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THE LOGICAL PART

of

AL-GHAZALI'S MAQĀSID AL-FALĀŠIFA

In an anonymous Hebrew translation with the Hebrew commentary of Moses of Narbonne, edited and translated with notes and an introduction and translated into English

BY

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PART I
HOW AND IN WHAT FORM APPEARED

CALL TO THE ARAB WORLD
At first glance it might seem strange that so earnest and pious a Jewish savant as Moses of Narbonne should be so interested by and labor so long upon a tractate composed by an earnest and pious Muslim such as Abu Ḥamīd al-Ghazālī, and a tractate on Logic at that. A little inquiry, however, disclosing the community of interest between the two men, makes the connection far more understandable. Both Jews and Muslims were "People of the Book" who had Scriptures which they revered as the word of God and which were their respective ultimate authorities. And both communities had comparative bodies of Tradition, the Talmud for the one and the Ḥadīth for the other, each of which was less authoritative only than Scripture for the practical ordering of one's life since, in a very real way, it represented the voice of God to man. At the same time, being human, both Jews and Muslims were accustomed to invoke reason to guide their daily affairs. But the authoritative voice of reason did not always harmonize with the authoritative voice of revelation, a fact which inevitably raised for them both, as it had for other religious communities, the problem of "Reason and Revelation," which in its ultimate form meant the problem of reconciling reason with revelation.

The injunctions given in revelation were often obscure, and at times they seemed to conflict with what reason showed quite clearly to be right and true. Moreover, revelation was found to be what reason would call self-contradictory. A classical example is the question of freedom of the will. In both the Bible and the Qurʾān there are passages in abundance which assume that man has free will, can make his own choices and is responsible for the results of his choice. But at the
same time there are passages which clearly teach that a man's actions are determined by a will outside himself; that in a given situation he did what he did not out of free choice but because that was what God wanted him to do. And reason would judge, because here was no free will, that man was not responsible for the results of his action in that situation.

Within both Judaism and Islam, however, the conviction was strong among thoughtful men, as it had been strong among thoughtful men in other religious communities as well, that these two sources of authority could not possibly be in ultimate contradiction since both, revelation and reason, came from God. Whatever the apparent contradiction or surface variance, it was felt, they could not but be in ultimate harmony. And it was the duty of pious men to seek out and make plain that harmony; to demonstrate how reason and revelation might be reconciled. This has been the major preoccupation of the theologians and philosophers of both Judaism and Islam. But to accomplish this the teachings of both reason and revelation must be examined with equal care, stated with scrupulous exactitude and considered in proper relation to each other. The teaching of revelation was easy to handle since there was a definite Corpus of Scripture, and later of Tradition as well, setting forth what God had revealed. But where was the Corpus giving the teaching of reason? The answer, for the great body of philosophers in both Judaism and Islam, during the period under consideration, was Hellenistic philosophy, and in particular the Corpus of the Aristotelian writings plus some remains of Hellenistic philosophy.
From Philo to Abravanel it is the Hellenistic philosophy which, to the Jewish savants represents the authoritative system of reason, standing over against the authority of revelation, just as it does to the Muslim theologians and the "Arabian" philosophers from al-Kindī to al-Qazwīnī. For most of them it is particularly that Corpus, partly Neoplatonic, partly pseudo-Aristotelian, and lacking some of the genuine Aristotelian writings, which had come to be regarded as the Aristotelian philosophy. There had been philosophers before Aristotle, and there were others after him, whose thought and teaching made an impression on the peoples of the Orient, but in the period under discussion it was the Aristotelian philosophy, as they understood it, which presented a complete reasoned system of thought about the world and man's life in it.

There was good reason for this impression. It was Aristotle who had made the most influential synthesis which brought together the results of earlier reasoning and research into the meaning and significance of life in man's universe. In the Physics, the De caelo, the Meteorologia and the De generatione he had thought out the problems of the natural phenomena in man's physical universe and the general principles of its operation. In the Historia Animalium and the smaller treatises on animals, he had grappled with the problems of organic nature. In the De anima and the Parva naturalia he had studied the human soul and its functions, and in the Politica, man's relations to his fellow men. In the Ethical treatises he had discussed the problems of the moral life, and in the Rhetorica and the Poetica even those of literary composition and criticism. In the Metaphysics, or First Philosophy, he
had faced the ultimate problems of being and reality, while in
the Organon he had, for the first time, worked out the problems
of the reasoning process itself, i. e., the problems of the
very instrument reason must use as it endeavours to think out
each individual problem.

It was this Organon, this "tool" or "instrument" for arriv-
ing at the truth, which particularly intrigued our Jewish and
Muslim scholars, for it offered them not only a guide to the
correct and sure use of the reasoning process, but also a
method of classifying all the different kinds of knowledge
arrived at by reasoning. The method of demonstrative reason-
ing whereby assured knowledge could be reached was the object
of the discussions in the Analytica posteriora. Demonstration,
however, is only possible when reached by the aid of the syllo-
gism, so the Analytica priora is devoted to a detailed study of
the problems of the syllogism. Each syllogism, in turn, is
built from propositions, so the problems of the proposition
are studied in the De interpretatione. Each proposition is
made up of terms, which must belong to one of the ten categories
of the real, and these are expounded in the Categories. Besides
the demonstrative syllogism, with which the above is concerned,
there is also the dialectic syllogism, which is investigated in
the Topica. Finally, reasoning may be vitiated by various
fallacies (sophisms), which tend to slip into the reasoning
process, and these are exposed in detail in the De sophisticis
elenchis.

The foregoing is the instrument by means of which one may
arrive at assured knowledge, and Aristotle showed how all the
bits of knowledge attained by such a method can be built into a
coherent system. He taught that reasoning may be of three kinds:

(a) theoretical - when it searches for truth as a thing in itself, with no regard for practical applications. Mathematics, Physics, and First Philosophy as well as Rhetoric and Dialectic belong to this kind of reasoning.

(b) practical - when it seeks knowledge to regulate action. Ethics, Economics and Politics belong to this kind of reasoning.

(c) poetical - when it seeks knowledge of the means necessary to produce a material product. The Crafts and Architecture belong to this kind of reasoning.

Here, then, is a scheme in accordance with which it is possible to arrange all that reason can give us as assured knowledge about ourselves and our world into a clear and coherent system, reason's authoritative system, which may be studied along with, and over against, the data given in revelation.

It is not that either Jewish or Muslim thinkers in the period under discussion had access to a complete or wholly authentic Aristotelian Corpus; still less that they always agreed with the teachings that came to them as Aristotle's philosophy, but whenever and wherever we find them dealing with their two groups of data, those of reason and those of revelation, it is always the figure of Aristotle we discern standing behind what they consider to be the authoritative pronouncements of reason. Even when they are most critical of him they are nevertheless his disciples, for whether it be Saadia, Bahya b. Paquda, Maimonides, Levi b. Gerson, or Joseph Albo, or whether
it be al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Ṭūfayl, al-Ghazālī or Ibn Rushd, the dialectical method they utilize to set forth their argumentation is the dialectic they learned from Aristotle. In the fullest sense, he is for both groups il maestro di color che saano.

Philo of Alexandria, in the first century A.D., was acquainted with the teaching of Aristotle, as he was with that of most of the other Greek philosophers. And even earlier, in the thought of the Wisdom of Solomon and perhaps in that of Ecclesiastes, within the Canon, there is more than a suggestion of Greek influence, though not necessarily Aristotelian. But the later Jewish philosophy, in whose tradition Moses of Narbonne is included, received its Aristotelian doctrine for the most part from the Arabs. It is thus of some importance to enquire how these Arabs came to know of Aristotle, and what constituted the Corpus of Aristotelian writings they had. It is a somewhat complicated story.

Greek political influence had begun to penetrate eastwards, into Asia, perhaps as early as the VIIIth century B.C., but it was after the conquests of Alexander the Great and the setting up of the kingdoms of the Diadochi that the Hellenization of the Near East and North Africa gained real momentum. Initially, the chief center of Hellenistic learning outside of Greece was at Alexandria, Alexander's own city, where, under the Ptolemies, Greek learning was encouraged and the Museum was set up. Alexandria housed one of the finest libraries known to the ancient world, and founded Schools whose research and teaching in mathematics, physics, astronomy, botany, medicine, philosophy and literature made it the outstanding intellectual
centre in the eastern Mediterranea. It was at Alexandria that Jewish savants had translated into Greek the books of the Old Testament and had produced, in Greek, no small amount of literature - religious and secular.

The influence of Alexandrian learning spread both eastward and westward. We find Josephus using the Hellenistic books which form part of our LXX with as much freedom as he uses those of the Hebrew Bible. The Pentateuch of the Samaritans show many traces of the influence of the Alexandrian LXX. The Ethiopian eunuch, steward of Queen Candace, whom the evangelist Philip met on the road between Jerusalem and Gaza, was reading the prophecies of Isaiah in a Greek MS, which the Hellenist Philip immediately recognized. The facts that the Jerusalem mob expected the Apostle Paul to address them in Greek (Acts, XXI); that the Hasmoneans and Herodians employed Greek on their coinage; and that the oldest synagogue inscriptions in Palestine are in Greek, do not necessarily indicate a spreading of Greek culture from Egypt, for there were many Greek-speaking centres in Palestine, such as Samaria, Tiberias, Scythopolis and Caesarea-Philippi, from which the Greek language and customs spread to other areas. The many places, however, where the peculiarly Egyptian language of the Greek papyri has provided the solution of puzzles in the language of the Talmud, give clear evidence of the continuing influence of Alexandria in Jewish Palestine, while the fact that it was Origen of Alexandria who was called upon to deal with the problem arising from the heretical teaching of Beryllus of Bostra, is equally clear evidence of its influence on the growing Christian community in that country.
But Alexandria was not the only great center from which Greek learning spread eastwards. The Seleucids of Syria were hardly less enthusiastic promoters of Hellenism than the Ptolemies of Egypt, and as Antioch on the Orontes, in northern Syria, developed into the chief center of Seleucid power, its reputation as a center of Greek learning soon came to rival that of Alexandria. Cicero (pro Archia, 3:4) speaks of it as Eruditissimis hominibus liberalissimisque studiis adfluenti, words of praise which the city continued to deserve while it remained the home of such famous men as Malchion the Rhetorician and Longinus, the teacher of Zenobia. The Seleucids had attracted to Antioch, as Alexander had to Alexandria, an important colony of Jewish residents. And just as in the first Christian centuries a center of Christian thought and teaching, adorned by such illustrious names as those of Clement and Origen, had grown up in Alexandria, so in Antioch there developed a similar center whose leaders were Lucian, Eustathius and Diodorus. And as Gnostic teaching had flourished at Alexandria under Valentinus and Basilides, so it flourished at Antioch under Menander and Saturninus. The teaching at Antioch and at the neighbouring centers was in Greek, and was particularly concerned with the study and teaching of Greek philosophy. In fact, as the respective centers developed, Antioch gained a reputation for maintaining the grammatical and literal exegesis of Scripture and the use of the Aristotelian dialectic, as against the figurative exegesis and Platonic speculation favored at Alexandria.

Mere mention of the names of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius is sufficient to demonstrate the eastward and south-
ward spread of the influence of Antioch. The school of Edessa, which carried on the Antiochen tradition when the center at Antioch declined after the condemnation of Nestorius, settled at a place already famous for its energetic pursuit of the study of Greek books. It was also the place where the classical Syriac language had taken on a literary form into which, partly in the Jewish community and partly in the Christian community, a Syriac version of the Scriptures had been made. A later revision of this gave us the Peshitta. When this Edessene School was in turn broken up in 489 by further anti-Nestorian persecution, Barauma reformed it at Nisibis, in territory under Persian suzerainty, where once again the Antiochian tradition flourished.

Persia was another Eastern area where Greek studies were favored. The Parthians, who succeeded the Achaemenides in Persia in 247 B.C., rather prided themselves on their Greek culture and used Greek in inscriptions and on their coins. But it is difficult to say whether there was much study of Greek philosophy among them. Under the Sassanians, Christian youths from the Persian area came in such numbers to study Greek learning in the schools in Edessa and Nisibis that the school at Edessa was popularly known as "the Persian school." Many of the students from these schools labored at their lifework in different parts of the Persian Empire, and though the evidence we have deals, for the most part, with Christians from Persia, there is no reason to think that non-Christian youth in Persia had no part in such studies. There was, indeed, a tradition that Shapur I (240-271) had founded, at Gundishapur, an academy where medical science according to Hippocrates was
to be taught, and though this may be a reading back into the
days of the great Shapur what really belonged to the days of
Khusrū I, the fact that several Nestorians who fled to Persia
from the persecutions to which they were subjected in areas
under Byzantine control taught medicine in this city is
evidence that the beginnings of such an academy were there
before the reign of Khusrū I (531-579). We are informed that
translations of Greek works had been made into Sassanian
Pahlavi, and the Greek philosophy cultivated, so that when,
in 529, Justinian closed the Greek schools in Athens, the
seven philosophers of the Neoplatonic School who took refuge
at the Court of Khusrū Amushirwan would have come into a circle
of students already somewhat familiar with and appreciative of
the Greek learning which they represented.

It is important to remember that this interest in Greek
culture affected the whole life of those areas which it touched.
The use of the Greek language became widespread, Greek forms of
political organization were adopted, Greek customs, fashions and
styles were followed, Greek games were instituted at a great
many centers, and the people grew fond of adopting Greek names,
often translating their oriental names into what seemed to them
Greek equivalents (e. g. Wahballāt= Athenodoros), and even
equating the names of their deities with those of the Greek
pantheon. Youths from these lands went to the West to study and
often remained to teach. It is sometimes forgotten that Zeno,
the founder of the Stoic School, was an Oriental from Cyprus;
that Poseidonios, who built up the Stoic school in Rhodes, was
a native of Apamea in Syria; that Antiochus, who came to lead
the New Academy, was a man from Ascalon in Palestine; that the other Zeno who became the head of the Epicurean School was from Sidon; that Diodorus, who came to head the Peripatetics, was from the neighbouring city of Tyre, and that the great Nemesius was a native of Emesa. Nor was the interest in this Greek culture confined to the educated few in the great cities of Africa and western Asia. While it is true that the masses continued to use their own vernacular in daily intercourse, it is clear that they had a sense of the importance of Greek learning. The citizens of Palmyra, as their inscriptions show, used their Aramaic dialect both in private and in public life, but when they came to reorganize their municipal government they gave its officials the usual Greek titles of πρεσβύτερος; γραμματέας; σύριγας; σιχαρφης. Their neighbours, the Arab Nabataeans, were fond of Greek names and titles, and not only they but the chieftains in far off South Arabia used Greek on their coinage. The Monumentum Adulitanum from the coast of Ethiopia is in Greek. Silko, the first Christian king of Nubia, has his inscription at Talmis cut out in the best Greek that could be managed in his remote kingdom. Even the semi-settled Arabs, who frequented the Jebel aṣ-Ṣafā at the edge of the basaltic plain south-east of Damascus and whose early rock straurlings are in a form of South Arabian script, are, by the IVth century A. D., writing their scrawls in Greek and naming their chief deity Ζως Σαφαθγενος.

What interests us particularly is the spread among these peoples of a knowledge of Greek science and Greek philosophy. Obviously the pre-Christian schools at such centers as Alexandria and Antioch would have studied this science and philosophy, and that the "pagan" tradition was carried eastwards is evident from
the fact that right down to the days of the Abbasid Caliphate there was a center of "pagan" Greek learning at Harran, whose leaders claimed from the Caliphs the right to the same protection as the Jews and Christians, since they were also "People of the Book" and thus were the Sabians referred to by Muhammad in the Qur'an. One famous scholar of this community, as we shall see later, is said to have translated a number of Greek works into Syriac and Arabic. There are also traces of the work of "pagan" philosophers and teachers in other places in Syria. Of more importance for us, however, is the fact that both the Gnostic and the Christian schools which flourished in the Near East made great use of this philosophy as they began to work out their teaching systematically, just as Philo had made use of it in working out his teaching. What strikes one first in the Gnostic treatises is their numerous affinities with the teaching of Plato, but Origen sees them as Aristotelians.

Of Basilides, in particular, he says that he drew all his heresy from the teaching of Aristotle, who had fascinated him, so that what he sets forth is the doctrine of the Stagirite, not that of Christ. It is the same further east where we find developing the systems of Bardesanes (Bardesan, d. 222) and Mani (d.277), the "last of the Gnostics", both of whom were strongly influenced by Greek speculation.

It is in the writings of the teachers of the Christian schools, however, that this becomes more evident. Clement of Alexandria (d.c. 215) had a high appreciation for the philosophy of the Greeks, judging that philosophy was what God had given
them to be their *paedagogus* to lead them to the true religion, as the Law had been given to the same end to the Jews. Though his own leaning is towards the teachings of Pythagoras and Plato, it is the dialectic perfected by Aristotle which he hails as the stairway whereby one may mount up even to the Lord of the universe. Origens's training had made him familiar with Plato's philosophy and with the Aristotelian logic, too. But what is perhaps more important is that the early adversaries of Christian teaching, Celsius, Iamblichus, Porphyry and Proclus, made use of the Aristotelian dialectic in their polemic against Christianity, so that the Christian apologists, in turn, made use of it in their defence of Christianity against the attacks of its enemies. What could be more natural, then, than that the Christians, when they came to writing polemic treatises among themselves - heretics against orthodox and orthodox against heretics - should draw their dialectical weapons from the same armory? Arius, whose aberrant teaching had threatened to split the Church, and was the main issue at the Council of Nicaea in 325, had a reputation for his close acquaintance with the Aristotelian dialectic, and Athanasius, his opponent from the orthodox side, used the same dialectic in his treatise against Arius. It was held against the heretic Artemon that he placed Euclid above Christ and abandoned Scripture for dialectic and mathematics, while the more famous Paul of Samosata, who "renewed the heresy of Artemon," and who had the esteem and support of the Arab queen, Zenobia, was so renowned for his dialectical powers that at the Synod convened at Antioch, in 269, to enquire into his teaching, a skilled,
professional dialectician, named Malchion, was chosen by the assembled Bishops to conduct the discussion with him.

The polemic of the succeeding centuries, and in particular that of the Christological controversies, followed the same pattern. Monophysites, Dinophysites, Monothelites - all used the Greek dialectic in their treatises in defence of their views, while the orthodox used it, in turn, in their polemics against the heresies. Jacobites, Nestorians and Melkites were, in this matter, equally disciples of Aristotle, and were all equally indebted to the Greek philosophy, however widely their theology may have come to differ from that of Athens. The Monophysites in particular seemed to their opponents to base their entire structure of theology on a statement in Aristotle's Metaphysics (Metaphysica, VII, 13), and as a result, John of Damascus accuses them of considering Aristotle a thirteenth Apostle and of giving more credit to his statements than to those of Scripture.

Both Monophysites and Nestorians were regarded by the orthodox Church at Constantinople as heretics, and heretics were subject to persecution. Their strength was always among the non-Greek-speaking population, and as persecution waxed hotter there naturally developed an anti-Greek feeling, one result of which was that the leaders of both the Monophysite and the Nestorian communities ceased writing in Greek and labored at developing all necessary literature - Bible, Liturgy, Theology, etc. in the vernacular. The case of the Monophysites in Africa is outside our present field of interest, but the Christians in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia were, for the most part, Aramaic speaking communities. Their Aramaic differed dialectically from area to area, but in one
dialect, that of Edessa (East Aramaic dialect) there were already beginnings of a literature. A beginning with the translation of the Bible into this Edessen dialect had been made, perhaps as early as the end of the first century. It was called Syriac, and by the fourth century a vulgate version of this Syriac Bible, the *Peshitta*, was in circulation and had been widely accepted by Aramaic speaking Christians not only in Mesopotamia but in Syria, Palestine and Persia. It was this Syriac which the persecuted groups in these areas now used as their medium of cultural expression, both composing in it original works and translating into it everything they thought they might need of Greek writings. This practical motivation explains why there was so little translation of purely literary or historical works, and so much theology, philosophy, science and medicine.

The honors for these translations were shared. The West Syrians were for the most part Monophysites (Jacobites) and the East Syrians, by and large, Nestorians (Djaphysites), but in both cases their literary language is Edessan Syriac, with only minor dialectical differences. The oft-quoted rhyme from 'Abdishos (Ebedjesu's) Catalogue says:

"Ḫibḥa and Kūmī and Prōbhā
From Greek into Syriac
Translated the books of the Commentator
And the writings of Aristotle,"

a rhyme which represents the popular tradition of the Nestorian schools. Ḫibḥa (Ibas: d. 457) was known as "the translator" (methargemana) and both he and Kūmī (or Kōmāl) may well have translated the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia, "the Commentator," but it is with Prōbhā (Probus) in that same 5th
century that the work of translating Greek scientific and philosophical works got its real start. He is said to have translated Aristotle's *Analytica priora* i-vii, and perhaps the *De interpretatione*, and he certainly wrote commentaries on both and on the *Isagoge* of Porphyry. 57)

The earliest translators among the Jacobites are unknown to us by name. Anterior to the work of Sergius of Theodosiopolis, however, we find Syriac translations of John Philoponos' commentary on the *Isagoge* and of the Scholia of Olympiodorus to the *Organon* of Aristotle. 58) Perhaps a little later, chronologically, are the texts studied by Purlani. Sergius himself (Sargīs of Rēsh’aīnā, d. 536) was the most famous of all the Jacobite scholars, a physician, astronomer and philosopher whom Barhebraeus called "the most outstanding medical authority among the Syrians." 59) In Philosophy, he was a Neoplatonist, and translated the tractates of the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, which were to have so great an influence on the mystical theology of the Orient. He composed a work in seven books on Aristotelian logic; an essay on genus, species and individuum; an epistle concerning the *De interpretatione* iii; an essay on the relation of the *Analytica priora* to Aristotle's other writings; tractates on the use of the terms oūsia and schema, and a work on Aristotle's idea of the universe. 60) He translated the *Categories* of Aristotle, the *Isagoge* of Prophry, two pseudo-Aristotelian treatises, the *de Mundo* and the *de Anima*, and part of the medical works of Galen.

Translation continued into the Islamic period. At the Jacobite center associated with the monastery at Qimneshrin,
south of Aleppo on the left bank of Euphrates, Severus of Sebokht (d. 667), who was skilled in both Pahlavi and Greek, translated Aristotle's *Analytica priora* and *De interpretatione* and *Rhetorica*, while his pupil Athanasius of Balad, in 645, translated the *Isagoge* of Porphyry and wrote an introduction to Aristotelian logic. Jacob of Edessa (d. 708), who had also studied at Qimeshrin, made a fresh translation of the *Categories*, studied the *Metaphysics* and wrote a handbook explaining the philosophic terms used in works of this nature. George, the so-called "Bishop of the Arabs," (d. 724) who was the Monophysite Bishop at Kufa and a pupil of Athanasius of Balad, translated the *Categories*, the *De interpretatione* and the *Analytica priora* with introductions and commentary. Theophilus of Edessa (d. 785), the astronomer who had won the esteem of the Caliph al-Mahdi, and who translated the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* into Syriac, also busied himself with the translation of philosophic works.

As will have been noticed, the activity of these writers in Syriac was not confined to translation, for they studied and wrote on the scientific and philosophic matters they learned from the Greeks. Nestorians were early active in the exposition of Greek philosophy. Abhā of Kashkar, who was an important figure at the court of Khusrau II from which he was sent as ambassador to the Emperor Maurice (582-602), was a man learned in medicine, astronomy and philosophy, and wrote an exposition of the Aristotelian logic. His contemporary, Budh, wrote an exposition of Book I of the *Metaphysics*, and one Michael, also a Nestorian, is credited with a tractate on
man as a microcosm — which shows, interestingly enough, that Neoplatonism was active in the school at Mṣibis. 72) Aḥūdmmeh (d. 575) wrote several philosophical works, among which was one concerned with questions of logic. 73) Silvanus of Qardu, early in the VIIth century, was writing against astrology, and produced a work on Greek philosophy which shows a knowledge of the Categories and De interpretatione of Aristotle, the Isagoge of Porphyry, and the Prolegomena used in the Neoplatonic schools as introductory to the study of logic. 74) Ḥanāšū, as a monk at Mt. Islām, composed in his cell a collection of philosophic ṣūratān and ḥawārīm, 75) while the Catholics Ḥanāšū I (d. 700) wrote a commentary on the Analytics and a work De causis. His pupil, Ishābokht of Ṣawār, wrote on meteorological matters, on Aristotelian logic and tractates on such problems as "possibility" and "fate." 77) Theodore bar Kōnai of Kashkar even wrote a general sketch of the Greek philosophy. 78) Among the Jacobites we find the VIIIth century writer David bar Paulus writing on the Categories, and Moses bar Kepha (d. 903) wrote a commentary on the Aristotelian logic, a book of Prolegomena to the Categories, and a treatise De anima. 79)

The advent of Islam early in the seventh century made almost as great a change in the intellectual life of the Near East as it did in the political life. In the first years of Muslim expansion the lands where both the Jacobite and the Nestorian churches flourished came under Arab control, and under the Caliphate the Arabic language quickly superseded both Greek and the Aramaic dialects throughout the Near East. In the Iranian area the use of Arabic spread so widely that though the vernacular was not superseded by Arabic, the language be-
came so modified by contact with Arabic that it passed from the Middle Persian Pahlavi to the development of what we know as modern Persian. Into those areas of older culture the Arabs came as the teachers of a new religion, but in all else they had everything to learn. They had their Scripture, the Qu’ran, but when they were confronted by the necessity of explaining it and working out the grammatical structure of their own language, the model they used was that of the grammatical concepts said to be derived from Aristotle. When they found it necessary to formulate their doctrines and defend them, there developed the famous kalam, in the discussions of which the opposing parties in Islam used the dialectic methods learned from the Greeks, just as the opposing parties of the Monophysites, Byrophysites and Orthodox in Christianity had done before them. The Courts of the Caliphs, however, were interested in things other than theological argument. They were eager to make use of the teachings of Greek science, and in particular of Greek medicine. As a result, their Courts, and especially that of the ’Abbasiid Caliphs at Baghdad, gave a new impetus to the task of translation and interpretation — only now these were in Arabic. There was some translation done directly from Greek texts, and there was some from Pahlavi versions of Greek texts, but for the most part the new translations were from the Syriac versions which, as we have already seen, were available in considerable numbers.

Among the Arabs at the Courts of the Caliphs there would have been few, if any, who had a sufficient knowledge of Greek or even Syriac to read books in these languages, and so for
translation and exposition the Muslim rulers had to depend very largely on men of learning in the older religious communities. The full story of this translation process is yet to be written. It must suffice here to mention some of the more important names concerned.

The most famous translators into Arabic were Ḥunain b. Ishaq (d. 875) and his school. Ḥunain had occupied himself with translation into Syriac from Greek, but with his son Ishaq b.  Ḥunain and his nephew Ḥuṣayn b. al-Ḥasan, he translated from Greek and from Syriac into Arabic, and this was their chief work. Between them, they translated most of the Organon of Aristotle, the De anima, the De gener. et corr., the Physica and Metaphysica, the Ethics and the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Themistius and Ammonius on the Aristotelian writings, the Republic and Timaeus of Plato, the Quadrupartitum of Ptolemy and numerous mathematical, medical and other scientific works.

Ḥunain and his immediate successors were Nestorians. There had been translators in this community before him, important among whom were Yahya b. al-Baqri (fl. 830), the physician Yahya b. Masawayh (d. 857) and Abu Nu‘a of Anbar, who translated the Aristotelian Topica. Ḥunain also had successors not of his own School, notably Abu Bishr Matta b. Yunus (d. 940), known as "the Logician" (al-mantiq), but mostly famous for his translation of Aristotle’s Poetica. The other communities also shared in this work. Among the Melkites were Qusta b. Luqa (c. 912) and another Yuhanna b. al-Baqri (c. 850). Among the Jacobites were Ibn Na‘ima (fl. 835), who translated, among other things, the so-called "Theology of Aristotle," and Yahya b. ‘Adil (d. 974), whose work has been especially studied by Graf and Perier. To these Christian translators must be added the
names of Thabit b. Qurra and his fellow students at the "pagan" schools of Harran.

In the Xth century, as a result of this contact with Greek science and Greek philosophy and under the stimulation of men of learning of the older religions, an independent Muslim development of this body of knowledge began. It made some notable contributions to the study of astronomy, medicine and mathematics, and produced the series of "Arabian" philosophers. It is with these latter that we are here concerned. Beginning with the association of the "Faithful Brethren" at Basra, it developed on this philosophical side at the hands of al-Kindi (fl. 850), al-Farabi, Ibn Nasr, Ibn Sina, Ibn al-Haitham, al-Ghazali, Ibn Badja, Ibn Tufail and Ibn Rushd, in that form of Oriental Aristotelianism which was to have so profound an effect on Scholasticism in the West. For their knowledge of the Greek philosophy, all these "Arabian" philosophers were dependent on the translations which came to them through the labors of the above-mentioned translators. In this connection there are five matters of some importance to be kept in mind:

1) The extreme literalness of the translations which had been made into Syriac and later into Arabic. This fact is commented on by almost every scholar who has had to deal with them. On the one hand, it has been useful in enabling scholars to see fairly clearly the type of Greek text on which the translators worked, but on the other hand so literal translations made for unidiomatic Syriac and unidiomatic Arabic, and often led to passages which are hardly intelligible without reference to the Greek which they are supposed to represent. Part, at least, of the mistaken ideas some of the
"Arabian" philosophers had of the teaching of Aristotle may be laid to the charge of the translations they used. Tkatsch, in his two volumes on the Poetica, began a detailed study of the translation methods of these translators, a study which has been carried to the Categories in the recent work of Kh. Georr.

2) The fact that the interest of Muslims, in these texts, was long a purely practical interest. They had no cultural-aesthetic interest in them, no desire to read them just for enjoyment. What they were after was the content of the texts, the material of which they could make immediate practical use. To some extent this had been true of their immediate predecessors, and it explains why we have in Syriac, and more particularly in Arabic, so many epitomes. In the case of medical, mathematical or similar scientific works it was hardly practical to epitomize, but with works of a philosophic nature the epitome, which gave the gist of the treatise, and the commentary, which expounded the meaning, were in much greater favour than complete translations. It was doubtless this practical interest which led to their preoccupation with Aristotle, and in particular with the Organon.

3) The fact that the Aristotelianism which came to the Arabs was strongly tinged with Neoplatonism. This was apparently inevitable. From the third century A. D. it was the Neoplatonic School which dominated Greek philosophy. In Alexandria, indeed, there had been a Platonic tradition before Plotinus, the pupil of Ammonius Saccas, made it the dominant School in Egypt. The labors of Iamblichus show it was well
domiciled in Syria. In the Christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries the technical terms used make it clear that the philosophical background of the disputants on both sides was the current Neoplatonism. At the time the work of translation into Syriac was at its height the only living philosophical tradition among the Greek speaking peoples was Neoplatonism, which will explain why in the literary histories there is so often mention of the Neoplatonic connections of one and another of the translators. The Arabs who studied their Aristotle, for the most part through the medium of the Alexandrian commentators, had no means of distinguishing what was the original Peripatetic teaching and what was Neoplatonic interpretation, and so they treated the *Isagoge* of Porphyry as though it were actually a part of the *Organon*, accepted the excerpts from the *Enneads* of Plotinus which passed under the name of the "Theology of Aristotle" as Aristotelian, and attributed the *Stoicheiōs theologike* of Proclus to Aristotle under the name of *Liber de Causis*. Even the earlier *kalam* of the Muslim theologians had been strongly affected by the Neoplatonism they learned from their contact with Christians of the Eastern Churches, and the teaching of the *Batinisya* sects was even more deeply colored by Neoplatonic ideas.

4) That the Arab interest in medical writings, in particular in those of Galen, was important for their understanding of philosophy, since Galen himself had strong Aristotelian leanings. A great many of the Muslim philosophers were also physicians, and so were imbibing Aristotle through two channels.

5) The fact that for the Arabs the name of Aristotle
came to cover practically the whole of Greek philosophy. It was not that they did not know the names of Hermes, Empedocles, Democritus, Socrates, Plato, and Plotinus, but that Greek philosophy as the body of reason over against that of revelation was to them ta'lim Aristū (the teaching of Aristotle). One reason for this was that even in pre-Islamic days the name of Aristotle was known to Arab legend as one of the "Masters of Wisdom." Aristotle had been the friend and tutor of Alexander the Great, and as the legend of Alexander spread and grew in the East, the name of Aristū the mentor of Dhu'il-Qarnain was included in it. And so it is not at all strange that in the widely known story of the dream of the Caliph Ma'mun it was Aristotle who appeared to him and gave him explicit assurance that there was essential agreement between the authoritative pronouncements of reason and the equally authoritative pronouncements of religious law and of common sense, so that the Caliph need have no qualms about encouraging the study of the ta'lim Aristū at his Court.

This led to the Arabs having a curiously exalted idea of the importance of Aristotle, which in its turn may have had some influence on the reverential regard for Aristotle characteristic of Europe in the Middle Ages. Not only did this lead to a number of non-Aristotelian treatises being ascribed by the Arabs to Aristotle, but it made them easily accept the harmonizing notions of the Alexandrians and believe that the philosophy of Aristotle was in essential agreement with that of the earlier Greek philosophers. So we find that al-Kindī compounds the teaching of Plato and Aristotle with regard to the "Intellect," and al-Fārābī devotes a whole tractate to expound the essential harmony of Aristotle's
philosophy with that of Plato, and in the great Shifa' of Ibn Sīnā' we find Aristotelian teaching mingled with, supplemented by and brought into harmony with Platonic, Stoic and Neoplatonic ideas.

It is rather remarkable how this taṣlīm Arisṭū affected the whole area of Muslim intellectual endeavour. That it should have affected their theology and philosophy, even though they were compelled on dogmatic grounds to oppose certain teachings of the Greeks, is not surprising. What is surprising is the extent to which it moulded so many other fields of "Islamic science." (al-ulum al-islāmiyya). We have already noted the influence of the Aristotelian categories on the development of Arabic Grammar. It is the same story in the field of Rhetoric. Even in the domain of Law (Fiqh), which has been hailed in recent years as the most characteristic product of the spirit of Islam and its finest flowering, we find that the orthodox Jurists (fugahā') use the categories of universal and particular, genus and species, general and special, etc., and argue syllogistically in peripatetic fashion. Indeed, al-Ghazzā'ī, the great treatise he wrote on Jurisprudence, with an exposition of the logical method which he asserts is indispensable for the handling of questions of jurisprudence. Medicine and Mathematics, Astronomy, Botany - all the regular studies among the Arabs had their basis in the teaching of the Greeks and were organized in Islam in what was thought to be the Aristotelian order. Finally, the mystical theology of the Ṣūfīs, as it began to express itself in systematic form, drew, in turn, from this taṣlīm Arisṭū. It is thus of peculiar interest to note that the jibe of John of Damascus against the
Monophysites, which we quoted above, appears in almost identical words in the mouth of a pious Muslim of the third Islamic century. In the formal study of this teaching it became customary to reckon the writings making up the Aristotelian Corpus as twenty treatises in four groups.

I. Logic - (containing eight treatises) -

II. Physics - (containing eight treatises) -

III. Metaphysics - (two treatises)

IV. Ethics - (two treatises) - Nichomachaen Ethics and Politics.

On this basis, it was then possible to make a complete system covering the whole range of knowledge as it could be attained by reason. The system of classification in al-Farabi’s Ikhāṣ al-‘Ulūm is typical, and has the added interest of showing clearly the influence of the eight-fold scheme of the Neoplatonists.

I. Grammar. (‘ilm al-Lisān).
II. Logic. (‘ilm al-Manṭiq).

4. Posterior Analytics (al-Burhān).
5. Topics (al-mawādī al-jadaliyya).
8. Poetics (ash-shi‘r).
III. Mathematics. (ʿilm at-taʿlīm).

1. Arithmetic (ʿilm al-ʿādād)
2. Geometry (ʿilm al-ḥandasa)
3. Optics (ʿilm al-mannāṣ wa l-falsāfah)
4. Astronomy (ʿilm an-nujūm)
5. Music (ʿilm al-muṣīqī)
6. Weights and measures (ʿilm al-athbāl)
7. Mechanics (ʿilm al-ḥiyyāl)

IV. Physics. (ʿilm at-ṭabīʿa)

1. Natural Philosophy (as-sama' at-ṭabīʿa)
2. Cosmology (as-sama' wa l-ṭabīʿa) lit. Heaven and earth
3. Generation and corruption (al-kawn wa l-fasād)
4. & 5. Meteorology (al-ṣarār al- ulutūkīna)
6. Mineralogy (al-ṣarmūḏīn)
7. Botany (al-nabūt)
8. Zoology and Psychology (al-bayān wa l-nafs)

V. Metaphysics. (ʿilm al-ilmāḥ)

VI. Politics. (ʿilm al-maḍānī)

VII. Jurisprudence. (ʿilm al-fiqh)

VIII. Theology. (ʿilm al-kalām).

There are still too many unpublished documents, especially from the early period, for it to be possible to write the history of the formal study of the Aristotelian Logic in Islam, beginning with the exposition of it in the Rasāʾil of the 131
Faithful Brethren of Baṣra and carrying the story on till we reach its final form in the Logical treatises of al-Ǧazāʾirī. The Kutakallimūn used it but did not treat it formally, while the Faṣāfīs, on the other hand, felt it their duty to give some formal exposition of their dialectic method. Al-Fārābī did so, and though the surviving fragments of his logical works have not so far been assembled for proper study, we know that al-Qiftī regarded him as the logician among the Arabs.

From one point of view, the formal treatment of Logic reached
its highest development in the work of Ibn Sīnā', whose compendium, an-Najāt, is still studied. Al-Ghazālī made no important departure from the teaching of Ibn Sīnā', so that he is a faithful follower of "the grand Sheikh," but he did set forth the logical doctrine a great deal more clearly and succinctly than we find it in the works of Ibn Sīnā'. He expressed it in a form more in accord with Arabic ways of thinking and showed far better than any of his predecessors had done how the syllogistic forms of reasoning could be applied to the problems of the Jurists and the Theologians. Thus it is with the Logic of al-Ghazālī that the tradition of Aristotelian logic took its final form among the Arabs. After his day, though Logic continued to play an important part in the writing of philosophers, e. g. in those of Ibn Rushd, there were no important developments in Islamic study of Logic until the modern period when, under a fresh stimulus from European thought, Muslim writers have again attempted to think out a formal system of Logic suitable for students in modern schools.

One important result of these developments in the intellectual life of Islam was that they stirred a reaction within the communities still professing the older religions. Both Jews and Christians formed considerable communities in the lands under Muslim control. Being "People of the Book" they became Dhimmis, i. e. they had the status of "protected communities" (ahl adh-Dhimma), and though suffering from certain disabilities, they were permitted to profess their religion and live freely in all Muslim territories. Many of them came to hold positions of power and influence under the less fanatical
Caliphs. As Islam worked out its dogmatic positions and formulated its theological system, we find the leaders of the Jewish and the Christian communities having to think out their religious position as against that of Islam. Inevitably, there was polemic. From the VIIth century onwards we can list an unbroken series of references to Muslim, Jewish and Christian controversies, and from the time of John of Damascus in the VIIIth century we even have many of the tractates on either side preserved, such as those of 'Ali B. Rabbān al-Ṭabarī, Theodore Abū Qurra, Abū Naṣr Anbār, as-Suʿūdī, Niketas and Buthymius.

The writers of polemic used the dialectic as they had in the days of polemic before Islam was born, and the Muslim writers used it in their refutation of the Jews and Christians, Manicheans and other dualists, and of the heresies which soon enough arose within Islam itself. A by-product of this polemic was the need felt by all parties for a closer working out of their own problem - the reconciliation of reason and revelation. We see this in the case of al-Ghazzālī, who had stepped more than once into the polemical arena, and we see it in John of Damascus, in his pupil Theodore Abū Qurra, Ibn Zur'a and other Christian writers. What is closer to our own subject, however, is that in the strange ferment produced by this reaction in Judaism in the early Islamic centuries, there was a revival of interest in the philosophy of the Greeks. That contact with Greek thought that had meant so much for Philo, but which had been cut off after the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A. D., cut off so completely that even the works of Philo have survived only in MSS transmitted by Christian scribes, was now made once more through the Muslims, and proved once
again to be a very fruitful contact.

As late as 870 we find an Arab writer complaining that, quite unlike the Christians who welcomed scientific and philosophical studies, the Jews were opposed to the study of kalām, medicine and astronomy as being things which led to heresy and insubordination to the religious authorities. The ferment, however, was working and before long we find the contact with Greek learning being made. At first it was most evident in the writings of the Qaraite and in the speculations of some of the strange, heterodox, mystical sects which arose and flourished for a while, but presently in the full tide of Jewish thought there flowered that truly philosophical movement which forms the Jewish contribution to the Oriental development of Aristotelianism, and in whose tradition Moses of Narbonne stood.
NOTES.

1) "La synthèse aristotélicienne se présente ainsi comme l'aboutissement de l'immense effort de siècles de recherches, dont les résultats sont critiques, intégrés, organisés en une vue d'ensemble rigoureusement coordonnée. Il fallait le génie du Stagirite, sa vaste information, ses moyens mis à disposition, pour réussir avec une telle sûreté cette entreprise qui devait, en traversant les siècles, conserver, une si solide célébrité."

2) in Greek, though it does mean "a poetical composition", is from ποιμέν "to make", and commonly means "a piece of workmanship", so that creations of a musical, dramatic, literary, artistic nature, as well as those of architecture or of any of the crafts, could come under the name.

3) This is strikingly evident in the case of al-Chazāfī, for while in his Muncīd he uses somewhat violent language in his rejection of certain conclusions reached in the Physics and the Metaphysics, in his logical tractate Mīhakk an-Nazar he is pure Aristotelian.

4) Dante, Inferno, IV, 131.

5) Wolfson, Philo, I, 93 ff. Wolfson has exaggerated Aristotle's influence on Philo. Philo's sources are Plato, the Middle Platonists, the Stoics and the Neopythagoreans, much more than Aristotle.

6) H. Friedlander, Grießische Philosophie im alten Testament: eine Einleitung in die Psalmen und Weisheitsliteratur. Berlin 1904. For Wisdom see now C. C. Torrey, The Apocryphal Literature, (New Haven, 1945), pp. 98 ff.; and for Ecclesiastes Lukyn Williams' commentary on that book in the Cambridge Bible for Schools (1922), pp. xxx ff. H. H. Schrader in Die Antike, IV, 230, 231, points out that what is even more important than these traces of a technical philosophical character which are often noted, is the fact that when we pass from the book of Job in the Old Testament to the book of Wisdom in the Septuagint we are passing into a quite different world, a world whose thought and whose method of expressing that thought have been moulded by Hellas.
7) This has been emphasized again by I. Husik in his History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy, (Philadelphia, 1941), p.xx.


10) Omit.

11) Every known MS of the Greek Old Testament, the Septuagint, contains writings which were never part of a canonical collection of Hebrew writings, but as all our MSS of the LXX are from the hands of Christian scribes we cannot be sure that Jewish savants at Alexandria included them in their Canon of Scripture.


13) Acts,VIII,26 ff. The name Candace suggests that his mistress was ruler of the kingdom of Nubia.


15) S. Lieberman, Greek in Jewish Palestine, New York, 1942, passim.

17) Seleucus Nicanor in 300 B.C. founded the city there, laying it out on the plan of Alexandria, and named it after his father. It was under Antiochus I (280-261 B.C.) that it became the chief city of the western part of the Seleucid Empire, where the rulers themselves took up residence.

18) Though without the lustre of the capital the centres of Greek learning at Apamea, Emesa, Laodicea and Samosata were by no means unimportant. It will be remembered that when Origen had to leave Egypt he lived and taught at Caesarea in Palestine, where Gregory Thaumaturgus and Athenodorus studied with him. (Eusebius, Hist.Eccl. VI,30). The name of Nicolaus of Damascus reminds us that that city also had some fame for its cultivation of Greek learning.

19) It will be remembered that both Chrysostom and Theodore of Nymphius were pupils of the pagan Sophist Libanius in one of the Schools at Antioch.

20) Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, (1931),II,189 quotes the evidence for the use of the Aristotelian dialectic by such heretical teachers as Arius, Aetius and Eunomius, who were connected with the Christian school at Antioch, and on p.190 he says: "Der aristotelische Rationalismus beherrschte die Schule." Cf.also Cayre, Patrologie et histoire de la Théologie, I,270.

21) R.Duval, Histoire d'Edessa,Paris,1892,pp.161,162. Even in so early a document in Edessene Syriac as the letter of Mar Serapion to his son, we find him saying: "This is why I have written to you this memorial of my experience of the world. For I have had experience of the life of men, and have been introduced to learning, all of which I have found in the teaching of the Greeks." See Schultess, "Der Brief des Mara bar Serapion", in ZDMG,LI,(1897),pp.365 ff.; Baumstark, Geschichte der syrischen Literatur, pp.10,11.
22) I. Guidi, Gli statuti della Scuola di Nisibis, Roma, 1890, p.10; Ohlott, "L'École de Nisibis," in Journal asiatique, juillet-aout, 1896, pp.43-63. Nisibis had earlier been the centre of a Christian school, but when the city was handed to the Persians by Jovian in 363 its leaders had transferred their work to Edessa so as to be under Christian rule. Now they moved back to escape Christian persecution directed by the orthodox groups at Constantinople.

23) The schools at both Edessa and Nisibis were for most of the time strongly Nestorian, and so were looked on with disfavour by the Monophysites, who, though equally persecuted by the orthodox, were anti-Nestorian. The result was that the Monophysites used to send their students to the monastery school at Jinneshrin, which as we shall see became a centre of no little importance.

24) On these their rulers not uncommonly add to their titles that of Ḫiṣṣāhān.


27) A. Christensen, L'Iran sous les Sassanides, Copenhagen, 1944, p. 422.


29) Among them were the Syrian Damascius, whose treatise De præcipiis has come to have a new interest because of the Mas Chamma discoveries, his pupil Simplicius, perhaps the greatest of the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, and the Lydian Priscianus, whose Solutiones ad Chosroem are extant in a Latin version.
Somewhat later than the famous seven whom Agathias ii, 30 lists (Agathiae Myrinae Historiarum Libri V, in CSER, vol.3,Bonn,1828), we read of the Sophist Uranius coming to the Persian Court and obtaining the post of instructor to Khusrau himself (Agathias, ii,29,32). Schaeder in Die Antike, IV,227 admits that Khusrau's receiving them, and seeing them safely back to Greek territory twenty years later when peace had been made, was a political gesture, but insists that it also shows evidence of appreciation by the Persians of the importance of Greek learning.

30) Agathias ii,28,29 records the tradition that Khusrau was already acquainted with treatises of Plato and Aristotle which he had read in Persian translations, and that he discussed with the philosophers such questions as that of the origin of the world, whether it was destructible or indestructible, whether there was one First Cause or a plurality. The famous Paul of Persia is said to have composed a book in Pahlavi expounding for Khusrau the Aristotelian logic, and this was later translated into Syriac by Severus of Sebokht. (Baumstark, Geschichte, p.246; Renan, "Lettre à Reinaud" in Journal asiatique for 1852, p.21).

31) Schaeder,op.cit.p.239 emphasizes the Oriental strain in the teaching of Poseidonios.

32) See art. "Ḥarrān" in Ency.Islam,II,p.270. Ḥasʿūdī, Le livre de l’avertissement, p.170 has a confused tradition about how Greek learning when it was driven from Athens took refuge at Alexandria, and when driven from Alexandria found a home at Harrān, a tradition which at least shows that the Muslims were early aware that Ḥarrān had some reputation as a centre of Greek learning. See further Ḥasʿūdī’s Nuruʾj IV,p.61-71, ash-Shahrastānī, Kitāb, 202,251.

33) Ibn an-Nadīm, Fihrist,p.320. Ibn Ḥazm in his Fīsal, i,35 seems to accept without question their identity with the Shībians of the Qurʾān. Shahrastānī, Kitāb, p.253 remarks on their interest in philosophy as well as in religion. See on them now Schaeder in Die Antike,IV,p.257.

35) Baumstark has a section on "Reste pagan-philosophischer Arbeit in Syrien", in his paper "Ostsyrisches Christentum und Ostsyrischer Hellenismus", which appeared in the *Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde*, XXII (1908), pp. 32-35.

36) *Contra Haereses*, VII, 1 and 14.


40) *De Faye*, op. cit. p. 165.

41) *Stromateis*, I, 28. In *Strom.* I, 20; VI, 10 he refers to the dialectic as the wall of defence which prevents the truth from being overthrown by the sophistries of the Sophists.


43) It is noteworthy that when at a later date the Arab philosopher al-Kindī came to write a treatise against the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, he claims that he is basing himself on the dialectic of Pseudo-Porphyr. See Périer, *Yahya ben 'Adī*, (Paris, 1920), p. 45.
44) Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. LXXIX, 70; and for his follower Aetius, see ibid., LXXVI passim.

45) Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. V, 28. Speaking of the controversial methods of this man and his followers Eusebius says: "and should anyone present (in his argument) a passage of divine truth, they examine it first of all to see whether a connected or a disjoined syllogism can be formed from it."


48) Tractatus contra Jacobites, 10, (Migne, PG, XCIV, col. 1441). He might with equal appropriateness have made this statement about the Nestorians, of whom Tktach, Die arabischen Uebersetzungen der Poetik des Aristoteles, I, 56 says: "Damit ist das Organon, speziell der angeführte Abschnitt, das wissenschaftliche Brevier der Nestorianer geworden".

49) Greeks settled in the Orient for the most part held with Constantinople and so were among the orthodox. The native peoples who did not follow one or other of the heresies but also held with Constantinople were later called Helkites, i. e. "king's people".

50) Nau, "L'Araméen chrétien", in RHR. XCIII. (1928), p. 237. It is noteworthy that one of the first Greek books translated into Edessene Syriac was the Grammar of Dionysius Thrax, whose model was long followed by later Syriac grammarians.

51) The Egyptian Church was monophysite and developed its new literature in Coptic, and the Abyssinian Church a literature in Ethiopic. The Armenian Church was also monophysite, and developed a rich literature in its vernacular, but it too is outside the range of our present interest.

52) Perhaps mention should be made, along with the Peshitta, of the Syriac poetry, whose verse forms had been
set by Bardesanes, and which Ephearem Syrus (d.373) found to be a literary medium so highly appreciated by the common folk that he used to preach his doctrines and refute his opponents in hymns and metrical homilies.

53) The so-called Christian-Palestinian Syriac literature is translation literature made from the Greek by the Melkites of Syria and Palestine into their West Aramaic vernacular when they finally came to feel that as orthodox they could no longer use the Peshitta and other religious books favoured by heretics.


55) Assemanus B.0. III,85 n. Renan, De philosophia perinatetica apud Syros, p.15, is in error in thinking that he was the one who introduced the works of Aristotle to the School at Edessa, for it now seems that they must have been studied there much earlier than the time Ibas was at the School. ”Abdishof”, whom Assemanus quotes, attributes to Ibas the translation of the Logic of Aristotle, and Baumstark, Aristoteles bei den Syrern, p.140, is inclined to attribute to him a version of the Isagoge of Porphyry, but both attributions are very doubtful. See Kh.Georr, Catégories, p.13.


58) Baumstark,p.163. Klinge, "Die Bedeutung der syrischen Theologen als Vermittler der griechischen Philosophie an den Islam", in Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LVIII (1939),p.356 notes that these tractates are both strongly influenced by Neoplatonism in their translation, which he thinks shows that there was Alexandrian influence in the centre at which they were translated.


61) Chronicon Syriacum, p. 62 of the Syriac text.

62) On this work see Furlani, Meine Arbeiten, pp. 21, 22, and for his work on the Catégories, ibid., pp. 17-21.

62b) In the list of translations of Sergius of Rasaina we have "¹²" Un traité de l'âme attribué à Aristote, différent du μὴ ἔχον, et comprenant cinq sections." - Georr, Catégories, p. 20; (Cf. Wright, Catal. 1157; Renan, p. 330; Baumstark, p. 168; Duval, p. 264; Studia Sinaitica I, p. 19).

63) Baumstark, Geschichte, pp. 256, 247; Fr. Nau in RHR, XVIII, (1928), pp. 256, 280; Kh. Georr, Catégories, pp. 25-26. He is said to have translated from Pahlavi the commentary of Paul the Persian on the De interpretatione, and probably also his work on Logic.


68) There were some anonymous Nestorian translations. Baumstark, p. 23 lists a translation of Theomistius' commentary on the Ethica, of the Commentaries of Olympiodorus on the De Anima, and of John Philoponos on the De generat. et corrupt., as well as a translation of a pseudo-Aristotelian tractate on Virtue.

69) Since the versions into Arabic of the Sophistici of Aristotle by Yahyā b. `Adī and Abū Bishr Ḥattār are expressly said to have been made from the Syriac of Theophilus we know that he had translated at least this tractate of the Organon and it is probable that he had translated others. See Georr, Catalogues, pp. 31, 190.

70) Baumstark, Geschichte, pp. 123,124; Duval, p. 254.

71) Baumstark, pp. 124,125; Duval, p. 250.

72) Baumstark, p.129; Klinge, Bedeutung, p. 356. A Jacobite Julian is quoted by Klinge p. 356 as also writing on the problem of man as a microcosm.


74) Baumstark, p. 197.
75) Baumstark, p. 202, and see Aristoteles bei den Syrern, I. 212.

76) Baumstark, p. 209; Duval, p. 254.


78) Baumstark, p. 218, and his paper in Orients Christianus, V. (1905), pp. 1-25, "Griechische Philosophen und ihre Lehren in syrischer Uberlieferung: Abschnitte aus Theodoros bar Koni's Buch der Scholien". Klinge, Bedeutung, pp. 360-363 discusses the extent of his knowledge of these philosophers.

79) Baumstark, p. 272.


83) Ahmad Amīn, Duḥā'il- İslam, (Cairo, 1936). III, 8; Gardet et Anawati, Introduction, p. 45; and in particular see the study by C.H. Becker, "Christliche Polemik und islamische Dogmenbildung", in Zeit. As., XXVI, (1912), pp. 175-195.
The famous Ibn al-Mugafîs and his son Muhammad were noted for their translations from Pahlavi into Arabic, but whether they translated Pahlavi versions of Greek texts is somewhat doubtful. Nadkour, *Orzanne*, pp. 31, 32, accepts at face value the notice in al-Qiftî's *Tārikh*, p. 220 that the son of Ibn al-Mugafîs translated from Pahlavi the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, and the *Categories*, *de interpretatione* and *Analytics* of Aristotle. Paul Kraus, "Zu Ibn al-Mugafîs", in KSO, XIV, (1934), pp. 13 ff., was more than doubtful, but Klinge, *Bedeutung*, p. 354, n. 17 suggests that the arguments of Kraus are not conclusive and that there may have been some translation of Aristotelian work from Pahlavi. In *Oriental Studies presented to E.G. Browne*, (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 345-363, C. A. Nallino drew attention to traces of three scientific works passing from Greek through Pahlavi to Arabic.

al-Allai, Bulush al-Arib, I, 181, admits that all the Greek learning of the Muslims came by way of translation from the works of the Syrians (ahl ash-Sham).


G. Bergsträsser, *Runain b. Ishag und seine Schule*, Leiden, 1931. He was born of Nestorian parents at al-Sira in 809, studied medicine at Baghdad under Yahya b. Kasawih,
and journeyed into Byzantine territory in order to learn Greek properly. He is the Johannitius of the mediaeval Latin writers. Barhebræus, Chron. Syr., 170 tells us that when Gabriel bar Bokhtishot met him and talked with him he said: "If God but give this young man length of life he will blot out the memory of Sergius of Reshaim."


90) Their translations of Galen were of particular importance. See G. Bergstrasser, "Qunain b.Ishqū über die syr. und arab. Galenübersetzungen", in the Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Vorgäng, XVII, (1925), and "Neue Materialien zu Qunain b. Ishqū's Galen-Bibliographie", in the same Abhandlungen, vol.XIX, (1932).

91) Graf,II,112 ff. deals with "andere Übersetzer und Profanschriftsteller vor Qunain".

92) Brockelmann, I² pp.221 ff; Suppl. I,364,955; Graf,II, pp.112-113; J. Tkatsch I,111.

93) Brockelmann, I², p.266; Suppl.I,416; Graf,II,113,114.

94) Graf,II,118.

95) Brockelmann, I²,228; Suppl.I,370; Graf,II,153,154; Tkatsch,I.pässim; Margoliouth, Analecta orientalis ad poetigam Aristotelian, London,1887; A. Gudemann, "Die syrisch-arabische Übersetzung der aristotelischen Poetik", in Philologus, LXXVI, (1920), pp.239-265.

96) Graf,II,30-32.
97) Graf, II, 32; Brockelmann, Suppl. I, 364.


99) Brockelmann, I, 228; Suppl. I, 370, 956; Graf, II, 233-249.


101) Brockelmann, I, 2, 241-246; Suppl. I, 384-386, 958-959.

102) For the scientific side of this Arab development adequate references are given in A. Keil, La science arabe, Leiden, 1939, while the philosophical development has been sketched by H. Horten, Die Philosophie des Islams, München, 1923; T.J. de Boer, A History of Philosophy in Islam, London, 1933, and more recently by G. Quadri, La philosophie arabe, Paris, 1947.


106) Fr. Rosenthal in Islamic Culture, XIV, (1940), pp.392-393 notes that this is the reason why we have almost verbal
translations of the works of Galen, but no existing translation in Arabic of a Platonic dialogue, and points out the further fact that in extracts and expositions of the kind favoured by the Arabs it was possible to present the thought of the Greeks in an oriental guise, a form of presentation which of course is impossible in a direct translation.

107) Klinge constantly remarks on this. E.g. of John of Apamea he says: "Die Fundamente des Johannes von Apamea verraten einen nur äußerlich christianisierten Neuplatonismus" (Bedeutung, p.356); of Sergius of Rēsh‘ainē, "seine philosophische Stellung ist charakterisiert durch die begeisterte, im Sinne des Neuplatonismus gehaltenen Vorrede zur Ubersetzung der Schriften des Areopagiten" (p.356); of Julian, "dami ordnet er sich in das gesamte, grundsätzlich neuplatonische Denken ein, das für Jacobiten und Nestorianer gleichmassig charakteristisch war" (p.356); of Yahiya b. 'Adi, "das Jahja nicht Aristoteliker im eigenen Sinne des Wortes ist, sondern seinen Aristotelismus in den Neuplatonismus eingebaut" (p.348 n.14). De Boer in Ency.Isl.I,432 remarks that Land's edition of the Syriac version of Paul of Persia's Logic shows to what extent the logical tradition of the period was tinged by Neoplatonic influences, and on p.433 he notes how even Ibn Rushd preferred the Neoplatonic explanations of Porphyry and Themistius to those of Alexander of Aphrodisias.

108) They seem to have known Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias as authoritative interpreters of Aristotle, but they preferred as a rule the expositions of Porphyry, Simplicius, Themistius, Ammonius, David the Armenian and John Philoponus. This latter was in particular favour with them since he was critical of Aristotle at some of the very points, e.g. that of the createdness of the world, where they themselves had to reject the master's teaching. See Kadkour, Organon, pp.37,38.

109) This they doubtless owed to their Christian predecessors. In the schools at Edessa and Nisibis the Isagoge had been treated as the proper introduction to Logic, and seems to have been so attached to the body of logical texts studied in the schools as to have been regarded as inseparable from them. See A.Freimann, Die Isagoge des Porphyrius in den syrischen Uebersetzungen, Berlin, 1897.


112) Horten, op. cit., p. 68, referring to ash-Shahrastānī’s Kitāb, p. 147.

113) Note how al-Alūsī, Bulūgh al-‘Arab, I, 181 uses the name Aristotēles to stand for the whole of Greek philosophy.


118) Renan, Averroës, pp. 54 ff. gives a number of quotations from Ibn Rushd to illustrate "l’admiration superstitieuse d’Averroës pour Aristote", but much the same high regard is expressed in the writings of the earlier "Arabian" philosophers, who recognize him as without question the one who may bear the title as-mu‘allim al-‘alwāl "the chief Master of Instruction".
119) The Plotinian "Theology of Aristotle" and the Liber de Causis of Proclus, as well as the spurious De mundo and De anima which Sergius of Rūsh'aim translated into Syriac have already been mentioned. Besides these, we have such works as the "Book of the Apple", (Cf. D.S.Margoliouth, "The Book of the Apple ascribed to Aristotle", in JEA for 1892, pp.187-252), which is a dialogue on the immortality of the soul in a kind of Hermetic imitation of the Phaedo; a Sīr al-Asrār (Secreta secretorum, on which see Förster, De Aristotelis Secreta secretorum commentatio, Kiel,1880), which is a curious hodge-podge of scraps of information about every conceivable subject; a Botanica which is really that of Nicolaus of Damascus, and other works. The passage from Yaʿqūbī's Histories translated by Klarmroth in ZDPV, XL (1897), pp.420-432 gives a good idea of the multiplicity of tracts the Muslims ascribed to him.


121) Al-Fārābī's tractate Fi ʾittīfāq raʾl al-balāʾīn Aṯārīn wa Arisṭaṭalīs, was edited by F.Bisterlin in his Al-Fārābī's Philosophische Abhandlungen, (Leiden,1890), pp.1-33. Such a harmony between the two philosophers was an idea often played with in late Hellenistic times, so that al-Fārābī may have been but working up in his own way what had come to him from some older source. See Rosenthal in Islamic Culture, XIV, pp.411-412.

122) Kedkour, Organon, p.23: "Au point de vue philosophique, Aristote y joue certes un rôle prépondérant; mais il est aussi associé et même confondu avec des doctrines platoniciennes, stoïciennes et néoplatoniciennes.... C'est un syncrétisme qui concilie Platon avec Aristote, et qui n'hésite pas à admettre certaines idées de Zenon ou de Chrysippe".

123) The three teachings to which they took particular exception were (1) that of the eternity of the world, because the Qurʾān taught that the world was created at a particular moment in time; (2) that of the denial of a special providence, for the Qurʾān was constantly referring to particular providences; (3) that of the denial of a bodily resurrection, for the resurrection of the body is essential for the Qurʾānic eschatology.
124) Madkour, Organon, p.16; Taha Hussain in his Kucaddima to the edition of Qubūma b. Jā'far's Naqd an-Wāthir, (Cairo, 1933), pp.5-29.


127) Ibn Qutaiba, Mukhtalif al-Hadīth, p.67, where the charge is made against Muhammad b. al-Jahmi al-Barmakī that he substitutes Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione for the Qur'ān, and spends his time studying Aristotle's Physics and Logic while neglecting his fasts.

128) See de Boer in Ency.Isl.I, 433. The insistence on eight in the sections I and II is thought to be due to the canonical arrangement by the Neoplatonists. Madkour, Organon, pp.10,11 gives an account of the arrangement of the logical treatises by Ibn Sīnā.

129) There was some confusion in this section, the eight being made up differently by different writers, some using a Mineralogy and a Mechanics supposed to be Aristotelian.

130) The Politics here is not the treatise of Aristotle known to us, but is sometimes the Republic or Laws of Plato, and sometimes a spurious Politica.

131) Logic occupies the second section under "Philosophical Sciences" in their Encyclopaedia.

133) This compendium, an-Najāt, is a resume of his larger work *ash-Shīrāz*, which is the work whose logical part is analysed by Kadkour in his book *L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe*. An elaborate analysis of its contents is given in Arabic in the recent book by O. Anawati, *Essai de Bibliographie Avicennienne*, (Le Caire, 1950), pp.30-68. In both the *Shīrāz* and the *Najāt* the logic occupies the first section and follows closely the recognized order of the Aristotelian logic.


135) A good example will be found in Muhammad Eussain 'Abd ar-Raziq's *'Ilm al-manṭiq al-ḥadīth*, Cairo, 1928.


137) Schreiner in *ZDMG*, XLII, 618-621, discusses this, and there is an analysis of his ar-Radd al-jamīl by Louis Massignon in *Revue des Études Islamiques* for 1932, Cahier IV.

139) Maimonides himself gives us testimony on the extent of the indebtedness of the Qaraite speculation to the writings of the Muslim Kutekallimar, cf. Le Guide des Égarés, I, cap.lxxi. Husik, History, p.xxxv goes so far as to pass this judgment: "There are no medieval Jewish works treating of religious and theological problems in which there is so much aloofness, such absence of theological prepossession and religious feeling as in some Karaite writings of Kuf'tazilite stamp. Cold and unredeemed logic gives the tone to the entire composition".

LIFE AND INFLUENCE OF AL-GHAZALI

The tractate of Moses of Narbonne, with which we are dealing, is his commentary on the logical part of the Nāṣīṣīd al-Falāṣīfī of al-Ghazālī. Since the latter's influence, not only on Moses of Narbonne but on other members of this group of Jewish Aristotelians, was so considerable, it is worthwhile looking more carefully into the story of his life and influence.

Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Tūsī (2) al-Ghazālī was born A. H. 450 (1056) at Tūs in the province of Khorāsān in Persia. Thus like "the majority of the learned amongst the Moslems," al-Ghazālī was not of Arabian descent, but was a Persian. He lived in an age which boasted such illustrious names as those of al-Hasīrī (1054-1122), the poet and man of letters; the philologist, al-Khaṭīb of Baghiād (d. 1071); al-Baghwāl (d. 1122), the Qur’ān commentator; the Persian man of letters Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1106), whose treatise on Ethics, Kitāb adh-Dharī‘a, al-Ghazālī is said to have carried always on his person; al-Hujwīrī (d. 1072) whose Kashf al-Mubīh is the earliest Persian treatise on Sūrisr; al-Maḍānī (d. 1124) who collected the ancient Arab proverbs; az-Zamakhshārī (d. 1143), the grammarian and Qur’ān commentator; Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130), the Berber who introduced the Ash‘arite theology to North Africa; ash-Shahrastānī (1086-1159) whose Kitāb al-Wilā‘ wa‘n-Wilā‘ is a standard work on the various philosophical opinions and religious sects. Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī's name outshone them all. His own and later generations gave him the
honorific titles of Ḫujjat al-Islām (proof of Islam) and Zain ad-Dīn (ornament of religion). Ibn al-Suḵkī said of him “If there had been a prophet after Muḥammad it would have been al-Ghazālī”.

al-Ghazālī had a younger brother, Āḥmad, who later gained fame as a preacher, and several sisters about whom we know nothing. His father was a wool-spinner who probably could neither read nor write. Nevertheless he seems to have been a devout man and a lover of learning, for when he came to die he entrusted al-Ghazālī and his younger brother to the guardianship of a Ṣūrī friend to educate and care for. From the fact that the friend is reputed to have taught both boys how to write it would seem that they must have been quite young when their father died.

al-Ghazālī and his brother would probably have studied with the Ṣūrī what was equivalent to the usual curriculum at that period in the Kuttāb or Primary School. When a child was about seven he commenced his labors by learning the Qurān by heart, and also as many of the Traditions as he was able to acquire at his native place. As a rule the Qurān was mastered at ten years of age as was the case with Ibn Sīnā. During this period the young pupil customarily memorized much poetry and many proverbs. He also learned the rudiments of numbers. And as the name Kuttāb implies, the art of penmanship was emphasized. “Thus when the foundation had been laid, during the first three years, two or three more years were devoted to religious instructions, grammar, and elementary literature.” At twelve the child was ready to enter the madrasa, al-Ghazālī and his brother seem to have remained long enough with their
guardian to have covered most of the usual course of study for when they left his hands we find they were prepared to enter the madrasa. They were in especial haste to do this as the money which their father had committed to the Şūrī had run out, while by becoming students at a madrasa they would be assured of stipends. As-Subkī tells that when their father died, "the Şūrī began to teach them till the small means which he had left them was exhausted, and the Şūrī was unable to continue to support them. So he said to them, 'Know that I have spent upon you what was (left) to you, and I am myself a man who has kept from the affairs of this world, so that I have no fortune of which I can give you a share. And, as far as I can see, the best thing you can do is to find shelter in some school; for you are seekers of knowledge (theological students), and you will get food on which you can depend during your lives.'"

So it was that al-Ghazālī and his brother entered a madrasa in alus, probably, like most boys, at about twelve years of age, and studied under Ahmad b. Muḥammad ar-Rādḥkānī. al-Ghazālī would seem to have spent several years there during which time he studied Fiqh (jurisprudence). "His first lesson would be on ceremonial purity by the use of ablution, the bath, the tooth-pick and the various circumstances of legal defilement when ghazal or complete ablution is prescribed; of the ailments of women and the duration of pregnancy. Then came the second part of the book on prayer, its occasions, conditions, and requirements, including the four things in which the prayer
of a woman differs from that of a man. He would learn all about the poor-rate (zakāt), about fasting and pilgrimage, about the laws of barter and sale and debt; about inheritance and wills — a most difficult and complicated subject. Then the pupils would pass on to marriage and divorce, a very large subject, and one on which Moslem law books show no reserve, and leave no detail unmentioned. Then would follow the laws in regard to crime and violence, Holy War, and the ritual of sacrifice at the Great Feast. The last three chapters of books on fiqh generally deal with oaths, evidence, and the manumission of slaves." Thus a good memory was at a premium in these studies as well as in the studies of the kuttāb. In the kuttāb the Qur’ān was memorized. In the madrasa the study of fiqh was also mainly a matter of memory. For analysis, a good grasp and keen understanding of the material, was not demanded of the student. He was not expected to know the reason behind the promulgation of a given law but rather on whose authority it was enunciated. And so the study of fiqh tended to reduce itself to the study of Traditions. This type of study, which valued memorization at the expense of reasoning, was uncoenogenial to al-Ghazālī. His was an enquiring mind. He was not content to accept things merely because they were based on authority. He wanted to satisfy his reason. He demanded proof for the truth of different dogmas. The result was that he broke with taqlīd even at this early age. He tells us in the Mungidh, "The thirst for knowledge was innate in me from an early age; it was like a second nature implanted by God without any will on my part. No sooner had I emerged from boyhood than I had already broken the fetters of taqlīd.
and freed myself from hereditary beliefs."

This break with taqlīd did not mean that al-Ghazālī had lost his faith. It simply meant that he now demanded that this faith pass before the bar of his reason. He began to look for a surer base for his faith than mere authority. But he continued his studies.

It was the custom for Muslim youth, on attaining the age of from fourteen to sixteen, to begin their travels and visit the great cities where they might continue the study of Traditions and fiqh, for at about this period of their lives they would have already learned all the Traditions they could acquire at their native places. It was, therefore, at about this period of his life that al-Ghazālī went from "Ṭūs to Jurjān, a journey of ten or eleven days through unsettled country", where he continued the study of fiqh under the Imām Abū Naṣr al-Isāfīlī. Here too his dislike for memorization was almost his nemesis. In the manner of students in all ages and climes al-Ghazālī took copious notes but failed to commit them to memory. On his way home to Ṭūs from Jurjān, he tells us, "We were set upon on the way, and the robbers took everything I had and went off. But I followed them, and the chief turned to me and said, 'Turn back, or you will perish'. But I said, 'I beg you by Him from whom you hope for salvation, that you give me back only my notes, for they will do you no good'. He said 'what are your notes'? I replied, 'The books in that bag. I left my country to hear them, and write them, and learn their knowledge'. Thereupon, he laughed and said, 'How can you pretend to have learned their knowledge, when I have taken them and stripped you of your learning so that you
have no knowledge? Then he gave orders to one of his companions, and he handed over the bag to me. And this man was sent by God to teach me."

al-Ghazālī spent the next three years in Tūs committing to memory the lectures he had learned in Jurjān. This means that he must have been continuously in Tūs for about three years. Whether he remained in Tūs for more than three years is impossible to decide. His attempts at memorization were not completely successful. As a matter of fact even to the end of his life, his quotations remained inaccurate. This made it possible for his later assailants to charge him with having falsified Tradition.

It was probably at this period while al-Ghazālī was at Tūs that he began the study of Sūfism. "Abd al-Ğāfir relates that, "He began by making friends with al-Fūrūn, from whom he learned the opening of the Way, and whose advice he followed in remaining in the tasks of servitude and poverty, in supererogatory works, in continuous recollection, in earnest endeavour and all diligence seeking salvation, until he out-passed those activities and overcame those difficulties and all that besets one who has taken this as his goal." He was also guided in Sūfī exercises by Yūsuf an-Massāj and while under his guidance saw God in a dream. Nevertheless al-Ghazālī was not ready yet to throw in his lot completely with Sūfism. For Abd al-Ğāfir continues, "Then it is related that he returned to secular learning and embarked on the various disciplines thereof, again taking up labours at books on these abstruse subjects, whose masters he encountered...."
This return to "secular learning" probably coincided with his journey in the year 470 A.H. to "Nisâbûr along with a group of youths from Tûs, to take advantage of the lessons of Imám al-Ḥaramain," at the Niẓâmiyya College founded expressly for him by the vizier Niẓâm al-Mulk. The "abstruse subjects" seems to refer to the study al-Ghazâlî was beginning to enter into of the "diversity in beliefs and religions and the variety of doctrines" in his quest for certainty. Thus study, which was not done in course, but privately, perhaps even secretly, was the logical consequence of al-Ghazâlî's youthful break with taṣâbîḥ. He began these investigations when he was less than twenty, as he tells us himself in the Munqīdha. At the same time he continued to pursue his studies in the fiqh of the Shâfiʿite sect under the Imám who was "The most learned Doctor of the Shâfiʿite sect in later times." al-Ghazâlî also studied theology, philosophy, logic and dialectics. He "laboured with such diligence that he cut the time appreciably, outran his contemporaries, embellished his class, and became the outstanding figure of his year and the keenest minded of his fellows in the days of Imâm al-Ḥaramain. Even the students used to benefit much from him, for he would teach and instruct them, and labour diligently at a matter so as to attain it until he came to where he produced writings of his own..." But al-Ghazâlî was not popular with his fellow students, nor was Imâm al-Ḥaramain entirely happy with the brilliant al-Ghazâlî. al-Ghazâlî, someone remarked, "showed externally a vainglorious disposition". Evidently he exhibited his
independence of thought and his disdain for authorities too clearly, as well as his impatience with those of his fellow students whose mental grasp was inferior to his. Clearly, al-Ghazālī had not as yet approached his Sturm und Drang period which was destined to have such momentous results for himself and for all Islam.

In A. H. 476 when al-Ghazālī was twenty-eight (lunar) years old his master Imām al-Ḥaramain died. al-Ghazālī probably stayed on in Nisāpur until 482 or 483 and then proceeded to the camp-court of his fellow-townsmen Niẓām al-Mulk seeking acceptance. al-Ghazālī could not have come to the camp-court earlier because it had not been established in Khorāsān before 482.

He could not have come later than 484 because in that year he went to Baghdād. "The great man welcomed him because of his high rank, renowned name, fine appearance, and the surety of his reputation. Now that Court was the centre for men of learning and the goal sought by leaders of life and letters, so that al-Ghazālī had excellent opportunities of rubbing shoulders with these leaders.....Thus his name became known far and wide, to his great profit, so that the question was mooted of his journeying to Baghdād and settling there as a teacher in the Maimūniyya Niẓāmiyya School." He was appointed to that post in 484.

However, sometime before that date, al-Ghazālī underwent an intellectual crisis. In the investigations of religious beliefs and opinions which he was pursuing, he was struck with
the contradictions which he encountered in endeavoring to dis-
entangle the truth and falsehood of these opinions. He craved
certain knowledge but wherever he turned he encountered only
intellectual confusion. His researches into the problem of
the possibility of gaining certain religious knowledge, led
him to consider the problem of certain knowledge in general.
He came to the mournful conclusion that no certain knowledge
was possible. For two months al-Ghazālī was plunged in deepest
skepticism only to be rescued by an inner illumination coming
from God. In the Mucqādiḥ he gives an account of the crisis he
underwent. First he mentions the unsatisfactory nature of
religious opinions. Then he gives the conditions which are
necessary for the attainment of certitude in general.

"I then examined what knowledge I possessed," says
al-Ghazālī, "and discovered that in none of it, with the ex-
ception of sense-perceptions and necessary principles, did I
enjoy that degree of certitude which I have just described.
I then sadly reflected as follows: 'We cannot hope to find
truth except in matters which carry their evidence in them-
selves - that is to say, in sense-perceptions and necessary
principles; we must, therefore, establish these on a firm
basis. Is my absolute confidence in sense-perception and on
the infallibility of necessary principles analogous to the
confidence which I formerly possessed in matters believed on
the authority of others? Is it only analogous to the reliance
most people place on their organs of vision, or is it rigor-
ously to me without admixture of illusion or doubt?"
"I then set myself earnestly to examine the notions we derive from the evidence of the senses and from sight in order to see if they could be called in question. The result of a careful examination was that my confidence in them was shaken. Our sight for instance, perhaps the best practised of all of our senses, observes a shadow, and finding it apparently stationary pronounces it devoid of movement. Observation and experience, however, show subsequently that a shadow moves not suddenly, it is true, but gradually and imperceptibly, so that it is never really motionless.

"Again, the eye sees a star and believes it as large as a piece of gold, but mathematical calculations prove, on the contrary, that it is larger than the earth. These notions, and all others which these senses declare true, are subsequently contradicted and convicted of falsity in an irrefragable manner by the verdict of reason.

"Then I reflected in myself: 'Since I cannot trust to the evidence of my senses, I must rely only on intellectual notions based on fundamental principles, such as the following axioms: 'Ten is more than three. Affirmation and negation cannot co-exist together! . . . To this the notions I derived from my senses made the following objections: 'Who can guarantee you that you can trust to the evidence of reason more than to that of the senses? You believed in our testimony till it was contradicted by the verdict of reason, otherwise you would have continued to believe it to this day. Well, perhaps there is above reason another judge who, if he appeared, would convict reason of falsehood, just as reason has confronted us. And if
such a third arbiter is not yet apparent, it does not follow that he does not exist.'

'To this argument I remained some time without reply; a reflection drawn from the phenomena of sleep deepened my doubt. 'Do you not see,' I reflected, 'that while asleep you assume your dreams to be indisputably real? Once awake, you recognize them for what they are - baseless chimeras. Who can assure you, then, of the reliability of notions which, when awake, you derive from the senses and from reason? In relation to your present state they may be real; but it is possible also that you may enter upon another state of being which will bear the same relation to your present state as this does to your condition when asleep. In that new sphere you will recognize that the conclusions of reason are only chimeras.'

'This possible condition is, perhaps, that which the Sūrīs call 'ecstasy' (ḥāl) that is to say, according to them, a state in which, absorbed in themselves and in the suspension of sense-perceptions, they have visions beyond the reach of intellect. Perhaps also Death is that state.... Our present life in relation to the future is perhaps only a dream, and man, once dead, will see things in direct opposition to those now before his eyes; . . .

'Such thoughts as these threatened to shake my reason, and I sought to find an escape from them. But how? In order to disentangle the knot of this difficulty, a proof was necessary. Now a proof must be based on primary assumptions, and it was precisely these of which I was in doubt. This unhappy state lasted about two months, during which I was not, it is true, explicitly or by profession, but morally and essentially,
a thoroughgoing skeptic.

"God at last deigned to heal me of this mental malady; my mind recovered sanity and equilibrium, the primary assumptions of reason recovered with me all their stringency and force. I owed my deliverance, not to a concatenation of proofs and arguments, but to the light which God caused to penetrate into my heart - the light which illuminates the threshold of all knowledge. To suppose that certitude can be only based upon formal arguments is to limit the boundless mercy of God."

Now that he knew that certain truth was obtainable al-Ghazālī next ascertained that those engaged in the search for certain truth were divided into four groups:

(1) The Mutakallimūn, the scholastic theologians, "who professed to follow reasoning and speculation."

(2) The Bāṭiniya, or the Ta'limites, who thought they could attain truth through their infallible Imām.

(3) The philosophers "who professed to rely upon formal logic and demonstration."

(4) The Sūfīs "who call themselves the elect of God and the possessors of intuition and knowledge of the truth by means of al-Mukāshafa (unveiling)."

"The truth," said al-Ghazālī to himself, "must be found among these four classes of men who devote themselves to the search for it. If it escapes them, one must give up all hope of attaining it."
al-Ghazālī then proceeded to make a thoroughgoing study of Kalām. He read the "authorities in this department" and himself "composed several treatises." This seems to refer to the ar-Risāla al-Qudsiyya and the al-Iqtīṣād fi’l-I’tīṣād. Kalām could not give him the certain truths he sought because it was not based on self-evident premises but rather on an appeal to taqlīd, ijmā’ (universal consent) or akhbar (tradition).

al-Ghazālī’s researches into Kalām extended until his appointment to the Nizamiyya in 484 (1091). He then proceeded to Baghdad where "he amazed all by his teaching and method of discussion, so that after having had the leadership of Khorasan he now became leader in ‘Iraq." His lectures were very popular. He himself tells us that they were attended by three hundred pupils. He was also engaged in composing works on fiqh and giving fatwas or legal opinions. His time, therefore, was well taken up. Nevertheless, he found opportunity - during his leisure hours - to continue his private investigations in his search for certain truth. He now turned to philosophy.

He had already found that the Mutakallimūn had attempted to refute the philosophers. But their refutations were not based on a thoroughgoing understanding of philosophic doctrine.

"Convinced," says al-Ghazālī "that to dream of refuting a doctrine before having thoroughly comprehended it was like shooting at an object in the dark, I devoted myself zealously to the study of philosophy . . . With the help of God, these studies, carried on in secret, so to speak, put me in a condition to thoroughly comprehend philosophical systems within a space of
two years. I then spent about a year in meditating on these systems after having thoroughly understood them. The Maqāsid was probably the product of al-Ghazālī's two year investigation of philosophical doctrines. For he attributes his writing of the Maqāsid to the same reason as his indulging in philosophical study. The Tahāfut seems to have been the fruit of his one year "in meditating on these systems." In it he reduced the errors of the philosophers to twenty propositions: three of them irreligious, the other seventeen heretical. In the Tahāfut he goes to the extreme of intellectual skepticism, and, 700 years before Hume, he cuts the bond of causality with the edge of his dialectic and proclaims that we can know nothing of cause or effect, but simply that one thing follows another . . . When he has finished there is no intellectual basis left for life; . . . But his end is very different from that of Hume. We are thrown back on revelation, that given immediately by God to the individual soul or that given to the prophets. All our real knowledge is derived from these sources. So it was natural that in the latter part of his life he should turn to the study of the traditions of the Prophet.

al-Ghazālī's reputation during this time continued to grow. "He rose in rank till he attained the rank of the nobles and princes and members of the Caliph's house." It is no surprise then that the Caliph should have asked him to write a book against the Ta'limites, a heretical sect. al-Ghazālī grasped at the opportunity, because after having finished his investigations of philosophy he felt impelled to study the
doctrines of the Ta‘līmites. The book he wrote against them was the Mustazhīrī, "which shows," says MacDonald, "that the Caliph in question must have been al-Mustazhīrī, who succeeded al-Muqtadī on 15th Muḥarram 487. As al-Ghazālī finally left Baghdād in Dhū‘l-Qa‘da 488 he must have been studying the Ta‘līmites early in 487." 

As might have been expected, al-Ghazālī found the teachings of the Ta‘līmites unsatisfactory; what with their appeal to taqlīd in the person of an infallible Imām and their ignorance of almost all branches of knowledge. Besides the Mustazhīrī he also wrote against them a Shu‘bat al-Haqq perhaps during his second residence in Baghdād, a Murassīl al-Khālīf, while at Hamadān, and "a Kitāb ad-Durū, written in tabular form, the record of a controversy at Tus." al-Ghazālī attempts to lay down in his Giṣṭās "a rule of guidance in theological dispute." He demonstrates there "that those who have such a rule have no need of an Imām."

al-Ghazālī next turned to Shūrī doctrine. He had from his earliest days been under Shūrī influence. His earliest teacher had been a Shūrī and the Imām al-Ḥaramain would doubtless have added to his knowledge of Shūrī teaching for we have the testimony quoted by Ibn Khallikān I, 413, that when the Imām lectured on the mystic states of Shūrī experience, he would draw tears from the eyes of his auditors. He had also, as we have seen, had Shūrī training under Fārṣadī and had been exposed to the experience of a religious dream while under the care of the
Qurfi teacher an-Nassaji. Nevertheless, he did not then continue systematically with his Qurfi studies. At that time his Qurfi studies would seem to have been of a somewhat dilettante character. However, al-Ghazali now proceeded in earnest to pursue such studies with a definite and steadfast purpose.

First, he studied the basic Qurfi books: the Gult al-qulub (The Nourishment of Hearts) by Abi Talib al-MakkI, the works of Garih al-WaqasibI and fragments of Junaid, ash-Shibli, Abi Yazid al-BisamI and other leaders. But he soon realized that knowing Qurfi was not the same as practising it. "To define health and satiety, to penetrate their causes and conditions, is quite another thing from being well and satisfied . . . In the same way there is a considerable difference between knowing renunciation, comprehending its conditions and causes, and practising renunciation and detachment from the things of this world. I saw that Qurfi consists in experiences rather than in definitions, and that what I was lacking belonged to the domain, not of instruction, but of ecstasy and initiation." (47)

Salvation could be attained by renouncing this world and turning towards "eternity and meditation on God." (48)

By this time al-Ghazali had attained a firm faith in God, Inspiration and The Last Judgement. This faith had been confirmed in him "not merely by arguments but by a chain of causes, circumstances and proofs which it is impossible to recount."

Next he examined his actions and found that his studies and lectures were motivated by a desire for honor and reputation. He felt that he "was on the edge of an abyss and that without an immediate conversion I should be doomed to eternal fire."
A struggle ensued in his soul between his desires for this world and his fears. "... one day I decided to leave Baghdād and to give up everything; the next day I gave up my resolution. I advanced one step and immediately relapsed... On the one side a world kept me bound to my post in the chains of covetousness, on the other side the voice of religion cried to me, 'Up! Up! thy life is nearing its end, and thou hast a long journey to make'..."

"Thus I remained, torn asunder by the opposite forces of earthly passions and religious aspirations, for about six months from the month Rajab of the year 488" (1095). At the close of them my will yielded and I gave myself up to destiny. God caused an impediment to chain my tongue and prevented me from lecturing. Vainly I desired, in the interest of my pupils, to go on with my teaching, but my mouth became dumb. The silence to which I was condemned cast me into a violent despair; my stomach became weak; I lost all appetite; I could neither swallow a morsel of bread nor drink a drop of water." The doctors realized that al-Ghazālī's malady was mental in origin.

Finally, he says, God gave him the strength to give up honor, wealth and family. "I gave out publicly that I intended to make the pilgrimage to Syria, not wishing that the Caliph - may God magnify him - or my friends should know my intention of settling in that country. I made all kinds of clever excuses for leaving Baghdād and not returning thither." His decision was criticized on all sides. "The Imāms of 'Irāq criticized me with one accord. Not one of them could admit that this sacrifice had a religious motive, because they considered my position..."
as the highest attainable in the religious community." Others in 'Iraq felt it to be "a calamity which one can only impute to a fate which has befallen the Faithful and Learning."

Those outside of 'Iraq thought that al-Ghazâlî was leaving 'Iraq because of fear of the government. There was, indeed, reason for al-Ghazâlî to fear the government. His patron the vizier Nizâm al-Mulk was assassinated in 485 and Mâlik Shâh died in the same year. Civil war broke out and al-Mustafîr who had become Caliph in 487 espoused the cause of Tutush as against that of Bargiyâruq. Bargiyâruq finally became the Great Seljuk, but al-Mustafîr, in the belief that Tutush would win out, had inserted Tutush's name in the public prayers. With the defeat and death of Tutush "the Caliph might well feel uncomfortable, and the theologians and advisors of his court might well look out for themselves." al-Ghazâlî as one of the most important men in the Caliph's court would be in especial danger. He himself, however, denies that his flight from 'Iraq was motivated by any such considerations. He claims that the authorities wished to detain him and showed displeasure at his resolution to leave in spite of their request that he remain. And he cites "those who were on the spot", the 'Iraqis, as proof of his contention.

In Dhûl Qâ'da A.H. 488 = (1095) al-Ghazâlî left Baghdad. "This date . . . was the great era in his life; but it marked an era, too, in the history of Islam. Since al-Ash'ârî went back to the faith of his fathers in 500 and cursed the Mut'azîlites and all their works, there had been no such . . . flight of al-Ghazâlî. It meant that the reign of pure scholastic
theology was over; that another element was to work openly in the future Church of Islam, the element of the mystical life in God, of the attainment of truth by the soul in direct vision."  

al-Ghazālī went to Syria where he remained two years in "retirement, meditation and devout exercises". There he lived "a solitary life in the Mosque of Damascus, and was in the habit of spending his days on the minaret after closing the door behind" him. He next proceeded to Jerusalem where he secluded himself in the Sanctuary of the Rock. He then decided to make a pilgrimage "to receive a full effusion of grace." First he went to the tomb of the Friend of God (Abraham) in Hebron and then he went to Mecca and Medina, the pilgrimage cities. "Finally, the longings of my heart and the prayers of my children brought me back to my country, although I was firmly resolved never to revisit it. At any rate I meant, if I did return, to live there solitary and in religious meditation; but events, family cares, and vicissitudes of life changed my resolutions and troubled my meditative calm. However irregular the intervals which I could give to devotional ecstasy my confidence in it did not diminish; and the more I was diverted by hindrances, the more steadfastly I returned to it. Ten years passed in this manner."

'Abd al-Ghāfir gives another account of these ten years which seems to differ from this account of al-Ghazālī's in the Munkidh. According to 'Abd al-Ghāfir, al-Ghazālī first made the pilgrimage. "Then he entered Syria and settled in that region for about ten years, going around visiting famous shrines, and began to produce famous writings the like of which
had never previously appeared, as for example the *Ihya* (The Revivification of the Religious Sciences), and shorter books such as the *Arba’In*, and other Essays, such that whoever meditates upon them will know at once the place this man holds in the various branches of learning. He also began to make war on the lower self in order to change this human nature, improve its moral qualities and educate its impulses..." [57]

Gardner suggests that ‘Abd al-Ghafir’s account does not contradict al-Ghazâlî’s but is simply a more detailed one. [58] Be that as it may ‘Abd al-Ghafir’s attributing the writing of the *Ihya* to this period of his life is not disputed by anyone. Ibn al-Athîr tells us that al-Ghazâlî taught the *Ihya* while he was at Damascus. This book was al-Ghazâlî’s *magnum opus*. One of his biographers has remarked that “if all the books of Islam were destroyed, it would be but a slight loss if only the *Ihya* of al-Ghazâlî were preserved.” [59]

During this ten year period of Şûrî retirement al-Ghazâlî deepened his understanding and experience of Inspiration as being the only basis of metaphysical certainty. The Şûris who emphasized the reality of Inspiration were therefore the only people who would attain certainty. Muhammad was a Şûrî before he became the Prophet. The Way of the Şûrî to God was therefore the path of certainty. [60]

al-Ghazâlî’s retirement from active public life was disturbed by the widespread decay of faith which he noticed on every side. The learned ‘ulamâ’ set a bad example through the laxity of their religious and moral behavior. Many Şûris preached antinomianism. The Ta’lîmites were increasing their
activity. The philosophers insisted that practical piety was necessary to curb the passions of the masses but had no authority with them. Their guide was science. Such is the faith "of those who study the doctrines of the philosophical theists (meta-physicians) in the works of Ibn Sīnā' and Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, the philosophers of this sect who bear the name of Muslimi" says al-Ghazālī. And he cites the Wasiya (Testament) of Ibn Sīnā' as destroying purity of belief and respect for religion.

The times cried for reform, and al-Ghazālī felt that he was called upon to come out of his retirement and do battle for the ways of the Lord. Yet he hesitated, for he realized that unless he had the active aid "of a sovereign zealous for religion" his attempt would be vain. Finally, "the vizirship fell to . . . . . .Fakhr al-Mulk . . . .who heard of the fame of al-Ghazālī . . . .so . . . he besought him instantly with every form of persuasion, and became severe in his importunities, until he consented to emerge and was taken to Nisapur". al-Ghazālī was encouraged in taking this step by his friends. "Besides, some holy men had several consecutive dreams in which it was revealed to them that my departure would be a symptom of good luck for the century which was about to begin. This accorded with the promise made by God to revive his religion at the beginning of each century.

In consequence, al-Ghazālī proceeded to Nisāpur in the month of Dhū'l Qa'da 499 (July 1106). He had left Baghdād exactly eleven years before in Dhū'l Qa'da 488. His return to
public life followed the death of Bargiyāruq in 488, as his retirement from public life had followed the accession of Bargiyāruq.

The al-Ghazālī who returned to public life was a different man from the one who had left it. He was no longer proud, arrogant, ambitious, but gentle, humble, fired by a sense of mission. The change in him was indeed tremendous, and it was difficult for his friends to realize that it was genuine. ‘Abd al-Ghāfir says, "I indeed, visited him frequently, and I did not suspect of him, after what during long years I had experienced of the malevolence and distaste with which he regarded the people, looking on them with eyes of scorn, full of self-love and self-consideration, seeking rank and high position, that he had become the opposite, and had purified himself of such unworthinesses. . . ." Yet al-Ghazālī did become what we have been accustomed to think of him, a man of honour, a proved and tempered nature, which is itself a sign of the assistance given him by Allah."

In Muharram A. H. 500, less than two months after al-Ghazālī's return to Nīsābūr, Fakhr al-Mulk was assassinated. al-Ghazālī did not remain in Nīsābūr for long. His stay there was clouded by envious and slanderous attacks made upon him, but unlike the old al-Ghazālī, he endured them without protest. He returned to Tūs, where he continued his studies of the true knowledge derived from Inspiration through Sūfī exercises, and from Revelation through the study of the Traditions of the Prophet. ‘Abd al-Ghāfir describes al-Ghazālī's last days as follows:
"Then he left that after a while and returned to his house, and in its neighborhood set up a school for seekers of knowledge, and a Şūfī monastery, and used to divide his time between undertakings for the local inhabitants, such as pre- lections of the Qur'ān and sessions for devotional exercise, and occupying the teacher's seat, until the fulness of time attained him, and the span of his days with the people of his age narrowed, and Allah transferred him to His neighborhood, after he had endured the various courses including strife with adversaries and having been traduced before kings. His "seal", however, was his grasp of the Traditions of the Chosen One, his sitting in company with his followers and expounding the two books called "Ṣaḥīḥ", viz. those of al-Bukhārī and of Muslim, who were both Ḥujjas of Islam. So he passed to the mercy of Allah on Monday the 14th of Jumādā al-Ākhira A.H. 505, (December 18, 1111), and was buried at the exit of the Qasbah of Tabarān."

Abū'l-Muqaffar Muḥammad al-Abīwardī composed an elegy on the death of al-Ghazālī which contained the following lament:

"He is gone! and the greatest loss which ever afflicted me, was that of a man who left not his like among mankind."

al-Ghazālī, points out Steinschneider, "cannot be considered a first-rate philosophic author as regards original ideas, or any full scale system which he might have developed, or any thorough and correct critical work." "For us, Ghazālī's whole significance," according to Munk,"rests in his skepticism, by virtue of which he has a place in the history of Arab philosopy; for he administered a blow to philosophy from which it was unable ever to recover in the Orient . . . "
"Gazzali's influence on Jewish theology was very important. It began to be felt in Spain in the middle of the twelfth century. . . . Jehuda Hallevi (app. 1140) follows his arguments against Greek philosophy."

This last judgement, however, is somewhat modified by the latest investigations of the relationship between Hallevi and al-Ghazālī made by D. H. Baneth. Baneth, after considering the literature on the subject comes to the following conclusions:

The general lines of Hallevi's approach are based on al-Ghazālī though Hallevi differs from al-Ghazālī in the manner in which he presents his material, marshals the evidence and formulates the points of the philosophers with which he takes issue. It would therefore seem, says Baneth, that Hallevi proceeded not with al-Ghazālī's book in hand but with the general lines of his approach in mind.

Like al-Ghazālī, who aims at pointing out the tentative nature of Aristotle's premises and the dialectical character of his conclusions as opposed to the certain knowledge that Aristotle thought he was providing, Hallevi too sets out to puncture the authority of Aristotle in the form in which the Jews had received his doctrines from the Arabs. Secondly, Hallevi even more than al-Ghazālī emphasizes the unsatisfactory nature of Aristotelianism for the religious life.

Neither al-Ghazālī nor Hallevi denies the possibility of a scientific metaphysics. al-Ghazālī merely denies that metaphysics or religion can be grounded in Aristotelianism; but apodictic certainty can be achieved by the chosen. Therefore
says Bene't "There is no room to speak of a dichotomy between religion and science according to Ghazâlî."

Hallevi (Al-Kharazi V:14) points to experience as opposing the Aristotelian belief in the four elements of earth, water, air and fire that make up the sublunar world. He admits only to heat, cold, moisture and dryness as being primary qualities. "This is, however, but a conception and nomenclature, but it does not mean that they can... produce by combination, all existing things." This argument is entirely omitted by al-Ghazâlî.

Both Hallevi and al-Ghazâlî reject the Neoplatonic theory of emanations. However, Hallevi formulates his objections on the basis of al-Farâbî while al-Ghazâlî goes back to Ibn Sinâ.

In his theoretical objections to the philosophers Hallevi is not as cogent as al-Ghazâlî, but in elaborating the claims of the religious consciousness, as against the claims of metaphysics for the religious life and the demands of morality he reveals deeper insight than al-Ghazâlî. Hallevi points out that for the philosophers God is an object of recognition, the lack of which is no more serious than the ignorance of any other object of thought. For the believer the awareness of God's nearness is his highest bliss. His absence a source of infinite despair. The believer therefore is happy to be a martyr, while the philosopher will bear no pain for the sake of Aristotle's God who has no knowledge of particulars: and of this particular devotee. The ethical demands of religion are a categorical imperative while those of the philosophers are only good advice, a matter of refinement.
Neither al-Ghazālī nor Hallevi, according to Baneth, reveals a thorough-going skepticism. Both believe in the possibility of a scientific metaphysics which, however, cannot be achieved by the method of the Philosophers; though neither hesitated to use it for the practical purpose of defending the faith. al-Ghazālī apparently believed that the scientific attitude in matters of faith could be achieved by the chosen few. Hallevi believed, if his argument for creatio ex nihilo can serve as an example, that it is afforded by the prophetic tradition and miracles. Thus al-Ghazālī attempts to prove through reason creatio ex nihilo and to disprove the eternity of the world, while Hallevi is willing to concede that "the question of eternity and creation is obscure, whilst the arguments are evenly balanced" (I-57). Nevertheless, Creation and the existence of God are authenticated for him through the miracle of the history of Israel which points to "the providential care which He bestowed on our forefathers" (III-17). And miracle points to a Power beyond and sovereign over nature: Hence to the Creator of the World.

Hallevi and al-Ghazālī differ in their position on free-will and determination. To al-Ghazālī, like Hume, causation cannot be perceived. We observe only the sequence of events. Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī maintains the causal nature of events in the sublunar world: a causation that is only contingent. Each cause is dependent on its proximate cause back to the divine act or event which is the only authentic cause from which
all other causes stem. Thus only God as the first cause effects anything and every event is a necessary event. But even the divine act is not completely free. It has consequences only when conditions that make it possible are fulfilled.

It follows then that the individual, linked by a chain of causes to God, does not possess freedom of will. His choice is determined. A human and natural event differ only in that in the case of the former the exercise of the will is a condition that must be fulfilled.

According to Hallevi's God is the first cause but unlike al-Ghazâlî he does not regard every act in the sublunar world as being in effect a divine act. By dividing all acts and events into four classes: the divine, the voluntary, the natural and the accidental, Hallevi gives a certain autonomy to the latter three intermediate events through secondary causes which play a part in producing them: God's influence diminishing progressively in relation to the degree of purpose involved. In this way the voluntary act argues some measure of freedom of will. For while the will is linked through other causes to the first cause it is not part of a necessary chain of causes. It is itself a secondary cause that has a genuine role in producing an event.

This theory made possible the integration of supernatural events into Hallevi's unified world view. For prophecy, miracles and the miraculous destiny of Israel became reflections of the divine act without the operation of secondary causes. And since according to the Aristotelian view matter and form
are presupposed in all activity in the sublunar world, with
matter having a disposition for its corresponding form, so
Israel alone has the disposition for prophecy and God's
guidance which disposition is realized only when Israel lives
in the land of Israel and according to God's commandments.

al-Ghazâlî on the other hand does not attempt to inte-
grate his own historic religion - only religion per se - into
his world view.

al-Ghazâlî accepts the Neoplatonic view that it is in-
cumbent upon the soul to free itself from the prison of the
body by ascetic means and return to its home the world of
ideas - by means of ideas of a general nature which may be
found only in the knowledge of God whose existence, attrib-
utes and acts are the only true existents. This knowledge -
which is a religious value - may be achieved either through
logical demonstration or by way of ecstatic intuition. The
purpose of the religious commandments is to create conditions
that will cleanse the soul of those qualities that prevent
the acquisition of knowledge.

According to Hallevi, nearness to God may be achieved not
through reason but by way of God's help: through the Torah
whose commandments it is incumbent upon Israel to follow.
Thus, according to Hallevi union with God makes man an instru-
ment to do God's will on earth, while according to al-Ghazâlî,
by the exercise of his reason man shares God's omnipotence.
In al-Ghazālī's view the ideal man is an ascetic who dreads the day of judgement. He is a spiritual aristocrat, who travels the way alone. According to Hallevi he is imbued with the joy of the commandments and through their observance he is linked with the entire people who in this way achieve the ideal life. Differences in intellectual capacity are irrelevant.

Some scholars have sought the origin of Bāhya's "Duties of the Heart" in the teaching of al-Ghazālī. A. S. Yahuda has pointed out the close parallels that exist between Bāhya's work and al-Ghazālī's Al-hikma fi maqālāt allāh. Yahuda concluded that Bāhya's source was al-Ghazālī. In this view he was sustained by Goldziher.

Nevertheless, when Yahuda came to edit the Arabic text he indicated the possibility that both Bāhya and al-Ghazālī may have drawn from a common source, though he still clung to his original view, albeit with less assurance. Goldziher continued to maintain his original position. This view became untenable, however, when P. Kokowzoff showed, on the basis of new material, that the Hidāyā could not have been written after 1080-1090, whereas al-Ghazālī's chief work the Ihvā was published in 1105. Many passages in the al-hikma coincide verbatim with sections of the Ihvā.

D. H. Baneth undertook to show that the tractate Kitāb al-Dalā'il wal-I'tibār 'ala al-Khalq wal-Tadbīr, of unknown authorship but wrongly ascribed to Al-Jāfiḍ (d. 889), is the common source of both Al-Hidāyā and Al-Hikma.
"A comparison of the three books shows that those passages which Bahya has in common with al-Ghazālī, are also to be found, without exception, in Dalā'il, the coincidence being even closer. Other passages are common only to the Hidāya and the Dalā'il. The passages in Al-Hikma corresponding verbally to al-Ghazālī's Ḥyā' are not taken from the Dalā'il, and do not occur in the Hidāya. Thus the Dalā'il appears to be the source of the Hidāya for the passages in question, either directly or indirectly; at all events it was not al-Ghazālī."

There are more parallels between the Hidāya and the Dalā'il than are at first apparent, because Bahya allows himself greater freedom than does al-Ghazālī in his use of the material from the Dalā'il. "In some places he expresses the idea in a very free manner or even changes the ideas appreciably, although it is evident that the source of the idea is the Dalā'il."

Al-Ghazālī's al-Hikma, at least in major part, is an Islamic rendering of the Dalā'il, which is apparently a Christian book, together with additions from the Ḥyā'. In any case, Bahya did not make use of the al-Hikma and therefore he was not dependent on al-Ghazālī. Both made use of the Dalā'il and both in writing their respective books were influenced by the Ṣufī literature.

Margaret Smith has tried to show through examples that many of the ideas and the illustrations of which al-Ghazālī makes use in his rule for the religious life are only expansions of the system of orthodox Islamic mysticism basically laid down by al-Muḥāṣibī (d. 857)."
Bahya made use of \( \text{\`S} \text{\`I} \text{\`I} \text{\`I} \) sources similar to those that were open to al-Ghazālī. His originality lay in the fact that he was selective in his use of the sources. He rejected the \( \text{\`S} \text{\`I} \text{\`I} \text{\`I} \) emphasis on mystic ecstasy and an ascetic ethic and emphasized the “duties of the hearts” above the “duties of the limbs”, i.e. the importance of those commandments that demand constant effort to get closer to God as against those commandments that are fulfilled through habit.

The question has also arise whether al-Ghazālī, the opponent of philosophy, had any influence on Crescas, the Jewish philosopher, who also opposed philosophy. The answer to this question depends on whether or not Crescas knew al-Ghazālī's \text{Tahāfut al-Falāsifah} either directly or through Averroes’s \text{Tahāfut al-Tahāfut} which incorporated it.

That he knew the \text{Maqāsid al-Falāsifah} is certain because though no direct quotation from it can be found in the \text{\`or adnāy} (83) nor is it referred to by title, all references to al-Ghazālī by Crescas can be traced to the \text{Maqāsid}.

In fact, Crescas, whose knowledge of Arabic philosophy was derived from Hebrew translations, knew the \text{Maqāsid} not directly but from a Hebrew translation. (85) (86) (87) (88) Joel, Kaufmann, Broyde, Husik, and especially Julius Wolfson (89), who has devoted an entire book to the subject, insist on the influence of the \text{Tahāfut} on the \text{\`or adnāy}.

Harry Austryn Wolfson does not regard Julius Wolfson's evidence for the thesis that al-Ghazālī's \text{Tahāfut} was a source used by Crescas in the composition of \text{\`or adnāy} as being in any degree conclusive. The similarities that Julius Wolfson adduces as to their general attitude toward philosophy,
their view of the problem of the attributes, the Unity of God and Free Will, as well as the similarities brought out by Wolfssohn in the Commentary on the Text, are regarded by Harry Austryn Wolfson as being only general in character and "even when not offset by a more impressive list of differences that can easily be drawn up, do not in themselves establish a literary relationship." Even when the similarities are of a less general nature it is no evidence that the Tahāfut is the source of Crescas' views.

In arguing like al-Ghazālī that philosophically two deities could entertain a division of labor, Crescas could have been drawing his argument not from the Tahāfut but from Narboni's commentary on the Mōreh where it is "reproduced without the mention of the name of Alghazali... and we know that Crescas had made use of that commentary." Other parallels of like nature can be accounted for in the same way. "We have shown," says Julius Wolfssohn, "that there are other sources, with which Crescas is known to have been acquainted and from which he could have taken these views."

Furthermore, there is evidence "that Crescas could not have known the Tahāfut." For Crescas mentions al-Ghazālī as admitting "the possibility of an infinite number of disembodied souls." But this view appears only in the Maqāsid which reflects the views of Avicenna. In the Tahāfut al-Ghazālī explicitly rejects this view. "Had Crescas known the Tahāfut he would not have allowed that fact to pass unnoticed."
However, even if it is granted that Crescas was acquainted with the Tabārūṭ and that it is "the source of all those arguments for which we find parallels in it, it is far from being the predominant influence upon the ʿaṭāʾ. The most that can be said is that it is one of many works from which Crescas has borrowed certain arguments which he has incorporated in his own work. It is not impossible that his knowledge of the Tabārūṭ, assuming that he had any knowledge of it, he obtained not from a study of the book itself but from his pupil Zerahiah Saladin, who was versed in Arabic and later translated the Tabārūṭ into Hebrew."

To go back to the twelfth century, "Abraham ibn Ezra takes a passage from Gazzali's Ethic (p. 40) the beautiful analogy between the organs of the human body and the functionaries of the King, and builds around it one of his most beautiful hymns. Abraham b. David takes from the same book a parable (pp. 173-175) which shows the various uses of science. Maimonides was probably acquainted with Gazzali's more famous books; but commentaries to his ʿMōrēḵ since the end of the fourteenth century very seldom draw parallels to Gazzali. David b. Jehuda Leon, however, maintains that Maimonides used Gazzali's precious works as a main source, and that it was with especial regard to them that he stated in the preface to his ʿMōrēḵ that such a book had never yet been written 'in our nation'. Several more recent authors have pointed to various places in the ʿMōrēḵ where some of Gazzali's arguments or theories may be found. It should be
remembered, however, that Gazzali in his main work merely repeats the opinions and even the very words of other authors.

But though al-Ghazālī’s influence began to be felt in the middle of the twelfth century, he did not become an authority for the Jews until much later. During the great controversy about the acceptability and authority of philosophy, all through the thirteenth and part of the fourteenth centuries, none of the contending parties made use of al-Ghazālī’s name or any of his treatises; even though his ethical work had already been translated during the early period of this struggle.

The important works of al-Ghazālī were subsequently translated into Hebrew and played an important role in the Jewish literature of the Middle Ages. We shall limit ourselves, however, mainly to the translations of the Maqāsid.

The Maqāsid served for the Jews as a textbook of the peripatetic philosophy according to the version of Ibn Sīnā. And al-Ghazālī, whatever his own attitude in writing the Maqāsid, came to be regarded by the Jews, by virtue of it, as the chief popularizer of philosophy. As late as the 16th century, David ibn Yahya, Rabbi of Naples, included in the curriculum he taught his students, the Kavanōth, the Hebrew version of al-Ghazālī’s Maqāsid.

This book was translated many times during the second half of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth and also during the second half of the fifteenth century and first half of the sixteenth. Some of the translators were motivated by a desire to defend philosophy,
believing that philosophy was an ally of religion, while others hoped that their translations of the Maqāsid would serve as a weapon against philosophy, to point out, as did al-Ghazālī in his Tahāfut, the weakness of philosophy.

"The first Hebrew translation is probably that of Isak (ibn) Albalag (al-Balag), towards the end of the thirteenth century. His (Isak's) land of origin is unknown, but it is probably the same as that of most of the translators, namely, Northern Spain, or Provence. His edition, entitled Inventory (Roll) of the Philosophers, is not a simple translation of the original, the title of which he translates as Views of the Philosophers. However, he finished only two parts (Logic and Metaphysics) and started on the third (Physics); the greatest portion of the last one was shortly thereafter translated by Isak ibn Polgar (Pulgar), author of a work of apologetics."

Albalag was denounced by the Zealots as a heretic, an unbeliever and almost an atheist because of the free spirit in which he composed his translation. If these denunciations were showered upon him in his own lifetime, it would account for the general silence concerning him and his ultimate fate. Why he did not complete his work was unknown even to the man who undertook to add to it.

Albalag explains in the preface, that has been published in its entirety, that he was persuaded to translate al-Ghazālī's book from Arabic into Hebrew because "most scholars......as well as very many unlearned people, believe that philosophers demolish the basic pillars of religion.... and therefore hold books of philosophy in disfavor...Prophetic
truths can be arrived at only through the prophets and through tradition, which tradition loses its accuracy by and by, so that a competent teacher or scholar must be sought. Doubt has shaken prophetic truths; many men who would have been worthy of them turned therefore to ideas of philosophy, which supported as they are by proof, are free of such doubts. All this moved the author to clarify the principles of religion with philosophic methods and through the translation of the writings of Aristotle." Albalag chose to occupy himself with the translation of al-Ghazālī’s book, "because it comprises most of those views, and because its method is that of the middle way, suited both to philosophy and common belief, and its presentation tends toward simple narration, which is easily understandable to the un-initiated layman."

Albalag introduces his own notes and comments to the translation with the words: "the translator says." In his first note, Albalag says that al-Ghazālī "presented the beliefs of the philosophers only with a view to refuting them, which he had been asked to do, and which he thought himself to have accomplished. Actually, he offered not their opinions, but his, and he confuted not the philosophers but himself and his allies, in such a way that he found not their error but his own. Ibn Rushd answered these attacks and pointed out the errors and sophistries; Albalag attempts to do the same in certain places." al-Ghazālī, claims Albalag, "follows the teachings of Abū Naṣr and Ibn Sīnā’ who deviated from Aristotle."
Thus Albalag believed that the philosophic views expressed in the *Majāsid* were not really al-Ghazālī’s, while Narboni believed - as we shall see later - that they were really al-Ghazālī’s convictions. The same difference of opinion concerning al-Ghazālī’s own views we find among non-Jewish scholars.

There is a Latin translation of the *Majāsid* called *Logica et Philosophia Alcæalæ*, printed in Venice in 1506, an exceptionally rare book. The translator is ‘Dominicus, Archidiaconus Secobiensis apud Toledo’. This work contains neither the preface nor the conclusion of al-Ghazālī, the author, in which he pointed out the purpose of the book. Evidently the translator did not take the author’s expressed purpose with regard to the book seriously. He believed that the views expressed in the *Majāsid* were the views of the author; though it is possible that the translator worked from an incomplete manuscript. On the other hand, D. B. Macdonald, in a review of the published Arabic original of the *Majāsid* and of J. T. Muckle’s edition of the Latin translation of *Alcæalæ’s Metaphysica*, insists with a great show of indignation that the latter book “most emphatically is not al-Ghazzali’s *Metaphysica* but is an objective statement by him of what the Neoplatonic-Aristotelian philosophers of Islam meant in their books.”

Another translator of the *Majāsid*, a contemporary of Narboni, was Jehudah (Maestro Bongodas) Nathan, a Provencal physician and author, and a translator of medical works (circa 1352–6). The title of his translation *Kawibot ha-Malakot* (105) corresponds to that of the Arabic original.
As Jehudah Nathan himself explains in his preface, the purpose of his translation was two-fold. First, it would afford a short-cut to students of the Talmud who were eager to study the sciences but did not have sufficient time to devote to them. Secondly, it would ward off the opinions of the mitpalerim, the pseudo-philosophers, that tend to weaken the Law, for the author intended to follow this book with another that would refute all the arguments advanced against the tenets of religion. This translation was quite popular; many copies of it exist in many libraries.

From the same period comes a translation of an anonymous author which was the basis of Narboni's commentary. This translation was used by many commentators of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But it is difficult to ascertain "which manuscripts contain this translation. Even some of the manuscripts of Narboni's commentary contain also one of the two other translations, viz. those of Albalag or Nathan. Some of the manuscripts, too, give only the beginning of the parts on which Narboni commented." Steinschneider gives a list of manuscripts that contain only the translation without commentary. "This translation comes closer to the Arabic text."

These three commentaries, including Albalag's elaboration, were the best known and were used by those Jews in subsequent generations who delved into philosophy. "In the native country of translations, no other commentator after Narboni is known for a hundred years. We do know of some commentators during the second half of the fifteenth century."
There is a commentary on al-Ghazālī's Metaphysics (in ms. P. 906) by Isaac b. Shemtob (who is probably identical with Isaac b. Shemtob b. Shemtob commentator on the Moreh), written in 1495 at Aguilar de Campo.

A fragment consisting of five leaves commenting on the first part of the Logos by Isaac Kohen is found in Ms. P. 907.

An incomplete commentary on the Physics by one Jesseia, who probably commented on the whole book, is found in Ms. P. 907. He cites Albalag and it seems from the catalogue that he did not know Narboni's commentary. He is probably the Jesseia b. Meir mentioned by Joseph Gaspi.

Eli Habillo of Monzon, apparently later called Maestro Mancel (c. 1470), was the author of a commentary on the Metaphysics and the Physics. He tried to elucidate the text of al-Ghazālī and the remarks of Albalag without deciding in favor of either interpretation.

Shemtob b. Joseph b. Shemtob mentions in his printed speeches (finished 1489) his commentary on the Maqāsid.

"The last commentators ... lived in the Levant." The Karaite Abraham Bali b. Jacob (c. 1510), a physician at P粟i, wrote a commentary for the sake of his pupil Joseph b. Kaleb. In his commentary he attempted, he said, to explain more fully the commentary of Narboni "whose words are few in quantity and great in quality."

Elia Miraachi, (d. in 1528 at Constantinople), the author of a supercommentary on Rashi's Pentateuchal commentary, wrote a commentary on the Maqāsid that is apparently lost. Moses Almosnino mentions it once in one of his sermons.
Moses Almosnino, a preacher of Salonika, is the author of a commentary on the *Magagid* that he called *Migdal Oz*. He used the anonymous translation as the basis of his commentary.

There are a number of commentaries and notes by anonymous authors whose dates and localities are unknown. Steinschneider, therefore, mentions these commentaries according to the libraries in which they are found.


2. Lp. 40 I, K, - A supercommentary on Narboni: 
   *parshah* al Maestro Vidal - Metaphysics and Physics.


4. Mu 269 - Notes on the Metaphysics. The author refers in his remarks only to Albalag and ibn Polgar both of whom he attacks severely. Whenever Albalag confesses that he did not understand the text and raises an objection, our critic remarks of what value is an objection based on ignorance. He then proceeds to explain the text. And when ibn Polgar refutes an objection of Albalag, the critic remarks that neither understood the meaning of the text, and he explains it.

5. Mu 269 - notes on the Metaphysics directed at Albalag. He too criticizes the translator but is
less severe. He admits that some of Albalag’s explanations are good. This critic knew other translations besides that of Albalag.

2. P. 907 - A fragment explaining Narboni’s commentary on the Metaphysics.

3. P. 907 - Another fragment on Part II of the same commentary of Narboni.

4. P. 907 - Comments on different passages of the text (mainly Part II) and on Albalag.

5. P. 907 - Fragment of a commentary on Part II and on Albalag’s notes.

9. P. 907 - Explanation of some passages in Part III.

11. P. 907 - A collection of comments on I-III.

Abraham Abigador b. Meshullam, at the age of seventeen (1367) composed a treatise in rhyme on the Logic, Metaphysics and Physics called segulā melākḥim.

Zerahiah Halevi b. Isaac, called Saladín, a pupil of Hisdai Crescas of Saragossa, translated the Tabāfut for the scholarly Don Benvenisti ibn Labi, (son of the “Prince” Salomo ibn Labi; Benvenisti died in 1411), giving it the title ḫap-pāṭlat ḫap-piłāṭūm. This translation is very rare and is the only translation there is of that work.

The Mizan al-‘amal, an ethical work, was translated by Hisdai Halevi of Barcelona (c. 1235-40) under the title ma’ozne sedeq. This book, says the translator, is the first excellent collection of scattered ethical ideas since
Aristotle began working on them in a scientific manner.

Mishkāt al-Anwār fī Ribād al-Azhār - was translated by Isaac b. Joseph al-Fasī with the title Maskit ha-ṭorot be-pardey ha-miggānîm. The date of the translator is unknown. Steinschneider suggests that he was the father of Moses b. Isaac al-Fasī who was still alive in 1398.

There is another manuscript by an unknown translator of this book. Some think, as does Gosche, that this book was held in the same high esteem by the Jews as by the Muhammedans, but Steinschneider deems this estimate an exaggeration. He shows that the theme of this book had less interest for the Jews than did other books by al-Ghazālī. In fact, the book is not mentioned by any Jewish author before the end of the fifteenth century. Moses ibn Ḥabeb quoted from the Mishkāt and added that the book was "ascribed" to al-Ghazālī. Jehanan b. Alemanno quoted from it in order to compare the arrangement and gradation of the lights with Qabbalistic theories. He called this book ha-ṭorot ha-ṭelhīyot.

A poem written by al-Ghazālī was translated by Abraham Gevison (born in 1547 at Tlemcen). Introducing the poem, the translator says, "Although the author is not a Jew all agree that the pious of all nations participate in Blissfulness: the more so, such a man to whom Heaven will not withhold Grace." The poem is supposed to have been written shortly before the author's death; a presumption based on the theme which tells of
a dying man speaking of his immortality and future rewards.
NOTES

1) The main source for an account of al-Ghazālī’s life is his own autobiography in the Mungidh min al-Dalā’il. This may be read in Schmödlers’ text published in his Essai sur les Écoles philosophiques, (Paris, 1843), and M. C. Barbier de Meynard’s French translation in the Journal Asiatique, septième Série, tome IX. There is an English rendering by Claud Field of the Mungidh, which he calls The Confessions of al-Ghazali. Field’s translation must be used with care. It is not always accurate. Sometimes it omits sentences. It has also omitted several sections. For instance, the entire section on the Ta’limes is missing. There is another English translation of the Mungidh by Charles Horne, called Besouro de Error, published as volume six of the Wisdom of the Orient Series, (1917), but I have not seen it. Besides the Mungidh I have also used ‘Abd al-Gafir b. Isma’îl’s account of al-Ghazâlî which is found in the Tabyin of Ibn ‘Asâkir of Damascus (from the text as published by M. A. F. Mehran in Travaux de la troisième Section du Congrès Internationale des Orientalistes, St. Petersburg, 1876, Tome II, pp. 322-324).

Of secondary sources, I have made use of D. B. Macdonald’s "Life of Al-Ghazzali, with especial reference to his religious experiences and opinions", (in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 20, First half 1899; pp. 71-138). In addition to the primary sources mentioned above, Macdonald used also the autobiographical material in the introduction of the Gayfî Mawâḏî’s to his commentary on the Thây’. I have also found Reverend W. B. W. Gardner’s Al-Ghazali in the Islamic Series III, (Madras, 1919), useful. Unfortunately I was not able to use Miguel Asin et Palacios’, Al Cagzal: dogmata moral. Ascetica, (Zaragoza, 1901). Carra de Vaux’s Ghazâlî, (Paris, 1902), is not as helpful as might have been expected. Zwemer’s A Moslem Seeker After God, (New York 1920), is a rather popular and ‘lyrical’ account.

2) Ghazâlî is said to be spelled with a tashbîḥ if it means cotton spinner and without a tashbîḥ if it refers to the name of a town of that name in the dependency of Ṭūs. As-Sam‘enî in his Ansâb spells it with a tashbîḥ as is the general Arabic usage. (Ibn Khallîkan’s Biographical Dictionary, translated from the Arabic by Baron MoOkechin De Slane, Paris, prepared for Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland - 1843 - vol. I, p. 80).

D. B. Macdonald doubles the ‘z’ but most orientalists do not. For a discussion of the name see Macdonald in
the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, for 1902, Appendix II to article, Emotional Religion in Islam as affected by Music and Singing (Part II), pp. 18-22. "What purports to be his tombstone has since been found and has apparently the two Z's." Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science, vol. I, p. 755. Zweener, op. cit., p. 66, note 2 bottom, states, "I have a fatwa from the Sheikhs of Al-Azhar, Cairo, however, stating that the true spelling is now agreed on by Moslems as Ghazâlî with one middle radical."

3) ûs is the name of a place comprising the two towns of Taberan and Nawkan to which more than a thousand villages belong. Ibn Khallikan, op. cit. vol. I, p. 80.


6) Like al-Ghazâlî he also became a Sûfî. Subki, Tabagât, IV. 102 ff.

7) Their mother lived long enough to accompany them to Baghdad.

8) De Slane - Introduction to vol. I of Ibn Khallikan's Biographical Dictionary, p. XXXI.

9) Totah, Contribution of The Arabs to Civilization, p. 49. This information be derives from Ibn Khallikan, op. cit. vol. I, p. 191.
10) Totap, p. 49 ff.

11) "From as-Subki we learn that Madrasas existed before the days of Nizam al-Mulk. He adds, however, that he is strongly of the opinion that the latter was the first to establish appointments for the support of the students. Tabagat, vol. III, p. 137" in Gardner, Al-Ghazali, p. 5, note No. 1.

12) as-Subki, Tabagat, III 36, in Gardner, ibid.

13) as-Subki, ibid.

14) This account of Zwemer's agrees with the account of the course in the Taqrib of Abu Shuja' al-Ispahani, which is given in Appendix I Section VII, p. 351 ff. of D. B. Macdonald's Muslim Theology Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory.


18) This story is given on the authority of Imam As'ad al-Mayhani and of Nizam al-Mulk. It is found in the Tabagat, vol. IV, p. 103 - Gardner p. 7 and note.

19) 'Abd al-Ghafir, ibid. All quotations from 'Abd al-Ghafir are from the same work unless otherwise cited.
20) Macdonald, Life I, p. 89, says that "al-Fârâbî died in Tus in 477 A. H. and there al-Ghazali studied with him." Thus he disagrees with Mehren, p. 239, who says that it was after al-Ghazali returned from his wanderings to be a professor at Nisapur "where he continued his contemplative life under the direction of the Sufi al-Fârâbî (as Mehren spells it)." They differ in the phrasing of the 'Abd al-Ghafir passage. From the text it is not clear whether the passage is intimately connected with what went before, and therefore refers to the next period of al-Ghazali's life as Mehren seems to think, or whether the passage is independent, as Macdonald seems to think. Gardner, op. cit., p. 8, thinks that al-Ghazali studied under al-Fârâbî in his first Nisapur period at the same time continuing under Imam al-Åramain.

21) "Of whom elsewhere I can find no trace." Macdonald JAS, XX (1899), p. 89. Ibn Khallikan does not mention him at all. Macdonald calls him Nasaj or as-Sajaj.

22) The story of this dream goes back "directly to al-Ghazali through the autograph manuscript of Qutb ad-Din Muhammad b. al-‘Iddibi (S. K. p. 9)", and is quoted in its entirety by Macdonald in the Life, p. 89 ff. Cf. also Smith, Margaret, al-Ghazali, The Mystic, London 1944, pp. 14, 15.

23) Margaret Smith, op. cit., p. 15, quotes from the Ms. of Ibn ‘Asakir that he studied under an Imam thelogy, philosophy, dialectic and natural science.


26) Field, ibid.

28) 'Abd al-Ghafir, ibid.

29) as-Suhki, Tabagat, IV, pp. 107 and 108 (Gardner, op. cit., p. 9 and note 3).

30) 'Abd al-Ghafir, ibid.


32) Field has "three groups" instead of "four groups" as in the Arabic and French. He leaves out the Ta'llimites which the Arabic puts in the second group. For the Arabic text cf. Schmoller's Nesai, Arabic section, p. 10.

33) Field, op. cit., p. 20.

34) Cf. the Jawāhir al-Qur'ān p. 25 according to Gardner, p. 36n.

35) 'Abd al-Ghafir, ibid.

36) Brockelman, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur, I, p. 420, says, "Vielleicht fällt in diese Zeit (i.e. while he was with Najm al-Mulk) seine Beschäftigung mit der Philosophie, zu der er an der orthodoxen Hochschule von Kisabur kaum in nähere Beziehungen getreten sein dürfte."

37) Field, p. 25.

38) Maqāsid, p. 1b.

39) Bouyges in his edition of the Tahāfut, Beyrouth, 1927, p. 9, notes that at the end of manuscript F of Fatih, (Constantinople), of the Tahāfut, the copyist,
after giving the date of his own copy, says that the composition of the Tahafut was completed on 11th Muharram 488, i.e. January 22, 1095. Bouyges accepts that date.

40) "It is above all through the criticism of the principle of causation that he opens his attack against rationalism. Hume did not say anything more. We only perceive simultaneity, never causality. Causality is nothing other than the will of God making two things usually follow each other. The laws of nature do not exist, or they only express a habitual fact; God alone is immutable. This was, as one can see, the negation of all science." (Renan, Averroés et l'Averroisme, p. 97). al-Ghazālī had founded religion on skepticism.

41) MacDonald, Life, p. 105. Obermann, in Der philosophischen und Religiösen Subjektivismus Ghazālīs (Wien und Leipzig, 1981, pp. 55-57) points out that in the Tahafut Ghazālī makes clear the unsatisfactory nature of the doctrine of emanation employed by the Arab Aristotelians as a solution for their problem of maintaining their belief both in an absolutely necessary cause and a Creator, and as a bridge uniting the One and the many, the infinite and the finite, the Uncombined and the combined. Ghazālī calls their solution "arbitrary asphyxiation" and "darknesses surpassing darkn esses" ḫulumāt fawakhi ḥulumāt (Tahafut III, Cairo, 1508, quoted by Obermann, op. cit., p. 66, note 1.)

42) 'Abd al-Ḡāfir, ibid.

43) Life, p. 87.

44) For an account of the Ta'limites cf. Margoliouth, D. S., Assassins in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (1927) vol. II, pp. 1569 - 1614. "Ta'lim" refers to the fact that "Man cannot attain to the Truth by his unaided endeavors, but stands in need of the Teaching (ta'lim) of the Universal Reason, which from time to time becomes incarnate in the form of a Prophet or 'Speaker' (Nābi), and teaches more fully and completely in each successive Manifestation according to the evolution of the Human Understanding, the
spiritual truths necessary for his guidance." According to E. G. Browne in *A Literary History of Persia*, N. Y. 1903, p. 408, the *Ta'limites* were *Ismā'īlīs*, who counted *Ismā'īl* b. Ṣafīr *aṣ-Ṣadiq* or his son as the seventh *imām* who would reappear as the Mehdi, the divinely guided leader. *al-Ghazālī* directed his attack against the *Ismā'īlīs* who developed into the *Assassins*. In 463 their founder, al-Ḥasan b. *aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ* seized the stronghold of * Alamut* on the edge of the *Alburz Mountains* near *Rasvin* which he fortified and made a seat of learning.

45) MacDonald, *op. cit.* , p. 83.

46) MacDonald, p. 86.

47) Field, p. 41F.

48) Mungidh. Field, p. 43.


50) Field, p. 43-45.


52) MacDonald, *Life*, p. 92. A. J. Wensinck, *La Pensée De Ghazzālī*, p. 110 ff., puts it as follows... "the conversion of Ghazzālī had consequences as important for Islam as that of Saint Augustine for Christianity. This importance for Islam can be briefly characterized by saying that Ghazzālī succeeded in assuring a place in official Islam for the mystic or introspective attitude at the side of the legalism of the jurists and of the intellectualism of the dogmatists."
53) Field, op. cit., p. 46.

54) ibid.

55) ibid.

56) ibid.

57) 'Abd al-Ghafir, op. cit.

58) al-Ghazali's ten year retirement is a very confusing period. The biographers contradict each other. Gardner, p. 15ff. has attempted to harmonize the conflicting accounts.

59) Gardner, ibid.

60) 'Abd al-Ghafir, op. cit.

61) Cf. Wensinck, op. cit., pp. 103-125 for al-Ghazali's identification of faith with certitude, and Obermann, op. cit., for a detailed analysis. This certitude comes from the knowledge of the heart - qalb - that is a gift of God. Obermann aptly characterizes this knowledge as 'subjectivism'. From a thoroughgoing skepticism in the capacity of objective science to yield certain knowledge al-Ghazali, by a virtual tour de force, establishes certitude on the basis of subjectivity.


64) The Arabic text has Fatih al-Mulk but the reference is to Fakhr al-Mulk.
65) Mungidh, Field, op. cit.

66) Ibn Khallikān, p. 624, Vol. II.


69) Steinschneider, *op. cit.* vol. I, par. 163


74) *ZMG*, vol. 67, pp. 534-535.


76) This argument is not conclusive, however, for in the *Ihya* al-Ghazali reissued much that he had been teaching many years before.

78) Published by Muḥammad Rājib al-Ṭabāį at Aleppo in 1928.


80) *Mayyor Meshūțaf, op. cit.*, p. 28.


82) This article is mentioned in *Isis*, Vol. 25, (1936), p. 527.


85) Don Chasidai Creskas' religionsphilosophische Lehren, Breslau, 1866, p. 3.


87) "Ghazâlî", *Jewish Encyclopedia*, V, 649.


89) Der Einfluss Gazâlî's auf Chisdai Crescas, Frankfurt A. M. (1905)


92) Wolfsohn, Julius, op. cit., p. 15.

93) Wolfsohn, Julius, op. cit., p. 15.

94) Wolfsohn, Julius, op. cit., p. 18.

95) Steinschneider, op. cit., Vol. I, Par. 163.

96) Steinschneider, loc. cit.


99) loc. cit.

100) op. cit., Par. 167.

101) ibid.

102) op. cit., Par. 169.

103) op. cit., Par. 165.

105) Steinschneider, *op. cit.*, Par. 172.

106) *ibid.*

107) *op. cit.*, Par. 173.

108) *op. cit.*, Par. 174.

109) *op. cit.*, Par. 175.

110) *ibid.*

111) *ibid.*

112) *ibid.*

113) *op. cit.*, Par. 179.

114) *op. cit.*, Par. 180.

115) *ibid.*

116) *ibid.*

117) *op. cit.*, Par. 181.

118) *op. cit.*, Par. 182.
119) op. cit., Par. 183
120) op. cit., Par. 185
121) op. cit., Par. 196
122) ibid.
123) ibid.
THE LIFE AND WORKS OF NARBONI

Moses b. Joshua, called Maestro Vidal Balshom or Bellsom was probably born in the last years of the thirteenth or the first years of the fourteenth century. His family came from Narbonne, but he was born and raised in Perpignan, capital of the province of Roussillon, the property of the Kingdom of Aragon. The Jewish community of Perpignan in whose midst Narboni was raised, and where most of his works were written, had an unenviable lot. The King was no favorer of the Jews. At his command copies of the Talmud were once delivered up to the auto-da-fé; but as he hoped to gain material advantages by the settlement of intelligent and industrious Jews in his domain, the King suffered them. They were compelled, however, to live in the most miserable section of the town, almost in what constituted the leper colony. But neither the wretched surroundings nor the oppression of the government were able to destroy the ardor for study evinced by the Jewish communities of Spain and the Provence then as in the preceding three centuries. The taste for science and free enquiry among the Jews of the community of Perpignan was even sharpened by the controversy that raged at that time mainly over the philosophy of Maimonides. The controversy grew so intense that Solomon b. Adret, the Rashba (d.1310), at the instigation of Abba Mari of Montpellier, issued an edict against the study of the sciences and especially against the study of philosophy. This edict was proclaimed in the synagogue in Barcelona on the fourth day of Ab (26 July) 1305. But the ban settled nothing. It served but to inspire the followers of Maimonides to undertake even deeper
study in order to be able to justify his philosophy. Thus the battle continued, and not even the expulsion of the Jews from France (1306) was able to stop it. The expulsion even helped to intensify the battle, for it brought the two antagonistic parties vis-à-vis each other in the same community. After the expulsion Abba Mari, the leader of the anti-Maimonidean party, and a portion of the Montpellier congregation were compelled to remove to Perpignan (1307) where a group of the opposing Tibonides party had settled. So it happened that when Narboni was seven or eight years of age the battle was again fully engaged, with Perpignan now as its center.

The father of Narboni, a partisan of the Maimonidean party, with the courage of his convictions introduced his son to the study of philosophy at a very early age. Notwithstanding the ban of the Rashba and the wrath of Abba Mari and his anti-Maimonidean party, we find Narboni at the age of thirteen engaged in studying the intricacies of the much controverted philosophy of Maimonides. It has been claimed that this fact is proof positive of the ineffectiveness of the ban even in the Rashba's time, though perhaps it cannot in itself prove so much as that.

The fact of the ban, and the controversy connected therewith, far from discrediting the study of philosophy in young Narboni's eyes, seem rather to have intrigued him and aroused in him a more than usual curiosity which impelled him to enthusiastic study of it. To widen his knowledge Narboni made voyages to other great centers of learning in Spain:
to Cervera in 1347 and 1349, to Barcelona in 1349, to Toledo and Soria in 1355 and 1358, to Burgos in 1361 and to Soria again in 1362. In the preface to his commentary on the Mat'war b'eshem haqalgal Narboni mentions the great tribulations which befell many communities in the wake of the Black Death, and among them the community of Cervera while he abode there. He was obliged to flee from Cervera along with all its Jewish inhabitants. There he left not only his property but also his valuable books. From a passage of his commentary to the Koran (Book II-47) we learn that from the year 5118 (1358) Narboni was established at Soria, where he tells of having seen, in that same year, a Christian woman, one hundred and thirty years old. From another passage of the commentary we learn that Narboni engaged in a controversy with a great Christian savant concerning meteorology, physics and metaphysics, and that this controversy excited a great deal of interest among all the inhabitants of the city. At Toledo he received a letter from Seville relative to a difficult passage of the eighth proposition of the Guide. In Spain, he probably learned Arabic. Since he had discussions with Christian savants he must have known Latin and, of course, also Provencal and Catalan the idiom of his native country. It would seem, therefore, that Narboni was a gifted linguist with a competent knowledge of Latin, Arabic, Catalan and Provencal.

Narboni was also a physician of some prominence. He wrote an important work called 'Orakh Metzin which was a kind of medical encyclopedia; a collection of remedies for different
maladies, containing much that he had learned from his own experience. He introduces his own novellas by "Moses said" - 'āmar Mosheh. Very often he says, wa-āni nissitī "I experimented," and wa-āni hiddashtī, "I invented," thus revealing the fact that he had a genuine scientific bent. In this work he has an interesting explanation of the Black Death. It was caused, he says, by the conjunction of Saturn and Mars. He believed it would last fifty days. This view was shared by Gersonides (Levi b. Gerson, also known as Rabbag: 1286-1344). Narboni revised ʾopenhagen: tāmāk 18 twice so that we have two recensions of it.

In his youth, Narboni studied medicine under Abraham Casalari (first of Narbōnne then of Baselu near Perpignan), who was an authority on fevers, concerning which he wrote a famous work. Nevertheless Narboni says that Casalari's were not original observations. Elsewhere Narboni adds that Casalari appropriated medical ideas from the works of Maimonides.

Narboni was married, had a son for whom he wrote Perfection of the Soul, and a daughter. In his book ʾopenhagen he speaks of his father and mother, his younger brother and his daughter. In this book he also reveals his belief in astrology, the influence of the stars on the lives of men.

Narboni also had an inclination towards mysticism such as is also found in Gersonides. He wrote a commentary on a mystical work ʾāṯār qumān. He often cites the midrash on Ruth which is Kabbalistic in character. In his own philosophy he is at times Kabbalistic. In his ʾopenhagen, for example,
he explains the word 'androgy nous' to mean 'male and female' because the letters of both have the same numerical value. Even in his Commentary on Lamentations one can see his interest in Kabbala as well as in philosophy. He was opposed to the use of amulets and went so far as to record an anecdote indicating the foolishness of the use of a charm.

Narboni's main interest was philosophy. In philosophy he was a Peripatetic in the Averroist sense. Like Gersonides he supported Averroes and wrote commentaries on many of Averroes' books. He was quite as daring in his views as Gersonides but not as original. Particularly in his commentary on the Ma'nh Narboni expresses some rash opinions, frequently giving the impression that he is explaining Maimonides while he actually refutes him. Thanks to his obscure style and this lack of frankness Narboni's rashness was not always apparent, so that for the most part he escaped sharp attacks. Nevertheless, he did not altogether escape criticism. The theologians of the fifteenth century in particular disliked him. Moses Rieti, who studied al-Ghazālī's work in Albalag's translation together with Narboni's commentary, excluded Narboni along with Albalag and Gersonides from his heaven, in a poem called lam ibadan, where he enumerated all the great scholars. This omission was not a mere oversight, for in a footnote the author expressly states his exclusion of these three men. On the other hand, Rieti's contemporary, Johanan Aleman, the teacher of Pico di Mirandola, speaks of Narboni with great respect and admiration and mentions his name in an abbreviated form as man which means manna. It is possible that Aleman was influenced in favor of Narboni by the latter's
deep interest in the Kabbala.

Even during Narboni's lifetime, or possibly soon after his death there was a critic who claimed that he had known Narboni personally, possibly in Perpignan. The name of this critic is Leon (Jehuda) Moscono of Oszmida (in Roumania) who (in 1362-7) wrote a super-commentary to the Pentateuch commentary of Ibn Ezra. This Moscono made an attempt to evaluate Narboni's knowledge in the various fields of scholarship. It was a strange phenomenon in Hebrew literature for the competence of a scholar to be evaluated by a contemporary. Moscono measures Narboni's knowledge in the various sciences by comparing it to research made by means of various lights. In linguistic science as in Talmud, Narboni investigated by the light of sparks, in logic by the light of a spiritual candle, in mathematics without any light. Whenever Narboni speaks of mathematics it is the result of self-taught or second-hand knowledge. In physics he investigated as though with the light of the sun because he follows what was already found in secular writings with the exception of his own explanations of some haggadot as relating to physical laws. In metaphysics he follows what others wrote but he investigated as though with the light of the moon because in metaphysics the doubts are greater and greater still are they in his explanation of haggadic passages which are like thorns in the eyes of those who have no understanding of the harmony of divine laws with the profane sciences. Finally when Narboni tries to combine physics and metaphysics his light is extinguished.

Moscono's evaluation, notwithstanding, it is clear that
Narboni had studied the more important Arabic philosophical works carefully and knew them well. The knowledge he displays in his commentaries on the principal works of the great Arabic scholars, in his commentary on the Ḥoreh and on the logical terminology of Maimonides, and his exact discussion of the great philosophical questions, discussions which are both instructive and informative, give his work considerable value for the history of philosophy.

Narboni did not make any translations from the Arabic. He wrote only commentaries. Among his earliest is his commentary on al-Ghazālī's Naqūṣīd. Narboni's was the first important commentary on the Naqūṣīd. He used for his commentary not the well-known translation of Isaac Albalag, or that of his contemporary Jehuda Nathan, but an anonymous translation which deviates much from those of Albalag and Nathan. It is, however, unlikely that it is older than that of Albalag. It is probably the translation of the Provençal scientist of whom Jehuda Nathan speaks in the introduction of his translation.

Narboni commented on this book because he sincerely believed that the Naqūṣīd reveals al-Ghazālī's philosophical convictions. Al-Ghazālī, says Narboni, in a long note to Ghazālī's preface, was only a tool in the hands of Providence to teach the secrets of science to those who were worthy. Al-Ghazālī lived at a time when the study of philosophy was prohibited by the King. Al-Ghazālī's noble soul, however, urged him to communicate the basic knowledge of this science. To avoid danger, Al-Ghazālī pretended that he was expressing
the views of the philosophers, only to refute them afterwards. For after the Maqāsid, he would write the Tahafut al-falāsifah, the falling to pieces of the philosophers. Furthermore, Narboni maintains that after al-Ghazālī wrote the Tahafut, he also wrote a small book in which he shows how the objections he raised against the opinions of the philosophers may be refuted. At the end of this book the author forbids all those into whose hands this book might fall to show it to anyone but scholars worthy of it. Isaac b. Nathan of Cordova (or Xativa), living in 1347 at Majorca, translated this book into Hebrew. The Arabic original has not yet been found. Narboni, it seems, knew this translation. He found it necessary to prove that the opinions expressed in the Maqāsid were really the opinions held by al-Ghazālī because he would not comment on a book whose author confesses that he was teaching falsehoods.

The opinions of the philosophers expounded in the Maqāsid are the opinions held by Narboni himself. His commentary to the Maqāsid, like Albalag's translation of it, was meant to defend the assailed philosophy, unlike Jehuda Nathan's translation which was meant to provide weapons against it. In the words of Steinschneider, Narboni was "der letzte hervorragende Freigel der jüdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters bis zur Renaissance."

Narboni exerted a great influence on the Jewish thinkers of his day and an even greater influence on those of subsequent generations. In the manuscript there are marginal notes and supercommentaries by many of those who used Narboni's commentary, and by some commentators and translators of al-Ghazālī's Maqāsid. Some praised him, others criticized him.
but they could not ignore him. More than thirty copies, complete or fragmentary, of his commentary are extant, and this in itself indicates the popularity it enjoyed.

In all we have some twenty works from his pen though not all are as yet published. Included among them are:

- **Kawwanot haqappilagorim** – A commentary on al-Ghazâlî's Ṭaqâsid written between 1342 or 1344 and 1349.

- **Iggeret 'al Sh'î'îr** – Completed in 1342 or 1343.

The gnostic book with which this deals goes back to the Geonic period. It is a description of the height of the divine body. It was frequently used by the Karaites to defend their beliefs, so that Maimonides conceived it to be a Karait forgery. Narboni interpreted the book philosophically explaining away its anthropomorphisms. In it he agrees with Maimonides on creatio ex nihilo.

- **Commentary on Lamentations** – Written before 1344. It is a philosophical commentary. Narboni wrote it because he thought that Lamentations was unduly neglected. The commentary has already been published.
Commentary on Ibn Rushd's, The Elytic Intellect. It was finished in Perpignan in 1344. Narboni composed it in the midst of the war troubles that took place in the region of Roussillon between Peter IV, King of Aragon, and his brother-in-law Jacob, King of Majorca.

Commentary on one part of the Physical treatises of Ibn Rushd, completed at Cervera on the 24th of February 1349. Narboni commented on the entire collection.

"In the preface of the commentary on the first part, the author who has returned to Cervera, says that he had undertaken this work at the request of his friends, the savants of Perpignan, in order to preserve his literary connection with them. He called them mat ha-ahim which Munk believes was a literary society in Perpignan. In the time of Joseph Caspi, a contemporary of Albalag, such a society already existed in Perpignan.

Done at Cervera and completed in 1349. Narboni began this commentary after composing his ma'amār be'sēkhel ha-hiyyūlānī.
- at the end of which he promised this
work. But "he was prevented from
continuing it by the misfortunes of the
time and by other philosophic pre-
occupations. He alludes to a great
persecution which took place at
Barcelona. He believed that he did
not have much longer to live, and was
50) in a hurry".

shlēmut han-nefesh - "Perfection of the Soul" written
between 1344-9 for his son.

țebra hayyim - A collection of remedies for
different fevers. The date is easily
ascertainable from the treatise itself,
for Narboni says, "We saw during the
past year, which was the year 5109
(1349), a man who died of pestilential
fever". Steinsohnider supposes
that Narboni alludes to the Plague as
it was on this occasion that Abraham
Casliari had composed his treatise on
51) Fevers.

ma'amar bi-beḥirah - Finished at Soria on the tenth of
December 1361. It was written in defense
of free-will and personal responsibility
against the fatalist, the apostate
53) Abner of Burgos.
His greatest and last work written at the behest of his son, who lamented that Narboni had written commentaries on so many philosophical themes but had neglected "many books composed by people of our nation and above all, the divine book, which shines with the light of wisdom, that causes the nation to live and reveals all mysteries." The commentary was begun at Toledo in 1355, but several circumstances among which was in particular the plundering he suffered on the second day of Pentecost 5115 (May 18, 1355), compelled him to discontinue his work for a time. He finished it seven years later at Soria on Tuesday, the third of Iyar, 5122 (April 26, 1362). He then prepared to return *wargi u-lamoladti*, to Perpignan where he was born, but death took him by surprise.
1. On the orthography of the name v. Renan, Ernest, 
Les Écrivains juifs français du XIVe siècle, p. (667) note 1, Steinschneider, Moritz, Die hebräischen 
Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden 
as Dolmetscher, p. 311. Alexander Marx in his un-
published notes has 'Balshome'.
2. Munk, S., Mélanges de Philosophie juive et arabe, 
p. 302. Marx, op. cit.; puts it in the last year of 
the thirteenth century.
3. Narboni, Commentary on the Môreh, Chap. 50 and 63.
5. Graetz, Heinrich, History of the Jews, vol. IV.
6. Ibid., p. 39.
7. Ibid., p. 50.
8. Ibid; Munk, op. cit., p. 502 according to Narboni's 
commentary on the Môreh, part I, Chap. 50 and 63.
9. Weiss, M. Mör-árbé, Book II, p. 113. This claim, 
however, has not been substantiated.
9b. He is still found at Perpignan in 1344 according to 
Munk, op. cit., p. 503.
fact that Narboni was in Toledo and Soria in 1355 as 
well. For he began his commentary on the Môreh at 
Toledo in 1355.
12. Ibid, pp. (679-680)
15. Marx, _op. cit._
17. Marx, _ibid_.
18. Marx says that it was published by Steinschneider.
19b. _ibid_.
20. Marx, _op. cit._
21. Renan, _op. cit._ (671) and Marx, _op. cit._
22. Rensn, _op. cit._, pp. (672) and (677).
23. Marx, _op. cit._
25. Marx, _op. cit._
26. Renan, _op. cit._, pp.(679-680) and Marx, _ibid_.
27. Marx, _op. cit._
28. Steinschneider, _op. cit._, Par. 175.
29. Marx, _op. cit._
30. Omit
31. Steinschneider, _op. cit._, Par. 175.
31b. Steinschneider, _ibid_, claims that Narboni studied them from Hebrew translations.
32b. Renan, _ibid_., (p.670) quotes Steinschneider in the _Catal. de Berlin_, p. 46 as supposed that it was composed in 1342. But in the _Hebräisch.Uebersetz_, Par. 175, Steinschneider maintains that it was written between 1342-1344 and 1349.
32c. Lived in the second half of the thirteenth century.

33. Steinschneider, *ibid*, Par. 175, assumed that it was written between 1300-1345, or 1306-1340. If we assume the first date, Narboni could not have written his commentary in 1342-44. The translation was discovered not earlier than 1871. Cf. Steinschneider, *ibid*.

33b. Steinschneider, *ibid*, Par. 175.

34. *idem*.

35. *idem*.

36. *idem*.

37. *idem*.

38. *idem*.


40. According to Marx, *ibid*.


42. Marx, *op. cit*.


44. *idem*.

45. Marx, *op. cit*.

46. Omit.

47. Munk, *op. cit.*, p. 503, note No. 2.


49. Renan, *op. cit.*, pp.(674) and (524) fourth line from the bottom.


52. Renan, *op. cit.*, p. (678). If this book was written in 1350 he could not have mentioned his journeys to Toldeo and Soria which took place in 1355-62. Steinschneider *op. cit.*, par. 175 mentions that the *Orah Hayyim* was written in Soria, but since Narboni was not in Soria in 1350 when this treatise was begun, it would appear that the treatise was completed in Soria. That is why Narboni mentions in the *Orah Hayyim* his visits to Toledo and Soria.

53. Renan, *op. cit.*, p. (678) and Marx *op. cit.*


DESCRIPTION OF EDITION AND TRANSLATION
OF KAWANOT HAGILALOSOFIM

The treatise that is here edited and translated is the logical part of al-Ghazali's Haqiqid al-falasifah in the anonymous Hebrew translation known as the Kawanot Hagilalosofim, together with Narboni's Hebrew commentary on the same anonymous Hebrew translation. In his logic, divided into five sections, al-Ghazali takes up in the following order: words, predicables, judgements, syllogism, form and matter, and qualities of the demonstrative syllogism.

The following Hebrew manuscripts were used:

Ms Aleph
Ms Adler 1015 (p. of Cat. 55) now in Jewish Theological Seminary written on European paper, 50 ff 21 ll. 19 x 13.5 cm. in Spanish semi-square characters. Second half of the sixteenth century.
Interrupted at p. 50 which equals beginning of Perek Shelishi on the recto side, verso left blank. Four pages missing between pp. 27 and 28. Variants by same hand.

Ms. Bet
Ms Adler 398 (p. of Cat. 55) now in Jewish Theological Seminary, written on European paper, 32 ff 26 ll. 18.7 x 14.9 cm. in Spanish rabbinic characters. Sixteenth century.
Variants by same hand.
Contains only Book I. Censor is Camillo Jag(h?)el - 1619. Belonged to Dr. Michael Sachs.

Ms. Gimel
Ms Mich. 519 - The Michael collection. It is
No. 1285 Part III in the Neubauer Catalogue.
There are two sets of the old Oppenheimer and the Neubauer. The old Oppenheimer numbers 1174 and 1175 are equivalent to Neubauer 1343 and 1345. That is the reference of the Latin words that are appended to the end of the Logic, e.g. Versis substrata comenentario est eadem ac Opp. 1174, 1175 etc. et Mich. 332 (Log. et Metaph).

This manuscript is written in Spanish rabbinic characters. I have made use of a photostat.

Ms. Aleph was used as the basic text, the other two manuscripts as variants. The variants will be found on each page underneath the basic text. Where ms. Aleph is defective, ms. Bet is used as the basic text and ms. Gimel without being designated as Gimel, as the variant.

The symbols by which the Hebrew variants are cited are as follows:

( ) - omission
: : - addition
: - indicates word or phrase in the text to which variants are cited.
2-1 - means that in a given source the order of the words is reversed.

As a check I have used also the logical part of the Maqāṣid al-falāṣifah lili-Ghazālī published in the original Arabic at Cairo, A.H. 1331 - A.D. 1912, Sa‘īda Press, (reprinted in 1936). "The Cairo edition is not, of course 'critical';
it has no apparatus; it was made apparently from two manuscripts only; but it gives a sound text. It is the only edition..... The book does not seem to have been common in the East. The Sayyid Murtaza in his commentary on Ihya' (1, p. 42) knew it, but apparently did not possess it." 1) This may be due to the fact that al-Ghazali 'himselF seldom (or never?) alludes to it by name." 2) Macdonald, therefore, comes to the tentative conclusion "that the Maqasid was left by its author in an unfinished and quasi-unpublished state; it may represent lectures that never reached book form, much like some of the Aristotelian treatises." 3) A specimen consisting of the preface and first two chapters of al-Ghazali's logic was published by George Beer at Leiden in 1888 for a doctoral dissertation at the University of Leipzig. His Arabic specimen was based on one Berlin and one Oxford manuscript. It was accompanied by a German translation. I have also made use of Beer's specimen.

The Arabic variants have been given in an English rendering which will be found loco citato in the notes to the translation. The reference is either to "Beer", or to "Cairo", or simply to "Arabic", which then refers to the Cairo edition.
NOTES: DESCRIPTION OF EDITION AND
TRANSLATION OF KARRAS nacélīgūrin

2) ibid.
3) ibid.
PART II
ספר כלנה חפירות

לأمن חוסר אלנגואליים אפי
הברגרי
Moses ben Joshua Narboni - "He entereth into peace, They rest in their beds, Each one that walketh in his uprightness - (1) - ben Mar David said:

After giving thanks to God and praising Him, and after invoking aid from Him, Blessed Be He, we wish to explain the book *Maqāsid al-Falāsifa* by the distinguished, cherished and honored Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. We propose in this small treatise to adhere to the meaning of the learned al-Ghazālī, for this prince has revealed and made known the secrets of philosophy, to those who are worthy of them, in a wonderfully concise manner, to show God's Providence for His servants who yearn after philosophy but meet with opposition and oppression. (2) According to the testimony of Abū Bakr ben Ṣaf, He sent this honored one, who saw the spiritual world, to make known to us the rules of philosophy that we might acquire them in a short space of time and be saved from the obstructionist bend of hypocrites who cause distress to us, to our wives and children. He would save us, too, from the ruling spirits and from the rest of the zealotry and opposition hinted at in the perceiving of the thunder and lightning at the Sinaitic Revelation. For everything which is attained through prophetic vision is only an allusion to something else, as Rabbi Moses said, May Peace be on Him. (4) Therefore I shall explain only what seems

a) Reading with ms. Gimmel.
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة.
hidden and obscure in his words, clearly and concisely, without explaining at great length the contrary views of Ibn Rushd or adding what has been explained in other books. For then we should be changing the character of the book, and that is not incumbent upon us. Our sole purpose is the elucidation of the words of the learned (Ghazâlî). Only after having comprehended this divine vision, which al-Ghazâlî described, will anyone who wishes to know all that (which I have omitted) be able to do so. And now, with the help of God, let us begin with what we have proposed, e.g., we shall bring first his statement, and then our comments, wherever needed.

Abû Haîmid said, (5) Glory be to God who has preserved us from error and made known to us the stumbling block of the ignorant. And may praise be uttered for him who is the most distinguished of the exalted ones. You have asked me, my brother, (6) for a thorough exposition, which would contain a refutation of the philosophers - the contradiction of their opinions, and (the disclosure of) their hidden errors and mistakes. But you cannot hope to refute them before you know their doctrines and study their dogmas, for to grasp the falsehood of certain doctrines before having a complete understanding of them is absurd. Such an effort leads only to blindness and error. Therefore, before entering upon a refutation of the philosophers, I deemed it necessary

a) Reading with ms. Gimmel.
to present an exposition and a full description of their ideas of the logical, physical and metaphysical sciences without, however, distinguishing between the true and the false. My sole intention is to set forth the purport of their words without prolix and so I omit glosses and additions. I shall set forth their ideas in expository and descriptive form adding what they consider to be proofs. The purpose of this book is to give an account of the *Meaning Of The Philosophers*; and that is its title. Know, first, that their sciences are divided into four classes; the mathematical, the logical, the physical and the metaphysical. The mathematical sciences deal with arithmetic and geometry. There is nothing in the theorems of arithmetic and geometry which contradicts truth, nor are they subject to disagreement and denial. Since this is so, it is not our intention to deal with them, and we will not trouble to deal with them. (8) In metaphysics most of their dogmas (9) contradict truth, and the true occurs only sporadically. In the logical sciences most of their propositions are correct and error occurs only sporadically; here they deviate from truth only in so far as their conventions and assumptions are concerned, but not in so far as
רימויור ברכל על חקיר כרומת מתוכנות המבנה וסכריהות
המחלקהプラס שפירי ו泂 התמא אום שמלת חכם שמלת אבсолוט אל אברך
אך על הנביא מבכל התכנית שלפיו עשתה בוכורה בוכורה עם שכרמט ורסמנ
או התוכנית ועשתה מבכלת תכנית הלא מתאימה על דרכו סוכנות ורסמנ
שימור כבש התאמה וראיה להבה升起 ותפ_semaphoreETY לע כותר
בפליורפוזים ונדננה שמר. וארדיס רראשב שנטאת ירבדה יתקיפ
ה TYPOבקריתור ויהבקריתור. ותחקיקת. ראותהיתור. ירבדה התאכיור תמקום
שהעדן בנסうま ראותהיתור רז
 like התאמה. שלוש לא התאמה שפפיית עם בוכורהות ו tüי этаות עם שפרט
הnescיה הלא תמאש בבחשה. ראותהיתור נובר רד
בפרת בין שפרט התאמה רדיבר אב בפלתו הבכרותית והנה
ריכב על דרכו וראשר התאמה אב בפלתו. רואים שפרט התאמה ב
בהכמה ראותהיתור ויגלה

- 1. רימויור:מיסיון,_Play:1
- 2. הסברות:בכרות,_Play:2
- 3. המחלקה_Play:3
- 4. נדננה: TableView,_Play:4
- 5. גדרות:מש褫ית,_Play:5
- 6. שפרט:צורת,_Play:6
- 7. הצללה: والفמה,_Play:7
- 8. הארץ:שפרט,_Play:8
- 10. הבכרותית:בריכת:גת:ן,_Play:10
- 12. הבכרותית:בריכת:גת:ן,_Play:12
the objects and purposes are concerned. For the purpose of
the logical sciences is to correct the methods of logical
proof. On this all logicians are agreed. In the physical
sciences the true mingles with the false and right resembles
error; no judgement is possible. What must be regarded as
false will be explained in the al-Tahāfut. Know then that what
we shall set forth will be a general and unqualified account
without examination of what is true and what is false. Only
after we have completed the exposition will we begin, earnestly
and with zeal, a separate book, to be called al-Tahāfut
al-falsāfa, if God will. Now we shall begin with the
exposition of logic and its assumptions.

COMMENTARY: The holy Rabbi Moses, May he rest in peace,
explained in his book, The Guide, that "there are three causes
which prevent men from discovering the exact truth. They are:
arrogance and vainglory; the depth of a subject and its
difficulty; and want of capacity to comprehend what might be
comprehended. And at the present time there is a fourth
cause, custom, e.g., the love of habit and training." He
thereby hinted at an explanation of the rabbinic statement,
"Four entered the Pardes." And indeed, the Rabbis meant
by that that philosophers may be divided into four classes.

Elisha ben Abūya
הצוותים ו tüכרצות כיכרות בג״ס יושרו וזכרו ויצאו וזה אמר סילאנסו
ככל למצב או אכדיטו惡ש Mercy השפעה עב כוכז רפדנזו וינכרא כספף
הם מתרים בכורת ודיני ושפת השפעה עב כוכז רפדנזו וינכרא כספף
הם מתרים בכורת והשראויו ליווערבר בכרל. ריבנים חותם המכסאכר על
דרד ההיכר והשאלה וดาילו וידימה מהמאמס מכוס הנקס עין אשיר
משלאדם ומקיניו החזירו כספף והשראתם ספר טעווה עב הפילוסופים
אם רצון תחל יי וברךיה התחלתו חבטה חבטה וחתונתיו. יודאשת בכיר
כפיי רבי יחיש אתוליו חע כספף הסדרה כי סבון התחלתו כלול
שלאחרו והסמכ חרטות רבודמה ודקנס המושב ודרי. וברך 한국
אבא עלבר כסבי עב ה kapsה וברך את מאמת התברל ומותם. רמז
הזה בארא קדם אתבשח הכרן ואפרות רבדיו, זמנים זכר צדה לברך כי
המציאים גנוזו על זה התברעתי החים כי אפרות כליה בארא

14: שכר烦躁ות (ב) / שכר烦躁ות (ב)
15: שכר烦躁ות (ב) / שכר烦躁ות (ב)
16: רצון תחלתו (ב) / רצון תחלתו (ב)
17: משלחת (ב) / משלחת (ב)
18: מחנימי שבידת (ב) / מחנימי שבידת (ב)
19: מחנימי שבידת (ב) / מחנימי שבידת (ב)
20: ייעצון (ב) / ייעצון (ב)
21: חותלות (ב) / חותלות (ב)
22: חותלות (ב) / חותלות (ב)
loved authority and disputation; As a result he thought he had already arrived by logical proof at things which by their very nature could not be logically demonstrated. "Rabbi Akiba, may he rest in peace, entered in peace and came out in peace" and did not deny an assertion the opposite of which had never been proved. "And he cast a look and died", refers to the lack of capacity for perception. "And he looked (into the divine secrets) and became afflicted" refers to habit and training; for they hinder man from attaining that which is in his power to attain had he been weaned from habit and from desire. Consider, for example, the literal readings in the Torah which are anthropomorphic. Some learned men believe the literal meaning of the verse. Had they been guided by their intellects they would not have thus erred. There is nothing worse than this. It is as though one wanted to see the sun but a curtain before his eyes prevented him even though the sun was strong and his sight was good. That curtain may have been purposely hung for men with weak eyes and bad vision who might suffer injury were they to look at the sun. A healthy man in the same room, because he is deprived of the sight and sweetness of sunlight, suffers thereby.
ספרות השראה ותודעה של חיבורי שונים נחרצה[float32] וענינוי בהן בובלום דים ובובלום שלום.

תבしゃיר המ שלו היא מופת של בחירת רצימה של רמה ושל שחירור. רצימה וסבלANCE

רסן את החובלה והצגה בכמה יסודות מיושנים של שברחת התחייה.

אם ירשפם מחברות ותואמות ברשימים הזהות ידד של המרדים על תבשהור.

כפי שמכאן על חפירות אינפרא מגלה גם מהרשיא אוכלים רבים מתלולים ומרוחים.

שלוב לא יטרח הוא. ואיך פאץ' יער בורדו המב. כי יציץ זה אלא כמי

שערת לארקד החשמל והופיעה כבר ההצגה משכלי בני חשמל רבייה עדכית.

רבות צ.city התורח ולא יכלו לארקדו עי מארג החצרה הרביעית עדכית.

ראפה החופש התואר הקבר שלים החצרה הרביעית עדכית שבירון המ

יוכש בר כלכלה יערבל לארקד והבקעה הידית לאריס הצרה בשבע

הקרור אחר עי התודעה החולות עטיפה פארה חאור והתחמל עב.
When Abu Hamid lived the fourth cause was prevalent and widespread. (15) He lived in a nation and in a generation in which the King banned the study of philosophy, so that in his day the study of philosophy was prohibited. But his integrity compelled him to influence others and to give them the benefit of what he knew of the secrets of philosophy. He therefore conceived a stratagem by means of which he might reveal the secrets of philosophy, with no harm to himself. He pretended that his main intention was to refute the philosophers. But he said that, since it was impossible to grasp the error of a doctrine before understanding its real meaning, it would be necessary for one who wished to compose a book against the philosophers to first write one which would explain what they meant and then refute their views in another book. The book he would compose to reveal the principles of the philosophers would be entitled Maqasid al-falasifah, the book with which we are now dealing. The second book would be entitled Tahafut al-falasifah, and in it, he would refute, by logical proofs, those views which are mistaken. He would disprove, for example, the arguments of the philosophers concerning the eternity of the universe, etc. But the Lord only knows what Abu Hamid really had in mind.
ולפי שאברתא אמר נאonna_CORRECTED
בإزالة הטקסט בחירה הרצייתית והתחממות כויה كانت
תורם תמך שלמה זה מדאנת לפורר הפילוסופיה�הויה אוסר לביסר לפורר
שבכר יידע סדרותת התוכנה עדות טבליאי סדרת שבליאי הוביר בד מולדת
בשעתה העבר טבליא עברה הרשותה להחלור על הפילוסופיה או ב־כבר
שהותם העפילות על שבר הטבליא עזרה אספקת ידות יריאיכ לים ליראת
לתקש טבליא הפילוסופיה שיעזים ל entidad טבליא בכות עזרה כו וברשת עזר
אירג עלילם קדר טבליא נגובי עזרה ה(ps) דבר טבליא כו שיריאיכ
הפילוסופיה ירשאה בכות הפילוסופיה. רואינ דה טבליא יד אצטוג כו
שה צאזר כו יושב טבליא ידיע כו על מה שבליא ידיעת מה הסדרת
אירגנ הפילוסוף הפילוסופי בריאיאиру בכות טבלילט הפילוסופי על השורט
העולם ריאל זידע מה הסדרת כבל

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12: שאברתא מתכון
and what his intention really was. But the learned philosopher Ibn Rushd called attention to this in the book he wrote against the Tahafut al-falāsifah, entitled Tahafut al-tahafut. In that book he said that it is difficult for the virtuous to do without honor and glory. Therefore this great man, finding that he could attain to honor only through a stratagem, pretended to submit to revealed religion and not to believe the demonstrations of the philosophers. But why bring testimony concerning this intention from someone else when Abū Ḥāmid himself “revealed the secret to his friends” in a short treatise which he composed after he wrote his Tahafut al-falāsifah. In it he resolved all that which he had maintained against the philosophers. At the end of the treatise he enjoined and adjured anyone into whose hands it might fall to reveal it only to the worthy among philosophers. In sum, this provided the author with a pretext to explain the ideas of the philosophers. For whoever comprehends their ideas will be able, if he is favored by God, to resolve the objections which al-Ghāzālī later brought against them. It was like building a protecting wall. This is the sixth method. We have already said enough, but the Lord will forgive us. We did it out of necessity. We did not wish
הצהרתיות והרגשות הם מכלל רכבי זה התוכןanken רשר כפרר בשבר כגור
הפרק הפiphersים עשר חפלת החפה. אפרר בו בפי כשורי זי עפרר למרכיבים
مسلין הצרוכל רוכרכו והӠא השטחרים לטבע אזלא ההכרד בוח נעל
ארפס את התحجرת את עבר בכם ג愫ב חמקה חמקה לשחת מפימי לϗרט
הפiphersים. הולמה בכי אריא על זה הפריו וטור: רוחח ארקותר עץ-
גאל טרור אל עיניך בשיבור פפא עזר או הפרר המקנה חפלת הפiphersים
הדריך בך חימר כל הז שמת על הפiphersים ראפר בכר ואתגרד רשבין-
לכל וי שдорож תספור התואר של אגט גאול אל יאי או פنسي הרבחה.
ברכלל חפף עתת על הז הפריו שיתבציו רירכל לזרדיי בכר חפלת הפiphersים
כי מוי שיכברו זה בבעל עמ תnaments זאל להדרי במ שיסעיר עלים-
אכרי כך ראנר זה אל בכפיו החסר מקיב רוחא דר שיש ריני כפת
שפירוף בין רואל ייפר כי החרביה הביאegov זה כי לא.
to write a commentary on a book whose author, the reader might think deliberately leaves error in it. That is why we have revealed all this. Only the Lord knows (what al-Ghazālī had in mind).

TREATISE ON LOGIC.

ABUḤĀMID SAID: Introduction to an exposition of logic, its parts and its value.

EXPOSITION: Although the sciences are divided into many branches they may be reduced to two; conception and judgment. Conception consists of grasping the essence of things designated by uncombined words by way of making something understood and asserting a truth. As for example the grasping of the object designated by the word "body", 'tree', 'angel', 'spirit', and the like. But judgement is e.g. the knowledge that "That the world was created," that "The believers will be rewarded and the rebellious will be punished." Every judgement is of necessity preceded by two concepts. For without understanding either 'world' and its definition, or 'created' and its definition one cannot possibly assert that it was created. But the word 'created', when its meaning cannot be properly conceived, is like the word 'preated', (2) for example. For if it were asserted that "The world was preated," it would be impossible to affirm or deny it. For

a) Reading with mss. Bet and Gimmel.
b) Reading with mss. Bet and Gimmel.
כרת אלפיש ספר חשים פעמים والفנתנים אתורワイuko היוון בו שופך כף דעות

בעבר_representation: רז והארשלtmlר בונריוו זה ראות נורא

המאמ הכנריי אויר המוקדש

כותרת כתובות הביתון רכיב תרליות וחקלאים...

שהמהם שתים רבן שליחים הנה עם בדליים בשתי הלשון העברית והRowCountורית

אולמה זאיר מ hút את השניפרות וشرح יריד הלשון בצירה בתוך המרור יותר

על דרי השבטים והצותות שלהם התוכן העצ الكريم לספר בחינה ושלש ראת

ומתתך עד שברמהroredים על ימין ומסדרים ישיב עברות פלעם. לכל אימת

הנהו השבטים להגואדרוות צירה וידינה הם מפי שלא יבון עשה

бережו הができות כامر לא ירצה עגינה הוא בחינה מתורגף על דרי משלו

זוהי תיאטרון מהודר אא אושר ולון אמסת ולא תכלה. אם שמע שלוש

ייזכוםайл

ספרות זעירה חלקית (ב)
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be negated or confirmed? The same is true of the word "world" when it is replaced by a meaningless word. Every conception and judgement is further divided into that which is grasped immediately without investigation and reflection and into that which results only from investigation and reflection. That which is apprehended without investigation is e.g., 'things', 'beings' etc. That which results from investigation is, e.g. the realization of the true nature of 'spirit', 'angel', 'truth', 'elements' and the conception of those things whose essences are hidden. Judgements that are immediately affirmed are e.g. the assertions that "Two is more than one," or that "Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other." To this may be added judgements accepted on the basis of sense perception or authority and judgements which are embraced by people without preliminary investigation or reflection. All these judgements are reducible to thirteen classes and will be revealed later in their proper place, if God Wills. The judgement which is grasped through reflection is e.g., the affirmation that "The world was created," or that "Material bodies were created", or that "There is reward and punishment for good and evil deeds," etc. A conception that is made possible only through investigation is arrived at only by a definition. And judgement that is made possible only through

a) Reading with ms. Bet.
cılık בה או יאיר זיידקין. דרכו המבוכה הן התוצאות הדרמטיות בכפר
כל אחד מהטיפונים הרמה שיווצרו וה洛克 על יד חסידי רמדחנס מקולטים. רימונים
באל מהם שליחים לא הורשו להתאימ. ואלו יאיר זיידקין מקולטים. רימונים
הנהר בכרמי והטופס נִדָּמָה. ואלו יאיר זיידקין מקולטים. רימונים
רמות שגה ובהם רימונים Ezra בנוביס מנהלי בכפר בבני יאיר
המודו ובהם רימונים Ezra בנוביס מנהלי בכפר בבני יאיר

רמות שגה ובהם רימונים Ezra בנוביס מנהלי בכפר בבני יאיר

1: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יזכרֶנְךָ/ (ב)
2: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יזכרֶנְךָ/ (ב)
3: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יזכרֶנְךָ/ (ב)
4: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יזכרֶנְךָ/ (ב)
5: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יזכרֶנְךָ/ (ב)
6: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יזכרֶנְךָ/ (ב)
7: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יذكرֶנְךָ/ (ב)
8: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יזכֶרֶנְךָ/ (ב)
9: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יזכֶרֶנְךָ/ (ב)
10: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יזכֶרֶנְךָ/ (ב)
11: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יזכֶרֶנְךָ/ (ב)
12: יוחנן: יושב/ (ב) יזכרֶנְךָ/ (ב)
investigation is arrived at only by argumentation. Each one of them must be preceded by undoubted knowledge. For when we do not understand the concept 'man' and we ask "What is man?" and are told "He is a rational animal," then the concept 'animal' and the concept "rational" should both be known to us so that from both these concepts we arrive at the knowledge of the unknown concept 'man'. When we doubt that "The world was created" and proof is adduced that "The world has form," and that, "whatever has form was created," and therefore the "The world was created," then this proof will not give us any knowledge we did not have before concerning the creation of the world, unless this proof is preceded by the two judgements that "The world has form" and that "Whatever has form was created." Thus by these two affirmations we gain knowledge we did not have before. Consequently, it is hereby established that all knowledge which is acquired through investigation results only from a preceding knowledge. But there cannot be an infinite regress. For it is impossible not to arrive at first principles which occur in the intellect without investigation and reflection. This is the introduction to logic.

COMMENTS:

This is the meaning of the statement, "Although the sciences are divided into many branches
דרישת הוראה לא飛びת אליהם בתשובה. רמכתraits כל אחר מתי שחקים לא יдвигו
בלא ס肮 כי תנו אחד לא יפריט עסייתו המאום. ואמרי颂 אין זה יהודים
בראשית עליה כי אם כי תמו של שזרת התשובה המאום ידו אחר ותבורי
עד כי יראו על הזכאים המראות דבר המוסכל
שכשכש התשובה המראות יברש חזיר בתחילה לכל
מסירותו רוא ניThunder מתרש. הנה זה לא just הלא יдвиית
במה שהכל מראות התשובה אלא יכשר כי אם לזר אמה תברשמל לתפזר
רושמתבריר מתרש רוא זה
tydvic המזה את מוכן עצירה. הנה כי לבא ברכה כי יдвигת ורדש
אמס תבות מיבריך ככר קדה אובץ קלא לא יסחלש אל כל כי מכלה
אבל כי אסף מבטוח שייציע על ראשה והמדיעהו ביסודה יסודע בלשניך.
דרישת רוחבכה. אמר זה התשובה המראות הבירה והניזידה אוסר אליהם התשובה נגה
שהךככטהו רוא רבר הלכתיות

[1] יותם: 1
[2] בלשון: 2
[3] הוביצר: 3
[4] רבך: 4
[8] רבך: 8
[9] רבך: 9
[10] רבך: 10
[12] רבך: 12
they may be reduced to two: conception and judgement." Know
that conception is the knowledge of essence. And judgement,
whether it be uncombined or combined, is the knowledge of
existence. Conception is grasped either immediately or through
reflection and the same is true of judgement. Conception,
which requires investigation, is arrived at by definition and
judgement by argumentation, as will be shown later. I have ex-
plained this here because I have seen the error of the pseudo-
philosophers of our day who claim that conception is definition
and judgement is argumentation. Thus they err in not distin-
guishing between the thing itself and the method by which it is
grasped. For the enunciative sentence is called judgement only
because it may possibly be a truth or a falsehood, which is not
the case with conception, as long as it is not related to the
object concerned. When it is, we have judgement. This is meta-
phorical. For, as a matter of fact, conception has no subject
or predicate, the object conceived is its own definition. Keep
this in mind. Now 'preated' is a term with no meaning. The
statement "replaced by an unknown term," means replaced by a
word without meaning.

ABU HAMID SAID: THE VALUE OF LOGIC. Now that it has been
established that the unknown
הנה המכלים הביאים תלמידי תזירר והמאמר מהמשנה בברא דר workplaces
והוא עדות התנאתק. הראなもの וเมนูית התפסות דlarından עדות עוד הרא
מודרכ ותפשים זכויות והם יזעוף ומסביב יזעוף הראות דרוה. דרכו
כן האמור. תכשיטי המזון ואילו רויית היברח בברא. שד哈哈哈 להשתתף
שער. אלא שבاهرתיה הזה לארות שם נברא עליה החכמה והמשנה דרכו
שאמר נחנני תח积极配合. המסקנות מדרכי. התפשים והם מסכימים. רצחר וניב הרבר עשה
רביי תשיעי היה רר. דהמתנה בקורה הרמט軟 הרסס אשכח כל הגר יקבל
האם התפשים מה שאר כל תכשיטי סתרים אל התכשיטי דרכו אר
או אכיפה. דהואตนיו. כי על ברך התפשים אין סברآخر תכשיטי דרכו.
הוא מבדר בכמה רחובות זה. רתдер וגרה חביבה יחל עבירה לה. רעפר
ככשך התפשים בכפיפות יציאה בתויה יחל מעבון לה. אפר
EndElement מהירה שקדיוות שעוריפ
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(חדרית) (ב) 3
(האמות) (ב) 6
(ריבי) (ב) 7
(מד) (ב) 8
(ב) 9
(ב) 10
(שד) 14
follows only from the known, it must be understood that not every unknown will result from every known, but for every unknown there is a particular known which is related to it. There is a method of bringing it into the intellect and this method makes the unknown known. That which yields affirming conceptual knowledge is called definition or description. And that which leads to affirming knowledge is called argumentation. To the latter belong the syllogism, induction example, etc. Every definition and every syllogism is divided into that which is true, and gives certainty, and that which is false, but resembles truth. Therefore, the knowledge of logic will furnish us with the criteria by which we may distinguish between the sound and the unsound definition and syllogism, so that by it we may distinguish between certain and uncertain knowledge. It is, as it were, the weights and scales of all knowledge. But you cannot differentiate increase from decrease, gain from loss, in knowledge which is not weighed on these scales. You might demur and say that, while the value of logic is that it discriminates between knowledge and ignorance – or what value is knowledge? the answer is that all values
לא ניתן להאכיל ואלו יќלעך שכל סכלו ישוכל שקע איז שפער들과 בטבעו הרחק מכל סכסוך עלייהEVERYDAY schizophrenic part.
בכשכל ישוכל שקע איז שפערicolon of schizophrenia ב_segmentsוים.]
akışך קרם רָוָה. רומז científית הידיעות המאובדן
סמכיהם של המוח האלמוגרי המוח האלמוגרי
ורכת אל מקום╖ה
[ckenאחור] מה MADEpole מקטע מה MADEpole
ובכשכל ישוכל שקע איז שפערicolon of schizophrenia ב_segmentsוים.]
 kênhית המקטע הגדול ממקטע הת לעמוד והוקם אחר ב_segmentוים של
מקטע של מקטע המוח האלמוגרי של מקטע התServletResponse
ובורס הידיעה של מקטע התresponsive של מקטע התResponsive
ואזorns
אם הידיעה הת الشخصية המוח האלמוגרי, והמקטע התresponsive של

כְּסֵפָר הַיִּדְּעָה לכל

(ב) מסכן: פֶּלֶת
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are contemptible compared with eternal bliss, which is the ultimate bliss and depends on perfection of the soul. This perfection is of a two-fold character: ornamentation and purification. Purification consists of cleansing (the soul) of mean virtues and ridding it of vices. Ornamentation consists of engraving on the soul the ornament of truth, so that there will be revealed to it the divine truths, nay the whole of existence in its proper order, with a complete and true knowledge corresponding to reality, free from ignorance and error. It is like the mirror, the perfection of which lies in the fact that beautiful forms may be seen in it as they really are, without perversion or change. This is effected by keeping it clean of dirt and rust and further by having beautiful forms placed in front of it. The soul is a mirror in which the forms of the whole of existence are impressed when it is freed of the mean virtues and cleansed and polished. But to distinguish the praiseworthy from the blameworthy virtues is possible only through knowledge. Thus the engraving of the whole of existence on the soul is made possible only through knowledge; there is no way of reaching it except through logic. Therefore, logic serves to acquire knowledge, and knowledge
מאמרות צ'רץ על התצללות בבנייתם וריהוטם של חכת מגננות והפיזיקה שלה
בשליומן ובשפלמהorns benefici-בunnz המפרץ הגדול.ATIONS במגננות
הנה זו התצלות הפיתויים מהורר רוחית השפעת המהירות המשותפת. רואים
הlógית הגה בשיפוטה בח בנירן אמה או ירבד לחומרים התאולים
אם המסתיים לכל עדנום גלרי יצקiji משקיעים לא פסיבית אם איי
כשלות בין זה שלון רפיי ישסיי רדויי ברטקה אפסים
הנה בחר בשתמש ענחת המרבצון הנחית הבחנה הנפק מרכה
בכ представляет המופרר לכל בשאר וריכזה חולים תפן הפיתויים המפרים
וכאם אפש התוכן ליריהם המפרים את רמאותו את הנייה גזיז
לגבשת ורמת הנפתצורה לכל ליבש אלא דיייעי רייד אל המתחות אלא
כתחוות. זא כל חורעל התהגוזן

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gains for us eternal bliss. Since it is true that eternal bliss may be traced back to the soul made perfect by purification and ornamentation, logic, then, without doubt is of extra-ordinary value.

**COMMENTARY:** The rational soul (3) is at first simply a potentiality prepared to receive abstract intelligence. This potentiality (4) is dependent upon memory images which appear in the imaginative soul. But this dependence is one of existence not of identity. The Active Intellect unites with the potentiality by acting on it, e.g., by acting on the memory images, stripping them of the accidents of plurality and individuality, reducing them to universal form - for only then is a concept intelligible - and illuminating the potentiality in us so that it might receive these concepts. The relation (6) is similar to that of the sun, color and our sight, which transforms potential into actual vision; potential into actual sight. This is the view of Ibn Rushd concerning the true meaning of the possible intellect, and also the view of Alexander (i.e., of Aphrodisias), except that Alexander does not hold that the Active Intellect serves as the form to this potentiality, but that it exists independently outside of it.

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a) Reading with mss. Bet and Gimmel.
בקנתה הדרישה ומריעה זו jetzt התחלה הגבהתית וגם התאמה השזרות
התקנתה של ספרה בתוכך היה נוספות וחברתיה התפרשות על
הפיורוש היא הנפש המצריפה.

מורכבות התוכנית זו היא התברנה בכבוד המכסה דרכי התוכנה
הキー מציינת. לאキー טריוו. רוחכון המסרוק בכבוד הנ施行 התוכנה
והאניירונה.

נראה כי שיער תורדרי מקוריית ששמיית הריברキー קורונה/left רוחניירונה

ריבועים תורדרי מתכלה שי איר מתכלה ודליה זו ריוורר התוכנה הראשי
נשתقيل רח abslכילה ווחצניpta בציצית בשמש עם המרכזים וחברת אש

בגזר כי מריארש תורדרי סרט בכבוד וברトーועי מכות

והאר האこんな התוכנה הת기간 יוה ריוורר התוכנה רוחניירונה

מלבד ישארבררין נוסף היא שဟמת המסרוק וכבוד הכבוד הכלים הסדרים

בלתי בקרוב ביה.
Yet they all agree, including Abū Ḥāmid, that even though the
rational soul was created with the body it is not material,
and therefore will not perish with the death of the body. But
that is true only after the soul has perfected itself by
acquiring universal ideas. At first it is like a slate ready
for writing, as Aristotle says, while Abū Ḥāmid considers
it an intellectual substance, though only potential. That is
what he means when he says that "ornamentation consists of
engraving on the soul the ornament of truth so that there will
be revealed to it divine truths, nay the whole of existence is
its proper order, with a complete and true knowledge corre-
spending to reality, free from ignorance and error." This means
that the perfection of the soul, purified from the mean virtues,
is accomplished through engraving and developing in it truths
and universal forms, just as the individual forms are reflected
in the mirror. For the soul itself is devoid of all forms, as
the mirror is devoid of images. Therefore, the soul is able
to receive all forms. "So that there will be revealed to it
divine truths" means that these are the divine essents; "the
whole of existence" means material and spiritual. "According
to its order," i.e., how it was ordered and how it emanated
from the First Cause.
ראנוו חל נסיגים עם אנשי המפרץ. אני מקווה שהحمد וידעה הيقة.

עשתה מספר פעמים נסיגה כאשר הוחלט לשלול את נוכחות האנשים הפגועים. אחד מהם ה𝜂ם שפיע את הפרק. הוא אמרתי כי פקדו את הים. הוז SATA מחבל עם האיותות לכל טורו. כל אחת מהאימות מהговорות הביניהם הביעה את התשומת.

בראיים סעודת. הצגה כי שפגעה והושקה האותיות המפורשות האמותות מזרחיים. ריפורטים הבה האומנות רוזנוריה הקולות בצידי התרזה אני לא ידע. כי זה פגעו בתוסף של כל דיר，默认 האומנות האיתות והם שרים.

הנה במנהיגות כל בשתי רבי הידיעות לאייקות של ברווז וקישווש.
All existent things are dependent on the other, as a flame is dependent on a coal. By "complete knowledge" he means the knowledge of universals, for the particular is not an object of the intellect. By "true" he means true in itself, (i.e., real). By "agrees with reality" he means corresponds to existence. For true ideas are those whose forms, conceived by the soul, correspond to the real objects that exist outside of the soul. He said, further, "free of ignorance and error". Now, synonyms are not employed in the demonstrative sciences. Therefore, ignorance and error have two distinct meanings, as was explained by Aristotle's definition in the *Topics*, when he said that there are two kinds of ignorance - ignorance due to mistaken knowledge and ignorance due to the lack of knowledge. Mistaken knowledge is the conceiving of a thing as being different from what it really is. Lack of knowledge refers to the fact that no judgement is made at all. So by ignorance he means lack of knowledge, and by error he means mistaken knowledge. By the statement, "the soul is a mirror" he means that God will make his soul conceive the most perfect forms found in existence - and this is called *mar'eh* (mirror) - as it is said "though art the God of my seeing". (ra'i).

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**THE PARTS OF LOGIC AND ITS STRUCTURE**
רבדים שעוררים ז"ז כור ח samen שישה בחלות גליו פועל מכפלת כלול מי מהשלל כרמל
לצורות. רעיוני יאכזיב גליאר פנימאי יאכזיב מייבש. סוסים לאמת של סוסים.
שע המצלמה יז"ע הרדיו המפורים והשאר המוזריים הםbservice חירשים.
לצורות הצבע בעור איור לנר. עד ארוך צלולה זה רציף צלעה.
וזה כיוון התוכן לבוש לאי ימשה ביליביר המפורים. זה רוזיו יאיר צלון זה.
השכון החשמול מת"י עירובים: רוזיו זה כור שבארא ארמון כפר עירובים.
אפר כיוון השכוןswire עירובים מצכילה ארמון עירובים מצכילה עירובים.
וזה הצבע הברב ברזו משלח רפוסה כפהコレוקיה וה piiים של ינפוז כר פר.
產業 רוזיו יאיר צלון זה א어서 יצבה השכון כפולה עירובים nationally למיצר עירובים.
וזה הצבע ברב ברזו משלח רפוסה כפהコレוקיה וה piiים של ינפוז כר פר.
אנר רוואול מלחי החברון טורנדור הנזה

1: רבדים: מפלט הכלכלים/ב (כ"ט מהשלל כרמל) (1)
2: ז"ע אינדייאנים/ב (2)
3: (המ/ב) (2)
4: (הון/ב) (ב)
5: צ"א רוזיו/ב (ב)
6: שאר נאטו צ"א (ב) צ"א תצוגת כפר המפורט/ב (ב)
7: (郃) (郃)
8: (郃) (郃)
9: רוזיו יאיר צ"א (郃) (郃)
10: (郃) (郃)
11: אפרアプリ/郃 (郃) (郃)
will become clear a statement of its purpose; viz. definition, the syllogism and the differentiating between the true and the false in both of these. The more important of the two is the syllogism, which is composed of two premises, for a syllogism is constructed out of two premises, as will be seen in what follows. Every premise contains a subject and a predicate, and every subject and every predicate is a term which clearly designates a concept. He who wishes to grasp that which is combined, whether it is a real object or only an object of thought, must put the uncombined parts first. Just as the builder of a house must prepare wood, bricks, and clay, and bring the uncombined and the particular first, and then concern himself with building, so is the process of knowing in relation to the known. For it is an image corresponding to the known. Therefore, he who strives after knowledge of the combined must first strive after knowledge of the uncombined. It follows from this that we must deal first with terms and the manner in which they designate concepts; then with the concepts themselves and their divisions; then with the proposition composed of a subject and a predicate, and its divisions; then with a syllogism, which is composed of two premises. We will discuss the syllogism in two chapters. In one we will deal with its matter, and in the other with its form, as will follow.

a) Reading with ms. Bet.
b) Reading with ms. Bet.
c) Reading with ms. Bet.
d) Reading with ms. Bet.
e) Reading with ms. Bet and Gimmel.
לא טעמתי הקדשה בכל שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה הנגה בצירフラך ולא שיבוץ. לא סיפחתו הנגת בצירフラך.

שאנו את של였다. רכוב בר悱ה המשיכו לעבר את הのではないか העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין.

שהו את שלידה. רכוב ברfgang המשיכו לעבר את הのではないか העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדディים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין. הנגה בצירフラך לא שיבוץ. על כל הקדשה העדדיים ועקבו אחר דוריין.
This is the subject matter included in our presentation of logic. It contains five chapters.

**COMMENTARY.** Statement: "The parts of logic and its structure will become clear by giving a statement of its purpose: viz. definition and syllogism..." He means by "its purpose" the purpose of logic, which is "definition and syllogism." (17)

From this eight books resulted. The further statement "Just as the builder of the house must prepare wood, bricks and clay, and must bring the uncombined and particular first - and then concern himself with building - so is the process of knowing in relation to the known", means that just as the skilled artisan must first prepare the parts of the object to be made and then is occupied with combining these parts and completing his work, so, too, is the process of knowing in relation to the known. The philosopher must know the parts of the object to be known before he can know it in its entirety. He (18) gave us a further reason by saying that "it is an image corresponding to the known". This means that knowing denotes the true essence of the known, i.e., its real being, stripped of accident. Therefore, knowledge of the uncombined must precede knowledge of the combined, since the existence of the parts precedes the existence of the combined, i.e., the known after we know it.

a) Reading with ms. Ret.
שאכרל משה שטרצף להביאר את הקיבוץ והם אחריהם הם הסדרים ואפוא
בך הክים הנהרות
 ногה רהמה
 ירדה יומין
กระทור במספר
 רגרג רכס פרות
 ישכרת בש yat
 רהמה רהדס
 קכם יזכר

אפרים

ב estar על התקופה

ולא שבר כל ירידה השוכבgend רד התורה מוכן ידיעת הירידה

ולא שבר כל ירידה השוכבgend רד התורה מוכן ידיעת הירידה

שלאחרות
ערוך עלהtextContent תוארי כי אריו דמיון ספכיס ליידר.SimpleName על כל.

הרייטור העצה האמת מתור הירידה ו القرار מפרסום מפרסום אחר לא
לוד

שישה שקים היריעה הביפורים על המורת אחר שאדק מפייאור החלוקים

למסדרות המורות.
CHAPTER I

CONCERNING THE MEANING OF TERMS

This theme will be explained in five sections.

Section 1. The term designates the idea in three different ways. One of them is by congruence, as when the term house designates the idea of house completely. The second is by inclusion, as when the term "house" designates "wall". For the term "wall" expresses only what it means by congruence, and designates it accordingly. But the term house also designates it, except that it differs in the manner of designation. The third is by means of connotations, as when the term "ceiling" designates wall. This method differs from the method of congruence and inclusion. The latter two are employed, though not connotations. Connotations imply other connotations and therefore may be applied to an indefinite number of connotations without arriving at any definite meaning.

COMMENTARY. Statement; "The third is by means of connotations as when the term 'ceiling' designates 'wall'; This means that the term 'ceiling'"
בראשית א: הגריה מדיה שבייתו וריאיתו וראשתו בש ['. וסיוו

ה_PICTURE

והלך וה вполнין וסרווה תחתיתו על העניין שפנש בקברם בבריליום וחק

הוא דברך והמשכת חדם חועד חובה על עניין. דומה פך ברלך הכללד

かれוה תיבת השים על ממולח כוסר. כי תיבת הכרמל מטרעה על הבריקה

גה על תיבתת וגרדה על בור. כי מזרחה התורה בנזיר עלייו

השלישי ברלך הוחלץרועה בבריליום. וקרוב מברית וסרווה תחתיתו.

הלך וכרך ביכר ברלך וסרווה תחתיתו על עניין. דומה פך ברלך הכללד וסרווה תחתיתו.

ויאמר והיון חנה ולא פיין שמחורב לחר בצס בך כל החורביכים ריביאו

ענניים ביכר ביכר וסרווה תחתיתו על עניין וסרווה תחתיתו.

והبرشلونة ככרעה תיבת תיבת על עניין וסרווה תחתיתו.

- - -
designates a wall, since the existence of the ceiling presupposes a wall upon which the ceiling may rest. Therefore, a wall is also called a ceiling. He said that this should not be employed because the connotation may have a further connotation. The foundation may be called both 'ceiling' and 'the interior of the house'. Thus no definite meaning would be arrived at.

Section 2. The term is divided into the incomplect and the complex. The incomplect is a term no part of which designates any part of the concept, e.g., "man" (Mnsh). For neither part of the term, whether "en" or "nosh," designates any part of the concept "man", in contradistinction to the statement "Reuben's son" and "Reuben walks," where the "son" which is part of the sentence, designates a concept and "Reuben" designates a concept. When you say "解说-Ullah," if the word is a kunyti, it is incomplect because you mean by it only what you mean when you say "Zaid," but if you mean a na'at then it is a complex term.

For all who bear the name "解说-Ullah are really servants of God. Therefore, this expression is in essence homonymous, sometimes it serves as a designation - and then it is incomplect, and sometimes it serves as an attribute, and then it is complex.

COMMENTARY: "And if this is a kunyti means that it is
אין לי להבריא להודותشور והוחדת יִדָּרָה שְׁלֹשֶׁת לְחֹלֶל. ישכון
על ידי התחלת כל בֵּיתֶנוּ ואתת המשרה. דברי זה נמי كانوا שְׁלֹשֶׁת
המַּחֲרוֹצִים גם הם להוֹדָה לְיִדְּרָה הָיוֹרָדָה וְכֶנֶּר הָיוֹרָדָה גֶּזֶרֶב רְבִּיעֵי
ולא עָקַדּוּ אִלֵּא יֶרְבִּיעַ. אַלּוֹ לָלַּקֶּר עַבָּדַת המַחֲרוֹצִים
ונַחֲרוֹצִים רְבִּיעֵי שְׁלֹשֶׁת. נַחֲרוֹצִים לָלַּקֶּר שְׁלֹשֶׁת.
הלַּקֶּר מַחֲרוֹצִים אֱבוֹדֶשׁ כָּיְם לְרַבְּרָה עַבָּדַת עַבָּדַת. בָּלוֹן מַחֲרוֹצִים
ובּוֹרִאֵבִים עֹצְמֵן רְבִּיעֵי. נַחֲרוֹצִים אֱבוֹדֶשׁ כָּיְם לְרַבְּרָה. כָּיְם לְרַבְּרָה.
לְרַבְּרָה מַחֲרוֹצִים אֱבוֹדֶשׁ כָּיְם לְרַבְּרָה. כָּיְם לְרַבְּרָה. כָּיְם לְרַבְּרָה.
רְבִּיעֵי שעון שְׁלֹשֶׁת בָּלוֹן מַחֲרוֹצִים אֱבוֹדֶשׁ כָּיְם לְרַבְּרָה. כָּיְם לְרַבְּרָה.
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a designation, as when you say Abraham Moses. The statement "if you mean a na'at" signifies that you mean by it that he is the property of God and that God is his master. Therefore it is a complex expression, for its two parts are parts of the meaning. Further, he resolved a difficulty when he said, "For all who bear the name 'Abd-Ullah are obviously servants of God." He means by "all", that all men and all (other) beings are messengers of God, servants who do his will. Therefore, though "'Abd-Ullah," which is the name of this man, is a kunyah, it also designates a quality - that God is his master, so that it is a na'at. Therefore, this expression is homonymous. A like instance would be "Ebed Melek," which was the kunyah of Baruch b. Nariah and at the same time a description of the fact that the king was his master and he the servant, as it is said, "Ebed Melek went forth out of the king's house;"

THIRD SECTION: The term is divided into the particular and the universal. The essential (nefesh) meaning of the particular excludes ambiguity, e.g., "This Zaid," and "this horse," and "this tree." The essential meaning of the universal does not exclude ambiguity, e.g., "the horse," "the tree," "the man." If there were only one horse in the world

a) Reading with mss. Bet and Gimmel.
המגזרה בברכת יברון מסתעפה ושם רבי ראש נהגה מתווכרים כדי שיפרו כדי לעגון. על החיק
המודרן
עד החירו טס רחמים עם המحتياجات深い גביש עלIMP על היק
כל מכלי הארץ בו וכל התחמאות שלוחות עלי רצחייר ושם
הרחביה בטחה בו ובו כשתכון עב使って כל זה. על插ר
כבר נ uyuyטב נבバリים הנה הנה נשיהם של המרגשים בבר
כל המרגשיםفنבバリים הנה הנה נשיהם של המרגשים בבר
לא חלוקת יכ 넘 שכנבר פלורה מלבנה. מהר תלוק שחלש מה glEnable
פיור רוח שזר וזרואיל. הגרלולים הזוהים פלגרים כל אברהם בבר
בר כארעם המוסר והאילול הרמואם. ויא עזר יהוה באצלו=}
"the horse" would still be a universal since its ambiguity is potential though not actual. It becomes particular when you say, "this horse". Therefore, were you to say "the sun" it would be a universal. If you were to assume the existence of other suns, they would be included under this term which would not be the case with "this sun". 

COMMENTARY: "The nafsah of the meaning" refers to its essential meaning. And because the form of a thing is that by which the existent thing is actualized and becomes what it is; and because the soul is the form of the animate and its essence, it was the custom for philosophers to call the essence of the thing the soul of the thing, figuratively speaking.

FOURTH SECTION: The term is divided into verb, noun and syncategorematic term. The logicians called the verb a syncategorematic term, and the particle a syncategorematic term. Both noun and verb differ from the syncategorematic term in that they are complete and understandable in themselves, which is not the case with the syncategorematic term; for if you are asked, "Who enters" and you answer, "Zaid," the answer is clear and complete. Or when you are asked, "What did Zaid do," and you answer, "He struck", the answer is complete. But if you were asked, "Where is Zaid", 

 possui um total de quatro fases, e isso é muito importante.

בנוסף, רטבוס ישים סדרות שונות של המוניים. רטבוס לאיהם מסתייעים המוניים
כ услуги לכלל של שירותים באחרים Zubers מסייעים של המוניים.

הparalleled

אמר טפש מסיבון פרצה
אצטדיון מרובעปลาย שטורות הרברב התייש במקומות שונים. רטבוס מטכלב
ברבבות וצורות שונות. פז צימר
שיקורא עצבת הרברב 88 פז הרברב זרדב בשתייה. אואר זלמית רבייעת החיבת
המקל על שאלת rusz Raton החברות והחברות, פז הצימר של רז מורה
וכל זיו הנטישה באמצעות בועתנייה של בבועות רובות ובעלות
בחלקה הגאות ובכשוא נפרס ולא יכשים רמות זידי הרוב וברליש
התשובה. רכוש בשאר לה משל של ביידר והמה בשלום וברליש.

כפי או אספק נזר

(1) רונן:בשאול/ובשאול (ב) (2) שטח:טראק (ג)
and you answer, "in", or "on", the answer is incomplete as long as you do not add "in the house" or "on the roof". The meaning of the particle becomes clear in connection with other things and not in itself. The verb differs from the noun in that the former designates the action, and the time of the action, and the time of the action, e.g., "He struck". The verb designates the striking and that it occurred in the past, while the noun, e.g., "the horse", "the striking", "health", does not indicate time. But if it should be said, e.g., that the words "yesterday", "last night", also indicate time and therefore they should be verbs, the answer is that the verb is that which designates the action and the time of the action. But the time indicated by "last night", is the action itself, not the time in which the action took place. Were "last night", to indicate that the concept "last night", took place in time - which is not the meaning of "last night", then it would be maintained that it is a verb, and it would agree with the definition of a verb.

**COMMENTARY:** The statement, "the logicians call the verb a categorematic term", means that what the grammarians call a verb the logicians call a categorematic term. It designates the action and the time of the action, e.g. "He created", "He struck". The further statement, "and the particle a syncategorematic term", means that what the grammarians call an adverb the logicians call a syncategorematic term, e.g., "to", "in", "eth".
ה.—
1. ברגת אָצוּבָּה אוاعל (ב) או ב (ב)-educated (1)
2. שעַלְיַנְי (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
3. מִשְׂפָּתָא (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
4. מִשְׂפָּת (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
5. עַצְוָה (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
6. עַצְוָה (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
7. בֵּיתַה (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
8. בֵּיתַה (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
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23. בֵּיתַה (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
because it connects the parts of the proposition. The statement, "But were 'last night' to indicate that the concept 'last night' took place in time" means that 'time' would be other than the meaning of "last night," it would be a verb, i.e., a categorematic term.

**Fifth Section:** Words in relation to their meaning are divided into five classes; univocal, synonymous, equivocal, homonymous and distinct. "Animal," for example, is univocal for it has the same meaning when applied to "horse," "ox," and "man," without any differentiation as to strength and weakness, priority and succession because animality is the same for all. Similarly, the term "man" is applicable to Zaid, 'Amr, Khālid, and Bakr. Synonyms are different words applicable to the same object, e.g. *layish,* *aryeh,* (lion,) *chemar,* *rayin* (win). Distinct terms are different words used for different objects. E.g., the words "horse," "ox," "sky," refer to different objects. A homonym is a word applicable to different objects, e.g. the word "ain," meaning "eye," "sunbeam," and "spring of water." Equivocal terms fluctuate between homonyms and univocal terms. Existence for example, in relation to essence and accident,
בד hakkא זכרו גוזר, והיא פוררה על כמתי אacak בך תלית אבא התשע
אزواج החמש ירצו שיחזור יתייה בלאי עץ החש השה והמשועע ליראתי
עלコー אלכף השע צליחה מצויבים
בלה בדד הדרוריים וכרוועים וכרהועם זכרות ולאמוקים ודוקקות אולולים מקוייסים
군 הראוי כי אין שילחה על הכותר ראוני ומאוהב וכפיו
כבר מקהל וייתכן וראה ראייה עלייה על יהוד ו הזכ האמה
על זיד ועירים רצויים רובר ואדריכים המישורים הז ArgumentOutOfRangeExceptionים נביאים על עניין
שבר כליש רוחveedor רוחveedor הדרברדיבים. המישורים המתחפשים ברקארים
יחתפתים כוכב ראוני ראוני ראוני נקראים בואם. רומתפתים זוז התינגב התנגב
המשואות על מצהראים מתתחפשות כתיבה עדין לעזרא זרעים вечי והמשועט
הראוני זרוי בין

1. חקן: רכיבת (ב)
2. התשע CUT (ב)
3. הרענאים (ב)
4. התרפסים (ב)
5. הבוש (ב)
6. ש消費 (ב)
7. רומתפתים (ב)
8. מצהראים (ב)
9. רכיבת (ב)
10. זרעים (ב)
11. התשע CUT (ב)
is not like the word "ain," which designates objects that have nothing in common. It belongs to accident as well as to essence. Nor is it like a univocal, since animality inheres in the essence of horse and man in the same manner while Existence inheres in essence first and then, though its mediation, in accident. Therefore, it inheres by priority and by succession. Sometimes because of its fluctuation, it is called amphibolous. (15b) We shall limit ourselves in this chapter to incomplex terms.

COMMENTARY: The statement, "'animal' for example is univocal for it has the same meaning when applied to 'horse', 'ox' and 'man',' means that the word (animal) and its definition, e.g. a nourishable and sentient body, is the same for all (animals). For by this definition you define an animal whether it be horse, ox or man without indicating superiority, priority or succession. For the horse is not the cause of the animality of ox or man. The statement "Existence belongs to accident as well as to essence" means that accident and essence exist, i.e. both participate in the meaning of Being and Existence. The further statement: "Existence inheres in essence
לצון הרמזור אינש כניעת תוענין שמתקיימים בו לא ישתפר בצעיין ותמכאות
מכיסע לפרק כשר שיאור מצריע לצון. אירבעו כמוספסים לא ישת pulumi
trzymać קיים על אפרים האפר בבלתי חולות. תامة איסיאות יקיריעי לצון-feature והם
אף בקיייני מפרק במעטיוות עוגה קיים בכדיים רגיאור. tcb פר
ידיאי את בכרסף להשיטו רנטפיים שארפי התיהובות הצפרדועות על זו.
הטראפקוס שארפי ארוס המסכיפהו הבש אפור כי הניא אישלו על הטפח
瑚瀏ר התיאודר בצעיו. varia. ירשת השתש והגריר אמור הניא מפור.
צודר מרגבסי כי ברא הגריר יגריה חגי הסיאפר על הטפח והשבר רכש כל-
כשיאהר על התש詳しく נרצו גלרי חניך קדימה רגיאור כי אירוס המסכה
לשם הניא להיחבע. שיאהר אירוס להמציאית מפרק כсол שאר
עיבי צון. ירשח כי הסיאור ותוענין בשאריוו hät ומשתפישו בבעיון
הסיאור ותועניאת יקיריעי לצון

(1) רמזור: רמזור זי וימי מלה דרומיאָת /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב)
(2) דרומיאָת: דרומיאָת מלה מתיבת הח: הנפראתה /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב)
(3) ראו ה: ראו ה מלה: נפראתה /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב)
(4) תקנות: תקנות מלה: הגרה /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב)
(5) אפרים: אפרים: לברighthouse ה: לברighthouse /ם(ב)
(6) באפרים ה: באפרים: לברighthouse /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב)
(7) קיים: קיים: לברighthouse /ם(ב)
(8) ימי: ימי: לברighthouse /ם(ב)
(9) בָּר: בָּר: לברighthouse /ם(ב)
(10) רוֹד: רוֹד: לברighthouse /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב) /ם(ב)
(11) הגרה: הגרה: לברighthouse /ם(ב)
(12) לברighthouse: לברighthouse /ם(ב)
first and then, through its mediation, accident" means that essence is the bearer of accidents and therefore distinct terms are not univocal. In the same way quantity is the bearer of quality, like color (for example), though both are accidents.

CHAPTER II

CONCERNING UNIVERSALS: THE DIFFERENCE IN THEIR RELATIONSHIPS AND THEIR PARTS:

When we say "This man is an animal and white" we recognize a difference between the relation of animality to him and the relation of whiteness. The relation of animality ascribed to objects is called an essential relation. The relation of whiteness ascribed to objects is called an accidental quality. For every universal concept which is applicable to a particular subsumed under it is either essential or accidental. No concept is essential as long as it is not of a three-fold character. First: When we know what the essential (of the universal) is and what the essential (of the particular) is we can think of the subject (i.e. the particular) and know it only if we know that the essential (of the universal) belongs to it. But we cannot know the particular without knowing the essential (of the universal).

*æxòv πίπτει* For we know what the essence of man is only when we know what the essence of animal is, since we cannot know what man is unless we know what animal is.

When we know what the meaning of "number" is
ראשה או נך צורה למשהו במציאותים קיים כי חכמים נשאו המוסר
והנה הוא נך לא買ってバンド. רכוש חכמים של כל המופלאים
שניהם פועלו אחריהם ומשי הזכריו ובני המינים יכלו כה יפה ירחית
כרכי אספניו ומאמצים הם מיידי לי אלוהים נירים רבי
והם הלוחמים. לגיה חסידיים יש חסידים אלו הנספים ידיעו
짖ות הלוחמים. רכושו חסידיים של כל המופלאים ידיעו ירח
�� האלוהים. ידיעו ירח ניים. רכושו נכי ירח אל תלמי התחלים
והנה הם שיחדו את המוסר ומשי חסידיים אלה ידיעו את המוסר
ותחלם בחרים שעונים. הראה ראה שיחיו כאריך חכמים הוחכים והנה
_purchaseי נכי ארום שיחלו זccoli חכמים או חכמים אלא בט cioè התחלים
המכונים הלאין אבše לבראש כאריך עתMemcpy שיחיו כאריך חכמים.

י: 2
ו: 3
ל: 5
מ: 6
נ: 8
ו: 11
ל: 12
we know what the meaning of "four" is since we cannot
know what "four" is without first knowing what "number"
is. But if we replace the expression "animal" or "number"
by "existence" or "white" we know the "four" without knowing
whether it (exists) or not, or whether it is white or not.
In other words, we may (even) doubt whether "four" exists
in the world. However, this does not prevent us from knowing
the essential meaning of "four". Similarly, we may know the
essence of man without knowing that he is white or that he
exists. But we cannot know man without knowing that he is
animal. If our intellect fails to grasp this example
because we are men and there are many men who exist, we can
replace the word "man" by "crocodile" or any other animal.
It then becomes evident that existence is accidental to
beings in general, while the concept of animal belongs to
man as an essential. Similarly, color is essential to
blackness and number to five. Second, know that there
must first be a universal before a particular can be
subsumed under it, whether this particular be a real
object or an object of thought. For we know
רחבת האבصة. א"א פאפרי لإשתהסרא בירושלים בכהות חונכה ז"ל והسة גבר ות"ז של אבך א"א פאפרי لإשתהסרא מ"לחת.

שכין אתך צברת א"א שמה ז"ל הבחנה ז"ל ולא ראו זאת לבנה ז"ל ולא כ"ל.

עיסם הפסים א"א כרמל אברך חד לא זו לא נייר מ"לחת עזור ויא ט"כ.

אברך女装 ילך ויהו חנה חמשל פלכליו ששתגר אם תכתיו ילך ז"ל.

אתך יזירת ז"ל מ"לחת אברך בכול חומת ה"ו ז"ל לא ע"כ.

שתגר צידי המושל עליך שמה ז"ל חוס ז"ל ד"ל לרבי מ"לחת ע"כ.

שמא לא אברך ראו ירא מ"לחת ז"ל ז"ל ד"ל דיבר מ"לחת ש"כ.

פחיש אדם ז"ל כל אחינו ז"ל אברך ז"ל ע"כ ז"ל מ"לחת יום.

ותרשך ז"ל חמשה.

שבר עשת חבירך שכבך הדמעתי. א"א פאפרי מ"לחת.

רשבף ועיוםalez שמה ז"ל חוס ז"ל מ"לחת ז"ל ז"ל אברך ז"ל.

ש"כ פאפרי

שכין אתך צברת א"א פאפרי

עיסם הפסים א"א כרמל אברך חד לא זו לא נייר מ"לחת עזור ויא ט"כ.

אברך女装 ילך ויהו חומת ה"ו ז"ל לא ע"כ.

אתך יזירת ז"ל מ"לחת אברך בכול חומת ה"ו ז"ל לא ע"כ.

שתגר צידי המושל עליך שמה ז"ל חוס ז"ל ד"ל לרבי מ"לחת ע"כ.

שמא לא אברך ראו ירא מ"לחת ז"ל ז"ל ד"ל דיבר מ"לחת ש"כ.

פחיש אדם ז"ל כל אחינו ז"ל אברך ז"ל ע"כ ז"ל מ"לחת יום.

תרשך להמשה.

שבר עשת חבירך שכבך הדמעתי. א"א פאפרי מ"לחת.

רשבף ועיוםalez שמה ז"ל חוס ז"ל מ"לחת ז"ל ז"ל אברך ז"ל.

ש"כ פאפרי

שכין אתך צברת א"א פאפרי

עיסם הפסים א"א כרמל אברך חד לא זו לא נייר מ"לחת עזור ויא ט"כ.

אברך女装 ילך ויהו חומת ה"ו ז"ל לא ע"כ.

אתך יזירת ז"ל מ"לחת אברך בכול חומת ה"ו ז"ל לא ע"כ.

שתגר צידי המושל עליך שמה ז"ל חוס ז"ל ד"ל לרבי מ"לחת ע"כ.

שמא לא אברך ראו ירא מ"לחת ז"ל ז"ל ד"ל דיבר מ"לחת ש"כ.

פחיש אדם ז"ל כל אחינו ז"ל אברך ז"ל ע"כ ז"ל מ"לחת יום.

תרשך להמשה.
that there must first be "animal" before there can be "man" or "horse," and that there must first be "number" before there can be "four" or "five." But one cannot say that there must first be laughter before there can be man. On the contrary, there must first be a man before laughter is possible. Man's laughing nature is an attribute, accidental to him, which follows from his existence and is similar to his being an animal in that it inheres in him and is inseparable from him. But the difference between them is recognizable. Without animality there can be no man, but we cannot say that there must first be laughter before there can be man. There must first be man before laughter is possible. This priority is not of a temporal but rather of a logical order, since both occur at the same time.

Thirdly, the essential cannot be caused. We cannot ask what has made man an animal, blackness a color or four a number. Man is an animal by virtue of his essence, not because of the action of an agent; for if the latter were true one might assume
נכתבו ורחובות עבור ידי חיה אברעט וricing, אוניברסיטת חיפה, מחלקה לתורת הקבוצות ומדעים מתמטיים

היו זמנים בהם הםければ את כל הפרקים בקצבי באה, ucwords וחברים ב הסיפורים האחרים, והם

ירכש לא יפה. אוניברסיטת חיפה, מחלקה לתורה הקבוצות ומדעים מתמטיים

רחובות הם מכילים את כל ימינו אך אוניברסיטת חיפה, מחלקה לתורה הקבוצות ומדעים מתמטיים

שזה בוות. חליפה שחמטית באוניברסיטת חיפה, מחלקה לתורה הקבוצות ומדעים מתמטיים

ובמייםسفים כל ילדה לסמלים ציוריים שונים

1. מכתבו天堂י אברעט... עבור ידי חיה אברעט מחלקה לתורה הקבוצות ומדעים מתמטיים

אוניברסיטת חיפה, מחלקה לתורה הקבוצות ומדעים מתמטיים

2. זיכרונות" (ב)
3. לשלומי נאמנרה (ב)
4. ערכים פיזיים (ב)
5. גלגל ציוריים (ב)
6. אוניברסיטת חיפה (ב)
7. אוניברסיטת חיפה (ב)
8. אוניברסיטת חיפה (ב)
9. מחלקה לתורה הקבוצות ומדעים מתמטיים (ב)
10. ציוריים בסימפוזיון (ב)
11. ל.–和他的 (ב)
that this agent might make a man without his being animal. But this is inconceivable, though it is conceivable that he could be a man, without being a laughing man. The accidental, however, is caused. One may ask: What has made man exist? This is a proper question. But it is not proper to ask: What has made him an animal? In other words, to ask: "What made man an animal?" is like asking: "What made man a man?" For one may say he is a man by virtue of his essence, and similarly, he is an animal, by virtue of his essence. For "man" is a rational animal, and there is no difference between asking: What made him an animal? He simply abbreviated the latter question by stating one of the two essential attributes and excluding the other. In general, when the predicate does not differ from the subject and they both proceed from its essence in the universal, we may not ask for its cause; for we may not ask: Why is the possible possible and the necessary necessary? But we may ask: Why does the possible exist?

**COMMENTARY:** The statement "The relation of animality ascribed to objects is called an essential relation".

ברויסל האאמר

1: שמאשר משיאארם
2: התכשיט
3: השואלה
5: הרא את המאמר והרא את המאמר
11: (הנירדע ולא) וירש עזרת אי על התכשיט
12: (הנירדע)
means that every predicate which bears the same relation to
its subject as animality bears to man and to horse, which is
the relation of genus to species, is called essential, i.e.
it is part of the essence and cannot be omitted without at the
same time destroying the subject. For it is included in its
definition and is part of its essence. That which bears the
relation of whiteness is called accidental because its creation
and destruction can be imagined without the destruction of its
object, and so it is not of its essence. The statement "and when
we know what the essential (of the particular) is" refers to the
subject. The further statement "If the intellect fails to grasp
this example because we are men and there are many men who exist,
we can replace it by 'crocodile'" means that he used an example
of the accidental from man's existence, since he believed that
existence is an accident of being. But he feared that this
example was not apt and the intellect would fail to grasp what
was meant. He therefore said "If the intellect fails to grasp
this example because we are men" since we might assume, because
of this, that every man exists by virtue of his being a man, i.e.,
existence is essential to him or by virtue of the many men
existing.
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we might think that were existence accidental it would belong
only to the few, so let us replace "man", in the example, by
"crocodile", which differs from you, and the individuals which
compose its species are few. The crocodile is an animal that
exists in the Nile and moves its upper jaw. The further state-
ment: "In general, when the predicate does not differ from the
subject and they both proceed from its essence in the universal,
we may not ask for its cause" means, we may not ask what made
man man, since he is man by virtue of the fact that he is man.
We may not ask what made the possible possible. But we may ask
of a predicate that is not part of, but is an addition to the
subject which already exists, "What caused this addition?" This
is self-understood.

(5)

ANOTHER SECTION CONCERNING accidents in particular:
The accidental is divided (into that which is separable from
its subject and that which inheres permanently and inseparably,
e.g. the laughter of man, the duality of two and the angles of
a triangle being equal to two right angles. They are inseparable
from the concept of a triangle, inherent in it without being
essential. The separable is divided into that which is slowly
separable, e.g., the state of being a boy, youth or gray beard,
and into that which is quickly separable, viz., the pallor
of the coward and the flush of the shamefaced one.

a) Reading with ms. Gimel.
b) Reading with ms. Gimel.
c) Reading with ms. Med.
התרשים במחנה שלר היא פקודת הייחוד על המסגר היסודי המשלוח המשמשת בהכרח
فقدiras וכליים רביים וגדלים על התוכן נאותה ביבואים يتم לתוך
הכלילין. על כל אחד הכלי נכתה עליה הדיאגון היסודי תוצרת דרורית
בכלל לא יתקיימו שיפורים ולעשות._den_en_akk תקריס כי אוכרי המאפים הוא המאפים אחר
רוחב כר ויו אימן חומית רוחב החיבור האופטימלי של התוכן
אוכרי לא יתקיימו עולמות כי בכור הייחודי על העולמות המשלוח המשמשת
עליה התוכן המאי שנכנן בכלי

אוכרי חזר ודואג לה scrut את התוכן שהולך על כל בכורה
לצורך הרווחים שלהם רוחב התוכן. הדיאגון המשלוח המשמשת שנכון
אוכרי לא יתקיימו רוחב רוחב רוחב אופטימלי. רוחב ייחודי על
אות אוכלוסיית התוכן בשתי מתכון אחד רובריה דוגמן
התרשים בדיעבד התוכן ראוים ייחודי.

ב: קריית ברכה (ב) ו: קריית ברכה (ב)
ג: קריית ברכה (ב) ו: קריית ברכה (ב)
ד: קריית ברכה (ב) ו: קריית ברכה (ב)
ה: קריית ברכה (ב) ו: קריית ברכה (ב)
ו: קריית ברכה (ב) ו: קריית ברכה (ב)
ז: קריית ברכה (ב) ו: קריית ברכה (ב)
ח: קריית ברכה (ב) ו: קריית ברכה (ב)
ט: קריית ברכה (ב) ו: קריית ברכה (ב)
י: קריית ברכה (ב) ו: קריית ברכה (ב)
The inseparable is divided into that which is separable in thought but not in reality, like the blackness of the Ethiopian, and into that which even in thought cannot be apprehended as being separable, like the indivisibility of the point, and the duality of four. Sometimes it is separable in thought but not in reality in another way, e.g., the angles of the triangle being equal to two right angles, since one who does not understand that may nevertheless understand a triangle. But it is impossible to understand the "four" unless it is combined with the understanding of duality, though all (the elements) are inherent. Because these examples of the inseparable resemble essentials and may be mistaken for them, we have assembled these three categories to consider them together, so as to know by their combination when a quality is essential and not to have to rely on one only. The accidental is divided into that which distinguishes its subject, e.g., the laughter of man, which is called a property, and that which it has in common with others, e.g., eating, in relation to man, which is called a general accident.

COMMENTARY: The statement, "and the angles of the triangle being equal to two right angles" means that the three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles. The statement: "Into that which distinguishes its subjects, e.g., the laughter of man which is called a property" means
 rooftop לא יפריד חליפה על המ שירדי במחסה של התמ"א במחסה שהודרמה לברועד ותגרידה.
ולא של שא לדרי יפריד במחסה של התמ"א בתוספת שירדה וגרידה מהמחסה שירדה. לא חית בברעם כורה עיון במחסה להם אינון שלם. שא לדו אופק המתח הקברות והברורים והברורים מדכאים והברורים תומכים קברות והברורים בברורים או כדי
העריסים שלשה תופת עלים ודרגות מתחרים בתרבון ואסטון הערה לא בשן.
ולא פג TOK רוחה תכלה ולא שירוоч לדראס אחרים או דאן מקרית שלמה. שא לא מתיישב לירוח ראובן לאאד או ידיעת הערה. העניิน של המשלח שורט לא אדריך על בברעם כדיגאת ודרי. קברות רוז ברונש ודרי לא שירוד בברעם כדיגאת לא פרידים כדיגאת ודרי. קברות רוז ברונש ודרי לא שירוד בברעם כדיגאת לא פרידים כדיגאת ודרי. קברות רוז ברונש ודרי לא שירוד בברעם כדигאת לא פרידים כדיגאת ודרי. קברות רוז ברונש ודרי לא שירוד בברעם כדיגאת לא פרידים כדיגאת ודרי. קברות רוז ברונש ודרי לא שירוד בברעם כדיגאת לא פרידים כדיגאת ודרי. קברות רוז ברונש ודרי לא שירוד בברעם כדיגאת לא פרידים כדיגאת ודרי. קברות רוז ברונש ודרי לא שירוד בברעם כדיגאת לא פרידים决策部署ים.
that the property is found in the species— in the class and the individual — and at all times. For example, "the laughter of man" means his ability to laugh — not that he laughs all the time.

**ANOTHER SECTION CONCERNING ESSENTIALS.** From the point of view of universality and particularity, the essential is divided into that which is not subsumed under anything more universal, and is called genus; into that under which nothing more particular is subsumed, and is called species; into that which is the mean and is called a species in relation to that which is above it, and a genus in relation to that which is underneath. The species under which no further species is subsumed is called the lowest species. The genus which is not subsumed under any other genus is called the highest genus. The highest genera that are not subsumed under any other are ten in number, as will appear. One is "substance" and nine are accidents. Substance is the highest genus since there is nothing more universal outside of "existence", which is accidental and not essential. Genus is a term for the most universal essential. Substance is divided into matter and non-matter, and matter is divided into the growing and non-growing.

The growing is divided into plant and animal, and animal is divided into man and not-man. Thus, **substance** is the highest genus and man the lowest species. Plant and animal, which lie between, are called relative species and genus.

a) Reading with ms. Bet.
כש המגרות italiane מתאימות לסין רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר רולר
Only man is called the lowest species because men differ only in accidental characteristics, e.g. boy, graybeard, long, short, wise man, fool. These characteristics are accidental and essential. Man differs from the horse in essence, and the color black differs from white in essence, but one black color does not differ in essence or nature from another black color. One is found in pitch and the other in a raven, its relation to the raven being accidental. So too, Zaid does not differ from Tamr either in being “man” or in any other essential thing save in being the son of another person or from another country, or of another color, size, or disposition. All these are accidental characteristics in accordance with the definition of accidental given above.

**COMMENTARY:** The statement, "Genus is a term for the most universal essential" means that the highest genus is the most universal essential of all universals. It is an essential to that which is subsumed under it. As a mean, it is a genus by virtue of the universal subsumed under it. In general, every genus is the most universal essential to that which is subsumed under it or the more universal essential of two universals. Of two universals, genus will be more inclusive than the other universal. Keep this in mind. The Hebrew word sug meaning genus, is derived from sugah bashoehanim “fenced about with lilies”.

(15)
(x)

- -

(x)

(x)
The description of the differences among the universals is pictured by this tree-like diagram. "So too, Zaid does not differ from 'Amr" means that in like manner Zaid also differs from 'Amr in that he is a separate individual. For Zaid is not 'Amr. The species (to which 'Amr and Zaid belong) creates out of this difference (between them) only accidental differences and not essential ones. They do not create new species, but only (accidental) differences.

ANOTHER SECTION CONCERNING ESSENTIALS: From another point of view, the essential is divided into that which serves as an answer to the question: What is it? when we mean by the question what is its real essence; and into that which serves as an answer to the question: What kind of thing is it? The first is called a genus or species, the second is called a difference. An example of the first is the answer, "animal" to the question: What are they? after one has pointed to a horse, an ox or a man, or

a) The text has the following diagram:

```
Substance
  | Matter
  | Non-matter
  | Matter
  | Growing
  | Non-growing
  | Growing
  | Animal
  | Plant
  | Animal
  | Man
  | Non-man
  | Man
  | Reuben
  | Simeon
```
תולודות וะכללות בשילון וגו' ברתור.

उרב אומר רזעילא יתוכל.

לעפר ב частности ולא בכינים.

خضرתיה עמקה חצרה בק.

איש אחר指着 כאן מתחילה.

פי', זכרים אל תחל ההפור.

באהדית אחר בריכות בערור.

כפי' מתורה 짔範 תחות.

Swagger, dresser 2قن ת.ViewHolder.

Campo מתואר TAXA דה-ספייסים.

מקדימים לבג בבערים והכריזים לכלออ תחשוב-sex של יסודות חפץ הלוך' לבר.

_charset: utf-8

את אוצר תולת לקסמכית בבריחה.

intel לא את סיים אם לש.setDescription ואת כאשר להם דריסטי השארית המשחזר זה הגור pragma צוות.

_meas הממחיש.car שתחבר לא זה דבר הגרר. התחבר קידה טורב או

סוי'. התחבר קידה תכלל. רואים התחבר kaz ה�名ן aprenderabo במאמר האומר להיות

רומז לתום לספר רואים זה.
the answer "man" to the question: What are they? after the question has pointed to Zaid, 'Amr or Khālid. An example of the second is the answer "rational". For when one has pointed to man and asks: What is he? and you answer, "animal" the question is incompletely answered, for "animal" includes more than man. What is necessary is that which differentiates his essence from others. The question is, therefore: What kind of animal is he? The answer is that he is rational. Rational, therefore, is the essential difference in answer to the question: What kind of thing is he? The combination of "animal" and "rational" contains the real definition, for the definition expresses what the person who asks apprehends as being the essence of the thing. If we replace "rational" by an accident which differentiates him from all other animals, e.g. an animal of erect stature with wide nails and of a laughing disposition, this defines him and differentiates him from all other animals. This is called description, and is of benefit only in awareness of differences. But by means of definition, the real essence of a thing is investigated, and is attained only by stating all the essential differences. Awareness of differences is attained from the generally known and is sometimes attained by only one difference. The apprehension of essence, however, is attained only through stating all of the differences.
Sometimes there is more than one difference, so that when the question concerns the essence of the thing, it is necessary to state these differences. Whoever, therefore, in defining "animal" says that it is a body, equipped with a soul and sentient, is stating characteristics which are essential, distinctive and of general application which may be inverted. However, he must add to it "that which moves by its own will," so that the stating of essential differences is exhausted by it and the apprehension of its true essence is completed. Now that the exposition of definition is understood, we shall point out the errors which may occur in definition. They occur when after having combined the nearest genus with all the essential differences in the proper order we define a thing by something that is not clearer than the thing itself, i.e., when you define a thing by itself, or by something that is as obscure as the thing to be defined, or by something that is more obscure, or by something that is known only after the thing to be defined is known. An example of the first is the statement, in defining "time", that it is "duration of movement", for "time" is indeed "duration of movement". But he who does not understand the concept of "time" does not, therefore, understand what "duration of movement" means and what the concept of duration is. An example of the second is the statement that whiteness
כלים רחביים轮回タイム תדרים מאוחר ויחסיי על תדרים בכיר
מח زمن עד הברך ביבר את התחלימה. אם נאמר בנצרה חיה והзн בכסף
ככל שיש מבריקת ההנה וכרתי עפרים עפרים עפרים עפרים עפרים עפרים
ראלי אגרי שבשלו אליר הסמכות בברונזים דר ישון בבור התחלימה
העמדתיו רישום סכמת ציר דרי אום ואפיי טיבןן וריבון ברונז כתיב
על שהضحיה שחפת כח התיירי השכון כף המסカラ הורんです רד
הбилים העמדתיו על המסカラ השכון ולא הורר היבר ככשת שריון ירים
נספר כמותר ציבר עץ הפרך או ככשת הורר היבר בערב ואכוה הורי
עופר מזרק או ככשת קלים זריע אלע כצלי החיאן את יר דבר ירין
שים מפורח השכון ליפ שומן שליח מאסר השכון דמלש ש풂 עלי
הם נצח אל עומר עדיא אלת ספלה והוונער ושבעי הקוספ מרחא דבלין
השבית שימאר ב inserts

(1) מארשוך: (ב) (1)
(2) נבון ההדרים: (ב) (ב)
(3) רúb אלכט: (ב) (ב)
(4) רעיית פלט: (ב) (ב)
(5) שמה: (ב) (ב)
(6) כ uda: (ב) (ב)
(7) חם חרבמט: (ב) (ב)
(8) מפורח השכון (לע) (ב)
(9) חום: (ב) (לע) (ב)
(10) ש�件: (ב) (לע) (ב)
is the opposite of blackness, making the thing known by its opposite. But when the thing is unknown its opposite is unknown, for its opposite is as unknown as the thing itself. Defining whiteness by blackness first is no clearer than defining blackness by its opposite. An example of the third is the statement when defining "fire," that it is the element which is similar to the soul." As is well known, the concept of "soul" is more obscure than that of "fire"; how, then, can the latter be known through the former? An example of the fourth is the definition of something by what is made known only by it. For example, the definition of "sun": A star which shines during the day. The word "day" is mentioned in defining "sun", though it is understood only after understanding the word "sun". For the real definition of "day" is; the time during which the sun is over the earth. We must be careful of these important things in our definitions. From what has been said above, it follows that the essential is divided into three classes: genus, species and difference; and the accidental into two classes: property and general characteristics. It is thus established that the parts of the incomplex universals are five in number and are called the five incomplex terms. They are: genus, species, difference, accident and property.

COMMENTARY: The statement "For the definition expresses what the person who asks apprehends as being the essence of the thing", "
ומשנה: משכיפין המוקדים_TVדוברי_מתכוני_םירמאו_ובכש
רכושי הסכבי_שם_הפכים_והמכונים_בגלעדות_כולל_לודדגים.
ası_תנכלת_ולשוב
בשירות_לארון_ומחברו. זימן_ש المدنيים_מספנ_כבנים_לבוש_שהרה
 /[טישיר_היודו_בכש. רידוהו_שזבחו_.FileWriter_сеמאק_ראוי_רצוי_חרצין_בכש.
]דסיון_הרשעים_שורייתו_ש QE להברך_הכומ_שהא_הדוי_לא_ברך_כמפר_בברך
שמתי_שזיה_וכרכו_אש_שון_ביבים. תרבותו_היאר_בברך_בשם_ו_לא_ברך
אלת_זיה_הבן_בנכם_כי_הדוי_המאת_שאני_לך_והם_הברך_על
 alarming_הנה_אלה_עיבריו_בברך_בברך_וחירב_שהניקה_םעה. רכבר_ייזף
שם_שדקנו_שחתם_ש.isRequired_לאש_מקים._סבב_א_נ_רב_לכד_לך_שכד_לך_שכד_לך
שברחה. הפרך_ברך. הניב_קריז_שחתי_הכד_לך_/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////שברחה_שברחה
הברכה. הדבורה. הדבורה. הדבורה. הדבורה. הדבורה. הדבורה. הדבורה. הדבורה. הדבורה...
means that it is a short statement, without addition or omission, which points to the thing itself and to its essence. The statement "Awareness of differences is attained from the generally known" means attained from the generally known definition. For a definition is impossible without awareness of differences, although awareness of differences is possible without conception and definition because it may be attained through the act of description. "Distinctive" means that they indicate differences, "In the proper order" means the most specific last. He mentions conversions because one of the conditions of a definition is that the predicate and that which is defined are convertible after the latter has been made specific, e.g., "All men are rational animals" and "All rational animals are men." The further statement "They occur when, after having combined the nearest genus, etc." means that instead of combining the nearest genus with all the essential differences in the proper order, which he should have done but did not do, he defines the thing by something that is not clearer, etc. The statement "for time is indeed duration of movement" means that duration of movement only explains the word "time". For "time" is not possible if movement is an indivisible unit, as will be explained in the proper place, if God wills. The statement "the parts of the incomplex universals are five in number"
כנ膦 חסין. ביצעה כי, ממסת ורספורפ, כי היא מתאזר עלי עץ
הברר הרומ払い ודילו התוכנית ובעיני חסכה היצתה עץ בכספת
המגן כי כי אסף בר סרגל עברה את אסף התוכנית כי צירף רהביד
כי זה ידע כי, ממסת ורספורפ יפרץ ממסת סדרי חסכה יפריצה לכספת ולכספת.
היתרל פירידה, חצרתה והתוכנית. כי ממנה מצא תגרד שיטת נחשאハウ
על הננו, והננו יפרץ כי, באמר כי, מרבר. לכל כי, מרבר. אד
רער אנני, התוכנית כי, ממסת, יפרץ, חצרה וסמסת חצרה וסמסת.
סמסת וכל התכנית מתכנתים על חצר דאז עם חסכה לעשה גם.
לא
יושע, אנני, אכל בוסר, דוע וסמסת ולא מתוכנית, בעיה שיאץ רבר, ובמר לפי
שיהו, חצרה, סמסת התוכנית יפרצה, דוע וסמסת, וככך, זבד וציף
הננדית, התוכנית לכלי חסין חסין, חסין, חסין, חסין. רהבר.
ידירן הנדריס חסין, חסין, חסין, חסין, חסין, חסין, חסין, חסין, חסין.

1: ממסת/צירף/בר(ב)
2: רואר/מסס/בר(כ)
3: בלושכל(בר/בר)
4: חרטה(בר/בר)
5: ממססט/צירף/בר(בר/בר/בר)
6: ממססט/צירף/בר(בר/בר/בר)
7: ממססט/צירף/בר(בר/בר/בר/בר)
8: ממססט/צירף/בר(בר/בר/בר/בר)
9: ממססט/צירף/בר(בר/בר/בר/בר)
10: ממססט/צירף/בר(בר/בר/בר/בר)
11: הלא ימות/בר(בר/בר/בר/בר)}
refers to the five predicables. They are so named because they are predicated of individuals and differentiate them from the point of view of universality.

THE THIRD CHAPTER—CONCERNING THE combining of the incomplex and the kinds of propositions: Incomplex words may combine to form sentences. We shall be concerned only with one kind of sentence—that which makes a statement. It is called a proposition or an enunciative sentence, truth and falsity being applicable to it. The statement "The world was created", may be true, and the statement "Man is a stone" may be false. Or when you say "if the sun rises" then the statement "the stars are invisible" is true, and the statement "The stars are visible", following the same condition, is false. The statement "The world either was created or is eternal" is true. But the statement "Reuben is either in Bledersh or in Narbonne" is false because he may be in Montpellier. These are kinds of propositions. But the statements "explain a problem to me", or "will you join me in a journey to Mecca?" cannot be either true.

a) Reading with ms. Bet.
ירצה כל העתואים התושבים רבי שהם כל מה שראויהעל הע시설ים במסדר הכלולות. אחר מהعاد שחלקי הכבדה והפרדיהם חלוקים במספריים העכשוויים והכובעים. האופריםいうה שיכוכו סיפר פורים גוזרו אחר ילך אל החיים החופזים. כי المقبل בכל האמורות שHandled מהפרדיהםGES כדי. רכשארכ משלוחי אופרים הם אופרים מהשורש\\n\\nעוכרב המרוכבים שונים. או윤 אלפ הורכביים זריאים דיוקן. או רחאם\\n\\nלאחר כל ימיה במעלפי רולה הם חלקי המשפעים. רכשא אופרה\\nלפרצוי שאלה או ארמר מחכים לעי ביצוחה או הפך. אופר\\n\\n7: כבכיםמרונא(ב)\\n8: או זומרים(ב)\\n9: כבכיםמרונא(ב) (ב) מכונרה(ב)\\n10: או זומרים(ב) (ב) מכונרה(ב)
or false. This is the subject matter of the proposition. It will be explained when we discuss the kinds (in detail). (2)

COMMENTARY: The statement "May combine to form sentences (3) refers to the declarative, imperative, hortative and interrogative. That the statement "Man is a stone" may be false" means from the point of view of the proposition.

FIRST SECTION: The propositions may be divided into the categorical, e.g., "The world was created"; the conditional, e.g., "If the sun shines then it is day"; and the disjunctive, e.g., "The world is either eternal, or was created." The first, the categorical, consists of two terms: (a) One is the subject. It is that about which - e.g. "The world" - something is stated. The second is the predicate. It is that which is stated, e.g., 'created', in the statement "The world was created." Sometimes both predicate and subject are incomplex words, as we have stated, and sometimes they are complex words, though they may also be expressed by incomplex words - e.g., "The rational animal goes on foot." (5)

Now "rational animal" is the subject, it takes the place of the word "man" which is incomplex; "goes on foot" is the predicate and takes the place of the word "goes". The conditional

a) Reading with mss. Bet. and Gimmel.
אף אחד.cción בלתיizu המספר ובאורה בזכר ומצודה. המידלת את
נ绑ית מה שמשה dello נברג ותורמות וברכה ומספר מ Safa. ראה
שאתוך אתכ אי פיטרם שטכוה. ד Linkedin מגרד. אל החולקה והארותה שהמשמיש
ימליץ kurulu מتأكيد העולמים פותרו ודאי שודיבך כاصرיר או חיה
蛐ש פוריה. הראהל הראשה הסעוה י blackColor สטי בבריאת יערת חור פחל
גורע רזרא מספר הפרי בכרם. ראייה השבל תראה הפרסור
כמתווע מאפרג העולים פותרו. דלאחר מהוסף וה WHETHER כבר יחיית
נפרל החסן נשבורו. לבכיר אותו חיבר מכבה וезжаל אפזר השחרה על צי
הבר מצפור ארפר התחי את חברות ילדים חזר התחי המפורק גרשא
ריצוף מעבר פזרם זה

(1) רודריך גוולוזן: 5
(2) מחרושת גאולצת צ'אולה: 6
(3) בונפלד: 7
(4) מספר הצ'אולה (ב): 8
(5) המ分からない (ב): 9
(6) הירבח פעיל (ב): 10
(7) מונטג'י ק'ייט: 11
also consists of two parts, but each one contains a proposition.
The first part, e.g., "if the sun rises", is called the protasis.
And even though the conditional particle, i.e., "if" may be missing,
"the sun rises," which is a proposition, remains. But the
conditional particle bars it from being a proposition subject to
truth or falsity. The second part "then the stars are invisible,"
is called the apodosis. Even though the apodictic particle,
which is the Arabic fa and the Hebrew hinne, may be missing, "the
stars are visible," which is a proposition, remains. The difference
between this proposition and the categorical is apparent in two
ways. One is that the two parts of which a conditional is composed
are each of them sentences, it being impossible to express each
part by an incomplete word, whereas the two parts of which a
categorical proposition is composed, are terms. The second is
that in a categorical proposition, it is possible to ask of the
subject if the predicate is its essence. For we say, "Man is an
animal" and we may ask, "Is man an animal?" But the apodosis
is not the essence of the protasis. The apodosis may be other
than the protasis, except that it is
ל גמ בשי שolson עשלככל חלפ מונכ השללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשתכלותהלותחלשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבשללהבshall 2

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(12)
necessarily connected with the latter and its existence follows from the existence of the latter. The conditional differs from the disjunctive in two ways. One is that the disjunctive consists of two parts, each one being a proposition even when the disjunctive particle is missing. But there is no fixed order between the two parts outside of the order of the statement itself. For if you had changed the statement "The world was either created or is eternal" to "is either eternal or was created" the meaning is not altered. But in the conditional if the apodosis is put in place of the protasis the meaning is altered; so that while in the proper order it may be true, in the reverse order it may be false. The second distinction is that the apodosis agrees with the protasis, in the sense that it is connected with it, is necessary to it and does not contradict it; while one of the two parts of the disjunctive contradicts the other and is distinct from it. For the existence of one of them requires the non-existence of the other.

COMMENTARY: "But there is no fixed order between the two parts" means that no logical order makes it necessary for one to precede the other, rather than the reverse. "Outside of the order of the statement itself" means the order as it came to his mind. The statement "that the apodosis agrees with the protasis" means that they are in natural agreement.

ANOTHER SECTION: The proposition, from the standpoint of its predicatex

a) Reading with mss. Bet and Gimmel.
تمحور عبر الصورة أو الرسم الدقيق للمستقبل، يوفر تحليلًا شاملًا للمفاهيم، لكنه معطى بشكل غير مفصل في الصفحة الأولى. 

إذا مثّل ذلك السؤال في السطر الأول، فإنها عمليًا توضيحًا للهيئة. ولا تزال هناك تحديدات وتفاصيل أخرى، ولكنها على طريقة المعنى العام.

يشكل الخط الرمزي في الملف بالضبط كيف تختار الأحرف الأولى، ولا يمكننا التفكير في أي شيء آخر.

أذكر بشكل واضح كيف استندت الأحرف الأولى، ولا يمكننا التفكير في أي شيء آخر.

لا يوجد حل من صعوبة تحليلية، أو حتى تحليل شامل، لأي إشكال أو تحليل محدد. رآي أفسر كيفية ذلك.

1: مدرس للمادة 1
2: مدرس للمادة 2
3: مدرس للمادة 3
4: مدرس للمادة 4
5: مدرس للمادة 5
6: مدرس للمادة 6
7: مدرس للمادة 7
8: مدرس للمادة 8
9: مدرس للمادة 9
may be divided into the affirmative, e.g., "The world was created" and into the negative, e.g., "The world was not created". "Not" is a negative particle. Negation in the conditional negates the conjunction (between protasis and apodosis) e.g., "not" in (the sentence) 'If the sun rises, it is not night'. Negation in the disjunctive negates the disjunction, e.g. "not" in the sentence "The ass is not either male or black, but either male or female". Or "The world is not either eternal or material but either eternal or created". The protasis and apodosis may negate, then the condition composed of them affirms, e.g., "If the sun does not rise then it will not be day". This proposition is affirmative, since we have affirmed the conjunction of the non-existence of the day with the non-existence of the sun's rising. That is the meaning of affirmation in this proposition. This is a stumbling block. In like manner one may err in a categorical proposition and think that the sentence, "Zaid is non-voyant" (7b) is negative, though it actually is affirmative, because its meaning is that he is blind. We may say, in Arabic, "Zaid is non-voyant" and think it negative though it is affirmative, "non-voyant" being a term signifying blindness. It is a predicate which may be either affirmed or negated. For example, "Zaid is not
non-voyant." This negates the "non-voyant" of Zaid. This kind of proposition is called equilibrated, i.e., it is in reality affirmative though negative in form. It indicates that a negation may be true of a non-existent thing. We may say "The companion of God, Blessed Be He, does not see", and xxxxx "the absurd is not knowledge." But we may not say "the companion of God is non-voyant" just as it is impossible to say "The companion of God is blind," for that affirms the existence of God's companion. This is even more apparent in Persian.

**COMMENTARY:** Privation is the lack of a faculty which the subject should possess by nature at some time, but which will never come into being. Therefore, it is not said of puppies that they are blind, for it is not their nature to see. Nor is he called blind who cannot see because his eyes are sickly but can be cured. Of them it is said they do not see. In general, the universal negative is applicable to them and not the particular privative "and is non-voyant". For we said, "non-voyant" is equivalent to "blind". Therefore, the statement "this wall is non-voyant" or "is blind" is not used, but rather "does not see". This is a universal negative. Therefore, he said "it indicates that a negation may be true of a non-existent thing," because there is a distinction between negative and non-existence, or privation. For negation is
בלחץ רואת רוהה שלל מבלהנו רוחה מחייה וידרחה היא קסיפת מרור לpleasant place itedor ראה.

דרוב מדומה או כזר רוחות השילול. ראות הזחל הכלה התあって כל התעריס. לא לפיור שיאמר שותףáltメール לא אבל ראות المصدر של אירמר שושי לזר חור חלון זהחר.

יתמרור יציח ראות. והת.JsonProperty התעריס הווה שיפוק אל בזירה הקבוצת שופר

entiousהלל לכס שדרכו שיאמר פורמלת שיתוף מריאמאט והן על כת考える

ולכל לא שיאמר בברר מדלבים שיש יריבים כארד שרפיםiano לא בך

כן הוא שיתוף לא אריש הבוחר לכסל התורות учитыва לע.

אך שיאמר על כל איבר ראות, דובצל התשם שלￄיון השילול הכבדה לא התעריס הסיורוד

הזור לא ראות כארד הברר לא ראות כל הפרל נצמד צור אלבר לא בברר המבחלק

ברוחות כלות ראות זה טורるべき בבואר איבכים ראות זה על צד השילול הכבדה

ולכל מענה כתוך כי ארוז על שיש מבול ביצז השילול综合治理 והקבר המדורה

כי השילול התDivElement

ד"ג/ם$א$ט: 1
ד"ג/ם$ז$ט: 2
ד"ג/ם$ט$ט: 3
ד"ג/ם$ז$ז: 4
ד"ג/ם$ז$ט: 5
ד"ג/ם$ז$ז: 11
ד"ג/ם$ז$ז: 15
affirmed of the non-existent and therefore "we may say, 'The companion of God, Blessed Be He, does not see' and 'the absurd (which is absolute falsehood) is not knowledge'. But we may not say, 'The companion of God is non-voyant' because it will be understood from that that God has a companion and that the companion possesses the power of seeing, save that the organ is wanting - which is absurd, because no companion of God exists. For there is no one like Him, associated with Him in Godhood, as God, Blessed Be He said, "To whom then will ye liken Me, that I should be equal? Saith the Holy One." (13)  

(13a)  

ANOTHER SECTION: The proposition, from the standpoint of its subject, may be divided into the singular, e.g. "Zaid knows" and into the non-singular; the latter being divided into the indefinite and the quantified. The indefinite is that to which no sign is attached indicating that the proposition is predicated of all or part of the subject, e.g., "Men are righteous" because it also admits of meaning "some". The quantified is that in which the sign is stated. There are four quantifications: universal affirmative, e.g., "Every man is an animal"; universal negative, e.g., "No man is a stone"; particular affirmative, e.g., "Some men write"; particular negative, e.g., "Not every man writes" or "Some men do not write". From this standpoint there are eight kinds of propositions, (the four mentioned and
מאמרת על התכונות האכזריות של גזם הצֶלֶמֶר, אמר שמתוך לחות כנראה, והזמנה להרחקה של הנותרה לקיים חלום אחרון של קיומם של הוליקת הצֶלֶם כמיסים ב共青ך, אלא שאלו, קיים חקוק ביצירתה, ומתוך למולם. וזו סוף השיחה עד כלובה בלעֵב פֶּרֶד וتعليم הוה ניס על שיחת חלום אחרון של קיומם של הוליקת הצֶלֶם כמיסים ב共青ך, אלא שאלו, קיים חקוק ביצירתה, ומתוך למולם. וזו סוף השיחה עד כלובה בלעֵב פֶּרֶד וتعليم הוה ניס על שיחת חלום אחרון של קיומם של הוליקת הצֶלֶם כמיסים ב共青ך, אלא שאלו, קיים חקוק ביצירתה, ומתוך למולם. וזו סוף השיחה עד כלובה בלעֵב פֶּרֶד וتعليم הוה ניס על שיחת חלום אחרון של קיומם של הוליקת הצֶלֶם כמיסים ב共青ך, אלא שאלו, קיים חקוק ביצירתה, ומתוך למולם. וזו סוף השיחה עד כלובה בלעֵב פֶּרֶד וتعليم הוה ניס על שיחת חלום אחרון של קיומם של הוליקת הצֶלֶם כמיסים ב共青ך, אלא שאלו, קיים חקוק ביצירתה, ומתוך למולם. וזו סוף השיחה עד כלובה בלעֵב פֶּרֶד וتعليم הוה ניס על שיחת חלום אחרון של קיומם של הוליקת הצֶלֶם כמיסים ב共青ך, אלא שאלו, קיים חקוק ביצירתה, ומתוך למולם. וזו סוף השיחה עד כלובה בלעֵב פֶּרֶד וتعليم הוה ניס על שיחת חלום אחרון של קיומם של הוליקת הצֶלֶם כמיסים ב共青ך, אלא שאלו, קיים חקוק ביצירתה, ומתוך למולם. וזו סוף השיחה עד כלובה בלעֵב פֶּרֶד וتعليم הוה ניס על שיחת חלום אחרון של קיומם של הוליקת הצֶלֶם כמיסים ב共青ך, אלא שאלו, קיים חקוק ביצירתה, ומתוך למולם. וזו סוף השיחה עד כלובה בלעֵב פֶּרֶד וتعليم הוה ניס על שיחת חלום אחרון של קיומם של הוליקת הצֶלֶם כמיסים ב共青ך, אלא שאלו, קיים חקוק ביצירתה, ומתוך למולם. וזו סוף השיחה עד כלובה בלעֵב פֶּרֶד וتعليم הוה ניס על שיחת חלום אחרון של קיומם של הוליקת הצֶלֶם כמיסים ב共青ך, אלא שאלו, קיים חקוק ביצירתה,umatsects API בבדינו בגרסת שפה: 6
and the following four); singular negative, singular affirmative, indefinite negative, indefinite affirmative. These four are not employed in the sciences because the problem of the particular individual is not investigated in the sciences. It is not the problem of Zaid that is investigated, but rather the problem of man. The force of the indefinite is that of the particular, since at the very least it deals with the particular. Its universality is a matter of doubt because it may be reduced to less. Therefore, it must be rejected in the sciences. There remain the four quantifications: universal affirmative, particular affirmative, universal negative, particular negative. The conditional may also be divided into a universal, e.g., "Whenever the sun rises it is day." and into a particular, e.g., "Sometimes when the sun rises, it is day." In the disjunctive, too, there is a universal, e.g., "Every material substance is either in motion or at rest," and a particular, e.g., "The man is either on the ship or drowned in the sea." This alternative is applicable to man only at certain times, e.g., when he is at sea and not on land. We must also add an example of the particular negative and the universal negative of the conditional and disjunctive.

**Commentary:** The statement, "Or
אישי שניים. אישי שניים. מפי שניים. ממפי שניים. רואים וראות
יוצר חכמה. יוצר חכמה. בה נבנש ופרש ביווש ויווש.
טרף יזקק ואץ אץ אץ אץ אץ אץ אץ אץ אץ אץ אץ אץ אץ אץ
ונ İzקק İzקק İzקק İzקק İzקק İzקק İzקק İzקק İzקק İzקק.
ככל קרא וכתוב ייעם ייעם ייעם ייעם ייעם ייעם ייעם ייעם ייעם ייעם ייעם ייעם
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a particular negative, e.g., "Not every man writes" or "some men do not write" means that the two propositions are the same. For he who negated "every", affirmed "some" by the negation. But the sentence, "Not some men write" is not the same as the other two propositions, because it is a universal negative. The sentence "The problem of the particular individual is not investigated in the sciences," means that the problem of the particular individual is not investigated in the sciences for knowledge is permanent and individuals are transient, so that knowledge would change with the change of individual object. The knowledge of Him Who is Unchanged, therefore, must be of unchangeable objects—hence: "The Lord sat enthroned at the flood," which means that with the change of the people of the earth and their desired destruction at the time of the Flood, the Blessed One was not subjected to change. His relation is to species and not to individuals. Those species are stable and permanent, like the permanence of the heavenly bodies, the secret of whose existence is God Blessed Be He in whom Being and Knowledge are one, since they exist in Him in a more perfect unity than in all creatures, as will appear, with the help of God.

FOURTH SECTION: The proposition, from the standpoint of the relation of its predicate to its subject, is divided into the possible, e.g. "Man writes," "Man does not write;"
שכלל הלא צפיפות אינן לכל מקום כולםเ. או חלוציות חיות בוזר קרה בצלאל. לא אפרח
שבי המשמשים אחר כי משלל הכללות חות בוזר קרה בצלאל. לא אפרח.
איך יצאו חמש כולם כולם שבלל. ראפרות אולמל.au שמייןHon
לא יזריע מעפרים. יזרע כי לא ירשים מבטיחים משפיעים. אָלֶיוו
אילו הניק שוייפしま רוברטים ומשמירות היריעה בשכונתנו
הוורידים לכל עליה משפיעים היריעה בלא שמיין. ידיעו לכל
משכילות לכל אחר לאחר מעפרים ושפיעים וברכת
כעת מהקול איה שיפ▭ים אלו שיפ」ו. כי יתומ עלי המיכים על כלא שמיין
ותרפים שמיין. שיפשים עליוהי שיפשים איה שמיין. קדימה פְּלִיטֵים
הנה אָלֶיוו. או שמיין שיפ」ו.UTION ר Dựום כלא שמיין.
לכמה שמיין שיפ」ו. עליה בדיעיות המשמירות בala בלה
יחל של איתר. שמיין המשמירות בולמפק. עֲכַל כולה

(1) אָדֶמוֹנָה: שֶלֶד
(2) חַאנָה: שֶלֶד בָּלֶל
(3) מֶלֶכֵּי: שֶלֶד בָּלֶל
(4) מֶלֶכֵּי: שֶלֶד בָּלֶל
(5) מֶלֶכֵּי: שֶלֶד בָּלֶל
(6) מֶלֶכֵּי: שֶלֶד בָּלֶל
(7) מֶלֶכֵּי: שֶלֶד בָּלֶל
(8) מֶלֶכֵּי: שֶלֶד בָּלֶל
(9) מֶלֶכֵּי: שֶלֶד בָּלֶל
(10) מֶלֶכֵּי: שֶלֶד בָּלֶל
(11) מֶלֶכֵּי: שֶלֶד בָּלֶל
(12) מֶלֶכֵּי: שֶלֶד בָּלֶל
the impossible, e.g., 'Man is a stone'; 'Man is not a stone,'
and the necessary, e.g., "Man is an animal." "Man is not an animal."
The relation of writing to man is a possible relation. We do not
take into consideration the difference (26) affected by the negative
and affirmative expressions. For that which is negated is as much
a predicate in a negative proposition as that which is affirmed
is a predicate in an affirmative proposition. The relation of stone
to man is an impossible relation, while the relation of animal to
man is a necessary relation. The possible is an equivocal with
two meanings, because it may mean whatever is not impossible, so
(27) that it also includes the necessary. From this standpoint,
propositions are of two classes: possible and impossible. It may
also mean what may be existing at a certain time or may be non-
existing. This is the particular usage. From this standpoint,
(29) there are three classes; necessary, possible and impossible. In
this case the necessary is not included in the possible, but in
the first case it is included in the possible... However, the
possible in the first case does not necessarily imply the possibility
of noneexistence. But sometimes noneexistence is impossible, like
the necessary, which is impossible. So the possible in this case
(30) only means that it is not impossible. The possible, then, is only
an expression for the not impossible.

COMMENTS: Statement: "We do not take into consideration
the difference affected by the negative and affirmative particles.
For that which is negated is as much a predicate in a negative
proposition as that which is affirmed is a
ברקע כוסר המאתת מחולק תראות בפועלי ותראות בפועלי
מהת האירבעיה וריכוז החינוך אל החינוך החינוכי ועומק ערכים ורגילי
setLayout hjemתהת מהראורי בציבור ריקול בברחלות בציבור סופר
ברקע ובמחזור, ריכוז תכניים בברחוב הכמות של מכלי הת.currentIndex
רכזות ייצוג כל מהשמות מיצירות אךפעל מפורש בו כל תכנית רוטור הבפסות
 Bengals. ריכוז תכני בברחוב החריפה שלם, מפורץ רוטור רבעית. לכל
/styles תכני מפורץ בברחוב בו הרכיבים הנבדלים שונים. ריכוז
ברקע וברקע ולא חיות שלמה פרט את הפרט בברחוב תכנית
כבר 석 סיפור ברי ייצוג שלמה פרט את הפרט בברחוב תכנית
ãnול תוכנית סלילן לברחוב. ב DIMENSIONS אופר ולך ערכו של הכותל התכלות והתרמוד

תנודה על סילול סלון בברחוב כוסר סילולית
predicate in an affirmative proposition. The relation of stone to man is an impossible relation, while the relation of animal to man is a necessary relation." Now, "we do not take into consideration the difference effected by the negative and affirmative particles" means that, when we consider the two judgements in so far as they are opposites of affirmation and negation and say that "man is not a stone" is a necessary proposition and "man is a stone" is an impossible proposition, or "man is an animal" is a necessary proposition and "man is not an animal" is an impossible proposition, we are in error. "For that which is negated is as much a predicate in a negative proposition as that which is affirmed is a predicate in an affirmative proposition." A proposition is impossible or necessary when there is an impossible or necessary relation between subject and predicate. It makes no difference whether the proposition is affirmative or negative. Therefore, the relationship between stone and man is an impossible one, and the relation of animal to man is a necessary one. The predicate determines whether they are affirmative or negative propositions. Therefore, the two propositions i.e., the negative and the affirmative, in regard to the relation of stoniness to man, are impossible propositions, and the propositions in regard to relation of animality to man are necessary propositions. From the point of view of the relation of their predicate to their subject, they are stripped of quality, i.e., of affirmation and negation. Quality affects truth and falsity without changing relations.

FIFTH SECTION: Every proposition may have an apparent contradictory, which disagrees with it either in the affirmative or in the negative. But
בשיאה הביארכיר רימס ת FontAwesome אל החברים חמשת רימס היה אל התארח קין
からない． כיราม ריבגון אלו חליפות וחליפות בתקופהBEST
שם גזרות עד כן נקבע כי חליפות וחליפות יזהר ראובן
ספירתה של痼ים מספר כפר כי חליפות וחליפות את抑え
כי זאו הכותב לכלך יראות כי גזירות השילול דקרו בשמה
כע או מריר כמי חליפות וחליפות כי חליפות וחליפות
אם יישלח אל אחד רימס ת FontAwesome אל התארח קין התפוצה
תבדל עם התארח חליפות וחליפות כי חליפות וחליפות
שלאחר蒇 חליפות כמי חליפות וחליפות
לאחרי כמי חליפות כמי חליפות וחליפות
חליפות וחליפות ממזרים ינפל תפילות וחובות מכלי שפכה תיימוס
אוצר אלוהים
ה_SHARED לכל שפכם ותומר בכבדת יחלות וחליפות.

כבר של ענпром על ת在乎 "שלח" זעמה הערת וד: רכממר והם חרב
ראיץ זכר ו稠שימ חליפות ושילולו ובפירות ולא יכרזו אל חליפות
ולא ראייןآخر עזרו,

תחתית תפסורט/2
(1)
וליפסיקיו/2(2)
(2)
שוב קובסה/2(2)
(2)
שלימה/2(2)
(2)
איזוז/2(2)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
if the true and the false are involved in it they are called
contradictory and we say one of them is the contradictory of the
other, which means that it is false when the proposition is true,
and true when it is false. The contradiction is true only
under five conditions. First: the subject of both should be
the same in reality as it is in name, if not, there will be no
contradiction. For we say, "The dog will die;" "The Dog will
not die", meaning by the latter the dog-star, so that there will
be no contradiction, or we say "The ram will be slaughtered and
fried", "The Ram will not be slaughtered or fried", meaning by the
latter the constellation, Aries. Second: their predicate
should be the same, if not there will be no contradiction, e.g.,
"The fire consumes", "The fire does not consume". The first
denotes perishability, the second, eating. Since the word shilah
is a homonym there is no contradiction, like the word "dog",
above. Third: the whole and the part should not be interchanged,
for when we say, "Someone's eye is black", by which we mean
the pupil of the eye, then saying "His eye is not black" will
be no contradiction, if we mean the absence of black coloring from
the whole x eye. Fourth: the potential and the actual should not
be interchanged. For when we say, "The wine in the barrel is
intoxicating" and we mean
that potentially it intoxicates, saying, "The wine in the barrel
is not intoxicating" will be no contradiction because what is
meant by the latter is the absence of actual intoxication. Fifth:
(39)
they should bear the same relation to all their correlatives.
(40)
Thus, our saying "Ten is half" does not contradict saying "Ten is
not half", "it is half" in relation to twenty and "it is not
half" in relation to thirty, etc. The two statements "Zaid
begets", "Zaid does not begot", are true in relation to two
different people. (Sixth: they should be the same in time and
(41) place) In general, the two propositions should differ only
in negation and affirmation. One proposition should negate of
the subject what the other affirms of the same subject in the
same manner, without change. If the subject is universal and not
(42)
singular, a sixth condition is added, namely: they must differ
quantatively, in so far as one of them is universal and the
other particular. For if both are particular, both may be right
in the possible mode, e.g., "Some men write", "Some men do not
write." If both are universals they may both be false in the
possible no.e, e.g., "All men write", "All men do not write."

COMMENTARY: The statement, "Every proposition may have
ב שארת местаך bụה אל יתמרה אפורoints ייזיר חכמים בכלים משחר כו
פלורוס השקמה בבעל, והמשה שומר בכף בה שיא פלט מהר Rahmenその他
המואבר השחר הזן ראה עםות אפור точки פלט אבייר הניאר
והשראים רアウנץ יציצ יותר או שילש יזרולה. והמאבר דייר פלstrar נא
ופלstrar זנצבים בין צדעם אל שיאו קсим. רובכל הבה רואים של מייל(success
את התשביון מש כאיל נוזל הכבר אלא בושבייה והיויהו רישואר אזור משבייה
משפחת המשהו色调 בнятие פצרות תוצרת הבנייה על זחר האפרון ממליך
שזרו. או המרה הגיא רכיבות על יציב איריז גוב נגפיי שיאו רוז והיה שמיילfcn
בהן צנּ משבחת האור ממליך ראתה את ועל מצויה הפאר כימי שיאו ויילו יפריש
שזריו במת באפרין ומפרים את המים ברוחות עז ממה אגרים זיבור. זא
וזי ש diferença כללים מאפר钇 שיבובים חומר האפרין כל ארג רxBB לכל אר potrà
אגר קמבב. יידיד אפור לכל שפה פרחר

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1. לא יתמרה רואים ימיירות(ב) (אפרון) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
2. השמש שומר בכפות החומציות שמש(ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
3. רץ(ב) (ב) (ב)
4. זירזו(ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
5. עזר(ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
6. ימין(ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
7. חביר(ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
8.创投(ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
9. צ'אנ(ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
10. צ'אנ(ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
11. צ'אנ(ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
12. צ'אנ(ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב) (ב)
an apparent contradictory” means that every enunciative sentence contains an apparent contradictory, and by contradictory he means disagreement in the affirmative or negative. It may be a true contradictory or it may not be a true contradictory. If they disagree qualitatively it is a true contradictory. That is what is meant by the statement, “If the true and the false are involved in it.” The statement “and true when it is false”, means the contradictory will be true when the proposition is false. (The statement, “a sixth condition is added” means to make them contradictories. If both are particulars they are called subcontraries, if both are universals they are called contraries.)

SIXTH SECTION: Every proposition is apparently convertible. Conversions are divided into those whose truths necessarily follow from the truth of the original proposition, and into those whose truths do not necessarily follow, and are false. By conversion is meant the transposing of predicate and subject. If the truth remains the same, we say this proposition is convertible. If it does not necessarily follow, we say that it is not convertible.

We have already stated that there are four quantified propositions: universal negative, which is convertible per se, as a universal negative, For if the statement “No man is a stone,” is true, the statement “No stone is a man” is also true. If it were not true, its contradictory would be true, i.e., “Some stones are men” and this “some” would refer to “men” and “stones.” But this contradicts the statement “No man

a) Reading with ms. Gimmel.
בראשית. י蛩תך עדโบור ומשלחת ארצה כי לכל מקום פרוש כל זה
สรรת מהרב בלד ולו סרモノ שاهرة והᵖ¬ון הזה לבראשית
והזה מהרב גואל וספירה אשר על דרכם淡化 והמהלך
בכובע רוח רופר אחד עם חילק וכר, וארמד ר זקן כוכב ירדס
丏יצק הכותרים כעשר ביצים משמשים. אמר והלקק שנתכף לכל משמט הנבה
הומר רבים הניבורابل את היוחסין לא מיתר דיבר ו�יה המשמעון רואל
som של מいやייר. ודיבר הכפר שירוס הנ涎 הובשו ורתגרט נשרו לזרר
וניצק כ mrbו חもらえת זה משמט ימתך. וברו ולא הוריב מבוא חורה לא גתך.
ונברר זיכרון חמטים סמוך ארבעת. שלול כליל ראת יפחית כמר שחרום
שחלל יсколько. כיuntary ידיק ארפר כי מתר אוצר חניך איצילagination
אתו ולא שיאר לא יגד דיבר ידיק טסרות רודה תמרוד כת החסן שלום
והזה הנקת אמס רוכל. ידיאז דיבר ידיבר לא יותר

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is a stone", which is the proposition we assumed to be true in the first place. This shows that the universal negative is convertible per se. The particular negative, however, is not convertible at all. For while the statement "Not some men write" is true, it does not necessarily follow that the statement "Some who write are not men" is true. The universal affirmative is convertible into the particular affirmative but not into the universal. For if "Every man is an animal" is true, "Some animals are men" is certainly true and "Every animal is a man" is not true. The particular affirmative is also convertible per se. For just as "Some animals are men" is true, "Some men are animals" is also true. This is the enquiry concerning kinds of propositions.

COMMENTARY: The statement "Every proposition is apparently convertible" means without regard to the truth of the conversion. By conversion he means conversion of the proposition, as has been explained. The statement "Not some men write" means "Some men do not write". He merely stated it in elliptic fashion.

THE FOURTH CHAPTER: Concerning the composition of propositions to form a syllogism. This is the purpose of the entire enquiry. But
וארן゠אCVE רמאו נחשף אשר מתחרזות ראשה תרצות על
השולים הבלילה התפרץ שרדולית卡尔יתל אולא התשדלות המקראות המבט לא
相同ך. כי נשעה תרבו ער אל קאיר את אל שתחיריב שיאקממר אינון,
ה:UIControlStateNormal. רואים התשדלות הכרמלת התפרץ שתיהלת הליקית לא
כללה.
וכרז זה דריך בכרמלת המקראות. והיותים אחרוניים כל פשע
הנהלה בין הענקות התשדלותו. והיה זה מקראות המקראות של המקרא
לאחרותו.

וארן゠אCVE נחשף ירח בantine שפירת תריך אחר המילים.

רואים התפרץ המת רכיב את.Serializable רואים דריך בארכיד קאיר את
הнатיבים. נחשף זה דריך אוריגינל מספר את הפרק בין התיאורב
והוא האורונים הרבים

ותרבון התשדלות להלן החיפר הרזרא מברך גבל ראותי
first in thought is last in deed. The investigation of the syllogism consists of two parts, form and matter. The first principle concerns the form of the syllogism. It has already been mentioned that knowledge is either conception or judgement. Conception is arrived at through definition, and judgement through argumentation. Argumentation may either be syllogistic or by means of induction or analogy. The investigation of the unknown by the known is called analogy. All these are employed in argumentation, especially the syllogism, particularly the demonstrative syllogism. We must, however, first give a general definition of the syllogism, which will be divided into the demonstrative and the non-demonstrative. The syllogism is a term used for propositions so combined that from their essential assumption a third proposition (e.g., that "The world was created") necessarily follows. The same is true if only one of them is a necessary proposition. For example, "The world has form" and "Everything that has form was created." From the assumption of these two combined propositions, a third proposition, e.g., that "the world was created", necessarily follows. Similarly, when we say, "If the world has form, then it was created," and "It has form," the conclusion "The world was created" results from the assumption of the two premises. Similarly, when we say "The world was either created or is eternal," but, "It is not eternal," the necessary conclusion is that "it was created." The syllogism is divided into that which is called categorical and into that which is called hypothetical. The categorical combines two propositions, which have one common term. For every proposition necessarily contains a subject and predicate. And the two propositions include four elements. Had they not one element in common no conclusion
מהותם המรสם התשע"ט בשתי ינואר, בהיותם בחירות, והם מתחרים.

היה להם לברך את השיר לברך עכבר סכתב. הם ניצלת או שלוחים של צדד, והם
ופנו את הצוואר של הנשיאה בשתי ינואר, לברך גם בדולח לדולח.

 Became מبذل את התשע"ט בשתי ינואר, והם מתחרים. וככ
כבר היה זה אחר כך מברך עכבר סכתב, לכל זרותיו מברך.

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statement, "The world was formed" and the statement, "The soul is a substance." But if the (second) proposition were connected to the first by one of its parts, e.g., "The world has form", and "Every form was created", then the sum of the parts of the proposition is reduced to three, called terms. Thus, the syllogism above is concerned with three terms, "world", "formed" and "created". What the two propositions mention twice, and have in common, is called the middle term. The subject of the conclusion, "world" is called the minor term, and the predicate "created", is called the major term. "The world was created" is the conclusion resulting from the syllogism. When the proposition is made part of the syllogism it is called a premise. The proposition which contains the minor term is called the minor premise. That which contains the major term is called the major premise. Neither premise can be designed by the middle term, because it is found in both premises. The minor term is contained in only one of them as is the major. The resultant of the syllogism is called a conclusion after it has become a resultant, and is called a postulate before that. The relationship of the two premises is called combination and the form of the combination is called figure. Three figures result: the middle term may be the predicate of one of the two premises and the subject of the other is then called the first figure; it may be the predicate of both, and is then called the second figure; it may be the subject of both, and is then called the third figure. The rule for antecedent and consequent in the conditional is the same as the rule for subject and predicate
משמש משותף לארוך בצורת מחט ומכים מספר הוראות מסדרי ומסדרי
משתמש עם עוברים לפניclado הממששים לא סלפי הולך והולך ב источנים.
השכון על bande רואים בעור גוזל וטראנס סקיקיני רואים פלס.
כיסא שבו המסתרים רומת פיקאצ'稳 ואחרים רואים צי economía דרור בבל רצלה.
הסוחרים רואים מסתורין קורא בבל רצלה, רוברטו קורא בבל רצלה בבל רצלה.
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in the categorical in that the conditional is divided into these figures. The three figures are similar in that no syllogism can result from either two negatives, or two particulars, nor can the minor premise be negative with the major premise particular. Every figure will be defined by the characteristics we have mentioned.

**COMMENTARY:** The statement "First in thought is last in deed" means that the final cause of every action is first in thought. The purpose is present at the very beginning, but it is attained only at the end of the action. For the purpose of the chair is to be used for sitting, and because of this the carpenter shapes the wood in the form of a chair. But this sitting is effected only after all the actions (have been completed). Therefore, every purpose is an end but not every end is a purpose.
Death is not the purpose of all men, though it is the end of all men. The further statement: "is reduced to three", explains their being called terms. The syllogism is concerned with and is composed of them. He compares these terms to the boundaries of the road from which, to which and in which one walks. The statement "The predicate (of the conclusion) is called the major term" means that the predicate of the conclusion is more universal than the subject, or is at least equal to it, which is when the subject is a particular. The statement, "and is then called the first figure", means that when the middle term is a predicate of the minor premise it is a subject of the major premise. When the opposite occurs it is the fourth figure, as formulated by Galen, but it is unnatural and is therefore not taken into consideration, as has been explained in the Prior analytics. The further statement, "The rule for antecedent and consequent in the conditional is the same as the rule for subject and predicate in the categorical in that the conditional is divided into these figures," means that we say, e.g., "If the sun now rises it will be day." But "The sun is rising, therefore, it is day," or we say, "Now the sun is rising," and "whenever the sun rises it is day." "Therefore, it is now day" - they become categorical.

**THE FIRST FIGURE:** This figure differs from the other two in two ways. One is that in yielding its conclusion, it need not be reduced to another figure, while the other figures are reducible to this figure to make the necessary conclusion appear - it is therefore called the first figure. The other is that it yields the four quantified propositions, universal and particular affirmative, universal and particular negative, as conclusions.
יכא איצי המות discretion רומא מעון כל מדרום. זכר מקא על השלושה חליפות
닷 הארץ בדולבוש הצליים ועלים מהטשה בחפושי והז.readFileSync
המקס ילעוף כל דופק סופת. רואות הז בדולבוש והז_readable עלכז
וזלגי ורב התאורוג. דיפור וראם הייאת בשורה תוארה.zהמה מספה קויא בבל
בזגגה. רצאת לשיר השובראם בשורה הזרא גיבור מחנה פרימיות LZיו שרה
ולא רוד בכרותה זה מפריך. זכרור וקדש ההסבורה הארזimachinery רצאת שיאית הבבל
המשטח נ绷 עין בפנט ניגא בכרלה. כו יכשיהה חטף התיא המברגה רביישתה
"יבשת באקדיבג ורוד במדעך plotted ולא ח보호יה רמזורר ודוד בכפר המקש.
זרזז זה המספה חדות והמברגה שהבראה לבריאת והבריאות שכרבי
לא כל התמרונתה ירצה כי זה המ劑 במלעת התשובה מרצים כפג. מצוים
הספה רודל הנה בודא במנא רזיבבי שפצי רוד ירגוב. בשEmpleado תחל התשובה רצלה
וכל על התשובה עלית الإير怎么可能 עלית העוני בצמא.
אימר החברות הרשויות והמדינת מחכמי האמונית ובצייב העליון אי חתולם.
שלאר יצצרכ ביבר ותולדתם על התושבויות הדורות שונים והתרבות רכזבגה
לא זה התמרונת דע יצץ חיבר התולדות רודל בקיאת דאות רראבורה. דואראר
שהאיו תודידי המקסיפים ירבו業務 על מצסיית הבבלות התולהית והשלולתה
黑龙江省. רזואו טובנה שציינה לא תודידי מיתייבר כפל. רחובות
שהאשיש לא תודידי וכלל, רתאאי תולדות אוז המופמכים צפי הכריבים זכר
סמס שStringValue התוכנה מימי ברו שתהיה בוים להתהלות כלל. רוזר תורב מסתיים
בנביא פסיפס ידנ궕מקסיפון לא תודידי התולהות הוא ברקע בצמאו. רסיב
ואם התמרונת והקטנה הגדולה צהוית וסתיית.
The conclusion of the second figure can never be affirmative, and the conclusion of the third figure can never be universal. The first figure, to be conclusive, is subject to two conditions: the minor premise must be affirmative and the major, universal. If (one of) these two conditions is wanting then, though the premises may be true, no conclusion will result from postulating their truth. It follows from this figure that when you have postulated an affirmative proposition
(1) התשובה: כאשר הוליך כלא זרפין (2) כדיتم את (3) מספרים כ:list: 1
(3) מספרים כ:list: 2
(3) מספרים כ:list: 3
(3) מספרים כ:list: 4
(3) מספרים כ:list: 5
(3) מספרים כ:list: 6
(3) מספרים כ:list: 7
(3) מספרים כ:list: 8
(3) מספרים כ:list: 9
(3) מספרים כ:list: 10
(3) מספרים כ:list: 11
(3) מספרים כ:list: 12
(3) מספרים כ:list: 13
(3) מספרים כ:list: 14
(3) מספרים כ:list: 15
(3) מספרים כ:list: 16
(3) מספרים כ:list: 17
(3) מספרים כ:list: 18
(3) מספרים כ:list: 19
(3) מספרים כ:list: 20
which is true, then whatever is asserted as true of the predicate is necessarily true of the subject. It cannot be otherwise. It is the same whether what is asserted as true of the predicate is negative or positive, or whether the subject is universal or particular. From this, four conclusive moods result, and the necessity of this conclusion is apparent. For if "Men are animals" is true, then everything which is truly asserted of animals—which is the predicate— their being sentient, or their not being stone, must be true of "men" since "men" are necessarily included in "animals." And if the proposition concerning all animals is true, then it is necessarily true of some. This follows from the first figure. We shall now state the four different moods: the first contains two universal affirmatives, e.g. "All matter is composite," and "Everything composite was created." Therefore, of necessity, "All matter was created." The second mood contains two universals, the major premise being negative. It is essentially like the first, except that it substitutes "is not eternal" for the word "created" so that it becomes negative, e.g., "All matter is composite", "Nothing composite is eternal." Its conclusion is, that "No matter is eternal." The third mood is essentially like the first, except that we make the subject of the first premise particular. This does not necessitate a conversion of the proposition, because each particular is universal in relation to itself and whatever is asserted of the predicate of the particular is true of that particular. For example, we say "Some beings are composite", and "Everything composite was created." Therefore, the necessary conclusion is, "Some beings were created." This has been constructed from two affirmatives, the minor premise being particular. The fourth mood is essentially like the third, except that we make the major premise negative, thus substituting
ברזידת תngen המשמש על כל שוראר מסים כליל, סמס על גוואר אי אופייר שירת
לאן כו רזאיה תngen המשמש על השנאר שלילא ואיריב רזאיה תנגה דרישה כליל
וא חלוף. רזאיה פותח איביצים פליזים ואיריב רזאיה תנגה כר צות
כאמש鬣י פראירג לזראה תנגה כי הפOUNCE של חף アיה שאר איז תנגה בוזה
ברזידת הז לזרה כלת, אכן צי אופייר מחלום שיביצים על איזאם ליפז שחות
בכים לכל סמס בורך צות המשמש על כל חף יוהו גיצא על גזמא
חוליך לכל סמס תנגה מיניאצ הצרפת והאצרונים והכרזים旗帜ת ההברעה נствие:
ה Pager האצרון פסייט מנייצות כלראות שלילא פליס בזימ חורבר רל חורבר פטרית
תנגה לכל בזימ חורבר לכל ספיים שיביצים כלראות זוגיות ממה שפלט.
אות האצרון ביצוא על חף מיסר אופר גשmour בשחרא איזיב עד מזון עד לחף שליר.
זיס דני בזימ חורבר ראין צי חורבר סדרת. צי חורבר שיאין בזימ
שז qed. העריך שלישים גור האצרון ביצוא על חף סימי ביצא הת다고ה האצרון
חליפה דצה לא היויב יצחק המשמש יפי בזימ חף אחר בזימ צ dedic.
המשמש על כל תנגה החלם משמש על זה החף. דידיינר שאותה ז🤢א על גזמא
חרזמה על כל תנגה החלם משמש על זה החף. דידיינר שאותה ז🤢א על גזמא. מינייר בזים שאותה אופייר ז�인ב תנגאה
חרזמה לכל חורבר מיסר תנגה יוהיב פסי伊斯兰 מגרב כליל סמס ש工業ים נע先把 תנגאות מוחזר.
חרזמה לכל חורבר מיסר תנגה יוהיב פסי伊斯兰 מגרב כליל סמס ש稷יז ש稷יז מגרב.
חלק dword מחרזמה על צי הצרפת והאצרונים והכרזים旗帜ת הז לזרה.
ברזידת הז לזרה עד שם האצרונים והכרזים旗帜ת הז לזרה, ברזידת הז לזרה כליר.
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ברזידת הז לזרה עד שם האצרונים והכרזיםFLAGSת הז לזרה, ברזידת הז לזרה כליר.
e.g., "Some beings are composite", "Nothing composite is eternal." The conclusion is that, "Not all are eternal."

This has been constructed from a minor particular affirmative premise and a major universal negative premise. There are twelve other combinations, which do not yield conclusions, making sixteen combinations in each figure. The minor premise may be a universal or particular affirmative, or a universal or particular negative, making four. To each one of these
(3)/17נ (כ"ה וsonian)

(1)/17נ
(1)/17נ
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לפי שמצינו... tecnולגיית אוליגר始め להטמעה בכל מודעות/1(1)
four major premises are added. Multiplying four by four, sixteen (moods) are obtained. Since we have laid down the condition that the minor premise must be affirmative, two negatives and their conclusions are excluded. Thus eight are invalid and two affirmatives remain. But four major premises are added to the minor universal affirmative premise; two of the former necessarily being particulars, and these two are invalidated, since we have laid down the condition that the major premise in this figure must be a universal. Thus, the number of moods is reduced to six. But neither the particular negative, nor affirmative, of the major premise may be combined with the particular affirmative of the minor premise, or no syllogism is possible from two particulars. Two more combinations, of the remaining six, are eliminated, leaving four. This is how the table now appears: When the minor premise is universal affirmative, "Every C is B" and "Every B is A" it yields a conclusion. If the major premise is a universal negative, "No B is A", it yields a conclusion. But if the major premise is a particular affirmative, "Some B is A" it does not yield a conclusion because the major premise is a particular. So, too, if the major premise is a particular negative, "Not every B is A" it does not yield a conclusion. When the minor premise is a particular affirmative, if the major premise is a universal affirmative, "Some C is B" and "Every B is A", it yields a conclusion. But if the major premise is a particular negative, "Not every B is A" it does not yield a conclusion, because the major premise is particular. Thus we have combined with every minor universal affirmative premise and minor particular affirmative premise.
כלי כל צורה מתאימה derekh הדינה רבעה בארכאת ברברית שסנכנא עלייה:
ובך התוכנות השתיית התאירון מאחר שהרי שפירות עם יסודות מהאיברים
מהתרדם נע ב solução כ הנורמות הדריחים את המתייחסות הברירה.
החברה יספורים אליהם ארכאת ברברית אחת עם כל מה שיתירו ויבלו
כ בריך בך. כי התמצירי ברברית דאת התאירון השתיית דוכלת. הבח הבור.
שכנה אל השכון. זרואלי המיחונית התאירון השסנכנא לא יספורו אליהם התאירון.
ברךלא לא שסכנא ולא מהיכין כי איאי התש השכני התאירון ההבדל שסכנא
והרצייס השסנכנא התאירון גרבלה התאירון שסכנא הבח פכור שסכנא.
זארת צוררת השסנכנא התאירון גרבלה התאירון שסכנא גרבלה כל בכי רכל בכי
וזארת גרבלה גרבלה כלות. איזי ריב מייאוי גרבלה התאירון התאירון
רצעת מה שסכור כיא עקר למ שסирование גרבלה התאירון גרבלה שסכנא.
ר zale כלא ביא עקר שסכור התאירון התאירון גרבלה התאירון כלות. עשת ביב
וכל ייאו½. גרבלה שסכנא התאירון. אירן כלא ביא דג עקר למ
שסנכנא התאירון לתוך התאירון על כל חפירת התאירון אברך למ שסנכי התאירון
ליגברתי השסנכנא. רבר התמצירי השתיית הברירה דאת התאירון ריבר התאירון.
השכיתו רס göו שסכור שסכנא התאירון ריברורלא הבח התאירון.
ארכאת ברברית המיחונית השסנכנא התאירון ריברורלא הבח התאירון המיחונית התאירון.
הפשיטו כלא ג çözüm המיחונית התאירון שסנכנא עלייה כלא המיחונית עלייה.
But the negative predicate is dissimilar from the subject, and what is asserted of it cannot be carried over to the dissimilar subject. So if we say, "Man is not a stone," and then make an assertion, whether negative or positive, with regard to "stone" that assertion does not carry over to "Man". For you have clearly marked out the dissimilarity between "stone" and "man" by the negative. This is the reason for the conditions we have laid down, and the reason that the conclusion is limited to four out of the sixteen moods.

**Commentary:** "It follows from this figure that when you have postulated an affirmative proposition which is true, then whatever is asserted as true of the predicate is necessarily true of the subject" means that the particular result of this figure, from the point of view of its conclusiveness, is, that when you postulate an affirmative proposition that is true, i.e., the minor premise, then what you assert with regard to the predicate of that proposition, i.e., the middle term, is of necessity an assertion concerning its subject, i.e., the minor term, whether it concerns all of it when the minor premise is a universal, or a part of it when the minor premise is a particular. The subject retains the quantification, "It cannot be otherwise." This signifies that the minor premise must be affirmative and that the middle term predicated of it is the subject of the major premise. The result is that it yields the four quantifications as conclusions. He used letters for his examples.
הככותב מחיבב את הסופים של הנשיםWARDS מזרה וארק ציבור של נשים
נברט. רכש את תואר אוניברסיטת אוניברסיטת וונט החסיק את הדלקה של יונתן
וירגון בין נשים. אחד מגב התוספת של הזרוע והחצרות הרוסיותubbles.
החלפת התחזיות במעבר הם של שוהי מובן היפוכווסיס מסייע במאמץ.
כاصر הנחת בנגד מצוות ברקעת הנוספת
על כל בכורהسسפס בלי סוף של בושאר. גרש 배スーペר טופורזלות לדורת סדרה
כコミュニטים תורודת של נשות בנות בנהר מתוכננת ברקעת והחקירות
הככותב את התוספת של נשות בנות בנהר מתוכננת ברקעת והחקירות
בלי סוף של בושאר רדגר חקק כל דבר ההזדהיה בין רדגר וגדולה הנביכה שסופס
באם כי כותר לא התאה החסיכות רדגר על הברושים כיカップר שנה
אכשר שיתיה אל תכרם. רךכר קלרה זה עד שהתחזיות מתייחסות
ב씌 לה של ברה סדרה והחקירות הסופסס והאמרכת. המסה של בושאר בכרדה
כاصرות הבכורות סדרה והחקירות הסופסס והאמרכת.
to show that the nature of the figure yields the conclusion and that the conclusion does not depend on the accident of the truth or falsity of the matter. (Aristotle, too, chose letters as illustrations, as though the letters questioned and dictated his work. This knowledge is called knowledge of the speculative faculty.) An example of this is, "Man is an eagle," and "Every eagle is rational." The conclusion is that "Every man is rational" which is a true conclusion derived from two false premises, false not because of the nature of the premises but because of the nature of the content. The figure too may be erroneous.

The Second Figure: The middle term is the predicate of both premises. It follows that every premise that asserts of its predicate what may not be found in its subject is a negative and not an affirmative premise. For if it were affirmative then what is asserted of the predicate would be asserted of the subject, as in the first figure. We said that whatever is asserted as true of the predicate of the affirmative premise is necessarily true of the subject. Then we found that what can be asserted of it with regard to the predicate cannot be asserted of it with regard to the subject, so that we know that the proposition is negative. If it were affirmative the judgement with regard to the predicate would be present in the subject. The conditions which make this figure conclusive are that the two premises shall be different in quality,
ספירה של מספרים לשתי עשרה. זה לא בسكرת כפיי
תמהותם של כל הבתרים ארבעים מסייר ואילו התמרדו שאלות זה על דידי
מצרפת. זה היה לשם כךيكבר במעוך העץ. יבואו זה כי אם הוא מואם הטובה
כשכל בתי מדברים באז העד משבר רחום את את ניסי זכאיות
כדבורה הוא ראי ויהב ומחברות של כל מספר התוכן רכוב כו יקיר זה בים
ספירה התמרדו. אם המרבנה השכינה רה ישייה הנבילה האמסרי מעשה בשתי
המקורות רדש하며 משמית על כל דבר אדם שיבוש אלו נבואה של שאל ישמא
לך כל נשיאתتضمن על בשמים כמוך שידמח בתמרדו וıyorum בית הממשת
על כל דבר המוסר על כל דבר חציות משיחיות מסרצל על הנבואה נשיא
ומتمويل מגוון של בין שלושהămירדו המשיחיות יסチーム על הנבואהنشاط
שתחאת שללכי לא הוא מחייב יכרצה משמת הנבואה菒ועץ. וחציה רוחך
וזאת התמרדו שלושה השתי המקורות באכרזה
(3) כַּלַּלְּכַּלְּלַלְּלַל (1)/(2)ֹ; 18
(2)/(3)/(4)ֹ; 15
(3)/(4)/(5)ֹ; 6
(6)/(7)/(8)/(9)ֹ; 7
(10) (2)/(3)/(4)ֹ; 8
(5)/(6)/(7)/(8)ֹ; 19
(9)/(10)/(11)/(12)ֹ; 10
(8)/(13)/(14)/(15)ֹ; 11
(15)/ןוֹוֹוֹוֹוֹוֹוֹו לַלַלַלַלַל (15)ֹ; 12
ץָזָזָזָזָזָזָזָזָז (15)ֹ; 15
(3) כַּלַּלְּכַּלְּלַלְּלַל (3)ֹ; 6
one of them being negative, the other affirmative, and that the major premise shall be universal in every mood. These two conditions also reduce the conclusive moods to four, as in the first figure.

**THE FIRST MOOD** of a minor universal affirmative and a major universal negative: e.g., "Everything material is divisible" and "No soul is divisible", therefore, "Nothing material is soul." The necessity of this conclusion is explicable by a reduction to the first figure in a conversion of the major premise. For it is a universal negative and is converted per acc., "Nothing divisible is a soul" the 'divisible' becoming the subject of the major premise, which is already the predicate of the minor premise. Thus it becomes reducible to the second mood of the first figure.

**THE SECOND MOOD** of two universals, the minor premise being a negative: e.g., "Nothing eternal is composite," and "All matter is composite," therefore, "Nothing eternal is matter." This is explicable by converting the minor premise and then making the major minor, and the minor major, "All matter is composite," and "Nothing composite is eternal," therefore, "Nothing material is eternal," as above in the second mood of the first figure. This conclusion is convertible since it is a universal negative. The result is, as we have stated, "Nothing eternal is material."

**THE THIRD MOOD** of a

a) Reading with ms. Beat.
minor particular affirmative and a major universal negative. This
is similar to the first mood of this figure, except in that the
minor is made a particular, e.g., "Some creatures are divisible,"
and "No soul is divisible," therefore, "Some creatures are not
souls", because when we have converted the major it is reducible
to the fourth mood of the first figure.

THE FOURTH MOOD: of a minor particular negative and a major
universal affirmative; e.g., "Not every creature is composite," and
"Everything material is composite," therefore, "Not every creatur
is material." This cannot be reduced to the first figure by con-
version. If we were to convert the major affirmative, it would
become particular and there is no syllogism for two particulars.
But it can be made true in two ways, one of them being called
assumption, the other apagoge. It is assumption when we say
"Some creatures are not composite". This "Some" assumes "Every";
assume that it is "Every" and we may call it "Some" or "Every."
Then it will conform with the second mood of this figure. By
apagoge is meant that, if, e.g., "Not every creature is matter" is
not true, then its contradictory, "Every creature is matter", is
true. Now it is known that "Everything material is composite,"
therefore, it necessarily follows that "Every creature is composite."
But we have already assumed, in the minor term, that "Not every
creature
מותיעה טפשטף שללת רודיתו רודיה המים הרוסשים ממותה המאובנים ללא
שוסטנטנרט הוה נאכה תֵּנוֹת. והמאמר טפשטף הבどうしてもות השתחופי ריווק סכית
מותהלקת הנשה קשת השוסטנטנרט איברה בוש. לילפי סשה נזרם ימכסה המפה הגצולה שירב
אלא מייל ורחביעים ממותה המאובנים. הופן הרביעי השוסטן ליאל שירב קשת
ריכרלט מטפיחים בורלא טבאר איוול סל בפורטבייר. ודoleans מתרבה תנח
איני כל נסאו בטום. רוחי ייז אמשיר שיר耠ים אל המאובנים הרוסשים המפורק ל développe
שוסטנטנרטובר הליך ניון תֵּנוות של רודיה הבורלא המאובנים חפסות הליך
ריאור קשק שרח החליפיורצ'ר. ר_SLEEP מיתות בטבי רדוכיס ליררא נזרק אלו הטופ_dst
המהור הלוחים גואב התמחה ככ_trees שאר אפרים קשת השוסטנטנרט אייבר מחוברים
הנה סד נפץ אלו בטבי ר這裡 נזרק לטנברנ נזרק בלך בBrowsable
תפקית יטבש סברת המאובנים. ריאלוס הלוחים תנח הת האטיפס או מכתוה
سمعאריפר כדי כל נסאו טום צורך מתרבה אריאנו בפורטבייר כל נסאו בטום רדוכיס
ר אוליי סכל שסמטארוות התנה הלוחים שירקח כל טאה מתרבה ובר המחוברים
תחתה טפשטף שאצי כל נסאו

(1) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיולשተרטרולול/ך'ן
(2) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשተרטרולול/ך'ן
(3) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשተרטרולול/ך'ן
(5) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשተרטרולול/ך'ן
(6) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשተרטרולול/ך'ן
(7) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשחטוערלול/ך'ן
(8) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשחטוערלול/ך'ן
(9) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשחטוערלול/ך'ן
(10) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשחטוערלול/ך'ן
(11) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשחטוערלול/ך'ן
(12) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשחטוערלול/ך'ן
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(54) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשחטוערלול/ך'ן
(55) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשחטוערלול/ך'ן
(56) צ'נלז'רוכגילון/ך'ן/ שיוולשחטוערלול/ך'ן
(57) צ'核准... על נסאו מתרבח
(58) צ'核准... על נסאו מתרבח
(59) צ'核准... על נסאו מתרבח
(60) צ'核准... על נסאו מתרבח
(61) צ'核准... על נסאו מתרבח
(62) צ'核准... על נסאו מתרבח
(63) צ'核准... על נסאו מתרבח
(64) צ'核准... על נסאו מתרבח
(65) צ'核准... על נסאו מתרבח
is composite" is true, then how can its contradictory be true. This (apagoge) is absurd, and what leads to it is absurd. What led to it was the assumption of a false conclusion.

COMMENTARY: "It follows from it that every premise, that asserts of its predicate what may not be found in its subject is a negative and not an affirmative premise" means that it follows from this figure that every minor premise, in which what is asserted of its predicate cannot be asserted of its subject, is negative and not affirmative. It is as though he signified that the minor premise of this figure may be negative, as "may not" (esbar) signifies. This distinguishes it from the first figure. This figure also yields the universal quantificate as a conclusion, with its middle term the predicate of both.

THIRD FIGURE: the middle term is the subject of both premises. It follows that every minor premise is affirmative, so what is asserted of its subject may be asserted of part of its predicate, whether the assertion is negative or affirmative, or whether the minor premise is particular or universal. That is perfectly plain. It has two conditions: that the minor premise shall be affirmative; that one of the two premises shall be universal, whether it be the minor or the major. There are six conclusive moods in this figure.
מדורה על שבתא צהרתה ואריק. צהרתה רותŃ שער רהיטמה אלני שער.

רואמנם נביאי אליגר חונתה הורכלת לכלת צהרתה. העדכון אוורר עדכון.

noopener על שבתא צהרתה שעריה על שבתה בני שעריה כלית נפרת. הוה

והוה גזרה שלולת רוא המתיחת. רוחה רירג ראות התמגנת לכלת צהרתה

שהוחיה בני שרייה שעריה על שבתה בני שעריה כלית נפרת. הוה זה

גזרה שלולת רוא מתיחת רובל זה שהצורה שבתה הכלת התמגנת

ובבר החיה שלולת רוח וחברת המחרבווה רוחיהו מתיחת התמghanוק הכלת

נושאים של חיות שלוחה מחאה מחאה מחאה המחא המחאה רוחה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה ומחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחאה מחא

רואמנם נביאי אליגר חונתה הורכלת לכלת צהרתה. העדכון אוורר עדכון.

HTTPRequest boycotted 생성 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 요청 및 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The first mood of two universal affirmatives: "Every man is an animal" and "Every man is rational", therefore, "Some animals are rational", since the minor premise is converted as a particular. It is as though you said, "Some animals are men" and "Every man is rational" therefore, "Some animals are rational". This is similar to the third mood of the first figure.

The second mood of two universals, the major being negative; "Every man is an animal" and "No man is a horse," therefore, "Not every animal is a horse." This is due to the fact that when the minor is converted it becomes a particular affirmative. It is thus reducible to the fourth mood of the first figure.

The third mood of two affirmatives, the minor being a particular; "Some men are white," "Every man is an animal," therefore, "Some, who are white, are animals". For the minor particular affirmative is convertible. Thus it is reducible to the third mood of the first figure.

The fourth mood of two affirmatives, the major being a particular: "Every man is an animal" and "Some men write", therefore, "Some animals write", for when the particular major has been converted and has been made a minor it becomes, "Some who write are men," and "Every man is an animal" and it necessarily follows that "Some who write are animals." The conclusion is then convertible, and it becomes "Some animals write."

The fifth mood of a minor universal affirmative and a major particular negative: "Every man is rational" and "Not every man writes", therefore, it necessarily follows "Not everyone who is rational writes." This is explicable by way of assumption.

The sixth mood of a minor particular affirmative and a major universal negative:

a) Reading with ms. Bet.
המיתרarraבך[F(א)] ממתן לכללמה מתאימה. כל אוטוזי ולכל אוטוז מברך את

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"Some animals are white," and "No animal is snow," therefore, "Some white is not snow." This is apparent in the conversion of the minor, for it is reducible to the fourth (mood) of the first figure. These are the details concerning categorical syllogisms.

**COMMENTARY:** "It follows that every minor premise is affirmative, so what is asserted of its subject may be asserted of part of its predicate, whether the assertion is negative or affirmative, or whether the minor premise is particular or universal" means that it follows from this figure - which is indicated by its form, i.e., the order of the middle term and the conditions which make possible the yielding of the conclusion in the quantificative - that every minor premise is affirmative. Therefore, what is asserted of its subject - the middle term - is asserted of part of its predicate - the minor term. It is as though he indicated by this that the minor is affirmative and that the middle term is the subject of both premises and yields only the particular as a conclusion. The statement, "it necessarily follows 'Not every one who is rational writes' (This) is explicable by way of assumption" means that this "some" of "Some who are rational do not write" assumes "Every"; so we may call it "Some" or "Every." It follows the second mood of this figure, as if the statement were: "Every man is rational," "No man writes", therefore, "Some who are rational do not write." By the statement, "No man writes" we refer to every one of the class of ignorant men who cannot form letters.

**CONCERNING HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS**
לפי הראוי, בברות של שלב]-ארכיון שלב-[בתרח רבכון הקשחת ר Bashar
לא תמייך בהבנה של התוכן הרaseña והברורין затל הבליעת המשכיות המפורשות
אך רישוםبر ייבא על 신בל גזירה מתייהっていない תחת משפט על
כissant שורה זו הווה תשתוףזכレビュー של שלב]-ארכיון שלב-[בתרח רבכון הקשחת ר Bashar
כissant.ираשה תשתוףזכレビュー לשאות המשכיות אשל ירושה על תודעה על תודעה
המשכיות של רעשה נושאת תודעה ותשףזכレビュー של שלב]-ארכיון שלב-[בתרח רבכון הקשחת ר Bashar
ברשה יTableView תשתוףזכレビュー של שלב]-ארכיון שלב-[בתרח רבכון הקשחת ר Bashar
 NIRIECC א Unterstützung schooling רעיית תודעה דוד תודעה תודעה תודעה
התרשים אין כל תודעה רעיית תודעה דוד תודעה תודעה.
ספנסר התודעה כוח כל מתכון תודעה לכל תודעה בבר ארכיון
המשכיות של שלב]-ארכיון שלב-[בתרח רבכון הקשחת ר Bashar
האגניש המשכיות ארכיון שלב]-ארכיון שלב-[בתרח רבכון הקשחת ר Bashar
שיפוץ המשכיות ארכיון שלב]-ארכיון שלב-[בתרח רבכון הקשחת ר Bashar
Hypothetical syllogism are of two kinds: conditional and disjunctive. An example of the conditional is, "If the world were created, then it has a creator." If we affirm the condition in the antecedent the consequent follows as it is, i.e., if we say, "And it is known that the world was created," that is the antecedent as it is, the consequent as it is follows, "It has a creator." But if we affirm the contradictory of the consequent the contradictory of the antecedent will follow, e.g., when we say, "It is known that it has no creator," it will follow that "It was not created." But if you affirm the contradictory of the antecedent, neither the consequent, as it is, nor its contradictory will follow. For were we to say, "It is not created," this will not yield a conclusion, as when we say, "If this is a man, then he is an animal, he is not a man," it does not follow from it that "He is an animal," or that "He is not an animal." Similarly, if we affirm the consequent as it is, it will not yield a conclusion. For when we say, "And it is known that the world has a creator," no conclusion will follow. For when we say, "If this prayer is acceptable, the one who prays is pure," and "He is pure." It does not follow that the prayer is accepted or that it is not accepted. Of these four affirmations
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 görevו הרוח שמי מרגים מנכרי מתכנים גואלי מוחלט.

 המתרחב הנגה שלר אפור או השולט מטורף הנגה אל מטורף רוח התרחרר.

 אם נצייעﾁ׳ העורף על אום חניך עץ המורתר מכצער הנגה ורقبض עץ הנכשר.

 רוחו על תם ונקרע מתורף רוחה עד השולט עץ חרטים חרטים יהודי שבץ.

 עץ הנכשר רוחו שלר מטורף. אל ש裨 מטורף הנכשר והריבי שבץ.

 פירור רוחו רוחァר עיניים עין אל מהרש הנגה זה חורי שבץ.

 אם ישתי טורף החרטים לא יתיריב סמכר לא עץ הנכשר ולא מטורף.

 האם ולפי האל阏י מגורים הנגה זו לירידי כמר שאה כיבר וידיה.

 זה ראי הנגה זו אליך 여זר אטרון דחצ אל חוריב שבץ.

 רוח הנבון אחריך כי זכר אם ברית עניי הנכשר לא ירידיך כי."אמרה את אמא.

 רוחות של עץ מגורים אל חורי שבץ סמכר השולט כיבר מגור.

 אם הובח כמקתי הנגה המותלקת נגור. וראלי הוא מטורף הנגה לא

 יירידי שבץ שוחחל גרהו אל ששית כסלות. ראלה ארבעה שבטים לא ירידיך.
only two yield conclusions, i.e., the antecedent as it is, which yields the consequent as it is, and the contradictory of the consequent, which yields the contradictory of the antecedent. But the contradictory of the antecedent and the consequent as it is yield a conclusion only when it is established that the consequent is equal to and is not more universal than the antecedent. In this case, the four affirmations (alternants) yield four conclusions. For we say, "If this is matter, it is composite", "And it is matter, therefore, it is composite." Or, "And it is composite, therefore, it is matter." Or, "And it is not matter, therefore, it is not matter." But when the consequent is more universal than the antecedent, as "animal" in relation to "man", then, when the more universal does not exist, the particular does not exist. For the non-existence of "animal" includes the non-existence of "man". But the non-existence of the particular does not include the non-existence of the universal. For the non-existence of "man" does not include the non-existence of "animal". But the existence of the particular includes the existence of the universal. For the existence of "man" includes the existence of "animal", but the existence of "animal" does not include the existence of "man".

(32) COMMENTARY The statement "The non-existence of the more universal includes the non-existence of the particular" means that when the more universal does not exist, the particular in nature. Prior existence in nature means that when what is posterior exists, what is prior (necessarily) exists. But it does not follow that, when what is prior exists, what is posterior also exists.
HashMap אל STORY ראה עין תקדימים ירידי עין 넘כת רמות אלולד כרמל

לצוד תקדימים שא 갖고 תקדימים רעיונות תקדימים גם אלolid לא נשיא.

קריסמ תסנכים שע קריסמ רגזר קריסמא לכל סמלים ראב"ד. ראב"ד זה אלולד.

תקסיסמא התולעה. כי מהח תוער עין חיה עז בשמ נחב תגר תגר נחל אנדר פיר.

כשם הנחת זוז סופר. הצל הגר מטורב הצל הנחת זוז זוז כשל זוז זוז זוז.

זוז אייבר מטורב. אבל זוז מטורב זוז אייבר בשמ זוז בשמ זוז זוז זוז.

להמשך ירידי לכל מתקדימים צומח בשמ ולא חמיה המכח צומח לשל מתקדימים לכל

ספל בהימר צומח בשמ צומח בשמ רזים בצולק המשור יזים לכל המכח צומח.

כי אין ספלים צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח כשל פיו

حجر קדרת ראיית בקידום צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח.

יפורים אפר זוז מכח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח.

צומח מכה לכל מתקדימים צומח צומח מח או מח צומח מח צומח מח צומח צומח.

כי מכה לדר引き סבעת צומח מח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח צומח.

נבעה שמשארת המאה צומח קדרמים וԸ enactment הקדרמים לא מיכר שמס.
The reverse is true of non-existence. For when what is prior does not exist, what is posterior does not exist. But when what is posterior does not exist, it does not follow that what is prior does not exist, as in the priority of one to two or of genus to species or of animal to man. Know that the first mood of the conditional is employed in the Talmud. It is always indicated when they say, "There is every reason that it is even so." They designate by it the strength of the connection between the consequent and the antecedent. The second mood is employed when they say, "If this be so," which is understood to mean "I grant, if you were to say."

THE SECOND KIND The disjunctive: e.g. "The world is either eternal or was created." Four arguments are constructed from this. For we say, "And it was created, hence it is not eternal." Or "And it was not created, hence it is eternal." Or "And it is eternal, hence it was not created." Or "And it is not eternal, hence it was created." Therefore, the affirmation of either one, categorically, will yield the contradictory of the other, and the affirmation of the contradictory of either one will yield the other categorically. These are its conditions: the disjunctive contains two parts. If there are three, the categorical affirmation of only one would yield the contradictory of the other two. For example, "This number is either smaller or larger or equal," and "it is larger"; hence that "it is smaller or equal" is invalid. If the contradictory of one were affirmed, one of the remainder would follow, but not categorically, i.e., "And it is not equal," hence it follows that it is
הספוגות. הרעת הלעויות הכפר כנפי העיניים הצלעות המקור מהἸαμάλι_
לא יילה מתוך. בדיעבד התארך להצעיד. הת מחפש את נפילת בחג. רוד תמך
התרחשות מהתחזקම והまる הגולגולת חמר גרעין יסוד בعسكر כפל סוכן כפי יזב
ובו. כל הזדז המרתיסות נהמנה בברזים 지역י ישרי יכל המברים אצ
הכי שראיר, י الفكر כאי ארבע שבליב. אמרי החזק ושוד ידписание המפרשים הוזר
שיםם הצלעות אא כדי לארט ואר מחרור רוז ילדר כארבעה לשבט ביב האת.
התאфр אוכל וחוסר הנה זינו ded אוやはり חזר הנה והמה עטרון.
אכל את זכרות הטבע זנין חוטב זאלא איבזר מפרשים הזה במה מתורש.
נתיב השבתה עדין, כאל זפריר פרמר החיהなどが ספוגת טמר כאל זזריר
עוין לאני. רוד מזג את התח ובחサポート. זאלה חנות הצלעות הזן השבוגת עדין
כאל זפריר פרמר החיהなどが ספוגת טמר כאל זזריר שורש יא ח Türkiye.
אכל את זה הת좌 כשל לאורו פטום זא שיש. זאלה חנות ספוגות המפרשים
וזה זזיםổן הקפירה לא Каפרד אוכל איזבי שות הנה זז和发展 שימה.
either smaller or larger. If the parts are not all included, e.g. "Zaid is either in France or Spain or elsewhere" or "This number is either five or ten or more", then the affirmation of each one, categorically, would result in the falsity of the other two. But the affirmation of the contradictory of the one will not yield a conclusion because not all of the remainder is included in the other. These are the principles of the syllogism. We shall complete the treatise by stating the four kinds of syllogism: apagogic, inductive, analogical and combined.

"CONSEPTAR": The statement "These are its conditions: the disjunctive contains two parts" means what we stated, namely that the affirmation of the contradictory of each will yield the other as it is, will be true when the condition contains only two parts.

The apagogic syllogism is also hypothetical, since we assume the contradictory of the conclusion, and by then, affirming it in combination with a premise whose truth is apparent, and then we affirm the contradictory. The form of the apagogic syllogism is such that we substantiate your opinion by invalidating its contradictory and its contradictory is invalidated by the fact that falsehood follows from it. And that is done when we combine with it a premise whose truth is apparent and which yields a conclusion whose falsity is apparent. Then we say that the false conclusion results only from a syllogism whose premises contain a falsehood. And since the truth of one of the
לא סמעו מה רבו, והם לא יתיירו חללים בכלים אפרית יד ט בכרם.
רואים כפררים. רואים שמפור גופם והם נשמה רואים עשים. הנגב השונער עדין כל אחמד
יולין בולל האוחיט. הרביל השבורת סמור הוא הן לא יולידה. לפני שיאוף
כללות בובאף אtraîל לא יולדה. הנגב אללא הורשיו והמשלות והברוך בכבר
ברכות עניבベース. חשו החולות והח喾ות וה었שיות והמשיכים המוקצים. הפירות
אירפרר זה תאנא חתף חדש השירים. ונרצה זה אפרים אתרוברט השвшего סדר
כל אחמד. יוליד עיד יאתם עואט הפריש בשמה שונה יכללו שעני חללים לבור.
ארז עאלות בוש חולים זה לנ להת א맑ה לפי שמה מתנק טיפי השירים והידים
רוחנה בה רוחבר את הפרשים בלביה צרצר ורולידי ונולדה בצילה התכון. חשו
השומת חדש צרצת שיקсим סרופר למלאו תורודה יִיחָס שלטונית השמשים
ספג שישר. הוא בחרו איליאז החופר stronę צרצר והמרת שלה
נגילה הבכר, אחמד אחמד והורודה בכורה לא וגיכי אלא משמח שה.startActivityים
cזב ראמה.
two premises is apparent, the falsity is to be marked in the second premise which is the opinion of the opponent. An example of it is when one's opponent wishes to assert that "Every soul is material". You contradict him by forming a syllogism: "Every soul is material", "All matter is divisible." Therefore, "Every soul is divisible". The falsity of this is apparent in by the nature of the soul of man. There must be something false somewhere in the premises for them to yield this conclusion. But we have said that the truth that "All matter is divisible" is apparent, so that the falsity rests in our saying "Every soul is material." When this is invalidated, it is substantiated that the soul is not material.

COMMENTARY: The apagogic syllogism is called so on the principle that "Out of the wicked cometh forth wickedness" and falsehood necessarily results from falsehood. Nor will falsehood ever come from truth, for evil does not come from good. This syllogism is employed in the Talmud. It is that (47) which is indicated when they say "If you do not say so".

INDUCTION refers to transferring the x judgement concerning x many particulars to the universal which contains those particulars, e.g., "Every animal moves its lower jaw while chewing". (48) We have seen man, the horse, the cat and other animals do so. Therefore, this is true if it is possible to complete an investigation of all animals. Then a syllogism in the first mood could be constructed.
"Every animal is either horse or man, etc." "Every horse and man, etc. moves his lower jaw while chewing." Hence it follows that "Every animal moves his lower jaw." But if even one is omitted - like the crocodile, which moves its upper jaw - the truth will not be affirmed. It is not far-fetched to assume that a judgement will be true 'in a thousand cases save one.'

Dependence on induction is sound 'in matters of fígh, but not in things which require demonstration. In matters of fígh, the more induction is based on exact investigation and the closer its approach to completeness the more certain it is to put opinion out of court.

**Commentary** - Nature was wise - because of God's guidance in not allowing the animal to move its upper jaw lest its eye suffer fatigue. The structure of the animal and its characteristics point to the existence of a transcendent intellect which watches over nature. For though nature is wise in what it brings to fruition, it is not rational, and would not know what it does, were it not for God who guides it. Therefore, said Job, "Then out of my flesh shall I see God." And David said: "All my bones shall say: 'Lord, who is like unto Thee.' The statement "Dependence on induction is sound in matters of fígh" refers to the fact that that method is employed for ordinary people and satisfies them. The method of study of the elite differs from the method of the ordinary person. We will find this type of syllogism in the Talmud. We will also find there the two
affirmative premises of the second figure, but only in the form of a question and not as demonstrative proof.  

(THE ANALOGICAL) The jurists and Mitakallims call the analogical by the name Qiyas, which is the transference of the judgement from one particular to another which resembles it in some respect. When one looks at a house and sees that it was created and has form, then at the heavens and sees they have form, he extends his judgement to it and says, "All matter that has form was created, the heavens have form, therefore, they were created", (56b) in analogy to a house. This will not yield certain knowledge. (56) But it is suitable for soothing the mind and convincing the listener in discussions and so is employed in rhetoric. By rhetoric is meant the discussions current in disputes namely: complaints and apologies, blaming and praising something, expressing revulsion or disgust at something (and things of that sort). A sick person is told, "Drink this medicine because it will benefit you," and he asks, "Why?", and is told "Because so and so, who was sick, drank it and it did him good". He is, therefore, inclined to take it without asking that it be demonstrated as beneficial to every sick person, or that his sickness is similar to the other's and his condition as far as age, strength, weakness, etc., are similar to his. And because the dialecticians felt the weakness of this method they invented a new one; they said it is clear
 handheld box that is free from any influence of the moon. The box must be kept in a room where there is no light, and the keys must be kept in a safe place.

If the box is kept in a room where there is light, the keys are not considered to be locked. If the box is kept in a room where there is no light, the keys are considered to be locked.

The box must be kept in a room where there is no light, and the keys must be kept in a safe place.
that in the original proposition the judgement was arrived at in this way. So they proceeded to establish the (meaning and the) cause in two ways. One of them was called a proposition of general application which may be inverted; the other, investigation and division. In relation to the proposition of general application which may be inverted, they said it means that "whatever has form was created." And "whatever has no form was not created." This goes back to induction and does not yield certitude on two counts. First, a complete enumeration with none omitted is impossible. Second, in the investigation, the heavens were or were not investigated. If they were not investigated, then a complete investigation was not effected. And if an investigation was made of a thousand cases save one, it is not far-fetched to assume that the one judgement out of the thousand may be different, as we mentioned in the case of the crocodile. Now, if the heavens were investigated and it is known that they were created because they have form, the question is already solved, since it was clear before establishing the truth of the premise of the syllogism. The syllogism is not needed to affirm it, since it is already plain. The other method is investigation and division. We say, for example, let us investigate all the attributes of "house". It exists, is material, self-sufficient and has form. But it is fallacious to say that it is created because it exists, or because it is self-sufficient, or it is this or that, as if every existent thing or self-sufficient thing had to be created.
עלול לבשה תעכבו רהפן בקירות네 החלק ריבה רכישה זכרונות אתר ממק
רפחן. דוארים הבתים את רוחאלוקמך ואכומך הזמרות רוחם נגかも
עבירות על המושג מזרחי זכרון כל אשה וברדית רוחם של שארם מזרחי
הנה איבן מתרחים. דואר ישבר על חיוותם ודואר בלתי מצוקה העשוי.
פיכע זורח חמה שלגפה כל המתרחים בצלאל האפרים זכרונות צללים זכרונות.
רוחות האזרחים רוחות המסינת את לא חкер או לא חקר חכמה אמך כל לא חקר
䰱כל אף חקר שלח על פי זכר וראיה רוחם שלקחי מסינות מסינות מסינות
כמך שברבעה עתבלה זמך חק חכמי רידר שם מתרחש התרחש מזרחי
הנה את בחיר התרחשת זכרון מברך מצויר לדרן את חכמי חכמי חכמי
ברך וביל חכם ברקךי זכרון זה בך; התרשוחת מצוירת רוחם רוחם
שם האפרים בצלאל בחיר כל ריח שלח רמן שארם כמך בעם
בהצמר ברקךי עמל שלח ח oma בחיר לתרחש כל בך.
כי חוכמך שמחה כל בכם קיים בברך.
Therefore, it is established that it was created because it has form. But this is fallacious on four grounds. **First**, it admits of being said that the judgement in the original proposition was not arrived at through any of these causes, which include more than "house", but through a cause which is limited to "house" and therefore does not extend beyond it. Even if it be established that something other than the house was created, it will be caused by a quality that includes "house" and that thing in particular and does not extend to the heavens. **Second**, this is valid only when all descriptive attributes of the matter under consideration are investigated. Now, a complete account and full investigation can never be proved, some attribute may have been omitted and that might be the cause. So the majority of dialecticians do not consider completeness, but say, "if there be another cause, show it." Or, they say that if there were, you and I would certainly have perceived it, just as if there were an elephant before us we would perceive it. If we did not perceive it, we would assert that it does not exist; but this is weak since the inability of the two conflicting parties to perceive it immediately, or however long the inability exists, does not indicate non-existence. This case is not like that of the elephant; it is not possible for an elephant to stand before us and for us not to see it immediately. Yet there are many matters we have investigated which we could not understand immediately, but only after some time. **Third**, even if the investigation were completed,
הנה קוראشفれて זה השם המכריע. רבים בבל מראבדים עיניהם. הרואים

שלטב שיאמר שמואל תבוא לכל שנה בבלהعنا הערות שלם ומלא ציון. נתיירא

יוחנן כרצליה על בבלת כל יהודי大楼 מקדשו עם חנינה עלי כל יהודה שיאבה ה WCHAR

בשלא, אמר קדרון שדיה נכתמה והיה עדixo עלי כל יהודה שיאבה ה WCHAR

חרב. ויאמר.Abudされていたו שידי כלMatrixXd י땃ה כל שדה מחנה חרב על חוראי

השוור עד שהלך במרד רוד. הערות והקדומות לא נשתייה והלות ראובן למלש

תרואר מגבינת והא אחר הערו המברилים לא חישב הכללות במלא יימורים

ודתיות בין עליות גזירת גזירת להזיז את השבחים美方 אברך.

כבר שחררת אך הקדמים לכל לא מתבגרות רכושר לא שיסחוב מסלול

ותרו חורים כי לרגל עליית השמחה לתוך כל רואית תוצרי אי.stageursive

על התערר רואית זה כפל כי לא יסצה פלא עזור לニック רואית וימורים.

וכמה גאונים ומבינים כלentarioי כי ודבעים רואים גם על מעוז הרוחות שה.gen

דע""מ. השלישים שאט על כלת הכללות המורדים הגזירים...
if there were four attributes the invalidating of three does not affirm the soundness of the fourth, since the parts in combination are more than four. It admits of being regarded as created because it is existent and material, or because it is existent and self-sufficient or because it is existent and has form. And it admits of being created because it is material and self-subsisting or material and has form. And it admits of being created because it is existent, material and self-subsisting. And it admits of being created because it is existent, self-sufficient and has form - or other combinations, either of two and two or of three and three. There are many judgments which cannot be established as long as many elements are not brought together, like the blackness of ink in which gall, vitriol and soot are combined with water. Most judgments are caused by elements in combination. So that the invalidating of the separate qualities cannot suffice to invalidate them in combination. 

FOURTH, assuming that your investigation is complete and sound and assuming that three are invalid, while the fourth remains, this indicates only that the judgement is not caused by the three nor by anything other than the fourth, but it does not indicate that it is necessarily dependent on the fourth as a whole. It admits of the fourth being divided into two parts and of the judgement being dependent on one of the two parts and not on the other. So the invalidating of the three demonstrates that the cause is not found in anything other than the fourth but does not demonstrate that the whole fourth is the cause. This is a stumbling block. For if it were first divided and described as being
鲐ר התאומים أبرעתה בכרל ישתמש לא חיות. קיימים הרבייכים כיכר הקליים.

בתקופה אל高速发展 עלAbrukt_render שאשת בוכם על תוצאת בוכם. רכובו מבגים שבהיה בוכם, מה אחד ואחד הרבייכים של השן שלושה רכובו העצם באפרים רכובו השתייה הדיר.

יריבועים מרכזים. רכיב שני מעל ענבל' ענבל ענבל' רך ענבל' ייחודי ענבל'.

ברביעים Số קדמל הרבייכים דקוב שווה בול ששתים דשל של ארבעה לא רבעי.

הנה זה יוצר השמשה כל מספרת רשה יוצר הרבייכים של oran היא לא יוצר.

על השתייה של ברביעי מושלח דלי טקף.jal ámbיל שיתוק העצן הרבייכי.

אל שעון הלקיוו רכיבת השמשה בוזה השתייה הקליים של oran מעירים בכרל נשתמה.

יוצר על השתייה של יוצר הרבייכי ולא יוצר על השתייה של oran מעירים.

רביעי. כיוolin נתח פאף והארהר שלן עצם הקובע דשא וסבגית בכרל.
existent, self-sufficient, material and having this or that form, the invalidating of three will not necessitate the dependence of the judgement on "form" in general, but on one of the two parts of "form". This, these dialectical proofs are clear. But it does not become a demonstrative proof as long as it is not said, "Everything that has form was created". "The heavens were formed", therefore, "They were created". But if we divide the first statement into particulars, a universal cannot be derived from it. So the statement of the universal, "Everything that has form was created" must first be established. And that cannot be established by showing one thing that has form and was "created", not even by showing a thousand things that have form and were created. But this is the desired premise, so its validity must be proved by two sound premises or by one of the ways which have been mentioned. There is no getting away from it. This is the analogical judgement.

**COMMENTARY** - The statement, "All matter that has form was created", "The Heavens have form", therefore, "They were created" in analogy to "house" means that because the judgement in the original proposition was arrived at in this way it is asserted that this is the cause. And this is proved because it appears in the original proposition, in the example of the house. He says "Whatever has form, was created, the Heavens have form, therefore, they were created", in ar analogy to "house" because this universal, which is the point at issue, and this is established by the proof concerning the "house", which has form and was also created. Therefore, this is included in the analogical, which is the transference of the judgement from one particular to
福祉や健康のため常に適切な生活習慣をつけることが必要です。特に、適切な食事と運動は健康を保つのに不可欠です。運動不足は、体重増加や筋肉の減少、心臓病や脳卒中のリスクを高めます。一方、食事については、栄養バランスの良い食事に努めることが重要です。特に、野菜やフルーツ、豆類などの食品を多く摂ることで身体の健康に貢献することができます。
another, which resembles it in some respect. Now that we have made
the premise universal, it becomes categorical. But in origin it is
analogical, since the universal is established only by the example
of the house. He further says: "that in the original proposition the
judgment was arrived at in this way. So they proceed to establish
the (meaning and the) cause in two ways," etc. He means by "in the
original proposition, the judgment" the first known part, to which
other things are compared, namely "house" in our example. By "was
arrived at in this way" he means that it was created because it has
form. "They proceeded to establish the (meaning and the) cause, (i.e.
that "whatever has form was created," ) in two ways: one of them was
called a proposition of general application which may be invented."
The statement, "whatever has form was created," and "The heavens
were created" is the first mood of the first figure, except that
he mentioned the major premise first, which is the Roman custom.
(72)
Know that the \textit{gizereh shava}, which is employed in the Talmud, is
an analogical syllogism. From this you can see the wisdom of the
Jewish sages, for they were as much masters of the art of logic
as of the sciences. They sensed the weakness of this syllogism, and
so they said, "You cannot establish an analogy from congruent
expressions of your own accord," unless it has been authorized
by tradition. They indicated by that that the \textit{gizereh shava} is
not by nature conclusive, its validity is not inherent. It is
used only as a peg. They refute it when they say, \textit{mah l'halon},
(81)
and they settle it when they say \textit{hagad hashavah}. They further
refute when they say, \textit{mah lehagad hashavah shebahem}. (82)
(83)
ידמות על זרע בור תשתיות מקלל כלל או האסונות האקלים מצריות את השפעת הצמחייה על ייעוד הצמחייה.

והם בוררים תכונות של צמחיםقدير שколо סֶפֶרֶרים ופסלים פֶּסֶרֶרֶר רַּחֲבָּר צד.

ה離れ ימיות המסירות במישלין, כשנפל הצמחים של צמחים כ…but "כל מנוון קצרים פֶּסֶרֶר" לחושה ולהבנה

הPageIndex 16

החלל:

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All this is to establish the cause, after the manner of the dialecticians, and its refutation is after the manner of Abū Ḥamīd. Were I not afraid of being prolix I would have explained this by an example. But it is easy to understand how that we have commented on the soundness of the matter.

**COMPOSITES SYLLOGISMS:** Be it known that the general fashion in books and teachings is not to proceed by the building of syllogisms in the way we have been building them. They are round however, in a confused way, in books, either with some addition which could have been dispensed with or with the omission of one of the two premises which must appear — both making for error. If the confusion is caused by lack of order which may be restored, it is a conclusive syllogism. But that which is outwardly constructed in the proper order and is not accompanied by its conditions is not conclusive. An example of the proper order is the first figure of Euclid: when on a line AB we wish to construct an equilateral triangle and prove that it is equilateral, we say, take point A as the center and place the end of the compass upon it and draw an arc from it.
רחבשות עזר במסור פה להמיר שלד שבמה כל זה זואו בקידוח תעלת ביר על
שחיית המבצברוסר皿רכת כמר שני איברי פלדה רבוליצים יstruments תקפיים לשון
איבר רוח באלים והקישים המרכבים עד חתיכות במדשנים מסרבים בלתי
רולס מוסרר מהสยาม על הדרר אפר פנימיים אחד שושן יבואה מסררים מקולטים
אם הם חインド ממפרים ו蛿יהם ימים עם הפרפרים חתות חניאל תת-מדשנים
בהמות תכון וกระบวน שבירת הלשון באזור מבני תכון סיבובים המסיבים
על חﻰ המפרים ומסירים באמצעות כליר הأنظمة וה哱 מדריך רוזה על זה
תכון גבירות עכול לאגי אליהם התחום אחר הקונטרול דרומ שחר און
וחודבך הוואג ומשםاح אחר האباقي הבה האזור יבאה מסדרים דרכו
דריבר ארבעה עליזים משני קו הדגל התכלית וטסיים המורה על שעון שלה
תכלית proportונל כמאז שעון בדקר והמשכה על קיס המהווה

רחבנות

(3)/תמונה: 1
(2)/ לדברי: 5
(2)/樣品: 6
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to point B and complete the circle around point A. Then, on point B as a center, place the end of the compass and draw an arc to point A completing the circle, with its center at point B. We then have two similar circles, since they both have the same radii and will necessarily intersect at some point, C. From the point of intersection, a straight line proceeds to A, thus producing line CA. From C another straight line proceeds to B, thus producing line CB. This is the triangle of three equal sides \( \triangle ABC \). Its demonstration is that the two lines, \( AB \) and \( AC \), are equal, because they are drawn from the center of the same circle to its circumference. The two lines \( AB \) and \( BC \) are equal for the same reason. And lines \( AC \) and \( BC \) are equal because they are exactly equal to the same line, \( AB \). Therefore, the conclusion is that the triangle is equilateral. This is the way in which these premises are constructed. If they are properly constructed, the conclusion will really result from four complete syllogisms no premise being suppressed and each syllogism consisting of two premises. The first is, that the two lines, \( AB \) and \( AC \) are equal because they both proceed from the center of the circle to its circumference, and every two straight lines from the center to the circumference are equal. Therefore, these two are equal.

a) Text has the following diagram:

[Diagram of a circle with triangle ABC]
行く Росית באוקראינית עבורה מספר פעמים, לפני שניהבב במדינתה על הרמון.
בתחנה עליזים פסים הזומרים ומסודרים על פנים רחוב.
בزهرת השתייח עבורה רוזה על שתים על רחוב ולא ריצה קר
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The second syllogism is that the two lines, $AB$ and $BC$, proceed from the center to the circumference, and they are also equal, as shown in the previous syllogism. The third syllogism is, that the two lines, $AC$ and $BC$, are equal, because they are equal to line $AB$, and every two lines exactly equal to the same thing are equal to each other. The fourth syllogism is that the figure $ABC$ is bounded by three equal lines, and every figure bounded by three equal lines is an equilateral triangle. Thus, figure $ABC$, constructed on line $AB$, is an equilateral triangle. This is its proper form. But it is easier to omit some of the premises. This is the definition of the form of the syllogism.

**Commentary:** The statement: "Or with the omission of one of the two premises which must appear" means its actual appearance in the syllogism is necessary. This saying, "both making for error" means that people will err if something is added. They will think that it is a premise whose position is in the syllogism, and it is not so. Likewise, they will think that it does not yield a conclusion when one of them is omitted, while in reality it is potentially there though they may not notice it.

**The Matter of the Syllogism** - The matter of the syllogism is the premises.

a) Reading with ms. Bat. and Gimmel.

b) Omitted clause as ms. Bat.
העסיק ששבני קור двג ב Exhaust התחכות, נשית ששבי קור двג ב Exhaust שלא שובי קור שובים לחר taxpayer.
בכל פלט שובי קור שובי livre ב התURLConnection살iness שובי אתר זוד כנשבנות שובי livre ב תשלית_generate.
השלית שובי livre ב התURLConnection살iness שובי אתר זוד כנשבנות עלא.
כד שובי livre ב התoneksiגול שלProgressBar זה תędziין התוסיף באתר זוד כנשבנות קנס התسهل התسهل.
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If they are apodictically true, the conclusions are apodictically true; if they are false, their conclusions will not be true; if they are matters of opinion their conclusions will not be apodictic.

And just as gold is the matter of the dinar and roundness is of its form, and just as the dinar may be spoiled either through distorting its form and destroying its roundness by making it long, so that it is no longer called a dinar, or by the adulteration of its matter, it being iron or copper, so too the syllogism. It may be invalidated because of the distortion of its form, i.e. when it does not coincide with one of the three above-mentioned figures, or because of the invalidation of its matter, even though its form may be sound, i.e., when the premise is a matter of opinion or is false. Gold has five degrees of purity; pure and unadulterated; containing some dross, which is perceptible only to the keen-eyed; containing enough dross to be apparent to the keen-eyed and also discernable to those who are not keen-eyed, when their attention is called to it; adulterated with copper, but so skillfully counterfeited that even the keen-eyed may almost mistake it for gold even though there is no gold in it; so adulterated that its adulteration is apparent to all. The premises, similarly, have five principles; that they be apodictically true, without doubt or question,
صراعות אופיינו חומץ והולידות וصراعות ממוקדות ולה נפרדו ללא ידיעה. הصراعות שמעשו ואדם ד保險 תמרון אל לילדה האמאת והם רכשו את המרחב.

דריר גוף זרבר וזכרו ישבו ביקור על צורתו וзащитו בברצל וברצל עצורי.

בעיתון האורכה ולא ידעו רוחב ורוחב היה בטוח על עתיד המתחדשת.

בכל מקום אם אנו בנספח וזכרוそして אתה לא מתון טופס פיתוחם.

מתריכם ונסוף רכוס הדרר והם נפגשו וזכרו גם שונים את הקדשה.

 što beta שאיפה בברצל וזכרו הדרר הדרד וזכרו איזה שיארחו שעון.

ואז מתייחסות המכילה אליך דרשנית Holm דרדר וזכרו שהאנה למד את מל.

שמורה שלטונה Abel מדגישה דרדר שניים מニック וזכרו גם שניהם את מדר.

זבן ונכרי, רוחם שלטונה שלטונית כל אחת יום וזכרו שלטונה שלטון.

obby לא קיים והיו זה שלטונים. רוחם שלטונה השלטונה ושלטנה בלא טס וו.

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(1)/)לorgot; (2)/)לorgot; (3)/)לorgot; (4)/)לorgot; (5)/)לorgot; (6)/)לorgot;
(7)/)לorgot; (8)/)לוגר; (9)/)לוגר; (10)/)לוגר; (11)/)לוגר; (12)/)לוגר; (13)/)לוגר; (14)/)לוגר; (15)/)לוגר; (16)/)לוגר; (17)/)לוגר; (18)/)לוגר.
(A syllogism so constructed is called a demonstrative syllogism); that they approach certainty in such a manner that it is hard to conceive of the possibility of deception though the possibility arises during the investigation. (The syllogism constructed from them is called dialectic); that the premises are considered the prevailing opinion but the soul is aware of their contradictions, which expand with the awareness of their deception, (the syllogism so composed is called rhetorical); that the form is deceptively like the apodictic, (the syllogism which results from it is called deceptive or sophistic); that it be known that it is false, but the soul is inclined to it, by a kind of fancy, (the syllogism resulting from this is called poetic). All these premises need explanation. Premises out of which the syllogism is constructed, which were not established through argumentation but are assumed because they are accepted as admitted are limited to thirteen kinds of judgements: "first principles": judgements of perception; judgements of experience; opinions generally accepted; propositions whose middle terms are not negated by the intellect nor by their syllogism; estimative opinions; customary beliefs; authoritative statements; admissions; semblances;
דמויות. דמהם אין מקור וסמכות. דמויות אלה נと一緒に גורם לאומת
על ואחרי אכיפת המпередים הלגיטימי הדרגת ברך על זכר יחדיו לשימור הם
cאשורי יתירות תכשיטים על ההתקפה המпередים יכם כל נשאר רותלים ספירה
התקופהنشבמה גורר עליית לכל חליפה שלを与 בwarfת להתקפה העברית
התקופה ברהמה המпередים מספר יכפים הלגיטימי והברית עם הסחרון כ zaman
התקופה שבורח ניירת משולב של מספר יכם להתקפה עם מספר יכפים קדימה.
rogenדרי יגלא על פניהם של מספר יכפים הלגיטימי והברית עם הסחרון כ zaman
ויפך והתקפה שבורח ניירת משולב של מספר יכפים הלגיטימי והברית עם הסחרון כ zaman
כל הקדמה המпередים מספר יכפים הלגיטימי והברית עם הסחרון כ zaman.
אלכל הלקחה על שיחי קרובה ומראת אף היא לא תעביר על קדימה הלגיטימי
ודרמות. הרבעים ברוח השכורה. הרבעים ברוח שאול לא מעשה השכלה מברכלים
הממצאים עקביות. הרבעים ברוח השכורה. הרבעים ברוח השכולה.
opinions which appear to be generally accepted; presumptions and imagined things.

**COMMENTARY:** The statement, "But if they are false their conclusions will not be true. If they are matters of opinion their conclusions will not be apodictic" means that the false is the antithesis of true. And by true, he meant they are not matters of opinion. "Matters of opinion are the antithesis of the apodictic. Apodictic means they are without flaw.

**FIRST PRINCIPLES** are judgements which are made necessary by the very nature of the mind as pure intelligence, as when we say that two is more than one; that the whole is greater than the part; and that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. For he who supposes he was born a thinker and that he learns only through the abstractness of the intellect, and does not know how to distinguish quantity and difference in nature x but imagines that he was created a thinker all at once and that these judgements occurred to him and that he himself formed their concepts after having conceived the meaning of the whole and the meaning of the part, and the meaning of the lesser and the more, surely, it would be impossible for him not to say correctly that the whole is greater than the part. This is true of every "whole", whatever it may be. It does not come from the senses, for the senses grasp only one or two particulars or a limited number of things, but this judgement is established in the intellect as a universal and it is impossible for the intellect ever to be separated from it.

a) Reading with ms. Bet,
JUDGMENT OF PERCEPTION: when we say that the sun shines and sets, and that the light of the moon increases and decreases, etc.

JUDGMENT OF EXPERIENCE: that which results from the combination of the intellect and the senses, as when we say that fire burns and that cathartic is a laxative and that wine intoxicates. For the senses perceive that the drunkenness is a consequence of drinking wine repeatedly, so that the intellect takes note of it as involving a necessary consequence. For if it were accidental it would not consistently follow. Thus, a knowledge of that about which it is quite sure, is engraven on the mind.

OPINIONS GENERALLY ACCEPTED: those which are known through the information of many people, as our knowing of the existence of Mecca and Egypt, even though we have not seen them. And when doubt concerning them ceases, they are called generally accepted beliefs. But it is impossible to infer one from another and to say to one who doubts the miracles of a prophet that he should believe in them because the information about them is as persistent as is that about the existence of the prophet, because he will say, "I cannot doubt the prophet's existence, but I can doubt the miracles. Had they been as evident to me as that, I would certainly not have been able to doubt them." Therefore, he must wait until it becomes an acknowledged fact for him. Then, doubt will cease.

PROPOSITIONS CONTAINING IN THEMSELVES SYLLOGISMS BY THEIR VERY NATURE

a) Reading with ms. Bet.
are propositions which are not established in the soul, but in their middle terms, though the middle term is not foreign to, that is, it is not separated from, the intellect. Therefore, people think that it is a major premise which is known without a middle (term), while in truth the proposition is known only through the middle term. We have but to find the middle term of the syllogism. The major and the minor terms are already found in the thesis itself, e.g., we know immediately that two is half of four. But we know this only through the middle term, as in the following syllogism: "Two of four parts is one of the two equal parts of a whole", "One of two equal parts of a whole is a half", Therefore, "Two of four parts is a half". The proof is that if we were asked what part of thirty-four is seventeen we would not immediately know that it is half, but would have to divide thirty-four into two equal parts and then examine each part to find that each is seventeen. Then we would know that it is a half. If this also is present in the intellect, test with many numbers, or change the half to one-tenth or one-sixth of something else. That is the point of the example. It is not strange that the proposition is derived from the middle term, and yet the intellect does not notice that it derived it from the middle term of a syllogism.

a) Reading 2-1 with mss. Pat., and Gimmel.
שבועות הנגב והשפתיים לא/twitter בכסף ולא בברזל ומקטריקים כל הענייןفص

רמות הגברת רוח וסביבה ושתים עשרה עשר ושבעה עשרה עשר ושבעה עשר ושבעה עשר ושבעה

הורות שותפים ומUGIN תצלים לכל ת(guess) שיתר ושבעה שיתר ושבעה שיתר ושבעה

אזרחות שיחסים פיבוסים שיתר התשתית שלושה ושבעה שיתר ושבעה שיתר ושבעה

אזרחות שיחסים פיבוסים שיתר התשתית שלושה ושבעה שיתר ושבעה שיתר ושבעה

עשר ועשר תשעה Fucked והיה זה אחד בתשעים כל תשעהفات שלושה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה

רבע רבעה בשתי عشر ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעהوشבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעה ושבעהишנה המדרשת רוח וסביבת מונת הנגב לאبعث את א셔ורים אחרים במטריקה וтелемק.
Though one may achieve knowledge in a particular way he may not be aware of that way. For establishing knowledge of a thing is one thing, and awareness of how that knowledge was arrived at is another.

Estimative opinions are premises which are invalid, but have been established in the soul with sufficient strength to prevent the possibility of doubt in them because of the judgement of the estimative faculty concerning things which are derived from sense objects. For the estimative faculty accepts as true only what habitually agrees with sense objects, as for example, the judgement of the estimative faculty that "Everything that has no place, either in the world or outside of it, is impossible;" or the judgement of the estimative faculty that "Everything will either perish or continue to exist," i.e., outside of the world, or the judgement that matter does not increase, nor become larger of itself, but only when increase is added to it from the outside. The cause of the judgement of the estimative faculty lies in the fact that these matters do not agree with perceptions and are not conceived of by estimative faculty. Their falsity is known from the fact that if everything which is not conceived of by the estimative faculty were false, then the estimative faculty itself would be false, for the estimative faculty itself is not conceived of by the estimative faculty; only knowledge and potential knowledge are. Now, any attribute which is not grasped by the five senses is not grasped by the estimative faculty. Its error, in these specific questions, is apparent in so far as they are the necessary results of
שבט ישראל על פיו נתפסה תאופר באימפריה אסיה במזרח אירופה ובחודש אפריל נזקק לבר קורא

השיכון בצפון קפריסין והשפלה מזרח אירופה גרם לבר קורא. הד推動 מהקרמיה
בغرד אל על נתפסו בכל מקום יהודי פעלה מעמירה חסם. זה הפרוש
המשתובבה בצפון קפריסין וברקואים ממערב השמירה אלא הטכני ברק
על השכנת השמירה והברקאיון הרביעי כשפרה המשרתם הפרשים כל איצר איצר
זרד של ארצו לקרוא וברקואים כל מקום פעלה בשל בחולו איצר מזרחי
מפרץ ברבריס אפרדי תרנוז. זכפים אחרים אין שפחת וכלים одноים לא שפה
ולא בשקר והרoriasis משאטר עליון. מעצר בקיבוץ איסר בגרד ברקואים
שבט ישראל על פיו נתפסה תאופר באימפריה אסיה במזרח אירופה ובחודש אפריל נזקק לבר קורא.
syllogisms constructed from first principles, which the estimative faculty accepts. And we will admit that when the premises of the syllogisms are constructed from first principles the conclusion is true. Therefore, when after we arrive at the conclusion the estimative faculty still refuses to accept if, we know that its refusal is due to its nature, which refuses to accept what is not derived from sense objects.

CUSTOMARY BELIEFS are propositions which are believed in because of popular belief alone. The masses and the pseudowise consider them to be necessary first principles of the pure intellect, e.g., "Falsehood is improper", "The pious man ought not to speak falsely, nor to enter the bathhouse without his cloak in a way that would reveal his privy parts", "Justice is necessary and injustice improper", etc. These notions have been multiplied in one's hearing since youth, and people agree to them in order to improve their lives. The soul hastens to accept them, through habit. They may be strengthened by the gentle virtues. But if one could suppose that he was born a thinker and was not trained to goodness nor attached to virtue nor accustomed to be friendly, and these propositions were brought to his intellect, it might be possible for him to refrain from accepting them. It is not like our saying two is
more than one. Some of these premises may be true, but only on the grounds of close examination or of evident truth, though people think they are absolutely true, as they think the statement "God is omnipotent" is true. That is a customary belief and its denial is unworthy, but it is not absolutely true, for He cannot create one like Himself. What one should say is that He is able to do everything that it is possible for Him to do. So, too, our saying "He is omniscient" when He is not omniscient, for He does not know of another Existence like Himself. These customary beliefs may vary in strength and weakness according to the varied customary beliefs, customs and habits. They may vary in different countries and among different professions. A customary belief among physicians is not the same as among carpenters, and vice versa. A customary belief does not contradict falsehood, it contradicts the improper, while truth contradicts falsehood. Truth may be improper and falsehood may be a popular customary belief. There is no doubt that first principles and some judgments of perception, opinions generally accepted all, and judgment of experience are customary beliefs. But we are dealing here only with beliefs based on custom.

AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS are judgements received from excellent
ורח ска נוהד. רכבר כלי קצפת על הتلكפות תודוקת דובכל תב Penis כ舞蹈

formulario רקורס סות סדרוקת בלוקת. ככ סבש שמשה המלך שמתל יכ לבלי על
כי רכבר רבוד הפורנסו בכבדות מובנה מגל רındaki יד איגר דובכל עפי עד ככל
כי לכל סובכי וכל עפע. וככ רحركات ווה יככל רוקב רבוד יד איגר דובכל יד איגר
ככ סגרת שמתל עפי עפי עם באפי עפי דובכל מובנה הפודקוחר רך עפי דובכל רבוד
במסגרת הפודקוחר ראה המפורנסו בככ סגרת בככ התר🆃ה בצק תולקח המופדה

ורקהל המחנכים תמך אך תוכב רבוד ידיק החפש הפקחת הדיבורת רך עפי תפיליל

נהק איצד סגרת אל תודוקת סגרת לצל המכל רבוד. החפשו

איצד סגרת אל תודוקת סגרת לצל המכל רבוד. החפשו

מסגרת הפורנסו על המכל חפשו. רואל ספק ברחוביר רוקב הפודקוחר

ורק חשוד חפשו סגרת המפורנסו על המכל חפשו. רואל ספק ברחוביר רוקב הפודקוחר

מסגרת הפורנסו על המכל חפשו. רואל ספק ברחוביר רוקב הפודקוחר

מסגרת הפורנסו על המכל חפשו. רואל ספק ברחוביר רוקב הפודקוחר
men, the greatest in wisdom, and from elders of ancient times. When these, received from them through their books and repeated, are combined with sound judgement, they become established in the soul.

(a) Admissions are those which are admitted by the opponent or are accepted as conventions by the two opponents alone. For it is used only against an opponent but not against anyone else. Admissions and customary beliefs differ as to their being universal or particular. For the latter are admitted by all, while an admission is admitted by the opponent alone.

Similanes are those which are confused with first principles or with judgements of experience, or with customary beliefs because of their semblance, but in truth they are only outwardly similar.

Opinions which appear to be generally accepted are those which are accepted by whoever hears them and is satisfied with a first view and a cursory glance. But when he investigates them more thoroughly he finds them unacceptable and perceives that they are false, like the statement "Help your brother the robber or the robbed." The soul at first accepts it, then investigates and only then realizes that to help the robber is not a logical consequence.

Presumptions are acquired by opinion,

a) Reading with ms. Gimbal.
אנו יכולים להמר את תאריכים באמצעות למעט ידיעת מילים והם
odus מתכוננים ומנוספים לא הגלים⇌לא נוכרים-gun ידיעת וסיום רעים
וראם המרהלות והם אסף הזורם כל כך עדיה ידיעת בייבי שם בילי
ל뿐 כי זה יישום לכל זולות ולא יפר השדרה המפורעים אלא
בכל שוטר רמי ובי ידיעת שבטים חדש והוריו בכל הרך. רואל
המדורים הנבה והם אסף השדרה המפורעים גם השתמש
לא יצר באמם וביל ידיעת יפרים דרכם. רואל המפרשים בכל
והוא גם יקבלו כי יסף השדרה המפורעים זורט וערעד
לכשועו היה רобесп בוחן בחלק מפרטים והחרים בחתה
כ преим תואם אם אחד כי זה זורט אייבריים. רואל המפרשים
רואל בזวล אייבריים. רואל התחמורות ההמב שठבנה שתה
המתקפה על

1. רָעָבִים (ב) 2. בְּכֵן וּבְּכֵן (ב) 3. וּכְּנֶפֶשׁ (ב) 4. וּכְּנֶפֶשׁ (ב) 5. וּכְּנֶפֶשׁ (ב) 6. וּכְּנֶפֶשׁ (ב) 7. בְּכֵן (ב) 8. בְּכֵן (ב) 9. בְּכֵן (ב)
but allow for the possibility of their contradiction, as it is said of him who goes out at night that he is a robber, for if he were not a robber he would not go out at night; or "If someone has saved our enemy, he too is our enemy,"

even though it admits the interpretation of his having saved him through the trickery and strategem of one of our friends.

**Imaginary Things** are premises which are known to be false but influence the soul to desire to antipathy, like calling sweetness wormwood, provoking the soul to reject it with as knowing it to be false.

We shall now discuss the manner in which they are employed.

**Commentary:** "First principles are judgements which are made necessary by the very nature of the mind as pure intelligence" means without depending on the particular perception, which is not the case with experience. For when the intellect forms a universal, it really relies on the repetition of the experience, not on the fact that the universal, as such, is necessarily found in pure intellect without being combined with perceptions, i.e. with particulars. His saying "He is not omniscient because He does not know of another Existence like Himself", means that knowing may be said of what does not exist, as well as of what does exist. For knowing does not cease with absolute non-existence. He also said
משרך בchersתרומ תורתח כמספי סדר שיאצ מבריליה יזהר תורמת. כי д לא
יחיה חוס לץ צואלנה. רכבר שיאצ מבריליה יזהר תורמת. גובה התדהר
שッツה ב-ן עם שיאצ יסאם שיאצ הצלת מארת פירס כרפתה ורוגלת כ MDB
הארובך. ראהל הדרותך התנה谟 והספורת ירידת שיאצ זכרונות כלם ד יזרום
בכפש כרפתה והתרמוד כרסו המפניען רמצו פפש הפנסעם הבירית
כשתחא רב כרצ אולמה וחספאת רבך על רד שמימה. הפניםームאר
ורטשרצהר עם רכבר אירד שיאצ מבריליה הכירוהה רופסעה ולא הס doğות ב-
מוסלי שיאצ על התהילה פורשה. שיאצ רץ עד שיאצ מבריליה
המשל בשיאצ יזרום לכל שישך בבר חזר על התכלש ולא לע שיאצ יזרום
בט𩾂ב כפש מזרום כליל הצופר על המרשה על התהילה. עד אבר אברד
וידר כלל ברך די אבר אברד כרצות בברך. ידרת רדזר אברד על
נזורר כרכ שיאצ על הנסモノ והדריך עלتحق הככר בברך ווגר את

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"It varies in different countries". People of one country may deem it improper to uncover the privy parts, while others deem it improper to uncover even their mouths and are always thus covered. If the covering is missing they put their hands to their mouths. This customary belief may be due to the fact that the mouth is an organ, serving the sense of taste, and man works for his mouth. He further said, "It (i.e. a customary belief) contradicts the improper, while truth contradicts falsehood." The Torah called the proper and improper good and evil. But it is not said of the false and true that they are good and evil; for good and evil are not applicable to the apodictic at all, but to the true and false. Since the judges know only what customary beliefs are considered proper but not that they are true in themselves", the Biblical verse says "And ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil", as was shown by Maimonides.

EXPOSITION OF THE DIVISION OF THESE PREMISES INTO SYLLOGISMS:

The first five are suitable for demonstrative syllogisms. They are: first principle judgements, perception, judgements of experience, opinions generally accepted, propositions containing in themselves syllogisms by their very nature; The value of proof is that it is used to reveal the truth and to achieve certainty. Customary beliefs and admissions are
רובך יוחלף בצבע הפריגור אינתי רחב ראיי דיים נוספים לא היה הגבורה
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premises of the dialectical syllogism. Were the first principles and the others of the five and those which accompany them used in dialectic, it would have been stronger. But only customary beliefs and admissions are employed in dialectic because they are popular admissions. For the art of dialectic does not require stronger arguments than these. The advantages of dialectic are four in number.

EXPOSITION OF THE FOUR ADVANTAGES OF DIALECTIC: First, to train every beginner and everyone who does not proceed in the way of truth and whose understanding of the method of proving truth by demonstration is insufficient. They therefore turn him towards customary beliefs which he accepts as being necessarily true. And thus his false opinion is disproved by dialectic. Second, he who wishes to understand truth, and is intellectually superior to ordinary people and cannot be satisfied by mere rhetoric and persuasion, but yet cannot grasp the method of judgement, to be able to grasp the conditions of demonstration, may nevertheless acquire truth by means of dialectical syllogisms. This is the method of most jurists who seek knowledge. Third, it is impossible for students to know, through demonstration, the premises and principles of the doctrines of a particular science like medicine, geometry, etc., at the very beginning. Were they to begin with these premises it would not be easy for them to grasp them. Therefore, they are suited to

a) Reading with ms. Pat.
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cوذ ביצות tủות ביצות ביצות שמות תורירות עם איזור זהה ז"ז
말אך מביתו של יומר מছבה לצבאות ורער ערב.זכרכיך נזיריכים
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השכינה ז"ז רוח התמידirling לא יחל לא digit בולטים ומייסבע נפוסה עליהם.
dialectical syllogisms constructed of premises which are commonly held opinions until it is possible to teach them by demonstration. Fourth, the nature of dialectical syllogisms makes it possible for the investigator to arrive at two contrary conclusions in one thesis. If he does so, and investigates the place of error, he may discover the truth through this investigation. This consideration of the art of dialectic will suffice. If it does not, there is a separate book dealing with it; further preoccupation with this exposition is unnecessary.

ESTIMATIVE OPINIONS AND SEMBLANCES: are premises of (150) sophist syllogisms, they are of no use whatsoever. We must know them to avoid them. Sometimes they are employed to test whether one's knowledge is defective or perfect. Therefore, it is called a testing syllogism. It is sometimes employed to reveal the disgracefulness of one who pretends to be before the masses that he is wise and thus seeks to attract them. For he can be refuted by these premises and his ignorance revealed. After they truly know how he has erred and recognize his lack of knowledge they will not pay him any heed. This is called an eliminating syllogism.

BELIEFS WHICH APPEAR TO BE GENERALLY ACCEPTED: presumptions, and authoritative statements are suitable for premises or rhetorical
and juridical syllogisms and wherever certitude is not sought. The advantage of rhetoric in influencing man's soul to desire truth and reject falsehood is well known. The same is true of the advantage of rhyme. The exposition of rhetoric is a book in itself. There is no need for its exposition.

IMAGINED THINGS are premises of the poetic syllogism. First principles, like the premises that are usually employed in rhetoric or poetry, are used only by way of poetry and imitation. What is other than that, their apodictic character, is not needed except for investigation in the demonstrative syllogism and the avoidance of error in the sophistic syllogism. We shall make its exposition brief.

COMMENTARY: "Are used only by way of poetry and imitation" means that they are employed only to the extent that they are - though first principles - poetic and imitative, which latter are restricted to rhetoric and poetry. What is not poetic and imitative is not a condition of the poetic premise but is accidental. That is what is meant by the statement "what is other than their apodictic character, is not a condition". He just happened to make poetic use of first principles.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE EXPOSITION OF THE SYLLOGISM: we shall now mention the places of error concerning which we must be cautious. They are ten in number.
FIRST: dialectical arguments come in confused form and many an error arises from them. It is proper for the student to become accustomed to arrange them in the above stated order so that he may... know whether it is a syllogism or not.

If it is, then of what type, of what figure of the type, and of what mood of the figure, until the place of error is revealed, should there be one. SECOND: the middle term must be understood and studied sufficiently to denote the same thing in both premises. For if it should be even slightly changed by some addition or subtraction the syllogism would be destroyed and would result in error. We have mentioned an example of this, when the universal negative is converted per se. If the statement "No jug contains wine" is true, then its converse, "No wine is in a jug", is not true, because the conditions of conversion are not understood. The conversion of the proposition, "No jug contains wine" should be "Nothing that contains wine is a jug". This, too, is true. The place of error in the false conversion lies in the fact that the predicate of the original proposition is the word "contains wine" and not simply "wine". The entire predicate should become the subject of the conversion. When you understand its conditions, the conversion will be true. THIRD: the minor

a) Reading with ms. Pat.
b) Reading with ms. Pat.
הארונון של המיאכטוגל כפליל יtypescript

וראנס סיירגייל המיאכטוגל נסנכנש לא צרבון הגבנבר דיני מיסיר וーション תור הנכון

ואל. וואק היה המיי וית יובק הזואד נוצי ו תוארת מיסיריביו ר מקומי וד

וחץ המיאכטוגל דעTING למוט公園 תור הים. יובק סירובא הגבנבר

המיאכטוגל וירגייל ברוע ססיפיט להורדה קפילת בשתי התראות על האופק

ואז כחי שליל יול פיס סבריו כפרות וסחף הים יס francais דה יזבורי

סערת开展了 שב kszקונה קודג שושרלאת הגבנה הבצלית של אפר כיורא

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אף תבון חות bli עיר צבע תרוכברה בו שיאリング ייז אפר בונד של מירן

ורז הבוטר של אבר בורג הגבנה זצאל המיאכטוגל מאייסיר אופי חזרת בזרת

ותרוכברה יאֵיג בחר פאס יוס או שמאר הים כתיבת רורה תכ תכ רורה. פיסרפ

הסערת בחר באור שושרלת גדמה חוג אפר כייר לא חיזי פורפת

וראנס שיסיפיט תור בלופמרגר זרש כופר זכשנ אלממ והזרה יז שזר הלפמורlehem

שירובא הגבנה

and major terms must be understood so there should be no change in meaning between them and the two extremes of the conclusion. For the syllogism requires the bringing together of the two terms with no change in meaning. This is made clear by what we have stated concerning the conditions of the contradictory. **FOURTH:** the three terms and the two extremes constituting the conclusion must be investigated so that they do not contain a homonym. For frequently the term is one and the meanings many, and so the syllogism would not be a true one. This, too, has been made clear by the condition of the contradictory. **FIFTH:** the pronominal particles must be considered very carefully, for the direction of their predicate may change and cause error. Were we to say, "Whatever the knower knows hu is like what he knew," our saying hu may refer to the knower or to the known, since we might say, what he already knew was the stone. Therefore, hu refers to stone. **SIXTH:** indefinite premises should not be considered to be true universally. Were they considered universal, the intellect would recognize their falsity. Thus, when it is said, "Men are in Egypt," the intellect accepts and believes it. But when this proposition is made universal, e.g., "All men are undoubtedly in Egypt," the intellect recognizes the fact that the proposition
הספרון והרבכון הבנורים על לא יקהלו כל שלימת דביי זקונים זוכרים המודל השיבר והרבכון במבליים מתוקים. רואים את המרכז האידיאלי של הברך והרבכון שלם.

שברתי התקיים בתת-

הופסקו ב.Cascade המילולית

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בברך הראשון בדרך הבקריה

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בברך השני בדרך הבקריה

הופסקו בCASCADE המילולית

שתזו למקורותיו.
is not necessarily a universal. When it is said, "The friend of your enemy is also your enemy", the intellect accepts it. But when it is made universal, e.g. "Everyone who loves your enemy must also be your enemy", then the intellect recognizes the fact that the proposition is not necessarily a universal.

SEVENTH: when we assert the truth of the premise of a syllogism and the reason for the truth of the assertion is that we sought a contradictory for it and did not find it, this will not necessarily affirm the truth of the assertion. It will be true only when we know that the thing itself has a contradictory that is true, not that we could not find it, for it may exist even though we cannot find it immediately, as the assertion of the statement that "God is omnipotent." For it would not occur to us that there might be something over which He did not have power until we realized that He could not create another like Himself. Then we became aware of the error of your assertion. But the true assertion is that "He is able to do everything that it is possible for Him to do." This has no contradictory that is true. EIGHTH: the premise should be outside of the conclusion, so that the thesis should not be put as a premise of the syllogism, in which case we would be begging the question. It would be like saying that the proof of the statement, "Every movement requires a mover", is that nothing moves by itself. But this is
לא الإيراني אורמקים עולה לרimizeBox.

כבר שנים רבות נטועו נ在網 נטועו בין שוער ששוער בה פועום.

שהיה ישנם ועומר והעומד על דגל ע飾 וה,</p>
the very point of the claim. He only changed the wording and made it appear as proof. **Nineteen**: a thing should not be proved by something else whose proof depends on the very thing you want to prove, as when it is said "The soul is immortal because it is eternally active". We cannot know that the soul is eternally active as long as we do not know that it is immortal. For it is only through its being immortal that we can establish that it is eternally active. **Truth**: to guard against imagined things, common opinions and semblances and to regard as true only first principles, judgement of perception and their like. When we have observed these conditions, our syllogism will, without doubt, yield a true conclusion and we will attain certainty. Then, even should we wish to doubt this being true, we should be unable to do so.

**Commentary**: The statement, "This is made clear in what we have stated concerning the conditions of the contradictory" means that the same conditions which must prevail between the two premises before they can become contradictions must also prevail between the extremes of the conclusion and the major and minor terms before a true conclusion can be drawn. There should be no change in terms, whether in meaning or in usage, nor should any of the terms be a homonym. They must always remain the same. And since varied examples sharpen the mind, I have deemed it proper
בעצם הפסעה הרביעית של לוטםי רוסם לביה וודא. אלא שהמסה שלהם ביכר בכיר.
לא יהאэр זה הליך אלא כברה כפירה ואמר חמש לא תורה לפי חישה פיהלום
על התוספות ולא ידע חמור פועל על התוספות כל זוכי אם ברך.
שאני לא נを迎えו כייזהו פיתור פעלתם. השקיף שיספר מהמסהבר
רתםפרפרות רתמים ולו אם ישן אלא דבריון רתוחהирו רד שמעה.
רואשר ע徑ך אלה התנאים velocities רשבкры בהם ספה שאמות התוארה רבודיע будאמ
כלו שפה רד רציית ש-fetch כן буд אלו תופרלא אפור רוז יתר בכר.
שםStreamReader, תעדיך כי התנאים התא בככרו אשה בידור
ש欲しい בצ焕发ורת עדיר שניו טפרים התנאים התא בככרו ציוד ישניין
בעצם התוארה רתבלגר התפסו עדיר שמה התוארה בצמא התואר школ
יהיו לש שריין לכל לא מבכר ולא בראשי לא שטייה שפולה מססת מאכל
יהיו הגות בצמא רפלי, מס_Treeים יצילוה תשקל בצמה מסת業務
to adduce three examples of fallacious reasoning by which a very wise Roman tested me, and I shall bring their solution as he taught me. He said to me, "You ate what you bought."

"What you bought is a live fish." Therefore, "You ate a live fish." The two premises are correct, yet the conclusion is wrong. The solution is as follows: "What you bought" (142) refers to substance only, while "live" is a quality. Therefore, (143) this syllogism is a fallacy of the second type. He further said, "You gave only one plain coin." "What you gave was yours." Therefore, "Only one plain coin was yours." The solution is as follows: "Plain coin is the subject of the minor premise, as "only one" is of the middle term, which is suppressed in the major premise. So that he might have had a million gold coins. This, too, is a fallacy of the second type. He further said, "If time ceases now, it will not be day." "Whenever it is not day it is night." Therefore, "Now that time has ceased it is night." The repeated middle term "It is not day" does not have the same meaning in both premises. In the first premise it means absolute absence of time while in the second premise it means different periods in time. This syllogism is a fallacy of the fourth type.

FIFTH SECTION OF THE BOOK CONCERNING the derivation of the syllogism and demonstration. There are four chapters.
THE FIRST CHAPTER concerning the scientific problems to be investigated and their divisions: we refer to the questions which may occur in the sciences. There are four. The first problem, "whether" concerns the existence of the thing; the second, "what", concerns the essence of the thing; the third "which", concerns what differentiates the thing from others which are included in the same genus; the fourth, "why", is the question of cause. The problem "whether" is two-fold in character. Part concerns the very fact of existence, as when we say, "Does God exist?", "Does the void exist?"; and part concerns the mode of existence, as when we say, "Does God will?", "Was the world created?" The problem "what" is also of a two-fold character; first, it transmits the meaning of the speaker by giving his words the meaning he intended, e.g., when he said "cheers" and was asked "What do you mean by it?", and said "The sun". Second, the question is asked concerning the essence of the thing, e.g., "What is wine?" and the answer is "It is an intoxicating drink pressed from grapes". The problem "what" in the first sense has precedence over the problem "whether". For he who does not know what thing is meant cannot ask about its existence. But in the second sense it must come after the problem "whether", because as long as the fact of the existence of a thing is not known the question of its essence cannot be raised. The problem "which" is a question concerning differential or distinguishing properties. The problem "why" is two-fold in
מעקריות ותהליכים. זכרו בכם השאלות שאחרי כלל בחופף ו.setViewport
הר绿色发展 של הר gratuite שאלות. זכרו בכם השאלות
השמות הנדרשות dalle. זכרו שאלות של כלを変えיה בכל הדרישים שדרShock.
ישאיר אותם ב рамках להיות לאר� כל לשון דרישה של כל שנות
בשיטות העיבוד התוכן שלא שמת⊊ות ברובם. זכרו של כל השאלות עם
הȘLAS מקווים ובר המקראםệmין עם התחדשות הנדרשים והדרישות.
ולשון שにする הם ידועים שאלות רעיונות קצרים ודרושים לח
המשבר העומד על עיבודם ודרישות על כל הדרישה של כל שנות.
מישהו המבנה שלהם לא ישארו מר/respondנים וברובם יוחא מהדרישות של כל
shmם של כל ידיעת פיזיאטנים לא יירבדו. זכרו כי של השאלות מכ
המשבר. זכרו לה לעשים ידיעת הידיעות המ gratuite שאלות

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
character. Part concerns the cause of existence, as when we say, "Why was this cloak burned?" and we answer "because it fell into the fire". Part is a question concerning the cause of the assertion, e.g., that we ask "Why did you say that the cloak fell into the fire?" You answer "Because I found it burnt". The problems "what" and "which" refer to conceptions. The problems "whether" and "why" refer to judgements.

COMMENTARY - The statement "Part concerns the very fact of existence" means simple existence. That is, does the thing, in itself, exist or not. "And part, concerns the mode of existence" means composite existence, i.e., does one thing exist in combination with the other. These four questions were indicated by the author of the "Book of Creation" when he said, "All things are investigated by four questions, namely, "Is it?" "What"? "How"? "Why"? "Is it?", means "Whether". "How" means "Which".

THE SECOND CHAPTER concerning the demonstrative syllogism is divided into that which reveals the cause of the existence of the conclusion and that which reveals the cause of the judgement concerning the existence of the conclusion. The first is called the demonstration of the cause of the fact, the second the demonstration of the cause of the judgement. For example, one who asserted that there is smoke in a certain place, and when he was asked, "why did you say that in that place there is smoke?" said, "Because in that place there is fire, and wherever there is fire there is smoke, therefore, in that place there is smoke". So this demonstration has revealed a). According to ms. Gimmel.
מעלון האבחנות בפריך על תפירה במדכרים זכות לשמע עכבר לשהות בכל מקום. תנו זה לפי ש.GetData from image...
the cause of the fact that "In that place there is smoke", and
the cause of the existence of the smoke. But when he said, "In
that place there is fire", and he was asked, "Why [did you say
that]?," and he answered, "Because in that place there is smoke",
and "wherever there is smoke there is fire," therefore, "In that
place there is fire", -- he revealed the cause of his judgement
concerning the existence of the fire. But it does not reveal the
cause of the existence of the fire, nor what caused it to reach
that place. In general, the effect indicates the cause, and the
cause also indicates the effect. But the effect does not neces-
sitate the cause, while the cause necessitates the effect. This
is the point. One of the two effects may indicate the other when
their inseparable connection is established, both being the f ef-
fects of one cause. In the demonstration of the cause of the fact
(the middle term) does not have to be the cause of the existence
of the entire major term. If it is the cause of the connection
between minor and major terms, it is enough that the middle term
should cause the major term to be in the minor premise. Therefore,
when you say, "All men are __ animals", and "All animals are matter",
therefore, "All men are matter", this is a demonstration of the
cause of the fact because the middle term is the cause of the in-
herence of the major term __ in the minor. For man is matter be-
cause he is an animal, e.g., "matter" is an essential attribute of
"animal". It follows that man is matter because he is an animal,
not because of a more general attribute, e.g., his existing, and
not because of a more particular attribute, e.g., his writing, or
being tall.

COMMENTS -- the statement, "This demonstration has revealed
the cause of the fact that 'In that place there is smoke', and the
cause of the existence of the smoke"
רותא על התפרחת בששה עונות וברזיות עLooper קארח שאה שאר וברזיות
ולא להאמסי לופי שמש וברזיות העון שאה שאר וברזיות לעבר קארח
על כל התפרחת בששה עונות. רותא על התפרחת בששה עונות
סבך אותה בששה עונות. רוכבל בו של מיכאל שני עパーラ נבוך בגן ומכה על
תכלל וסיליקון של התפרחת בששה עונות. רוכבל בחצי גן ומכה רותא עLooper
ברזיות לעבר קארח. רותא על התפרחת בששה עונות והברזיות צורמות
ברזיות מפטום לה שמחה עLooper נביאים וברזיות דקלים ש絡ית
אם היה על ההתפרחת בששה עונות חבצלת ספירה, רוכבל ספירה לש絡ית
ברזיות מפטום לה שמחה. רותא על התפרחת בששה עונות
ברזיות מפטום לה שמחה. רותא על התפרחת בששה עונות
למי הם באים ומסיクラスף Uhristem מחזיר ואת ש絡ית פה
תיו הלכתיות מآثار אוספי Uhristem מחזיר ואת ש絡ית פה
מסכי בעיתות מאמץ. לא ליעץ Uhristem מחזיר אחרים אלא
היפרשל אמור רוכבל מפטום לה שמחה לעבר.
means that the syllogism gave the existence of the smoke and its cause; and is called proof of existence and its cause. It may be called absolute proof. It is that which Maimonides called, in the Guide, decisive proof, when he said that the eternity of the world cannot be explained by decisive proof. The same is true of God, Praised be He, concerning Whose Existence there is no decisive proof, for He has no cause but is the cause of all existing things. The further statement, "he revealed the cause of his justement concerning the existence of the fire" means that it was proved from its effects. It is called the proof of existence, or x proof from effect. The statement, "In the demonstration of the cause of the fact, the middle term does not have to be the cause of the existence of the entire major term", means that it is called a proof revealing the cause, but not absolute proof.

THE THIRD CHAPTER concerning things around which the demonstrative sciences revolve. There are four: subjects, essential accidents, theses and axioms.
(1) SUBJECTS: By this is meant the subjects whose judgments are investigated in the sciences, for every science without exception has a subject matter which is investigated. And we inquire as to the judgments in that science, e.g., man's body in relation to medicine, magnitude in relation to geometry,

a) Reading with ms. Bet.
 awaited to continue exercise. Continued, when they first learned that the man was already placed in a deterministic fate. Continued, when they first learned that the man was already placed in a deterministic fate.

The law goes to great effort to ensure that the man's name is never revealed, and that his fate is not made known to others. The law goes to great effort to ensure that the man's name is never revealed, and that his fate is not made known to others.

Roshuvar Lea Bedradin.

(1) [Name of product] 1
(2) [Instructions] 15
(3) [Instructions] 15
(4) [Instructions] 16
(5) [Instructions] 6
(6) [Instructions] 7
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(8) [Instructions] 10
(9) [Instructions] 11
(10) [Instructions] 12
number in relation to arithmetic, melody in relation to music and the actions of responsible beings in relation to jurisprudence. (In each one of these sciences) it is not incumbent on the one occupying himself therewith to prove the existence of these subjects (in his science). The jurist does not have to prove that man acts, nor do the geometers have to prove that magnitude is an accident which exists. The proof of this is attempted in another science. It is incumbent upon him to understand these subjects with their limits by way of conception.

**THE ESSENTIAL ACCIDENTS:** By this is meant the distinguishing properties which occur in the subjects of that science but do not occur outside of it, like the triangle and the quadrilateral in certain magnitudes, the curved and the straight in others. These are essential accidents of the subjects of geometry, as even and odd are of number,
הענין לתרומת וочки לחתימה. תescoאר להבוקן והדברים למסיינות ומפורטות
�습니다 לוח הצבעים על המפתירה. על אדמה משייך על עוגת המפתירה
אכל שטרול בקצרה והכסות אחריה. אלה עלייה שיכיון על הנסיגה
 endured רעל. דריו הצוואר. הפעמים התספורもっと. רידה בון הבולוח
אשר על יפני הכורא ארגון ההכמי של יפלר חזר מנבר communicator עם
לעוץ השירירין. הוראות ויוווש לעצמא ומשייך עצמורוהו ולנדש
הכ_ttl רימונים ותפרים לעסקים

1. יפשטות:ותרות רכל חכמה המחלקת החכמה (ב) (המסדרון לוגו) (ב)
2. ציוד:ציבורךני (ב) (ג) (המסדزادוגרף/1)
3.千方百ות (ב) (ג) (המסדרון לוגו) (ב)
4. עליצור (ב) (ג) (המסדרון לוגו) (ב) (ג)
and harmony and x disharmony of melody, that is, relation (of sounds), and sickness and health of the animal. But it is necessary at the beginning of the investigation of every science to understand these essential accidents, with their limits, by way of conception. Their existence in the subjects only follows the demonstration of that science. For the purposes of the science (6) (7) is to demonstrate their existence in it.

THE X THESIS: "Thesis" is an expression for the combination of these essential accidents with the subjects. They are the (7b) problems of each science. Questions in it are asked concerning them, and in so far as questions are asked concerning them, they are called theses of that science. In so far as they are investigated, they are called problems. And in so far as they are conclusions of a demonstrative syllogism, they are called conclusions. (9) But whatever the name, all refer to the same thing. These names change with the change of the viewpoint. The subject of every demonstrated thesis in science will be either the subject of that science or some of the essential accidents of the subject of that science. If its subject is the subject of the science it may be the subject itself, as it is said in mathematics, every magnitude is x either commensurate with another magnitude which is homogeneous with it, or is not commensurate with it. (11) This is the thesis investigated. As it is said in arithmetic every number will be a half of another number if it is equidistant from the two x ends of the other number, e.g., five is half of the sum of six and four, and three and seven, and eight and two, and one and nine. Or the subject will be the subject of the science with an essential description,
(כל הלופי הגרות המכתף דאילר שיקיף להרגשות ג')

רבכונסה ובחיליפנז ובחכונסה רכזתונר. התוחמת התולה רכזל
כנדריה הሳבורהם.
13. יערו תלמידה: ינשה מלמדת. זכרת יבי רזון (חנניא) התוכנה שיברה
14. יערתו: ייזאר שﻸת ותת התוכנה ואמרש ידרו.
15. יערתו: ייזאר שﻸת ותת התוכנה ואמרש ידרו.
10. ( łatwo)
11. אתא'
12. בהראב' התוכנה בכסאכ' דו
13. בבול'ה' על(_ptrs)
14. בבית ליבא
15. רוחב:ับ לבלה
16. ואליהם: לאמרא' על(_ptrs)
17. לאמרא' על(_ptrs)
18. לכלל ולחאל חכמי חצץיו רכזת התוכנה כלך כלך
19. שירוב:בו רבך שבל קר ישי פשמ שימל לו החזיר הכח את החזיר משיח
i.e. an essential accident. As it is said in geometry, the magnitude incommensurate to a thing is incommensurate to every magnitude which is commensurate with it. So what was taken was the incommensurate magnitude, not mere magnitude, seeing that the incommensurate is an essential attribute of the magnitude.

(13) And as we say in arithmetic, if you multiply one-half of a number - which is divisible into halves - by the other half, the product will be one-fourth of the square of the number. Here we take a divisible number, not number in general. Or the subject will be one of the species of the subject of the science, (14) as it is said in arithmetic, "six", and "six" is a species of number. Or the subject will be one of the species of the subject of science with a description of an essential accident, as we say in geometry, a straight line drawn to another straight line will yield two angles whose sum is equal to two right angles. The line is a species of magnitude which is the subject of the science, and straight is an essential accident in it. Or the subject will be only description, as you say in geometry, the angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles.
for triangles are essential accidents in some magnitudes. Therefore, the subject of the demonstrated theses in the sciences must be one of these five. But their predicates are particular essential attributes in that subject.

**AXIOMS:** By this is meant the admitted premises in that science by which these are demonstrated. These premises are not demonstrated in that science. Either they are first principles, which are called axioms, as it says in the beginning of Euclid, if equals are taken from equals or added to equals equals remain. Or if they are not first principles but admissions of the student of that science, then if the student admits them and is satisfied, they are called hypotheses. If some doubt remains in his soul they are called postulates. He will admit them (to the one who advances them) only when they are demonstrated to him by another science, so that in the meantime he can build his proof on them as it is said in the beginning of Euclid, that we must admit that every point may be the center of a circle to be drawn around it, though some people deny the conception of a circle, i.e., that the radii from the center to the circumference are equal. But it is admitted at the beginning of the science.

**COMMENTARY** - The statement "it is not incumbent on the one occupying himself therewith to prove the existence of these subjects in his science" means that it is not necessary, even though it may be possible. But then Ibn Rushd explained that it is impossible to establish (the existence of) the subject of any science by demonstration. Therefore, he said, metaphysics (receives from physics the existence of the Separate Intellect and explains its truth. In this, Abū Ḥāmid follows
ככ המשולשים המאיימים לעבר היצירתיות שונות לא יפרעו
נעשה השולחן הפרימיטיבי בכוכבים כלשהם התשובה. וראינו בשורותיהם את השתי המאיימים לעבר היצירתיות
הזרקה ובו בשורותיהם בבטחה ואינו יפרעו בכוכבים.
לא כדי להראות. ראינו את השתי הפרימיטיבים וחדו את השתי התשובה בבטחה בהם
שיהיה כל שנה. ראינו את השתי הפרימיטיבים וחדו את השתי התשובה בבטחה בהם.
ראינו את התשובה כל שנה. ראינו את השתי הפרימיטיבים וחדו את השתי התשובה בבטחה בהם.
פורים, וחוזר הזמן, כוכבים זכרוandraות משכורות, ראינו את התשובה כל שנה. ראינו את השתי הפרימיטיבים וחדו את השתי התשובה בבטחה בהם.
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the viewpoint Ibn Sīnā. In the further statement "If you multiply one-half of a number - which is divisible into halves - by the other half, the product will be one-fourth of the square of the number" the example is that four is divided into two and two, and multiplying two by two, we get four. Multiplying four by four yields sixteen, and four is one-quarter of sixteen. The statement "a straight line drawn to another straight line will yield two angles, whose sum is equal to two right angles" means we may increase the acuteness or the obtuseness (of the angles) in any proportion we wish, the two angles will always be equal to two right angles. This is the diagram of the non-right angles and of right angles.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{non-right angles} \\
\times \\
\text{right angles}
\end{array}
\]
11. המzeń למצבים
12. חידוש
13. בקורות
14. דעטרה (שה)
15. דעות
16. ממון
17. פער
18. פער
19. רזิต
20. כש
21. רז
22. שזורים

שנתניר
בירחת
חתות
FOURTH CHAPTER concerning the conditions of the premises of
demonstrations. There are four conditions: They must be true,
necessary, immediate and essential. By true is meant the certain,
as for example first principles, perceptions and their like. This
condition has already been mentioned. By necessary we mean that
the relation between subject and predicate should be a necessary
one, like the relation of "animal" to "man", not like the
relation of "writing" to "man" whenever a necessary conclusion
is being sought. For if the premise is not necessary it will not
compel the thinker to assert the necessity of the conclusion.
By immediate we mean that the predicate of the premise should
exist in the subject because of the subject, e.g., when you say
"every animal is corporeal" it means that it is corporeal because
it is an animal and not because of a more universal attribute,
not as when you say (in the conclusion) "man is corporeal". For
"He is corporeal" not because he is a man but because he is an
animal, which is more universal. After we know that he is an
animal we know that he is corporeal. Corporeality is first
asserted of animals then through the animal it is extended to man,
and it is corporeal not because of a more particular attribute
than it, e.g., "animals write". It writes not because it is an
animal but because it is man. And man is a particular animal.
So the first term is that predicate which has no middle term
between it and its subject. Therefore, that predicate will be
immediately true of that middle term. Then this idea will be
extended by means of the middle term to the subject. This is
the condition of the major premise. This condition does not
hold in premises which are conclusions.
attività התנדבות המתהמה
זוהי אורכתchwאיה צורפת
חברת יד ארצה
เทคโนโลยיה

התר ebpורה החנה בבראר ביוליאדה ורפורטורת אחת שמעה רבך עד
זה התאים. expenditure החנה בבראר ביוליאדה ורפורטורת אחת שמעה רבך עד
בחירב כחר ח女朋友 לא כחר הכותב לארז וזו היא דרש הפרד מולדת
הבריחה. כי החינה חכש את שכחה חכישה לא חתריב על המשכלי הכית
ה}->{ברכת. רארלר הארגון הזה בבראר ביוליאדה ורפורטורת אחת שמעה רבך עד
蜊בוש בן בברכת בבראר ביוליאדה כי יSigning כי החר גמש לא יSigning יSigning
יזור בבר פרד מפגר לא שארר יסימל כי ארז לא יSigning יSigning באסמ.
ابل ליפ שארר כי יSigning יSigning מפגר על יSigning וזו היא יSigning.
ליזר השארר קאר בברっちים על יSigning ולא יSigning יSigning פרג מפגר בכופל
ליזר שארר קאר בברっちים על יSigning ולא יSigning יSigning פרג מפגר בכופל
שארר יSigning יSigning תגשה אפייטג ריזיה לארז המקיצים רארלר אפקטר
שארר יSigning יSigning תגשה אפייטג ריזיה לארז המקיצים רארלר אפקטר
לא זה המברך האפשר. אראלב הארגון את יותר
התר ebpורה החנה בבראר ביוליאדה. {}
ארמלל בחנהטירトー היי קליפור
ליזר השארר קאר בברっちים על יSigning ולא יSigning יSigning באסמ.
骠ורין בבר הפרד מפגר לא שארר יSigning יSigning באסמ.
骠ורין בבר הפרד מפגר לא שארר יSigning יSigning באסמ.
骠ורין בבר הפרד מפגר לא שארר יSigning יSigning באסמ.
骠ורין בבר הפרד מפגר לא שארר יSigning יSigning באסמ.
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骠ורין בבר הפרד מפגר לא שארר יSigning יSigning באסמ.
骠ורין בבר הפרד מפגר לא שארр
of other syllogisms and are made premises of a new syllogism.

(9) But they must be necessary and essential. The essential guards against irrelevant accidents, for the sciences do not deal with irrelevant accidents. It is of no concern to the geometer whether the straight line or the circle is more beautiful, or whether roundness is the contrary of straightness, because beautiful and its opposite are irrelevant to the subject of his science, i.e., magnitude. These attributes follow from magnitude not because they are magnitude but because of an attribute which is more universal than magnitude, i.e., because it exists etc. The physician does not inquire whether or not the wound is circular or not, for roundness is not characteristic of the wound because it is a wound but because of something more universal than the wound. And when the physician says this wound is slow in healing because it is circular and circles are the widest of figures he is not stating (anything in) the science of the physician and it does not testify to his knowledge of medicine but of geometry. Therefore, the predicate must be essential in the thesis of the sciences and in the premises.
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12: זריעת זרעים
15: קבוצת חמש פעילות
10: נפרדות
11: נפרדות
13: זכרונות, זיכרונות
14: זיכרונות
15: זיכרונות
16: זיכרונות
17: זיכרונות
18: זיכרונות
19: זיכרונות
20: זיכרונות
21: זיכרונות
22: זיכרונות
23: זיכרונות
24: זיכרונות
25: זיכרונות
26: זיכרונות
27: זיכרונות
28: זיכרונות
29: זיכרונות
30: זיכרונות
But there is a slight difference between them, namely, that the essential is applied in two meanings. One of them is that the predicate is a part of the definition of the subject, e.g., "Man is an animal". For the predicate "animal" is essential because it is included in the definition "man", since the meaning of "man" is that he is an animal with certain attributes. The second is that the subject is part of the definition of the predicate, and the predicate is not part of the definition of the subject (12). E.g., the crookedness of the nose, and the straightness of a line. For the crookedness of the nose is an expression used for the possessor of the nose with the special attribute "crooked". The nose is part of the definition without a doubt. The essential in the first sense cannot become the predicate of the conclusion in theses which are investigated in the sciences because the subject is known only by it, and the knowledge of it precedes the knowledge of the subject. Then how would its existence in the subject be investigated? For he who has no conception of the triangle as it is defined will not investigate its laws. After he knows that he may investigate whether or not its angles are equal to two right angles. But he cannot investigate whether or not a triangle is a figure because he must first understand what a figure is, and then he must understand that it may be divided into a figure bounded by three sides, i.e., a triangle, or by four sides, i.e., a quadrilateral. So the knowledge of the figure precedes the knowledge of the triangle.

(15b) The predicates of the premises, too, must be essential. The predicates of both premises may be essential in the second sense, but may not be essential in both premises.
א. הרבח הקדומים ענקיים, ראב"ד ברייה יבכח, תנבא. בהגרה ותנתקות הגרות שחררה.

ב. בהגרה על السبت ענקיים, ראב"ד משיחי ובכבר גורמה כי לאחרון. כ"א

ג. הרבח הקדומים יאדו שחררה ביניהם,になり הגרות והחרות שבחרה.

ד. ברשיות ובכבר גורמה שלא ישתה אל נימי שלש ימים.

ה. ברשיות לשחררה ולקיחת השם על נימי שלשה ימים.

י. ברשיות והיוםgang באולא כל היוםgang על נימי שלשה ימים.

י. ברשיות באולא כל היוםgang על נימי שלשה ימים.

יב. ברשיות באולא כל היוםgang על נימי שלשה ימים.

יב. ברשיות באולא כל היוםgang על נימי שלשה ימים.

다고 ב. ברשיות באולא כל היוםgang על נימי שלשה ימים.

ח. ברשיות באולא כל היוםgang על נימי שלשה ימים.
in the first sense. For the conclusion then will be known before the premise because the essential is the very essence of that subject. We cannot say "Every man is an animal" and "Every animal is corporal", "Therefore every man is corporal", so that this should be a problem to be investigated for the knowledge of corporality precedes the knowledge of being a man. And since the subject of the question is "man" we must first have a conception of him before we investigate the laws about him. The conception of man is necessarily preceded by the conception of animal and matter. Since we know matter, we know that it is divided into animal and non-animal, and that animal is divided into rational and non-rational. But the predicate of the minor premise may be essential in the first sense and the predicate of the major premise essential in the second sense, and vice versa. This is what we wished to explain about the rules of logic, and praise be to God alone. The science of metaphysics follows.

COMMENTARY - "For if the premise is not necessary it will not compel the thinker to assert the necessity of the conclusion"
1. חותם
2. אופקית: יזמי
3. עקרונות
4. כל יבנה
5. לולא
6. אלו
7.ර
8. שירר: דוגים
9. ישראל
10. כל
11. רואים: חותמים: заявил
12. משלי: שלוש
13. בעיות: מיני
14. מסדר: מזרעים: שלום
15. לארשים: נגטיב
16. כו
17. חותמים: מִגְּז
18. מִגְּז
19. חותמים: מִגְּז
20. העצמה:ascal
21. וחס
22. חותם
means that the syllogism will not only necessitate affirmation or negation but it will be of the same mode. For the nature of the source must be found in that from which it is quarried. "As the mother, so her daughter." The further statement: "So the first idea is that predicate which has no middle term between it and the subject.... Therefore that predicate will be immediately true of that middle term"... means that afterwards, by means of that middle term, the predicate will be extended to the subject. The further statement, "but they must be... essential. The essential guards against irrelevant accidents," means that they should be relevant. And by relevant he means that they should not be foreign to it nor outside of the genus being investigated, i.e., they should not extend beyond the genus of the science under consideration. They must deal with the same essentials as the subject. For they are called essentials because the predicate is part of the definition of the subject, or vice versa. And they are called relevant because they must not extend beyond the genus of the science under consideration. In general, insofar as the predicate of the question is essential, it is called relevant. Insofar as the predicate of the premises is essential, it is called an essential. When the predicate and subject are transposed, the predicate will be a particular.

Praised be the First Cause who helped us explain the first part.
לא תחת הבטחת לא חוויכי על המשכיליםiae הפסמת בולדה ירצה לאโชון מהשימור ethernetバー כים ביטיחתי רצוי שיתוף נפשות בחכם שיתוף הסמך במשורר האם ציון בביוגר רכיב הנספח האם גיור לי אלאполитическין ר櫟ן אוסטריק
כמה פ들클ן עברתEVERYלי אלפאcurring אוסטריק
בכמברורה. עד ארבע ראשונות העבירות
הנה ת샤utherford התמישים והודים ירצה
דוא תזרוק בשיתופי הפרשים
יר檔案 ראש אנגלבע
ל겔 התוכניות של הסגר
הפרשים בו רכיבים
שלא יעבד
לסר
ה والاבחנה
משכילים

בכ רוח את אגר מסתע עבurersת כי צעררא.getAll עצמון dürש שמשישה
בעילה בגרים הטישה או חפוף. בצעררא fanווררות ומזר שורה מתכיפים
עצמון יכבש החופפים על הזהיא צעררא רוחראברגון יביכר הוראסם0.
א저 עזרבר לאל מחולוד החופש.

אם רבלס החול להאל רעלס. חזק רכמתך צעררא לא ידי רכמר פוהד.
PART II

NOTES ON TRANSLATION

Page I

Note 1. Isaiah 57:2. The Hebrew has the first letter of each word of the verse.

2. Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters, vol. I, p. 316, translates ṣāqīm to mean 'missgeschicke'.

3. Abū Bekr ibn Ḥūfa, Ḥāyy Ben Yaqdān ed. Leon Gauthier, Beyrouth, 1935. Arabic text p. 18, 1.3 f, French translation p. 18. "We do not doubt that the master Abū Ḥāmid (al-Ghazālī) belongs to those who have enjoyed Supreme Bliss and who have arrived at that sublime degree of union (with God)."

4. Omit.

Page 2

Note 5. The following is "a regular convention in the writing of didactic treatises," to begin "with an address to a supposed disciple who has asked for instruction". D. B. Macdonald in Isis, May-September 1936, p. 10.

6. i.e. his brother in faith and in religion.
Note 7. "The word 'meanings' in its title is used much in
the same way as in the title of Charles Kingsley's
pamphlet, "What, then, does Dr. Newman mean?"
This is what the philosophers 'meant'. A مَقْسَم is
what is intended or meant. مَقْسَم الـكَلَام is "the
intended sense of the saying". The word is thus a syn-
ononym of ماْى in the sense 'meaning' or 'idea'. But
the whole Western world took it that here al-Ghazālī
was speaking for himself, and drew up lists of his
principal errors. They were genuine errors for the
world, but not his. There is a full examination of
this by Fr. Maurice Bouyges, S. J., in the Mélanges
de la Faculté Orientale de la Université Saint Joseph,
Beirut, vii, pp. 398 f, 444ff."
D. B. Macdonald, "The meanings of the philosophers"

8. Omit.

"Articles of faith" - Carré de Vaux, "Averroes,
Averroism" in Encyclopedia of Religion & Ethics,
vol. II, p. 262.

Note 10. "earnestly and with zeal" - only in Arabic.

11. "The falling to pieces of the structure built by
the philosophers" - D. B. Macdonald, ibid, p. 9 ff.
On all the meanings of تَهاَفُت see Asín Palacios,
"Le sens du mot tahafut dans les oeuvres d'El-
Ghazālī et d'Averroes", in Revue Africaine, vol. 50, 1
1906, pp. 185-205.
Note 12. Marmoli leaves out the next sentence: "These causes are enumerated by Alexander". Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, translated by M. Friedlander, p. 41.

13. Marmoli leaves out, "not mentioned by him because it did not then prevail" ibid. There then follow in THE GUIDE the words: "namely, habit and training" without the word "custom" preceding them.


Note 16. Omit.

Note 17. Omit.

Amos: 3:7.


18c. Should be "fifth method". For to the four wrong methods ("causes") he adds the "building of a wall" which is the correct and fifth method. If the king's ben on philosophy is considered the fifth in addition to what Maimonides mentions then al-Ghazali's "Wall" is a sixth method.

d'Aristote et d'Ibn Sina, 'conception' and 'assentiment', Madkour, L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe, 'perception' or 'intuition' and 'affirmation' p.13 f.

2. madith.

Note 3. i.e. the material intellect.
4. i.e. it cannot exist without them.
5. i.e. it is not a part of the soul.
6. Of the active intellect to potentiality and the memory images.
7. i.e. light.
8. In his commentary on the De anima of Aristotle.

9. Hebrew has: hylic

Note 11. De Anima, 43Ca.

Note 12.
13. The reflection of perfect forms in the soul.
14. Genesis 16:13, i.e. the angel she apprehended.

Note 15. i.e. Terms — the entire premise.

Note 17. The Aristotelian logic which to the Arabs meant beyond the Isagoge of Porphyry as introduction the following eight books: Categorias, De Interpretatione, Analytica Priora, Analytica Posteriora,
Note 17. (Contd)

Topica, De Sophisticis Elenchis. Rhetorica, De Poesia.

18. Abu Hanid.

Note 19.

1. i.e. designating a particular by a universal.


Since the terms "consequence" and "consequent" in the Latin logical terminology, refer to relations between propositions (or to "implications" in the logical sense), whereas Chazali is here speaking of implicit connoted meanings of terms or concepts, the term "connotations" is being used here.

3. Rr. adds: "There was no escape from inventing a third term."

4. "in the sciences" added by Cairo Arabic and not by Beers Arabic.

Note 20.

5. i.e. an adjective, an epithet.

Note 21.


Note 22.

7. Which is particular.

8. Omit.

9. "And the adverb a syncategorematic term." Not in Arabic. The Scholastics used "syncategorematic term", as the technical logical name for those elements of language which have only a connective function and do not have independent meaning. Nouns and verbs were
called "categorematic terms." I have, therefore, substituted "syncategorematic term" – the equivalent of what we nowadays call "logical constant" – for the Hebrew הַכְּלֵי הַכְּלֵי "instrument" מַשָּׁל which is an alternative for "adverb", and categorematic term for the Arabic خِلْيَة and the Hebrew מַלֶּה The literal text with its logical meaning is as follows: "What the grammarians call a verb, the logicians call a word (i.e., categorematic term), and what the grammarians call an adverb, the logicians call a particle (or syncategorematic term)".

10. The Hebrew way of "and understanding" is superfluous.

11. Arabic: "What have you done." "I struck."

Page 23.

Note 12. i.e. The action thought of.


15. 'mullah' – superfluous.


Page 24.

Note 17. Omit.

18. Arabic has: "the word 'אִדָּם meaning 'dhuabat, and 'אֵשׁ and 'זָר and 'אָנָּו אָנָּו."

Page 25.

Note 18b. "Uncombined" not in Arabic.

Page 27.

Note 1. Hebrew adds "כָּפָרָה" probably so understood by Arabic.
Note 2. i.e. both qualities.

3. Omit.

Note 4. So Arabic and Albalag.

Page 31.

2 Note 5. Arabic: "Another special."

6. In Beer ms., not in Cairo ms., also not in Albalag. Cairo ms. is exactly like Hebrew.

7. This arrangement of mentioning: separable, then inseparable and an example of the inseparable followed by an example of the separable is a Biblical arrangement. v. Ibn Ezra on the words masah u'meriyah Exodus 17:7. Ḥūnzālī seems to be following a general Semitic classification.

8. Not in Cairo Arabic but in Beer.

Page 32.

Note 9; Beer.

10. Albalag has "both". "All" refers to all the inseparable; "both" would refer to the difference between rigyot and amiyot.

11. Text adds: "and this is its diagram." But the diagram is not preserved.

Page 33.

Note 12. Omit.

13. al-nawā' al-nawā'.

14. jins al-jinās.

15. Cairo and Beer have bırfat meaning craft or profession or occupation. Hebrew and Beer have "size"
Page 33.

Note 15. (contd)
Cairo has ḥulq meaning temperament, characteristic or essence.

17. Song of Songs 7:3.

Page 35.
Note 18. i.e. ‘Abūr and Zaid.

Page 36.
20. Arabic.

Page 37.

Page 38.
Note 22. i.e. white.
23. Cairo Arabic: "the light giving star which rises by day.

Page 40.
Note 1. Arabic: "Zaid is either in ‘Irāq or in Hijāz... for he may be in Syria.

Page 41.
Note 2. omit
3. omit
4. Arabic: "rises".
5. Arabic: "as in the example given."
7. Until the word 'goes' is according to Arabic and ms. No.3. The other two mss. are mutilated.

Page 44.
Note 7b. Hebrew has: "the sentence 'Zaid nābināsat' - in
Page 44.

Note 7b. (Contd.) Persian - ' (Zaid) bilti ro'eh' - in Hebrew - is..

8. "think it a negative" - missing in Arabic.

Page 45.

Note 9. Arabic adds: "but with equilibration for the negative".

10. As the Arabic has it. The Hebrew text says.

bi-lashon he-ham'on. Albalag says bi-lashon han-

nogrim.


Page 46.


15a. Cf. Maimonides, millot ha-higgayon, Chap. II.

The similarity is extremely close.

14. Arabic: "Man is in loss", and is a reference to Qur'an 103:2.

Page 47.

Note 15. Omit.

16. Arabic: "there is cloud present".

17. in Arabic and Ms. No. 2.

18. "disjunctive" added in Mss. No. 2 and No. 3 and in Arabic.

Page 48.

Note 19. See Mss. No. 2 and No. 3 - which note the difference here between Maimonides and al-Ghazali. Maimonides, 
millot ha-higgayon, Chap. II considers this a parti-
cular. Narboni's interpretation of al-Ghazali as considering this a universal cannot be correct for al-Ghazali specifically states that it is a particular
Page 48.

Note 20. God's knowledge.
23. Perhaps this is opposed to those who make knowledge a part of the Goodhood. Being and knowledge are not attributes in God. God is a real unity.
24. Ms. No.2 - i.e. Being and Knowledge.
25. Ms. No.2 and 3 and in Arabic.

Page 49.

Note 26. in the quality of the proposition.
27. Cf. Erros in his introduction p.24 to A'monides, Millot ha-nigardon.
28. "at a certain time" omitted in Arabic.
29. of propositions.
30. This sentence not in Arabic text.
31. Omit.

Page 50.

Note 32. Omit.

Page 51.

Note 33. i.e. in this apparent contradictory.
34. i.e. the proposition.
35. "five" not in Arabic or Albalag.
36. Example of dog-star in Hebrew but not in Arabic.
Page 51.

Note 37. Cf. p. 23 in Arabic.
38. "not" should be in first ms. but is not. Appears in second ms. and in Arabic.

Page 52.

Note 39. Basis text mistranslated. Arabic word meaning 'relation' to mean 'silver', i.e. ḫāra to ḡūra.
40. ms. No. 3, Albalag, Arabic.
41. Arabic: "save in regard to twenty or some other number."
42. Only in Arabic and Albalag.
43. Arabic has "seventh" instead of "sixth".

Page 53.

Note 44. Sentences in parenthesis are only in ms. No. 2 and partly in No. 3.
45. Omit.

Page 54.

Note 47. i.e. the proposition, "No stone is a man."
48. 'Um qeset haadam kotek.
49. Qeset haadam 'um kotek.
50. Cf. note 19, page 47.

Page 55.

Note 1. "e.g... created", not in Arabic or ms. No. 3.
2. This sentence not in Arabic.
3. In Arabic and Ms. No. 3.
Note 4. In Arabic.
5. i.e. The formed.
Page 57.
Note 6. i.e. boundaries.
7. i.e. boundaries.
Page 57b.
Note 8. "one of" not in Arabic.
Page 58.
Note 9. Arabic adds: "and the major a universal."
10. i.e. some beings are not eternal.
Page 59.
Note 11. Arabic has the following:
(Moods of the first figure, conclusive and non-conclusive).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yields universal affirmative, i.e. Every A is C.</th>
<th>Its Examples</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Its Examples</th>
<th>Minor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Every B is C</td>
<td>Universal affirmative</td>
<td>Every A is B</td>
<td>Universal affirmative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yields universal negative, i.e. No A is C</td>
<td>No B is C</td>
<td>Universal negative</td>
<td>Every A is B</td>
<td>Universal affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This mood is non-conclusive because the major is a particular.</td>
<td>Some B is C</td>
<td>Particular affirmative</td>
<td>Every A is B</td>
<td>Universal affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is inconclusive also as above</td>
<td>Some B is not C</td>
<td>Particular negative</td>
<td>Every A is B</td>
<td>Universal affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yields a particular affirmative i.e. Some A is C</td>
<td>Every B is C</td>
<td>Universal affirmative</td>
<td>Some A is B</td>
<td>Particular affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is inconclusive because both premises are particulars</td>
<td>Some B is C</td>
<td>Particular affirmative</td>
<td>Some A is B</td>
<td>Particular affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is inconclusive as above.</td>
<td>Not every B is C</td>
<td>Particular negative</td>
<td>Some A is B</td>
<td>Particular affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yields particular negative, i.e. not every A is C</td>
<td>No B is C</td>
<td>Universal negative</td>
<td>Some A is B</td>
<td>Particular affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>Every B is C</td>
<td>Universal affirmative</td>
<td>No A is B</td>
<td>Universal affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>Some B is C</td>
<td>Particular affirmative</td>
<td>No A is B</td>
<td>Universal affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>No B is C</td>
<td>Universal negative</td>
<td>No A is B</td>
<td>Universal negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>Not every B is C</td>
<td>Particular negative</td>
<td>No A is B</td>
<td>Universal negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>Every B is C</td>
<td>Universal affirmative</td>
<td>Not every A is B</td>
<td>Particular negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>Some B is C</td>
<td>Particular affirmative</td>
<td>Not every A is B</td>
<td>Particular negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>No B is C</td>
<td>Universal negative</td>
<td>Not every A is B</td>
<td>Particular negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>Not every B is C</td>
<td>Particular negative</td>
<td>Not every A is B</td>
<td>Particular negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note 11. (Contd).
"Now when the minor is a universal affirmative with the major a universal affirmative it yields a conclusion. Likewise with the major a universal negative. But with the major a particular it does not. When the minor is a particular affirmative with the major a universal affirmative, with the major a universal negative, there is a conclusion also."

12. Not in Hebrew text but in Arabic.
12b. Hebrew text wrongly adds "affirmative."
13. Not in Hebrew text but in Arabic.
14. Only in Arabic. Hebrew text here is corrupt.

Note 15. Only in Arabic and Ms. No. 3.

Note 17. i.e. Form.
18. Not in Arabic.
19. According to the Arabic "from it" would refer to "the second figure."

Note 20. Arabic simply: "to the first figure."
21. i.e. every one of the class 'some'.
22. i.e. that the contradictory of the conclusion is true whereas it is not true.
23. Arabic adds: "so whichever of them is universal satisfies (the requirements)."

Note 24. Arabic conclusion of the syllogism: "not every one who writes is rational" does not follow.
Note 25. Arabic continues: "as though you were saying, 'Every man is rational,' and 'some men are deaf', therefore 'some who are rational are deaf'. Then you say, 'some who are rational are deaf' and 'no one who is deaf writes', therefore, 'every one who is rational writes'".

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Note 26. "mood" omitted in Arabic.

27. Maimonides, millot ha-higgayon, Chap. 7 makes al-Ghazālī's fifth mood his sixth, and al-Ghazālī's sixth mood, his fifth.

28. i.e. every one of the class "some".

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Note 28b. The text was "hypothetical conjunctive".

But this terminology is now obsolete. Since the thirteenth century, "conjunctive hypothetical" has meant a sentence of the form "p and q", whereas al Ghazālī means by it the conditional, i.e., "if p, then q".

29. Gloss explaining that }sīn means 'ēṣem and qodēm means miqām lacking in Arabic and ms. no. 3.

30. Arabic has saḥīḥ meaning 'true', 'sound'. Hebrew has re'uṭāh.

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Note 31. Prentl, Geschichte der Logik, is correct in calling the added two-where the consequents are not more universal than the antecedents but the same in extent - 'childish' (lāppisch). For there was no point in bringing them in. Since they are the same in extent, what applies to one must apply to the other.
Note 32. Omit.

Note 33. i.e. when the condition is excluded.

34. ḫul ḵelq shakān'.

35. i.e. when the contradictory of the consequent is affirmed.

36. ḵalkhi'

37. ānārta bishālūnā'

Note 38. Parenthetical words understood.

39. idem. Arabic actually has "or such and such, or such and such."

40. Arabic: "save that of a limitation of the unlimited remainder."

40a. It should be noted that Ghazālī interprets the disjunctive in the exclusive sense, and not (as is nowadays customary) in the inclusive sense. It is only on this interpretation that the modus ponendo tollens is valid; i.e., only if "either p or q" is interpreted as meaning "either p is true and q is false, or p is false and q is true." Nowadays we admit the possibility of both being true, and merely exclude the possibility of both being false.

41. Arabic omits the first sentence after "syllogism".

42. "and... contradictory" lacking in Arabic.

43. Omit.

44. Arabic has instead: "from premises of which one that is false is apparently true. Then you mark the false in the opinion of your opponent."
Page 71.

Note 45. Omit.

46. 1 Sam. 24:14.

47. 'awâ id tûmâ hakhi'; i.e. but if its opposite is true the result will be an absurdity.

48. Arabic has instead: "Every animal is either a man or a horse or other than those two. And every man moves his lower jaw while chewing. And every horse moves its lower jaw while chewing. And all others apart from them move their jaws in this way while chewing. It follows that every animal moves its lower jaw while chewing. And it moves its lower jaw while chewing for we have seen the horse, and the man and the cat and other animals: thus. Therefore this is true..."

Note 49. Arabic omits the example of the fully constructed syllogism.

Page 72.

Note 50. Arabic yûtrid is e uivalent to wîfôrad as in basic Hebrew text uncorrected by xash that reads yiqûaq.

51. Arabic.


54. mah masînû.

Page 73.

Note 55. Arabic: "The Jewish and scholastic theologians call this jyûs (analogy) which is the transference of a judgment from a particular to a particular on the ground that it resembles it in some detail or other."

56. Arabic: "but it is suitable for soothing minds and convincing people in conferences, so that it is
Note 56. (Contd.).
commonly used in public discourse. By public
discourse is meant conferences where there is
competition in the making of disputation, or
complaints or apologies or in praising or blaming,
or in boasting about something or belittling it,
and things of that sort."

56b. Maimonides, op. cit., Chap. VII where the same example is used.

Page 74.

Note 57. i.e. "The house was created."
58. i.e. by its being formed.
59. Parenthetical words only in Arabic.
60. i.e. that whatever was formed was created.
61. Frantl, op. cit. simil et contrarium.
62. "The other...inverted" omitted in Arabic.
63. "We have looked and seen" in Arabic and 'Abulag.
64. Arabic adds: "e.g. before its inversion."
"conjectatio".

Page 75.

Note 64c. "all" only in Arabic.
65. "Show it" - Arabic.

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Note 65. Arabic and ms. no. 2.
66. Arabic. Hebrew has: "Even if the complete investigation were claimed."

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Note 67. i.e. the attributes.
68. According to the Arabic. Hebrew has "existent"
Note 68. (Contd.), which is logically wrong because "created" and not 'existent' is being proved.

69. According to Arabic, Hebrew text as follows: "existent and self-subsisting, or because it is a house and existent or because it is material and has form or because it is material and self-subsisting or because it is material and existent or because it is self-subsisting or existent and other combinations..."

70. Only in Arabic.

71. According to Arabic, Hebrew text has: "gall and vitriol."

72. i.e. as opposed to any of its parts.

73. i.e. particulars.

Note 74. i.e. one of the two particulars.

75. Hebrew adds: "which demonstration is impossible as long as the major premise is not a universal."

76. i.e. that 'the house was created'.

77. i.e. that 'the house has form'.

78. i.e. that "everything that has form was created."

Note 75. Analogies.

80. Talmud Babli: pesahim 56a; Niddah 15b.

81. "As below it means".

82. "the points common to both" i.e. to set aright, to settle, to harmonize.

Note 83. "what is the common point".
Note 85. "building up" - Arabic.

86. "are found" - Arabic.
87. Omit.

88. Arabic: "either thinking its premise is unnecessary, or with intent to cause ambiguity."
89. Omit.

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Note 90. Only in Arabic: "which are connected with the expressed premises."
91. Omit.
92. Omit.

Page 83.

Note 93. Omit.
94. Omit.

Page 84.

96. Arabic.
97. Only in Arabic.
98. Arabic has only "the more" and omits "the lesser."

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Note 100. Arabic omits "and a ts".

101. Arabic "as our knowledge that".
102. Al-balūg has: 'nakkat nigrayim'.
103. i.e. it must become well known in itself.
104. i.e. information.
105. i.e. the doubter.
106. Arabic adds: "because I have seen him."
107. i.e. The miracles.
Note 109. i.e. The existence of the prophet.
109. i.e. The conquerer.
110. Omit.

Page 86.
Note 111. "that is... separated from" lacking in Arabic.
112. i.e. that it is not innate in the intellect.
113. i.e. seventeen being half of thirty-four.

Page 87.
Note 114. Arabic: "Only the judgement as to its falsity is from the fact that were all of what does not enter into al-wahm it would be false, for al-wahm does not enter into al-wahm but al-f'lm and al-Qudra. How any attribute which is not grasped..."

Page 88.
Note 114b. Arabic omits "pious man... speaks falsely" and goes on "a prophet ought not to enter..."
115. Omit.
116. Arabic.

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Note 117. Only in Arabic.
118. Arabic: "whether he is the one wronging or wronged."
119. i.e. The statement.
120. Arabic: "doing wrong to another."

Page 91.
Note 121. Arabic adds: "like him."
122. "wormwood" in Arabic and ms. No. 3, lacking in ms. No. 1. text.

124b. *memurām* means probabilities, conventions, what is socially approved and disapproved.

124c. i.e. Judges.

125. *Genesis*, 3:5.


126b. Arabic: "Exposition of what happens to these syllogisms".

127. i.e. dialectics.

128. Omitted in Arabic.

129. Arabic adds: "and those".

130. Arabic has correctly "sophistic", and Hebrew has me'attim instead of correctly mat'îm.

131. Arabic: "only by way of setting forth or imagining it..."

132. Omit.

133. Omit.

134. Omit.

135. No "if there is one" in the Arabic.

136. i.e. "No jug is a container of wine".

137. i.e. "No container of wine is a jug".

138. *hay-yayin* i.e. "container of wine".

139. i.e. 'he' or 'it'.

140. Arabic does not have "in Egypt" but 'īf Khasni', a Qur'anic expression.
Note 141. Omit.

Note 142. Without any qualities, i.e. "fish".

143. Added to the substance.

144. The middle term contains an addition, e.g.

the quality of fish which is not meant in the
minor premise.

145. i.e. only one.

146. Here is an example of defection.

147. i.e. being outside of time.

148. i.e. of the homonymous middle term.

Note 149a. In Aristotle the four types of problems are:

the 'that', the 'why', the 'if', the 'what'.

149. Arabic - "by the expression that was not explained."

(i.e. by the ambiguous expression).

150. i.e. a homonym with meaning of "sun" and "potsherd."

151. And not the potsherd.

Note 152. Arabic: "because I saw it and found it burnt."

153. "yésh"

Note 1. Only in Arabic.

1a. Hebrew 'im is equivalent to Arabic 'in. But

Arabic here is 'an.

Note 2. Conclusion is omitted in Arabic.

3. Arabic adds: "of the difference between the

'verily demonstration and the 'why' demonstration."
Page 103.

Note 4. Arabic: adds "because".
5. Manuscript No.3.
6. i.e. the minor term.
7. i.e. the middle term.

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9. "...proving the existence of any being from its causes" as opposed to "morfi ṭ ra'ayāh" which is a proof from its effect". (Efron: Philoethical Terms in the Ḥurēh Nebukim, p.76).
10. Taking the text as nifaḥārim and not as text has il nifaḥādim or ms. No.2, maqmat aḥarim.
11. Which must also reveal existence. But here existence needs no proof. For the existence of man is taken for granted.

Page 104, Chapter III

Note 1. Albalag: "we mean by them the subjects whose essential accidents are investigated in the sciences."
2. Arabic: "by this we mean that every science without exception has a subject matter which is investigated." The Arabic omits the next sentence and seems to be right. It would appear that Harris' explanation crept in here.

Page 105.

Note 3. According to Arabic. Hebrew text was instead: "the actions of the nishtādālim." Ms. No.3 has "the actions in relation to jurisprudence."
4. Arabic and Ms. No.3.
5. Ms. No.3 and Albalag. Arabic has: "in it".
5b. Meaning in their science. Arabic and Ms. No.3.
Page 106a.

Note 5. i.e. essential accidents.
7. i.e. in the subject.
7b. According to Arabic and Ms. No.3.
8. i.e. in the science;
9. Arabic adds: "and expressions."
10. Omit.
11. Next sentence omitted in Arabic.
13. That follows is according to the Arabic and Ms. No.3.
14. Ms. No.3 adds an example from geometry.
15. Arabic: "as it is said that six is a whole number and six is a species of number".
16. i.e. of an accident.

Page 107.

Note 17. Omit.
18. Book I.
18b. Albalag: "student".
20. Only in Albalag.
21. ibid.
22. the natural sciences.

Page 107b.

Note 23. Omit.

Page 108a.

Note 1. The scholastic "primo vero".
1b. Arabic omits: "the relation... necessary one," and then: "it will be like..."
2. The syllogism is: "Man is an animal," "Animals are corporeal" therefore "Man is corporeal."
Note 3. As for example, 'existence'.
4. Arabic omits "which is more universal."
5. Omit.
6. Omit.
7. i.e. of the major premise 'animals are corporeal'.
8. of the syllogism.

Note 9. i.e. the premises.
10. According to Arabic and Ms. No.3.
11. In Arabic and Ms. No.3.

Note 12. In Arabic and Ms. No.3, the correct rendering.
13. i.e. by its definition.
14. i.e. of the predicate. In Arabic and Ms. No.3.
15. Albalag.

Note 17. Omit.
18. Ms. No.3.
19. Ezekiel 16:44. Only in Ms. No.3.
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