٦ - ٥)

Tama' Fi Ghair Matma'

واما البحث عن كيفية صدور الفعل من الله بالارادة ففضول وطمع في غير  
مطمع (تهافت ٩٦١٣١ - ١٠)

(The inquiry into the manner in which the action comes from God through His will is superfluous curiosity, and a desire [to know] that which must not be desired [to be known].)

ومن لا يعلم مضادة الدنيا للآخرة وإن الجمع بينهما طمع في غير مطمع فهو جاهل  
(احياء ١٠١٥٦١ - ٦٧)

وطلب دفع الشك في القسم المتوسط طمع في غير مطمع  
(احياء ١٠٨٥٦٤ - ٨٦٢١)

واياك ان تشتغل بخصامهم وتطمع في افحامهم فتطمع في غير مطمع  
(فصل ٦٥١ - ٥)

### Tā'il

Al-Ghazzālī likes this word, which means profit, usefulness, and usually appears in negative sentences<sup>172</sup>.

Combinations from the roots 'Ḥaṣala' and 'Hawl' recur in his writings in a fixed associative relation to this word. (The root 'Ḥaṣala' as such is a favourite of Al-Ghazzālī's too and appears some thirty times in different forms in "Al-Munqidh", for example.)

وقد بحثوا زمانا وما تحصلوا على طائل

(ميزان ٣٦٩ - ٢)

(... and they have already studied this for some time and have not achieved anything.)

فان رجعت الآن الى ... دل ذلك انك لم تخلص من هذا الكلام بطائل ولن ترجع منه الى حاصل  
(الاقتصاد ٢٦١١ - ٣)

وهي عبارات هائلة ليس وراءها طائل

(احياء ١١٥٦١٥٦١)

واكثر من غير طائل

(احياء ٨٥١٢٩٥٦١)

... فتعلم انه لم يكن لجميع متخيلاتك ومعتقداتك اصل وطائل  
(المنقذ ٦٦١٦٦١ الخ)

... انه لا حاصل عند هؤلاء ولا طائل لكلامهم

(المنقذ ٣٥٨٨)

انظر ايضا :

فبين ان كل ذلك تهويل ما وراءه تحصيل

(تهافت ٨٥٧)

فدل ان هذه خيالات لا حاصل لها

(تهافت ٥٥٢٥٢)

### Mazinna, pl. Mazānn

Al-Ghazzālī used many combinations, in which the word under discussion is in the construct, both in the singular and in the plural. It means 'the origin of ...', 'the place where ...' etc.<sup>173</sup> The following are eight examples to illustrate this:

(معيار ٦٣١ ٩)

مظنة الوهم

(محك ٩٥٤٧)

مظان الغلط

(المستظهرى ١٠٥٣٧)

لمظنة الاستحقاق

(احياء ٤٥١١٥٥٦١)

مظان الخطر

(احياء ٥٢٥٦١٤٩٦)

مظنة الفتنة

(الاربعين ٢٦٢٤١)	مظنة غرور الحمقى
(القسطاس ١٦٤٥)	ومظنة استعماله من الغوامض
(المنقذ ٣٦٨٨)	مظنة الخلاف

The negative sense which is attached to this word when it appears on its own may be influenced by the meaning of the determining nouns which are mainly negative.

#### 'Azala

This root is repeated in Al-Ghazzālī's writings in a fixed context: that of man's reason being feeble, remote (Ma'zūl 'an)<sup>174</sup> with relevance to matters which can be grasped by prophetic revelation only, just as the senses are powerless to grasp matters belonging to the sphere of reason. Such an expression may help to contradict the arguments of W.M. Watt regarding different levels in Al-Ghazzālī's spiritual development. Thus Watt believes that Al-Ghazzālī advanced from the thought of the parallelism of reason and religious experience', which he adhered to in the "Ihyā", to 'that of the superiority of religious intuition to reason' characteristic of the later "Al-Munqidh", wherein the level of intuitive religious experience ('Dhawq') is definitely placed above the level of reason<sup>175</sup>.

This assumption must needs be erroneous, because Al-Ghazzālī expressed grave doubts regarding the powers of the judgement of reason in matters of religious phenomena

already in the "Tahāfut" and he always remained faithful to this doubt. The latter holds true especially with regard to the "Ihyā" and related books, even if Al-Ghazzālī did sometimes express appreciation of reason and its power in these books<sup>176</sup>. Some of the examples which follow will suffice to prove that there is no reason to suppose that Al-Ghazzālī's conception of the spiritual development of man in the "Ihyā" differed from his conception of man's development in the "Al-Munqidh" and elsewhere, and that prophetic intuition is everywhere regarded by him as being the highest sphere of man's development, above the sphere of reason. His linguistic consequence with regard to this point is most amazing and may be considered a definite proof of his being consequent in his theory.

#### 'Azala 'An

ومفتحه (مفتح مذهب الباطنية) حصر مدارك العلوم في قول الامام المعصوم ونزل العقول عن ان تكون مدركة للحق لما يعترينها من الشبهات ويتطرق الى النظائر من الاختلافات

(المستظهرى ٢١٦٧ - ٢٢)

(... and the basis [of the Baṭīniyya sect] is the reduction of the means of understanding sciences to the sayings of the infallible Imām, and the contention that human reason cannot grasp the truth because of the uncertainty which haunts it and because of the disagreement occurring in those who speculate by reason.)

فالداعي الى محض التقليد مع عزل العقل بالكلية جاهل والمكفي بمجرد العقل عن انوار القرآن والسنة مغرور  
(احياء ٤٣٠، ٤٣١، ٤٣٢، ٤٣٣ - ١١)

(... and he who advocates a blind adherence to tradition alone, to the complete exclusion of reason, is a fool, and he who is content with reason itself without the light of the Qur'ān and the Sunna, has been deluded.)

فيكفيك من منفعة العقل ان يهديك الى صدق النبي صلعم ويفهمك موارد اشارته فاعزل العقل بعد ذلك عن التصرف ولازم الاتباع فلا تسلم الا به  
(احياء ٤٦١، ٤٦٢، ٤٦٣، ٤٦٤ - ١٤)

ولكن الله تعالى عزل هؤلاء الحمقى عن معرفة اسراره  
(احياء ٤٤٠، ٤٤١، ٤٤٢، ٤٤٣ - ٢٤)

فالحس معزول عن الادراك ان لم يكن مماسة  
(المقصد ١٣٦١٢ - ١٤)

ووراء العقل طور آخر تنفتح فيه عين اخرى يبصر بها الغيب وما سيكون في المستقبل وامورا اخرى ، العقل معزول عنها كعزل قوة التمييز عن ادراك المعقولات وكعزل قوة الحس عن مداركات التمييز . . . فكما ان العقل طور من اطوار الآدمي يحصل فيه عين يبصر بها انواعا من المعقولات والحواس ( الحواس ) معزولة عنها فالنبوة ايضا عبارة عن طور يحصل فيه عين لها نور يظهر في نورها الغيب وامورا لا يدركها العقل  
( المنقذ ٤١٠٦ الخ )

فالى ههنا مجرى العقل ومخطاه وهو معزول عما بعد ذلك الا عن تفهم ما يليه الطبيب اليه  
( المنقذ ٤١١١ - ٣ )

بل الايمان بالنبوة ان يقر باثبات طور وراء العقل تنفتح فيه عين يدرك بها مداركات خاصة والعقل ( العقل ) معزول عنها كعزل السمع عن ادراك الالوان والبصر عن ادراك الاصوات وجميع الحواس عن ادراك المعقولات  
( المنقذ ٩١١٢ الخ )

فقد تناطق قاضي العقل وهو الحاكم الذي لا يعزل ولا يبديل  
( المستصفي ٤٦٣ - ٥ )

Bi-mu'zal 'an (remote, set apart)

والبله من العوام بمعزل عن فضيحة هذه المهواة ١٧٧  
(تهافت ١٥٦)

والمكافيء عن الاسائة بمعزل من (عن) هذا الوصف  
(المقصد ٢٤٣٦ - ٨)

Ta'assaba

This verb is chiefly known in connection with ideals of the Arab tribes especially, though not exclusively, in times of 'Djāhiliyya'. It means being a fanatic adherent of the tribe, having close family ties with it, and so on<sup>178</sup>, and recurs in Al-Ghazzālī's writings mainly in connection with the term 'Taqlid'<sup>179</sup>. Here it means being 'a fanatic, a zealot, of the inherited tradition', especially with a kind of harmful fanaticism, which brings about disaster even when directed towards positive ideas because it is too extreme and subjected to the wilfulness of man. This fanaticism usually comes together with man's disregard of his neighbour ('Taḥqīr', 'Istiḥqār') and of his opinions, and the taking root in his heart ('Raskh') of certain ideas

which become so much a part of him that he fails to distinguish between right and wrong. Thus, for instance, fanatic adherence ('Ta'aṣṣub') to one of the traditional schools of law ('Madhhab')<sup>180</sup> was, according to Al-Ghazzālī, most objectionable for it resulted in ungodly competition, hatred and jealousy between the 'Ulamā of the different schools. Modernists, like Muḥammad 'Abduh, accepted Al-Ghazzālī's attitude and took it as a basis for their special eclectic approach to the classical schools of law ('Talfīq'). Al-Ghazzālī adhered to this opinion though he did admire the founders of all schools and demanded that one should be allowed to join any one of them according to one's judgement<sup>181</sup>. Yet he believed that fanaticism could cause more harm than good even when it was fanaticism for the truth, as in the case of the zealot theologians. ('Al-Ta'aṣṣub li-l-Ḥaqq'.) Much more objectionable is, of course, fanaticism for negative phenomena such as unwellcome religious innovations ('Bida'), or the fanaticism for self-will and passion ('Al-Ta'aṣṣub li-l-Ahwā')<sup>182</sup>. Al-Ghazzālī did therefore deny every form of fanaticism and used this verb only in a negative sense as opposed to its positive use in Arab and tribal historiography or in the well-known philosophy of history of Ibn Khaldūn.

ولكنكم تعاندون في اخفائه تعصبا (المستظهرى ٢٥٣٩)

(But you insist upon hiding this [tradition] out of excessive fanaticism [for your way of thought].)

الثاني ( من حجب الفهم ) ان يكون مقلدا للمذهب سمعه بالتقليد وجمد عليه وثبت في نفسه التعصب له بمجرد الانباع ( الاتباع ) للمسموع من غير وصول اليه ببصيرة ومشاهدة ( احياء ١٦٦٥١٦٦ الخ )

(The second obstacle [to real comprehension] is for man to follow blindly a school of thought which he has accepted by the way of 'Taqlīd' only, and in which his mind has become atrophied until fanaticism [for this school] has taken root in him, by the fact of his very following what he had heard, without trying to understand this by personal insight and vision.)

فان خاض في المذاهب والبدع والتعصب في العقائد هلك من حيث لا يشعر ( احياء ٥٣ ط ١٠٠٢٠١٠٣ - ٤ )

(... and if he becomes absorbed in the different schools, in the undesirable innovations and in fanaticism with regard to the religious tenets, he will be lost without knowing how.)

ولكن شدة التعصب دعت الذابين عن الحق الى تطويل النزاع معهم<sup>١٨٣</sup> ( مع التعليمية ) ( المنقذ ٤٨٨ - ٥ )

(But violent fanaticism provoked the defenders of truth to prolong the discussion with them [e.g. with Bāṭiniyya].)

واكثر الجهالات انما رسخت في قلوب العوام بتعصب جماعة من جهال اهل الحق اظهروا الحق في معرض التحرى والادلاء ( الاقتصاد ٥٧٥٧ - ٤ )

التعصبات الفاحشة والخصومات الفاشية المفضية الى اهراق الدماء وتخريب  
البلاد (احياء ١١٦٧١٥٦١ - ١٢)

وهذا (التقليد) ايضا حجاب عظيم به حجب اكثر المتكلمين والمتعصبين  
للمذاهب (احياء ١٢٦١٣٦٨٥٦٣ - ١٣)

ومن ابوابه (ابواب الشيطان) العظيمة التعصب للمذاهب والاهواء والحدق  
على الخصوم (احياء ٧٦١٤٠٥٥٦٣ - ٨)

ونرى فضوليا آخر يتعصب لعلي رضي الله عنه  
(احياء ٤٦١٤٠٥٥٦٣ - ٣)

وهذا حكم المتعصبين للشافعي وابي حنيفة ومالك واحمد وغيرهم من الائمة  
... ولم يتمكنوا من الاستتباع واقامة الجاه الا بالتعصب  
(احياء ١٣٦١٤٠٦٦٣ - الخ)

فاجبتك الى طلبتك ... باظهار الحق الصريح من غير مداهنة ومراقبة  
جانب ومحافظة على تعصب لمذهب ذي مذاهب<sup>١٨٤</sup>  
(الجام ١٤٦٢ - ١٦)

انظر ايضا :

الميل الى الدنيا والشهوات والتعصب للمذاهب  
(الجام ٦٥١٣ - ٧)

(الخصلة) الثانية - خلو باطنهم عن تقليد وتعصب لمذهب موروث ومسموع  
(القسطاس ٦٥٨٧)

ولا يحصل به (بالتواتر) العلم ... لا سيما بعد وقوع التعصب بين  
ارباب المذاهب (فيصل ٩٥١٨ - ١٠)

... او لاجل التعصب لنصرة مذهب الآباء  
(مشكاة ٣٥٥٧)

### Inqadaha Fī

The verb 'Qadaha fī', meaning to hurt, to injure<sup>185</sup>, is quite frequent in Arabic and in Al-Ghazzālī's writings too. But Al-Ghazzālī's repeated use of the seventh conjugation of this root is interesting. Sometimes it means the same as in the first conjugation and sometimes it has the meaning of 'to have occurred to'. This conjugation is not frequent in literature and usually does not appear in the dictionaries<sup>186</sup>, and we might regard it as a special linguistic characteristic of Al-Ghazzālī.

ومبدأ الشرفية ان ينقدح فيه خاطر من الهوى ويهجس فيه فينظر القلب  
الى حاكم العقل<sup>١٨٧</sup> ليستفتي منه ويستكشف وجه الصواب فيه  
(احياء ٢٦١٤٢٧٥٦٣ - ٤)

(... and the basis of dignity is that if a wilful idea occurs [to man] and haunts him - his heart should turn to the judge of the mind as it were in order to obtain his verdict and ask [him] to divulge the right way [to him].)

فان قال قد جريت شيئا من النجوم والطب فوجدت بعضه صادقا فانقدح في  
نفسي تصديقه وسقط من قلبي استبعاده ونفرته ...  
(المنقذ ٧٥١٢٠ - ٩)

(... and if he says: I have tried some astrology and medicine and found some truth in them; therefore it has occurred to me to believe in them and I have no wish to consider them untrue or to shun them.)

ولا يد من التنبه على قاعدة اخرى وهو ان المخالف قد يخالف نسا  
متواترا ويزعم انه مؤول ولكن ذكر تأويله لا انقدح له اصلا في اللسان لا  
على بعد ولا على قرب وذلك كفر صاحبه مكذب وان كان يزعم انه مؤول  
( فيصل ١١٦١٧ - ١٣ )

فلما خطرت لى هذه الخواطر (و) انقدحت في النفس حاولت لذلك علاجا  
( المنقذ ١١٦٦٢ - ١٢ )

فلما رأيت اصناف الخلق قد ضعف ايمانهم الى هذا الحد بهذه الاسباب  
انقدح في نفسي ان ذلك ( رجوعي ) متعين في هذا الوقت محتم  
( المنقذ ٤١١٤ الخ )

وهذه حركة قدرها الله تعالى ( وهي ) من عجائب تقديراته التي لم يكن  
لها انقدح في القلب في هذه العزلة  
( المنقذ ٣٦١١٥ - ٣ )

بل العاقل الواحد ربما ينقدح له وجه الحاجة وامكان التعريف بتأليف  
الحروف فيتولى المعنى ثم يعرف الآخرين  
( المستصفي ٤٦٣١٩ )

فان الذي انقدح في سره ان المراد به من لفظ الاستواء والفوق مثلا اما ان  
يكون ٠٠٠ او ٠٠٠٠٠٠  
( الجام ٩٦١١ )

احدهما ان المعنى الذي انقدح عنده هل هو جائز في حق الله تعالى  
ام هو محال  
( الجام ٥٦١١ )

لكن كل واحد من الظنين اذا انقدح في النفس وحاك في الصدر فلا يدخل  
تحت الاختيار دفعه عن النفس ( الجام ٧٦١٢ )

فاني يساوي هذا حكاية الظنون المنقدحة في النفس  
( الجام ٤٦١٥ )

Qarā'in Al-Aḥwāl (seldom in the singular: 'Qarīnat  
Al-Hāl')

This expression is repeated often, mainly, perhaps, in  
"Al-Munqidh", and means circumstantial evidence, sustain-  
ing proof resulting from circumstances etc. Al-Ghazzālī  
regards such empirical indirect evidence as very important  
for the acquisition of reliable information - especially  
that pertaining to the prophet, the personality of his  
friends and the Ṣūfī saints.

وذلك مما يمكن تفهيمه بقرائن الاحوال ويمكن تليسه بقرائن الاحوال  
( احياء ٦١٠٩٦ - ٣ )

(... and this can be either clarified or mixed up by cir-  
cumstances.)

فان ذلك ( المعجزة ) اذا نظرت اليه وحده ولم تنضم اليه القرائن  
القصيرة الخارجة عن الحصر - ربما ظننت انه سحر وتخيل  
( المنقذ ٢٦١٠٩ - ٣ )

(If you consider miracles alone and do not add the evidence  
of the many - unlimited in number - circumstances surround-  
ing it, you may think that it is nothing but witchcraft or  
phantasy.)

بل الايمان الراسخ ايمان العوام الحاصل في قلوبهم في الصبا بتواتر  
السمع او الحاصل بعد البلوغ بقرائن احوال لا يمكن التعبير عنها  
( فيصل ١٦٢٢ - ٢ )

فمن لم يرزق الذوق فيتقنها ( هذه الحالة ) بالتجربة والتسامع ، ان اكثر  
معهم ( مع الصوفية ) الصعبة حتى يفهم ذلك بقرائن الاحوال يقينا  
( المنقذ ٦٦١٠٣ - ٨ )



Kunh, Kunh Al-Himma

This word appears in Al-Ghazzālī's writings in two fixed connections:

- a. Together with a determining noun such as 'Al-Himma', 'Al-Djidd', meaning something like 'all your heart and soul', and it is generally used with regard to the ṣūfī way of life;
- b. In order to study or to know a science right to its very end, or, in the negative, a science which cannot be understood to its limits, such as the knowledge of the Almighty. The expression is quite frequent in the language in both forms and its frequency in Al-Ghazzālī's work is not necessarily exceptional. However, I shall give several illustrations since it seems that Al-Ghazzālī was very fond of this expression and used it frequently.

ولا ينبغي من التضخيم بهذه الهيئات الا كلف النفس عن الهوى والاعراض عن  
الدنيا والاقبال بكنه الجد على العلم والتقوى

(تهافت ٥٦٣٥١ - ٦)

فعلت ان رد المذهب قبل فهمه والاطلاع على كنهه - رمي في عمائة  
(المقصد ٦٦٩ - ٥)

(... and I understood that to fight a system which one has not yet understood and grasped to its very limits is like shooting in the dark)<sup>189</sup>.

... التوبة ورد المظالم والاقبال على الله عز وجل بكنه الهمة  
(احياء ٦١ ط ١٦٥٥٧٦ - ٢)

بل قالوا الطريق تقديم المجاهدة ... وقطع العلائق كلها والاقبال بكنه  
الهمة على الله تعالى (احياء ٦٣ ط ١٠٦١٣٧٧٦ - ١١)  
انظر ايضا س ٣ - ٥)

ثم التجرد بكنه الهمة بعبادة الله

(احياء ٦٥ ط ١٠٨١ - ٤)

وان رأس ذلك كله قطع علاقة القلب عن الدنيا ... والاقبال بكنه الهمة على  
الله تعالى (المنقذ ٢٦٩٨٦ - ٤)

فان اخرجت عن الضبط مبادئ الاستعدادات ولم تقف على كنهها ولم يكن  
لنا سبيل الى حصرها فمن اين نعلم استحالة حصول الاستعداد في بعض  
الاجسام ... (تهافت ٧٦٢٩١ - ٨)

كنه

... وان القصور عن معرفة كنه جلال الله نقص  
(احياء ٦٤ ط ١٠٩٢٦٠٩٢٦ - ٤)

الاحاطة بكنه جلال الله تعالى غير ممكنة

(احياء ٦٤ ط ١٠٦٢١٢١٦ - ١١)

Notes:

1. The combination 'Al-Iqbāl bi-kulli-l-himma' appears in "Mīzān", p. 44, 4, 10-11, and it is probably a later, easier version or an erroneous rendering of 'bi-kunh al-himma', which appears in a parallel example of this paragraph in "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1377. (See examples above.)

2. The determining noun is entirely missing in "Al-Munqidh", p. 95, 2: 'Aqbaltu bi-himmatī 'alā' ... probably due to a wish to use a slightly different language or due to an unintentional omission.

### Talāfā

Al-Ghazzālī has a preference for this word which he used to denote the setting right of a wrong or a rectification of the past. 'Tadāraka' appears concurrently with the same meaning (in the "Bustān" dictionary one appears as an explanation of the other!) The combination 'Tamām-al-Talāfī' - meaning full, complete correction - also recurs.

والتشغيب على من ٠٠٠ مال ميلا يسيرا عن ملازمة الرسم الى العمل بمقتضى العلم طمعا في نيل ما تعبد به الله من تزكية النفس واصلاح القلب وتداركا لبعض ما فرط من اضاءة العمر ياسا من تمام التلافي والجبر  
( احياء ٦ مقدمة ٦١٣ - ٦١٠ )

(The strife with the one who ... tends to deviate slightly from adherence to external things, to do that which fits real knowledge, in order to achieve the cleansing of the soul and the heart which Allah has ordered, and in order to set right at least some of the things he neglected in the course of his spent life, while despairing of making amends completely<sup>190</sup>.)

تشوقا الى درك ثارهم وتلافي امورهم

( فضائح الباطنية ٦ تحقيق بدوى ٦  
(٣٦٣٤

فمن سعى في تلافي هذه الفترة وسد هذه الثلمة اما متكفلا بعملها<sup>١٩١</sup>  
( احياء ٦٢ ط ٦١٩٢٥ (٨٦

واما ( الفعل ) بالماضي فبتلافي ما فات بالخير والقضاء

( احياء ٦٤٤ أ ٦٠٨٠٦٢٠١٢ - ١٣ )  
انظر ايضا س ٣ - ٣

وهو ( التندم ) روح التوبة وبه تمام التلافي

( احياء ٦٤٤ أ ٦٠٨٤٤ )

واذا كان متناول السم اذا ندم يجب عليه ان يتقيا ٠٠٠ تلافيا لبدنه  
المشرف على الهلاك ٠٠٠ فمتناول سموم الدين اولى بأن يجب عليه الرجوع  
عنها بالتدارك الممكن  
( احياء ٦٤٤ أ ٦٠٨٩٦٢٠٣ الخ )

وينبعث من هذا النار صدق الرغبة في التلافي والحذر اما في الحال  
فبترك الذنوب واما في الماضي فبالتلافي على حسب الامكان  
( الاربعين ٦١٨٢٦ - ٦ )

فتيقنت اني على شفا جرف هار<sup>١٩٢</sup> واني قد اشفيت على النار ان لم  
اشتغل بتلافي الاحوال  
( المنقذ ١٠٦٩٨ - ١١ )

Mawqūf 'alā (Waqafa 'alā)

This expression which usually means 'dependent on', 'based on' appears in Al-Ghazzālī's writings also with the well-known negative meaning of 'dependent not only on ...', 'based not only on', 'not confined to - alone'. It appears also in the combination 'Dja'alahu waqfan 'alā', 'he made it the private property ('Waqf') of, 'confined it to...'<sup>193</sup>. Some examples follow wherein the limiting element of this expression is explicit. In other examples this element may or may not be observed according to the context or the way the reader wishes to understand the text. (Compare also Yehudah Halevi's Kusari, I, 26 [Hirschfeld ed., p. 18]: Said the King of the Khasars: I therefore see that your Bible was given to you alone.)

ولكن فهم الحقيقة والماهية غير موقوف عليه

( محك ٤٦١٧ )

(But the understanding of truth and essence is not confined to him alone.)

فمن ظن ان الكشف موقوف على الادلة المحررة فقد ضيق رحمة الله (تعالى) الواسعة

( المنقذ ١٥٦٢ - ٢ )

(... and whoever thinks that the revelation of truth is based only on methodically ordered proof diminishes the great compassion of the Almighty.)

فهبؤلاً ضيقوا رحمة الله الواسعة على عباده اولا ، وجعلوا الجنة وقفا على

شرذمة يسيرة من المتكلمين . . . ( فيصل ٤٦٢٠ - ٥ )

فصار نظره موقوفا على مسموعه ( احياء ٤٦١٦٦ ح )

فاني ارجوان يشاركني غيرى في هذه المعرفة فيمكن ان يتعلم منه كما يتعلم مني فلا اجعل التعليم وقفا على نفسي

( القسطاس ٣٥٨٦ - ٣ )

اعني ان نجاتهم ( نجاته العوام ) غير موقوفة عليهما ( على معرفة ادلة العقيدة ومعرفة اسرارها ) ولا فوزهم موقوف عليهما وانما الموقوف عليهما كمال السعادة ( الاربعين ٥٦٢٦ - ٦ )

واتفقوا ايضا على ان جواز ذلك موقوف على قيام البرهان على استحالة الظاهر ( فيصل ٩٦١١ - ١٠ )

فاذا انكر لم يحصل من انكاره عند اهل المنطق الا سوء الاعتقاد في عقل المنكر بل في دينه الذي يزعم انه موقوف على مثل هذا الانكار ( المنقذ ٥٦٧٧ - ٧ )

وبهذا يعرف ان التصديق الجازم غير موقوف على البحث وتحرير الادلة ( الجام ٩٦٤٣ )

انظر ايضا :

وربما كان هذا البدن المحسوس ( للملائكة ) موقوفا على اشراق نور النبوة كما ان محسوسات عالمنا هذا موقوف ( ! ) عند الادراك على اشراق نور الشمس ( المضمون به على غير اجله ١٢٦٢٤ - ١٤ )

انظر ايضا :

بل الايمان نور يقذفه الله في قلوب عبده عطية وهدية تارة بيينة من الباطن . . . وتارة بسبب رؤيا في المنام . . . وتارة بمشاهدة حال رجل متدين . . . وتارة بقريئة حال ( فيصل ٩٦٢٠ الخ )

Notes to Chapter II

1. Mainly Ṣūfī authors like Al-Hārith Al-Muḥāsibī, Al-Hakīm Al-Tirmidhī, Al-Qushayrī, Abū Tālib Al-Makkī and Al-Rāghib Al-Isfahānī, Al-Ghazzālī's less known contemporary who must have influenced him deeply (cf. GAL I, p. 289; GALS I, p. 505.) Yet I have used also different kinds of books for comparison, especially those which are supposed to have been read by Al-Ghazzālī like the Epistles of the Pure Brethren, or Al-Fārābī's and Ibn Sīnā's writings and also books which deal with topics similar to those raised in his books, as, e.g., Ibn Hazm's, Ibn Rusd's or Bahyā b. Paqūda's writings.

2 Cf. M. Buber - Essays on the Style of the Bible (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 1954), p. 284.

3 Cf. Bouyges - Essai, pp. 7-9. See now also H. Laoust - La Politique de Gazālī (Paris, 1970), p. 28.

4 I cannot accept Bouyges' assumption (ibid., pp. 13, 49-50) that this book dates from a much later period of Al-Ghazzālī's life. Cf. below p. 378.

5 See now Suleiman Dunja's edition of this book (Cairo, 1961.)

6 The Arabic text is usually quoted as "Mustazhiri". I have also used A. Badawi's full edition (Cairo, 1964) of this book and designated it "Faḍā'iḥ Al-Bāṭiniyya", Badawi's edition. Cf. on this book also H. Laoust - ibid., p. 13, 75 ff.

7 There is no consensus among scholars with regard to the date of composition of this book. I think (cf. below p. 259, n. 1) that the "Mīzān" was written at the end of Al-Ghazzālī's stay in Baghdād and at the beginning of his Ṣūfī period. Cf. also H. Laoust - ibid., pp. 71-72. Although this book is, according to Al-Ghazzālī himself, a continuation of the "Mīyār" (''Ilm wa-'Amal' is a well-known idiomatic expression in mediaeval theology. Cf. I. Goldziher [ed.]. "Kitāb Ma'ānī Al-Nafs" [Berlin, 1907], notes p. 54 ff. and F. Rosenthal - Knowledge Triumphant, p. 246.) I have chosen to deal with these books separately, as they are very different and there is no need to assume that they were written consecutively. It is quite probable that Al-Ghazzālī, even more so than other Arab authors, used to plan in detail his writings of the future and even 'quoted' from as yet unwritten books. He may also have composed different books at one and the same time. Therefore one must be very careful with regard to his mentioning one book in another and never attach too great importance to these quotations in fixing dates or chronological sequences of his books, as most scholars are prone to do.

8 Unfortunately I could not use the scientific Turkish edition of this book mentioned in the preface above. On this book see also H. Laoust - ibid., p. 84 ff.

9 This edition is not very reliable though very readable. Henceforth I shall quote "Iḥyā" according to its main four parts in Roman numerals (I - "'Ibādāt", II - "'Ādāt", III - "Muhlikāt", IV - "Mundjiyāt") with the number of

each of the ten books of every part in ordinary figures. As far as possible I shall give also the number of the line in which the quotation begins, a hyphen (-) above the number meaning the line from the bottom of the page upwards. Of course the "Ihyā" was composed over a long period, parts of it when Al-Ghazzālī was still in Baghdad (for instance I, 2, or parts of it) and not chronologically according to its present order. Cf. below Ch. V.

10 Thus e.g. H.H. Schaeder thought that Al-Ghazzālī coined the term 'Fatra' which he translated as 'Zeitalter der (religioesen) Stagnation' and he evaluated it as 'eine der bedeutendsten Leistungen der Islamischen Begriffsbildung'. (Cf. H.H. Schaeder's review of J. Obermann - Der Philosophische u. Religiöse Subjektivismus Ghazzālī's [Wien, 1921] in Der Islam 13, 1923, p. 123.) But this term was not new at all and was used even before Al-Ghazzālī as a term for the dark ages between Jesus and Muhammad (cf. Tor Andrae - Die Person Muhammads in Leben u. Lehre seiner Gemeinde [Upsala, 1917], p. 325) and especially as a Ṣūfī term designating the religious weakness either of the individual or of the whole generation. (Cf. Al-Qushayrī, "Risāla" [Cairo, 1940/1359 Hg.], p. 2, 1, and *ibid.*, p. 199, 6, together with 'Waqfa' which means a total standstill.) See also "Ihyā" II, 7, p. 1075, 8. Al-Ghazzālī did not even add any new nuance to this term. Lamentations on contemporary religious demoralization (cf. the opening of "Al-Munqidh") were quite common in Ṣūfī literature preceding Al-Ghazzālī. (Cf. Al-Qushayrī, "Risāla", p. 7, and Bahyā

b. Paqūda, "Al-Hidāya ilā Farā'id Al-Qulūb", ed. Yahuda, p. 13.) As for the term 'Fatra' see also H. Steiner - Geschichte der Mu'tazila, p. 11, and F. Meier - "Sufik u. Kulturverfall", p. 149 (in: G.E. von Grunebaum u. W. Hartner, eds. - Klassizismus und Kulturverfall [Frankfurt, 1960].)

11 One may of course come to a different conclusion too: there were no real violent changes in Al-Ghazzālī's life and therefore his language is so stable and consistent. This assumption could be based also on the fact that his autobiographical confessions (see above p. 19) are much less historical than spiritual.

12 Thus there exists without doubt a close affinity between the "Tahāfut" and "Al-Munqidh", both in style and content. Yet these books were certainly written at different periods of Al-Ghazzālī's life. (He may have consulted the "Tahāfut" when he set out to compose the "Al-Munqidh".)

13 Linguistic methods in a more statistical manner have been used both with and without success by several scholars. Cf. Ch. I, n. 5. See the brilliant results of such a study apparently without mathematical tools in G. Scholem - Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, Schocken, New York, 1954, Ch. 5, p. 163 ff; ch. 8, p. 326.

14 F. Jabre accuses Al-Ghazzālī that he never actually used rational polemics with his adversaries, e.g.

the philosophers. He tried to convince them with the certainty of his own belief, while raising, as it were, his voice in the discussion and moving so quickly forward in his argument that the adversary had not time left for thinking, reacting and arguing. Yet the study of Al-Ghazzālī's writings has so far not confirmed these accusations and the psychological conclusions that Jabre draws from them. Cf. his above mentioned book La Notion de la Certitude selon Ghazālī (Paris, 1958), p. 57, 58, 63, 70, 71 et al. See also below p. 84 ff: Expressions of Mockery and Vituperation.

15 Cf. f.i. Al-Qushayrī - "Risāla", p. 3, 4; 4, 11, and as a verb in the fifth conjugation *ibid.*, p. 3, 7. See 'Taḥqīq' as against 'Taqlīd' *ibid.*, p. 8, 7-6. Cf. also Brockelmann - GALS III, index, pp. 1112-1114, the long list of books which begin with 'Taḥqīq'. On 'Taḥqīq' as a means of polemics cf. Goldziher - Streitschrift, Introduction, p. 51.

16 See Appendix B.

17 For examples of the fifth conjugation see "Al-Wadjīz", p. 18, 6; "Tahāfut", p. 7, 3; 11, 9; "Ihyā" II, 4, p. 896, 3; *ibid.*, IV, 1, p. 2174, 7; IV, 4, p. 2431, 9; "Al-Munqidh", p. 84, 1; 103, 6. For examples of the second conjugation see, "Tahāfut", p. 229, 10, and A. Goichon - Lexique de la Langue Philosophique d'Ibn Sīnā (Paris, 1938), pp. 80-81, 83.

18 Cf. "Tahāfut", Index D, p. 421; Streitschrift, p. 3, 13, 18; "Mihakk", p. 47, 7, for examples of the philosophical use of this term. Cf. also D.Z. Baneth, "Philological Notes to the Metaphysical book of Joseph ibn Yahūda ibn Shim'ōn" (in Hebrew) in the Anniversary Book to G. Shalom (Jerusalem, 1958), p. 115, n. 30. Cf. also "Mi'rādj Al-Sālikīn" (attributed to Al-Ghazzālī?), p. 23, 2; 35, 3. As for the less frequent Ṣūfī use of this term see "Mizān", p. 39 and Al-Qushayrī - "Risāla", p. 2, 4. Cf. also Fakhr Al-Dīn Al-Rāzī - "Mafātīh Al-Ghaib" VIII, p. 493, 20; 502, 7.

19 Cf. Al-Qushayrī, *ibid.*, p. 48, 10; 49, 11. I did not find in Al-Ghazzālī's books other forms of this root, such as 'Fahaqīq anna' (Cf. Rāghib Al-Isfahānī - "Tafsīl-Al-Nash'atāin", p. 104, 7), 'Fahaqqun 'alā' (Cf. Al-Muḥāsibī - "Kitāb Al-Ri'āya", p. 324, 18, 20) or even 'Wa-Ana Maḥqūqun bi' (*ibid.*, p. 272, 1.)

20 See also "Al-Wadjīz", p. 4, 9; "Tahāfut", p. 116, 9; "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 57, 3-4; "Al-Maqṣad", p. 74, 2; "Faiṣal", p. 11, 11.

21 Cf. also below, p. 105.

22 'An-Annahu' in an indirect question seems to be typical of middle Arabic and modern colloquial Arabic. See also "Al-Munqidh" p. 60, 5 ff.; 81, 1; 107, 3.

23 Cf. below, p. 110.

- 24 Here Al-Ghazzālī almost identifies 'Taqlīd' and 'Taṣdīq' and prefers 'Taqlīd', blind faith in truth to 'Taṣdīq', blind faith in falsehood.
- 25 See the different approach in "Miḥakk", p. 47, 3 ff., and a different scale of values in "Ihyā" I, 1, pp. 122-126, esp. p. 125, 2-3. Cf. also H. Laoust, *ibid.*, p. 71.
- 26 Cf. "Ihyā" IV, 4, p. 2406, 8, 10-11. (See also "Mi rād̄j Al Sālikīn", pp. 89-90.)
- 27 Cf. "Tahāfut", p. 116, 9-11; 222, 7; "Miḥakk", p. 58, 5. See also F. Jabre - Certitude, p. 332.
- 28 Cf. Streitschrift, Text No. 15, "Al-Munqidh", p. 38, 3 ff. It is interesting to note that here Al-Ghazzālī did not use 'Taqlīd' in its negative sense and parallel to conjecture and guesswork, when contrasted with religious certainty. On the contrary here he denotes 'Taqlīd' as the blind following of the Ta'limiyya after the 'Imām', whereas conjecture and guesswork, even though wrong, are positive means. In this context, however, he did not use 'Takhmīn' and 'Zann', because these expressions have a negative sense in his writings. Therefore he prefers here to use 'Ra'y' 'Idjtihād'. As for the legal expression 'Ghālib Al-Zann', of which Al-Ghazzālī was very fond, see "Al-Wadjīz", p. 19, 5; "Ihyā" I, 3, p. 242, 4, and also "Tahāfut", p. 266, 3-4; 309, 3. Cf. also R. Brunschvig - "Variations sur la thème du doute dans le fiqh", St. Orient. in Onore de G. Levi Della Vida I (Rome, 1956), p. 66; F. Rosenthal -

Knowledge Triumphant, p. 294, 307.

29 In this context Al-Ghazzālī repeats the well-known Ḥadīth:

من اجتهد واصاب فله اجران ومن اجتهد واخطأ فله اجر واحد

See Streitschrift, p. 27, 13-15, "Al-Qustās", p. 92, 3-2, "Al-Munqidh", p. 89, 6-7, "Djawāhir", p. 27, 2-4. Cf. also I. Goldziher - ZDMG 53, 1899, p. 645 ff. Al-Ghazzālī did not quote the Ḥadīth verbally, perhaps because he quoted by heart (like other Muslim and Jewish authors in mediaeval times.) Sometimes he even quotes inaccurately verses of the Qur'ān.

30 Cf. "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1382 ff.

31 The contrast 'Takhmīn-Burhān' is only a linguistic variety of 'Takhmīn-Taḥqīq'. Cf. also "Miḥakk", p. 51, 2 ('Bi-l-yaqīn al-burhānī'), and "Al-Munqidh", p. 103, 12; "Al-Qustās", p. 25, 1-2.

32 'Darūriyāt' are the axioms of rational thinking. Cf. "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1372 ('Ulūm 'Aqlīya Darūriyya); "Al-Mustasfa", p. 12, 1; "Al-Munqidh", p. 60, 2, 7; 61, 9.

33 As for the philosophical use of the word, cf. "Tahāfut" p. 29, 10; 136, 4; and Index C, p. 401. See also A.M. Goichon, *ibid.*, pp. 195-196.

34 Cf. the note in "Tahāfut", Index E, p. 443, 5 -

(Bouyges gives there this one example only.)

35 Cf. R. Brunschvig, *ibid.*, p. 68. The same contrast is expressed by 'Darūratan' as against 'Istidlālan' (Cf. Al-Bāqillānī, "I'djāz Al-Qur'ān" [Cairo, 1945], p. 393, 3.) See other less frequent combinations, "Tahāfut", p. 41, 7-8; 135, 6-7.

36 The combination is the same as 'Badīhat Al-'Aql'. Cf. also "Tahāfut", p. 30, 9-11;

— فان قيل نحن بضرورة العقل نعلم . . . ومجوز ذلك مكابر لضرورة العقل . . . قلنا . . .

'Mukābarat-Al-'Aql' seems to be a kind of technical term meaning to try to prove rationally the impossible. The verb seems to occur only in the "Tahāfut" (Cf. p. 30, 4; 64, 9; 130, 7; 12, 9.) The dictionaries give the verb without the addition of 'Al-'Aql' as in Al-Ghazzālī; therefore the meaning is: I contended or disputed with him for superiority in greatness, and I overcame him therein (Lane): *contradire quelqu'un obstinément* (Dozy). See also Ibn Ḥazm, "Kitāb Al-Milal" (Cairo, 1371), I, p. 105, 9.

37 See further examples, i.e.: "Maqāsīd", p. 225, 1; "Tahāfut", p. 222, 3; *Streitschrift*, p. 17, 10 ff; 18, 17 ff; 28 text No. 16; "Mi'yār", p. 32; "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 141, 9; "Qustās", p. 32, 1.

38 Cf. *Streitschrift*, p. 18, 17 ff; "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2156, 3; *ibid.* IV, 6, p. 2592, 13, 2; 2617, 3-2.

39 An adverb rarely used by Al-Ghazzālī. However, see "Al-Munqidh", p. 69, 2.

40 The term 'Mushāhada' has two meanings. 1) Physical sight including any empirical knowledge. Cf. "Faḍā'iḥ Al-Bātiniyya", ed. Badawī, p. 50; "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 21333, 4-5; "Al-Munqidh", p. 61, 3. 2) Religious revelation and insight (seeing - as it were - with an inward eye). Cf. "Al-Maqṣad", p. 16, 11; "Al-Munqidh", p. 102, 4. Our sentence may carry both meanings of the word, as e.g., "And we learned to know these things by logical necessity as certain as physical sight (or: as religious revelation)".

41 This seems to be the way the editors of "Al-Munqidh" used by me understood the sentence. F. Jabre follows them. Cf. his text (p. 30, 6) and translation (p. 89).

42 The adjective 'darūrī' and especially the combination 'ilm darūrī' recur often. Cf. "Tahāfut", p. 27, 8; 116, 5; 122, 10; 210, 6; 277, 3; "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2091, 1; "Qustās", p. 34, 2, 2; 82, 6-7; 83, 6-9; 85, 4; 85, 8; 45, 6; 80, 3; "Al-Munqidh", p. 109, 5, 9; 114, 3; 121, 4, 7 etc.

43 Cf. 'Al-Hawas: Al-Iḥsād' ("Lisān Al-'Arab"), *Revérie*, *Idée extravagante* (Dozy). According to Bouyges this word, of which Al-Ghazzālī was very fond, was not understood by some copiers. Cf. Index E, p. 443. See also "Tahāfut", p. 163, 1 (this rare word occurs twice on one page, by association!) and p. 313, 3; "Ihyā" I, 2, p. 170, 9;



ibid., IV, 1, 2151, 3; "Al-Arba'īn", p. 112, 1.

44 Only here there occurs the fourth conjugation instead of the eighth, perhaps because of a printing error.

45 Mustanad meaning 'proof'; see in "Tahāfut", p. 47, 1; "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2120, 6; "Al-Munqidh", p. 109, 5, 8.

46 Including the Maghrib. 'Aslan' e.g., is quite frequent in Ibn Ḥazm's writings. Cf. his "Risāla" against Ibn Naghrīla, ed. Dr. I. Abbas, 1960, p. 55, 8, 5; 56, 7 or "Kitāb Al-Mīlāl" (Cairo, 1371), p. 101, 11; 117, 7, 8; 119, 3, 9, 2; 224, 4 e.a. On the other hand I did not find this adverb in the "Qūt-Al-Qulūb", perhaps because it does not deal in polemics. Both 'Aslan' and 'La Mahāyata' also do not occur in "Tafsīl Al-Nash'atāin" by Al-Rāghib Al-Isfahānī.

47 For other examples see ibid., p. 2087, 2; 2093, 2; 2111, 2; 2134, 1; 2140, 9; 2142, 8; 2155, 2; 2157, 15; 2161, 5.

48 Here the word appears in the middle of the sentence. Cf. also the unusual construction in "Ihyā" II, 4, p. 899, 4-3 and "Al-Munqidh", p. 115, 2-1.

49 In this small booklet there are frequent examples of this adverb. See p. 19, 10; 21, 14; 27, 1; 37, 10, 10; 38, 4; 55, 13; 59, 8; 63, 12; 70, 7. Cf. also "Al-Iqtisād", p. 9, 9; 10, 1; "Mi'yār", p. 44, 1; "Djawāhir", p. 32, 2; "Faiṣal", p. 16, 4, 2; 17, 8, 12; 22, 13;

"Mishkāṭ", p. 37, 1; 39, 9; 55, 9; 58, 14; 59, 4; "Al-Munqidh", p. 67, 5.

50 This method of negation often appears after 'Lā Al-Nāfiya Li-l-Djins' in relative clauses. See further examples here and cf. "Tahāfut", p. 332, 6 (25, 6, though the word does not appear in the Index).

51 In "Kitāb-Al-Tawba" more than fifteen times. See p. 2082, 10; 2084, 5, 5; 2094, 6; 2097, 3; 2100, 8; 2101, 1, 7; 2108, 6; 2119, 9; 2124, 6, 9; 2170, 3. Cf. also "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 77, 13; 78, 15; 89, 6. It appears at least ten times in "Al-Maqṣad". See p. 4, 10; 9, 7; 17, 8; 27, 9; 32, 9; 35, 10; 64, 9; 65, 5. For more examples see "Maqāsid", p. 34, 3; 228, 9, 12; 298, 8; 299, 13; "Mi'yār", p. 38, 2; 40, 4; "Miḥakk", p. 8, 4; 93, 4; "Ihyā" IV, 6, p. 2613, 1; 2615, 7; "Qustās", p. 38, 7; 39, 2; "Mishkat", p. 56, 5; "Al-Mustasfā", p. 7, 10. Cf. also "Ayyuhā-l-Walad", p. 43, 1, and Al-Muḥāsibī, "Kitāb Al-Ri'āya li-Huqūq Allah" (ed. M. Smith), p. 12, 3.

52 Cf. "Tahāfut", Index E, p. 442. As has been stated above, the word 'Aslan' does not occur at all in the index in spite of its frequency in the book. For 'Qat'an', too, Bouyges gives only very few examples, and does not include the one given here (see p. 42, 5; 246, 8; 266, 3); for the examples of the verb 'Qata'a bi' (Index D, p. 435) one must add at least one more example - p. 266, 4.

53 This is a well-known example in the discussion of different levels of certainty. Cf. Streitschrift, p. 16, 3 ff.

- "Iqtisād", p. 10; "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1371, 2 ff; *ibid.*, III, 8, p. 1848, 12 ff. See also the description of the 'Izdiwādj Al-Aslain' in "Iqtisād", p. 10, 17-18.
- 54 Cf. also "Faiṣal", p. 14, 10; 16, 7; 17, 7.
- 55 Cf. also "Ildjām", p. 5, 1.
- 56 'Burhān Qāti' see "Qustās", p. 57, 5; "Faiṣal", p. 13, 2; "Al-Munqidh", p. 75, 4; "Al-Mustasfā", p. 320, 2-7; "Ildjām", p. 27, 7.
- 57 A plus forte raison (Dozy). Cf. also "Ihyā" I, p. 74, 1; *ibid.*, II, 7, p. 1097, 8, and Bahyā b. Paqūda (ed. Yahuda), p. 169, 13; 270, 14; 319, 9.
- 58 See more examples with 'bi-l-ḥarā', *ibid.*, p. 37, 1; 38, 7; 51, 1, 3, 11, 6, 3, 2; 54, 9 and see also "Kitāb Al-Dalā'il wa-l-Idjāz" (ed. 1928/1346), p. 51, 9-10.
- 59 See Appendix C.
- 60 It may well be that the following sentences belong to the same category:
- وإذا كان ذلك بعيدا فإذا الاصلح لكافة الخلق فقد المال  
(احياء ٢٤٢٠٦ د ٤٤٤)
- وإذا كان ذلك محالا او بعيدا فلنطلق القول بان الفتراصلح لكافة الخلق  
(احياء ٢٤٢١٦ د ٤٤٤) وأفضل
- 61 This is an interesting part of Al-Ghazzālī's doctrine of prophecy. Usually he puts greater stress on man's need

- of God's grace to achieve prophetic revelation. Cf. below p. 304.
- 62 See J. Blau, A Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic (Hebrew), (Jerusalem, 1961), introduction p. 10. See also p. 200 ff. *ibid.*, as well as note 3. Of course this phenomenon appears not only in conditional sentences. See the fixed combinations:
- |                 |                  |
|-----------------|------------------|
| ( فيصل ١٢٥٦ )   | وهذا لا مأخذ له  |
| ( تهافت ١٥٢٨١ ) | وهذا لا مخرج عنه |
- (Minhu? Cf. Index E, p. 443) and cf. also "Tahāfut", p. 218, 2; 35, 6-7; 45, 1-2.
- 63 Cf. "Qūt-Al-Qulūb" I, 2, p. 27, 12.
- 64 Cf. for example, Zaki Mubarak's book on Al-Ghazzālī (Cairo, 1925?).
- 65 F. Jabre, Certitude, pp. 70-71.
- 66 Although these expressions are very closely related (cf. Streitschrift, p. 1, 10, and "Al-Munqidh", p. 113, 8) I had to separate them in order to deal here with expressions of folly and stupidity from the stylistic point of view, and below p. 353 with the term 'Āmīyy' as part of Al-Ghazzālī's doctrine. As for 'Da'īf Al-Īmān' (cf. "Ihyā" IV, 4, p. 2407, 5) it appears sometimes to be identical with 'Da'īf Al-'Aql' but sometimes it seems to bear a different meaning. It is very frequent in "Al-Munqidh" (cf. p. 112, 3; 116, 6; 121, 8; 122, 7). See also "Mizān",

p. 5, 5 and "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2170, 13.

67 Cf. e.g., Al-Muhāsibī, "Ri'āya", p. 272, 6; Bahyā b. Paqūda, p. 15, 4-5. See also F. Rosenthal - Knowledge Triumphant, p. 253 ff.

68 See Ibn Al-Athīr, ed. Thornberg VIII, p. 21, and cf. below p. 92.

69 The same parable appears in "Al-Arba'in", p. 225, 1 ff.

70 'Khubāl' is an infrequent word and appears mainly in "Tahāfut", but nowhere is the version doubtless. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 5, 13; 16, 4; 22, 11 (not mentioned in the index); 25, 7; 96, 8 (not mentioned in the index); 229, 2, 4; and Index E, p. 442. Cf. also below p. 123, and see in the dictionaries: 'corruptness', 'unsoundness' (Lane).

والخبال - النقصان وهو الاصل ثم سعي الهلاك خبالاً  
الفساد ويكون في الافعال والابدان والعقول ( لسان العرب )

71 The combination is frequent. See "Tahāfut", p. 121, 4; 260, 3; "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2134, 3; 2157, 5; *ibid.*, IV, 4, p. 2602, 15, 1; "Al-Qustās", p. 55, 6 and other examples below.

72 Al-Ghazzālī preferred the expression 'Tā'ifa' (esp. in "Tahāfut", "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya" and "Al-Munqidh") to denote different groups of people (as in the Qur'ān) and not only the Ṣūfīs, as is common in Ṣūfī literature. (Cf.

Al-Qushayrī, "Risāla", p. 2, 4; 22, 16, or "Qūt-Al-Qulūb" I, 2, p. 32, 5). See also "Tahāfut", Index D, p. 429; "Al-Munqidh", p. 67, 2; 68, 2; 71, 5; 91, 1; 103, 3-2; "Al-Mustasfā", p. 4, 3; 7, 6.

73 This is a technical term for a polemic method of argumentation whereby the question is thrown back to the questioner, instead of an answer being given. Cf. Goldziher, Streitschrift, Introduction, p. 21.

74 Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 84, 8. This parable, as well as the idea behind it, recurs in Al-Ghazzālī's writing. Cf. "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 88, 6 ff; 39, 2 ff. "Al-Maqṣad", p. 76, 4-6; "Qustās", p. 83, 5 ff. Cf. also Ibn Al-Djawzī, "Talbīs Iblīs", p. 87, 3; Ibn Toumert (ed. Luciani, intr. Goldziher), p. 75, n.3 .

75 And not especially 'Hilm' as according to Goldziher (Mohammed. Studien I, p. 219 ff). Cf. "Tahāfut", p. 221, 10-11; 224, 9; 272, 2-3; 313, 8 ff. (not mentioned in the index); 314, 5.

76 Cf. Goldziher, Streitschrift, Introduction p. 19, n. 2. Goldziher mentions only two examples, from the "Tahāfut" and "Al-Munqidh". Yet he adds also Ibn Gharāma's translation of this proverb into Hebrew in Aqedath Jitzchak (Pressburg, 1849), I, p. 6/b, 16.

77 'Al-Darar fī-l-Dīn' is especially frequent in "Faiṣal". See p. 14, 7; 16, 6, 4; 17, 1; 19, 12. Cf. also "Ildjām", p. 14, 4; 19, 3 etc. See also:

وهذا فن من الكلام عظيم ضرره في العوام

‡ (أحياء ١٤١٤، ١٤١٤؛ ٣٤٦٣)

انظر ايضاً : فساد في الدين (ايها الولد ٥٤٧٥)

اضر . . . للدين (ايها الولد ٢٤٥٧)

78 'Djināya' means the same as 'Darar' in a more forceful way. Cf. "Tahāfut", p. 11, 7; "Al-Munqidh", p. 75, 8 ff. "Ihyā" II, 7, p. 918, 2.

79 الكيس - العاقل والكيس خلاف الاحمق (لسان العرب)

clever, ingenious skilful (Lane). The dictionaries usually bring the fifth conjugation where Al-Ghazzālī uses the sixth: he affected actueness or sharpness or quickness of intellect ... or did so not having it; he feigned or made show of ... (Lane).

80 Cf. below, p. 129, 127.

81 الركيك - الضعيف في عقله ، استركه - استضعفه

he esteemed him feeble (Lane)

الغت - الردى من كل شيء (لسان العرب)

82 No doubt therefore Badawi's reading (p. 7, 1, 10) of Streitschrift 2, 14, is much better than Goldziher's version, of which he was not too sure (ibid., n. 2).

Another correction of the same kind should be made in "Mi'rād̄j Al-Sālikīn" attributed to Al-Ghazzālī ("Madjmū'a, Cairo 1924/1343 Hg.) where one should read on p. 75, 6

'Al-Mustarakk' instead of the editor's 'Al-Mushtarak'.

83 Cf. Al-Qushayrī, "Risāla", p. 22, 18, Ruwaym's saying where this word is used in a positive sense (see the same in "Ayyuhā-l-Walad", p. 45, 7-8, quoting Dhū Al-Nūn Al-Miṣrī). Cf. also Ibn Ḥazm, "Kitāb Al-Milal", p. 217, 2 and G.W. Freytag - Arabia Proverbia I, 296 ('Djā'a bi-l-turraha'). See the following explanations: Inepties (des Soufis) - (F. Jabre, Certitude, p. 227); metaphorically applied to false or vain sayings or actions or affairs; unprofitable sayings (Lane); 'Turrahāt-Abātīl' ("Lisān Al-'Arab").

84 'Tāmmāt' - cry or vehement cry that overcomes everything (Lane). Les expressions dont se servent les Soufis dans leur exstase et qui sont fort choquantes pour les vrais croyants (Ghazzālī - "Aiyohā-l-walad" ...) (Dozy). Interpretations erronées de la parole de Dieu; sentences extatiques - (F. Jabre, Certitude, p. 223, 227).

85 The meaning of this verb is to swallow, catch, snatch, etc. It occurs often with 'Taqlīd':

ولست اعني الاعتقاد الذي يتلقفه العامي وراثة او تلقفا

(أحياء ١٤١٤، ١٤١٤؛ ٣٤٦٣)

فان الواقف على الحالة التي نشأ عليها عقيب الولادة الجامد على ما

تلقفه بالتقليد عن الآباء والاجداد . . .

(أحياء ١٤١٤، ١٤١٤؛ ٣٤٦٣ - ٣٤٦٣)

. . . حتى اذا فعل ذلك انكشف له حقيقة الامر في معنى اعتقاده الذي

(أحياء ١٤١٤، ١٤١٤؛ ٣٤٦٣ - ٣٤٦٣)

تلقفه تقليدا



examples 8 and 9 later on) are quoted according to Goldziher's quotation (?) of the "Ihyā" in Der Islam 9.

95 This was quoted above on p. 57. Cf. also "Qūt-Al-Qulūb" I, 2, p. 17, 3 and—

بالاسم والرسم دون الحقيقة (المضنون به ٣٦٥)

The contrast between the reality of a thing and its name occurs also in Al-Ghazzālī's concept of prophecy, which is based on the Neoplatonic idea that only prophets can know what prophecy means. Cf.

واما من لا نبوة له فلا يحرف من النبوة الا اسمها  
(المقصد ١٠٦٢١)

فمن لم يزرق شيئا بالدوق فليس يدرك من حقيقة النبوة الا الاسم  
(المقصد ١٠٣٦١٠٣ — ٣)

انظر ايضا: روضة الطالبين ١٩٤، ٦١٩ الخ

96 In the Ḥadīth for example 'Tadjammul' usually has no negative meaning as yet. See also Ibn Hishām, ed. Wuestenfeld, p. 967, 9. But in Dozy's Suppl. the word already means: Pompe, luxe, aussi curtoisie fainte. Cf. also in Persian, Niẓāmī 'Arūdī, "Djehār Maqālet" (Teheran, 1331 Hg.), p. 36, 6.

97 Cf. N.A. Faris' wrong translation of 'Tadjammul' in one of these examples ("Ihyā" I, 1, p. 110, 9-10), which does away with the logical contrast between following gladly the luxurious way of life of the rulers and following it

only by withholding rebuke in order to seek their favour. See Nabih Amin Faris - The Book of Knowledge, being a translation with notes of the "Kitāb Al-'Ilm" of Al-Ghazzālī's "Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn" (Lahore, 1962), p. 179.

98 In the Maghrib as well. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm's Risāla against Ibn Naghrīla inter alia p. 54, 7; 63, 5.

99 The negligence of the dual is of course typical of Middle Arabic and quite frequent in Al-Ghazzālī's writings.

100 Cf. below pp. 189-192.

101 See *ibid.*, p. 267, 2, 4; 371, 5 (not mentioned in the Index). Bouyges mentions especially 'Min Aina An' - cf. p. 332, 8, according to Index E, p. 441. See also p. 181, 7, 'Fa-Aina Man' as a rhetorical question too.

102 Cf. below p. 208.

103 The loss of time is an autobiographical motif with Al-Ghazzālī. Cf. his regret at having spent time on compiling books of Fiqh. "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 65, 8 ff; 67, 9-10; 69, 3-4 inter alia and see his booklet "Bidāyat-Al-Hidāya", passim. Yet, even this motif may be more of a literary fashion than autobiographical truth. Cf. "Qūt-Al-Qulūb" I, 2, p. 18, 6; 67, 10 ff.

104 See the linguistic play ('Tadjnīs') with the root 'ʿAdjb', here. As for 'Khubāl' cf. n. 70 above.

105 Cf. *ibid.*, the recurrence of this word (l. 8, 11) and

words from the root 'Ḥmq' (l. 3) in the passage.

106 There follows the well-known parable of the blind man who accuses the landlord of disorderliness because he stumbles over utensils. See also "Al-Madnūn 'alā ghair Ahlihi", p. 17, and Bahyā b. Paqūda (ed. Yahuda), p. 95, 18 ff.

107 More frequent are Ṣūfī sayings which appear also as Hadīth sayings such as: 'Ḥasanāt al-Abrār Sayi'āt al-Muqarrabīn'. "Ihyā" I, 3, p. 226, 6; *ibid.*, II, 8, 1159, 5-6; 1189, 9-8; *ibid.*, IV, 4, 2157, 2; 2401, 8. Cf. also below p. 127 and n. 74 above.

108 This sentence appears also in "Ma'āridj Al-Quds" (Cairo, 1927/1346 Hg.), p. 95, in a passage copied fully out from the "Mizān".

109 This meaning seems to be suppressed by the dictionaries. Yet cf. Dozy : Le moyen ou l'occasion de perdre quelqu'un, de le ruiner. (Al-Ghazzālī does not use the combination 'Naṣaba lahu al Ghawā'il' mentioned by Dozy). Cf. also the example from Zuhair in "Lisān Al-'Arab": La Tukhshā Ghawā'iluhu (W. Ahlwardt - Divans, p. 83, no. 7, l. 4).

110 Cf. 'Ghawr kulli Shai' - Qa'ruhu, 'Amquhu wa-Bu'duhu' ("Lisān Al-'Arab"); ... of mystical language: 'depth', 'profundity' ("Kitāb Al-Luma'" ed. R.A. Nicholson, Glossary, p. 146); profondeur, impénétrabilité (Dozy).

111 Cf. e.g., "Al-Munqidh", p. 74, 5; 75, 7, 11; 81, 8, 7, 6; 122, 5 ff.

112 Cf. above, n. 22. 'Ghadr' at the end of the sentence has to be corrected to 'Ghawr' (see the editors' note with regard to other mss.). Cf. also "Al-Munqidh", p. 84, 9, and n. 3, *ibid.*

113 This root is used in a negative sense with Al-Ghazzālī as with other authors. See "Faiṣal", p. 21, 5, "Al-Munqidh", p. 86, 4-5.

114 See for example Al-Ḥakīm Al-Tirmidhī - "Bayān Al-Farq baina-l-Ṣadr wa-l-Qalb wa-l-Fu'ād wa-l-Lubb", ed. by N. Heer (Cairo, 1958), p. 50, 5.

115 'Wa-l-Talbīs ka-l-Tadlīs wa-l-Takhlīt' ("Lisān Al-'Arab"). 'Talbīs' and 'Tadlīs' are sometimes interchanged. See Bouges, Essai, p. 69, n. 4. Cf. also Streitschrift, p. 6, text no. 5: 'Ḥīlat al-Tadlīs'. See also: 'Labbasa' - involving a thing in confusion or doubt (Lane); Tromper, falsifier, altérer (Dozy); 'Talbīs' - imposter (Dozy); 'Mulabbis' - imposteur (Dozy) (according to "Lisān Al-'Arab" one should use 'Labbās' instead of 'Mullabis').

116 See Prockelmann, GAL I, 504 (38); GALS I, 918.

117 Al-Ghazzālī too borrowed the names of some of his legal studies from the names of Al-Wāḥidī's Qur'ān commentaries (cf. "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 67 and GAL I, p. 411) but was taken to task for it (Bouyges, Essai, p. 11). The name of

Ibn Al-Djawzī's book was also copied (and misunderstood). See Bouyges, *ibid.*, p. 69, n. 4, GAL I, pp. 451-452.

118 See, e.g., Al-Subkī, "Tabaqāt" IV, p. 116, 10; Al-'Aidarūs, "Ta'rīf-Al-Ihyā", p. 17, 2; Murtadā Al-Zabīdī I, p. 41, 14. Cf. also Bouyges, *ibid.*, p. 69.

119 Cf. *ibid.* in addition to the following quotation, also: p. 66, 6 (not mentioned in the index); 96, 2, 7; 191, 2; 208, 5; 308, 7-8 ('Mawdi' Talbīs wa-Mawdi'-l-Iltibās'); 343, 11 (not mentioned in the index). Cf. also the verb in the second conjugation, *ibid.*, p. 102, 13; in the eighth conjugation, *ibid.*, p. 10, 10. See also "Mīzān", p. 65, 3; "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2159, 11, "Al-Qustās", p. 70, 5.

120 Al-Ghazzālī liked this expression, as he liked all those that were connected with illness and medicine (Cf. below n. 135). Cf. "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya", ed. Badawi, p. 35, 6; "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 69, 1; 79, 2; *ibid.*, I, 4, p. 296, 4; *ibid.*, IV, 1, p. 2160, 3; "Al-Arba'īn", p. 223, 3.

121 Cf. 'Iltabasa 'alaihī al-Amr-Ikhtalata wa-ishtabaha' ("Lisān Al-'Arab"); to become entangled, confounded or confused (Lane); être obscur, douteux (Dozy).

122 Cf. below pp. 181, 186 and "Al-Iqtisād", p. 11, 5-6, "Ihyā" I, 4, p. 288, 5, and also Streitschrift, p. 6, 5. (Badawi's edition, p. 27, 5).

123 See Muh. Studien II, p. 373, n. 2, and cf. with "He

(God) drew him near to punishment little by little" (Lane); 'Istadrāju-khada ahu' ("Al-Bustān").

124 Arab ed. by M. Badr Al-Din, 1323 Hg., p. 182. See A.J. Wensinck - The Muslim Creed (Cambridge, 1932), Ch. VIII.

125 Cf. also H. Ritter - Das Meer der Seele (Leiden, 1955), p. 71, 138, 271 ff.

126 A book named "Kitāb Al-Istidrādj" (also "Risālat-Al-Istidrādj") is attributed to Al-Ghazzālī (see Bouyges, Essai, p. 85, and n. 2 *ibid.*, and Brockelmann, GALS I, p. 752, no. 47a). However, it is very doubtful if he ever wrote such a book. In no bibliographical list of his books is this work mentioned.

127 See also "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya", Badawi's edition, p. 19, 9, 13; 23, 2; 36, 8.

128 This verb is frequent in Al-Ghazzālī's writings. See, e.g., "Al-Iqtisād", p. 7, 12, 7, 2 ('Al-'Ulamā Al-Mutalaṭṭifūn'), "Ihyā", Introduction, p. 5, 4, 2, 1; *ibid.*, IV, 1, p. 2138, 31 ff (4 times) and with regard to the prophets' activity, *ibid.*, p. 2145, 2; "Al-Munqidh", p. 121, 2.

129 Cf. also J. Obermann, Der Philosophische u. Religioese Subjektivismus Ghazālīs (Wien, 1921), p. 25 ff (although his distinction between 'Aql' and 'Qalb' seems to be mistaken). Al-Ghazzālī actually expressed in this case 'modern' twentieth century ideas!



130 Cf. f.i. "Ihyā" I, 2, pp. 199-20, where sentences expressing this idea recur:

لانه في العقل ممكن (٤٠١٩٩ - ٤)؛ وهو ممكن (٨٠٢٠٠)؛  
وهذا ممكن (٣٠٢٠١)؛ فيجب اجراءه على الظاهر ان لا استحالة فيه  
(٨ - ٧٠٢٠١)

131 Cf. e.g., the exegesis of the Ḥadīth "The Angels will not enter a house wherein there is a dog" in "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 82, 2 ff. "Mishkāṭ", p. 49, 2 ff.; "Al-Imlā", p. 3055, 8 ff. See also Goldziher, Koranauslegung, pp. 199-207. But Goldziher gives only half of the relevant material from the "Mishkāṭ", or quotes books which do not seem to be authentic. Therefore the picture he draws here of Al-Ghazzālī's theology is not very convincing. See also below Ch. V.

132 Cf. "Al-Munqidh", p. 106 ff.; 177 ff.; 119, 5-7 and Ch. V below.

133 See "Tahāfut", p. 127, 10; 220, 4; 275, 1; 322, 8; 325, 1, 9; 371, 6 (the last four examples do not appear in the index). See also *ibid.*, p. 12, 4.

134 Cf. "Al-Munqidh", p. 87, 3:

كلماتهم المستحدثة التي ولدتها خواطر اهل العصر

135 This is an idea frequently found in Al-Ghazzālī's writings. Cf. "Al-Munqidh", pp. 110-111. He liked to use parables and metaphors taken from the world of medicine, but this was very common in all mediaeval Arab literature (see n. 120 above). The ideas concerning 'maladies' of the heart and their medicines are one of the linguistic

signs of Hellenistic heritage in Jewish, Christian and Muslim mediaeval Arabic literature. Cf. below Ch. IV, n. 73.

136 Cf. e.g., especially J. Obermann, *ibid.*, 'Die Lehre von der Dunja', pp. 128-142, and his whole book *passim*.

137 See: لان الذي يبغض شيئاً فهو مشغول به كالذي يحبه  
(الاربعين ٤٠٢٤٠)

فان من ترك الدنيا وظن انه ترك شيئاً فقد عظم الدنيا  
(الاربعين ٤١٢٤١)

138 Cf. "Ihyā" II, 7, p. 1768 ff., *ibid.* IV, 4, p. 2417 ff.; "Al-Arba'īn", p. 147, 4 ff. and below Ch. VI.

139 'Fi-ḥaqq' - à l'égard de, envers (Dozy), 'subjectively' (A.J. Wensinck, Cosmology and Mysticism, p. 22); 'bi-l-idāfa ilā' - in comparison with 'in relation to' (Lane).

140 The subject of discussion is the method of acquiring truth, whether by intellectual investigation or through prophetic experience. Al-Ghazzālī explains that both ways are possible, though different, and illustrates his opinion by means of the parable about the Chinese and Byzantine painters, which later became famous through the Persian poet Nizāmī. Cf. "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1376 ff., and p. 1382.

141 Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 248, 4; 249, 3-4. (The index has only one example on p. 54, 10). See also p. 39, 1; p. 40, 10.

142 'Madjāz-Haqīqa' are two important, and very frequent, Platonic contrasts in Al-Ghazzālī's writings. Cf. Appendix C, and "Tahāfut", p. 100, 5; "Mishkāṭ", p. 36, 10-11; 40, 1. See also "Ihyā" IV, 4, p. 2401, 14; *ibid.* IV, 6, p. 2592, 1; 2602, 9-10 and N. Keddie - "Symbol and Sincerity in Islam", *Studia Islamica* XIX, 1963, p. 55, n. 1.

143 See many other examples, e.g.: "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2143, 5; 2156, 10, 11; 2157, 13, 9, 3; *ibid.* IV, 5, p. 2496, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 4; *ibid.* IV, 6, p. 2610, 8; 2611, 2-1; 2620 seven times! "Al-Maqṣad", p. 14, 1; 17, 8; 52, 3, 4, 5; 55, 5, 8; 65, 5, 7, 11, 10, 4; 66, 2; 71, 5; 78, 3, 5, 7; 82, 5; "Al-Munqidh", p. 102, 1-2; "Ildjām", p. 6, 4-3; 7, 9, 7, 6, 5, 4; and at the end of the sentence, "Mizān" p. 13, 8; "Al-Maqṣad", p. 64, 4.

144 Although this expression is quite frequent in the "Tahāfut" it does not appear in the index. See p. 166, 4; 238, 7; 246, 5, 9-10 et al. Cf. also "Al-Maqṣad", p. 30, 7; 38, 11; 50, 8; 51, 8; 70, 8 etc. and "Maqāsid", p. 224, 13; 299, 9 etc.

145 Al-Ghazzālī likes to mention these together with popular religious storytellers ('Qusās') who were looked upon with real contempt by the official theologians. Cf. "Mizān", p. 17, 3; 63, 4 ff; "Ihyā", Introduction, p. 2, 3; *ibid.* I, 1, p. 23, 9; 58, 3 ff; 134, 6 ff; *ibid.* II, 9, p. 1246, 1 ff; *ibid.* IV, 1, p. 2102, 1; 2169, 7 ff. See also "Ayyuha-l-Walad", p. 51, 10 ff.

146 See above many examples such as: 'Ghāyat Al-Mustab'ad, Ghāyat Al-Djahl, Ghāyat Al-Humq, Ghāyat Al-Rakāka'. The word is also frequent in "Tahāfut" et al., not in the context of exaggeration. See several examples of both kinds in Index D, p. 432, *ibid.* The word also seems to be a favorite of Arab authors who used it especially in names of books (Cf. GALS III, index, pp. 881-883). Cf. also Bouyges, Essai, p. 117 (17); 133 (215); 165 (345).

147 Cf. Bouyges, Essai, pp. 17-18, no. 171, and *ibid.*, p. 115, no. 163; 161, no. 310.

148 It is in this way that one must understand "Ihyā" I, 4, p. 305, 1 (cf. "Al-Munqidh", p. 103).

149 Cf. "Al-Bustān":

جری فلان مجری فلان - ای کان حاله کحالہ ( البستان )

150 For instance "Mizān", p. 77, 3 ff; "Munqidh", pp. 110-111: کما ان . . . فکذلک  
or "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2159, 7, 12, 16, 3: ووزانه من . . .

151 These are the Bāṭinī's words. But Al-Ghazzālī also said:

وایک ان تقصر بتصدیقک علی ما یدرکه البصر والحواس فقط فتکون حمارا  
برجلین ( احیاء ٤٤٤، ٢١٢٣، ٢٦ - ٢٧ )

152 The first parable also appears in "Mizān". Cf. below, p. 173. See other examples *ibid.*, p. 33, 2, 1; 94, 3-4; "Maqāsid", p. 31, 7; "Mihakk", p. 92, 4-5;

"Ihyā" I, 1, p. 29, 5; *ibid.* IV, 1, p. 2093, 7 et alia.  
Cf. also "Al-Madnūn Bihi 'Alā Ghairi Ahlihi", p. 13, 3.

153 At the beginning of a sentence. See e.g.: "Tahāfut", p. 23, 8 (not in the index); 89, 8; "Mizān", p. 3, 10; 30, 7; 33, 3; 65, 1, 7; 92, 6; 97, 6; "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 69, 9; 80, 4; *ibid.* IV, 1, p. 2159, 2; "Al-Arba'īn", p. 244, 7; "Al-Munqidh", p. 101, 3; 103, 2. For use in the middle of a sentence (less frequent) see: "Tahāfut", p. 22, 4 (not in the index); "Mizān", p. 93, 6, 8; "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 75, 4; "Faiṣal", p. 12, 2; "Al-Munqidh", p. 121, 3. Cf. also 'bi-l-djumlati' - en général, généralement, enfin (Dozy).

154 Cf. G. Bergstraesser, Hunain ibn Ishāq u.s. Schule (Brill, 1913), p. 68, 2. He mentions 'bi-l-djumlati' and 'fī-l-djumlati' (not to be found in Al-Ghazzālī's writings) but does not mention 'alā al-djumlati'.

155 See the correction in MS. E to 'bi-l-djumlati'. This is the only example in Bouyges' index. Cf. also "Tahāfut", p. 281, 2-3 and "Mi'yār", p. 182, 4.

156 It is used in the same way by other author too. Cf. Al-Baghādādī's "Al-Farq baina-l-Firaq", Ch. I, as opposed to the later 'tafṣīl'. See also this contradistinction in "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 534, 5; "Mizān", p. 74, 5-6 (Djumlatan-tafṣīlan); *ibid.*, p. 70, 10. See also "Mustazhiri", p. 17, 3.

157 Streitschrift, Introduction, p. 43, n. 2, or

"Ildjām, p. 11, 6; 29, 7. Cf. also "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya", ed. Badawi, p. 43, 9; 52, 14; "Ihyā" I, 2, p. 179, 4, 6, 11; II, 5, p. 975, 3.

158 Yet cf.:

الخطب - الشأن او الامر صغرا وكبر (لسان العرب)

159 Cf. اجتر - جعل نفسه خطرا لقرنه فبارزه (القاموس)  
اجتر المريض - دخل في الخطر وهو مخطر (البيستان)

160 Cf. above, n. 122.

161 Cf. A.M. Goichon - Lexique de la Langue Philos, pp. 121-125.

162 Cf. "Tahafūt", Index C, p. 388, no. 6. *Ibid.*, p. 227, 6; 300, 14; 313, 4; 334, 3; "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 145, 9; "Al-Munqidh", p. 106, 6, 8; see also "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1365, 7: 'Idrāk-al-Ḥaqq'.

163 This short passage may be considered as typical "Ghazzālīan style". At least four words used in this sentence are mentioned in this chapter in detail.

164 See the same also in books attributed to Al-Ghazzālī, e.g. "Rawḍat Al-Tālibīn", p. 152, 2, or "Sirr Al-'Ālamain" (Bombay, 1912), p. 134. This saying was wide-spread in all mediaeval literatures indebted to Greek philosophy. See G. Vajda, Isaac Al-Balag (Paris, 1940), p. 127, n. 5 and cf. Al-Rāghib Al-Iṣfahānī, "Tafṣīl Al-Nash'atain", p. 14, 8 (as a saying by 'Ali) or Al-Hudjwīrī, "Kashf Al-Mahdjūb"

(Leningrad, 1926), p. 21, 22 (as part of an anonymous short poem). R.A. Nicholson translated it thus (Hudjwīrī, "Kashf-Al-Mahdjūb", p. 18): 'True perception is to despair of attaining perception'. See also Ibn Khaldūn, "Muqaddima", ed. Quatremère III, p. 31, 7. (F. Rosenthal's translation III, p. 39). Cf. also I. Goldziher - Das Buch vom Wesen der Seele, pp. 12-13; Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, I, Ch. 59 (Munk ed. I, p. 73, 16-19). See also, Abraham Gabison, "'Omer Hashikhha" (Hebrew commentary to the Proverbs by a sixteenth century Jewish scholar of Tlemcen, printed Livorno, 1748), p. 110, column a, l. 15-17. "And monotheistic sages of Arabia say ..." ff. This scholar knew Al-Ghazzālī and his work, although he attributed to him falsely books of other authors too, e.g. Al-Bataljausī's "Al-Hadā'iq". (See *ibid.*, p. 138, column a, l. 3 ff) and cf. D. Kaufmann, Die Spuren Al-Bataljausī's in der jued. Religions-Philosophie, p. 63, p. 9, n. 4; J. Pedersen, "Ein Gedicht al-Gazālī's", Monde Oriental 25, 1931, pp. 230-249. Of course there is no need to suppose that such a wide-spread saying came to be known to A. Gabison through Al-Ghazzālī's work.

165 دلى فلان بغيره - اوقعه فيما اراد من تخيره وهو من ادلاء الدلو  
ودلى الشيء في مهواة - ارسله فيها ، وتدلى - نزل ، واسترسل ، تعلق  
(البستان)

166 Cf. above p. 139.

167 'Hafwa'- meaning fault, slip, error - seldom appears in Al-Ghazzālī's writings. Yet see "Ihya" I, 1, p. 78, 11;

86, 4; "Djawāhir", p. 46, 2. It may be mentioned that by way of linguistic association it appears three times on the last page of "Al-Munqidh" (p. 122, 2, 10, 15), yet nowhere else in that book. As for 'Kabwa', see Streitschrift, p. 14, 1 ('Kabwat-Al-Djāhil').

168 See - 'He found a way to' (Lane); generally very frequent. See more examples (especially with words meaning doubt); "Tahafūt", p. 145, 12; "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 53, 11; 62, 1; 149, 11, 7; *ibid.* IV, 4, p. 2120, 3; IV, 6, p. 2602, 8; "Al-Mustasfā", p. 335, 1; and many other examples. See also 'Taṭarraqa li' in "Mīzān", p. 13, 1 and without any proposition meaning 'using the method of' - "Tahāfut", p. 78, 2. (Yet cf. also the variants there).

169 See also other combinations such as:

(تهافت ١٧٤٤) طريق التضمن واللزم

(ميزان ٦٨١) فطريقك ان

170 طمع في غير مطمع - اذا امل ما يبعد حصوله (البستان)

He coveted a thing not to be coveted, he hoped for a thing the attainment of which was remote or improbable (Lane).

Cf. also: Si vous voyez quelque chance de succès (Dozy) -

ان رأيت لك في الذي تريد مطمعا .

171 See there end of quotation:

ان الوقوف على فساد المذهب قبل الاحاطة بمداركه محال بل هورمي في  
العماية والضلال

and cf. "Al-Munqidh", p. 69, 6-5;

فعلمت ان رد المذهب قبل فهمه . . . رمي في عماية

172 Thus according to Arab lexicography:

هذا امر لا طائل فيه - اذا لم يكن فيه غناء او مزية ...  
لا يتكلم به الا في الجحد ( لسان العرب )

Yet Dozy mentions also a quite wide-spread use of the positive meaning;

الفضل والغنى والسعة والقدرة ( البستان )

profit, benefit (Lane). Yet cf. *ibid.*: One says of that which is vile or contemptible (Lane). See also 'Hawl' - étonner, surprendre par ... (Dozy); 'Hā'il' - terrible, étrange (Dozy).

173 Cf. e.g. Ahlwardt - *Divans*, p. 5, no. 4, l. 1, and see  
مظنة الشيء - موضعه وألفه الذي يظن كونه فيه ( البستان )  
Cf. also "Ihyā" IV, 5, p. 2510, 4; *ibid.* IV, 6, p. 2585,  
5; 2595, 13-14.

174 عزله - نحاه جانبا، عزل - نحاه عنه ( البستان )

175 See his: "Authenticity of Works Attributed to Al-Ghazzali", *JRAS*, 1952, especially pp. 26-28 and cf. below p. 298.

176 See, e.g., "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 140 ff; *ibid.* III, 1, p. 1349 ff.

177 'Mahwāt' + ravine as opposed to 'Mirqāt' see "Miḥakk", p. 4, 2. The quotation is not mentioned in the index of "Tahāfut". Cf. also Al-Qushayrī, "Risāla", p. 3, 6.

178 See 'he aided his people or party against hostile conduct, or, he was angry or zealous for the sake of his party and defended them' (Lane).

179 Cf. Appendix B below.

180 'Madhhab' with Al-Ghazzālī does not always mean the official schools of law in Islam. In other contexts he calls 'Madhhab' several ideological trends or different traditions. Cf. e.g., "Tahāfut", p. 13, 13-14.

181 See "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 42 ff. on what Al-Ghazzālī has to say about the founders of the schools of law. Cf. "Al-Qustās", p. 91, 5ff, and "Al-Munqidh", p. 89, 4 ff., on the necessity for judicious reasoning.

182 'Hawā' - is used frequently in Ṣūfī literature to designate passion, willfulness. The word has acquired a definitely negative meaning and under Qur'anic influence (see, e.g., Sura 23, 71) has come to mean even the opposite of the truth: 'Al-Hawā did Al-Haqq' ("Qūt Al-Qulūb" II, 3, p. 78, 7). Cf. also J. van Ess, *Al-Hārit Al-Muhāsibī*, pp. 36-37. Al-Ghazzālī uses it as parallel to 'Shahwa' (Cf. also Al-Muhāsibī, "Kitāb Al-Ri'āya", p. 37 ff):

بل هو معتقد احمق بطلال غلبت عليه شهوته ... فلم يقدر على قمع هواه  
( ميزان ٦٦٩ - ٧ )

وقد ذكرنا ان طريق المجاهدة مضادة للشهوات ومخالفة الهوى

( احياء ٦٣٥ ب ٤١٤٨٣٥ - ٥ )

In the plural it appears together with Bida': اهل البدع

والاهواء ( تهافت ١٥٥ )؛ الاهواء والبدع ( الجام ٥٦٢٨ )

Cf. also the entries in dictionaries:

فلان من اهل الاهواء اى ممن زاع عن المنهج القويم ويسمى اهل الاهواء  
باهل البدع ( البستان )؛ اهواء = بدع -

Hérésies (Dozy). Al-Ghazzālī joins this word also

with 'Ra'y' meaning autonomous reasoning, judgement. In this case 'Ra'y' acquires a negative meaning too and stands for tendentious reasoning, for judgement which does not look for truth itself but tries to satisfy a passion or serve a purpose. Cf. "Tahāfut", p. 8, 6, or "Ihyā" I, 8, p. 527, 11 ff. (on Qur'anic exegesis):

وإما النهي فانه ينزل على احد وجهين احدهما ان يكون له في الشيء  
رأى واليه ميل من طبعه وهواه فيتأول القرآن على وفق رأيه وهواه ليحتج  
على تصحيح غرضه

All this notwithstanding the fact that Al-Ghazzālī usually demands free reasoning ('Ra'y') from everybody else (e.g. in his *Streitschrift*, "Al-Qustās" and "Al-Munqidh") and puts it as a positive opposite to the authoritative 'Ta'līm' of the Bāṭiniyya and others.

Following the Qur'an, Sura 45, 23 Al-Ghazzālī too sees latent polytheism in man's following his passions:  
ولا سبيل في تهذيب الاخلاق الا بمراعاة قانون الشرع في العمل حتى لا  
يتبع الانسان هواه فيكون قد اتخذ الهه هواه (تهافت ١٦٣٥٣ - ٣)

فكل من اتبع الهوى فهو عبد الهوى لا عبد الله ولذلك سلط الله عليه  
الشیطان وقال تعالى: "افرايت من اتخذ الهه هواه" وهو اشارة الى  
ان من الهوى الهه ومعبوده فهو عبد الهوى لا عبد الله  
(احياء ١٦٣، أ١٦٣، ٣٩٣، ٤١٤ الخ)

As in all Sūfī literature he puts 'Mutāba'at-al-Hawā' (e.g. "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1397, 6) as opposed to 'Mudjāhadat-al-Hawā' (e.g. "Mīzān", p. 62, 1, 3) or 'Mukhālafat al-Hawā' (e.g. "Ihyā" III, 2, p. 1483, 5).

183 Cf. "Al-Munqidh", pp. 66-67. 'Al-Dhabb 'an' together

with 'Al-Nidāl' is especially frequent with regard to the theologians. Cf., i.a., "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 71, 8; "Al-Munqidh", p. 67, 2-3. See also Badawī's correction to *Streitschrift*, p. 40, 23, in his edition of "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya", p. 144, 9. See also "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 68, 12 ff.

184 The idea that Al-Ghazzālī wrote without any negative tendencies already appeared in "Tahāfut", p. 13, 14; 78, 2.

185 See: 'Ta'ana fī; 'ābahu wa-tanaqqāṣahu' ("Al-Bustān") and cf. "Tahāfut", p. 15, 5-6; 190, 6; "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 32, 8, 10; *ibid.*, II, 10, p. 1344, 1 *ibid.*, IV, 1, p. 2119, 8; 2135, 6; 2171, 12; *ibid.*, IV, 6, p. 2681, 10; "Al-Maqṣad", p. 64, 5 ff.

186 Les pensées qui passent l'esprit de l'interprète (Dozy) - "sich in die Seele einbohren". See also "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya" ed. Badawī, p. 25, 4; 26, 6.

187 Cf. "Al-Munqidh", p. 61, 7, 13.

188 A very interesting negative use of a word generally used with regard to perfumes! Cf. also "Al-Munqidh", p. 93, 6.

189 See above, n. 171.

190 'Rasam' - see above, p. 105 ff. 'Ta'abbada bi'. Cf. also "Ihyā" I, 3, p. 222, 4: 'Djabr' - here used to denote (following the Ḥadīth) the replacing of a bad deed done by a good one. Cf. 'Djabr nuqṣān al-farā'id bi-l-nawāfil' ("Ihyā" I,

4, p. 209, 4̄ and see also *ibid.*, IV, 1, p. 2138, 1-2).

191 Probably a printing error for 'bi-'ilmihā' as the usual combination is: 'Takaffala bi-'ilm wa-taqallada bi-'amal' (see "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 41, 6).

192 This idiom, taken from Sura 9, 109, appears also elsewhere. Cf. "Ihyā" III, 4, p. 1542, 4̄ ff.

193 This aspect is usually not stressed explicitly in the dictionaries. Cf. also Dozy: 'Waqf' - s'emploi dans les sense de 'Mawqūf' ('Tasmiya bi-l-maṣdar').

## CHAPTER III

Philosophical Terms as a Criterion of Authenticity  
in the Writings of Al-Ghazzālī

A very simple linguistic fact brought me to a closer scrutiny of Al-Ghazzālī's use of philosophical terms. That fact is: the common mediaeval philosophical terms (mostly neo-Platonic, but to a certain extent also Aristotelian), such as 'Uqūl, 'Aql kullī, Nafs kulliyya, 'Aql fa'āl, 'Aql hayūlānī, Mādā etc. are entirely absent from those books by Al-Ghazzālī which scholars have accepted as authentic books written by him. Only in those of his books which deal with the description or refutation of philosophical doctrines, such as his "Maqāsid", "Tahāfut", "Mihakk Al-Nazar", "Mi'yār Al-'ilm" and to a lesser degree also "Mīzān Al-'Amal"<sup>1</sup>, does this terminology appear; it proves the well-known fact that Al-Ghazzālī was well versed in philosophical doctrines and knew their technical terminology better perhaps than any Muslim theologian before him. Yet here is a most astonishing linguistic fact that in a large number of his books including his major works, there is nowhere any use of a single philosophical term, even when Al-Ghazzālī deals with typical metaphysical subjects and not in the usual orthodox way. These books include, among others, the "Mustazhiri" ("Kitāb Faḍāḥ Al-Bāṭiniyya"), "Kitāb Al-Iqtisād", the "Ihyā", "Al-Maqṣad Al-Asnā", "Bidāyat Al-Hidāya", "Djawāhir Al-Qur'an", "Kitāb Al Arba'in", "Al-Qustās Al-Mustaqīm", "Faiṣal Al-Tafriqa", "Mishkāt Al-Anwār", "Al-Munqidh min Al-Dalāl", "Kitāb Al-

Imlā" and "Ildjām Al-'Awāmm". All the books mentioned here in their assumed chronological order, from the end of Al-Ghazzālī's stay in Baghdad and until his death, are unanimously accepted as authentic books by Al-Ghazzālī. Only with regard to parts of the "Ihyā" and the last part of "Mishkāt Al-Anwār" have doubts been raised<sup>2</sup>. Nevertheless there can be little doubt that the above list represents at the least a very important part of Al-Ghazzālī's authentic books, written mainly during his decisive Ṣūfī period. This list contains different kinds of books, a fact which is of especial importance, as the absence of philosophical terms in the Ṣūfī books only would have been a much less extraordinary phenomenon. This list may be supplemented by a number of other books by Al-Ghazzālī, which do not contain any traces of the common philosophical terminology either. But, on account of their specific linguistic characteristics (books dealing with Fiqh, short epistles, books written in Persian etc.) I have avoided doing so.

It should be remarked here that though I deal mainly with philosophical terms concerned with metaphysics, the same holds true for other philosophical disciplines, such as logic. It is a well-known fact that Al-Ghazzālī tried to promulgate this science, as well as mathematics and other sciences, among the masses and fought the prejudice of the theologians against these sciences. He even considered this prejudice to be a sin that endangers and weakens religion unnecessarily<sup>3</sup>. There is no doubt that Al-Ghazzālī was fascinated by the science of logic and therefore dealt with it in many of his books. In fact the

radical change which occurred in the Ash'arite theology, with the formal admittance of logic into its sphere, is to a certain extent due to Al-Ghazzālī's influence<sup>4</sup>. Yet while he still used the commonly accepted terminology of this science in his early books like the "Mi'yār" and the "Miḥakk", he seems to discard it completely from the "Iqtisād" on, and up to the "Mustasfā" which must have been written towards the end of his life. Especially illuminating in this respect is the "Qustās". It deals with the most basic problems of logic, yet nowhere in this book is any technical term used. Even more so, Al-Ghazzālī explains his methods in a very explicit way in this book: due to the reader's simple mind and due to his susceptibility to external things Al-Ghazzālī will 'descend' to him and talk to him in the manner of physician who administers a potion in a water jug without telling his patient that it is medicine ("Qustās", p. 59 ff).

On the other hand we find a large number of books attributed to Al-Ghazzālī, the authenticity of each of which has been contested by various scholars on different grounds, regardless of the terminology and usually regardless also of the language and style. In all of these books there appears the widespread mediaeval philosophical terminology, used whenever metaphysical subjects are dealt with. These are, for instance, "Al-Risāla Al-Laduniyya", "Al-Madnūn Al-Ṣaghīr", "Ma'āridj Al-Quds", "Mi'rādj Al-Sālikīn", "Al-Ma'ārif Al-'Aqliyya"<sup>5</sup> and the book which is preserved in its Hebrew translation only, Abu Hamid's answer on questions he was asked, ed. with a reconstruction of the Arabic text,



by H. Malter (Berlin, 1894; Frankfurt, 1896). One may also add to this list other books which contain the same terminology but in a less conspicuous and less professional way, such as "Raudat Al-Ṭālibīn", "Al-Madnūn bihi 'alā ghair Ahlih!" (or "Al-Madnūn Al-Kabīr"), and others<sup>6</sup>.

Now with regard to all of these books it is very difficult to maintain that Al-Ghazzālī did use in them the accepted terminology because in them he expounded his philosophical esoteric ideas. The books are really not of the same kind and not one of them has attained a suitable standard and sufficient depth<sup>7</sup> for a book purporting to contain the esoteric ideas of a man who wrote then, allegedly for the masses, such books as the "Ihyā", "Al-Maqṣad", "Djawāhir", and "Mishkāt". On the contrary, it can be shown (and with regard to some of those books various scholars have done so) that most of these books are nothing but compilation of passages, copied out from both Al-Ghazzālī's authentic books as well as from the writings of great philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā and others<sup>8</sup>. In fact much more esoteric ideas of Al-Ghazzālī are expressed or hinted at in his books, accepted as authentic, including the "Ihyā" itself<sup>9</sup>, yet without the use of any technical terms.

It may of course be argued that all these books are authentic and were written by Al-Ghazzālī at an early stage of his career, perhaps before the "Maqāṣid". Yet, even if this far-fetched idea is accepted, it would not contradict my main contention in any essential way, since the books would therefore be of no consequence to the study of Al-

Ghazzālī's thought which developed from the composition of the "Tahāfut" until the day of his death. The books would then have only biographical value. Furthermore, this argument is invalid with regard to some of these books, such as "Al-Risāla Al-Laduniyya" and "Raudat Al-Ṭālibīn", since they contain pronounced Ṣūfī elements.

To this we must add the fact of various repetitions of Al-Ghazzālī's statement in his books that he is interested in the content, the ideas ('Ma'anī'), rather than in the correct expressions ('Alfāz') of his writings<sup>10</sup>, and he seems to include technical terminology ('Iṣṭilāh') among the latter. Already in his introduction to the "Tahāfut" he mentions that he will use in this book technical terminology only to address his philosophical opponents in order to impress them with his own mastery of, and familiarity with, their subject. Later on, however, he developed a certain contempt for accurate terminology, maintaining that fastidiousness of expression distracts the reader's attention from the intrinsic, real meaning ('Ḥaqā'iq') of the content. This professed contempt of form may, of course, be easily misconstrued as apologetics for Al-Ghazzālī's own inconsistent and inaccurate language<sup>11</sup>, yet I believe there is much more to it than plain apologetics. Al-Ghazzālī maintains that a multitude of diverse expressions tends to mislead people and prevents them from grasping the truth, while plain and lucid language facilitates understanding. Words to this effect appear in many of Al-Ghazzālī's books, beginning towards the end of his Baghdad period and increasing with the passage of years. They are expressed in

the same language, with repetitions of the same expressions of wonder, the same examples and generalizations<sup>12</sup>. Thus, while discussing in the "Mishkāt" such terms as Intelligence, Soul and Inner Eye, Al-Ghazzālī asks his reader to forget any terminology (and in fact discards not only philosophical terms but in this case the Sūfī ones as well) which tends to confuse the issue. He announces that he will use the common language only: "Know then that there is in the mind of man an eye ... which is variously called Intelligence, Spirit, Human Soul. But we pass over these terms, for the multiplicity of terms deludes the man of small intelligence into imagining a corresponding multiplicity of ideas. We mean simply that by which the rational man is distinguished from the infant in arms, from the brute beast and from the lunatic. Following the current terminology let us call it 'the Intelligence'."<sup>13</sup>

We may as well assume that by choosing this non-technical language Al-Ghazzālī hoped not only to avoid misconceptions but also to extend the range of his public, to include readers from all walks of life, even those who were quick to cast a suspicion of heresy on users of philosophical terms, as well as those who could not understand them.

It seems to me therefore that those books attributed to Al-Ghazzālī in which the philosophical terminology appears should be considered as not having been written by him. It may well be that this linguistic approach leaves less room for doubt than any other approach to the matter. While Al-Ghazzālī could always have been expressing new ideas, contradicting those he had outlined before (and even his

accepted authentic books abound in contradictions and changes of opinion), it seems hardly conceivable that Al-Ghazzālī would change his linguistic habits entirely while dealing with the same religious issues as before, even if he did express new and contradictory ideas. As a matter of fact, stylistic research has shown that there is a surprising consistency throughout Al-Ghazzālī's language, which is a most interesting phenomenon, not only when considering the author, but also from the point of view of research into language as such. Thus it may be said that, contrary to the usually accepted opinion, profound changes in the life or thought of a man do not necessarily leave their mark on the language of that man<sup>14</sup>.

However, extreme scholarly caution is called for too. In no case should a stylistic or linguistic feature be the sole criterion in determining the authorship of a book - even more so in Al-Ghazzālī's case, where his ambivalent and changing attitude towards all fields of philosophy during his lifetime should be the subject of still more special studies and research. I would, therefore, for the moment, express my conclusion as follows:

Whenever the common philosophical terminology is found in one of Al-Ghazzālī's books, the authenticity of which has already been doubted and contested, that book should be considered as spurious.

This conclusion will necessarily give rise to two main problems. The first and more important one can only be hinted at here: since the major part of research on Al-Ghazzālī has hitherto been based to a large extent on the

above-named suspect books (especially on "Al-Risāla Al-Laduniyya", "Ma'aridj Al-Quds" and both "Al-Madnūn") and has treated Al-Ghazzālī's doctrines on this basis, our conclusion will entail a totally new approach to the research of Al-Ghazzālī's personality and doctrine. This will be especially important with reference to the recurring doubt regarding his sincerity and his alleged philosophical teachings since the ideas which are particularly alien to those expressed in Al-Ghazzālī's authentic books appear in those books which also make use of the common philosophical terminology<sup>15</sup>.

The second problem will be the one dealing with this vast pseudo-Ghazzālian literature, which must have emerged very close to Al-Ghazzālī's death (1111/505 Hg) as Ibn Tufayl, the famous Western philosopher (d. 1185/581 Hg.),<sup>16</sup> already mentions some of these books as well as some of the authentic books of Al-Ghazzālī's in his "Ḥayy Ben Yaqdhān". We all know about the widespread practice in the Middle Ages of attributing one's book to a famous author in order to ensure its survival. Sometimes this was also done in order to discredit a famous author (as Goldziher and others have shown with regard to different writers). Macdonald, following Goldziher, supposes that this may have been done to Al-Ghazzālī too in one or two cases<sup>17</sup>. But here we are dealing with many different books attributed to Al-Ghazzālī and it is hardly conceivable that all these authors (who must have been different persons as shown by the contents of the books as well as by the evidence of their language) tried to expose Al-Ghazzālī as suspect of philosophical

heresy. On the contrary, the authors themselves were admirers of philosophy and did not conceal this fact in their writings.

Of course, each of these books (as well as all the others that will be found to belong to the same category) has yet to be edited and studied carefully. Yet we may perhaps already at this point put forth the assumption that the authors of these books were some of Al-Ghazzālī's enthusiastic admirers who undertook the task of expounding his esoteric ideas in a manner which seemed to them appropriate. Al-Ghazzālī repeatedly mentions in his books that there are certain esoteric metaphysical subjects ('Madnūn bihā') which should not be discussed too thoroughly in public. He expresses the hope that he may some day discuss them in a separate book (or books) meant only for the intellectual and virtuous elite<sup>18</sup>. Yet while he did incorporate esoteric ideas in most of his authentic Ṣūfī books<sup>19</sup> it seems that he never wrote such a specific work. It may therefore well be that some philosophical-religious thinkers, who failed to notice the discrepancy in their sources, tried to compile such a book by him by mixing excerpts from Al-Ghazzālī's own books with parts copied out from books of philosophers whom they admired no less than Al-Ghazzālī himself. The names of at least two of these books ("Al-Madnūn ...") seem in particular to strengthen this assumption, as well as a short remark to the same effect at the end of a third book in the same list<sup>20</sup>.

This strange mixture of ideas, which is never found in Al-Ghazzālī's books accepted as authentic, misled

generations of readers and of scholars with regard to Al-Ghazzālī, and engendered various theories as to his belief in dual truths, his hypocrisy, illogicality, inconsistency and so on. By eliminating the doubtful books, which make use of the philosophical terminology, from the canon of his books we may once more come nearer to a true knowledge and understanding of this great man and his thought.

Notes to Chapter III

- 1 All those books were apparently written before Al-Ghazzālī left Baghdad in 1091/488 Hg. The case of "Mizān" is a most complicated one, a fact which accounts for the great divergence of opinions with regard to the date of this book and even with regard to the authenticity of most important parts of it. It seems that a thorough literary study of this book would be able to show that it belongs, as a whole, to the transitory period of Al-Ghazzālī from the world of philosophy to the 'Taṣawwuf', and as such must have been written towards the end of his stay in Baghdad.
- 2 Cf. p. 23 above and notes 33, 35 on p. 40 above.
- 3 Cf. p. 95 above ('Al Ṣadīq Al Djāhil').
- 4 Gardet-Anawati - Introduction à la théologie musulmane (Paris, 1948), p. 148 ff; D.B. Macdonald - Life of Al-Ghazzālī, JAOS, XX, 1899, p. 122. Cf. also R. Brunschwig - Valeur et Fondement du Raisonnement Juridique par Analogie D'après Al-Ghazzālī, Studia Islamica 36, 1971, pp. 57-88.
- 5 Part of this book has been published by D. Cabanelas in Al-Andalus, XXI, 1958, pp. 19-58. The whole book has recently been edited by Abdel-Karim Uthman, (Damascus, 1963). In his Introduction the editor stresses the great similarity between this book and "Ma'āridj Al-Quds".
- 6 See Bouyges, Essai, and Badawi "Mu'allafāt" for each of these books. Cf. also S. Dunja (ed.) "Faisal Al-

Tafriqa", Introduction, p. 51.

7 Most of them seem to be just 'Textbooks of Philosophy', as G.F. Hourani put it in a discussion about the outline of this chapter, which I presented at the annual meeting of the A.O.S. in Philadelphia, 1966.

8 See for instance: A.S. Tritton, Notes and Communications, BSOAS 22, 1929, p. 353.

9 Cf. below Ch. V.

10 The common confrontation of 'Al-ma'ānī' with 'Al-alfāz', which is well known from Arabic rhetoric and other fields of study, is closely associated with the Platonic 'idea' concept. It should be noted that Platonic concepts as such play an important role in Al-Ghazzālī's thought. Cf. Appendix C.

11 See the accusations against Al-Ghazzālī in this connection in Al-Subkī's "Ṭabaqāt" IV, p. 110. M. Bouyges in the Introduction to his edition of the "Tahāfut" quotes later sources to the same effect. *Ibid.*, p. 26, n. 1.

12 For example:

فهم تنكرون على من يقول: دليل العقل ساق الى اثبات صفة الله تعالى،  
من شأنها تمييز الشيء عن مثله؛ فان لم يطابقها اسم الارادة فلتسم باسم  
آخر فلا مشاحة بالاسما وانما اطلقناها نحن باذن الشرع: والا فالارادة  
موضوعة في اللغة لتعيين ما فيه غرض ولا غرض في حق الله وانما المقصود  
المعنى دون اللفظ (تهافت ١٦٣٩ الخ)

... فان العبارات مباحة والاصطلاحات لا مشاحة فيها. فان قلت غرضي  
ان اعرف اصطلاح المتكلمين وانهم عبروا بالنظر عما ذا - فاعلم انك اذا  
سمعت واحدا يحد النظر بالفكر وآخر بالطلب وآخر بالفكر الذي هو  
يطلب به - لم تسترب في اختلاف اصطلاحاتهم على ثلاثة اوجه والعجب  
من لا يتفطن لهذا ويفرض الكلام في حد النظر ويستدل بصحة واحد  
من الحدود وليس يدري ان حظ المعنى المعقول من هذه الامور لا خلاف  
فيه وان الاصطلاح لا معنى للخلاف فيه واذا انت امغنت النظر واهتديت  
السبيل عرفت قطعا ان اكثر الاغاليط نشأت من ضلال من طلب المعاني  
من الالفاظ ولقد كان من حقه ان يقدر المعاني اولا ثم ينظر في الالفاظ  
ثانيا ويعلم انها اصطلاحات لا تتغير بها المعقولات، ولكن من حرم  
التوفيق استدبر الطريق ونكل عن التحقيق

(الاقتصاد ١١٠١ الخ)

فان العبارات مباحة والاصطلاحات لا مشاحة فيها... والعجب من لا  
يتفطن لهذا... واكثر من هذه التخبيطات انما ثارت من جهل اقوام  
طلبوا الحقائق من الالفاظ فتخبطوا فيها لتخبط اصطلاحات الناس في  
الالفاظ (احياء ١٥٢٠٤١٥٢٤ - ٣)

فاذا قد بطلت خاصية الانسان وما تميز به من الحس السادس الذي  
يعبر عنه اما بالعقل او بالنور او بالقلب او بما شئت من العبارات فلا  
مشاحة فيها وهيئات (احياء ٥٩٤٤٥٨٥٨٥٩٤٤ - ٩)

ولا معنى للاشتغال بالاسامي فان الاصطلاحات مختلفة والضعيف يظن  
ان الاختلاف واقع في المعاني لان الضعيف يطلب المعاني من الالفاظ  
وهو عكس الواجب (احياء ٥٦٤٤٥٦٤٤٥٦٤٤٥ - ٧)

ومن ينظر الى الحقائق من الالفاظ ربما يتحير من كثرتها ويتخيل كثرة المعاني  
والذي تنكشف له الحقائق يجعل المعاني اصلا والالفاظ تابعة وامر الضعيف  
بالعكس منه ان يطلب الحقائق من الالفاظ (مشكاة ٦٤٤٥٦٤٤٥ - ٣)

13 This is according to W.H.T. Gairdner's translation (R.A.S. 1924), p. 83 (see the Arabic text in the above mentioned "Madjmū'a", p. 33). This linguistic fact, as well as Al-Ghazzālī's inconsistent non-technical language, seem to have misled scholars like J. Obermann and W.M. Watt in some of their deductions from his writings.

14 Cf. above Ch. I.

15 Cf. Ch. V below. Of course there will remain the problem of other books written by, or attributed to, Al-Ghazzālī, in which this terminology does not appear and yet it seems doubtful that they were written by him. Most of these books call for special studies.

16 See L. Gauthier - "Ḥayy Ben Yaqdhān" (Alger, 1900), Arabic text p. 14 ff. and French translation, p. 13 ff. Ibn Bājja (d. 1139/533 Hg.) seems to mention only Al-Ghazzālī's "Munqidh". See Asin Palacio's edition and translation of the "Letter of Farewell", Al-Andalus VIII, 1943, p. 21 ff., p. 53 ff. Cf. also A. Altmann, "Ibn Bājja on Man's Ultimate Felicity" in H.A. Wolfson Jubilee Volume, 1965, p. 69.

17 See I. Goldziher, ZDMG 38, 1884, p. 681 and Muham Stud. II, p. 373, n. 5, and D.B. Macdonald, JAOS XX, 1899, p. 131. See also above pp. 15-16, below Appendix A, n. 18, and Al-Sha'arānī, "Al-Yawāqīt Wa-l-Djawāhīr" (Cairo n.d.), I, p. 7.

18 See "Djawāhir", p. 30; "Al-Arba'īn" p. 27; "Faiṣal Al-Tafriqa", p. 6, and cf. Chs. V and VI below.

19 Such as "Al-Maqṣad Al-Asnā", "Djawāhir Al-Qur'ān", "Mishkāt Al-Anwār" and even the "Ihyā". Ibn Ṭufayl discusses this problem in the above-mentioned passage (see n. 16 above).

20 See "Ma'āridj Al-Quds" (Cairo, 1346), p. 210. Cf. also the passage in Ibn Ṭufayl's book, referred to above. Most interesting in this respect is the modern editor's note at the end of "Djawāhir Al-Qur'ān" (Cairo, 1329), p. 189. See also "Minhādj Al-'Ābidīn" (? 1300), p. 3, although it does not belong to the 'philosophical books' attributed to Al-Ghazzālī. As for "Ma'āridj Al-Quds", cf. now G. Vajda's article in Israel Oriental Studies II, (Tel Aviv, 1972), pp. 470 ff.

- 93 Here follows another Hadīth of which Al-Ghazzālī was very fond (about God descending every night to the lower heavens and looking for somebody to grant him His favours). Cf., e.g., "Ihyā III, 1, p. 1359, 7; "Ildjām" p. 5, 4; and see also "Mishkāt", p. 43, 4 ff.
- 94 This is also one of the metaphoric expressions of which Al-Ghazzālī was very fond. Cf. "Mishkāt", p. 49, 2, 7 ff., and see Sa'adī, "Ghulistān" (Teheran, 1316), 4, p. 1.
- 95 Cf. the detailed explanation of this in Ch. VI, p. 425 below. Cf. also H. Laoust, La Politique ..., p. 197.
- 96 "Al-Arba'īn", p. 166, 6 ff. Cf. also "Al-Mustazhirī", p. 79, 3 ff.; "Mizān", p. 75, 7 ff.; "Ihyā" III, 2, p. 1450, 9; *ibid.*, IV, 1, p. 2107, 7; *ibid.*, p. 2615, 6 ff.; "Al-Arba'īn", p. 40, 4-5; 104, 9 ff. See also "Ma'aridj Al-Quds", p. 85, 2 - the same Hadīth in a different context.
- 97 "Ihyā" IV, 6, p. 2613, 9 ff.
- 98 Cf. "Mi'yār", p. 24, 2 ff.; "Mihakk", p. 3, 6-5; "Al-Munqidh", p. 116, 9-11.

## CHAPTER V

The Esoteric Aspect of Al-Ghazzālī's Writings

I have already mentioned several times above that I do not believe that Al-Ghazzālī secretly cultivated an esoteric doctrine or truth. How then do we account for the controversies and esoteric hints which abound in his diverse writings? I shall endeavour to answer this question in the present chapter and show that though Al-Ghazzālī had no specific esoteric theory, he still considered the discussion of certain subjects to be esoteric, and did not favour their wide promulgation<sup>1</sup>. The above is borne out by the divisions into which he divided both people and science. It will be seen that Al-Ghazzālī divided people into two groups, much in the manner of his predecessors, the masses 'vulgus' ('Awāmm') on the one hand, and the initiated, or the chosen few ('Khawāṣṣ') on the other. He also divided all the sciences relating to the world to come ('Ulūm al-Ākhirā') into the esoteric science of vision ('Ilm al-Mukāshafa') and the practical sciences ('Ilm al-Mu'āmalā') which alone may be imparted to the masses. Only a chosen few, after prolonged training may be considered worthy of an approach to the esoteric science and they may even be obliged to do so. This distinction furnishes the key to some of the apparent 'discrepancies' in Al-Ghazzālī's various writings, and it supports a clear rejection of the alleged theory of 'double truths' in his works. Many differences and even contradictions found in such writings of Al-Ghazzālī, which have been accepted as authentic, may, to a large extent, be traced

back to the fact that he compiled different books or chapters for different classes of readers, and he may, therefore, have divulged more in some than in others. It is, however, quite superfluous to try and explain away all the contradictions in his writings, since a man of his stature, who had undergone so many stages of development, and who had written so much, must undoubtedly have changed his opinions occasionally, and may have contradicted himself even while writing one and the same book.

Al-Ghazzālī's special cosmological doctrine, which is mainly constructed along the lines of the Platonic philosophy (and which seems to me of paramount importance towards reaching a better understanding of his ideas on diverse and variegated subjects), is also related to his esoteric theory. The discussion of the eternal and superior world of ideas is, according to Al-Ghazzālī, esoteric, since only an infinitesimal measure of its truths has been divulged to a few chosen individuals - mostly by way of dream or allegory. However, a few examples of this superior world have been revealed to all men - even in our transitory world (for example the Ka'ba, the Qur'ān and the faith of Islam) - and man is expected to study these examples to the utmost of his ability and understanding. I shall deal with some of these ideas in the present chapter and refer the reader also to Appendix C on Al-Ghazzālī's cosmology. I shall also discuss in this chapter the character of Al-Ghazzālī's great "Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn", as well as his special attitude towards the sciences of 'Kalām' and 'Fiqh'.

One more preliminary note prior to detailing these

matters must be made. It should be kept in mind that the idea of an esoteric approach or doctrine is neither Al-Ghazzālī's nor an innovation of his period. Moreover, this approach had been very common in Islam for many generations, and Al-Ghazzālī could have derived the division of men into the élite and the 'vulgus' from different worlds and sciences, such as the science of 'Kalām', the diverse modes of philosophy, the Ismā'īlī Shī'a or the Sūfī literature<sup>2</sup>. A sharp retort by Al-Subkī to Abu 'Abd-almāzārī<sup>3</sup> must be considered against this background. In an oversimplified manner the latter accused Al-Ghazzālī of meddling in esoteric sciences. He said: If those things which Al-Ghazzālī considered secret were untruths, of course they should be kept secret. If, however, they were true, why then should they not be revealed? The fact that Al-Ghazzālī could understand them would ensure their being understood by others as well. Al-Subkī answered this ("Tabaqāt" IV, p. 128) by saying that the assumption that certain (true) things had better be kept hidden was commonly known and very old:

وَمَا تَقْسِيمُ الْمَازِرِيِّ فِي الْعِلْمِ الَّذِي أَشَارَ إِلَيْهِ حِجَّةَ الْإِسْلَامِ أَنَّهُ لَا يُوَدَّعُ فِي كِتَابٍ فَوَدَّ دَلُّوهُ لَوْلَمْ يَذْكُرْهُ فَانَّهُ شَبَّهَ عَلَيْهِ وَهَذَا الْمَازِرِيُّ كَانَ رَجُلًا رَكْبًا ذَكِيًّا وَمَا كُنْتُ أَحْسِبُهُ يَقَعُ فِي مِثْلِ هَذَا، وَأَخْفَى عَلَيْهِ أَنْ لِلْعُلَمَاءِ دَقَائِقَ نَهْيِ الْعُلَمَاءِ عَنِ الْإِفْصَاحِ بِهَا خَشْيَةً عَلَى ضَعْفِ الْخَلْقِ وَأُمُورًا أُخْرَى لَا تَحِيطُ بِهَا الْعِبَارَاتُ وَلَا يَعْرِفُهَا إِلَّا أَهْلُ الذُّوقِ (!) وَأُمُورًا أُخْرَى لَمْ يَأْذَنَ اللَّهُ فِي أَظْهَارِهَا، لِحُكْمِ تَكَثُّرِ عَنِ الْإِحْصَاءِ وَمَاذَا يَقُولُ الْمَازِرِيُّ فِيمَا خَرَجَ الْبِخَارِيُّ فِي صَحِيحِهِ مِنْ حَدِيثِ أَبِي الطَّفِيلِ: سَمِعْتُ عَلِيًّا رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ يَقُولُ "حَدَّثُوا النَّاسَ بِمَا يَعْرِفُونَ. اتَّحِبُّونَ أَنْ يَكْذِبَ اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ؟" ٤ وَكَمْ مَسْأَلَةٌ نَصَ الْعُلَمَاءِ عَلَى عَدَمِ الْإِفْصَاحِ بِهَا خَشْيَةً عَلَى أَفْهَامِ مَنْ يَفْهَمُهَا . . .



a. ʿAwāmm wa-Khawass (The Elite and the Masses)

It is very difficult to go here into the details of Al-Ghazzālī's ideas regarding the different categories of human beings, and their aim and purpose on earth, since these ideas are closely connected with his theory about the ideal Perfect Man<sup>5</sup>. I shall, therefore, outline some main features pertinent to the subject, and shall give in detail only those points which are relevant to esoteric references in Al-Ghazzālī's works.

Al-Ghazzālī believed that every creature was created for a purpose, and that each creature should strive to achieve this purpose on earth, in this manner finding its fulfilment and happiness. Accordingly, for example, the horse was created beautiful and endowed with the attribute of galloping in battle. If the horse does not cultivate its attributes, it will sink to the rank of a donkey, which it already resembles in many other respects. The same applies to man. Al-Ghazzālī described the mineral, vegetable and animal elements in man in accordance with the common description in mediaeval literature (which followed Greek literature in this respect). He did, however, give special consideration to man's specific attribute, namely, his ability to know the truth of things (*Maʿrifat Haqāʾiq al-Umūr*). The developing of this last characteristic is man's vocation on earth. Inasmuch as he fulfils this vocation will he rise to the rank of the angels, and the more he revels in his base lusts and forgets his destiny the more will he resemble an animal or be like 'a two-legged ass'<sup>6</sup>.

## Esoteric Aspect

Al-Ghazzālī was not completely consistent with regard to this doctrine of man's ability, and even duty, to rise to the rank of the angels. He sometimes maintained that certain people cannot rise because they lack heart, as it were, or because of blindness which afflicted their inner eye (cf. Ch. IV, d, above). However, as befits one who considered himself primarily an educator and spiritual physician, Al-Ghazzālī usually inclined to the theory that things are subject to man's will and effort, and - as has already been mentioned several times - he often emphatically pointed out that the way to rise to the rank of saints, prophets and angels is open to anyone who is willing, and who tries to purify himself for this purpose. We may assume that there is no real contradiction here, but simply another way of contemplating matters from different points of view; he is influenced both by the ancient belief in fate and predestination and its Ashʿarite version of 'Kasb' as well as the Neoplatonic ideas of heavenly grace, which pours fourth and is bestowed incessantly on the willing. This ideological 'contradiction' is characteristic of all Sūfī literature, which combines the belief in man's power to purify himself and prepare for his vocation with a far-reaching quietism which borders on complete fatalism.

Al-Ghazzālī regarded the 'ʿĀmiyy' or the common man (that is, a person who lacked either the ability or the will-power necessary to raise himself to higher ranks) with contempt and pity. This concept is faintly reminiscent of the sayings of the Jewish Sages with regard to the masses (as, for instance, in the Mishna, Pirkey Avoth, Ch. 3, or

in the Talmud, Tractate Pessahim, p. 49). He repeatedly stressed that such a man, who does not endeavour to reach the light of higher knowledge, and who does not occupy himself with that knowledge for which he was created, is reckoned as no better than an animal, nay even less. Al-Ghazzālī accepted his predecessors' idea that the worship of such an ignoramus is worth nothing ("Iḥyā" I, 7, p. 432, 2-3; *ibid.*, IV, 7, pp. 2730-2731; and cf. "Qut Al-Qulūb" I, p. 124). He proposed that the 'Āmiyy should consider his purpose in life as serving the Sages, so that the Sages could be free to devote themselves to study and worship<sup>7</sup>. At the same time, however, he maintained that the 'Āmiyy may occupy himself with the study of the Qur'ān and the religious commandments but never with any science ('Ilm'). He repeated the extremist Sūfī idea, that the 'Āmiyy should commit adultery or steal rather than study ideas which he neither understood nor deserved. Consider the following examples<sup>8</sup>:

والعامي لو يزني ويسرق كان خيرا له من ان يتكلم في العلم  
(احياء ٦٣، ٧٤، ١٤٠٦، ٣٦١ - ٢)

وكل كبيرة يرتكبها العامي فهي اسلم له من ان يتكلم في العلم  
(احياء ٦٣، ٧٤، ١٦٣٩، ١٠١٦)

فكل كبيرة تجرى على العامي اهنون من ان يخوض في العلم فيكفر من  
حيث لا يدري (القسطاس ١٠٨٨، ١٠ - ١١)

بل لو اشتغل العامي بالمعاصي البدنية ربما كان اسلم له من ان يخوض  
في البحث عن معرفة الله تعالى فان ذلك غاية الفسق وهذا عاقبته  
الشرك (الجام ٤١٩ - ٥)

Prior to outlining the 'Ālim's' function in keeping knowledge from the 'Āmiyy', who is tempted by the devil to believe in his capacity and worthiness to deal with the hidden truths, one explanatory remark must be added: The ignorant person is not that one who is lacking in formal instruction, though this term may also include ignorance in this respect. The official 'Ulamā', especially the 'Mutakallimūn', whose conception of religion and doctrine Al-Ghazzālī considered to be only external, also belong to this category. According to Al-Ghazzālī they are as good as ignorant in matters regarding the true meaning of faith, world and tradition<sup>9</sup>, but are distinguishable from other ignorant people by their skills in debating and polemicizing ('Ṣan'at Talfīq al-Kalām'). These skills could be of great importance in defending traditional belief and in rejecting undesirable religious innovations ('Bida'). Yet nevertheless these 'Ulamā' do not really understand religion and their faith is only superficial. They resemble the soldiers who protect pilgrims on their way to the 'Ḥadjdj' from the Beduins and, like these soldiers, they have neither value nor quality in themselves, and will be entirely useless once the danger from outside has been overcome<sup>10</sup>.

We may quote yet another metaphor: Some people are able to swim in the sea of knowledge, and some are incapable of doing so. The former should not be held back from the river or the sea, while the latter must be kept as far back as possible from the dangerous shores. This metaphore recurs in Al-Ghazzālī's writings with regard to the 'Kalām'

which must be kept from the ignorant person, who asks no questions, or with regard to the true 'Ta'wīl' (allegoric explanation) of Qur'anic verses which seem simple and intelligible to everyone, and also with regard to philosophy and to the theory of the real meaning of man, universe, God and his creation<sup>11</sup>.

The conclusion is self-evident: Truth must be revealed to everyone according to the degree to which he is capable of assimilating it, and the ignorant must be kept outside the boundaries of such knowledge as it may prove harmful to him. In Al-Ghazzālī's *Ṣūfī* books, this refers mainly to the truth about man, the cosmos and God<sup>12</sup> ('*Ilm al-Mukāshafa*)

Every teacher should follow this principle<sup>13</sup>, since teaching *per se* is based on the teacher's assessment of the pupil's powers of assimilation and then taking this into consideration in his teaching. In this context Al-Ghazzālī repeated several well-known sayings taken from the literature of *Ḥadīth* and '*Taṣawwuf*', as for example:

التكلم مع الناس على قدر عقولهم<sup>١٤</sup>  
قلوب الأبرار قبور الأسرار؛ افشاء سر الربوبية كفر<sup>١٥</sup>


He added also that there is an obligation to reveal the truth to those who are capable and worthy of it, and that whoever keeps the truth from the latter, is as wrong as the one who reveals it to those who are incapable of understanding it. This he expressed usually by quoting the last line of a well-known poem<sup>16</sup>:

فمن منح الجهال علمه - اضاعه  
فمن منع المستوجبين فقد ظلم

All this is, of course, neither uniquely nor originally Al-Ghazzālī's but it does explain his esoteric attitude towards most people. More original he seems to be when he divides, as we shall presently see, also the highest of all sciences, the science of the world to come, into two categories: The esoteric science of revelation and vision and the practical science of human behaviour towards God and man.

- b. 'Ilm al-Mu'āmalā wa 'Ilm al-Mukāshafa (The Science Behaviour and Relationship and the Science of Revelation and Vision)

Al-Ghazzālī made several divisions of the sciences<sup>17</sup>, some of which are quite original. The division set out in "*Ihyā*" III, 1, p. 1372 ff. is especially relevant to our study. An endeavour will be made to convey its meaning by means of the following diagram:



Al-Ghazzālī saw no contradiction between the rational and the traditional sciences, and he believed that they complemented each other (cf. Ch. IV, b above). No man should content himself with the study of only one of them. The rational sciences are compared to food, while the traditional ones are compared to medicine, and the human body needs both<sup>21</sup>.

For us most important is the sub-division of the 'next-world' science, or of that science which directs man's progress towards happiness in the world to come. ('Ulūm al-Ākhira', or 'Ulūm Ukhrawiyya').

This science is subdivided into two categories: 1) The first may be termed either 'the Science of the State of the Heart' ('Ilm Ahwāl al-Qalb') or the 'Science of Behaviour or of Relationship' with God and man ('Ilm al-Mu'āmalā'); 2) and the second, higher 'Science of Revelation' ('Ilm al-Mukāshafa') which deals with pure knowledge only<sup>22</sup> about God, His attributes and works ('Al-'Ilm bi-Allah wa-Ṣifātihi wa-Af'ālihi). Both sciences differ totally from one another, in content as well as in the manner of mastering contemplating them; they differ especially in that the first is obligatory for every Muslim. According to Al-Ghazzālī it is a 'Fard 'Ayn' (a positive commandment which every Muslim must fulfil), while the second is an esoteric science, which may not be made known to the public. I shall now try to give certain details about both categories in accordance with the ideas of Al-Ghazzālī.

#### The Science of Behaviour or Relationship ('Ilm al-Mu'āmalā')<sup>23</sup>

This is the lower science of the two. It is like a corridor which leads towards and prepares man for the higher rank of visionary science. It deals with the base properties of the heart (such as fear of poverty, opposition to God's decree, hatred, jealousy, ambition, conceit, vanity, pride, miserliness, inconsideration and oppression

of others, worldliness, pursuance of worldly pleasures, etc.), and the uprooting of these properties from the heart. It also classifies the desirable qualities (such as endurance of suffering, gratitude, fear and devoutness, acceptance of the inevitable, abstinence and continence, honesty and goodness in dealing with one's fellowmen, etc.), and the means whereby one may constantly acquire and enforce the latter qualities in one's heart. This science is accordingly a science of action (''Ilm 'Amalī'), incumbent upon everyone.

The Science of Revelation (''Ilm al-Mukāshafa')<sup>24</sup>

Contrary to the practical science, which is a preparatory stage to this, there is no action involved in this esoteric science of revelation (''Ilm Bātin'), and no-one can learn or acquire it at will. This science deals with the true knowledge concerning God, His attributes and deeds, with cosmology, prophetic revelation, the nature of the angels and the devil, and with the deep religious meaning of concepts such as paradise, hell, etc. This science is the result of prophetic revelation and inspiration granted by Divine Grace to that man who is worthy of them and who has prepared himself for them both morally and religiously. The things revealed to man by this science are strictly esoteric and should not be made public:

وهذه الامور لا تسطر في الكتب ولا يتحدث بها من انعم الله عليه بشيء  
منها الا مع اهله وهو المشارك فيه على سبيل المذاكرة وبطريق الاسرار  
(احياء، ١٤١، ٦٣٥، ٦٤ - ٤)

I believe that this last sentence may contain the key to an explanation of the "mystery" of esoteric references and duality of truth as it were in Al-Ghazzālī's writings: These Divine secrets may not be made public either by writing or by word of mouth, yet they may be discussed with the "initiated", with those who have also been found worthy and capable of being granted a glimpse of the superior world and who follow the same esoteric path towards the real knowledge of God. This idea was outlined by Al-Ghazzālī already at the end of the "Mizān" (p. 212 ff.). It is there that Al-Ghazzālī explained that some people do understand that man's faith may be composed of different layers or levels as follows:

- 1) Traditional beliefs acquired from parents and teachers in childhood. Usually everyone defends these beliefs fanatically ('bi-l-ta'assub', cf. p. 197 above) in debates and discussions.
- 2) Instruction and teaching man imparts to his disciples, to each according to his abilities.
- 3) That which man really believes in his inmost heart, and which is known to God and himself only. He may reveal some of these beliefs to those who have reached the same stage as himself.

Rightly did Watt equate these three levels with what Al-Ghazzālī termed elsewhere 'Taqlīd', ''Ilm' and 'Dhawq'<sup>25</sup>.

In his prefaces to "Al-Maqṣad" and "Mishkāt" Al-Ghazzālī also reiterated the idea that truth would be revealed to the initiated alone. In the "Maqṣad" he even stated explicitly that truth seems almost like a contradiction of the

belief of the masses, a belief to which they have become accustomed and from which they cannot be deterred<sup>26</sup>:

والثاني ان الافصاح عن كه الحق فيه يكاد يخالف ما سبق اليه الجماهير،  
وفطام الخلق عن العادات ومألوفات المذاهب عسير  
(المقصد ٧٤٢ - ٦)

We may, therefore, sum up thus: There is no ground for the assumption that Al-Ghazzālī had a secret doctrine, which totally contradicted his widely known traditional one. The contradictions between his various books are partly due to the fact that he directed different books to different classes of readers. In books destined for perusal by the "initiated" (such as "Al-Maqṣad" or "Mishkāt") he divulged more of the one and only truth, while in books addressed to the masses he had a more reserved manner (as, for example, in his "Al-Arba'īn", "Faiṣal" or "Al-Munqidh"). He sometimes made use of both approaches in one and the same volume (see "Ihyā"), a fact which will be discussed in detail further on. (This practice must have sprung from the wish to arouse, in some readers at least, an interest in and a capacity for understanding the true nature of things.) As for Al-Ghazzālī's esoteric hints and general remarks about the author's duty to "hurry" and shorten his talk, as it were, these were quite a common literary device in mediaeval Arabic literature, with no special meaning at all. Al-Ghazzālī may therefore deal extensively with the same esoteric truth either before or after such a remark, and may discuss at length a subject which he had "intended" to deal with briefly<sup>27</sup>. These remarks could of course also be of an apologetic nature, and as such directed

at the reader who expected more than he had read. Conversely, they could be a literary device, calculated to provoke in the reader interest and reverence for the subject dealt with; and finally they could possibly have been introduced in order to distract a "simple" reader's mind from the fact that a "forbidden" subject was nevertheless dealt with in passing.

### c. Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn

A closer look at the exhaustive religious compendium "Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn" seems proper at this stage and an attempt will be made here to assess as far as possible the real nature of this encyclopaedia. A close scrutiny will prove that this voluminous encyclopaedia should not be regarded, as is usually done, as written for and directed at the masses. The reader should not be misled by Al-Ghazzālī's numerous protestations that he will refrain from dealing with esoteric subjects in this book<sup>28</sup>. The "Ihyā", especially, contains far-reaching esoteric portions, and their appearance together in one volume with other parts destined for the masses could aggravate the "danger" which they constitute to traditional belief. Moreover, sometimes, while perusing the book, the reader would get the impression that a section had been penned by two different authors simultaneously; or that the author had addressed the average reader in a loud and confident voice, while at the same time whispering additional hints to that reader who belonged to the chosen few, who was able to understand more than the average reader and probe further into the

real meaning of things<sup>29</sup>.

This can be shown in two ways:

- (a) By quoting passages from the "Iḥyā" itself;
- (b) by quoting passages from other books by Al-Ghazzālī about the "Iḥyā".

In passing an endeavour will also be made to point out certain details relevant to the complex problems of the chronological order of the "Iḥyā" books. However, one cannot reach definite conclusions on this matter before a scientific edition of each part is published, an edition which would be based on the most ancient manuscripts of the "Iḥyā" from among the many to be found throughout the world<sup>30</sup>. Thereafter a reconstruction of the order in which Al-Ghazzālī wrote the books of the "Iḥyā" would have to be made.

I believe, for instance, that in discussing the reconstruction of the chronological order of these books attention should be paid to the close connection between "Iḥyā" I, 1, and "Iḥyā" III, 4-10. The "Iḥyā" I, 1, contains Al-Ghazzālī's severest attack on the 'ʿUlamā' of his times<sup>31</sup>. Though he certainly was influenced to a considerable extent by the Ṣūfī literature which he had read and studied at that time (cf. especially "Qut Al-Qulūb" I, Ch. 31), these portions of the "Iḥyā" may also reflect his authentic biography and personal contacts with the eminent scholars of 'Fiqh' and 'Kālam' of his time. Al-Ghazzālī must have been most disappointed and even shocked at the corruption and perfidy he encountered upon arriving in Baghdād at Nizām's command, and during his brief sojourn in the circles of the

Nizāmiyya (1095/488 Hg. - 1091/484 Hg.), whose teachers considered themselves to be the spiritual and religious leaders of the Muslims. It may well be that this encounter with the great scholars of his time, whom he saw for the first time as they really were - small, petty, even corrupt people, hoping for fame and money as a reward for their scholarly studies - brought about his famous spiritual crisis<sup>32</sup>; it may have caused him to turn to the Ṣūfī movement, which he had known from early youth and which he considered to be a "pure" movement, demanding a high moral standard from its disciples. In the first book of the "Iḥyā" he describes the 'ʿUlamā' as ambitious and mercenary, serving the rulers with their knowledge, having no time to contemplate their ways and look for truth per se. In their debates ('Khilāfiyāt') they discuss details of rare laws and pretend to show their ingenuity and knowledge, and the spirit of competition develops in their hearts the most negative qualities, which lead man to eternal perdition ('Muhlikāt') such as jealousy, hatred, conceit, vanity, hypocrisy, ambition, etc.<sup>33</sup> As is well known, the third part of the "Iḥyā" is devoted to just these traits of character, and the names of the books therein correspond largely to a description of the negative qualities of the 'ʿUlamā'! This fact is not only important for a discussion of the chronological order of the "Iḥyā" books, but it may also illuminate Al-Ghazzālī's emotional background when he was writing this large encyclopaedia, in its entirety or in part. His estrangement from the official bearers of tradition and religious studies, and even

his shrinking from them are an important factor not only in the change of his way of life but also in the shaping of his new *Sūfī* doctrine<sup>34</sup>.

I come back now to the points raised above and will deal with them in detail:

a. Internal evidence from the "Ihyā" itself indicating specific dual structure of its parts: A popular book interlaced with esoteric hints for the initiated.

The general preface to the entire book already indicates this interesting duality: Al-Ghazzālī states that he will only treat the 'Science of Behaviour and Relationship' ('*Ilm al-Mu'āmalah*') in the "Ihyā", like the prophets who preceded him, since sages are the heirs of the prophets and should follow in their footsteps. Yet at the same time Ghazzālī adds that the prophets used to hint at themes of the 'Science of Revelation' ('*Ilm Al-Mukāshafa*') through inference, allegory and generalization. It seems as if the more thoughtful reader could conclude therefrom that Al-Ghazzālī was to follow the prophets in this respect as well:

...واعني بعلم المكاشفة ما يطلب منه كشف المعلم فقط واعني بعلم  
المعاملة ما يطلب منه مع الكشف العمل به . والمقصود من هذا الكتاب  
علم المعاملة فقط ، دون علم المكاشفة التي لا رخصة في ايداعها الكتب  
وان كانت هي غاية مقصد الطالبين ومطعم نظر الصديقين وعلم المعاملة  
طريق اليه ولكن لم يتكلم الانبياء صلوات الله عليهم مع الخلق الا في علم  
الطريق والارشاد اليه . واما علم المكاشفة فلم يتكلموا فيه الا بالرموز والايما  
على سبيل التمثيل والاجمال ، علما منهم بقصور افهام الخلق عن الاحتمال  
والعلماء ورثة الانبياء فما لهم سبيل الى العدول عن نهج التأسسي  
والاقتداء ( احياء ، مقدمة ٥٦٥ الخ )

This duality is typical of the "Ihyā" in all its parts. Al-Ghazzālī states in many instances that he will not deal with a specific subject since it belonged within the limits of esoteric science<sup>35</sup> as for instance, discussing the heart ("Ihyā" I, 1, p. 91, 8); discussing reason ("Ihyā" I, 1, p. 142, 6-7); discussing the date of 'Laylat Al-Qadar', ("Ihyā" I, 4, p. 335, 9-10); discussing death ('*Liqā Allah*', "Ihyā" I, 9, p. 550, 11-13); discussing dreams ("Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1389, 8-5); discussing the Devil ("Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1396, 8 ff.); discussing the Divine element in man ("Ihyā" III, 8, p. 1844, 3 ff.); discussing the real meaning of gratitude ('*Shukr*' - "Ihyā" IV, 2, p. 2222, 7); and discussing what may increase the real love of God ("Ihyā" IV, 6, p. 2620, 1-2).

In spite of these statements, however, Al-Ghazzālī dealt with those subjects in detail in other parts of the "Ihyā"<sup>36</sup>, and sometimes even discussed them in the same place immediately following such an esoteric remark. Often he did so without any explanatory note or apology. But sometimes he mentioned explicitly exceptions to the rule (see "Ihyā" IV, 6, p. 2601, 12 ff.) or admitted that he would disclose some short hints about one example of those esoteric subjects to his readers in order to arouse their interest in similar subjects:

ولا يمكن ان يتطفل به على علم المعاملة ولكن يمكن الرمزالى مثال واحد  
على الايجاز ليقع التنبيه لجنسه فنقول . . .

( احياء ٤٦٥ و ٤٦٦ و ٤٦٧ و ٤٦٨ )



The forbidden discussion of esoteric subjects might be accompanied by a remark like the following<sup>37</sup>: 'Wa-ghāyat al-ma'dhūn fīhi an yuqāla' ("Ihyā" I, 1, p. 91, 7: And all one is permitted to say on this subject is ...). Or: 'Walākin yanbaghī an ya'lama ...' ("Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1396, 10 ff.).

This phenomenon is especially apparent in the first part of the "Ihyā" IV, 5 ("Kitāb Al-Tawhīd wa-l-Tawakkul") where Al-Ghazzālī discussed the esoteric theme of predestination and free choice ('Sirr al-Qadar'). The book abounds in remarks about the discussion of this "dangerous" esoteric subject and its related themes, yet they are discussed explicitly there in much detail! (This is done, however, mostly in the traditional Ash'arī method.) The function of these remarks seems therefore to be to put the average readers off the subject, while provoking the interest of the understanding ones.

There follow two examples of this 'dual' approach in "Ihyā" IV, 5:

فان هذه (كيف يكون الكثير واحدا) غاية علم المكاشفات واسرار هذا العلم لا يجوز ان تسطرفيه كتاب فقد قال العارفون: "افشاء سر الربوبية كفر" ثم هو غير متعلق بعلم المعاملة. نعم ذكر ما يكسر سورة استعبادك ممكن وهو ان ... (احياء ٤٤ هـ ٦٤٩٦٦٤ الخ)

... ان مجرد التوحيد بالاعتقاد لا يورث حال التوكل فلنذكر منه القدر الذي يرتبط التوكل به دون تفصيله الذي لا يحتمل امثال هذا الكتاب ... واذا انفتحت لك ابواب المكاشفات اتضح لك هذا اتضاخا تم من المشاهدة بالبصر ... (احياء ٤٤ هـ ٦٤٩٦٦٤ الخ)

However, at the end of the first part of this book Al-Ghazzālī explicitly confessed to having "hinted" at esoteric subjects from the realm of the 'Science of Revelation'. He decided, as it were, to stop at these hints and come back to the 'Science of Behaviour' (ibid., p. 2517, 11-12). Such an admission is also made at the end of "Ihyā" III, 10, which is as much an esoteric book as "Ihyā" IV, 5. There Al-Ghazzālī expressed regret at having treated esoteric subjects<sup>38</sup> and at having revealed something of them, since they are of no use to anyone: He who follows the Ṣūfī will discover those things by himself, and he who doesn't, will never understand them. Nevertheless Al-Ghazzālī still hoped that his words might be of some use to a handful of chosen readers, whom these words might save from vain temptations, and in whom these revelations would strengthen the belief in the hidden truths.

وانواع الغرور في طريق السلوك الى الله تعالى لا تحصى في مجلدات ولا تستقصى الا بعد شرح جميع علوم المكاشفة وذلك مما لا رخصة في ذكره، ولعل القدر الذي ذكرناه كان الاولي تركه، ان السالك لهذا الطريق لا يحتاج الى ان يسمعه من غيره والذي لم يسلكه لم ينتفع بسماعه، بل ربما يستضر به ان يورثه ذلك دهشة من حيث يسمع ما لا يفهم ولكن فيه فائدة وهو اخراجه من الغرور الذي هو فيه. بل ربما يصدق بان الامراةظم مما يظنه وما يتخيله بذهنه المختصر وخياله القاصر وجدله المزخرف ويصدق ايضا بما يحكى له من المكاشفات التي اخبر عنها اولياء الله (احياء ٣٥٣ هـ ٦٢٠٦١٤ الخ)

We have therefore three categories of possible "Ihyā" readers:

1. Those who cannot understand the esoteric hints (the

masses);

2. those who do not need these hints (the Ṣūfī);
3. those whom these hints may direct to the right path and for whom these hints were added to the "Ihyā".

It seems that Al-Ghazzālī wrote the "Ihyā" and other books mainly for this last category, since they have the ability to understand and are worthy of knowing but none showed them the right way to follow nor directed their attention to the real meaning of their life in both this world and the next.

b. Evidence of the esoteric character of the "Ihyā" found in other writings by Al-Ghazzālī.

We may learn something of the esoteric character of the "Ihyā", and especially of certain parts of it, from Al-Ghazzālī's statements in other books by him. Thus, for instance, we suppose that he wrote his "Al-Maqṣad Al-Asnā fī Sharḥ Asmā Allah Al-Husnā" shortly after finishing the "Ihyā". This book deals with many esoteric aspects of God's "most beautiful names" and already Ibn Ṭufail said that Al-Ghazzālī "explained many obscure (esoteric) points in this book"<sup>39</sup>. Yet Al-Ghazzālī himself stated in "Al-Maqṣad" that he considered it to be a more popular book than the "Ihyā" and he could therefore not reveal in it certain secrets dealt with in the "Ihyā". Consider the following examples:

وانما احسن وجوه الشكر لنعم الله تعالى ان لا يستعملها في معاصيه بل في طاعته وذلك ايضا بتوفيق الله وتيسيره في كون العبد شاكرًا لربه، وتصور ذلك كلام دقيق ذكرناه في كتاب الشكر من كتاب احياء علم الدين فليطلب منه فان هذا الكتاب لا يحتمله

(المقصد ١٣٥٠ - ١٦)

وهذا انما يدركه من ادرك حقيقة التوحيد في الفعل وعلم ان المتفرد بالفعل في الملك والملوك واحد ، وقد اشرنا الى ذلك في اول كتاب التوكل من كتاب احياء علم الدين فليطلب منه فان هذا الكتاب لا يحتمله  
(المقصد ٩٦٧٢ - ٧)

بل الله تعالى هو المخترع لمقدورات العبد بواسطة قدرته مهما هيا جميع اسباب الوجود لمقدوره وتحت هذا غورلا يحتمل مثل هذا الكتاب كشفه  
(المقصد ٢٦٦٤ - ١)

In his "Kitāb Al-Arba'īn" Al-Ghazzālī also admitted the esoteric character of some parts of the "Ihyā", though he hinted there<sup>40</sup> that he had at least one other book, possibly even more esoteric, which dealt with secrets which may not be made known to the general public. Here are some examples of this book:

فان اردت ان تستنشق شيئًا من روائح المعرفة صادفت منها مقدارًا يسيرًا مشبوتا في كتاب الصبر والشكر وكتاب المحبة وباب التوحيد من اول كتاب التوكل وجملة ذلك من كتاب الاحياء وتصادف منها قدرًا صالحا يعرفك كيفية قرع باب المعرفة في كتاب المقصد الأسنى في معاني اسماء الله الحسنى ٠٠٠ وان اردت صريح المعرفة بحقائق هذه العقيدة ٠٠٠ فلا تصادف الا في بعض كتبنا المضمون بها على غير اهلها ٠٠٠  
(الاربعين ٥٢٧، الخ)

فان اردت ان تستنشق شيئًا من روائح هذه الاسرار ، وما اراك تريد فقد اخذ الشيطان بمخنك بجمال الشهوات ، فعليك بباب التوحيد من اول كتاب التوكل ان اردته  
(الاربعين ١٥٦، الخ)

ولهذا غور عميق<sup>٤١</sup> اشرنا اليه في كتاب الشكر من كتاب الاحياء ويكتفيك ههنا مثال واحد  
(الاربعين ٥٢٥٨ - ٤)

وهذا له غور عميق ويستدعي كشفه تطويلا فاطلبه من كتاب التوحيد والشكر  
من كتب الاحياء لتقف على تلويحات منه  
(الاربعين ٥٦٢٧٨ - ٧)

وقد شرحنا في كتاب التوحيد والتوكل والشكر من كتب الاحياء فاطلبه  
منه ان كنت من اهله  
(الاربعين ٤٦٢٨٠ - ٣)

We may therefore conclude that Al-Ghazzālī thought that the following parts of the "Ihyā" dealt with "prohibited" esoteric subjects:

- "Ihyā" III, 10 "Kitāb Dhamm Al-Ghurūr"
- "Ihyā" IV, 2 "Kitāb Al-Ṣabr wa-l-Shukr"
- "Ihyā" IV, 5 "Kitāb Al-Tawhīd wa-l-Tawakkul"
- "Ihyā" IV, 6 "Kitāb Al-Mahabba wa-l-Shawq wa-l-Ridā"

One may certainly add to these "Ihyā" III, 1, "Kitāb Sharḥ 'Adjā'ib Al-Qalb" and certain parts of "Ihyā" I, 1, "Kitāb Al-'Ilm", and "Ihyā" IV, 1, "Kitāb Al-Tawba"<sup>42</sup>.

In spite of the confidential nature of these books, Al-Ghazzālī still included them in his "Ihyā", and even referred the readers of his more moderate books (such as "Al-Maqṣad" and "Al-Arba'īn") to look up those parts in the "Ihyā"! How should we explain this peculiar fact? For if he really wanted to keep these matters secret, why did he incorporate them into the "Ihyā"? And if he did not want them to be made public, why did he refer readers of his moderate popular books to those esoteric parts of the "Ihyā"?

The most reasonable answer seems that which we have hinted at earlier: Al-Ghazzālī wanted to raise at least

some of his readers towards the light of true knowledge. He tried to arouse their interest in hidden truths in a slow and gradual way, by disclosing a little and concealing twice as much in the manner of those Ismā'īlī missionaries whom he himself condemned in his writings. To those who showed interest and accepted his challenge, and who were capable of absorbing the real truth, he gave additional instruction and revealed more details of the real truth. He thus willingly, though gradually, enlarged the circle of the "initiated" - quite contrary to the usual practices of the philosophers - because his aim was to "heal" many of his contemporaries from their spiritual maladies, and not to cultivate a secret truth among the few, as against the so-called truth of the masses. He therefore even placed gradual education towards self-discipline and the wish to know the truth above natural intellectual ability, believing that the purification of the heart may also sharpen intellectual ability.

The "Ihyā" is, therefore, to be considered Al-Ghazzālī's "map" of gradual education, in which he opens the eyes of the worthy readers in many ways (ranging from vague hints to entire books), and imparts to them some of the Divine secrets.

#### d. Al-Ghazzālī's Attitude to the Sciences of Law ('Fiqh') and Theology ('Kalām')

Al-Ghazzālī's ambivalent attitude to the 'Fiqh', and to the 'Kalām' in particular, seems to belong within the scope of the present chapter. His attitude towards these sciences

also becomes comprehensible only on the basis of Al-Ghazzālī's above-mentioned division of people into the elite and the masses ('Awāmm wa-Khawāṣṣ'), though from a different, somewhat technical angle; and of his attempt to keep the common man from studying theology, e.g., 'Kalām'. Moreover, it seems conceivable that towards the end of his life Al-Ghazzālī tended to cover up his true feelings about theology and theologians by means of a conventional disguise, so that he might obtain the latter's consent to promulgate his religio-moral teachings as he wished. This attitude may be considered "esoteric" according to common philosophical terminology; that is, he wrote quite differently for the masses and even hid the real truth from them. Yet even in this case, with regard to the 'Kalām', we are not dealing with a really hidden doctrine or a double-truth of Al-Ghazzālī. Instead we shall see him again revealing more of the one and only truth to those who can understand. A closer examination of his attitude to these sciences will also reveal certain characteristics of Al-Ghazzālī's style, which may be of some importance in understanding the whole of his work.

As we all know, Al-Ghazzālī was both an Ash'arite theologian and a Shāfi'ite doctor of law. Some of his first books on these sciences were written under the influence of the Imām Al-Haramain Al-Djuwaynī (d. 1085/478 Hg.), his teacher in Nishāpūr. These and other books of his on these sciences were widely popular and hundreds of students soon after flocked to Baghdad, to the Nizāmiyya, to study these subjects under Al-Ghazzālī, thus building up his extensive

reputation<sup>43</sup>. Yet it seems that Al-Ghazzālī inclined more towards the 'Fiqh' and devoted less time to the 'Kalām'. Certain explicit remarks in his writings and the comments of his biographers bear this out. Though Al-Ghazzālī voiced his regret, both in the "Ihyā" and in other closely related books, for having "wasted" his time on writing these books on law (cf. "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 69, 3-5; 92, 15 ff. "Djawāhir", p. 26, 2 ff.), the great influence of the science of law on his personality, on his style and on the structure of his books and his doctrine is easily discernible. In the late "Al-Mustaṣfā min 'Ilm Al-Uṣūl", Al-Ghazzālī seemed to acknowledge this while repeating the fact that he had spent much time on this most important science, but without expressing there any regret for the "waste" of time involved in the composition of his books on law:

واشرف العلم ما ازدج فيه العقل والسمع واصطحب فيه الرأي والشرع ،  
وعلم الفقه واصوله من هذا القبيل فانه يأخذ من صفو الشرع والعقل سوا  
السييل . . . ولاجل شرف علم الفقه وسببه وفر الله داعي الخلق على  
طلبه وكان العلماء به ارفع العلماء مكانا واجلهم شانا واكثرهم اتبعا  
واعوانا. فتقاضاني في عنفوان شبابي اختصاص هذا العلم بفوائد الدين  
والدنيا وشباب الآخرة والاولى ان اصرف اليه من مهلة العمر صدرا وان  
اخص به من متنفس الحياة قدرا ، فصنفت كتبا كثيرة في فروع الفقه واصوله (ص ٥٣)

In "Al-Munqidh" Al-Ghazzālī stated that he had also written some books on 'Kalām',<sup>44</sup> but those books were either so few or so unknown that some biographers claim that he did not write anything on 'Kalām' at all (which of course is untrue; cf. below). Certainly, most of his biographers thought that he did not excel in this science, although today we may assert, following Ibn Khaldūn, that his influence

on theology was quite far-reaching<sup>45</sup>. Below are several quotations from Al-Subkī to show that he doubted Al-Ghazzālī's proficiency in theology (although he mentions among his books the "Iqtisād fī-l-ʿIṭiqād" on p. 116). He quoted others to the same effect and agreed with them:

وانا لم ار له مصنفا في اصول الدين بعد شدة الفحص الا ان يكون قواعد العقائد وعقائد صغرى واما كتاب مستقل على قاعدة المتكلمين فلم اره (السبكي، طبقات ٤٤١٠٣٦١٥١٠٧ - ١٧)

ثم نظر في علم الاصول وكان قد احكمها ووصف فيه تصانيف وجدد المذهب في الفقه ٠٠٠ فجدد في الخلاف ايضا تصانيف (السبكي، طبقات ٤٤١٠٧٦١٠٦)

وقال (ابوعبد المازرى): هو (الغزالي) اعرف بالفقه منه باصوله واما علم الكلام الذي هو اصل الدين فانه صنف فيه ايضا وليس بالمستبحر فيها ولقد فطنت لسبب عدم استبحاره وذلك انه قرأ علم الفلسفة قبل استبحاره في فن اصول الدين واكسبته جراءة على المعاني وتسهيلا للهجوم على الحقائق لان الفلسفة تمر مع خواطره وليس لها حكم شرعي ترعاه ولا تخاف من مخالفة ائمة تتبعها ٠٠٠ واما قوله: الغزالي ليس بالمستبحر في علم الكلام فانا اوافقه على ذلك ولكني اقول ان قدمه فيه راسخ ولكن لا بالنسبة الى قدمه في بقية علومه (السبكي، طبقات ٤٤١٢٣٦١٦ الخ) ٤٦

Accordingly it would seem that if Al-Ghazzali named the first period of his search for truth 'The Kalām Period' ("Al-Munqidh", pp. 66-68), this must be considered simply another biographical inaccuracy: It probably represents the period in which he was mainly concerned with the 'Fiqh'<sup>47</sup>. The fact that he called it the 'Kalām period' could easily be accounted for by the fact that both Theology and Law were considered the typical traditional sciences and were

often mentioned together. This heading in "Al-Munqidh" could therefore be a convenient expedient for placing both sciences together, especially since the 'Fiqh' is not really concerned with the intellectual search for the truth but is a more technical science secondary to the 'Kalām'. It may be possible, however, that we are here faced with a deliberate attempt by Al-Ghazzālī to pay homage, as it were, to theology and to acknowledge publicly the importance of this science. Perhaps he tried in "Al-Munqidh" to stress the fact that he studied theology and wrote books on it and to change the obvious impression from the "Ihyā" that he disdained this discipline. But before elaborating on this I shall try to comment briefly on some other important features which may prove that Al-Ghazzālī felt himself to be a doctor of law rather than a theologian.

1. Al-Ghazzālī planned and constructed the "Ihyā" in four parts, according to the accepted structure of the books of law, possibly because he was so inclined by his very nature, or because he considered those books to be particularly appealing<sup>48</sup>. However, the influence of the science of 'Fiqh' is obvious in all phases of his work. Take, for example, the explanation of the planned structure of each book in its Introduction (though he did not always stick to his plans); the definition of the expressions he was going to use<sup>49</sup>; the fact that he shunned the vague mystical jargon on the one hand, and the 'Adab' kind of associative writing on the other; and the division of every topic into a multitude of causes, effects, sub-sections, types, stages, etc.<sup>50</sup> He used the terminology of 'Fiqh' even when

he treated quite different subjects and when he looked for that religious certainty ('Yaqīn') which the pure conjectural ('Zannī') 'Fiqh' of course could not grant him<sup>51</sup>.

2. Al-Ghazzālī, like many preceding Ṣūfīs, found in the literature of law, following the Ḥadīth, the first seed of his moral-religious approach, and it is quite possible that his eyes were opened to this approach while studying the 'Fiqh'. This may not have happened to him while studying the 'Kalām', which by its very nature would be altogether a barren study in this respect. The following example may bear out this contention, and may also furnish some aid in determining the chronological order of two of his books.

In one of his shorter books on law "Al-Wadjīz" (p. 103, 10-11), Al-Ghazzālī listed among the eight prohibitions of the fasts also lying and indulging one's lust. ('Kaff al-lisān 'an al-hadhayān wa-kaff al-nafs 'an djamī' al-shahawāt wahuwa sirr al-sawm'.) He immediately proceeded to a technical discussion, such as the prohibition to use a toothpick. But he elaborated on these points later on and developed them into a detailed theory regarding the 'secret of fasting', or the real meaning of fasting and its purpose, in "Ihyā" I, 6 ("Kitāb Asrār Al-Ṣawm"). There, under the general heading 'The Fast of the members of the body from doing wrong' ('Ṣawm al-Djawāriḥ 'an al-Āthām') which is the fast of the elite ('Al-Khuṣūs'), Al-Ghazzālī listed different moral prohibitions for different parts of the body<sup>52</sup>.

A detail of this kind could reinforce the assumption that "Al-Wadjīz" is one of Al-Ghazzālī's earliest books,

which would contradict Bouyges's theory about the late date of composition of this book<sup>53</sup>. One would hardly assume that Al-Ghazzālī would hint so vaguely in a late book at a theory which had beforehand been listed in the "Ihyā" in a much more detailed, orderly and complete manner. As a matter of fact four books (3, 4, 5, 6) of part I of the "Ihyā" discuss the "secrets" ('Asrār') of the real meaning of the ritual commandments, but 'Al-Wadjīz' knows nothing whatsoever about this, except for the one small though very important, detail of the fast! It is also difficult to believe that Al-Ghazzālī would immediately upon his leaving Baghdad and writing the "Ihyā", (especially following the writing of "Ihyā" I, 1, which attacks the traditional 'Ulamā' most sharply), go on to write a typical traditional book on 'Fiqh', as Bouyges suggests. We may, therefore, quite safely assume that "Al-Wadjīz" is an early product of Al-Ghazzālī, before he turned to Sufism and certainly before he left Baghdad.

3. Al-Ghazzālī dealt with several theological problems as if they were problems of law, such as the discussion of heretics and heresy, mainly in his "Faiṣal Al-Tafrīqa" (cf. Ch. VII below). He also continued to discuss details of law in his typical Ṣūfī books. For example, much law material is included in the first parts of "Ihyā" I, 3-6 (usually under the heading 'Al-A'māl al-Zāhira'). See also the special discussion and headings like 'Masā'il', 'Buhūth Fiqhiyya' etc. (as, for example, in "Ihyā" I, 4, p. 340; *ibid.*, II, 10, pp. 1212, 1216, 1231, 1236).

A closer scrutiny of this material will, of course,

reveal that in these parts of the "Iḥyā" Al-Ghazzālī did not follow the doctors of law in every detail and even diverged from his own books of law. This he did not only when he discussed the 'A'māl Bāṭina' (inward actions to accompany the outward performance of religious law) but also when describing, as it were, the common details of law pertaining to this outward performance. He included in what he calls commandment ('Tā'a', 'Wādjiḥ') many optional details ('Sunna', and even 'Āda'), and adds new religious and moral dimensions to every performance. Thus, for example, he demanded complete concentration during the entire period of prayer and not only at its beginning, as did the doctors of law, who knew how frail man's spiritual powers are and that only at its beginning (especially during the 'Takbīrāt al-Iḥrām'), can he concentrate<sup>54</sup>.

4. The main point in this discussion has now been reached: Al-Ghazzālī also found a way of introducing at least part of the traditional 'Fiqh' into the sciences dealing with the world beyond, by enlarging the concept of 'Fiqh' and by using the expressions 'Fiqh al-Nafs', 'Fiqh al-Dīn'<sup>55</sup>. He claimed that originally the science of law dealt both with matters of this world and the world to come, but that the first doctors of law, in the prophet's time, tried to deal mainly with the latter and to help people purify themselves by uprooting vices from their hearts and implanting therein virtues, in order to prepare themselves for the world to come rather than settle their petty disputes in this world. Yet in his day, and for several generations before that, it would seem that the doctors of

law preferred to deal with exactly at part of the 'Fiqh' which is concerned with this world only ('Fiqh al-Dunyā'). In this way they tried to comply with the rulers' wishes and add to their honour by means of barren disputation. These doctors of law seem to Al-Ghazzālī ignorant of the real, wider meaning of 'Fiqh', believing that they follow in the steps of the 'Ṣaḥāba' and deal with really important religious issues. In this manner Al-Ghazzālī could go on regarding himself as a doctor of law ('Faqīh al-Nafs') even during his Ṣūfī period and while unleashing his sharpest attacks on his contemporaries ('Fuqahā al-Dunjā!'). In "Iḥyā" I, 1, where he attacked the 'Fuqahā' he also outlined the essence of both sciences, from which it would seem that he practically equated the 'Fiqh al-Dīn' with the 'ʿIlm al-Muʿāmalā' or 'ʿIlm Ahwāl al-Qalb' (cf. p. 359 above). He introduced it into the sciences of the world beyond, the study of which is every man's duty ('Fard 'Ayn'). At the same time he regarded the common 'Fiqh' as a science dealing with matters of this world, such as arithmetic or medicine, and yet even less important than those<sup>56</sup>. Al-Ghazzālī gave clear examples of both sciences of law. Thus according to 'Fiqh al-Dunjā' it is enough to quote the 'Shahāda', to pray outwardly, or pay the Zakāt, because of fear of the sword. A man acting thus would be regarded as a Muslim according to this law. But according to 'Fiqh al-Dīn' or 'Fiqh al-Nafs' the outward performance of these commandments was not sufficient and would not be accepted by God, quite contrary to the doctors of law statements<sup>57</sup>!

At the same time, and while regarding himself a true 'Faḳīh', Al-Ghazzālī completely severed his links with theology. As a matter of fact he never really regarded himself as a 'Mutakallim' even while dealing with matters of theology. All his books show a marked reserve with regard to the 'Kalām' or a kind of philosophical disdain for this science, even "Al-Iqtisād" itself<sup>58</sup>! He reiterated that this is a science which heals the maladies of those who have doubts about their belief and that therefore it is the duty of the Muslim community ('Fard Kifāya') to develop it. Yet it has no intrinsic value, and no one should be encouraged to study it. On the contrary, men should be kept away from the "shores" of this "sea" and those who study it nevertheless should not be regarded as scholars of religion, but rather as vulgar men ('Awāmm') who gained some proficiency in the skills of polemics and dialectics ('Ṣan'at Talfīq al-Kalām'), but no more<sup>59</sup>. Yet Al-Ghazzālī went even further. He denied that theology really dealt with the great issues of belief, which are, according to him, part of the esoteric 'ʿIlm al-Mukāshafa' (see p. 360 above), although he himself had discussed them in "Al-Iqtisād" too. Moreover, in the "Ihyā" he regarded the 'Kalām' as a deterrent to the correct study and comprehension of these issues! Thus for example, he explained that the 'Mutakallimūn's' faith was but the faith of 'Taqlīd', a blind following of tradition, with the slight addition of defensive proofs<sup>60</sup>. 'Taqlīd', however, as we know, may prevent one from grasping the truth, just as such understanding may be prevented by man following his desires.

فان المطيع الفاهر لشهواته المتجرد الفكر في حقيقة من الحقائق قد لا  
ينكشف له ذلك لكونه محجوبا باعتقاد سبق اليه منذ الصبا على سبيل  
التقليد والقبول بحسن الظن فان ذلك يحول بينه وبين حقيقة الحق  
ويمنع من ان ينكشف في قلبه خلاف ما تلقفه<sup>٦١</sup> من ظاهر التقليد . وهذا  
ايضا حجاب عظيم به حجب اكثر المتكلمين والمتعصبين للمذاهب بل اكثر  
الصالحين المتفكرين في ملكوت السموات والارض لانهم محجوبون باعتقادات  
تقليدية جمدت في نفوسهم ورسخت في قلوبهم وصارت حجابا بينهم وبين  
درك الحقائق (احياء ٣ ، أ٦ ، ٦٨ ، ٦٩ ، الخ )

Al-Ghazzālī also gave warning in his "Paṣal Al-Tafrīqa" of the dangers inherent in the 'Kalām'<sup>62</sup>, saying that only rarely does this science really fortify man's faith. More often, the polemic of the theologians ('Al-Kalām al-Muharrar 'alā Rasm'<sup>63</sup> al-Mutakallimīn') would strengthen the 'Āmiyy's stubborn opposition. Al-Ghazzālī seemed to believe that polemics never influenced a man to change his ways. He, therefore, followed in the footsteps of those who declared that the study of this science was forbidden. Yet he excluded two cases: 1) The hesitating person, who might find in the 'Kalām' a solution to his doubts in his belief, after he could not be persuaded either by preaching or by traditional sayings; 2) the wise and well-informed man, whose faith was unwavering ('Kāmil al-'Aql', 'Rāsikh al-Qadam fī-l-Dīn') and who sought, by means of the 'Kalām', to save such a sceptic from his doubts, or to defend faith from dangerous innovations. However, every faith founded on the 'Kalām' ('Al-Īmān al-Mustafād min al-Dalīl al-Kalāmī') is weak, easily collapses ('Da'īf djidan, Mushrif 'alā al-Zawāl bi-Kulli Shubha), and



is far from the desirable, unwavering faith. One may say that the danger inherent in the 'Kalām' is greater than its benefit, much like a medicine which may harm the healthy or the one who takes an overdose. It is, therefore, desirable to keep far away from its "water" all those who cannot "swim" in it. Al-Ghazzālī accepted the general Ash'arite idea that man should never be encouraged to ask questions and discuss his faith as long as he is at peace with it in his heart.

Al-Ghazzālī repeated all this (though in a much more modified tone) in "Al-Munqidh", pp. 66-68. The 'Mutakallimūn',<sup>64</sup> are here described as a group of volunteers, whom Allah called upon to defend inherited tradition. Here Al-Ghazzālī attacked only their ways of polemic and their divergences from the well-defined limits of their task, when they tried in vain to probe more deeply into the real problems of religious knowledge. And even this attack is accompanied by the remark that they had, no doubt, helped many confused souls and healed them of their spiritual diseases, though he himself failed to find succour in their doctrines: "I do not exclude the possibility that for others these results have been sufficient; indeed I have no doubt that this has been so for quite a number ..."<sup>65</sup>.

Accordingly, the 'Kalām' may be of benefit to some people and harmful for others! Al-Ghazzālī almost denied here, as it were, the perils of 'Kalām' which he stressed so explicitly in the "Ihyā" and there is no trace left of his fierce attack on the 'Mutakallimūn' there. This moderate approach becomes even more positive in his

voluminous "Al-Mustasfā min 'Ilm Al-Uṣūl" which he composed after his return to Nīshāpūr in 1106<sup>66</sup>.

In the preface to that book, which deals with many subjects related to the 'Kalām', we find the only explicit words of praise by Al-Ghazzālī for the science of 'Kalām'. They appear in the division of sciences (in a different manner from the "Ihyā") into general sciences ('Ulūm Kulliyya') and particular sciences ('Ulūm Djuz'iyya'), where Al-Ghazzālī describes the 'Kalām' as part of the religious sciences, with a much wider scope than other parts like the 'Fiqh', 'Ḥadīth', 'Tafsīr' etc. Thus Al-Ghazzālī brought the 'Kalām' back within the framework of the religious sciences, but he did not let matters rest there. He even declared that the 'Kalām' was the most sublime of sciences, for it gives intellectual proof of the truth of he traditional sciences.

Moreover, the 'Mutakallimūn' appeared here remote from the description of "Awāmm who know some dialectics"<sup>67</sup>. They are considered the guides and teachers of all other scholars (like those who deal with 'Uṣūl Al-Fiqh!') who learn from them the basic elements of sciences by 'Taqlīd', and only then proceed to construct their own sciences on these foundations. It does, indeed, seem as if Al-Ghazzālī put aside, towards the end of his life, most of his more Ṣūfī doctrines, even though he mentioned many of them in the "Al-Mustasfā" itself! (Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 4-5: 'Ilm Ṭarīq al-Ākhira', 'Ma'rifat Asrār al-Dīn', 'Ilm al-Qalb wa-Tathīrhi' etc.) He seemed to go back as it were to study the elements of faith from the 'Mutakallimūn' by way of blind 'Taqlīd'!

اعلم ان العلوم تنقسم الى عقلية . . . والى دينية كاللغز والفقه واصول علم الحديث وعلم التفسير وعلم الباطن . . . وكل واحد من العقلية والدينية ينقسم الى كلية وجزئية فالعلم الكلي من العلوم الدينية هو الكلام وسائر العلوم من الفقه واصوله والحديث والتفسير علوم جزئية ، لان المفسر لا ينظر الا في معنى الكتاب خاصة ، والمحدث لا ينظر الا في طريق ثبوت الحديث خاصة ، والفقيه لا ينظر الا في احكام افعال المكلفين خاصة ، والاصولي لا ينظر الا في ادلة الاحكام الشرعية خاصة ، والمتكلم هو الذي ينظر في اعم الاشياء . وهو الموجود فيقسم الموجود اولا الى قديم وحادث ثم يقسم الحادث الى جوهر وعرض . . .

(المستصفي ٢٥٥ - ٢٦٠)

فانما الكلام هو المتكلم باثبات مبادئ العلوم الدينية كلها فهي جزئية بالاضافة الى الكلام ، فالعلم الاعلى في الرتبة ان منه النزول الى هذه الجزئيات (المستصفي ٢٦١ - ٢٦٦ الخ)

However, at exactly the same time Al-Ghazzālī also wrote other books such as "Al-Imlā Fī Ishkālāt Al-Ihyā" and the "Ildjām Al-'Awamm 'An 'Ilm Al-Kalām"<sup>68</sup>. Now, in these books he reiterated his opinions on the science of 'Kalām' in the manner of the "Ihyā" and its related books: The 'Mutakallim' does not basically differ from the 'Āmiyy' except in his capacity for linguistic polemic; the 'Kalām' has no part in the esoteric true science which deals with God, His actions and the revelation of truth to man, but it is only an auxiliary science, the purpose of which is to defend the 'Sharī'a', but from which true faith in God cannot be learned<sup>69</sup>. In the "Ildjām" the 'Fiqh' too descends

to the level of the low terrestrial sciences when Al-Ghazzālī explains how to drive away "from the shores of the sea of knowledge" those who could not survive its perils, and the term 'Āmiyy' again becomes wide and all inclusive:

وفي معنى العوام الاديب والنحوي والمحدث والمفسر والفقيه والمتكلم بل كل عالم سوى المتجربين لتعلم السباحة في بحار المعرفة (الجام ٦١١ - ٨)

. . . قلت طريقه ان يشتغل نفسه بعبادة الله وبالصلاة وقراءة القرآن والذكر فان لم يقدر فيعلم (فيعلم) آخرلا يناسب هذا الجنس من لغة او نحو او خط او طب او فقه فان لم يمكنه فبحرفة او صناعة ولو الحراثة والحياسة (الحياسة) فان لم يقدر فيلعب ولهو وكل ذلك خير له من الخوض في هذا البحر البعيد غوره وعمقه (الجام ٦١٨ - ٦١٩ الخ)

How should we, therefore, understand this frank contradiction between books which were probably written at practically the same time, between Al-Ghazzālī's return from his wanderings and solitude to teaching in Nīshāpūr and Tūs up to the day of his death (1106/499 Hg. - 1111/505 Hg.)?

It would seem that only the term 'Kitmān' or 'Taqiyya' (caution, see El) could answer this question. Al-Ghazzālī must have realized the necessity of appeasing the official religious scholars and paying respect, as it were, to their sciences, especially to theology and law, so that he could go on promulgating his religious-moral doctrines undisturbed. In "Al-Munqidh" he described the difficulties which would confront him, were he ever to return to public teaching<sup>70</sup>, and it is quite possible that his hesitation as to whether he should "come back" was mainly related to those

difficulties: Should he go back and reach his hand out towards that world and its leaders, whom he had so fiercely and firmly rejected in the years of his solitude? It may well be that his feeling of vocation and of the importance of his mission<sup>71</sup> for the renewal of Islam may have moved him to use the doubtful means of 'Taqiyya'. He may have wanted to avoid standing alone in his fight for renewal, as is the lot of everyone who rejects and discards all the accepted teaching; perhaps he tried also to avoid arousing the suspicions of the common people, who still admired the 'Ulamā and their profession, while attempting, in addition, to appease those 'Ulamā themselves. Here we have esoterism where we least expected it. As I have tried to show there is no trace of a "double truth" in Al-Ghazzālī's books with regard to the major religious problems, and one can only discern the fact that sometimes he revealed more of the one hidden truth to his "initiated" readers than at other times or in different books. However, on the public plane, we are aware that Al-Ghazzālī really hid his true feelings with regard to the official religious scholars and their sciences such as the 'Kalām', and even publicly voiced ideas which were not his real opinions. This he did so that he could go on unhindered with what he considered his great educational-religious task in the renewal of Islam and the purification of its followers.

This may also help us to find new answers to the well-known question: What kind of mystic was Al-Ghazzālī, if he ever was one<sup>72</sup>? I feel that there should be no doubt of the fact that Al-Ghazzālī really experienced authentic

mystic ecstasies and cherished deep mystical views about God, man, cosmos, gnosis etc., most of which he explained quite explicitly in authentic books of his such as the "Ihyā", "Djawāhir", "Al-Maqṣad" and "Mishkāṭ". He tried to infuse these views into traditional Islam, lending its basic principles deep inner meanings complementing its outward forms rather than contradicting them. Therefore he had no need for a secret doctrine, for a belief in double truths. He only revealed most of these deeper truths to those capable of understanding ('Ahlihi') while he withheld them from the masses.

Yet even as a mystic Al-Ghazzālī's outstanding characteristic was his social activity. He belonged to those mystics whose ecstatic experiences inspire them with a social-educational ideal and with a feeling of vocation and mission to confirm and to reinterpret their own tradition rather than try to revolt against it. G. Scholem describes these mystics thus:

"All mysticism has two contradictory and at the same time complementary aspects, a conservative and a revolutionary one. It depends on the character, perhaps I should say, personality, of the mystic and on the historical circumstances which confront him, whether he gives preeminence to one aspect or the other. It should now be clear that both elements are always present in him. He may want to conform, but is driven by his experience towards originality and independence. Operating in a concrete social context and saturated with tradition, his mystical upsurge may confirm his tradition and turn him into its protagonist and defender. When he becomes socially active, his spiritual energy released by a great encounter will be consciously

devoted to the preservation and intensification of his community and its life. His mind is not set on change albeit quite frequently on reform. Bent on restoring the spiritual element to its proper place in a society, where it only too often had lost its dynamic quality, he will try to infuse the social body with it. There is no end to the variety of such basically conservative activity of the mystic."<sup>73</sup>

Notes to Chapter V

1 See D.B. Macdonald, Life, p. 126 ff., and cf. "Ihya' I, 1, p. 96, 5: "Falāyanbaghī an yufshiya al-'ālim kullā ma ya'lamilā kulli ahad."

2 According to D.B. Macdonald (ibid., p. 125 ff.) Al-Ghazzālī's whole approach developed from the Ash'arite esoteric principle of 'Bilā-Kaifa'.

The division of men into élite and masses and the whole idea of esoteric teaching seems to have come first from Greek or Gnostic sources to Islamic philosophy, and was extremely widespread in Islam as well as in Judaism and Christianity. See G.F. Hourani - "Ibn Sīnā's 'Essay on the Secret of Destiny'", BSOAS 29, 1966, pp. 25-48, and idem, Averroes, On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, (translation), (London, 1961), Introduction, p. 32 ff.; N. Keddie - "Symbol and Sincerity in Islam", Studia Islamica 19, 1963, pp. 27-66; M. Mahdi - Ibn Khaldūn's Philosophy of History, (London, 1957), Ch. 2, IV; G. Makdisi - "Asha'rī and the Asha'rites in Islamic Religious History", Studia Islamica 17, 1962, pp. 37-80. Cf. also A.H. Abdel-Kader - Al-Junayd, pp. 35-37; I. Goldziher - Le Livre d'Ibn Tournert, pp. 75-76, and Maimonides - Guide of the Perplexed (translated by S. Pines with introduction by L. Strauss), (Chicago, 1953), Introduction and last chapter, and H.A. Wolfson - "The Double Faith Theory in Clement, Saadia, Averroes and St. Thomas and its Origin in Aristotle and the Stoics", Jewish Quarterly Review 33, 1942-3, pp.

213-264; L. Strauss - Persecution and the Art of Writing, (Glencoe, Ill., 1952). See also Y. Friedmann - Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindī, McGill Queen's University Press, 1971, p. 50.

3 Cf. Macdonald, Life, p. 113, 2. Abu 'Abd Al-Māzarī died in 1141/536 Hg. He wrote a book named "Kitāb Al-Kashf wa-l-Anbā 'an Kitāb Al-Ihyā". See also Al-Subkī, *ibid.*, p. 123, 8-8, and cf. 'Abd-Al-Karīm 'Uthmān - Sīrat Al-Ghazzālī, p. 73 ff.

4 This Ḥadīth appears frequently in Al-Ghazzālī's discussions of esoteric discipline. Cf., e.g., "Mīzān", p. 176, 6-5; "Al-Imlā", p. 3068, 2.

5 Through Greek-Hellenistic influences there are some interesting points in common between Al-Ghazzālī's Sūfi theory on the Perfect Man and the theories of Philon, Rabbi Jehuda Halevi, Maimonides and others on the same subject. Cf. especially J. Heinemann, Die Lehre von der Zweckbestimmung des Menschen im griechisch-romischen Altertum und im juedischen Mittelalter, (Breslau, 1926); "Der Begriff des Uebermenschen in der juedischen Religionsphilosophie", Morgen I, 1925, pp. 3-17.

6 See this expression in "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2123, last line. (Cf. also p. 239 above and "Ma'āridj Al-Quds", p. 12, last line). Al-Ghazzālī elaborates on all these ideas, mentioned here briefly, in many places in his books. See, e.g.: "Mīzān", p. 32, 102 ff.; "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 431; *ibid.* III, 1, 1360 ff.; 8, 1845; IV, 6, 2593; 9, 2830; "Al-

Arba'īn" 109, p. 218 ff. Cf. also "Ihyā" I, 4, p. 306; *ibid.*, IV, 8, 2280 (the moral exegesis of Qur'ānic verses which Al-Ghazzālī combines with these ideas), and "Tahāfut", p. 347. Again these theories were quite common in all Muslim mediaeval literature (see for example Ikhwān Al-Safā, "Rasā'il" III, twelfth Risāla, p. 289; IV, first Risāla, p. 318) as well as in Jewish-Arabic literature. (Cf. Maimonides, Mishne Tora, Sefer Hamada', "On Repentance", VII, end of 4th section).

7 See "Ihyā" I, 3, p. 226. (Cf. Maimonides [tn Gorfinkel] Eight Chapters on Ethics, Ch. 4). Here again we have the relative aspect of Al-Ghazzālī's doctrine: Cleaning the house and preparing everyday needs is, according to Al-Ghazzālī, a waste of time for the real 'Ālim', while it is a worthwhile occupation for the ignorant, who would otherwise only make mischief.

8 Cf. Zakī Mubārak's modern attack on Al-Ghazzālī because of these utterances (Zakī Mubārak, Al-Akhlāq inda Al-Ghazzālī, Cairo, 1925?, p. 250).

9 See "Ihyā" IV, 5, p. 2495, 3 ff.; "Al-Arba'īn" 27, 7 ff.; "Al-Qustās", pp. 86-87; "Al-Imlā", p. 3070, 9 ff.; "Ildjām", p. 11, 6-8.

10 Cf. "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 39, or "Djawāhir" p. 28. Parables concerning the 'Ḥadjdj' appear in Al-Ghazzālī's writings in other contexts too. For example, the 'Ḥadjdj' may be looked upon as a parable of man's life in this world, his striving forward towards Allah ("Ihyā" IV, 4, p. 2402, 7 ff.;

"Al-Arba'īn, p. 165, 1 ff.). See also the allegorical interpretation of the 'Ḥadjdj' in "Ihyā" I, 7, p. 486. Cf. above Ch. IV, n. 17.

Cf. also my unpublished M.A. thesis (in Hebrew) on the Religious Commandments in Ihyā 'ULūm Al-Dīn, Ch. 5: "The Symbolic Meaning of the Religious Commandments in Al-Ghazzālī's Ihyā" and my forthcoming study "The Religious Dialectics of the Ḥadjdj".

11 Cf., e.g., "Al-Munqidh", p. 82, 11; 84, 8-7 (including the parable of the snake-charmer who must not touch the snake in front of his young son because he knows that the boy will try to imitate him), "Ildjām", p. 11 ff., 23, 4. See also "Risālāt Al-Wa'z wa-l-I'tiqād", p. 30, 10. The whole idea is connected with the widely used metaphor of comparing knowledge and science to a deep sea. See "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 65, 5 ff.; 121, 15-16; "Djawāhir", p. 9, 7-6; "Al-Arba'īn", p. 240; "Ildjām", p. 10, 5, and especially the beginning of "Al-Munqidh". Cf. also below p. 387.

12 See also the esoteric approach to the Ḥadīth and 'Kalām' in "Al-Iqtisād", p. 7 ff.; "Faiṣal", p. 12, 2 ff.; 21, 12 ff.; "Ildjām", p. 3, 11 ff. And cf. p. 360 below.

13 See details in "Mīzān", pp. 174-175; "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 96 ff.

14 See e.g. "Mīzān", p. 174, 7; "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 96, 12. Cf. also "Qūt Al-Qulūb" I, 2, p. 32 ff.

15 Cf. "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 96, 6; *ibid.*, IV, 7, p. 2500, 2; "Mishkāt", p. 31, 12-13 (Introduction); "Al-Imlā", p. 3069, 2. See also the attack of Shams Al-Dīn Al-Dhahabī (d. 1153/548 Hg.) on Al-Ghazzālī because of these quotations and his division of the sciences - according to 'Abd-Al-Karīm 'Uthmān, *ibid.*, p. 74.

16 Usually Al-Ghazzālī quotes this last line only. See "Al-Iqtisād", p. 7, 8; 175, 8; "Mishkāt", p. 31, 4. Only in "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 96, does he quote additional lines. According to "Al-Iqtisād", the poem's author was Al-Shafī'ī, but this is doubtful. See also "Ma'āridj Al-Quds", p. 210, 1.

17 See for example "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 24 ff.; "Djawāhir", p. 21, 1 ff. "Al-Mustasfā", p. 5 ff. Cf. also "Al-Risāla Al-Ladunniyya" attributed to Al-Ghazzālī and G.E. von Grunebaum on this "Risāla" in his Medieval Islam, (Chicago, 1953), p. 170, ff. (Apparently von Grunebaum accepts this "Risāla" as authentic, following M. Smith's translation in JRAS, 1938). See Ch. III. Cf. also H. Laoust, *ibid.*, p. 195 ff.

As for the division of the sciences in general in Islamic literature see The Cambridge History of Islam (ed. by M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton, and B. Lewis), Vol. II, Ch. II, "Science" by G. Anawati, especially p. 744 ff.

18 Al-Ghazzālī means here obvious truths such as that man cannot be in two places at one time, that one thing cannot be both eternal and created, both present and absent, etc. Cf. "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1376 and "Al-Munqidh", p. 61. See

also p. 60 ff. above.

19 These sciences may be acquired both through study and revelation (the latter being quicker and better). Cf. "Iḥyā" III, 1, p. 1376 (with the famous parable of the Chinese and Byzantine painter) "Mīzān", p. 46 and Ch. VI below.

20 Elsewhere Al-Ghazzālī suggests medicine and astrology as examples of sciences started by man through prophetic revelation and therefore proving the truth of prophecy. Cf. "Al-Munqidh", p. 107, 11 ff. Sometimes these sciences prove the truth of prophecy in other indirect ways also. Cf. "Al-Arbaʿīn", p. 111, 8 ff.; "Al-Munqidh", p. 119, 6 ff.

21 The Kalām in particular is described as a medicine. Cf. "Al-Iqtisād", p. 6 ff., and "Al-Munqidh", p. 67, 8; 68, 4-6. Yet in "Mīzān" (p. 146) the picture is reversed: traditional sciences are depicted as food and the rational sciences as medicine. Elsewhere traditional sciences appear both as food and medicine ("Iḥyā" IV, 1, p. 2167, 6-5). See also the recurring motif that the religious commandments are like medicine, while prophets and sages are like doctors. (Cf. "Al-Munqidh", pp. 110-116; Ch. II, n. 12Q, 135 above). Cf. also J. Gardet and G. Anawati, Introduction a la Théologie Musulmane, (Paris, 1948), p. 71.

22 Cf. "Mīzān", pp. 53-54, where the first science is called 'Al-'Ilm Al-'Amalī' and the second 'Al-'Ilm Al-Nazarī' according to common philosophical tradition.

### Esoteric Aspect

(Sometimes the philosophers use also 'ʿIlm Ilāhī'. Cf. Shahrastānī on the philosophers). See also F. Jabre, Certitude, p. 372, on the common terminology of both "Mīzān" and the "Mustazhirī".

23 See "Iḥyā" I, 1, p. 36 ff.; *ibid.*, III, 10, p. 2028, ff.; *ibid.*, IV, 1, p. 2089, 3 ff. (Only once, in "Iḥyā" III, 1, p. 1349, 8, is this science also called 'ʿIlm Bāṭin', meaning the real inner way of performing the religious duties.) At least part of this science includes what Al-Ghazzālī terms 'Fiqh al-Dīn' or 'Fiqh al-Nafs'. See p. 380 below.

24 See "Iḥyā" I, 1, p. 35 ff.; 65, 5 ff. Al-Ghazzālī rejects the assumption that mystical (or intellectual) cognition in itself is sufficient to ensure the perfection of the soul (see "Iḥyā" III, 10, p. 2030, ff.), and he usually talks about 'ʿIlm wa-'Amal', but of course puts the 'ʿIlm' or 'Maʿrifa' on a higher stage than 'ʿAmal'. Cf. "Iḥyā" IV, 6, p. 2618 ff., and Ch. VI below.

25 Cf. W.M. Watt, JRAS, 1949, pp. 18-20 and see p. 305 above. (Yet in JRAS, 1952, pp. 38-40 [45] he expresses doubts about the authenticity of this book in its present form). Cf. also M. Smith, JRAS, 1938, p. 181.

26 Cf. Maimonides - Guide to the Perplexed III, Ch. 32.

27 For example, the esoteric "Mishkāṭ", wherein Al-Ghazzālī divulges secret truths to the chosen few, abounds in remarks of this kind. Usually they are placed there

after discussion and elaboration of the esoteric subject; he hints that what has been said - though it is only a small part of the whole truth - is sufficient for those who understand, and that he cannot go into further details etc. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 41, 12; 43, 15-16; 55, 1; 59, 3; 60, 2.

Remarks such as 'wa-sharḥu dhālika yaṭūlu', 'walasnā nuṭawwīlu al-kalām bihi', 'lā khaira fi-l-taṭwīl', 'laisa yattasi'ū lahu al'āna waqtī', etc., are very frequent in most of Al-Ghazzālī's writings. He often praises the short, clear manner of writing (cf. the introductions of "Al-Wadḥīz", "Al-Mustazhiri", "Al-Iqtisād", and "Iḥyā" and see also "Mishkāṭ", p. 34. 11), but seldom writes very briefly himself. Often a remark like this will appear before or after a lengthy discussion of a subject. (Cf. "Mizān", p. 3, 5-6; "Faiṣal", p. 4, 8; 15, 12-10; "Mishkāṭ", p. 53, 9). Yet usually Al-Ghazzālī tries not to deviate from his main subject and clearly mentions this. (Cf. "Tahāfut", p. 377, 6-8; "Iḥyā" IV, 1, p. 2101, 10; "Mishkāṭ", p. 34, 1-2). This manner of adhering to his plan of writing may be characteristic of his clear way of writing, and is quite unusual in most mystical literature. (Yet, cf. also the Introduction of Al-Qushayrī's "Risāla", p. 3, 3-2). But the remarks on the efficiency of writing briefly without adhering to them in the least are very characteristic of all Ṣūfī literature (Cf. also Al-Qushayrī, *ibid.*, p. 7, 14; 8, 11; "Qūt Al-Qulūb" I, 2, p. 86, 9-10), perhaps even characteristic of all kinds of Arabic literature.

28 Cf. also A.J. Wemmsinck, Pensée, pp. 128-129, and see "Iḥyā" IV, 6, p. 2601, 12 ff., where Al-Ghazzālī mentions the kind of subjects which should not be dealt with in public.

29 Cf. also "Imlā", p. 3067, 6-3, and see n. 2 above, especially G.F. Hourani on Ibn Sīnā's Essay on the Secret Destiny. See also L. Strauss, "How to Begin to Study the Guide of the Perplexed", in S. Pines (translation), Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago, 1953), p. 58. Of course it would seem that there is a basic difference between Al-Ghazzālī and Maimonides. Al-Ghazzālī, I believe, had no secret doctrine but only divulged more or less of the same truth to different kinds of his readers, whereas Maimonides, according to Strauss and Pines, was at heart a real Aristotelian but dared not to acknowledge this publicly.

30 Cf. M. Bouyges, Essai, p. 41 ff.; H. Bauer, "Zum Titel und zur Abfassung von Ghazzālī's Iḥyā", Der Islam 4, (1913), pp. 159-160; Hitzig, "Ueber Gazzālī's Iḥyā 'Ulūm al-Dīn", ZDMG VII, 1853, pp. 172-186; G.F. Hourani, "The Chronology of Ghazzālī's writings", JAOS 79, 1959, p. 229 ff. According to Dr. J. Friedmann of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem (in a letter dated 11.1.1965) one of the libraries in Haiderabad (Arshi Kutubkhana) has a ms. of the "Iḥyā" from the year 1147/542 Hg. (less than fifty years after Al-Ghazzālī's death!).

31 Cf. also H. Laoust, La Pditique de Gazālī, p. 90 ff.



See also *ibid.*, pp. 115-133, his thorough analysis of the "Iḥyā" from different aspects, excluding the esoteric one. It may well be assumed that this book was one of the main reasons for the burning of the "Iḥyā" in the Maghrib, where the 'Ulamā' reacted most vehemently to the personal attack launched at them by Al-Ghazzālī, rather than to the heretic ideas expressed by him in the "Iḥyā". Cf. J. Goldziher, Le Livre d'Ibn Toumert, pp. 35-36.

32 Seen from this aspect there seems to be some autobiographical truth in Al-Ghazzālī's account in "Al-Munqidh" about his crisis in Baghdad. (See *ibid.*, the chapter on the "Taṣawwuf"). Even small remarks may attest to this, as for example when Satan in his attempt to persuade Al-Ghazzālī not to leave Baghdad says that here Al-Ghazzālī is "untouched by the contentions of his adversaries" (p. 98, 2 ff.), which seems to have been an exception to the rule! But cf. also Ch. I, n. 21. Cf. also H. Laoust, *ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

33 Cf. "Iḥyā" I, 1, 'Bayān Āfāt al-Munāẓara Wa-Mā Yatawalladu Minhā Min Muhlikāt al-Akhlāq', particularly p. 76, 10-17 to p. 81, with the vices mentioned in the headings of the books which constitute Part III of the "Iḥyā".

Cf. also, for example, "Iḥyā" I, 1, 42, 7-6 (where it is stated that the most rebellious member of the body of an 'Ālim' is his tongue, over which he cannot obtain mastery or exercise control) with "Iḥyā" III, 4, "Kitāb Āfāt Al-Lisān"!

34 This may be connected also with Al-Ghazzālī's attempt

to encourage the study of medicine and other subjects instead of Law and Theology, which of course give promise of much more prestige. (This fact may also be part of the social struggle of the 'Ulamā' against the influx of too many youths into their professions, in which Al-Ghazzālī had a share, perhaps quite unintentionally. See Ch. VII below). See also H. Ritter, "Hat die religioese Orthodoxie einen Einfluss auf die Dekadenz des Islam gehabt?", (in: G.E. von Grunebaum u. W. Hartner [eds.], Klassizismus u. Kulturverfall, Frankfurt a/M, 1960), and I. Goldziher, Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften, Phil. Hist. Klass, Nr. 8 (Berlin, 1916).

35 In this context the following sentences recur:

فاعلم ان هذا من علم المكاشفة فلا يليق ذكره بعلم المعاملة  
فلنقبض عنان البيان عن هذا الفن فهو وراء ما نحن بصدده  
انه من اسرار علم المكاشفة ولا رخصة في اظهاره  
وذلك مما لم يتكلم فيه رسول الله فليس لغيره ان يتكلم فيه

See also "Djawāhir", p. 29, where the "Iḥyā" is described as dealing with 'Ilm al-Mu'āmalā' only.

36 See, e.g., the discussion of reason and heart in "Iḥyā" III, 1, p. 1349 ff., and his remark *ibid.*, p. 1350, 7-10, about the esoteric character of these terms or the discussion of dreams, *ibid.*, IV, 10, p. 2947 ff. Cf. also "Iḥyā" I, 9, p. 546, 2 ff., where Al-Ghazzālī shows that he cannot explain the real meaning of prayer, because this is part of the esoteric 'Ilm al-Mukāshafa'. But he had

already explained it quite thoroughly, *ibid.*, I, 4, p. 286! (Perhaps he composed "Ihyā I, 9, before "Ihyā I, 4).

37 See also "Al-Arba'īn", p. 72, 1-3; 103, 3-7; 106, 8-9, and cf. "Al-Maqṣad", at the end of the explanation of the title 'Al-Rahmān'.

38 For example, the last passage there deals with man's temptation through false revelations and Al-Ghazzālī quotes there the famous Ḥadīth about the seventy veils of light (cf. "Mishkāt", p. 56 ff.), he mentions the ecstatic cries ('Shath') of Al-Hallādj (without mentioning him explicitly) and the Christian doctrine of incarnation ('Hulūl). He quotes also the beautiful poem of which he is very fond, by Al-Ṣāhib Ismā'il b. 'Abbād (d. 995/385 Hg.). Cf. V. Kremer, *Ideen*, p. 73, n. 1; M. Smith, *Al-Ghazzālī*, p. 115, n. 4. See also "Ihyā" II, 8, p. 1165; "Al-Maqṣad", p. 75; "Mishkāt", p. 4 etc. Cf. also H. Lazaruz-Yafeh, "Is there a Concept of Redemption in Islam?", in R.J.Z. Werblowsky and C.J. Bleeker (eds.), *Types of Redemption*, (Leiden, 1970), p. 179, and R. Zaehner, *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism*, p. 165. The same discussion, with much the same motifs (including Bayāzīd's 'Shatahāt) appears also in "Al-Mustazhiri", p. 30; "Mīzān", pp. 29-30; "Ihyā" I, 1, pp. 60-61; "Al-Maqṣad", p. 61, 10 ff.; 75, 9 ff. In all the above cases Al-Ghazzālī has reservations with regard to the 'Shath' though in different measure according to his public. Cf. also "Mi'rādj Al-Sālikīn", p. 77. As for Al-Ghazzālī's ambivalent attitude to Al-Hallādj see Ch. IV above, n. 26, and cf. A.J. Wensinck, *Semiet. St.*, p. 206; M. Smith,

*Al-Ghazzālī*, p. 234; F. Jabre, *Certitude*, pp. 208-209.

39 Cf. Bouyges, *Essai*, pp. 46-47, and Ch. III above.

40 See this explicitly also in "Djawāhir", pp. 29-31. The "Djawāhir" and "Al-Arba'īn" are considered by Al-Ghazzālī as three parts (two and one) of one book, but he admits also that the "Djawāhir" can be read as a separate book. Cf. his introduction to both "Djawāhir" (p. 6, 9) and "Al-Arba'īn" (p. 5, 3). As for esoteric remarks in "Al-Arba'īn", cf. n. 37 above.

41 See the frequent use of 'Ghawr' in these examples. Cf. p. 130ff. above. As for the recurring verb 'istanshaqa' - cf. Ch. IV, n. 70 above. Most interesting are the names of the books in "Ihyā" as Al-Ghazzālī quoted them here. Perhaps the "Ihyā" was not yet finished or its inner division at the time Al-Ghazzālī composed "Al-Arba'īn" was different from what we know today; or perhaps Al-Ghazzālī just quoted the names in a short and inaccurate manner.

42 This is also borne out by comparing the "Ihyā" with "Al-Arba'īn", which is in a way a shortened version of the "Ihyā" (cf. Al-Ghazzālī's own remarks about this in "Al-Arba'īn", e.g., p. 83, 1-3; 96, 6-3; 115, 4-5; 209, 4-6). Yet the literary character of "Al-Arba'īn" differs definitely from the "Ihyā"; most details on Law from "Ihyā" I, 3-6, do not appear in it and several esoteric books from the latter are not to be found in it at all, as for example: "Ihyā" III, 1 ("Sharḥ 'Adjā'ib Al-Qalb"); first

part of the "Ihyā IV, 5 ("Kitāb Al-Tawhīd") and of "Ihyā IV, 6 ("Kitāb Al-Mahabba). Of course one must be extremely careful here; a mere comparison of the lists of contents in both books would be quite misleading, as the same subjects may be covered under different headings. For example some of the Ṣūfī parts of the "Ihyā" such as II, 6, II, 8 or III, 2 are not found in "Al-Arba'īn" under the same title, though their subjects are discussed elsewhere; and, vice versa, books bearing the same titles in both the "Ihyā" and "Al-Arba'īn" may be of different lengths and attitudes, and the contents may even be different. This is what happened to the "Kitāb Al-Tawba" in "Al-Arba'īn", where it shrank from 100 pp. approximately in the "Ihyā" to only 10 pp. All the discussions about Free Will and Predestination, the Last Judgement, Belief and Heresy, 'Ta'wīl', 'Taqlīd' etc. do not appear in "Al-Arba'īn" at all and the small book on 'Tawba' in "Al-Arba'īn" is much more definite, positive, "all-knowing" as it were, more instructive to the masses than its parallel in the "Ihyā", where Al-Ghazzālī searched for truth and wrestled with each concept - but with the "initiated" only.

It may well be that a more thorough and general comparison between the "Ihyā" and "Al-Arba'īn" would bring to light many interesting details about Al-Ghazzālī's method of writing, especially about his planning of the construction of the "Ihyā" etc. It seems that one should not take too seriously his own remarks about these matters. Cf., e.g., "Ihyā" IV, 1, at the end (p. 2174, 2-7) where he explains why after the "Book of Penitence" ('Tawba') there

must follow the "Book of Endurance" ('Ṣabr'), to "Al-Arba'īn", p. 227, 2; there he explains that after the Book on Penitence there must necessarily follow the Book on Fear of God ... Again this may be because of the different public to whom he addressed these books. Some remarks of this kind may also be later interpolations.

43 Cf. "Al-Munqidh", p. 69, 3; 99, 9 ff. See also Bouyges, *Essai*, p. 7 ff., and H. Laoust, *La Politique de Gazālī*, pp. 20, 64-65. The "Al-Mustazhiri" may of course also be considered a book of 'Fiqh', containing even legal devices ('Hiyal'). See "Fadāih Al-Bā'iniyya" (ed. Badawi), p. 168 ff.

44 "Al-Munqidh", p. 66, 2-3.

45 See the "Muqaddima", sixth part, Faṣl 10 on 'Ilm Al-Kalām', ed. Quatremère, Vol. III, p. 41, 6 (Translation F. Rosenthal III, p. 52, 17). According to S. Pines one should consider also the "Tahāfut" and "Al-Mustazhiri" as books of 'Kalām' in the real meaning of the term. Cf. his "A Note on an Early Meaning of the Term 'Mutakallim' in *Israel Oriental Studies I*, (Tel-Aviv, 1971), pp. 224-238, esp. 237.

46 Cf. n. 3 above on Abū 'Abd-Al-Māzarī and see the whole passage, quoted here in short, in Al-Subki's "Ṭabaqāt". It contains interesting remarks on the possible influence of the Ikhwān Al-Ṣafā, Ibn Sīnā and Abū Ḥayyān Al-Tawhīdī on Al-Ghazzālī. See also Goldziher's remarks in *Revue des Etudes Juives*, 1904, p. 106, and cf. Ch. III,

above.

47 Cf. H. Bauer, Die Dogmatik Al-Ghazzālī's, (Halle, 1912), p. 2; Bouyges, Essai, p. 11; G. Hourani, "Chronology", JAOS, 1959, p. 226; F. Jabre, Certitude, p. 375 ff.

48 Cf. "Ihyā", General Introduction, p. 5, 7 ff. See also W. Heffening, "Zum Aufbau der islamischen Rechtswerke", Studien zur Geschichte u. Kultur des nahen u. fernen Ostens, P. Kahle zum 60. Geburtstag ueberreicht, (Leiden, 1935), pp. 101-118. On the general influence of law on all Arabic literature cf. G. Bergstraesser, Grundzuege des Islamischen Rechts, (her. von J. Schacht, 1930), Introduction; F. Rosenthal, Technique and Approach, p. 41, n. 1.

49 Cf. the recurring term "Ibāra 'an", see Index of Arabic terms.

50 Of course one cannot deny the influence of theological literature and modes of discussion on Al-Ghazzālī's mode of writing too. Cf., e.g., "Mīzān", p. 52, 6 ff.: 'Dhālika lā yahlū immā an yakūnā ... wa-immā an yakūnā ... wa-bātil an yakūnā ...' etc., and see "Al-Iqtisād", p. 9, 17 ff., ('Al-Sabr wa-l-Taqsīm'). The division into sub-sections, grades etc. for example, is a characteristic of theological literature as well (and of philosophical and Ṣūfī writings too). It will therefore be difficult to decide where Al-Ghazzālī borrowed his specific methods of writing from, or if he had any main source of influence. Personally, I feel that further studies in this subject may confirm the deep influence of the 'Fiqh' on Al-Ghazzālī, which may account

for the great difference between his clear-cut style and the common, vague, mystical one.

51 Cf. Ch. II, p. 59 above.

52 See "Ihyā" I, 6, p. 428 ff. Al-Ghazzālī follows here moral sayings of the Ḥadīth, which were elaborated upon in the Ṣūfī literature before him. See, e.g., "Qūt-Al-Qulūb" I, 1, Ch. 22, esp. pp. 109, 113 ff.

53 Cf. Bouyges, Essai, p. 49. Bouyges' main reason for his new approach to this book is an inaccurate colophon added to Ms. 916, Cairo (Fiqh Shāfi'ī) of "Al-Wadjīz", which gives the year 1101/495 Hg., as the date of composition of the book.

Of course Bouyges discusses there also the fact that the "Ihyā" quotes "Al-Wadjīz" ("Ihyā" I, 4, Introduction, p. 260, 9). Yet I would not stress this fact too much, as mediaeval writers often composed several books at one time (!) and even "quoted" from books, which they had not yet written! Cf. G.F. Hourani, "Chronology", JAOS, 1959, pp. 228, 231. The main reason for rejecting Bouyges' assumption that "Al-Wadjīz" is a late book lies in the book itself: its style and contents seem to belong to a rather early date in Al-Ghazzālī's life.

54 See "Ihyā" I, 4, p. 287, and cf. "Al-Mustazhiri", p. 27. Cf. also Maimonides, "Mishne Tora, Sefer Ha'ahava Qri'at Shma", 2, with his Guide to the Perplexed, III, Ch. 51. In the first book, addressed to all people,

Maimonides demands a minimum concentration in prayer during the reading of the main tenets of belief. Yet in the Guide, addressing himself to the "initiated", he states that this is not enough and demands much more! See also Ch. VI below, and cf. also J. Obermann, Der Philosophische u. Religioese Subjektivismus, p. 170 ff., and I. Goldziher, Streitschrift, p. 102 ff., and M.J. Kister, "Rajab is the Month of God" in Israel Oriental Studies I, (Tel Aviv, 1971), p. 217 (about Al-Ghazzālī recommending a 'Bid'a').

Al-Ghazzālī's personal attachment to the profession of 'Faḡīh' may be asserted also by the recurrent parable of the student of 'Fiqh'. Cf. "Al-Mustazhirī", p. 28; "Mīzān" pp. 37, 73; "Iḡyā" III, 2, p. 1452. On his attitude to the science of law see also "Iḡyā" II, 10, p. 1255, and "Djawāhir", p. 19.

55 These terms already appear in early books by Al-Ghazzālī. Cf. "Al-Mustazhirī", p. 28, 1, 8; "Mīzān", pp. 72-73. He elaborated upon it in the "Iḡyā" I, 1, p. 30 ff. See also *ibid.*, IV, 1, p. 2150, 8; "Al-Maqṣad", p. 45, 11. Al-Ghazzālī is not original in using these terms. See I. Goldziher, Streitschrift, Introduction, p. 104, n. 1; p. 105, n. 1, and Le Livre d'Ibn Tournert, p. 28, 2. Cf. also Al-Ḥakīm Al-Tirmidhī's recurring phrase: 'Zādaka Allah fiḡhan fī-l-Dīn' in his "Bayān Al-Farq baina Al-Ṣadr wa-l-Qalb", p. 33, 8; 34, 5 et al., and *ibid.*, p. 77 ff., for his description of 'Fiqh Al-Qalb'. Cf. also "Qūt Al-Qulūb" I, 2, p. 18, 5; 24, 11, and especially pp. 26-27. According to Goldziher (Der Islam 9, p. 149, n. 2)

Ibn Qayyim Al-Djawziyya (d. 1350/751 Hg.) followed Al-Ghazzālī in using this term. Cf. also Ch. VII below.

56 See "Iḡyā" I, 1, p. 92, 4 ff.: everyone needs a doctor and medicine, but only communities need the law ('Fiqh'). This law is degraded here into an auxiliary science for the rulers (cf. Hobbes' doctrine!): If people were to live in peace with one another no-one would need law and the doctors of law would be quite unnecessary! (Cf. "Iḡyā" I, 1, p. 30, 10, but see also p. 33, 3 ff.) Cf. also "Al-Iḡtiṣād", p. 8, 2 ff., where the law is seen as the science that all people need at all times, whereas theology is a science necessary only for the few who are sick.

57 See "Iḡyā" I, 4, pp. 287-288; I, 6, 431, and cf. also *ibid.*, I, 1, pp. 37, 67, 72-73, 92. Cf. also "Qūt Al-Qulūb" I, 4, p. 8 ff. It may be worthwhile to mention here that in spite of this-later Sūfīs considered Al-Ghazzālī as an orthodox 'Faḡīh' much more than a Sūfī. See M. Winter's unpublished Ph.D. thesis on Al-Sha'rānī (Los Angeles, 1972), p. 306, n. 227.

58 Cf. Gardet-Anawati, Introduction a la Theologie ... p. 70; F. Jabre, Certitude, p. 99; H. Laoust - La Politique ... p. 210 ff. In "Al-Iḡtiṣād" itself the 'Kalām is still considered an important science (cf. p. 4 ff.), but the whole book represents a curious mixture of Ash'arite traditional beliefs and Al-Ghazzālī's independent opinions. Cf. also "Iḡyā" I, 1, p. 38, 3 ff.; "Al-Arba'īn", p. 26, 2 ff., and see Bouyges, Essai, p. 33 ff.

59 Cf. above. It is worth noting that generally the 'Mutakallim' is described as an 'Āmiyy', whereas

this is not so in the case of the 'Faql̄h', who usually stands in direct contrast to the 'Āmiyy'. See "Ihyā" IV, 6, p. 2623, 2 ff.

60 See the parable "Zaid in the house", "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1370, 3 ff., and cf. Jabre, Certitude, p. 93. Cf. also Appendix B below.

61 See p. 227 above, n. 85.

62 See "Faiṣal", p. 21, 3 ff., and cf. "Ildjām", p. 19, 6 ff.

63 Cf. p. 105 above.

64 Al-Ghazzālī meant of course the Ash'arite theologians whereas the so-called "heretics" here are the Mu'tazilites.

65 See "Al-Munqidh", p. 68 ff., and W.M. Watt's translation in The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazzālī, p. 29.

66 According to Ibn Khallikān (Vol. I, p. 587, 13) Al-Ghazzālī finished this book in 1109/503 Hg. Cf. also Bouyges, Essai, pp. 73-75; H. Laoust, La Politique de Gazālī, p. 152 ff. See also M. Schreiner, Geschichte des Aś'aritentums, p. 21. Schreiner stressed the fact that the 'Kalām' deeply influenced the science of 'Uṣūl Al-Fiqh'.

67 Cf. p. 355 above.

68 Cf. Bouyges, Essai, pp. 75-78, 80-82. Scholars differ

in their views as to the date of composition of "Al-Imlā". Bouyges' suggestion that it was finished at the beginning of the sixth Hg. century seems most probable, being as it were an answer to the attacks on the "Ihyā", especially in the Maghrib. As for the date of "Ildjām", Bouyges fixed it at 505 Hg., just before Al-Ghazzālī's death, relying on a colophon in a Ms. dated 509 Hg. (Bibl. Šehid Ali Paša, Nr. 1712).

69. Cf. "Al-Imlā", pp. 3070-3072.

70 Cr. "Al-Munqidh", p. 114, especially 10-9.

71 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 115.

72 Cf. R. Zaehner, Hindu and Muslim Mysticism, (London, 1960), p. 153 ff.

73 G. Scholem, "Mysticism and Society", in Diogenes, 57, 1967, p. 15, and see the whole article there, pp. 1-24.

## CHAPTER VI

Place of the Religious Commandments in the  
Philosophy of Al-Ghazzālī\*

It is well known that the homage accorded to Al-Ghazzālī by almost all sections of Islam was due largely to his success in showing the compatibility of mysticism with punctilious observance of the ritual laws. Not only was his own personality, with its rare combination of a dry legal scholar and a profoundly emotional mystic, a living demonstration of this truth, but he also devoted a considerable part of his writings, especially in his great work "Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn", to providing it with ample proof<sup>1</sup>.

Therefore it would be a mistake to suppose that Al-Ghazzālī relegated the religious commandments of Islam to a position of minor significance in his philosophy. On the contrary, these commandments occupy the center of his whole system of thought, so much so that he repeatedly returns to discussing the most diverse topics, and again and again, in all sorts of ways, emphasizes their importance and influence. Nor is this at all surprising. For just as Al-Ghazzālī aspired to give a deeper content to the religious life of those circles which, while keeping the commandments

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\* As has been mentioned already this chapter is part of a larger M.A. thesis on Al-Ghazzālī's exegesis of the religious commandments. The thesis contains seven chapters with appendices and it was therefore impossible to include all of it in this book.

of Islam, did so mechanically and without any inner devotion, so he also wished to revive a punctilious and rigorous observance of those commandments in those of his contemporaries amongst whom there was widespread disregard of religious law and of the daily practices ordained by it ('Ibāhiyya'). He was particularly concerned, like Al-Qushayrī before him, to extirpate this attitude of indifference from amongst the Ṣūfīs where it had taken a strong hold, and therefore he repeatedly stressed that it is wrong to seek "the way of the world to come" in the Ṣūfī spirit, without sincere and heartfelt observance of the religious commandments.

In Al-Ghazzālī's opinion, the uniqueness of man and the divine element in him consist in his ability to know and understand the truth about objects, the world and God. Now, every creature has been created for the sake of its own particular unique attribute in the full development of which it finds its mission and perfection. Hence, man's perfection and everlasting joy in the presence of his God lies in his attainment of true, eternal knowledge. If man does not seek after the knowledge for which he was created, he degrades himself to the level of the beasts. But if he pursues it with all his might, he can exalt himself to the ranks of the angels<sup>2</sup>. This knowledge brings man to the true love of God, which is the source of the love of one's fellow-men and of all the other human virtues, and thereby gives him a slight foretaste in this world of the joy everlasting in store for him in the next<sup>3</sup>.

However, man usually goes astray in his search for his

perfection. For most human beings, the element of the Divine which is implanted in them constitutes just as great a danger as do their bestial, licentious and diabolical impulses<sup>4</sup>. Thus, instead of seeking their perfection in true knowledge, men try to find it in worldly power, wealth, scholarship and all the other primrose paths to the soul's destruction<sup>5</sup>. Al-Ghazzālī therefore sets for himself the difficult task of guiding man back on to the right way to true knowledge.

In this guidance, the proper understanding of the religious commandments and their function has an important part to play. This understanding is part of the "Knowledge of action" (''Ilm al-Mu'āmalā') which, together with the "Knowledge of revelation" (''Ilm al-Mukāshafa') constitutes the "Knowledge of the world to come" (''Ilm al-Ākhira')<sup>6</sup>. The "Knowledge of revelation" is concerned with the true knowledge of God, His attributes and works, and seeks to comprehend the structure of the universe, prophetic revelation, the nature of the angels and of the devil, and the true content of such religious conceptions as Paradise, Hell and the like. The object of the "Knowledge of action", on the other hand, is the understanding of the "states of the heart" (''Aḥwāl al-Qalb'), both those which are laudable, such as long-suffering, gratitude, fear, hope and so on, and those which are to be condemned, such as malevolence, enmity, arrogance, anger and the rest. Proceeding by therapeutic methods, this science aims at eradicating from the heart all that is sinful and strengthening all that is virtuous, by teaching man to recognize the

symptoms, causes and consequences of the attributes of the heart, good and bad alike. Such a study is a necessary first stage, undertaken by an act of will, in man's preparation for the "Knowledge of revelation" which is subsequently granted by God's grace to all who are worthy of it. Man can attain to the "Knowledge of the world to come" both by revelation and by reasoning; nor is there essentially any great difference between these two methods of enlightenment. (The process whereby the heart perceives the true nature of objects as they are in the world of absolute reality is often compared to the way in which a mirror reflects the objects around it. There are many things that can obtrude themselves between the "mirror" and its surroundings, or between the heart and the truth<sup>7</sup>.) The heart that obtains the "Knowledge of the world to come" by revelation obtains it from the world of absolute reality but the heart that obtains it by reasoning obtains it only indirectly, through the somewhat distorting medium of the senses and organs that belong to the world of appearances<sup>8</sup>. Thus scholars, for example, who strive to attain this knowledge by their senses and minds, receive it through the entrance to their hearts which is open to the phenomenal world; whereas ascetics seek the divine truth by constantly rubbing and polishing the mirror of their heart (''Taṣqīl Al-Mir'āt'), hoping to be granted an inner illumination through the opening leading to the ideal world. The difference between these two methods is like that described in the well-known story about the competition between the Byzantine and the Chinese painters (a story which later became particularly



famous in the version of Al-Nizāmī, who made the competition take place before Alexander the Great). While the Byzantine painter busied himself with his designs and colours, his Chinese rival merely polished his surface. But when the painting finally appeared on the prepared surface of the Byzantine, it was reflected with far greater brilliance on that of the Chinese<sup>9</sup>.

Moreover, divinely vouchsafed revelation is not the prerogative of prophets alone. It was also granted to the 'Awliyā', the saints, God's chosen confidants, in their waking moments or in sleep, while they were still in this world. Hence, it may be granted to every man who struggles to master his impulses and schools his soul, cutting himself off from all that binds him to this world and preparing his heart for the grace which is ready for him by self-purification, by the strengthening of his desire for this grace and by sincere and persistent yearning and proper way of gaining true knowledge<sup>10</sup>.

In this struggle to overcome his baser impulses and in his efforts to purify his heart to do God's will, man finds help, guidance and support in the commandments of the faith. The main function of these commandments is to help him master his passions, "for God, in His supreme wisdom, has made the salvation of mortals dependent on their deeds as opposed to their natural impulses and has entrusted their control to religious law"<sup>11</sup>. Hence submission to God's will takes the form of repressing the instincts, and sin simply means yielding to the wilful desires of the heart<sup>12</sup>. Every action that in any way contributes to the conquest of

man's passions, and still more so of his mind, brings him closer to his true goal, the "cleansing of the soul" ('Tazkiyat al-Nafs'), without which a man can never draw near to his God and thus get to know Him and love Him. "Cleansing means purification. The Messenger of God, (may God's praise and blessing be with him), said: 'Purity is half of faith'. This teaches us that perfect faith is the cleansing of the heart of all that Almighty and Adored God does not desire, and adorning it with what God desires"<sup>13</sup>. Accordingly, the function of the commandments is two-fold: to extirpate evil from the heart and to implant good in it. "Know that the purpose of the (ritual) commandments is to strengthen the feeling of joy in the recollection of Almighty and Adored God, that man may return to the world of eternity and that the heart (of man) may be indifferent to the world of temptation; but only he will have bliss in the next world who comes to his God (at his death) through love, and only he can love God who knows Him and frequently mentions His name, since knowledge and love can only be attained by constant meditation and recollection. Nor can the recollection of God be kept lastingly in the heart except by (deeds) that recall Him, and these are the commandments."<sup>14</sup>

We see, then, that even "adorning the heart with good", after "cleansing it of evil", is still not the final goal to be desired. Virtue and moral perfection are only the necessary conditions for that supreme degree of knowledge and love of God in which lies man's true bliss. However, the function of the commandments is not merely one of moral

preparation. They further bring man closer to this supreme knowledge by meditation and thought, which lead to knowledge and recognition of truth<sup>15</sup>.

It is therefore impossible to overestimate the tremendous importance of the commandments. The observance of the ritual commandments purifies man's polluted inner being ("man is verily a dung-heap" says Al-Ghazzālī in one of his homilies!), cleans the mirror of his heart of the "blotches of greed and lust", and polishes it with divinely ordained good deeds<sup>16</sup>. With the help of the commandments, man can attain to the "knowledge and love" in which lies his true happiness in this world and the next; and who would wish to make light of the "key to everlasting bliss"?

However, in Al-Ghazzālī's opinion the matter is not so simple as the above words may seem to suggest. The commandments do not automatically bring man closer to his goal, as if by some magical process. It is true that they lead a man to "knowledge". But he must also "know" certain things himself, before he sets out along this road, if he is to make proper progress. Thus, a man must be well acquainted with the "states of his heart", its good and evil attributes and the influence of his actions upon them, before he can carry out the commandments in the right way to bring him nearer to his goal. For how can man fight against the evil within him, without being able to recognize it and its fruits, together with its corrective opposite? How can he become pure, without knowing what the pollution in his heart is? Every man is therefore enjoined

to obtain this knowledge<sup>17</sup> which comprises not only the "Knowledge of action" mentioned above, but also the knowledge of the Qur'ān and the Sunna, and a detailed familiarity with religious law and cognizance of all its subsidiary sciences, in so far as they are required by the individual for the proper observance of the commandments, (for example, an understanding of the direction of Mecca or of the course of the sun across the heavens, and so forth)<sup>18</sup>.

But still more is required of man. He must also know how to perform the commandments properly, if they are to have the desired effect on his heart. Every commandment must be carried out with singleminded devotion, purity of thought and absolute sincerity. Al-Ghazzālī discusses these conceptions at length in various parts of his writings, and even devotes to them the whole of the seventh book in the fourth section of the "Iḥyā". Single-minded devotion is, as it were, the breath of life of the commandments, without which they become meaningless motions of the body instead of divinely ordained good deeds. Thus, for example, a man who absent-mindedly pats an orphan on the head, or who does obeisance in prayer without any feeling of lowliness and spiritual humility, might just as well not have performed these acts at all; but when the same acts are performed with single-minded devotion and with full consciousness of what is being done, they greatly enhance the doer's feeling of compassion toward his fellow creatures and his self-abasement and spiritual humility before his God<sup>19</sup>. Besides the lowliness of spirit and concentration of thought incumbent upon a man when carrying

out one of the commandments, he must also, after its performance, have mingled feelings of fear and hope ('Khawf wa-Radjā) - fear that his deed may have been rejected by God, and hope that, by the grace of heaven, it may have been found acceptable to God<sup>20</sup>. For man always requires divine grace for his deeds to be found acceptable, even if he has performed them with the utmost possible regard for the requirements of religious law. Man is like the farmer who prepares his soil and then sows it with seed. Essential as this preparatory work is for the success of the crop, only the rain can ensure a rich harvest, and the farmer can do nothing but hope and pray that God will send rain at the proper time. In the same way, the commandments prepare the soil of the heart for the seed of faith to grow therein, but only by God's abundant grace can the spiritual crop come to fruition.

The divine injunction to obtain these categories of knowledge takes precedence over all the other commandments and is "the supreme form of the worship of God"<sup>21</sup>. Only the combination of "knowledge and action" (''Ilm wa-'Amal')<sup>22</sup> can ensure the proper performance of any deed in the "way of the world to come". By his well-known insistence on this combination Al-Ghazzālī, like other Muslim thinkers before and after him, rejects the assumption, which was popular particularly in philosophical circles, that intellectual cognition is in itself sufficient to ensure the perfection of the soul and its everlasting bliss. His opinion can be expressed by the old Hebrew saying: "Whenever a man's wisdom outstrips his deeds, his wisdoms comes to

naught". Nor, conversely, are deeds alone the main thing or an end in themselves. They are only indispensable means to the attainment of lasting knowledge, as has been described<sup>23</sup>.

There is thus an endless chain of reciprocal influence here. Knowledge (''Ilm') leads to right action, which in its turn brings man closer to "knowledge" ('Ma'rifa') and love of God, which again improve his deeds. In a similar way, fulfilment of the commandments and virtuous deeds lead to proper meditation and right thoughts, and meditation, in its turn, renews the "States of the heart" conducive to right action, while love facilitates the performance of such action<sup>24</sup>. Nor is right action confined to the proper observance of the written commandments; it also embraces every "good deed", a term which includes man's obligations to his fellow-men no less than his obligations to God. However, amongst these various reciprocally interacting factors there is no doubt that knowledge takes pride of place. "When a man knows (his heart) he knows himself, and when he knows himself he knows his God"<sup>25</sup>. "Knowledge is the beginning and the end. The beginning is only the 'Knowledge of action' the end of which is action, while the purpose of action is to purify and cleanse the heart that the truth may be revealed in it and that it may be beautified by the true knowledge which is the 'Knowledge of revelation'<sup>26</sup>."

This philosophy of Al-Ghazzālī incorporates ideas that were widely held in the intellectual circles of the Middle Ages. The conception of the knowledge of God as leading to

the love of God was a commonplace of mystic doctrine and, to a lesser extent, also of other thinkers who inclined to Neoplatonism. Thus, for example, the Ikhwān Al-Ṣafā also extolled knowledge as bringing man nearer to the next world and regarded it as the purpose of man's life. Unlike Al-Ghazzālī, however, they sometimes looked upon the commandments as no more than intermediate stage for those "who are not wise enough to understand" or who have not yet attained to true knowledge<sup>27</sup>.

In the Aristotelian philosophical circles of the Middle Ages, too, it was commonly held that the purpose of man's existence was his acquisition of knowledge, and that his perfection was to be found in the philosophical comprehension of the truth. To many Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinkers, moral perfection was merely a prerequisite and preparation for intellectual perfection, and the commandments a means to the attainment of perfection in both character and mind. Maimonides, for example, regards knowledge as the end for which man was created and the commandments as the means of bringing him closer to it by suppressing his bestial impulses and disciplining him in virtuous conduct, thereby implanting "the true knowledge" in his heart<sup>28</sup>. At the same time, although he regards the final perfection as "pure knowledge in which there are no deeds or attributes", Maimonides, like Al-Ghazzālī, has no intention of belittling good deeds and the fulfilment of the commandments in any circumstances<sup>29</sup>.

Thus we see that, in Al-Ghazzālī's view, the purpose for which the commandments were given is to enable man to

master his baser impulses, to purge his heart of its vices and to fortify it with virtues, and to bring him near in thought to eternal knowledge. It is true that Al-Ghazzālī occasionally gives other reasons for the commandments; but, on closer examinations, it transpires that all these reasons are merely different aspects of this primary purpose. Sometimes this is self-evident, as when Al-Ghazzālī describes the commandments, in their repressive influence on the impulses, as medicines for the diseases of a man's heart, those diseases being all those qualities that lead to a man's damnation ('Muhlikāt')<sup>30</sup>. But even when the connection is not so immediately obvious, as when the fulfilment of the commandments is represented as man's expression of gratitude for the delights of the body and the joys of personal property granted to him by God, or as a test of man's love for his God, even here, it seems there is no more than an emphasis of one particular aspect of the central purpose. Gratitude<sup>31</sup>, especially gratitude to the Almighty for His gracious mercies, and the determined rejection of the temptations of this world out of desire for the true joys of the next, are also virtues needed by man in his quest after truth. Similarly, whenever Al-Ghazzālī invests the commandments with a symbolical meaning, it is only for the purpose of strengthening their influence over man's soul.

It should not, therefore, occasion any surprise that there is a certain monotonous similarity about all the reasons given by Al-Ghazzālī for the commandments. In his section 'Ibādāt' of the "Ihyā" he does not so much as

mention any cosmic or astrological motivation for them; and he finds in them very little of social value, and still less historical or philosophical significance. Al-Ghazzālī's sole aim, the task for which he considers himself to have been chosen as "the reviver of religious knowledge", is to stress the importance of the commandments for the individual and the part played by them in helping him to master his passions, in schooling him to virtue, and in enriching his personal religious experience.

Al-Ghazzālī's conception of the commandments is one of the reasons, it seems to this writer, for his special attitude toward this world. He is far from preaching an extreme asceticism like that practised by many Sūfīs, since he regards such an attempt to escape from the world as no less of an enslavement to it than the eager pursuit of its vanities. For him, the world and its wealth are not in themselves the source of evil, nor is the body necessarily the accused flesh of Christian belief. It is man's attitude to all these that decides whether they are to be good or bad, and that makes them either a source of eternal bliss or a cause of everlasting ignominy<sup>32</sup>.

Of course, this does not mean that, for Al-Ghazzālī, this world is any more than the antechamber to the great hall of the world to come; every true Muslim must believe in the resurrection of the dead and the Day of Judgment, when his deeds will be weighed on the scales of justice and he will be called to account for them. But the wise man will understand that the essential thing for him is not merely to be saved from hell and found worthy of

entering Paradise, but to achieve the perfection of bliss which is the quintessence of all imaginable joys. Human beings are like the inhabitants of a town which has been captured by the Sultān. Some of them, though fortunate enough not to have been killed or even punished, are nevertheless banished from the city; others are permitted to remain living in the city with their kindred; but only he is truly happy who has not only escaped death and been allowed to remain the city, but has also been specially favoured by the Sultān, presented with lavish gifts and given a share in his rule<sup>33</sup>. He who desires everlasting happiness, and is not so foolish as to sell an eternity of bliss for an ephemeral joy, will always be mindful that this world has no solid foundations, that everything here is transient, and that death puts an end to worldly pleasures. Hence only a thoughtless fool will devote the best of his powers to it and make himself the thrall of its vanities<sup>34</sup>.

But, at the same time, it is only in this world that man can prepare himself for the world to come, as a guest grooms himself in the antechamber for his entry into the great hall. The more a man devotes himself in this world to polishing the mirror of his heart, the greater will be his reward of knowledge and bliss in the next. The better he prepares himself here, the greater will be his joys there. "This world is the sown field (whose harvest) is the world to come"<sup>35</sup>, reiterates Al-Ghazzālī, with even greater emphasis than his predecessors, thereby allowing ample scope for human free-will side by side with the

absolute determinism which he generally feels obliged to accept. It is by his actions in this world that man gains his reward in the world to come; he reaps there what he has sown here, and it depends very much on him whether the harvest brings him everlasting bliss or eternal damnation. At the same time, it is incumbent upon man to realize that God has dealt most graciously with him in letting him sojourn for a time in this world and in giving him his body and organs with which to prepare himself for the world to come. For, without this stopping-place on his journey at which he can fulfil the divine commandments and improve his heart by his physical deeds, he could never enter the next world. Without proper preparation here, he could have no hope of coming safely through his ordeal there.

Hence the apparent paradox that the man who wishes to prepare himself in the antechamber of this world for his meeting with his Maker in the world to come will, like the most worldly creature, also seek to postpone his death, the day when his harvest is reaped. In his case, however, the reason is not any deluded and soul-sickly clinging to the vanities of this world, but a sincere desire to make the fullest possible use of the period of spiritual preparation graciously granted to him by God. Such a man knows that death will end the connection between his immortal soul and his mortal body and thereby deprive him of any further chance of improving his soul and polishing its mirror<sup>36</sup>. From this point of view, and from this alone, death is a tragedy for every true believer, even though it frees him

from the fetters of the body which come between him and the true, eternally perfect knowledge .

God has given man this world for the satisfaction of his religious needs, and He maintains it in being, so that man may make use of it for this purpose. And since this world cannot continue to exist when it is "entirely good", God has also given evil, indifference and sin a place in it. But His only purpose in so doing is to preserve the world for the sake of the good, that man may prepare himself to meet his Maker<sup>37</sup>. However, Al-Ghazzālī goes still further than this. If man's purpose in this world is to prepare himself for his life in the world to come, by fulfilling the commandments and by other good deeds which bring him nearer to true knowledge and love and give him a slight foretaste of them, then a far-reaching conclusion may be drawn: "Whoever does not know God in this world will not behold Him in the next, and whoever does not find delight in "true knowledge" in this world, will not enjoy the sight of God in the next; for in the next world man will not be granted any new thing that he has not already attained in this world, and he will reap only what he has sown; he shall rise (at the resurrection of the dead) exactly as he died, and he shall die exactly as he lived<sup>38</sup>."

What is true of the world is true also of man's body, and his wealth. Man needs his body and its organs to achieve the true purpose of his life. His organs are, as it were, the vehicle of his heart, his knowledge is the provision he carries with him on his journey to meet his God, while his good deeds are the channel by which he is

enabled to "taste" and store up as much as he needs of this provision. Hence it is man's duty to take good care of his body, and to this end God has provided him with hosts of minions - the appetites, senses and organs - whose task it is to obey instructions of his heart for the proper maintenance of his body and soul<sup>39</sup>. In the same way, even money, which supplies man's body - the "vehicle" that bears him into the next world - with food, clothing and the like, is not evil in itself. If a man takes only what he requires of it, it will make him blessed<sup>40</sup>. For with money he will be able to fulfil such commandments as giving charity, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, and aiding in a Holy War; he will be able to build mosques, guard-posts, hospitals, bridges, etc. With money a man can support his family and pay for servants who will do his daily chores for him (!), thus releasing his heart from the vanities of this world and leaving it free to devote itself entirely to the affairs of the world to come. In this way money, the source of all evil (especially according to Ṣūfī doctrine), can actually be of benefit to man's religious practice and feeling, and thus become a further means of bringing him nearer to the next world<sup>41</sup>.

But in all this there lurks a danger for man. The world, wealth and his body are like the deadly poison of a snake which may also be a healing antidote. A man must be abstemious in his enjoyment of these blessings and not rush headlong after his appetites, knowing the harm they can do him as well as the benefit they can bring him; he must choose only what will stand him in good stand on his way to

the next world. Above all, he must beware of having his attention deflected from his main purpose by undue occupation with these accessories which, for all their subsidiary importance, are of no real value in themselves. If they succeed in diverting him from his real aim, they will become an obstacle and stumbling block on his path, and instead of bringing him nearer to his goal, will drive him far away from it to his perdition.

Here we meet that subjectivity and relativity on which J. Obermann<sup>42</sup> has remarked as the key-note of Al-Ghazzālī's philosophy and which appear also in Al-Ghazzālī's evaluation of every single commandment. The world, wealth, the human body are not good or bad in themselves, but become so according to the part played by them in a man's life. They should neither be eagerly sought after, nor deliberately eschewed. Moreover, a man may abandon himself to them by the very act of all the time running away from them; hence Al-Ghazzālī regards uncompromising self-subjection to the ideals of poverty, monasticism and the like as leading away from God. The extreme ascetic is little better than the hedonist. Therefore, the third and highest degree of self-denial is attained when "(a man's) soul is neither inclined to this world nor withdraws from it in disgust, but regards its presence or absence with equanimity. To such a man money is like water, and the treasures of exalted God like a sea which his heart does not seek after nor yet does it flee from it. Such a one is the perfect man, for he who hates something is no less occupied with it than he who loves it". This is the "freedom from all the bonds of this

world" in which lies man's true and everlasting perfection<sup>43</sup>.

In the foregoing pages, I have tried to give a general survey of the place occupied by the religious commandments of Islam in Al-Ghazzālī's philosophy, in so far as any single philosophy can be attributed to him. However, a fuller and more accurate picture of his views can be obtained only by a detailed examination of his statements on the nature of each individual commandment and the proper way of performing it. The rich pattern of symbolism and psychological explanation revealed by such an examination would be found to support a central doctrine of great interest concerning the influence of man's body on his soul. This doctrine which underlies Al-Ghazzālī's whole philosophy calls for a special study of its own<sup>44</sup>.

Notes to Chapter VI

- 1 This does not mean that his approach to the law was exactly the same as that of the 'Fuqahā'. Cf. below and p. 380 above. As for the general Sūfī approach to the commandments, cf. my article (in Hebrew) in Molad, 1961, p. 487 ff.
- 2 "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1360, 2 ff.
- 3 "Ihyā" IV, 6, p. 2654, 2-7; "Al-Arba'īn", pp. 95-96.
- 4 On the various elements in man see, e.g., "Al-Arba'īn", p. 218, 4 ff.; "Ihyā" III, 6, p. 1845, 1 ff.
- 5 "Ihyā", *ibid.*, p. 1845, 5 ff.
- 6 Cf. Ch. V above.
- 7 See Ch. IV, f, above.
- 8 See "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1366, 6 ff.
- 9 "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1377, 7 ff. See especially p. 1382, 12 ff. Cf. also p. 312 above.

In the literature of mediaeval Christian mysticism we also find ideas closely akin to Al-Ghazzālī's. Thus, St. Bonaventura, like Al-Ghazzālī and like his famous predecessors amongst the Fathers of the Church, believes that the revelation of divine truth (Beschauung) is an experience that may be granted to any man who has disciplined his soul to it by asceticism and self-purification and who desires



it with all his heart. According to Bonaventura, the most propitious time for this experience is during prayer, as was emphasized before him also by St. Bernard of Clairvaux and afterwards by St. Theresa. In the same way, Al-Ghazzālī regards the moment of liturgical obeisance or the days towards the end of the month of fasting, as the most likely time for the true worshipper to be granted a glimpse of the world of Divine reality.

10 See, e.g., "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1389, 10 ff, and cf. Ch. IV, d, above.

11 "Ihyā" I, 7, p. 485, 16 ff. See also *ibid.*, 484, 5 ff.

12 "Al-Munqidh", p. 110 ff.

13 "Al-Arba'īn", p. 116, 8-10. See also "Ihyā" I, 3, p. 222, 8 ff.

14 "Al-Arba'īn", p. 114, 5-10.

15 "Ihyā" III, 3, p. 1499, 5 ff.

16 Cf. "Al-Arba'īn", p. 122, 2 ff. See above Ch. IV, f.

17 "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 24, 8ff; III, 2, 1432, 1; IV, 7, 2706, 1.

18 See, e.g., "Ihyā" I, 4, pp. 348, 350; *ibid.*, II, 7, p. 1116, 7 ff; 1118-1119 et al. This is why Al-Ghazzālī begins his book on the commandments with detailed chapters

on the ritual law.

19 "Ihyā" III, 2, pp. 1451-1452. Note the emphasis on the supreme importance of habitual and constant repetition for the proper observance of all the commandments.

20 "Ihyā" I, 7, p. 488, 10-12.

21 "Ihyā" I, 5, p. 398, 7-8.

22 Cf. p. 359 above.

23 However, it is not only as a preparation for "knowledge" that action is important to Al-Ghazzālī. If my assumption about the "endless chain of reciprocal influence" (see below) in Al-Ghazzālī's philosophy is correct, it follows that action is for him not only a means to the desired end but also a part of that end, since "knowledge" improves and perfects action too. Though Al-Ghazzālī ultimately aspires to absolute spirituality, he knows that it is unattainable in this world, and therefore he holds that, throughout man's sojourn on earth, one of the purposes of his knowledge is to correct and improve his deeds.

I may add here that Al-Ghazzālī's attitude to this knowledge is somewhat ambivalent. Although he stressed man's duty to try and understand the deeper reasons for the commandments he held also the view that only those commandments which we perform without understanding really express our servitude to God. Therefore, performing the different rituals of 'Ḥadjdj' which seem as it were meaningless (!) is the highest form of worship of God. Much easier is it

to keep the moral laws, because reason helps us to understand their importance, whereas other commandments such as almsgiving stand in between these two categories. See "Ihyā" I, 4, p. 385, 4 ff. and cf. "Al-Arba'īn", p. 49, 8 ff., and "Al-Munqidh", p. 110, 13 ff.

24 "Ihyā" IV, 9, p. 2808, 11 ff; 6, p. 2647, 8.

25 On this saying, quoted often by Al-Ghazzālī, cf. A. Altmann, "The Delphic Maxim in Medieval Islam and Judaism", in A. Altmann (ed.), Biblical and Other Studies, Philip Lown Inst. of Advanced Judaic Studies, Studies and Texts I, Harvard Univ. Press, 1963, pp. 196-232.

26 "Ihyā" IV, 6, p. 2618, 7-5.

27 Cf., e.g., Ikhwān Al-Safā, Seventh "Risāla" et al.

28 Cf. Guide to the Perplexed, Part I, Ch. 54; III, Chs. 27, 28, 33, 54, et al. It would be interesting to examine the many points that Al-Ghazzālī has in common with Maimonides, in spite of the great difference in their methods.

29 Cf. Guide to the Perplexed, III, Ch. 54; Mishne Torah, "Sefer Hamada'", Hilkhot Teshuva 9, 1.

30 Almsgiving, for example, is a corrective for the miserliness in every human heart. Hence a man should be grateful to the poor who come to beg alms from him. For the spendthrift, on the other hand, the commandment of

charity is not so important. Moreover, with regard to all commandments man must beware of performing them ostentatiously to make an impression on others ('Riyā'), and he must endeavour to carry them out in private, or even to refrain altogether from performing them at certain times. Otherwise they may infect his heart with the additional disease of ostentation instead of curing it of the defects from which it is already suffering. In expressing such views, Al-Ghazzālī is obviously taking a very different stand from the orthodox Muslim legalists, the 'Fuqahā', whom he vehemently attacks, even while insisting, like them, on the punctilious observance of every jot and tittle of the ritual laws. Cf. p. 381 above.

31 Cf. S. van den Bergh, "Ghazzālī on Gratitude towards God and its Greek Sources", Studia Islamica 7, 1957, pp. 77-88.

32 Cf. p. 157 above.

33 "Al-Arba'īn", p. 26, 8 ff.

34 "Al-Munqidh", p. 112, 9-11; "Ihyā" III, 2, p. 1477, 5. Cf. also p. 88 above.

35 See Ch. IV, g, above.

36 "Al-Arba'īn", p. 104, 6 ff; "Ihyā" IV, 6, p. 2613, 6 ff. et al.

37 "Ihyā" IV, 6, p. 2652, 7 ff.

- 38 "Ihyā" IV, 6, p. 2613, 9 ff. Cf. p. 322 above.
- 39 "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1353: 'Bayān Djunūd Al-Qalb'.
- 40 "Al-Arba'in", p. 147, 3 ff.
- 41 "Ihyā" III, 7, p. 1768: 'Tafsīl Āfāt Al-Māl wa-Fawā'idihī'.
- 42 See his Der philosophische u. religioese Subjektivismus Ghazālī's (Wien, 1921). Cf. also A.J. Wensinck, Pensée, p. 131 ff. Wensinck gives a different explanation of Al-Ghazzālī's attitude towards the world, wealth etc., based on the Aristotelian idea of the "Golden Middle Path". It is worth contrasting Al-Ghazzālī's quite positive approach to this world with the generally accepted negative Ṣūfī notions, as expressed by Al-Qushayri in his chapters on 'Faqr' and 'Zuhd' (pp. 60, 134 ff.), or by Abu Tālib Al-Makkī in "Qūt Al-Qulūb" II, 2, p. 83 ff.
- 43 See "Al-Arba'in", p. 160, 3 ff.; 240, 8 ff.
- 44 See Ch. IV, f, and n. 87 above. Cf. also Appendix C.

## CHAPTER VII

Jews and Christians in the Writings of Al-Ghazzālī

Abū Hāmid Al-Ghazzālī is well known not only to historians of Islam but also to students of Judaism and of religion and philosophy in general. We have seen him descend to the level of the ordinary people and trying to impart to them the right approach to religious living and to the fulfilment of the divine commands so as to elevate them to the summit of true religious experience; but at the same time, we know that he scaled the heights of philosophy and theology and shook the assurance of the exponents of these disciplines with regard to religious concepts and the proper understanding of religious phenomena. It is not surprising, therefore, that we should wish to know Al-Ghazzālī's attitude towards Jews and Judaism and the place of Judaism in his teachings. Yet, this subject (or the parallel subject of his attitude towards Christians and Christianity) is not dealt with in any of the numerous publications dealing with his life, books and doctrine, although studies of this kind have been carried out with regard to theologians preceding, and historians following him<sup>1</sup>. The main reason for this is certainly not the great quantity of his writings (which makes it practically impossible to write a monograph on a particular subject), but the astonishing fact that in all these writings the relevant material is extremely scanty. However, this is not an isolated phenomenon in Ṣūfī literature, of which Al-Ghazzālī is a prominent representative. In fact, almost all the

great Muslim mystics before him were preoccupied with improving their own conduct or changing the face of Islam, and took no interest in anything else. They therefore refrained from theological polemics with Judaism and Christianity and seldom referred to contemporary Jews (although they frequently cited *Isrā'īliyyāt*, i.e. stories about Israelites, from the *Hadīth* or other sources to add point to their ethical-religious teachings). At a later period, this *Ṣūfī* disregard of other religions was superseded by a deliberate blurring of boundaries between the other religions and Islam, a phenomenon which found expression especially in the well-known Persian mystical poetry and in popular parables such as those which compare the various religions to coloured vessels that lend some of their colour to the water they contain, but do not change the essential nature of that water.

However, Al-Ghazzālī is an exception within that literature; he should not be measured with the same yardstick as his fellow *Ṣūfī*, any more than he should be regarded as a theologian or religious-legal scholar in the usual sense, even though his books have assured him an honoured place in each of these fields. Unlike other Muslim scholars, this man who was active in so many different spheres, who devoted years to the study of different doctrines (either to refute them or to find in them support for his own teachings<sup>2</sup>), evinced no interest in the Jews or any knowledge of Judaism, the Hebrew language etc. He took part in the polemic between the different Islamic sects, and especially fought the *Ismā'īli Shī'a* offshoot known by the derogatory

epithet of *Ḥashīshiyūn*' by writing several books against them<sup>3</sup>. But he did not, like other theologians engaged in polemics of this kind, deal also with the religions that preceded Islam, as Judaism and Christianity. He seems to have ignored the extensive polemical literature on these religions, literature which already flourished to an unusual degree in the generations before him, both in the east and west of the Muslim empire; nor did he mention that even his own teachers took part in these polemics, e.g. Al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013/404 Hg.)<sup>4</sup>, who was his teacher in spirit and whom he often quotes, or Imām Al-Ḥaramain Al-Djuwaynī under whom he studied until Al-Djuwaynī's death (1085/478 Hd.). Even when dealing with subjects which Islamic literature usually takes as starting-points of polemics against Judaism and Christianity, he disregarded this aspect completely<sup>5</sup>.

All the same we cannot say that he did not mention Jews and Judaism at all outside the *'Isrā'īliyyāt'*. Yet, the references to them in his works are side remarks, the character of which does not change during his many years of literary activity. They show none of the sarcasm, contempt or crude aggressiveness customary in polemical literature and thus prove that the matter did not interest him at any time. But before quoting some of these references, I want to stress again that in the present state of research it is quite impossible to deal exhaustively with any subject raised in Al-Ghazzālī's writings or reliably to trace the development of his thought on any matter. This is because we still lack the most elementary tools for a systematic

study of his writings and have to use many unscholarly and unreliable editions of his books. There is no unanimity as to the textus receptus of his works and even those recognised as authentic probably embody interpolations and later adaptations<sup>6</sup>.

The salient feature of Al-Ghazzālī's few utterances on Judaism is his mode of treating the subject. His approach is not that of a theologian polemizing against Judaism (or Christianity), but the dry manner of the legal scholar; this is seen even in his Ṣūfī or theological works. For example in his "Al-Iqtisād fi-l- I'tiqād", a scholastic treatise written while he was still a teacher in Baghdad, Al-Ghazzālī explained (in a chapter on the sects to be declared heretical) that the question as to whether a particular person is or is not a heretic or unbeliever is purely a legal one<sup>7</sup>. The 'Sharī'a', divine law, determines whose blood is permitted, whose property is without legal protection, who may not marry a Muslim woman and who will burn in hell for ever. The 'Sharī'a' is not interested in the nature of the heresy (whether it originates in ignorance, foolishness or a lying disposition) but decrees that "whoever denies the words of Muhammad the Messenger of Allah - may Allah's blessing be on him and peace - is an unbeliever who after death will be condemned to eternal fire and whose blood and money are permitted in his lifetime". As was customary before him, Al-Ghazzālī differentiated between several degrees of unbelief. The first degree, and lowest in standing, is represented by the Jews, the Christians and the adherents of the other religions, such as the

Zoroastrians, idolaters and others, whom the Qur'ān and general consensus of the nation explicitly declare to be unbelievers. Unbelievers of the second degree are the Brahmins who deny prophecy and the prophets, and the philosophers who deny even the existence of the Creator; they actually deserve the stigma of unbelievers more than the Jews and Christians, but as they are not expressly mentioned in the Qur'ān and Hadīth, and their unbelief may only be inferred by analogy, they are assigned to the second degree. Above them stand the theistic philosophers who admit the existence of a supreme God, but deny the creation ex nihilo, God's omniscience and the resurrection of the dead<sup>8</sup>. Still higher degrees are ascribed to the Islamic sects which deny one or another element of Muhammad's mission.

The foregoing recurs in another of Al-Ghazzālī's books, the "Faiṣal Al-Tafriqa bayna-l-Islām wa-l-Zandaqa", which was probably written after he left Baghdad for a life of seclusion and asceticism. Here he summed up the discussion by means of the following definition: "Every unbeliever denies the words of the Prophet, and everyone who denies the words of the Prophet is an unbeliever<sup>9</sup>." There was therefore no development in Al-Ghazzālī's thinking on the subject despite the change in his way of life.

Nor did Al-Ghazzālī deviate from this viewpoint in his great compendium "Ihyā 'Ulūm Al-Dīn", probably written during his wanderings and isolation<sup>10</sup>. In this book, the forty parts of which deal with every aspect of a Muslim's life, he frequently mentioned Jews and Judaism, but never

discussed them specifically. The relevant remarks are scattered here and there, and are all couched in dry legal language. Thus, Al-Ghazzālī says, for example, that one must be kind to every neighbour, whether he be a Muslim or an unbeliever or that the Prophet refused to curse any person, whether Muslim or unbeliever<sup>11</sup>. At the same time, in this book, too, which aims at the deepening of religious experience in every person and its expression in a richer moral life, Al-Ghazzālī quoted well-known sayings of the Prophet in order to stress the fact that Jews and Christians under Muslim protection ('Dhimmā') are second-class citizens; for them one should not make way, one should not greet them first, nor should one follow their customs<sup>12</sup>.

In the wake of his predecessors, Al-Ghazzālī mentioned the difference between an unbeliever who lives under the protection of a Muslim government and one who lives under an alien rule which Islam is duty-bound to overthrow. The latter, termed 'Harbī', must be destroyed while the former, called 'Dhimmī', is assured of his life and property against payment of a special poll-tax. He, therefore, must not be hurt except by turning one's back on him and showing contempt for him, pushing him out of the way and not greeting him first. One should in particular avoid coming into contact with him in everyday life or having business relations with him. Any friendship with him is so hateful to Allah as to be almost a prohibited act, as hinted already in the Qur'ān<sup>13</sup>. We may have here one of the earliest sources stressing the inadmissibility of business relations between Muslims and Jews, a concept which became central in

polemical literature at a later period and was aimed at dislodging Jews and Christians from commercial life<sup>14</sup>.

The distinction between 'Dhimmī' and 'Harbī' recurs, in a more positive form, in a 'Fatwā' (legal responsum) by Al-Ghazzālī, quoted by Murtaḍā Al-Zabīdī, the noted philologist and commentator on Al-Ghazzālī (d. 1791/1206 Hg.):

A 'Dhimmī' is like a Muslim in everything which relates to the prohibition of hurting him, for Islamic law protects his honour just as it protects his life and property; he, unlike the 'Harbī', must therefore not be slandered<sup>15</sup>.

However, in the thirty-fourth book of the "Ihyā" called 'The Evils of the Language' Al-Ghazzālī applied a new yardstick when discussing curses. Every curse is an ugly thing because it is an expression of the removal of the cursed person from Allah's patrimony. One is therefore only permitted to curse unbelievers and oppressors in general, because they have alienated themselves from God by their own deeds, but one should never curse a particular one of them because he always might repent. This may be done only with regard to an unbeliever who is already dead - like Pharaoh, for example.

But if you say in relation to a contemporary:

'Zaid, may Allah's curse be upon him', and he is a Jew, for instance, this may be very harmful because he may perhaps become a Muslim and die as one of those who are near to Allah - and how did you judge him to be cursed?<sup>16</sup>

It is thus preferable to find a compromise formula, such as 'A curse on this unbelieving Jew if he dies an unbeliever, but not if he dies a Muslim'. However, these compromise formulas are a secret which must not be revealed to ordinary people.

Elsewhere in this book, Al-Ghazzālī answered the question as to whether an unbeliever may admonish a Muslim with such words as 'Thou shalt not commit adultery', or hold the office of 'Muhtasib' (a functionary comparable to the Roman 'agoranomos'), in the following way:

Preventing a Muslim from doing evil means exercising control over him ... therefore an admonition of this kind is forbidden to an unbeliever, not because of its contents but because it is a manifestation of an urge to dominate and judge the Muslim. Every admonition of this kind involves humiliation of the person admonished, and although every evil-doer deserves humiliation, it should not be inflicted by an unbeliever, who deserves even greater humiliation. (A Jew or Christian, therefore, can never hold the office of 'Muhtasib')<sup>17</sup>.

Here we have the interesting religious motivation of the perpetual social struggle waged by Muslims against alien (especially Christian) officialdom in state and local administration<sup>18</sup>.

For a similar reason, Al-Ghazzālī encouraged his readers to study medicine, which he regarded as the religious duty of every individual. In his opinion, the medical

science was neglected in his time because it did not, like religious law and theology, secure key positions for its practitioners. The result was that in many small places Muslims were at the mercy of a Jewish or Christian doctor. This situation was unbearable in his eyes, as in that of many other Islamic scholars, who time and again unsuccessfully prohibited Muslims to resort to alien physicians<sup>19</sup>. Al-Ghazzālī compared those who study theology or religious law rather than medicine to persons who bleed thirsty people instead of quenching their thirst with a refreshing drink<sup>20</sup>. Here, too, Al-Ghazzālī was perhaps unintentionally the spokesman on the one hand for those striving to eliminate Jewish and Christian physicians from Muslim society, and on the other, for those involved in economic rivalry among the Muslims themselves. Perhaps already in his day, the first generation after the establishment of 'madrasas' throughout the Muslim empire, we may note the phenomenon, well known from later periods, of an over-supply of theologians and religious-legal scholars. In his own way, Al-Ghazzālī tried to persuade the young to seek other sources of livelihood.

On one point Al-Ghazzālī displayed a certain leniency towards the 'Dhimmīs': He allowed them to take part in prayers for rain ('Istisqā') in years of drought, in contrast, to the view of some other religious scholars. However, what he said in this connection hardly reflects a recognition of the 'Dhimmīs'' human dignity:

The Imām shall enjoin upon the people (in a time of drought) three days of fasting, of almsgiving

according to their ability, refraining from injustice and a turning away from sin. Thereafter, on the fourth day, he shall go forth to pray with them and with the old people and the adolescents, after washing, in simple clothes and in a humble frame of mind, unlike on a festival day. Some say that the participation of the animals (in the prayers) is desirable because they are partners in the need (for rain) ... And if the 'Dhimmi's' also go forth, separately, they shall not be hindered<sup>21</sup>.

It thus seems that all the lofty demands Al-Ghazzālī made upon his readers, both as regards themselves and others (including slaves and animals), do not apply to Jews and Christians. In fact, in his profound doctrine of man, the elements of his soul and the development of the divine spark in him, he equates man with Muslim, just as in his fight for religious tolerance he was concerned only with Islam and its various trends and sects. In the 'Dhimmi' he saw not man and the divine spark, but a mere legal object, similar to animals and inanimate things.

It seems that this legalistic approach is more than just a method of treating them; it may point to a basic attitude of Al-Ghazzālī which largely explains his abstention from all polemics with Jews and Judaism or Christians and Christianity. As we know, Al-Ghazzālī divided Islamic law into two strata: That which deals with this world ('Fiqh Al-Dunyā') and that which deals with the soul of man and the affairs of the next world ('Fiqh Al-Nafs, Fiqh Al-Dīn')<sup>22</sup>. The former is inferior to the latter, although

Muslim doctors of law have concentrated upon it for generations. It is a stunted form of the legal teaching of the Prophet, and is mainly concerned with subordinate aspects of rare cases in the law of property and criminal law, and the outward aspect of worship - with a view to granting dispensations and relaxations as far as possible. The scholars of this kind of law engage in casuistry not for the sake of religion but to enhance their own prestige. They regard all their colleagues, therefore, as dangerous competitors. They do not know that the law they deal with is of no intrinsic value, but merely a means of organizing man's life in this world, which itself is nothing but a place of preparation for the next; if people ceased quarrelling in this world, that law would no longer be necessary. Not so with regard to the law which deals with the next and only important world: it prepares man for the latter pointing out the undesirable qualities of the heart and ways of eradicating them, and the desirable qualities of the heart and ways of acquiring them. Therefore, a person who prefers the law of this world to that of the next is like one who, while his clothes teem with scorpions and snakes, sets about chasing flies from the face of another<sup>23</sup>. It seems that for Al-Ghazzālī the question of the other religions is a matter for the law of this world, and for neighbourly relations in it, but of no importance as regards the religious experience and moral improvement of the individual. Anti-Jewish and anti-Christian polemics are thought by him to be superfluous and dangerous since, like all polemics, they breed hypocrisy, mendacity, and lust for



status and power<sup>24</sup>.

Sometimes Al-Ghazzālī hinted at a different approach to the subject. As we know he was greatly concerned with the question of 'Taqlīd' - blindly accepted tradition<sup>25</sup>. He often inveighed against all merely outwardly professed faith, demanding that every person acquire his faith by honest intellectual, emotional and moral efforts; at the same time, he recognised the great effectiveness of the 'Taqlīd' in establishing firm patterns of faith, especially among simple folk, and warned against a weakening of such faith in the hearts of the people. He assumed, of course, that 'Taqlīd' of this kind existed also among Jews and Christians, and therefore already at the outset of his career, at the beginning of the "Tahāfut" he declared:

They (the philosophers) are heretics who have nothing to rely upon for their heresies but tradition blindly accepted from hearsay and habit, like the blindly accepted traditions of Jews and Christians, who are born and grow up in a religion different from that of Islam, as their fathers and forefathers did<sup>26</sup>.

Al-Ghazzālī reverted to this theme towards the end of his life in "Al-Munqidh":

Always, already in my youth, a thirst to get at the truth of things was a habit with me and an object of my striving. It was an urge, a natural feature which Allah had implanted in my heart, independent of my volition and efforts. And when I reached adulthood, the ties of blindly accepted tradition

were severed and my inherited beliefs collapsed.

I had seen how Christian boys for ever grew up in a spirit of acceptance of the Christian religion, and Jewish boys in a spirit of acceptance of the Jewish religion, and how Muslim boys were for ever educated in the spirit of the Islamic religion; and I had heard the Ḥadīth tradition originating from the Messenger of Allah, may Allah's salvation and blessing be upon him for peace, who said 'Every child is born with his innate quality ('Fitra')<sup>27</sup>, but his parents bring him up to accept the yoke of Judaism, Christianity or Zoroastrianism'<sup>28</sup>.

In spite of the critical vein apparent in these passages, there is also here a kind of veiled acquiescence in 'Taqlīd'. There are people who cannot cut loose from their traditional faith and seek after truth unaided. They should be left with their traditional faith, decreed upon them by Allah, even if it is built up on patent error like the faith of Jews and Christians. Every person should endeavour to improve his own faith and conduct to the best of his ability and let this suffice him; no one should attempt to improve his fellow man, lest he both cause him harm and be harmed himself.

When simple folk reach the age of discernment, they hear from their fathers and mothers of the existence of God the Most High, His knowledge, will, omnipotence and other qualities, and that He sent the prophets, all of whose words are correct and true. They accept these things as they hear

them; they regard them as firmly established, they trust in them, and it never occurs to them to deny them, because of the favourable opinion they have of their fathers, mothers and teachers. This faith ensures salvation in the next world; those who have it stand in the first ranks of the blessed. But they are not among those who are near (to God), for their faith does not involve vision and inner contemplation and rejoicing of the heart in the light of certainty, and there may be error in the attitude of both the individual and the community as to everything relating to beliefs and opinions. Thus, for instance, Jews and Christians place trust in what they have heard from their fathers and mothers, although their faith is erroneous, for so they have been taught; and the Muslims (i.e. the simple folk among them) believe what is true, not because they have found it to be so, but because they have been taught the true message<sup>29</sup>.

To sum up, although Al-Ghazzālī is unique in both the theological and Ṣūfī literature of his time, we cannot isolate him from the rest of his generation. His writings disclose no new attitude towards the non-Muslims, even though he laid the foundations for a new moral and psychological approach to all the phenomena of intellectual and religious life. We shall understand this properly if we bear in mind that he lived in a period of fanatical orthodoxy in both East and West, from which he could not detach

himself completely. Moreover, he, like earlier Ṣūfīs, did not regard the question of the attitude towards Judaism and Christianity as particularly important for the moral improvement of the individual and his preparation for the next world, and he may even have considered the whole debate with the adherents of these religions a superfluous attempt to change Allah's decree upon them<sup>30</sup>.

His scattered remarks on this subject are nevertheless important; by assigning it to the sphere of the 'law of this world', he meant to push the extensive polemical literature against alien religions into the background and direct the attention of Muslims to the main principle of improving their own conduct. The religious arguments preferred by him against the infidel official and physician and against business partnership with unbelievers may, perhaps unintentionally, have aided the social struggle of Muslims against non-Muslims, as well as intra-Muslim struggle of theologians and religious-legal scholars against the influx of too many youths into their professions<sup>31</sup>.

Notes to Chapter VII

1 I am not referring to the extensive literary polemics between Islam and Judaism or Christianity, or to the writings of theologians mainly concerned with the comparative study of religions. I mean such studies as W.J. Fischel's, "Ibn Khaldūn on the Bible, Judaism and the Jews", J. Goldziher Memorial II (Jerusalem, 1958), pp. 147-171.

2 Thus he very thoroughly studied certain systems of philosophy in order that he might combat them afterwards. He also dealt with the natural sciences, e.g., in his "Kitāb Al-Hikma fī Makhlūqāt Allah" (The Book of the Creator's Wisdom Revealed in His creatures), which contains many passages also found almost literally in Bahyā b. Pakūdā's "Al-Hidāya ilā Farā'id Al-Qulūb", Ch. 2. Bahyā was not influenced by Al-Ghazzālī, but both drew from a common (Christian) source. See D.Z. Baneth, "A common source of Bahyā Ibn Paqōdā and Al-Ghazzālī", Magnes Anniversary Book (Jerusalem, 1938), (in Hebrew), pp. 23-30 (English Summary, *ibid.*, pp. IV-V). Cf. also p. 31 above.

3 See p. 329 above (end of n. 15).

4 Cf. R. Brunshvig, "L'Argumentation d'un Theologien Musulman du X<sup>e</sup> siècle contre le Judaïsme", Homenaje à Millas-Vallicrosa I (Barcelona, 1954), pp. 225-241.

5 E.g., when discussing the 'Naskh', the abrogation of an earlier Qur'ānic passage or Ḥadīth by a later one. In the

wake of such discussions, Muslim theologians generally raise the question of the abrogation of the law of earlier religions by that of later ones, such as the abrogation of Judaism by Christianity and of both by Islam. But Al-Ghazzālī, who discussed the 'Naskh' at length in his "Kitāb Al-Mustaṣfāmin 'Ilm Al-Uṣūl", one of his important religious-legal works which he wrote towards the end of his life, never mentioned there the question of the earlier religions. Nor did he mention any of the controversial subjects frequently brought up in this connection, such as the alterations ('Tahrīf', 'Tabdīl') allegedly made by Jews and Christians, respectively, in the texts of the Old and New Testaments, the false interpretations of passages in them and in the Qur'ān, and the like. On the other hand in "Al-Iqtisād" he followed the general scheme of heresiography. Cf. H. Laoust, La Politique de Gazālī, p. 352.

6 Cf. above Ch. I.

7 "Al-Iqtisād", p. 110 ff. See also Ch. V, d, above, and cf. H. Laoust, *ibid.*, p. 342 ff.

8 The division of philosophers according to degrees of belief and the restriction of the theists' points of unbelief to three, occur in several of Al-Ghazzālī's writings, but do not originate with him.

9 See "Faiṣal", pp. 4-5, and p. 25.

10 Cf. Ch. V, d, above.

- 11 "Ihyā" II, 10, p. 1287, 6; 1299, 9.
- 12 Ibid., II, 5, p. 1012, 2 ff. "Jew" also appears in the "Ihyā" as the symbol of vices, especially unreliability, dishonesty etc. Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 5, p. 2536, 8 ff.
- 13 Ibid., p. 950, 7 ff., under the heading "Those Degrees Which Must Be Hated for Allah's Sake, and How to Behave towards Them". Hateful acts and prohibited acts are two of the five legal categories into which the Islamic law divides all acts perpetrated by Muslims.
- 14 See E. Strauss, History of the Jews in Egypt a. Syria under Mamluk Rule, (Jerusalem, 1944), (in Hebrew), Part I, 3, Introduction and Ch. III; Part II, 3, Ch. III. See also the epistle against the 'Dhimmīs' by Ghāzī b. Al-Wāsiṭī (13th century) in Richard Gottheil, "An Answer to the Dhimmis", JAOS 41 (1921), pp. 383-487.
- 15 Cf. Murtaḍā Al-Zabīdī, "Ithāf Al-Sāda Al-Mutaqqīn" (n.d.), Introduction, p. 16.
- 16 "Ihyā" III, 4, p. 1571, 12-14.
- 17 "Ihyā" II, 9, p. 1207, 1-4.
- 18 See E. Strauss, *op. cit.*, Part I, 1, Introduction and Chs. III, IV, V; I, 3, Ch. IV; II, 3, Ch. IV; Ghāzī b. Al-Wāsiṭī, ed. Gottheil, *loc. cit.*; see also A. Mez, Die Renaissance des Islam, (Heidelberg, 1922), p. 47 ff.

- 19 See E. Strauss, *ibid.*, Part II, 3, Ch. IV; II, 3, Ch. IV. Arab authors devoted special books to this subject, especially in the 13th and 14th centuries.
- 20 See "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 37, 6 ff.; 72, 11 ff. This theme accompanied by such and other similes, recurs in other books by Al-Ghazzālī as well.
- 21 Ibid., I, 4, p. 368, 11 ff. This theme recurs also in Al-Ghazzālī's various religious-legal works.
- 22 Cf. Ch. V, d, 4 above and n. 55 *ibid.* (pp. 380, 408 respectively).
- 23 "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 28 ff. ('Bayān Al-'Ilm Allādhī Huwa Fard Kifāya').
- 24 The damage resulting from such polemics is referred to by Al-Ghazzālī in several of his books. Cf. "Ihyā" I, 1, p. 76 ff., or "Ildjām", p. 21.
- 25 Cf. Appendix B.
- 26 "Tahāfut", p. 4.
- 27 The nature of this 'innate quality' is a moot point. There are two main explanations: according to some, it is Islam itself. (This has given rise to difficult theological and religious-legal questions). According to others, it is some kind of primitive monotheistic faith, like that of Adam. Cf. EI<sup>2</sup>, 'Fitra'.
- 28 "Al-Munqidh", p. 58. Both these passages, like many

others, show that Al-Ghazzālī saw no material difference between Judaism and Christianity or between Jews and Christians. Most favourable references to Christianity in his writings originate from the Ḥadīth or from ancient Sūfī literature and do not, as maintained, e.g., by M. Smith, reflect his own attitude. See M. Smith, Al-Ghazzālī the Mystic, (London, 1944), p. 47. Cf. also Appendix A.

29 "Ihyā III, 1, p. 1371, 5-13. Cf. also *ibid.*, IV, 5, p. 2521, 3-6.

30 As is well known, the effort for the conquest of man's desires is called in Sūfī literature 'Mudjāhada' and is termed in a famous Sūfī Ḥadīth even 'the greater Djihād' as compared to the 'lesser' one against idolaters proper. Al-Ghazzālī frequently quoted this Ḥadīth, e.g. "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1462, 1; 1463, 4; and stressed that the fight against one's inner idolatry ('Shirk') of the heart is more important than the fight against any outward idolatry. Only in one place have I found in this context any mention of Jewish, Christian and Zoroastrian unbelievers rather than idolaters proper. I am referring to a Persian-language pamphlet against the 'Ibāhiyya' (lawless people scorn of religious precepts) which is attributed to him. (See Otto Pretzl, Die Streitschrift des Gazālī gegen die Ibāhija, Verl. der Bayerischen Ak. der Wissensch., phil. hist. Abt., (Muenchen, 1933), pers. Text S.26; Uebers. S.49-50).

31 On the development of the Madrasa cf. G. Makdisī, "Law and Traditionalism in the Institutions of Learning of

Medieval Islam", in G.E. von Grunebaum (ed.), Theology and Law in Islam, (Wiesbaden, 1971), pp. 75-88. See also *idem*, "Madrasa and University in the Middle Ages" in Studia Islamica 32, 1972, pp. 256-264.

Appendix A

Who was the author of "Al-Radd Al-Djamīl  
li-Ilāhiyat 'Isā bi-Sarīh Al-Indjīl"<sup>1</sup>  
which is attributed to Al-Ghazzālī?

In Ch. VII above I tried to show that even though Al-Ghazzālī is considered to be an outstanding personality in the field of Sūfī and theological literature, no evidence of a new attitude towards Jews and Christians is to be found in his works. He is careful not to enter into polemics with Judaism and Christianity and in his books he offers only scattered remarks on the subject of Jews and Christians. In all of these remarks his approach is that of a legalist. It is his opinion that this subject belongs to the realm of the law of the earthly world, which is far inferior to the law of the next world. From this it is quite evident, that as the Sūfīs preceding him, he looked upon this subject as unimportant for the improvement of the virtues of the individual and his preparation for the next world. One may even say that he looked upon debate with members of the alien religions as a superfluous attempt to modify Allah's decree upon them.

There is however one book among Al-Ghazzālī's writings, which seems to contradict my view. This is the above-mentioned "Radd" which has been edited and translated into French by R. Chidiac<sup>2</sup> and has also recently appeared in a German translation accompanied by a detailed commentary by F.E. Wilms<sup>3</sup>. According to G.J. Padwick<sup>4</sup> an English translation of the book was prepared by K. Henry but I do not

know if it ever appeared in print.

L. Massignon was the first to draw the attention of the scholars to this book in one of his articles, called "Le Christ dans les Evangiles selon al-Ghazzālī"<sup>5</sup>. He also wrote a preface to Chidiac's edition of the book and accepted it (with some reservations) as an authentic book by Al-Ghazzālī. Since then the book has been quoted as authentic<sup>6</sup>, and used as evidence to confirm Al-Ghazzālī's doubtful visit to Egypt<sup>7</sup>. Nevertheless doubts have always persisted with regard to this book, and even those scholars who accept its authenticity admit that it must have undergone some editorial changes, made perhaps by a disciple of the author or that it may contain some older material which was incorporated into it, since both techniques were wide-spread in the Middle Ages<sup>8</sup>.

Other scholars went farther. Bouyges listed the book among those "d'authenticité douteuse, sinon certainement inauthentique"<sup>9</sup>. A. Badawi also listed the book among those whose authenticity is doubtful<sup>10</sup>, while W.M. Watt did not consider this book at all in his article on "The Authenticity of the Works Attributed to Al-Ghazzālī"<sup>11</sup> and in his book Muslim Intellectual; A Study on Al-Ghazali, (Edinburgh, 1963), which seems to indicate his view that the book is spurious. The same seems to apply to the works of F. Jabre on Al-Ghazzālī.

It is, of course, quite impossible to review here again all the relevant passages in the vast amount of literature dealing with Al-Ghazzālī or cite all the bibliographical details pertaining to Muslim-Christian polemics

in mediaeval times, which have some bearing on the discussion about the "Radd" and many of which are used and quoted by Wilms<sup>12</sup>. But I shall try to re-examine here some of the basic facts known about the "Radd" as well as the most important views advocated by scholars with regard to it. I shall also add some new material or points of view, and some new methods of investigation, especially those dealing with the literary character of the book and its style. These new methods may sometimes be regarded as more reliable than an examination of the contents<sup>13</sup>. With the aid of those methods I hope to prove my assumption that Al-Ghazzālī could never have written this book and that it seems to have been composed by someone formerly a Christian (probably a Copt), who became a convert to Islam. I feel that the question is of some importance both to the study of Al-Ghazzālī which should be based on a reliable canon of his writings, as well as to the study of Muslim-Christian polemics. Let us first look at some of the external evidence concerning the book.

#### External Evidence

##### a. Manuscripts

There exist three manuscripts of the book<sup>14</sup>, two in the Ayasofia (2246, 2247, called by Chidiac "B", "S"), one in Leiden (called by Chidiac "G"). The manuscripts have been described by both Massignon and Chidiac<sup>15</sup>, but two very important facts have not been stressed enough. All the mss. are rather late according to Chidiac (B - 19th century, S - 15th century, G - 16th century [1065 Hg.7]), and at least one manuscript of the Ayasofia (according to Padwick, p. 131,

both of them) is part of a recueil which contains another opusculé attributed falsely to Al-Ghazzālī. This opusculé, called "Shifā Al-'Alīl fīmā Waqa'a fī-l-Tawrāt wa-l-Indjīl", is a polemical work against Christianity by Al-Djuwaynī, Al-Ghazzālī's teacher in Nīshāpūr<sup>16</sup>. Apparently both opusculés were kept together because of their content.

Things being as they are, the least one can say about the manuscripts is that they hardly seem to furnish any reliable detail which proves Al-Ghazzālī to be the author of this book.

##### b. Lists of Al-Ghazzālī's books

All the scholars who dealt with this book had to accept the very astonishing fact that in not one of the well-known lists of Al-Ghazzālī's books composed by his many biographers is this book mentioned at all. This fact is all the more astonishing when we consider the numerous lists we have<sup>17</sup>, as well as the widely-known fact that those lists usually contain more books than Al-Ghazzālī actually wrote: they contain books which he intended to compose, but never did; they mention different names of one book as different books and they attribute to Al-Ghazzālī a great number of books of which he is certainly not the author<sup>18</sup>. As late as the end of the 18th century not one of Al-Ghazzālī's biographers mentions the "Radd", not even Murtaḍā Al-Zabīdī (d. 1791), who deals with the question of spurious books in the introduction to his commentary on Al-Ghazzālī's "Iḥyā". According to Bouyges (Essai, p. 126), the "Radd" appears for the first time in modern lists, compiled at the

beginning of this century by Al-Qabbānī and Al-Hilmī, and only L. Massignon called the scholars' attention to it. Different explanations have been advanced, of course, for the conspiracy of silence, surrounding this book, in a most voluminous literature during hundreds of years. Chidiac thinks that too many concessions have been made by the author of this book to the Christians. He accepted, for example, the text of their scriptures without claiming that they had been tampered with ('Tahrīf', 'Tabdīl') and dealt only with the right way of their explanation. According to Chidiac because of this and other reasons the book was repudiated by Muslims, while the Christians might have been unable to answer such a high standard of polemic and therefore preferred silence<sup>19</sup>. Abū Rīdah thinks that, on the contrary, no concessions at all were made by the author of the "Radd" to the Christians and that he wrote in quite a sharp and ironic manner. According to Abū Rīdah, the reason for the above-mentioned silence is to be found in the fact that the book filled no obvious need of the Muslim world and was therefore forgotten, like many other books of the same kind<sup>20</sup>.

c. Quotations of this book in other books of Al-Ghazzālī and vice versa

Complementing the conspiracy of silence mentioned in the last paragraph is the fact that no mention of this book is made in any other book by Al-Ghazzālī, whether accepted as authentic, or considered spurious. Even more: no books of Al-Ghazzālī's are mentioned in the "Radd", which is

quite contrary to Al-Ghazzālī's manner of writing. These two facts are especially interesting because it is well-known that in mediaeval times one of the many ways of fostering a spurious book on a famous author in Arabic literature was to quote titles of his other authentic, well-known books, or even to cite whole passages from them, in the spurious book. On the other hand, one usually tried also to interpolate hints about, or explicit quotations from, the spurious book into his authentic ones<sup>21</sup>.

d. The quotation of the Christian author Abū-l-Khair b. Al-Tayyib

The only author to mention, and quote, this book twice is the Christian 13th-century writer, Al-Rashīd Abū-l-Khair b. Al-Tayyib. According to Graf he was a Copt who wrote several polemical and apologetical treatises<sup>22</sup>. The two quotations from the text of the "Radd" are cited by P. Sbath in his "Vingt Traités"<sup>23</sup>. The passages are the same as appear in Chidiac's edition on pp. 43-45, although Massignon thinks them to be "malheureusement déformés" (Revue des Etudes Islamiques 6, p. 525). Sbath gives no detail about the manuscript and the name of the opusculum in which the quotation appears ("Maqāla fī-l-Radd 'alā Al-Muslimīn Alladhīna Yattahimūna Al-Naṣārā bi-l-I'tiqād bi-Thalāthat Ilāhāt") is not to be found either in Graf's Geschichte or in P. Sbath's "Bibliothèque des Manuscrits"<sup>24</sup>.

One more detail is stressed by Chidiac in a footnote on p. 20. The name of Al-Ghazzālī and both quotations



appear only in an appendix to this opusculé, though it would seem that the whole opusculé is a polemical tractate against books like the "Radd", yet without ever mentioning the name of the book or Al-Ghazzālī as its author. If we add to these details another very important fact, we may come to doubt even this one external piece of evidence we have concerning the "Radd". I mean the well-known fact that no Christian author after Ibn Al-Tayyib mentions the "Radd", or as Chidiac puts it: "Mais en dehors de ce témoignage isolé c'est la même conspiration du silence chez les auteurs chrétiens que chez les musulmans"<sup>25</sup>. In any case, this single quotation from our book may support at least one of my assumptions - that the book appeared or came to be known first in a Christian environment, either in very early times, such as the thirteenth century, or only much later, at a time closer to the date of one of the manuscripts.

We have seen that there is no reliable external evidence concerning the authenticity of our book. Let us now turn to look at the internal evidence in the book itself.

#### Internal Evidence

##### a. Language and Style

There is no doubt that the "Radd" is written in a very different style and contains quite a different vocabulary from what may be considered characteristic of Al-Ghazzālī's commonly accepted authentic books although all those also differ widely from one another.

Chidiac, as well as Massignon, were impressed in much

the same way. Thus says Chidiac in his introduction: "A première lecture, il est vrai, on se trouve quelque peu décontenancé par ce text austère, par cette exégèse minutieuse, par le style souvent obscur et contourné, par les reprises fréquentes d'une pensée qui cherche son expression adéquate. Ce n'est pas là la manière habituelle de Ghazzālī." (p. 21).

But his conclusion seems to be quite far-fetched and finds no support whatsoever in the book itself:

"Ces considérations nous ont amené à émettre l'hypothèse d'un ouvrage qui aurait Ghazzālī pour auteur sans être cependant de sa plume ... Ghazzālī l'aurait dicté ou même en aurait simplement exposé la matière devant un petit cercle d'auditeurs, ses documents étalés devant lui ... Quelqu'un prend des notes à la volée et ses notes sont ensuite soumises au maître qui délivre la 'Ijāza' en manière d'imprimatur." (p. 24).

Nevertheless Chidiac manages to find in the book also "un série d'indices qui ne laissent aucun doute (!) sur l'auteur du traité. L'ouvrage porte indéniablement (!) l'empreinte de Ghazzālī" (p. 21), and he mentions in this context explicitly the terminology, the ideas and the style of the "Radd".

The tremendous difficulties involved in stylistic research may account for the distinct contrast between Chidiac's different statements about the "Radd". Nevertheless I believe that stylistic research can be much more

precise and yield much better results than the above-mentioned. As we have shown above, it is quite possible to enumerate characteristic features of Al-Ghazzālī's language and style, and these characteristics can be very helpful in determining the authenticity of doubtful books, even though they should never be considered as the sole criterion for determining it<sup>26</sup>. Stylistic research has also shown that there is a surprising consistency throughout Al-Ghazzālī's language, although he wrote so many books over such a long period, dealing with different subject-matter and addressing different audiences in manifold ways. A fair amount of certain expressions occur frequently in all of his authentic writings. Some of them have acquired a special sense, or nuance, in his writings, not to be found in the dictionaries, but most important for an understanding of the exact meaning of his ideas. Some of the most common of those in his authentic writings do not occur in the "Radd" at all, such as the verbs 'istaghaththa', 'istarakka', 'taḥakkama', 'tadjammala', the adverbs 'alā-l-taḥqīq', 'bi-l-idāfa ilā', 'fī ḥaqq', the clauses 'lā maṭma'a fī', 'lā yutamāra fī', or the combinations 'ḥasm al-bāb', 'al-sadiq al-djāhil', 'ghawr wa-ghā'ila', 'amr mukhtir' etc.<sup>27</sup>

On the other hand there do occur in the "Radd" several expressions (some of them recurring often enough to be considered characteristic of the author's language), which are completely alien to Al-Ghazzālī and seem to occur nowhere in those of his books considered authentic, or are at least not very common there. Some of these are:

## Appendix A: Al-Radd Al-Djamīl

wa fī-l-qalb ḥasīka	(Chidiac, text, p. 5, 14 <sup>28</sup> )
min al-ra'sī an	( " " p. 28, 4)
faṣawābuhum 'anqā mughrib	( " " p. 30, 4)
lā aqāla allahu li-ḥādhihi-l-	
'isāba-l-nawkā 'ithāran	( " " p. 40, 15)
ṣarīḥ al-'aql, ṣarā'ih al-	
'uqūl	( " " p. 28, 2;
	38, 5, 11; 47, 17 <sup>29</sup> )

Yet the "Radd" contains also some expressions which Al-Ghazzālī liked to use in his authentic books<sup>30</sup>, as for instance the opening of rhetorical questions by 'falaita shi'rī' (see Chidiac text, p. 11, 17; 25, 12, and elsewhere) or the word 'mustanad' (text, p. 7, 7; 9, 7, and elsewhere) in the meaning of proof, "something to lean on" (usually in a negative context)<sup>31</sup>.

Especially striking in this respect is the sentence on p. 45, 7: 'wa-idhā ṣaḥḥat al-ma'anī falā mushāḥḥata fī-l-alfāz', which is translated by Chidiac as follows: "Si les idées sont justes peu import la terminologie et les conventions du langage". This appears to the reader as a paraphrase of a well-known declaration by Al-Ghazzālī, which occurs in several of his books considered authentic<sup>32</sup>.

Yet most of these expressions are very common and widely used in Arabic and can therefore hardly serve as evidence either for or against the authenticity of a book, especially when we keep in mind the above-mentioned statement that no linguistic feature should be considered as the sole

criterion in determining the authorship of a book. One may add that, generally speaking, the absence of typical characteristics is much more conclusive than the presence of the same, which may also be explained in different ways (such as literary fashion of the times, foreign influence, copying from others, later additions, etc.).

#### b. Philosophical Terminology

There is no doubt that the author of the "Radd" had some philosophical schooling. He uses the philosophical terminology quite freely as is amply proved even by Chidiac's "Lexique" (p. 101 ff.)<sup>33</sup>. He is especially fond of calling Aristo "The Philosopher", a common term among Arab philosophers<sup>34</sup>.

This terminology occurs only in Al-Ghazzālī's early authentic books which deal with the description or refutation of philosophical doctrines, such as the "Maqāṣid", "Tahāfut", "Mihakk Al-Nazar", and "Mi'yār Al-'Ilm". Yet it is entirely absent from all his other authentic works, even where he deals with typical metaphysical subjects in both the orthodox anti-philosophical way as well as in the Ṣūfī not so orthodox manner<sup>35</sup>. It would be very difficult, therefore, to assume that while Al-Ghazzālī tried to discard this terminology quite consciously in all of his books written from the end of his period in Baghdad until his death, he used the same terminology very freely in just one of his books, which does not even deal with really philosophical subjects, even though its author seemed to have felt that Christianity and Philosophy had become too

"close friends". The fact that there is no sign of any Ṣūfī attitude by the rationalistic author of the "Radd" seems to strengthen the assumption that this book could not have been written by Al-Ghazzālī after leaving Baghdād.

On the other hand it is hardly conceivable that Al-Ghazzālī composed the "Radd" during his early period in Baghdād, and before his supposed visit to Egypt, while he was completely absorbed by his studies of the various doctrines of philosophy, Ismā'īlite Shī'a and mysticism, and while he was dealing with a vast number of students. In addition, he had to respond to legal questions addressed to him from all over the world<sup>36</sup>. In all of these various activities there is no trace whatsoever that he dealt with or studied Christianity to the extent of knowing the dogmatic differences of various Christian denominations or of being able to cite their scriptures according to books and chapters, and even quoting in their languages, such as Hebrew and Coptic<sup>37</sup>. It is therefore very doubtful that the "Radd" was ever composed by him.

#### c. Quotations in Foreign Languages

The "Radd" contains three sentences not written in Arabic. Two of them are in Hebrew, according to the author, and one of them in Coptic<sup>38</sup>. The first quotation (text p. 5, 11) is taken from Exodus, 4, 6: "Behold his hand was leprous as snow." Chidiac remarks in his introduction (p. 32) that the author's translation is not exact and also draws our attention (ibid., pp. 68-70) to the fact that the author had to explain in a special way the

biblical quotation which assumes, quite contrary to the Qur'<sup>ān</sup> (Sura 36, 32; 27, 12), that Moses' hand had really become leprous. It is obvious that the author was well versed in both the Old and New Testaments, perhaps much more so than in the Qur'<sup>ān</sup>, but his translation of the Hebrew is not very fluent and his transcription is odd<sup>39</sup>.

This is borne out also by the second quotation (text p. 23, 4; see also p. 18, 2). Here the author adduces Jesus' well-known cry in Aramaic "My God, my God, why hast thou left me" (Mark 15, 34; Matthew 27, 49)<sup>40</sup>.

The sentence has been quoted often in Muslim polemical literature, and was used as a proof for Jesus' human nature in much the same way as the author of the "Radd" does it<sup>41</sup>.

Before passing on to the most extraordinary quotation of the "Radd" in Coptic, I must stress here that nowhere in any other book by Al-Ghazzālī is there any trace of a Hebrew quotation or word, even though they are quite abundant in other polemical or historical works, such as in the writings of Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn Khaldūn.

The quotation in Coptic appears when the author of the "Radd" quotes John 1, 14: "And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us and we beheld his glory."<sup>42</sup>

In order to prove the Muslim thesis that Jesus was simply a prophet of human nature, the author of the "Radd" announces that the only right version of this verse is the Coptic version because it proves the error of those Christians who accept Jesus' divine nature. He then quotes the Coptic (Bohairic) version which is as follows: "And the

Word (i.e. God) made flesh ..."<sup>43</sup>, and explains at length why only this could be the real meaning and translation of the verse (text p. 37).

There seems to be no doubt that the author knew Coptic. This was already pointed out by Massignon<sup>44</sup>. Chidiac and Wilms do not accept this<sup>45</sup>. Yet Chidiac stresses the fact that the whole "milieu" of the "Radd" is Coptic. This is supported indirectly by Wilms while dealing at length with the intricate problem of the New Testament version which might have been used by the author of the "Radd"<sup>46</sup>.

The transliteration of the Coptic is exact and the author knew how to adduce the Bohairic translation of the text, because in the Sahidi one he could find no support for his thesis<sup>47</sup>. (Of course this may also be explained by the fact that the Bohairi was the dominant Coptic dialect in Northern Egypt in the Middle Ages). The author also gives an elaborate explanation of the different meanings of the word 'Af'ar' and it is very difficult to imagine that he just repeated things he had heard or read elsewhere. At any rate it is extremely difficult to explain how Al-Ghazzālī (who never even mentioned an Arabic version of the Gospel and did not know that most of the sayings attributed to Jesus and cited by him were not to be found in the Gospels), should cite such a "finesse" of Christian scripture and translation, which was unknown even to such erudite polemicists as Ibn Ḥazm and Al-Shahrastānī!

But even if we suppose for just a moment that he did so (having been taught this by somebody), how could he

forget all of this immediately after finishing this book, and go back to writing other books, in which he quite often mentions Jesus as if he had learnt nothing new whatsoever!

d. Citation of the Names of Books and the Number of Chapters from the Old and New Testaments

The author of the "Radd" does not quote the "Tawrāt" or "Indjīl" in the most general way as Al-Ghazzālī does in all his books. The author of our book knows, that both the "Tawrāt" and the "Indjīl" are comprised of different books, some of which he cites by name, e.g., "The Books of the Kings and Judges" (text, p. 5), or "The Psalms of David" (text, p. 41). When he quotes the New Testament he quotes also chapter numbers, e.g., The Gospel according to John, Ch. 24, or 27, The Gospel according to Mark, Ch. 24 (text p. 9, 12, 13, 22, respectively) or The Epistles of Paul to the Corinthians (ibid., p. 13), or to the Ephesians (ibid., p. 22), or The Epistle, Ch. 29 (ibid., p. 31), etc. This knowledge is quite extraordinary, especially with regard to Al-Ghazzālī, and Chidiac has already drawn our attention to this fact, without however drawing from it the only possible conclusion - that Al-Ghazzālī certainly could not have been the author of the "Radd"<sup>48</sup>. Of course Muslim polemicists quote fairly often both the Old and New Testaments, but usually they do not show such an intimate acquaintance with the texts as does the author of the "Radd". Those who do show this kind of knowledge however appear to be converts to Islam who polemicized against their former faith<sup>49</sup>. Generally speaking, those converts

were also the only ones to quote - in Arabic transliteration - whole sentences in the original language of the texts in the same manner as did the author of the "Radd"<sup>50</sup>.

It is a well-known fact that nowhere in Al-Ghazzālī's authentic books is there any exact citation of a verse from the Bible, any mention of the name of a book in either the Old or the New Testaments, or trace of any Christian terminology. More especially, Al-Ghazzālī seems to have had no idea that those Holy Scriptures were divided into books and chapters.

Even if we accept the above-mentioned idea - that Al-Ghazzālī composed the "Radd" out of material he found ready before him - it is quite inconceivable that once he knew about such an internal division of the Bible (or for that matter details about, and names of, different Christian denominations), he fell back into his old manner of writing and quoting without ever mentioning this knowledge, or explaining why he discarded this manner of quotation later on, as he did explicitly with regard to philosophical terminology, for instance.

e. Writers Mentioned in the "Radd"

The author of the "Radd" cites in the last chapter of his book names which are never mentioned by Al-Ghazzālī, as far as I can see. Being interested in grammar (unlike Al-Ghazzālī who felt only contempt for the "science of language"<sup>51</sup> and was often accused of grammatical negligence<sup>52</sup>), the author of the "Radd" quotes Sībawaihī (text, p. 62, 2) in a detailed grammatical discussion. He also

mentions Al-Kisā'ī (d. 805/190 Hg.) and Ibn 'Amir (d. 1031/423 Hg.)<sup>53</sup>, as well as Al-Fārisī (d. 1134/Hg. 529)<sup>54</sup>. The latter died more than twenty years after Al-Ghazzālī, a fact which might of course present a special problem. Yet I do not wish to stress this difficulty too much as it could also be possible that Al-Ghazzālī already knew about Al-Fārisī's books or lectures. He could also have meant the earlier Al-Fārisī who died in 987/377 Hg. (Cf. EI<sup>2</sup>).

#### Jesus in Al-Ghazzālī's authentic books<sup>55</sup>

As I have shown elsewhere<sup>56</sup>, Jesus usually appears in Al-Ghazzālī's authentic books in three different contexts:

- a. As the author of typical Ṣūfī sayings;
- b. As an example of the belief in Incarnation ('Ḥulūl') often mentioned together with Al-Bistāmī and Al-Hallādj;
- c. As a prophet who performed miracles, especially those dealing with reviving the dead ('Ihyā Al-Mawtā), and usually while discussing the relevance of miracles to the prophetic mission.

Nowhere does Al-Ghazzālī deal with the problem of the Trinity, nor does he anywhere use any one of the typical terms of Christology. Even such current Christian words in Islamic polemical literature as the term 'Uqnūm' (pl. 'Aqānīm') were unknown to him, to say nothing of the rich Christological terminology used in the "Radd"<sup>57</sup>. Even more striking is the fact that Al-Ghazzālī does not seem to know anything about different Christian denominations, and his theological discussion of the doctrine of

Incarnation is very poor. This holds true both for books written before he left Baghdād, as well as for his later Ṣūfī books<sup>58</sup>. This fact is striking, especially with regard to the later books which would have been composed after the "Radd".

#### Conclusion

We have seen the great difference between the "Radd" and other books by Al-Ghazzālī, usually accepted as authentic. External as well as internal evidence seem to prove that the "Radd" was composed by someone else, not by Al-Ghazzālī. If we add to this his general attitude, that there is no point in polemicizing against Jews and Christians, or in trying to modify God's decree upon them<sup>59</sup>, we must needs come to the conclusion that Al-Ghazzālī could not have composed the "Radd" and did not compose it.

It will be mere chance if we ever come to know by name the man who wrote the "Radd". But I think that we can even now put forward certain assumptions about the personality of this man, which might come fairly close to the truth.

The author of the "Radd" seems to have been no ordinary Muslim theologian. He may have been a converted Muslim, a former Christian, probably a Copt<sup>60</sup>. This would explain his being so well-versed in the Christian Scriptures, more so than most of the theologians and polemicists of Islam, who wrote against Christianity. It would explain his knowledge of Coptic, as well as the fact that he probably used a Coptic version of the Old and New Testaments. It

would explain also his general Christian outlook, his polemics against, and knowledge of, other Christian denominations. The facts that he introduced new themes into Muslim-Christian polemics<sup>61</sup>, that he relied on what seems to be a Christian explanation of the word 'Kalima' in the Qur'ān<sup>62</sup>, and did not use the famous Muslim accusation against Christians (and Jews) of having forged the Old and New Testaments ('Tahrīf', 'Tabdīl'), that he knew almost no Hadīth and not much of Islamic theology, could be explained in this way too.

Both Massignon and Chidiac discuss the author's special attitude towards Jesus in the "Radd" and the contrast between his knowledge of Christianity and his misunderstanding as it were of some basic Christian ideas<sup>63</sup>. This problem too may find its solution once we accept the idea of a Christian convert to Islam as the author of the "Radd". If Ibn Al-Tayyib's quotation is proved to be authentic, I would put forward another assumption: The author of the "Radd" may have wished to leave his former milieu, Egypt, after his conversion to Islam. It could have been quite possible that he went to the greatest Muslim theologian of his time, to Imām Al-Haramayn Al-Djuwaynī, Al-Ghazzālī's teacher, to study Islam and Islamic theology under him. If so, he certainly was imbued with Al-Djuwaynī's ideas, much the same as Al-Ghazzālī was influenced by them, and this may account for what seemed to be (for some scholars) a similarity between the "Radd" and books by Al-Ghazzālī (for example, the attitude towards authoritative belief - 'Taqlīd'). This may also

provide the explanation for the fact that one manuscript at least was found bound together with Al-Djuwaynī's polemical tractate against the Christians. Later on the two books were confused, or considered to be one and the same, and, having originated in Al-Djuwaynī's circle, they were both attributed to Al-Ghazzālī<sup>64</sup>.

Be this as it may - the monotheistic idea of Islam seemed to have appealed enormously to the author of the "Radd" and in his book he set out to perform a twofold task: to prove Muslim monotheism to be right as against the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and to re-interpret this doctrine according to Muslim thought, as well as to ensure a special place for Jesus among Muslim prophets.

Notes to Appendix A

- 1 The book is also called "Al-Radd Al-Djamīl 'alā Sarīḥ Al-Indjīl". In this appendix the book will be referred to as "Radd" and the Arabic part of it as "text".
- 2 Al-Ghazzālī, Réfutation Excellente de la Divinité de Jésus Christ d'après les Evangiles; texte établi, traduit et commenté par Robert Chidiac, Préface de L. Massignon (Paris, 1939).
- 3 Franz Elmar Wilms, Al-Ghazālī's Schrift wider die Gottheit Jesu (Brill, Leiden, 1966).
- 4 G.I. Padwick, "Al-Ghazālī and the Arabic Versions of the Gospels", The Muslim World, 29, 1939, pp. 130-140.
- 5 See Revue des Etudes Islamiques 6, 1932, pp. 523-536.
- 6 See for instance: Abū Rīdah, Al-Ghazālī u. seine Widerlegung der Griechischen Philosophie (Madrid, 1952), pp. 49-56. N. Daniel, Islam and the West; The Making of an Image, (Edinburgh, 1962), p. 50; 334, n.5. S. Sourdél, "Un Pamphlet Musulman Anonyme d'Epoque 'Abbāsīde contre les Chrétiens", Revue des Etudes Islamiques 34, 1966, p. 5, n. 3. M. Smith in her Al-Ghazzālī the Mystic (London, 1944) also quotes this book as authentic on p. 115.
- 7 See Chidiac, Introduction, p. 25; Wilms, pp. 24-25. Cf. also G. Hourani, "The Chronology of Ghazālī's Writings", JAOS 79, 1959, p. 229. As for the doubts raised with

- regard to this visit, see F. Jabre, "La Biographie et l'Oeuvre de Ghazzālī reconsidérées à la Lumière de Ṭabaqāt de Sobki", MIDEO I, 1945, p. 94 ff.
- 8 See, for instance, Chidiac, Introduction, pp. 24, 26-27, 31-33, 59; Wilms, pp. 39, 46-47.
- 9 M. Bouyges, Essai, Appendice VI, pp. 125-126.
- 10 A. Badawi, Les Oeuvres d'Al-Ghazālī (in Arabic), (Caire, 1961), p. 262, No. 83.
- 11 JRAS, 1952, pp. 24-25. Cf. also his article "The Study of Al-Ghazālī", Oriens 13-14, 1961, pp. 121-131.
- 12 Unfortunately Wilms' book contains a number of basic errors and not only bibliographical ones (such as the one on p. XVII - "Talbīs Iblīs" was written by Ibn Al-Djawzī and not by Al-Māwardī!). For instance, Wilms tries to locate a Ḥadīth, quoted in the usual well-known way, in the Qur'ān, and of course he cannot find it there (p. 107, n. 1). In this case the Ḥadīth is very famous.
- 13 In a way this appendix is an attempt to apply practically what has been expanded theoretically in Chs. I-III of this book.
- 14 See Chidiac, Introduction, p. 95 ff., and Bouyges, p. 126. Badawī mentions only one manuscript (2246) on p. 262.
- 15 See also Wilms, pp. 32-33; Brockelman, GALS I, p. 47, No. 22.



16 See Bouyges, p. 126, and p. 140, No. 227; Goldziher, Streitschrift, pp. 29-30. Cf. also nn. 18 and 64 at the end of this appendix. Al-Ghazzālī wrote a book on logic called "Shifā Al-'Alīl fi-l-Qiyās wa-l-Ta'līl", not to be confused with this opusculum. Cf. Ch. IV, n. 21.

17 Most of them have been gathered in 'Abd-Al-Karīm 'Uthmān, "Sīrat Al-Ghazzālī wa-Aqwāl Al-Mutaqqaddimīn fīhi" (Damascus, n.d.).

18 That books were attributed very early to Al-Ghazzālī is already clearly attested by Ibn 'Arabī (d. 1240/638 Hg.) who even mentions the name of the real author of two of the books. See his "Kitāb Al-Muhādarāt wa-l-Musāmarāt" (Cairo, 1906/1324 Hg.), I, p. 125. Ibn Tūfayl (d. 1185/1581 Hg.) already mentions spurious books attributed to Al-Ghazzālī as authentic. Cf. Ch. III above, esp. nn. 16, 17 *ibid.* One of Al-Ghazzālī's biographers, at least, attributes to him Al-Djuwaynī's above-mentioned book under a different name bearing close resemblance to that of the "Radd". See Al-Yāfi'ī Al-Yamanī (d. 1336/768 Hg.), "Mir'at Al-Djinān" according to 'Abd Al-Karīm 'Uthmān, p. 87. The same list contains several other books attributed falsely to Al-Ghazzālī. Cf. also H. Khalīfa I, p. 386, No. 1085; III, 353, 6899; IV, 584, 9650. Cf. also pp. 18-19 above and see M. Winter's unpublished Ph.D. thesis on Sha'rānī (Los Angeles, 1972; University Microfilms, Ann Arbor), p. 235.

19 Chidiac, Introduction, p. 20; Wilms, p. 35.

20 Abū Rīdah, p. 52; Wilms, p. 35.

21 See p. 20 and Ch. III above.

22 See G. Graf, Geschichte der Christlichen Arabischen Literatur, 1947, II, p. 344 ff., No. 112, and the bibliography given there. Cf. especially Steinschneider, Polemische u. Apologetische Literatur, p. 37, No. 18, and G. Graf, "Zum Schrifttum des Abū-l-Barakāt und des Abū-l-Hair) Oriens Christianus III, 8, 1933, pp. 133-145.

According to Wilms who follows Massignon (Revue des Études Islamiques VI, p. 513), he was a Jacobite "von dessen Leben keine weitere Nachrichten vorliegen" (p. 203, n. 2). Nevertheless Wilms mentions Graf in his bibliography. He also thinks that Ibn Al-Tayyib lived in the eleventh century in contrast to both Massignon (*ibid.*, p. 525) and Graf.

23 P. Sbath, Vingt Traités Philosophiques et Apologétiques d'Auteurs Chrétiens du IX<sup>e</sup> au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle (Cairo, 1929), pp. 177-178. Cf. also Chidiac, Introduction, p. 20, n. 2, and p. 56 ff.

24 See Sbath, Bibliothèque, I (Cairo, 1928), pp. 38-39. Graf does not mention either Massignon or Sbath in this context, or the quotations.

25 See Chidiac, Introduction, pp. 19-20; Wilms, p. 35.

26 See Ch. II above.

27 Ch. II, pp. 99, 54, 157, 189, 68, 178, 95, 181 above.

28 Cf. also Chidiac's translation to the following references.

29 There are more examples of this sort to be found in the book (even in the name of the book!). The verb 'ṣaraha' is also very frequent in the "Radd", especially in the second conjugation. It should be stressed here that arguments based on rationalistic thinking as against "absurdities" are quite frequent in Al-Ghazzālī's authentic writings too, yet without this special idiomatic expression.

30 See also Chidiac's examples in his Introduction, pp. 21-22.

31 See p. 115 and p. 70 above.

32 See p. 253 above and n. 12 on pp. 260-261.

33 The lexique was of course not meant to be an index of technical terms and therefore many other examples of philosophical terms could be cited. Cf. also Wilms, p. 212 ff.

34 See EI<sup>2</sup> 'Failasūf'; this seems to be an abridged form of 'Al-Failasūf Al-Awwal', or, as Al-Ghazzālī puts it in his "Tahāfut" (p. 8, 5) 'Al-Failasūf Al-Mutlaq'. The term occurs especially often in the first pages of the "Radd". See text, p. 2, 12-15; 3, 9; 14, 4-5; 6, 8-13, etc.

35 See Ch. III above.

36 See "Al-Munqidh", passim, and cf. also Al-Subkī, "Tabaqāt IV, p. 101 ff.

37 This does not mean that he does not mention Christianity and Judaism in his books from that period. See, e.g., "Tahāfut", p. 4; "Al-Iqtisād", p. 91 ff., especially pp. 93-94, yet without the knowledge of any historical or theological detail. Cf. also Ch. VII above.

38 See Chidiac, text, p. 5, 11; 23, 4; 47, 3. Cf. Chidiac, Introduction, pp. 25; 31-32; 57; 69. In fact the second Hebrew quotation is Aramaic. See below, n. 40.

39 The transliteration of both Chidiac (p. 5) and Wilms (p. 54) here, as well as in the second case (p. 23 and p. 76 respectively) is inaccurate and fits neither the Arabic transliteration of the book nor the Hebrew or Aramaic original.

40 It is interesting to note that after both quotations the author says explicitly that these are Hebrew words. Chidiac omits this completely in his translation of the first quotation (p. 5), although he mentions it in the Introduction on p. 31. After the second quotation (p. 23) Chidiac corrects (!) the author of the "Radd" and translates, obviously after Mark 15, 34 - "Paroles qui sont en araméen" what should be: "Ces paroles sont en Hébreu"!

41 See, for instance, Ibn Ḥazm, "Kitāb Al-Faṣl fī-l-Milal wa-l-Nihal" II, p. 61. Cf. E. Fritsch, Islam u. Christentum im Mittelalter, (Breslau, 1930), pp. 117, 119. H. Stieglecker, Die Glaubenslehren des Islam, (Paderborn, 1962), p. 299.

According to Fritsch this kind of argument is valid only with regard to the Jacobite theology, although it was used by Muslim polemicists against Christianity as such. This fits well Chidiac's assumption that the "Radd" aims at the Jacobite theories mainly (Introduction, p. 26).

42 Text, p. 47, 3. See also Introduction, p. 25; 69; Wilms, pp. 100-101. The verse is cited often in polemical treatises. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, *ibid.*, II, p. 63; Al-Shahrastānī, "Milal wa Nihal", (ed. Cureton), pp. 173, 176.

43 See The Coptic Version of the N.T. in the Northern Dialect (Bohairic), (Oxford, 1898), pp. 334-335: "And the Word became (lit. did) flesh (indef. art.) and abode (lit. became) among us and we saw his glory."

44 Revue des Études Islamiques 6, 1933, p. 526.

45 See Chidiac, Introduction, p. 59; Wilms, p. 100, n. 1.

46 Wilms, pp. 154-164. This problem was discussed by every student of the "Radd", beginning with Padwick in his above-mentioned article.

47 Cf. Chidiac, Introduction, p. 58. I am very grateful to Professor S. Groll of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, who was a great help to me with this Coptic sentence.

48 Introduction, pp. 31-33.

49 See n. 42 above and cf. for example Ibn Taymiyya's knowledge of the O.T. (e.g. in the second book of his

polemical treatise against the Christians) with that of a Jewish convert to Islam, Samau'al Al-Maghribī, in his "Ifhām Al-Yahūd" (ed. and translated by M. Perlmann, American Academy for Jewish Research, New York, 1964).

50 See, for instance, Samau'al Al-Maghribī, *ibid.*, p. 7.

51 See, for instance, the "Ihyā" III, 10, p. 2047 ff. ('Ghurūr Ahl-Al-Lugha'); "Djawāhir", pp. 22-24.

52 Cf. Al-Subkī, "Tabaqā" IV, p. 110; "Tahāfut", Introduction by M. Bouyges, p. 26, n. 1.

53 Text, p. 61, 1. Wilms (p. 112) following Chidiac says that "Al-Kā'ī (read: Al-Kisā'ī) folgt diesem Ibn 'Amer ...", although he gives, according to Brockelmann, Ibn 'Āmir's date as 1031 and Al-Kisā'ī's as 805. Chidiac may have thought about the possibility of Al-Kisā'ī having lived in the eleventh century. Cf. EI<sup>1</sup>, Al-Kisā'ī.

54 Text, p. 60, 12. See also GALS I, p. 632.

55 Cf. also the works of M. Asin, Massignon, Margoliouth, Padwick and Zwemer, especially "Logia et Agrapha Domini Jesus apud Moslemicos Scriptorum" by M. Asin Palacios (Paris, 1916, reprinted from PO XII and XIII).

56 Cf. my article: "Is There a Concept of Redemption in Islam?" in R.I.Z. Werblowsky and C.J. Bleeker (eds.), Types of Redemption, Suppl. to Numen, (Leiden, 197), pp. 168-180.

57 Cf. Wilms, pp. 212-215 (the list is not complete).

58 See, for instance, "Al-Iqtiṣād" pp. 92-94; "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya" (ed. Badawi), p. 110; "Iḥyā" I, 1, pp. 60-61; "Al-Maqṣad", p. 98 (after the explanation of the name Al-Ṣabūr). Al-Ghazzālī would certainly have used more material in his discussion of these problems - if he had written the "Radd".

59 See above p. 447 ff. It should be stressed here once more that Al-Ghazzālī felt strongly that every polemic is dangerous to the religious life of man because it gives room for the growth of many unethical, characteristics. Polemics therefore, should be used as little as possible. Cf. "Iḥyā" I, 1, p. 76 ff. ('Bayān Āfāt Al-Munāzara Wa-Ma Yatawalladu Minhā').

60 Chidiac already thought about converts as teachers of Al-Ghazzālī, cf. Introduction, p. 32.

61 See S. Pines, "Israel my Firstborn" in Studies in Mysticism and Religion, presented to G. Scholem, (Jerusalem, 1967), p. 187.

62 Fritsch, op. cit., p. 114.

63 See Introduction, pp. 63-64. Cf. Wilms, p. 210.

64 Cf. Bouyges, Essai, pp. 126, 140; Steinschneider, Polemische u. Apologetische Literatur, p. 48, No. 31; p. 125; Goldziher, Streitschrift, p. 30; Chidiac, Introduction,

p. 19. See also nn. 16 and 18 above.

The confusion with regard to those books may be reflected in the fact that the book by Al-Djuwaynī has at least two different names, one of which resembles closely the beginning of the "Radd" title; the idomatic beginning of the second title is very common (cf. Goldziher, Streitschrift, Text, p. 52, 21, GALS, index).

Appendix B

Some Notes on the Term 'Taqlīd'  
in the Writings of Al-Ghazzālī

The religious connotation of the term 'Taqlīd' is well-known. Lane, following the classical dictionaries, explains it thus:

"'Taqlīd' means a man's following another in that which he says or does, firmly believing him to be right therein without regard or consideration of the proof or evidence."

J. Schacht in his article on 'Taklīd' in the EI<sup>1</sup> says:

"(3.) 'Taklīd' lastly means 'clowthing with authority' in matters of religion: the adoption of the utterances or actions of another as authoritative with faith in their correctness, without investigating reasons ... in this sense 'Taklīd' is the opposite of 'Idjtihād' ... The historical beginnings of the 'Taklīd' coincide with the formation of the juristic 'Madhāhib'.

Discussions regarding this term, which was first denounced by some Mu'tazilites, and its exact meaning as well as the evaluation of belief based on 'Taqlīd' only, are quite abundant in Islamic theological literature<sup>1</sup>. In Al-Ghazzālī's writings 'Taqlīd' is a "key-term" and many Muslim theologians after Al-Ghazzālī relied considerably on his definitions and evaluations of it.

In Al-Ghazzālī's writings the word usually means blind adherence to, or following, ancestral tradition and

pronouncements by teachers, without independent examination, meditation and reflection. It has a distinctly negative, derogatory connotation, and appears as the contrary to the faith which is founded on examination and study or on personal religious experience. It means, therefore, a lower level ('Hadīd') from which one ascends to a higher level ('Yafā', 'Dhurwa') of faith founded on independent thinking ('Istibṣār') or revelation in vision ('Kashf').

'Taqlīd' is the characteristic of the faith of the Jews and the Christians, as well as that of the Muslim plebs, who have been guided incidentally (mainly with the help of parents and teachers) towards the privilege of believing in the true faith. Al-Ghazzālī does, sometimes, welcome even a faith of this kind though mainly in the case of the simple man, "who does not know how to query". However, Al-Ghazzālī generally opposes the 'Taqlīd' and even stresses the fact that belief based on 'Taqlīd' can become a veil between man and religious truth, and may make it most difficult for him to accept even visions of truth, if they contradict what he has been taught in his youth<sup>2</sup>. In the same way the 'Shaitān al-Taqlīd', the Satan of authoritative belief, provides one of the veils or screens that make it impossible for man to understand the Qur'an in a personal, sincere way and makes him follow the trodden ways of ancestral exegesis which often have no real meaning for himself<sup>3</sup>.

Al-Ghazzālī quite often repeats the difference between belief based on 'Taqlīd' and that based on personal reasoning or revelation. In this context he uses expressions

such as blindness and darkness with regard to the external faith of 'Taqlīd' as opposed to the positive faith, which originates in the light of religious experience and recognition of truth. This of course corroborates the fact that the abundance and frequency of light similes in Al-Ghazzālī's writings is quite striking, especially in comparison with other theological and Sūfī genres of literature<sup>4</sup>.

It will suffice to give here only one example of this kind.

"Vision and belief have three stages: the first is that of the plebs ('Awāmm') and their belief is based on 'Taqlīd' only; the second is that of the theologians, and that is ('Taqlīd') mixed with a kind of reasoning, but still at a level very close to the belief of the plebs; the third is that of the Gnostics ('Ārifīn'), a belief (based on what) is seen (by vision) in the light of certainty. We can explain to you these three stages by an example of the three stages of your belief in Zayd's staying in his house<sup>5</sup>. The first stage is that of your being informed (about Zayd's staying there) by a truthful person, that you have never known to lie and whom you have never accused (of being untrustworthy) in his talk. Your heart trusts him and you rely on his information by merely hearing (it). This is belief based on 'Taqlīd' only and like this is the belief of the plebs. For those people, when they reached the age of discernment ('Tamyīz'<sup>6</sup>)

heard from their fathers and mothers about the existence of God, praised be He, and about His wisdom, will, potency and other qualities, as well as about his sending the truthful prophets and their messages. And just as they heard it, they accepted and confirmed it and trusted it, and it never occurred to them that things might be different from what they had been told, because of the good opinion they had of their parents and teachers. This belief is one of the causes of salvation in the world to come, and its believers will be among the first of the people of happiness, but they will not be among those who are drawn near (to God) because their belief (is not based on) vision or on independent thinking and the opening of the heart by the light of certainty ('Nūr Al-Yaqīn'). What has been told by one, certainly by many, can be misleading with regard to the tenets of belief. Thus, for instance, the hearts of Jews and Christians rely also on what they have been told by their parents, but their belief is based on error because they have been imbued with erroneous tenets<sup>7</sup>. The Muslims (plebs) believe in truth not because they have come to know it, but because they have been (incidentally) taught the truth.

The second stage is that you hear Zayd's talk and voice from inside the house, but from behind a wall, and you deduce from this that he is inside. This belief ... is stronger than that based on

information only ... but it can also be erroneous ...

And the third stage is that you enter the house and see him (Zayd) inside with your own eyes. This is real knowledge and truthful vision ...<sup>8</sup>

There seems to be no doubt that Al-Ghazzālī thinks it to be incumbent on every man who has some power of reasoning and who strives for personal religious certainty to scrutinize the religious tradition of his forefathers and to re-acquire his faith personally and independently, with the aid of permanent asceticism and worship and the "cleansing of his heart"<sup>9</sup>. Only the weak-minded who have no power of reasoning are exempted from this duty. I.W. Sweetman<sup>10</sup> believes that Al-Ghazzālī's opinions on this subject are very close to those of the Irish Christian philosopher, John Scotus Erigena (d. 877) who says:

The opinions of the holy fathers need not be advanced, particularly if known to most, except some grave necessity should arrive, so that the argument must be confirmed for those who, being uninstructed in the art of reasoning, submit to authority more than to reason (De Divisione Naturae IV, 9).

Sometimes one may discern some quite personal linguistic features in Al-Ghazzālī's usage of the term 'Taqlīd'. Thus he likes to describe the followers of both the philosophers and the Shi'ite Imāms as being 'Muqallidūn', namely, following blindly the authority of their teachers and leaders. He declares:

And how many people have I seen believing in sheer heresy only because of their blind following ('Taqlīdan li-') of Plato and Aristo and a group of philosophers of good fame. Their motive in doing so is to be accepted in the circles of the philosophers and not be included among those who are supposed to be less intelligent than the philosophers ...<sup>11</sup>

Al-Ghazzālī's attacks on 'Taqlīd' are especially severe when discussing the Ismā'ilite Shi'ite Ta'limiyya sect; to this discussion he devoted several of his books or at least parts of them, as is well-known. In these debates he opposes 'Taqlīd' by 'Idjtihād', the free decision in matters of law, and demands that everyone, in times of need, should try to form an independent judgment even if there is the risk of erring and deciding wrongly. Again we shall content ourselves with only one example<sup>12</sup> of this kind of debate:

There remains their (the followers of the 'Ta'limiyya', who demand blind 'Taqlīd' after the Imām and deny all reasoning) argument: 'How do you judge about what you have not heard (a point of law on which there has been no explicit ruling?) Is it by the letter of the law ('Naṣṣ')? But ex hypothesi you have not heard it. Is it by your independent interpretation ('Idjtihād') and opinion ('Ra'y')? This is precisely the place where differences occur.'

To this we reply: 'We do what Mu'adh did when the Apostle of God (peace be upon him) sent him

to the Yemen: we judge by the actual text where there is a text, and by our independent reasoning where there is no text. That is exactly what their preachers do when they are away from the Imām at the remotest corner of the land. They cannot in all cases judge by the text, for the texts which are finite in number cannot deal with all the infinite variety of events; nor is it possible for them to return to the city of the Imām over every difficult case - while the preacher is travelling there and back the person concerned may have died, and the journey will have been fruitless.

For instance, if a man is in doubt about the 'Qiblah', the only course open to him is to pray according to his independent judgment. If he were to go to the city of the Imām to obtain a knowledge of the 'Qiblah', the time of prayer would be past. As a matter of fact prayer fulfils the law even when directed to what is wrongly supposed to be the 'Qiblah'. There is the saying that the man who is mistaken in independent judgment receives a reward, but the man who is correct - a twofold reward<sup>13</sup>; and that is the case in all questions left to independence judgment.

Another example of the same is the giving of alms to the poor. A man by his independent judgment will often suppose the recipient poor although he is really rich and hides his wealth. The giver of

alms is not punished for this, though he was mistaken; he is liable to punishment only for the motive leading him to make the supposition (his resolution to give alms).

Elsewhere it seems, however, that Al-Ghazzālī approves of faith based on 'Taqlīd' for the plebs and even prefers it to the barren dialectics of the theologians. In this context 'Taqlīd' is connected with parables of illness and healing which are abundant in Al-Ghazzālī's writings, as in all mediaeval religious literature. The 'Muqallid' who follows the prophets blindly is like the sick man who listens to his physicians (quite often his father) and everyone needs a certain amount of this kind of 'Taqlīd'. Thus Al-Ghazzālī says in "Al-Munqidh":

In general, the prophets are the physicians of the diseases of hearts. The only advantage of the intellect is that it informed us of that, bearing witness to prophetic revelation by believing (the trustworthiness of the prophets) and to itself by being unable to apprehend what is apprehended by the eye of prophecy; then it took us by the hand and entrusted us to prophetic revelation, as the blind are entrusted to their guides and anxious patients to sympathetic doctors. Thus far may the intellect proceed. In what lies beyond it has no part, save in the understanding of what the physician communicates to it ...

Moreover I say: Even if you have not experienced it (religious truth, especially with regard to the



commandments) -- your mind judges it an absolute obligation to believe in it and follow it. Let us suppose that a man of full age and sound mind, who has never experienced illness, now falls ill; and let us suppose that he has a father who is a good man and a competent physician of whose reputation in medicine he has been hearing as long as he can remember. His father compounds a drug for him, saying, 'This will make you better from your illness and cure your symptoms'. What judgment does his intellect make here, even if the drug is bitter and disagreeable to the taste? Does he take it? Or does he disbelieve and say, 'I do not understand the connection of this drug with the achieving of a cure; I have had no experience of it'. You would certainly think him a fool if he did that. Similarly people of vision think you a fool when you hesitate and remain undecided.<sup>14</sup>

Thus only a man who feels that he has the power of reasoning and strives himself to re-acquire the tradition of his father should abandon 'Taqlīd' and start in his own way to search for the truth, like Al-Ghazzālī himself<sup>15</sup>. But does everybody really know if he has the intellectual and moral powers to find the right path? Will he not stray away from the right path or deduce false deductions regarding dogmas and tenets of belief?<sup>16</sup>

This gives rise to a difficult problem: Al-Ghazzālī's religious experiences combined with his mental exertions have enabled him to regain the traditional truth, and he

demands as much of his readers and disciples, especially from people of understanding and comprehension. The question of integrity and the freedom to study and reflect arises therefore, for it is possible that a devoted Muslim, who will follow Al-Ghazzālī and search, like him, for the religious truth, may, after some reflective thinking or religious experience, arrive at different conclusions, and thus be alienated from Islam and traditional faith. Certain scholars used this contention in order to question Al-Ghazzālī's intellectual integrity: Did he really mean to open the gates of free personal reasoning? It seems to me that they have erred in that their approach to the subject under discussion and to Al-Ghazzālī was too "modern". However modern Al-Ghazzālī's manner of writing may appear to be - he can be understood only against the background of his period: to Al-Ghazzālī the sense of religious certainty which he acquired was not only a subjective (personal) truth, but it was to him the only certain objective truth, and it is, therefore, inconceivable to him that anyone who troubles to study the truth or who is granted a religious experience or vision by God, can arrive at wrong conclusions or stray from Islam. Man can regain by reasoning or vision only the truth of Islam, its prophet and his message.

Thus, in the case of 'Taqlīd', as in other cases, if Al-Ghazzālī uses certain terms and contradicts himself as it were with regard to them, there is no reason to accuse him of lack of logic<sup>17</sup> or dishonesty and lack of integrity. He certainly was quite sincere and consistent in his

writings; it is only we, living in the twentieth century, who find it hard to accept his somewhat naïve combination of religious faith and free reasoning.

Notes to Appendix B

1 See, for instance, Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Abd-al-Djabbār, "Al-Mughnī.." (Monothéisme and Equity), ed. Ibrahim Madkur, Cairo, Vol. 12, p. 123 ff; Abū-'Udhba Al-Ḥasan b. 'Abd-Al-Ḥasan, "Al-Rawḍa Al-Bahiyya" (on the differences between the Ash'arites and the Matūrīdites), (Hyderabad, 1322), p. 21 ff. Cf. I. Izutsu, The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology, (Tokyo, 1965), p. 119 ff; J. van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Adudadīn al-Icī, (Wiesbaden, 1966), p. 44 ff. The term is closely connected with the Mu'tizilite and perhaps the Ash'arite idea of 'Kufr al-'Āmma', the condemnation of all common people as unbelievers. The Sūfīs also denounced the term quite violently. See, for example, Al-Qushayrī's "Risāla", Introduction, p. 3. Cf. also Bahyā ibn Paqūda, "Al-Hidāya ilā Farā'id Al-Qulūb", (ed. A.S. Yahuda), p. 15 ff., and G. Vajda, "La théologie ascétique de Bahyā ibn Paqūda", Cahiers de la Société Asiatique VII, (Paris, 1947), p. 18, and especially n. 1. Strictly orthodox writers like Ibn Taimiyya and Ibn Qayyim Al-Djawziyya also denounced this term for special reasons. Cf. H. Laoust, Essai sur les Doctrines Sociales et Politiques de Taḳī-d-Dīn Ahmad b. Taimiyya, (Le Caire, 1939), p. 226 ff.

2 "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1368, 9-15.

3 See "Ihyā" I, 8, p. 516, 2 ff.

4 Cf. Ch. IV above.

5 This well-known example of logical deduction recurs often in Al-Ghazzālī's writings in several variations. See, e.g., "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya" (ed. Badawi), p. 75, 1 ff.; "Al-Iqtisād", p. 10; "Ihyā" III, 8, p. 1848, 11 ff.; "Al-Qustās Al-Mustaqīm" (ed. Chelhot), p. 65, 2; 66, 5.

6 At the age of about seven years, according to Aristotle. See also Th.W. Juynboll, Handbuch des Islamischen Gesetzes, (Leiden, 1910), p. 195. Cf. "Al-Munqidh", pp. 105-106, and p. 298 above.

7 Cf. Ch. VII above. Al-Ghazzali mentions the Magians once in this context too: "If you take your belief in the infallible Imām or even Muhammad, peace be upon him, from the authority of your parents and friends ('Taqlīdan li-l-wālidain wa-l-rufaqā'), you are not different from the Jews, the Christians and the Magians who did the same" ("Al-Qustās", ed. Chelhot, p. 79, 5-6).

8 "Ihyā" III, 1, p. 1371, 2 - 1372, 7.

9 Cf. for example "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2081, 5 ff.; 2121, 4 ff.; "Faiṣal Al-Tafrīqa", p. 22, 5. As elsewhere in Al-Ghazzālī's doctrine both reasoning and asceticism may lead to knowledge and a vision of religious truth, either as separate paths (asceticism being the shorter and safer one) or in association with each other.

10 See his Islam and Christian Theology II, 2, (London, 1967), p. 55 ff.

11 "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya" (ed. Badawi), p. 35, 6-3. Cf. "Tahāfut", pp. 4, 14; "Al-Munqidh", p. 74, 6; 75, 4. This linguistic usage of 'Taqlīd' is especially interesting because most of the philosophers attacked the concept of 'Taqlīd' and saw no value in belief based on it only.

12 "Al-Munqidh", p. 88, 3 ff., according to Watt in The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazzali, pp. 46-47. Cf. also "Fadā'ih Al-Bāṭiniyya", p. 90 ff. (especially p. 100).

13 This "saying" is a well-known Ḥadīth, which Al-Ghazzālī is fond of quoting. As Goldziher has shown (ZDMG LIII, 1899, pp. 645-652), this Ḥadīth is often quoted also at the beginning of Jewish halakhic response in mediaeval times.

14 "Al-Munqidh", p. 111, 7 ff.; 120, 10 ff. See Watt's translation, *ibid.*, pp. 70, 82. See also "Ihyā" IV, 1, p. 2145, 9. Only once does the parable of prophets-physicians serve other ends: instead of following them blindly, the "patient" wants to be a doctor himself: see "Mizān", p. 21. Cf. also p. 343 above.

15 And even for a man like this a certain degree of 'Taqlīd', and following the prophets and saints, seems to be necessary, in order to avoid such crises as Al-Ghazzālī went through. See "Al-Munqidh", p. 62, 11 ff.; 99, 3 ff. Cf. H. Laoust, La Politique de Gazālī, pp. 180-182.

16 False deductions in matters of law are not a religious problem, but, quite unlike them, false deductions in matters of belief are very harmful, according to Al-Ghazzālī.

Cf. "Al-Munqidh", p. 90, 6-9.

17 This was stressed especially by R.C. Zaehner (though not with regard to 'Taqlīd'). See his Hindu and Muslim Mysticism (London, 1960), p. 153 ff.

Appendix C

Some Notes on Al-Ghazzālī's Cosmology

In the present Appendix I have collected several passages taken from Al-Ghazzālī's authentic books in order to prove two points:

a. The importance of cosmology in Al-Ghazzālī's doctrine. It would seem that no attention has been paid in the voluminous study of Al-Ghazzālī to the obvious fact that his approach to cosmology is the basis of his outlook on a multitude of subjects, such as man, body and soul, the Qur'ān and its exegesis, both kinds of the law ('Fiqh Al-Dīn' and 'Fiqh al-Dunja'<sup>1</sup>) and the commandments, prophetic revelation, this world and the coming world and many others.

b. Al-Ghazzālī's language abounds with stylish and literary elements taken from his cosmological descriptions. The reader of his books must therefore accept or understand these disconnected units as part of the whole theory of Al-Ghazzālī about the cosmos with which the reader has become familiar elsewhere. By "cosmology" I mean the recurring description (usually without any philosophical terminology) which occurs in many of Al-Ghazzālī's authentic books of three worlds, and more often of only two worlds, which according to Al-Ghazzālī constitute the "Cosmos".

The lowest of the three is 'Ālam al-Mulk wa-l-Shahāda' (The world of property and revealed objects) which is less frequently called also 'Ālam al-Khalq' (the created world)

dies, Harvard University Press, 1963, especially p. 213 ff.  
Cf. also R. Zaehner, Hindu and Muslim Mysticism, p. 155 ff.

20 See e.g. "Al-Arba'īn", p. 104, 1 ff. Closely connected with this is the idea that man's heart is a stranger in this world. See for example "Al-Arba'īn", p. 61, 1 ff. Cf. also Wensinck, Pensée, p. 63, and F. Meier, "Sufik und Kulturverfall" in W. Hartner and G.E. von Grunebaum (eds.), Klassizismus u. Kulturverfall, p. 154. This idea was quite common also in Jewish and Christian circles. See, e.g., Bahyā b. Paqūdā (ed. Yahuda), p. 131, 15 ff., and Bernhard von Clairvaux (ed. P.J. Leclercq), (Switzerland, 1953), p. 114, 17 ff.

21 See Ch. IV, b, above.