In the Mahābhārata (ed. Sakah, 3055) the Sanskrit Kānīkā is rendered by Ka-ni-ki, which is confirmed by the Tibetan-Sanskrit Lexicon, edited by J. Bocci, where 1 a 1, Ka-ni-ki ṭen-pa-ba, translates Kānīkā-cīṇa with Tibetan dten-ma and s. The नामार्थ मुनि (ed. J. Haskin, p. 20), has ṭen-pa-şi Kānīkā-cīṇa. It is in a list of royal names for 'king Kānīkā-cīṇa'.

In connection with Adapatana (कैसरन) a ball of clay, references should be made to the verse of the Śrīyudyanāma, p. 467, which is found in a Central Asian manuscript from Qazlū published by H. Lederer in his Westen Beiträge zur Geschichte und Geographie von Ostraraum, p. 29, on (597) 10: 'śikṣita sahāśyati svarm-prajñām jñānasūdrās nanu sarva bhūmanā gaded bhitāntaṃ prasannam-citta āryopayan mita-jñāna-prajñām abhas (the MS. irregularities have been here replaced), that is, 'a hundred thousand lumps of Jambudvīpa gold are not equal to his (possession) who with believing mind places one lump of clay upon the shatras of the Buddha(s).'

This year I received a microfilm of the manuscript containing the Kānīkā story and have been able to verify and confirm the uncertain readings noted on p. 17. Only the i in l. 188 and po in l. 190 where the microfilm is unclear remain unconfirmed.

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A Forgery in al-Ghazālī’s Mīshkāt?

By W. Montgomery Watt

The importance of the Mīshkāt al-Anwār for a full understanding of the thought of al-Ghazālī was long ago recognised by Goldziher. He impressed this on W. H. T. Gairdner, when, in 1911, he was guiding him into the higher reaches of Islamic studies; and in due course Gairdner produced an article on Al-Ghazālī’s Mīshkāt al-Anwār and the Ghulātī-Problem and a Translation of the opera accompanied by a thought-provoking Introduction. On the whole the problems there raised have not received from subsequent writers the attention which Gairdner’s discussion of their merits and their important warrants. Most of the problems formulated by Gairdner are connected with the last section of the Mīshkāt, the detailed interpretation of the tradition about the Seventy (or Seventy Thousand) Veils (which for convenience I shall call the ‘Veil-section’). The heart of the difficulties is in the apparent contradiction between many statements in the Veil-section and al-Ghazālī’s general position. It is the purpose of this article to argue that the contradiction amounts to incompatibility and is not apparent but real, and that therefore the Veil-section is not the work of al-Ghazālī but a forgery either completing a work dealing only with the Light-verse or else substituted for the genuine Ghulātī interpretation of the Veil-tradition.

1. The non-Ghulātīan character of the Veil-section

The contrast between the Veil-section and al-Ghazālī’s thought in general, and even the rest of the Mīshkāt, is striking, and thrust itself upon Gairdner as he wrestled with the difficulties he had raised. The doctrine of μαθητὴς—that the divine essence and characteristics wholly and entirely ‘differ from’ the human—appears to be asserted, as this treatise’s last word, in its most extreme and intransigent form. . . . Nevertheless the Mīshkāt

1. Der Islam, 1944, 121-133.
2. London, 1928 (Asiatic Society Monographs, XXX). Reference to the Mīshkāt is to the Cairo edition of 1922 (whose pages are given in the translation in square brackets, followed by the page of the translation in round brackets. I have usually used Gairdner’s translation without alteration.)
itself seems to be one long attempt to modify or even negate its own bankrupt conclusion."  

These words suggest a line of approach to the question of the authenticity of the Veila-sections. It is not enough to assume that it is incompatible with the author's views as expounded in other of his later works, for that would leave open the possibility that his views had undergone a further development in the last few years of his life or that in the Matthew he had been more ready to compromise his most held beliefs. If, however, it can be shown conclusively that the Veila-sections are incompatible with the rest of the Makkah, then the argument for its spurious character is a strong one. The following are the salient features on which I base it as I see it.

(4) The doctrine of the attributes in the Veila-section is opposed to that found elsewhere.

The first group of those veiled by pure light "have searched out and understood the true meaning of the divine attributes, and have grasped that when the divine attributes are named Speech, Will, Power, Knowledge, and the rest, it is not according to our human mode of nomenclature; and this has led them to avoid denoting Him by these attributes altogether, and to denote Him simply by a reference (in 'al-dhikr) to His creation (naskhiqah)."

At first sight this might seem to refer to those of the orthodox theologists, like some of the Ash'ariyah, who so carefully stated their own words between tasbih and al-qil (that is they avoided all mention of tasbih or anthropomorphism). Closer examination, however, makes clear that this cannot be so. Gainher, who is inclined to place some orthodox theologists here, is nevertheless constrained to admit that the latter half of the above quotation together with the following text "shows that al-Ghazali has rather in mind those who have seemed as clear as possible from kalam-theology in every shape and form, and have contented themselves with asserting the divine creatorhood and providence." The point could be put even more forcibly. None of the orthodox theologists, excluding the most extreme exponents of bi'at asqal, could be said to "avoid denoting Him, by these attributes altogether", for they all spoke freely of God's speech, will, etc.

Introduction, p. 29. Wundt is also aware of the contrast between the Veila-section and al-Ghazali's usual doctrine (Le Poesie di Ghazali, p. 13).

Wundt, p. 154 (954).

Der Islam, p. 176.


3 Holmberg, 51 (954).

4 Cf. Brockhaus, art. "Thulth" in RE.
Islam was endless, not with the internal unity of God, but with the avoidance of ascribing "parts" to Him.

In respect to these points, then, the Veil-section is definitely Neoplatonic in its outlook. The rest of the *Masbūk*, on the other hand, is, as definitely, not Neoplatonic. There al-Ghazali makes no attempt to "avoid denoting God by these attributes altogether", for he not merely quotes with approval the *Tradition* according to which the Prophet said, "I have become His hearing whereof He hears, His vision whereby He seeth, His tongue whereby He speakest," but even makes use of the conceptions of the throne and niche, on which, according to the Qur'ān, God sits.1

That these are no mere chance remarks or conceptions to ordinary usage (why should one make such a concession in a work for initiates?), but are in connexion with al-Ghazali's whole trend of thought in the *Masbūk*, is shown by the discussion of symbolism in Part II, especially pp. 54–5 (75–80). Al-Ghazali there distinguishes between the external or superficial meaning of words and their intrinsic or symbolic meaning, and insists that it is erroneous to confine oneself either to the symbolic meaning or to the superficial meaning. He stresses these misgivings towards the Būyāniyyah and the Ḥanbālīyyah respectively, and conceives of orthodoxy and truth as the maintenance of a balance between them. Admittedly he is not interested here in the application of this principle to the doctrines of the attributes, although, if not identical with the principle underlying that doctrine, it is at least closely allied to it; but he does in fact mention several of the attributes of God in the course of his explanation of the phrase that 'I have become "in the image of the Merciful"'.2 These include both some of the more philosophical attributes and also some of the more obviously anthropomorphic—both God's mercy, kingship, and leadership, and His handwriting and His hand.

It is, in terms of us, inconceivable that any thinker with a grasp of his subject could have designed a book to include both this treatment of the "image of the Merciful" and of symbolism in general and the passages about the attributes in the Veil-section.3

(24) "the face of God" in the Veil-section might appear to weaken the above argument, but does not really do so, since it is merely a quotation from the Tradition which is being interpreted. The presumed forges who have chosen the interpretation of this Tradition as a means of putting his goods into the hands of the custodians he cannot gain by lawful means is bound to mention this phrase from his text when he is trying to explain it.4

(6) There is no mention of prophethood or the prophetic spirit in the Veil-section. There are elsewhere these two central places in the thought of al-Ghazali.5

Towards the end of the Veil-section there is a reference to Abraham and Muhammad, and it is suggested that they are examples of the two different methods by which the mystic goal is reached.6 There is a passing remark near the beginning of the section that only "the prophetic power" (ṣīlah waḥdah) can determine the exact number of veils, and two *Traditions* are quoted which are ascribed to "the Prophet." Apart from this there is no mention in the Veil-section of the prophetic office or faculty, and the conception plays no part whatsoever in the elaborate "philosophy of religion" which constitutes most of the section.

This is in striking contrast to the rest of the *Masbūk* and indeed to other of al-Ghazali's later works, such as *Al-Munūf bi-dīn al-Dīn*, where sīlah is described (which almost always is translated "revelation") and ḍhikr of sīlah have a central place. He maintains that "the greatest of philosophies (ṣīlah al-ḥikmah) is the word of God in general and the Qur'ān in particular"7 and gives the Qur'ān a high place in his light-symbolism. The man through whom the revelation comes, however, is not a mere instrument, but has himself reached the highest point of religious development: "the Prophets, whose ascent reached unto the Veil of the Realm Celestial, attained the utmost goal, and from thence looked down upon a totality of the World Invisible."8 The prophets may therefore be regarded as Lamps which bring illumination to the rest of men.9 Finally, in his account of the five faculties or spirits of man and in his exposition of the light-symbolism, the culmination is the transcendent (μαγικόν) prophetic spirit which is here said to be symbolized by the oil that is "well-light illuminate though it is not light".

Not merely does al-Ghazali thus give a high place to the prophet

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2 *Masbūk*, 24 (76).
7 *Ibid.*, 79 (84) ff.; 43 (94) ff.
and to revealed truth, but he is intensely interested in the attitude of men towards revealed truth, and he makes this attitude the basis of a classification of the different types of men. The chief passage will perhaps be clearer if we keep to the Arabic terms: "Thee is above him, and them above 'Ullum; dhuwm is mejilla, 'Ullum is gitta, and Lame is the simple acceptance by taqdis and the approval of the man of mejilla or the men of 'Ullum." That is to say, there are three categories of men in respect of religion. The lowest class, in which the great majority of people are to be found, is distinguished by 'Ullum, faith or belief in revealed truth, and this faith consists in accepting such truth on the authority of another person or persons belonging to one or other of the two other groups; this taqdis or following of authority is sometimes naive and unconscious (as in the case of the child adopting the religious beliefs of his parent and teacher without question), and sometimes deliberate and conscious, in which case there is a deliberate acknowledgment or approval of the authority of the person followed. The second group is distinguished by 'Ullum; that is, they are able to give rational grounds for their acceptance of revealed truth, showing how certain matters involved in revelation, such as the existence of God, can be demonstrated by reason independently of revelation, and how the prophets or miracles of the prophets afford rational grounds for accepting what is revealed through them as true. Above these two groups is a third consisting of those who not merely are able to give a rational defence of revealed truth but have "seen" or rather "tasted" these matters for themselves—for the characteristic of this group is dhuwm, which is literally "taste" though it may be translated "mystic experience", and which involves or is a form of wujud or "feeling". 

Now all these groups hold the same dogmas; they differ only in what may be called their "attitude" towards them. In the Veil-section, on the other hand, the classification of the different religious groups is based on the fact that they hold different dogmas or beliefs and the question of their "attitude", whether it is taqdis, 'Ullum, or dhuwm, does not enter in. The contrast is considerable.

It is conceivable, of course, that the same man might employ different religious classifications at different times and for different purposes; but that is not credible in this particular case. The

conceptions underlying the classification according to 'Ullum, 'Ullum, and dhuwm are central in the thought of al-Ghazali, as a period of al-Menqul min al-Dira'il will readily show. For such a man to concern himself with the distinctions of the Veil-section would be to descend to a lower plane, for the groups discussed there are apparently at the level of either of 'Ullum or 'Ullum, although no attempt is made to distinguish them on these lines. Moreover, the two systems of classification ought to interest at the top, at least, for the group of "those who attain" in the Veil-section are presumably characterized by dhuwm; yet in the account given of them there is no mention of dhuwm apart from an incidental remark to the effect that those adopting the meaning of God's word, "All perish as his companions," becomes a dhuwm; and instead the impression is given that their chief peculiarity is the holding of a subtle metaphysical theory, about the distinction between God and the Object-One (Ma'ad).

While it is theoretically possible, then, that one man may employ different systems of classification, yet in this case the contrast between the two systems is of such a kind that it is inconceivable that the mind which produced al-Menqul and the main part of the Mishkāt could subsequently have produced the Veil-section. The subject-matter of the latter demands some reference to the earlier conceptions, at least in order to show how the two systems of classification are related to one another.

(c) While the rest of the Mishkāt is a closely argued whole, the Veil-section has no preparation made for it in the previous part.

Apart from the Veil-section the Mishkāt shows a closely-knit structure. From the very beginning of the treatise where he considers the properties of physical light he is working up to his climax, the interpretation of the Niche, Lamp, Glove, Tree and Oil; and while one or two passages might be regarded as digressions, yet on the whole it is true that the actual interpretation of the light-verses cannot be properly understood without all the previous discussion. Thus there is careful preparation for the final interpretation.

The Veil-section, on the other hand, is not prepared for at all. It opens abruptly in a manner that raises many questions: "I explain it thus. God is in, by, and for himself glorious. A veil

Ibid., 67.
A POSSESSORY IN AL-GHAZALI'S MISHKAT?

is necessarily related to those from whom the glorious object is veiled. Now these among men are of three kinds, according as their veils are pure darkness, mixed darkness and light, or pure light. Thus are we plunged right into the midst of an interpretation without any previous explanation of the properties of veils: yet surely there ought to be some explanation of how light can be a veil, even if it is held that veils of darkness require no explanation.

It is the case that the veiling of light is occasionally mentioned in the earlier part of the work. Thus al-Ghazali says that error is unveiled when intelligence is separated from the deceptions of imagination; but this does not contribute anything to the Veils-section since he also says that this separation is only completed after death. There is also a remark, to which we must later return, to the effect that there is no veil between the intelligence and the realities of things apart from one which it assumes of its own accord, whose relation to the intelligence is analogous to that of the eye to the eye. That also is no preparation for the Veils-section, and the indication that this is to be more fully explained in the third chapter of the work is discernibly mystifying.

What appears to be an explanation of "veils of light," is found in a passage whose closing sentence is: "then glory to Him who hides Himself from His own creation by His utter manifestnesst, and is veiled from them through the very efficiency of His own light!" The argument leading up to this is based on the fact that we generally see most readily apprehended things through their contrary, e.g., we are aware of the sun because its light is sometimes veiled; now God's light cannot be veiled by anything similar to the sun's, but is present with us in all our apprehensions (just as physical light is present in all our perceptions of visual objects); and therefore since the divine light is invisible and undifferentiated, it is not to be apprehended through the contrast with its opposite and is consequently overlooked by the he-man "on whose feet is the veil". In this sense the ineffability of the divine light is a veil of light.

This may very well have been al-Ghazali's explanation of the veils of light, but it does not prepare us for the explanation of the Veils-Tradition as found in existing texts of the Mishkat. In the account of "those veiled by mixed darkness and light".

1 111, 10; 11, 10 (51).
2 1111, 7 (48).
3 11111, 20 (97).

A POSSESSORY IN AL-GHAZALI'S MISHKAT!

there is mention of several divine lights, such as the light of majesty and beauty, the light of dominion and glory, but these lights are said to be combined with the darkness either of the senses or of the imagination or of false synaesthesis of the intelligence; this combination of light and darkness is exemplified by the idolator who has some appreciation of the Divine majesty and beauty, but regards these as inherent in objects of sense such as precious metals and stones. It is apparent only that darkness causes light to be a veil, how pure light can be a veil is not explained at all.

It is not necessary to discuss whether the earlier theory that the undifferentiated character of the Divine light makes it difficult to see can only be consistently held by one who wrote the Veils-section. The point to be noticed is that the earlier passage is as a preparation for the later one, so that nothing is left in the earlier part of the book which leads up to and prepares for the interpretation of the Veils Tradition. It is also curious, to say the least, that a man who had an explanation of how light could act as a veil should not mention it at all when explaining the phrase "veils of light".

In three notable points, then, there is a strong contrast between the Veils-section and the rest of the Mishkat. The contrast is one of oral matter and form. Other points could be added, such as the attitude to science, to which they would not be so immediately striking, and these already adduced are sufficient to establish the existence of a

1 There is an interesting reference to the Strong Veils at the end of Part III of the Mishkat (111, 10; 11 (31), last 11111, 10, 430). It points made here is that no veil is veiled that cannot be seen by man who has reached the final state, the "presence". The first veil is the veil of the angels, because in the heart are manifested or revealed, loath to all veil and veil no one, because the light of God shines in it, and the veil may be "removed from the eyes of man". This passage follows a different line of thought from both those just considered, but it is not inconsistent with either. It is perhaps closest to the text found in the Veils-section, but differs from it in that the descension in the latter is no barrier to a brighter light than beyond, whereas in the Veils-section there is a combination of the light apprehended with the darkness of sense, etc. This gives the most significant point about this passage in the Mishkat with regard to the present discussion is that there is no mention of "veils of darkness" but only of "veils of light". I have not come across the "veils of darkness" anywhere in the authentic works of al-Ghazali, whereas he frequently refers to the "seventy veils of light", cf. 1111, 1, 97; II, 220 (ed. 11111); 11111, 40; II, 243 (ed. 11111).
of a strong contrast. It now remains to consider what deductions may be drawn from this fact.

2. The Alleged Neoplatonism of al-Ghazzālī

Less than seventy years after the death of al-Ghazzālī his Neoplatonic1 character of the Veils-section was noticed by Ibn Rushd, and in particular the doctrine that the mover of the first heaven is not God but a being emanating from Him. Ibn Rushd, however, as a bitter opponent of al-Ghazzālī, drew the unfavourable conclusion that al-Ghazzālī was insistent, since there is no formally professed belief in the theological doctrines of the Neoplatonists, whereas in other places he had criticized them.2

This is a conclusion which the impartial student will not readily accept until he has proved that no other hypothesis has any great degree of probability. The alternative which leaps to mind is that in the course of the years al-Ghazzālī's attitude may have changed from hostility to Neoplatonism to acceptance of it. His great work in criticism of the Neoplatonists, Tahāfut al-Falāshīf, was written before the decisive change in his life when he left Baghdad in order to live the life of an ascetic and mystic. His studies in the mystical writers may have made him much more favourable towards the Neoplatonists and he may eventually have adopted some or all of their doctrines.

The precise nature of the point at issue should be carefully noted. It is not a question of whether al-Ghazzālī was influenced by the Neoplatonists; that there was some influence may be readily granted, although the character and extent of the influence requires to be studied more carefully than has hitherto been done. It is a question of whether, in the words of Ibn Rushd, there was any "formal or explicit profession of belief in the theological doctrines"3 which were regarded as peculiar to the Neoplatonists, for, following that distinguished philosopher, we cannot regard some of the doctrines of the Veils-section as explicitly Neoplatonic. Can we then find any other explicitly Neoplatonic doctrines elsewhere in the later writings of al-Ghazzālī?

It might seem that the theory of lights propounded in the earlier part of the Miskāh was such a doctrine, especially as al-Ghazzālī frequently used fādla, one of the regular words used for "emanate". Gardiner, however, in the article already mentioned, has shown conclusively that, despite his language, al-Ghazzālī maintains a doctrine of creation and not of emanation in the technical sense.4 Thus the theory of lights is not an instance of explicit profession of a Neoplatonic doctrine, even if it shows some Platonic or Neoplatonic influence.

In certain passages of the Miskāh al-Ghazzālī shows interest in unity and in the movement from plurality to unity, and this might be regarded as Neoplatonic. Thus he writes:

"This kingdom of the One-and-Onlyness (fardīqāna) is the ultimate point of mortal's ascent; there is no ascending stage beyond it: for 'ascending' involves plurality, being a sort of relation involving two terms, that from which the ascent is made and that to which it is made. But when plurality has been eliminated, Unity is established, relation is effaced, all indication from 'here to there' falls away, and there remains neither height nor depth, nor anyone to face up or down. The upward Progress, the Ascend of the soul, then becomes impossible, for there is no height beyond the Highest, no plurality alongside of the One, and, now that plurality has terminated, no Ascend for the soul."

This passage is to be interpreted in accordance with an earlier one in the Miskāh,5 where, describing the highest stage of the Ascend as experienced by some mystics, he says:

"When this state prevails it is called in relation to him who experiences it, Extinction, nay, Extinction of Extinction, for the soul has become extinct to itself, extinct to its own extinction; for it becomes unconscious of itself and unconscious of its own unconsciousness, since, were it conscious of its own unconsciousness, it would be conscious of itself. In relation to the men immersed in the state, the state is called, in the language of metaphysics, Identity (wādīf), in the language of mysticism, 'affirmation of unity' (tasdīf)."

All this fits in with al-Ghazzālī's account in the Ingāl of the four stages of savākī. The first is that of those who pronounce the formula, "There is no god but God," without believing in it; the

1 Ibn Rushd, V. 137-145.
2 Miskāh, 58 (394). I have made some alterations in the translation of the last part of the first sentence.
3 Ibid, 26 (614); I have substituted "affirmation of unity" as a translation of wādīf for Gardiner's "wādīf-wādīf", following Nāṣirī, Rouda'āt al-Shi'ah, 9, 254.
second that of those who believe, whether by ta‘wīl or by ‘išra‘: at
the third stage the man apprehends by direct mystical experience (ta‘wīl) the truths apprehended by ta‘wīl or ‘išra‘ at the second
stage, and seeks for himself how all things despite their multiplicity
proceed from the One: finally there is the stage “which Sufism
calls extinction in the ta‘wīl” when a man sees in all existence
only one thing.1

To interpreting these passages it has to be remembered that
al-Ghazālī does not mean “unity”, though we often conveniently
translate it so, as, for example, when we render the name of the
Muḥaddith for themselves, Abū al-Tawḥīd ur-rā‘ī ‘Allāh, as “the
party of unity and justice”. The mystic is the man who “makes
God one” or “declares God one” either by repeating the first
part of the confession of faith or in some similar sense; and ta‘wīl is
thus the declaration or assertion of God’s unity (though no
English phrase is adequate to all four of the stages enumerated).
In the highest of the four stages the mystic erases or declares God
one in the sense that he is aware of nothing but God, not even of
himself. The word fu‘adālah, isolation or solitudeness, is another
description of this experience; as Sallīn puts it, it “is a particular
form of the mode in which God is conceived by a person in a mystic
state, that is, it is an abstract conception of God without any
relation to the world, as if it did not exist”.2

The unity associated with the conception of ta‘wīl is thus quite
different from that with which the Veil-sect is concerned. The
latter bases its assertions on the principle that, since God is absolutely
One, He cannot stand in direct relation to more than one entity.
To be directly related to a multiplicity of things would involve some
plurality in His nature. On the other hand, this principle is not to be
found in the ta‘wīl-passages. The third stage in the Ḥikmat is to
apprehend all things as proceeding from God; and the fourth
stage is not the realization that all things proceed only ordi
narily from God, but a subjective condition in which the mystic no
longer notices either the things or their relation to God; there is no
suggestion, however, that what was apprehended at the third stage,
namely, that all things proceed from God, has ceased to be true.
Thus the unity of the Veil-sect implies that there is not a

1 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Muqaddas, ch. 5, p. 200.
2 Sallīn, i, 233 s. a.

plurality of relations in God; the unity of the ta‘wīl-passages is quite
compatible with, and normally seems to presuppose, a plurality
of relations in God.

Thus al-Ghazālī’s conception of the ta‘wīl found in the highest
stage of mystical experience is not merely not explicitly Neoplatonic,
but leads to the recognition of a further contrast between the Veil-
sect and the rest of the Muḥaddith. The concepts of at-‘alī al-‘uṣūl or at-‘alī al-khāli and of al-mahfīz al-hakīk which are found in some parts of the works of
al-Ghazālī3 need not long detain us here, however important they
may be in a study of the influence of Greek philosophy on al-Ghazālī.
We important point to notice is that al-Ghazālī does not concur
to some extent in his Tahāfut; therefore, we may conclude, he did not
regard them as incompatible with orthodox theology; his acceptance
of these concepts is therefore no indication that he had abandoned
orthodox theology for Neoplatonism. I should be inclined to suggest
that al-Ghazālī regarded these matters as neutral theologically, so that a
good Muslim could quite well accept the views of the Greek philosophers on them, in much the same way as a
theologian-to-day might accept Einstein’s theory of relativity.
Al-Ghazālī would be the more ready to accept the conception of
at-‘alī al-‘uṣūl in that he regarded as genuine a Tradition to the
effect that “the first thing which God created was at-‘alī”4. Whatever
the source of the conception may have been, the mention of “creating”
shows that al-Ghazālī’s employment of it was not

3 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Muqaddas, ch. 5, v. 1", cf. Dr. Margaret Smith’s Introduction to her Translation, OGHW, 1938, 179 ff.
4 Cf. M. Bârak, discussion of at-‘alī al-khāli and at-‘alī al-samī‘ in the section on the philo-
osophical sciences, ed. Dehne, 1939/1940, pp. 97(IN.
5 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Muqaddas, ch. 5, p. 107.
6 ISLAMIC, APRIL, 1960.
from the Mishkât, and its views are quite in harmony with those of the latter (apart from the Vaisya-section), although certain sides of his teaching are more fully developed in the Mishkât. It follows from these facts that all al-Ghazâlî's conversion and retreat from Bogdiald are not synonymous with an acceptance of Neoplatonism. The only hypothesis of such a sort which could account for the facts as here stated would be that of a second conversion (from mysticism considered with orthodoxy to Neoplatonism) subsequent to the Mishkât and indeed to the main part of the Mishkât! This need not be considered seriously; even if there were good grounds for holding it to have happened, the Vaisya-section might still be deemed competent to an essay of al-Ghazâlî's thought in that it merely shadowed the wanderings of a mind approaching dissolution; so great is the contrast between the Vaisya-section and the cost of al-Ghazâlî's later writings, and not least the cost part of the Mishkât itself.

3. Al-Ghazâlî's Alleged Errorism.

For those who want to maintain the authenticity of the Vaisya-section while admitting something of the contrast between it and other writings of al-Ghazâlî, there remains one possible means of escape from the net of argument closing round them. They may put forward the plea that in the Vaisya-section we have al-Ghazâlî's esoteric views, and it is not surprising that there should be some contrast between these and his exoteric views.

As proof that he believed in principles in distinguishing between esoteric and exoteric views a passage from Almîn, 'Anîn is commonly adduced. It will be convenient to commence our study of this alleged errorism by looking closely at this passage.

He is answering the criticism that part of what he says in the book agrees with the system of the Mishkât of Shaî'îr and part with the system of the Ash'arîyah and others of the dogmatic theologians.

"One group (with whom apparently al-Ghazâlî identifies himself) says that 'system' is a word common to three different stages or levels: (a) what a man "supports" in boasting and in debate; (b) what he says privately when giving guidance or instruction; (c) what in his heart he believes on speculative questions as a result of his personal experience. Every fully enriched man (âlîm) has three 'systems' in this sense.

"The first 'system' is the way of his parents and grandparents, the system of his teacher and the system of the people of the place where he grew up...."

"The second 'system' is the guidance or instruction adapted to those who come to him for knowledge or guidance. This is not something specific or fixed, but differs according to the inquirer; be it to discourse to each in any way he is capable of understanding. Suppose a Turkic or Indian pupil happened to come to him, or a country yokel, and he knew that, if he informed him that God's essence is not in a place, neither within the world nor outside it, he neither in content with the world nor separated from it, then he will immediately deny the existence of God and disbelieve in Him. In such a case he must maintain before his pupil that God is on the throne, that the worship and service of His creatures pleases and delights Him, so that He repays them and sends them into Paradise as an inducement and reward. On the other hand, if a man is capable of having the plain truth spoken to him, he shows that to him. Thus the 'system' in this second sense is changing and variable; for each pupil it is according to his capacity to understand it.

"The third 'system' is what the man believes secretly between himself and God. None but God is acquainted with it. He speaks of it only to his fellow (âlîm) who has had a similar experience, or else to one who has reached a stage from which he can apprehend and understand it. That will be the case when the inquirer is wise. He must not be one in whom an inherited creed, as an adherent and partisan of which he grew up, has taken firm root, or has, as it were, dried his heart with a fast colour, so that he is like a piece of paper into which writing has sunk so deeply that it cannot be got rid of except by burning or tearing up the paper. This latter is a man whose temperament is corrupted and of whose salvation there is no hope; if anything contrary to what he has heard's said to him, it does not satisfy him; indeed he is likely that he would not be satisfied with what is said to him and employs deceit in wording it off. Even if he were to pay the strictest attention and devote all his energies to understanding it, he would come to be in doubt about his understanding of it. How then when his aim is to ward it off, not to understand it? The method of dealing with such a man is to cease concerning with him and leave him where he is. He is not the first blind man to pitch through his own wanderings."

In the interpretation of this passage it is important to notice that the difference between the second 'system' or 'set of beliefs and the third cannot be simply one of degree, but must be a difference of kind or quality. Within the second heading fall both the teaching given to the country yokels and that given to those whom we might callhonours graduates, and there is a great difference between the two. The teaching which comes under the third head would appear to differ from this in some other way; it is not what is given to some group of people who are above the


A PROSEGY IN AL-GHAZALI'S AYEB!

Even if I have contained for have not been admitted, yet there is nothing in the passage to suggest that al-Ghazzali held exotic views which opposed or contradicted the views he publicly expressed. Still less does he mention the hiding of one's true views in order to avoid persecution. The example he gives, which might be regarded as involving opposition—the incompatibility of spatial categories to God as contrasted with His sitting on the throne—falls entirely under the second heading, and cannot prove that there was any opposition between the second and the third mukhtar. Besides, if we may apply to this what al-Ghazzali says about the reality of the outward symbol in the _mukhtar_, then we have to say that he would have denied that the two sets of assertions were opposed to one another.

I conclude therefore that there is no good ground for thinking that in principle al-Ghazzali distinguished between exotic and erotic teaching in any way that could serve to explain the contrast between the _Velia-section_ and other parts of his later works.

Finally, it should be noticed that, even if al-Ghazzali could be shown to approve of the principle of eroticism, this would not solve the problem I have stated it. For the contrast that was to be explained is not merely one between the _Velia-section_ and al-Ghazzali's later theology in general, but one between the _Velia-section_ and the rest of the _Mukhtar_; and it does not help very much to hold that the _Velia-section_ is erotic and the rest of the book is not.

**4. Conclusions**

If the above investigations have not overstepped some crucial point, there is no avoiding the conclusion that the _Velia-section_ of the _Mukhtar_ is a forgery. It has been argued that the contrast between that section and the rest of the book is shifting. The alleged theme of Neo-platonism in al-Ghazzali's thought would avail nothing to soften that contrast appreciably; it remains too great to be explained as a contrast between erotic and exotic views in any way in which al-Ghazzali can be supposed to have accepted that distinction. The essence of the matter is that the _Velia-section_ is explicitly "Neo-platonist" (in the special sense in which I have been using that term), and that nowhere else does al-Ghazzali either explicitly or implicitly disown that criticism of the Neo-platonists.
which is contained in his Yechiyya, even if in many ways he had come closer to them. That al-Ghazali should have written the Veils-section is repugnant to all we know of the man. A sentence near the beginning of the work I take to indicate that al-Ghazali intended to write a third section dealing with the Veils-tradition. Speaking of the intelligence he says, "its only veil is one which it acquires of its own accord and for its own sake... but we shall explain this more fully in the third chapter of this work." Apart from this there is nothing which absolutely implies a Veils-section apart from the statement of the Tradition at the beginning of the whole work along with the Three-verses; and that of course could have been added by the forger. In the Arabic text I have used the "third chapter" as simply the Veils-section, though in Guinbert's translation "Part III" begins four pages earlier; but this does not affect the argument. Needless to say there is nothing to explain the veil assumed by the intelligence for its own sake. Al-Ghazali had evidently thought much about the question of veils. It may be, however, that death overtook him before he was able to write this section of the book. The Neoplatonist forgot, with a book before him asking to be completed, would then make good use of his opportunity. The Veils-section was presumably either written specially, or else consists of old material specially touched up. There are two references to the previous part of the book: "the senses are darkness in relation to the World Spiritual, as we have already shown"; "to this we have made reference in the first chapter, where we set forth in what sense they named this state 'Identity'..." These do appear to refer to what has gone before, though they twist it too-complicated. In general the matter of the Veils-section is dull and second-rate compared with the rest of the book; and the style also is inferior. The recognition that the Veils-section is spurious—if my arguments are accepted—should embolden scholars to make more use of the rest of the Makhṣas in their study of the theology and metaphysics of al-Ghazali. The work is of the highest importance, but the apparently insurmountable problem set by the Veils-section have hitherto, it would seem, scared away students of al-Ghazali from making full use of it.

A Manuscript Chinese Version of the New Testament
(British Museum, Sloane 3599)

D. C. MOULBR
(PLATES 11-V)

To three interested in the translation of the Bible into Chinese it is well known that there is a manuscript part of the New Testament in Chinese among the Sloane MSS. in the British Museum. But no exact description of this manuscript seems ever to have been published, and even its author's name was unknown till lately.

In Marshall Rowanhill's Robert Morrison, 1924, p. 28, we read that William Moseley, a dissenting Minister in Northamptonshire, had in 1728 or 1729 "the unspeakable joy of finding in the British Museum a manuscript in Chinese labelled Squatter Evangelist Sowte". With the help of Sir George Staunton it was found that the volume contained "a Harmony of the Four Gospels, the Acts, and all St. Paul's Epistles". In 1803 this manuscript was copied out by Robert Morrison and a Chinese friend named Yong Sam-tak (Robert Morrison, p. 33).

Turning to the Bible Society Catalogue (T. H. Darlow and H. F. Norris, Historical Catalogue of printed Editions of Holy Scripture, vol II, 1911, p. 122, we read, after a brief mention of the Sloane MS., that "Morrison's own copy of the MS. is in the library of the Morrison Education Society at Hongkong. A copy was made from it for E. C. Bridgman, and from that copy a transcript was obtained by J. Lea, who in turn allowed his Chinese assistant to make a duplicate for G. H. Bondfield... at Shanghai. A transcript made from this last copy was presented by G. H. Bondfield to the Bible House Library in 1894". In the course of ninety-nine loose five transcripts seem thus to have been made, each one unfortunately copied from the one before rather than from the original. In the Bible House copy there are several variations from the original.

The manuscript, now marked Sloane 3599, is a folio volume bound in leather and measuring about 38 cm. by 24 cm., and it is preserved on the back: DIAETHYMEMONG EX VANGELIIS, SUM ACTS APOTOLEMIAT EM B. PAULI EPPISPOGIS. SINCE. [NON. BRIT. MUSE.]