The Authenticity of the Works Attributed to
al-Ghazâlî

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1. THE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPORTANCE

Before the invention of printing, when copies of a book were few, it was common to find works falsely attributed to an author. The person of unorthodox opinions, like the Pseudo-Dionysius, assigned his works to someone of unimpeachable reputation in order to avoid censorship or other obstacles to circulation. Or a man might insert heretical material into a rival’s book to discredit him. Of al-Ghazâlî’s Mafrûn (al-Sâghir), D. B. Macdonald wrote:

“Of course it is quite possible and in accordance with the rules of Muslim polemic that there should also have been in circulation a false Mafrûn teaching these heretical doctrines. Many such cases occur. A book against the belief in saints was ascribed to Abû Bakr ar-Râzî (d. cir. 250-320) ... and, it was suspected, falsely, in order to bring him into discredit. The same thing happened to ash-Sha’rânî. One of his enemies obtained a copy of his Al-Bahr al-Mawrûd, left out parts and inserted others of a heretical nature, and then spread it as the original work. In defence ash-Sha’rânî was compelled to lay before the Ulama of Cairo his original copy signed by himself, and so demonstrate the spuriousness of the other. Again, ash-Sha’rânî had to defend Ibn al-‘Arabi against a similar injury. Some hostile theologians interpolated his Futûhât with heresy. Even Fâkhîr al-Din ar-Râzî suffered from this; and there were enough such cases for ‘Ali b. Muhammad al-Misrî to make up a list of them. So we need not be at all surprised if this befell al-Ghazâlî also ...”

Goldziher and Miguel Asin also have helped to make the West aware that not all the works attributed to al-Ghazâlî are genuine. In Le Livre de Mouhammad ibn Toumert Goldziher argued against the authenticity of Sîr r al-‘Alâmâyîn. Miguel Asin’s list of works “apocryphal or of doubtful authenticity” at the end of his

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Espiritualidad de Algazel ¹ contains, in addition to the Sîr r, five other writings, namely, Ad-Durrah al-Fâkhira, Minhâj al-‘Arîfîn, Mukâtshafa al-Qulûb, Rawdat al-Tâlîbîn, Ar-Risâlah al-Ladaniyyah. I tried to show lately that the closing section of Mishkât al-Anwâr is spurious.²

Further study of the writings of al-Ghazâlî has convinced me that there are many additions to be made to Asin’s list. Indeed nothing short of a radical examination of the whole Ghazalian corpus is a prerequisite of any advance in our understanding of that great Muslim thinker. Of each work as a whole we must ask: Are we certain that this is a genuine work of al-Ghazâlî? And the discovery by Goldziher of an interpolation in the Ihya ³ shows that we must always reckon with the possibility that there are spurious passages and sections in otherwise genuine works.

A detailed re-examination of all the chief manuscripts and printed editions of al-Ghazâlî’s works would be a colossal undertaking. Let us hope that it may be possible for scholars to reach a wide measure of agreement on what is authentic and what spurious without too much tedious labour on minutiae. The present article, at least, has the limited aim firstly of setting out some general principles on which a critical examination of this sort could be based, and, secondly, of showing the results attained from the broad application of these principles to some of the more accessible of the works attributed to al-Ghazâlî.

On the solution to the problems of authenticity depends the answer to several questions of interest, such as whether in his closing years al-Ghazâlî altered his attitude to Neoplatonism. Ibn Rushd claimed that he did so, or rather that he vacillated; and many have been inclined to follow Ibn Rushd’s opinion. If it can be established that the most thorough-going Neoplatonic passages ascribed to al-Ghazâlî are not authentic, then the charges against him of Neoplatonism and inconsistency will fail. It will then also be possible to form a more adequate conception of how al-Ghazâlî developed in his later years and whether he inclined to more pantheistic and theosophical forms of mysticism.

2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In a critical examination of the kind necessary, the first essential is to get solid ground under our feet, that is, to find works whose

¹ The Life of al-Ghazâlî, J.,1895, pp. 71-132; quotation from p. 131.
² p. 18f.
³ Jkh., 1949, 5-22.
³ Streifk.eb, 16.
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authenticity is undoubted, so that from these we can form some preliminary ideas about al-Ghazâli's attitude and the course of his thought. The books which spring to mind are the Tahâfut, the Ihya' and the Munqîdh. Other early dogmatic works may also be accepted, notably al-Mustashirî and al-Iqtiyâd fi'l-I'îqâd. (The Munqîd al-Falâhîyân is authentic but does not give al-Ghazâli's own views.) In the later period my criticisms of the final section of the Mishkat tend to imply that the rest of the work is genuine.

Here then we have a working basis, namely, acceptance of the authenticity of the books named. We must still proceed with caution. We must be careful, for instance, not to place too much emphasis on an isolated passage, in case it should prove to be an interpolation. Again, we must not set up criteria which beg some of the questions at issue; thus, we cannot at this stage say that anything which is Neoplatonic is ipso facto unauthentic. As far as possible we must eschew the use of subjective impressions and of estimates in which there is a large subjective element; it is not enough to say, "This passage does not sound to me like al-Ghazâli"; there must be something more objective. Questions of dating are involved in the discussion of authenticity, and it is well to keep in mind the possibility that some of the dates commonly assumed may have to be revised. (More will be said about dating later in this article.)

I pass on to consider three points which, I claim, provide three criteria of the authenticity of the works attributed to al-Ghazâli:—

(1) One of the prominent ideas of the Munqîdh is that there is a sphere above the sphere of reason, namely that of prophethood or revelation, and that from the standpoint of this higher sphere some of the assertions of reason may prove to be false, just as from the standpoint of reason some of the deliverances of sense are false. Closely linked with this conception is that of the three stages of a man's religious development. At first he naively accepts the beliefs of parents and teachers without question; this is the stage of "faith" (imân). Later, however, perhaps after a period of doubt, he can give a rational account and defence of his position and has advanced to the stage of "scientific knowledge" (i'lm). Beyond this again is the stage of "immediate experience" (dhawq), at which a man knows intuitively what he has previously known discursively and inferentially. The third stage is pre-eminently that of the prophet and saint, but other men can share in it to some extent according to the purity of their lives. The prophet, it should be noted, is able to apprehend matters beyond the ken of reason, such as the qualities of the different hours of the day which makes a different number of rak'âhs appropriate in worship.

Thus there are two triads: sense, reason, prophetic faculty; and faith, scientific knowledge, immediate experience. These triads do not correspond throughout, though the upper members correspond. Both are found in the Mishkat as well as in the Munqîdh; in the Mishkat the former is expanded into five "spirits", the sensuous, the imaginative, the rational (âqlî), the discursive (fîrî), the transcendental prophetic (qudsi nabiînî).

Now, so far as I have been able to discover, the word dhawq is not used in this special sense in the Ihya'. Not merely is the word absent, but underlying what is actually said there is a different conception. Certainly, the idea that man may have a direct intuition of religious truth is present, but it is always assumed that the results reached by intuition are identical with those reached by reason. There is no suggestion of an opposition between intuition and reason, and the intuitive "spirit" or faculty is regarded as parallel to reason, not superior. Thus in the second-last book of the Ihya' dealing with tafakkur he applies a commercial metaphor to man's religious development and says: "the knowledge of the method of employing and profiting from (i.e. such knowledge as one already has) sometimes comes through a Divine light in the heart arising from the natural disposition (fitrâh), as in the case of the prophets... and sometimes—and this is more usual—comes from study and discipline."

Since the Munqîdh is subsequent to the Ihya', it must be presumed that al-Ghazâli advanced from the thought of the parallelism of reason and religious experience to that of the superiority of religious intuition to reason. Having made this advance, he can hardly have forgotten all about it again in the short period between the composition of the Munqîdh and his death. Even had his views changed he would not have passed over in silence the points which in the Munqîdh are explained by the superiority of religious intuition. Therefore it may be concluded that, where a work mentions reason as the highest faculty (as does Mi'raj as-Sâlihîn), and makes no attempt to deal, for example, with those qualities of particular things apprehended by the light of prophecy and not by reason, that work is not subsequent to the Munqîdh and Mishkat.
The possibility should not be overlooked that al-Ghazālī may have had a "Neoplatonic period" immediately after his flight from Baghdad and prior to the Ḩikāyat. This swing to the opposite extreme, as it were, would be plausible psychologically, and the resulting conception of al-Ghazālī's development would be coherent. But in the works where reason is given primacy there is usually some other point which makes the early date unlikely. I therefore conclude that the evidence for such a period of "Neoplatonism" prior to the Ḩikāyat is not yet sufficient.

The first criterion is thus the place assigned to reason. It is definite and clear; since in his latest period al-Ghazālī believed in a sphere above reason and a faculty superior to reason, no work ascribing primacy to reason can belong to that period. The criterion is limited, however, since it cannot exclude the possibility that the work belongs to an earlier period.

(2) Another point—and one much used by Asin—is that al-Ghazālī arranges his works in an orderly and logical fashion. The way in which the genuine part of the Mishkāt carefully prepares for the consummation, the interpretation of the right-verse, is a good example of this; but it can be observed in all the works whose authenticity has been assumed as our starting-point.

We have here, then, a second criterion. Like the first it is definite but limited. We find works that are a cento of varied materials, put together without any clear principle; and we can say at once "these were not put together by al-Ghazālī". However, the question is sometimes a little complicated. In some works ascribed to al-Ghazālī we find sections whose internal arrangement is clear and logical, but which have no close connection with the rest of the work. All we can say in such a case is that the work as a whole did not receive its present form from al-Ghazālī, although some of the separate sections may be genuine.

The fact is that we find authentic Ghazalian material embedded in works of the cento class, and this increases our difficulties. However, the criterion of orderly and logical arrangement helps here too. Where a passage that occurs in two works has a clear and logical connection with the context in one instance and not in the other, we can be sure that it has been inserted in the second work by someone other than al-Ghazālī. This is especially so when the wording is identical or is only slightly altered. Mere repetition, on the other hand, is not an argument against a passage,

since al-Ghazālī frequently repeats himself, sometimes in nearly the same words and sometimes with variations; instances of this are the description of the birth-charm at the end of the Munqidh and in the "Refutation of the Ḥalāliyya", and the descriptions of the formal Worship in the Ḩikāyat and the Bidayāt.

It is hardly necessary to add that a book or passage may be spurious even though it possesses clear and logical arrangement. A work of the "cento class" may contain a passage written by al-Ghazālī which does not occur in his authentic writings; yet since the work as a whole is suspect, the passage cannot be used to build up our view of al-Ghazālī until there has been a special justification of its genuineness.

(3) The third point which offers a criterion is the attitude towards orthodox dogma and practice. As D. B. Macdonald remarked in his Life of al-Ghazālī, his "conversion" to mysticism did not mean that he ceased to be a follower of al-Ash'ari. In the Munqidh he makes it clear that he still accepts the main points of his criticism of the Neoplatonists in the Tahāfut. In the Mishkāt his zeal for orthodoxy extends to advocating the literal observance of the precept not to keep a dog in the house. Throughout the works assumed above to be authentic he appears anxious to be regarded as orthodox and is careful (as a lawyer) in his application of the terms muʿāmin, muşrik, kāfir, etc.

Since this concern to be orthodox is found in both the Munqidh and the Mishkāt, it is almost certain that he retained it to the end of his life. There is no good evidence of any abrupt change in the last year or two. Even if there were a change we should be justified in ascribing it largely to senility, since there is no account of his having given a reasoned defence of his abandonment of the positions he had held all his life; thus, although this is abstractly possible, there seems no need to consider it seriously. Hence we can say that any work where the author is not aiming at orthodoxy or where he criticizes the Ash'arīyah, cannot belong to al-Ghazālī's latest period. On the other hand, the possibility of its belonging to the period immediately after his departure from Baghdad cannot be excluded; this theory of an anti-orthodox phase has a certain plausibility, and would fit in with the hypothetical "early Neoplatonic period", but once again the evidence so far collected is not sufficient to establish it.

1 p. 121.
This third criterion, the attitude to orthodoxy, is of little use
by itself, since it is often difficult to find statements from which a
clear inference can be drawn; but it can give useful support to the
other criteria.

These then are three criteria which may help us to distinguish
between al-Ghazālī’s genuine and spurious works. Making use of them
and of any other particular matters I happened to notice, I have
roughly examined those works of al-Ghazālī which were easily
accessible to me, and noted some of the salient points which make
for authenticity or the reverse. The separate discussion of each book
is relegated to an appendix, and I pass to consider the broad results
of the examination.

3. Provisional Results and Conclusions

The number of books or sections of books to be rejected as
spurious, or at least as of very doubtful authenticity is surprisingly
large. First of all there is Asin’s list of six, which I endorse (though
in the case of the third and the sixth, as I have not had the actual
text in my hands, my only basis has been his description): ad-Durrah
al-Fākhirah, Minhāj al-Arīfīn, Mukāshaft al-Qulūb, Rawdat al-
Tafṣīlīn, ar-Risālah al-Laduniyyah, Sīr al-Ālamayn. To these
may be added the work rejected by Macdonald which I shall call
the Hebrew ‘Ajībaḥ. Then there are the following works: Kīmīyā’
as-Sādah (Arabic), al-Madhūn as-Saghiḥ, Minhāj al-‘Ālidin,
Mīrāj as-Sālikīn, Miṣān al-‘Āmal; I have not been able to consult
the text of Ma’ārīj al-Qulūb, but from Asin’s description it appears
to belong to this group. Finally, there are the following sections
of books; the third part of the Bidāyiḥ, the definitions in the Imlā’,
and the ‘veils-section’ of the Mishkāt. That makes in all thirteen
complete works and three considerable sections.

The first criterion also makes possible a rough arrangement of
the authentic works in periods, as follows: (1) early dogmatic works,
that is, where there is no mention of the Iḥyā’; (2) the Iḥyā’
and works expressing similar ideas; (3) later dogmatic works, in
which the Iḥyā’ is mentioned but the conception of a sphere above
reason and the technical term dhauq are not present; (4) works in
which the conception of dhauq is found. These periods are partly
distinguished by subject-matter, and therefore may overlap one
another in time, though a study of the references to other works
will show that there cannot be any great overlap.

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(1) Maqṣūd, Tahāfut, Mi‘yār, Mustaẓhīrī, Iqtiṣād.
(2) Iḥyā’, Bidāyiḥ, al-Ikhmāḥ fī Makāhlūq Allāh, Muṣnaq,
(3) Qoṣūs, Iṣyām, Fuṣṣal.
(4) Ayyuḥā, Iḥlāṣ, Munīqād, Mishkāt.

In addition to these I have had before me the text of Al-‘Ādāb
fī ‘l-Dīn, al-Qawā’id al-‘Asharāh, Risālah al-Tawr, ar-Risālah al-
Wā‘izyāḥ. These are probably genuine, but they are so slight and
elementary that it seems better to omit them in this study. From
Asin’s description in his “Ghazalian chrestomathy” Risālah al-
‘Aqī‘id and ar-Tīr al-Mahsūk closely resemble the Wā‘izyāḥ in
subject-matter and are probably also genuine.

Such are the results of a rapid preliminary survey of the field.
Yet even when the superficial character of the examination is taken
into account, the mounting evidence of unauthenticity within the
Ghazalian corpus is impressive. I would not claim to have definitely
established the spurious character of all the works in the list of those
to be rejected, but I do claim that there is at least a prima facie
case against their authenticity and that, if anyone wants to make
statements about al-Ghazālī on the basis of any of these works
he must first do something to justify his use of such material.

A little additional light on these questions of authenticity may
come from further detailed studies, especially from the discovery
of parallel passages. But much more is to be expected from an
attempt to give an account of al-Ghazālī’s intellectual and religious
development as a whole. If the above theory of what is and what
is not authentic can become the basis of a more coherent account
of al-Ghazālī’s development than any alternative theory provides,
that will go a long way to vindicate it. Al-Ghazālī may have been
inconsistent with himself in minor points, as Professor Massignon
notes—but what great thinker is not—but in fundamental matters
he must have adhered to his position, or at least modified it only
in an understandable way. Such is my conviction, and such I
would maintain, ought to be the working assumption of the student
of al-Ghazālī (as of any other leader of human thought) until his
radical inconsistency has been proved.

At the moment what is most needed is a study of his attitude to
Neoplatonism during the various phases of his career. Clearly he

3 Revues 93.
learnt much from it, even if he never accepted the heretical doctrines he criticized in the "Takhasw". A study of his doctrine of man, including his use of such terms as "heart" and "soul" should be important.

The picture of al-Ghazālī that emerges from the above results is somewhat different from the one commonly given. Most of the "high mysticism", to which he is supposed to have turned in his later years, has disappeared. Instead he seems to have been chiefly busied with dogmatic and speculative theology, and on mystical questions not to have moved far from the position of the Ihgā'ī.

To reject certain works as spurious does not deprive them of all value. Some of them will still be of interest as illustrations of the attempts to acclimatize Neoplatonism and Greek mysticism within the House of Islam.

APPENDIX A. DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL WORKS

(1) Works rejected by Asin or Macdonald

AD-DURRAH

(Kūthād ad-Durrah al-Fākhīrah fi Kashf 'Ulūm al-Ākhīrah, ed. Gantier-Leipzig, 1877.)

"Its authenticity is very doubtful; the editor bases it on a single citation from Ihgā'ī on p. 27, but al-Ghazālī does not mention it as his in any of his books, and the eschatological doctrine which it contains—a poor résumé of the last tractate of the Ihgā'ī—offers nothing to justify the supposition that this devout compendium is the work of al-Ghazālī himself." (Asin, Espiritualidad, iv, 383.)

It is inconceivable, I would add, that al-Ghazālī could express himself about death as the Durrah does, since he so regularly preaches a preparatio mortis. The story of the ascent to heaven on pp. 11-15 (tr. 9-12) is in strong contrast to the tradition of Muḥāfīz in the Bidāyyah. The first encourages the man who performs the external duties of a Muslim to expect a hearty welcome in heaven, whereas the latter gives the warning that even men of outstanding piety may be hardly treated hereafter if their intention also is not absolutely pure. The reference to the Bidāyyah in one MS. on p. 20 (17) is probably a gloss. If not, it is very like a deliberate attempt to conceal the difference between the Durrah and the Bidāyyah.

MINHĀJ AL-ĀRĪFĪN

(Kūthād Minhāj al-Ārifīn, in Farā'id al-Lālī, Cairo, 1343, pp. 101-120.)

"This consists of twenty-eight very short articles on hackneyed themes of asceticism and mysticism which do not justify the title of the work. It has no prologue in which the author sets forth in the customary manner the occasion of the book, nor any mention of the

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other works of al-Ghazālī. For these reasons, its authenticity is very doubtful." (Asin, iv, 385.)

I agree with this judgment.

MUQĀSHAFAH

(Kūthād Muqāshafah al-Qulūb, Cairo, 1360.)

"The editor publishes it without the author's name, although asserting that it is a compendium of a book of the same title by al-Ghazālī. I do not think it is authentic, since in none of his books does he mention it as his. Moreover, it is a cento of anecdotes, traditions, and maxims from various authors on religious themes. Among the authors mentioned are (p. 26) al-Qurtubi, who belongs to the thirteenth century A.D., and so is later than al-Ghazālī." (Asin, iv, 385 f.)

I have not seen the text of this work, but the conclusion appears to be sound.

RAWDAH

(K. Rawdat al-Tālibin wa-'Umdat as-Salikin, in Farā'id al-Lālī, Cairo, 1343, pp. 121-201.)

"It consists of forty-three chapters. This likewise is not by al-Ghazālī in view of the lack of order in the material (an incoherent mixture of dogmatic and mystical themes) and because it includes whole chapters of his Muḥāfīz Šaghīr (pp. 173-9), and of his Muğāfd (pp. 193-9) without saying that they are taken from these books of his. Moreover, on p. 606 (sc. 266) he quotes a passage of the Qādī Iyād of Cordoba, his contemporary, without saying it is maghirbi, as he said in his Muğāfd in quoting Ibn Ḥazm." (Asin, iv, 386.)

I agree with Asin. As will be seen below, I regard Al-Muḥāfīz Šaghīr itself as spurious; all its conclusions are contained on pp. 173-9, but some of its arguments are omitted. While this Muḥāfīz is more philosophical (i.e. Neoplatonic) than al-Ghazālī, other parts of the Rawdah seem to come from an orthodox theologian less intellectualist than the Ash'arīyyah; thus on p. 203 the Ash'arīyyah are distinguished from Ašr al-Haqq, with whom the writer appears to identify himself. The work is a cento, not put together by al-Ghazālī, but some sections of it besides those so far recognized may come from his genuine or spurious works.

RISĀLĀH LADUNIYĀH

(Ar-Risālāh al-Laduniyāh; numerous editions; I have quoted from one in thirty-one pages in Al-'Uqūd al-Lālī, Cairo, n.d.; translation by Dr. Margaret Smith in JRAS. 1935, pp. 177-200, 353-374.)

"I do not believe that this work is by al-Ghazālī, since the text coincides exactly with a large part of the Risālāh f 'Nafī' wa-r'Rūh of Ibn 'Arabi of Murcia, edited and translated in my study, La Poésie de..." (JRAS. April, 1932.)
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various passages. In my edition and translation of the Risâlah of Ibn 'Arabi referred to above it can be seen how the terminology and ideology of that are the same which Ibn 'Arabi employs in other works which are indisputably his." (Asin, iv, 388.)

The above coincidences in themselves are sufficient to show that it cannot be an authentic work of al-Ghazâli. On the basis of the principles set out above the following affirmative point can be added.

"The knowledge of the Unseen produced by revelation is stronger and more perfect than acquired knowledge (see scientific and historical)" (p. 23). In one respect this tallies with the conception of dhâvq in the Munqîdh, but it omits the most characteristic aspect of that conception, namely, the contrast and opposition between prophetic and rational knowledge. This omission, too, is not accidental, but fundamental, since "it is the overflowing of the Universal Reason (al-'in al-kullî) which produces revelation" (p. 24). Thus there is no question of a sphere above reason. According to the first criterion, then, this work cannot belong to the latest stage of al-Ghazâli's life, where it is commonly placed by those who accept its authenticity.

Moreover, the whole tenor of the work is different from what we should expect of al-Ghazâli at an earlier period. However, since such subjective impressions are not always reliable, let one simple point be made. In Al-Risâlah al-Ladunîyâh, a distinction is drawn between what prophets come to know by revelation (wâlah) and what devout persons come to know in their religious experience by "inspiration" (ihtâm); the former comes from Universal Reason, the latter from Universal Soul; and it is the latter which produces the 'ilm lâduni from which the work receives its name. Now, if al-Ghazâli had once been so interested in this distinction, it is strange that he should ignore it so completely in the Munqîdh and Mîzkât, even if he had abandoned his supposed belief in Universal Reason and Universal Soul. From this point alone there is a strong presumption that the work cannot belong to any stage prior to that of the Munqîdh.

The case against Al-Risâlah al-Ladunîyâh is thus very strong, and it is difficult to see how anyone can maintain its authenticity.

KIMâYÂ (Arabic)

(Kimâyâ as Suâ'dah, in Al-Jawâhir al-Ghazali, Cairo, 1343, pp. 5-19; Asin, Espiritualidad, iv, 118-19, has conveniently numbered the paragraphs, beginning with Fasî fi mu'arrifat an-nafs, and making the previous paragraph the "Prologue". This Arabic book is not identical with the Persian and Urdu works with the same title.)

On the question of authenticity the following points are to be noted:

1. This book bears no resemblance to that mentioned in the Munqîdh, which refutes the doctrines of the Ibâhiyyah.

2. The highest or "angelic" part of man is identified with reason, 'iqal (paragraph 9, last line, cf. remark in paragraph 21 that the soul is like a horse and reason the rider). The use of dhâvq towards the end of paragraph 16 in a sense not unlike that found in the Munqîdh does not contradict this primacy of reason. Hence the work cannot be from al-Ghazâli's latest period.

3. The thought is confused and there is no clear line of argument running through the work. Thus, in paragraphs 8 and 9, happiness is made to consist in virtue, whereas in paragraphs 4 and 16 it consists in the knowledge of God, and there is no indication of how these two conceptions are to be reconciled or combined.

4. Comparison with The Alchemy of Happiness, the English translation of parts of the Urdu version (by Claud Field, London, 1910, Wisdom of the East Series), shows that the Arabic Kimâyâ is roughly parallel with the Introduction and first chapter of the Urdu, but each contains long passages which are not in the other. After carefully
noting what is omitted and what is inserted, I have no doubt that the original of the Urdu is genuine and the existing Arabic spurious. The argument of Chapter I of the Urdu is clear and orderly, in contrast to the obscurity and confusion of the Arabic. It appears to be an attempt to construct a treatise on Platonic psychology (as expounded in the Republic), round some of the bones of al-Ghazali's discourse on the soul. There are numerous Platonic elements in what is said in the Urdu version, and these serve as foundation, but there are also other points which have to be omitted, such as that about the power of certain souls over other persons by miracle or sorcery (p. 22). As a whole, however, the Urdu is not Platonic but Islamic and this explains some of the difficulties and confusions of the Arabic, e.g. the conception of happiness as virtue mentioned above does not occur in the Urdu; again, there is a clear tripartite division on p. 20 of the Urdu, animals, devils, and angels, but this scheme in the Arabic when the Platonizing reviser introduces a fourth element, preternatural beings, to represent the middle or "spiritual" element in the Republic.

It has already been seen that the Arabic Kitab al-Ma'iq could not belong to al-Ghazali's latest period. The interest in philosophy, which is very noticeable, especially when the Arabic and Urdu are compared, does not fit in with an earlier period of his life, such as that immediately following his departure from Baghdad. I have no doubt that the printed Arabic work is spurious.

MAYNI SAMGHIR
(K. al-Mas'ud al-Ghazali, also known as Al-Mawlawi al-Ghazalian jannat al-Khawarij, published along with K. Hām al-Assāmi, Cairo, 1308.)

I consider this spurious for the following reasons:

1. The authenticity was denied by Ibn 'Arabi, who said (Muhaddarah, i, 90) that it was by Abu 'l-Hasan 'Ali al-Musaffir, a sha'i connected with Cenaa (I quote from Asin, Expositio, iv, 183).

2. The criticism of the Ash'ariyah on p. 6 is very suspicious. The author has been saying that the Prophet forbade the revealing of the nature of the spirit and merely said, "The spirit is min umr rabb, because the minds of the common people cannot appreciate such things; the Karramiyah and Hanbaliyah consider God a body; those a little superior denied corporeality but affirmed direction (i.e. position)."

3. The "Ash'ariyah and Mu'tazilah have advanced still further beyond the ordinary men and affirmed an existent which had no direction. Question: Why may not this mystery (of the spirit) be revealed to such people? Answer: Because they hold that these attributes can belong only to God; it is you mention this (point) to some of them they regard you as an infidel and say you are characterizing yourself by an attribute which is peculiar to God, and that you are claiming Divinity for yourself. There is no evidence from admittedly genuine works that al-Ghazali ever to this extent dissociated himself from the Ash'ariyah.

4. In the above quotation and throughout the work true belief is distinguished from inferior varieties by rational criteria, which imply that reason is regarded as the supreme faculty. In view of his struggle with the problem of thaguy, al-Ghazali could not have written in this way during the Mongol period or subsequently.

5. The work could not have been written by al-Ghazali during the Iyana period, since he does not there regard the attribute gauum or gān im bi-nafsi-hi as constituting the essence of God. Moreover, in the creed of the beginning of Book II of the Iyana he says that God is a distinct (ista'min) from His creatures (through His attributes), which directly contradicts one of the main themes of Al-Mawli al-Ghazali, namely, the analogy and similitude between God and man. The same contradiction appears when the interpretation of man's being in the image of God (or of the Merciful) in the Maslak (44 f., tr. 75 f.) is contrasted with that on p. 9 of this Maslak.

8. The work could not have been written by al-Ghazali during the Iyana period, nor during the Mongol period nor after the Mongol. And there is no place for it either prior to the Iyana or between the Iyana and the Mongol. It must therefore be spurious.

(Minjā' (K. Minhāj al-ʿĀbidin, Cairo, 1313, 51 pp.; in Une Introduction Musulmane à la Vie Spirituelle (Revue d'Ascétisme et de Mystique, iv, 1923). Asin Palacios translates the whole of the Prologue and summarizes the following chapters.

I believe this to be spurious for the following reasons:

1. In Muhaddarah, i, 90, Ibn 'Arabi denies its authenticity and says it is by Abu 'l-Hasan 'Ali al-Musaffir, to whom he also ascribes Al-Mas'ud al-Ghazali. (I quote from Expositio, iv, 193 f.; cf. Macdonald, Life, 107.)

2. It cites as the author's the following six works which are not otherwise referred to al-Ghazali: Al-Qurah ila 'Ith (3, 10, 35), Al-Ghazali al-Qurah (10), Akhlaq al-Abūr (14), Tanbih al-Ghāshīn (95), Asrār al-Maʿānī (25 f., 30, 33, 35, 62), Talbis al-Ālī (19).

3. The citation of the Iyana do not prove authenticity.

4. The phrase "sons of God", which one would not expect from al-Ghazali, occurs on p. 4 (according to the translation).

5. The work is carefully arranged, but many things are put in a different way from that normal to al-Ghazali.

MI'RĀJ
(K. Muṣrāj al-Sātākin, in Fara'id al-Lu'li, Cairo, 1343, pp. 1-93.)

The following considerations show that this work is spurious:

1. On pp. 75, 96, the writer quotes as his own a book entitled Risalat al-Aqīl, which is not known as a work of al-Ghazali's.

2. On p. 70 he refers for fuller treatment to Miskkat al-Anwār, but the interpretation of the light-verse on p. 69 f. is quite different in its higher stages from that in the Miskkat, 45 (tr. 84 f.). The latter mentions five "spirits": al-ḥusni, al-khiyāli, al-āqīl, al-fikri, al-qudsi
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an-nabawi; but in place of these the Mi'raj has: nafs, quwah khayalyyah, 'agl, 'agl fa'âl. Thus this is a misleading reference which attempts to cover over a real difference of teaching.

(3) Besides the replacement of the "prophetic spirit" by the 'agl fa'âl just noted, other passages make it clear that the Mi'raj is based upon belief in the primacy of reason; e.g. the section describing the group of people above the ordinary believers says they have perfect certainty and that this comes from demonstration (burhân). Thus the work cannot come from al-Ghazâlî's latest period.

(4) Suspicious also is its conjunction in the Cairo edition with two works which Asin admits to be spurious.

MIZAN

(K. Mizân al-Amal, Cairo, 1328.)

This is perhaps the most important book to be discussed. The following arguments show that it cannot have been given its present form by al-Ghazâlî, although there may be Ghazâlîan material in it apart from the passages to which I have noticed parallels in the Ihyâ'.

(1) In most of the book the primacy of reason seems to be accepted without question. Thus in the Preamble (p. 3) he distinguishes three stages: acceptance of authority (tâlîf), clear apprehension (wâfâl), and demonstrative knowledge (burhân); and the last of these is higher than the other two. On p. 10 the perfection of man in the Sufi view—and on p. 164 the book is said to be an exposition of the Sufi standpoint—is held to consist in apprehending the true nature of 'agl quwâh. On p. 33 f. reason or intellect ('agl) is described as a king with reference to the other faculties. There is frequent mention of the "principle of reason" in pp. 137 f. Even where he says that the highest degree is that of the prophet (p. 29), there is no hint of any contradiction between prophetic knowledge and rational knowledge; the suggestion is rather that the former is the highest type of the latter. None of these passages could have been written by al-Ghazâlî after the conception of Dhuwayl had occurred to him; and therefore the Mizân cannot belong to the closing stages of his life.

(2) The argument of the book is extremely confused, and it is difficult and indeed sometimes impossible to say what its standpoint on any particular question is, since one passage appears to be contradicted by another. For instance, what is the relation of 'ilm to 'amal and their relative importance in the attainment of happiness?—the answer is sometimes that of a philosopher, sometimes that of an ascetic. In the Preamble (p. 2 f.) there is set out what appears to be the plan of the book: (a) slackness in seeking happiness is folly; (b) the only way to happiness is by 'ilm and 'amal; (c) knowledge and the method of attaining it; (d) the 'amal which gives happiness and the method of attaining it. ; now these four headings seem to correspond to the chapter titles on pp. 2, 17, 53, 74 (Chs. 1, 3, 3, 3, 14, in the French translation), but the matter of the intervening chapters often does not fit into the scheme, and from p. 137 onwards there is a discussion of 'ilm with little reference to 'amal. Thus by the second of the above general criteria the book falls under suspicion. This suspicion will

ripen into certainty of its unauthentic character when two passages of the Mizân are compared with two passages of the Ihyâ' with which they are parallel; indeed, it will become clear, I hope, that the Mizân is an unintelligent compilation from very varied sources.

(3) Ch. 27 (= pp. 148-178), describing the duties of pupils and teachers is a close parallel to the Ihyâ', vol. i, book 1, Ch. 5. Sometimes they correspond word for word, mostly they are very similar, but occasionally there are notable differences. The most important of these is probably in the allegory of the slave performing the pilgrimage (in the Tenth Duty of Pupils in the Ihyâ' and in the Ninth in the Mizân).

In the Ihyâ' this is an excellent illustration of the point to be made. A slave is promised freedom and an estate if he makes the pilgrimage to Mecca; if he actually sets out but, through no fault of his own, fails to complete the pilgrimage, he will receive freedom but no estate. Now there are three stages: (1) preparing what is necessary for the journey; (2) the actual journey; (3) performing the various rites of the Hajj. To these correspond three types of knowledge: (1) those concerning the welfare of the body in this world, such as medicine and law; (2) knowledge of the improvement of character, together with the practice of it; (3) knowledge of God and all that is comprised in 'ilm al-muqaddasah. All who start to improve their characters obtain salvation; those who reach the third stage attain the summit of happiness. This is excellent as an illustration, in al-Ghazâlî's usual manner. The Mizân has the story in much the same words, except that it says "wealth" instead of an "estate ", but draws quite a different lesson from it. The pilgrimage itself is the perfection of the soul by purity of character; the wealth is death, whereby the veil is removed and man sees the beauty of his soul and rejoices; the journey is the improvement of character; the preparations are the legal and linguistic sciences which prepare for the speculative sciences (al-'udum an-nazarayah). This interpretation is clumsy; the three stages are not three members of one process, but are quite disparate; nothing is made of the distinction between receiving freedom and receiving wealth over and above that. I have no doubt that this interpretation is spurious, the work of a forger who objected to something in the analogy of the pilgrimage in the Ihyâ'; the passage must therefore be subsequent to the Ihyâ'.

(4) The other passage to be discussed is the autobiographical one on p. 44 of the Mizân. No previous writer appears to have noticed that pp. 44-8 of the Mizân (beginning at the top of p. 44 and a little before the actual "autobiographical passage") is closely parallel to the Ihyâ', iii, Book 2, bayân, pp. 17 f. and 19 f. The two passages are not identical, but for the most part they have the same form of words with only slight grammatical changes, such as from the third person to the second or first. The most important difference is that the words which make the passage autobiographical do not occur in the Ihyâ'. The Mizân runs: "... when a man is for God, God is for him; so that, at the time when I truly desired to walk in this way, I took counsel from a distinguished Sufi about constantly reciting the Qur'an, and he forbade me and said, The way is to sever your connections with this world..." The Ihyâ', however, simply says: ... when
a man is for God, God is for him; and they consider that the method in that is first of all the severing of connections with this world."

About the relation of these two passages to one another various theories are possible. (a) The passage in the Mizan may be genuinely by al-Ghazali, since he may have written the same thing at different times in slightly different words and with slight omissions. Since the passage goes on to speak of the practice of constantly repeating the word "Allahu", and in the Mizan apparently approves of Sufism and of this practice and in the Ihya disapproves, I think this passage, if genuine, must be earlier than the Ihya; one can imagine a man in the first flush of a new enthusiasm adopting such a practice, and later deciding that it was not so beneficial as he thought at first, but it is more difficult to imagine al-Ghazali, when the ardour of his "conversion" had cooled, adopting this practice despite his disapproval of it in the Ihya. D. B. Macdonald in his "Life" (JAS, 1899 p. 89) describes an early but abortive attraction to Sufism, to which this might refer: "he took part in dhikr... but did not attain what he sought... so he went back to his worldly studies." If the thesis is accepted that the Mizan is not a unity, then we need not consider how the priority of this passage to the Ihya affects the dating of the Mizan, since the passage may have been incorporated in the Mizan at any of a number of dates. I do not see how the autobiographical passage can belong to the original genuine strain of the Mizan which I postulate. (b) The other main possibility is that the actual autobiographical words are a fraudulent invention, and that the whole passage has been copied from the Ihya with slight modifications. In view of what the rest of the Mizan is, I think this is most probably the case.

(5) It is possible, I think, with some degree of probability, to extract from the Mizan as it is printed the original form of a genuine work of this title by al-Ghazali. The genuine work is comparatively short, but it has supplied the framework of the existing work; all sorts of extraneous matter has been inserted bodily into the genuine work, so that only close examination can bring it to light, and that not always with complete certainty. I give this attempt reconstruction of the genuine Mizan in Appendix C.

For these reasons the Mizan as it stands at present cannot have received its form from al-Ghazali himself, and it contains much material that cannot be his.

(3) Parts of works to be rejected

Bidaya (Bidaya al-Hidaya, Cairo, 1353/1934, 47 pp.)

The closing section, entitled "The Discourse on the Rules for Companionship and Association with the Creator... and with Creatures" (pp. 40-7), is spurious in the sense that it was not part of the original work although it contains some Ghazalian material. The rest of the book is genuine, being a short account of some of the fundamentals of the Ihya. The main reasons for rejecting the closing section are as follows.

(1) The final sentence of the genuine part reads like the conclusion of a work: "This is all the Guidance to the Beginning of the way in respect of your dealings with God most high by performing what He commands and avoiding what He forbids" (30 f.). This corresponds to the closing words of the Introduction: "... the Beginning of Guidance is outward piety and the End of Guidance inward piety... Piety distinguishes between what God most high commands and avoiding what He forbids, and thus has two parts. In what follows I expound to you briefly the outward aspect of the science of piety in both its parts" (p. 4). The book does in fact consist of two such parts, arranged neatly and logically in al-Ghazali's usual manner. The plan is complete without the closing section. Moreover, the closing section is not so neatly and logically arranged, and has no clear connection with what goes before.

(2) The tone of the closing section is very different from that of the main part of the book. The latter is prescribing what is best described as a semi-monastic life, whereas the former is, at least superficially, rather worldly.

(3) There are the following parallels with the Ihya so far as I have noticed. For convenience I designate the parts of the closing section by the letters A to L. A—companionship with God (p. 40); see below. B—duties of "companion" (40 f.); no parallel noticed. C—duties to parents (41); does not correspond to section on rights of parents in Ihya ii, 169 f. D—distinction between intimates, acquaintances, and strangers (41); does not correspond to distinction in Ihya, which are between blood-relations, neighbours, etc. E—conditions of intimacy (41—3); some parts are summaries of the conditions set out in Ihya ii, 136—8, but the details do not correspond. F—rights of intimates (41 f.); much abbreviated from Ihya ii, 138—153. G—acquaintances (44 f.); no parallel noticed. H—miscellaneous duties of social intercourse (46 f.); repeats Ihyafa, ii, 153 f. with slight omissions (the closing section of Al-Adab fil-'il-Din, pp. 27—9, is similar with a few more omissions). I—conclusion (47).

Now the early part of the Bidaya shows that al-Ghazali is capable of repeating himself in slightly different words or of summarizing briefly. What is surprising here is that, along with some close parallels, we find palpable differences, as in D. Indeed the whole looks like the canto which constitutes several of the spurious works.

(4) The opening paragraph (A) of the closing section is liable to attack on special grounds, and may even be a later insertion within the "closing section". The immediately preceding sentence, which I hold to be the first of the spurious part, speaks about "the art of conduct whereby you may keep yourself right in your intercourse and companionship with the servants of God most high in this world" (p. 40); there is no mention of companionship with God. The transition to paragraph (B) is likewise abrupt and awkward, whereas the first words of that paragraph, "if you are a scholar..." would follow the sentence just quoted quite naturally.
Moreover, the conception of companionship with God is in itself
suspicous. The Bidāyah is in general an abbreviation of some of
the chief parts of the Ḫayr, but there is no section in that work dealing
with this idea. Dr. Margaret Smith, who is interested in the idea
(cf. Al-Ghazālī: the Mystic, 95, 96), mentions, besides the present
passage, only a brief anecdote from the Ḫayr, where the idea of companionship
is incidental to the main point, and where the word used is jālas
and not ṣāhih. If al-Ghazālī had been interested in this idea, its influence
would surely have been seen elsewhere, e.g. in his planning of his day;
but the governing thought there is not the seeking of companionship
but the fulfilling of commands.

These reasons seem to make it necessary to regard the closing section
of the Bidāyah as spurious.

Imlā‘
(K. al-Imlā‘ fi Mushkīliv al-Ḫayr, on the margin of K. al-Ithāf of
Sayyid Murtada, vol. i, pp. 41-252, Cairo, 1311; most is also found
in the text of Ithāf, i, 392-440.)

I have found no reason for doubting the authenticity of the greater
part of the text of this work, but the Introduction, consisting of a list
of Ṣūfī terms, is suspect on the following grounds:
(1) It does not appear to have any close connection with the rest of
the Imlā‘; in any case it is in disorder; any extraneous
matter could easily have been slipped in. So far as I have observed,
there are no instances of the use of some of these Ṣūfī terms by
al-Ghazālī.
(2) These definitions constitute the main amplified and commented
on by Ibn ‘Arabī in his Futuḥat, ii, 191-237. Ibn ‘Arabī would hardly
have found the definitions so much to his liking had they represented
the ideas of al-Ghazālī himself. They must therefore either be wrongly
ascribed to al-Ghazālī, or else be a purely objective account of current
usage. In either case they give no indication of al-Ghazālī’s views.

Mishkāt
(K. Mishkāt al-Anwār, various editions.)

I have already argued elsewhere that the concluding part of this
work, the “Veils Section”, is spurious—A Forgery in al-Ghazālī’s
“Mishkāt”! JRAS., 1949, 5 ff.

(4) Notes on some works accepted as authentic.

Ayyūba
(Ayyūba ‘l-Walad, Beirut, 1933, photographic reproduction of a manus-
script along with a translation by Dr. G. H. Scherer.)

This work consists of elementary advice in the sphere of ascetic
theology. Most of it is consonant with al-Ghazālī’s views in the Ḫayr
period, e.g. the emphasis on working and not simply knowing. The
reference to Ṣūfīs in paragraph xvi is superficially at variance with praise
of certain Ṣūfīs later, e.g. in xviii, especially p. 68 (tr.). There is appar
ently a beginning of the technical use of dhawq in xvi, where Dr. Scherer
renders it “experience”.

There is a high probability that this work is authentic.

Mādnūn
(K. al-Mādnūn bi-hi ‘alā ghayr Ahlī-hi, Cairo, Maymūnīyah, 1309.)

I accept this as authentic because within the framework of an orderly
arrangement there occur a number of typically Ghazālīan thoughts.
These are not repeated word for word, but vary somewhat, as is to be
expected when a writer uses a similar illustration on different occasions.
(1) The treatment of symbolism in i, ch. 4, resembles the Mishkāt.
The mention of the Sun and Moon as symbols of the Sultan and Visier
on p. 5 is parallel to Mishkāt, 32 (tr. 73).
(2) Towards the end of i, ch. 7 (p. 13), it is maintained that
revelation contains nothing contrary to reason in the sense of being self-
contradictory, but does contain some things which reason cannot
appreciate; he uses the example of fire which is also found in the
Munqād.
(3) The idea in i, ch. 10, that God in bi’tin because He is so extremely
ṣāhih is similar to Mishkāt, 26 (tr. 67 f).
(4) In iii, ch. 1, after saying that there are three ways of interpreting
miracles, sensuous, imaginative, and rational, the Mādnūn adds that
all three must be in the text; any case is in disorder; any extraneous
matter could easily have been slipped in. So far as I have observed,
there are no instances of the use of some of these Ṣūfī terms by
al-Ghazālī.

In general it does not appear to be necessary to discuss the case
for the authenticity of those works which I accept as genuine.

APPENDIX B. NOTES ON CHRONOLOGY

The chief attempt so far to date the works of al-Ghazālī is that of
M. Louis Massignon in Recueil, p. 93. Goldziher has some useful remarks
(Streitschrift, p. 27, n. 3; p. 28), but has not noticed that the Qaṣīdā
is mentioned in the Faysal. The following list agrees in the main with
that of M. Massignon, but a division of his last period is possible through
the use of the dhawq-criterion. The list of citations is mostly taken
in the first place from Asīn, Ḫaṣāṣīn al-Ṯaqāfah, iv, but has nearly every-
where been checked: I have not, however, been able to find the alleged
reference to the Mādnūn in the Faysal.
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EARLY DOGMATIC WORKS

Maqṣūdat

Tahāfut: mentions Miʿyār (17, 20, 213), but text doubtful in each case. Qeṣaṣ al-ʿAgāʾid (58, to be written—probably not identical with the opuscule of this title, nor with Book II of Ihyāʿ). Miʿyār: M. Masson places this after the Ihyāʿ period, which is possible if the above references are later glosses. Miḥākh: usually mentioned along with Miʿyār. Mustazhirī (Leiden, 1916): refers to Tahāfut (see Introduction, p. 29). Ihyāʿ (Cairo, n.d.): mentions Mustazhirī (107).

"IHYA’" PERIOD

Ihyāʿ (Cairo, 1316): mentions Iqṭiṣād (i, 84; iv, 201); Mustazhirī (i, 32); Miʿyār (i, 43); Risālah Qudsidah (i, 84; given in extenso, i, 90–100). Bīdayah: mentions Ihyāʿ (14 f., 28, 33, 39). Hikmah: Asin says (Kesp. iv, 80) that this is promised in Ihyāʿ, iv, 90. Maṣnad: Ithbāt: reply to attacks on Ihyāʿ. Maṣnūn: mentions Ihyāʿ; mentioned in Arbaʿīn (i in Faysal). Jawāhir: mentions Risālah Qudsidah, Iqṭiṣād, Tahāfut, Mustazhirī, etc., Miḥākh, Miʿyār (all on p. 21); Ihyāʿ (23 f.). Arbaʿīn (Cairo, 1328): an appendix to Jawāhir (2, 331); mentions Maṣnad (14, 27); Ihyāʿ (26 f., 352); Iqṭiṣād (27); Maṣnūn (28); Bīdayah (32).

Kimiyyā (Persian).

LATER DOGMATIC WORKS

Qīṭās (Cairo, 1318): mentions Ihyāʿ (65); Mustazhirī (58); Miḥākh, Miʿyār (69, 74); Iqṭiṣād (99); Jawāhir (63, 65, 83, 94, 98, 100); etc.

Iḥyāʿ (Cairo, 1309): mentions Qīṭās (44).

Faysal (Cairo, 1343): mentions Qīṭās; Miḥākh (96); Maṣnūn.

"DHAWQ" PERIOD

Ayyūnah (Beirut, 1933): mentions Ihyāʿ (tr. 63, 76).

Bīdayah (Munich, 1932): aḥī dhawq mentioned in Persian text, p. 25, 7.

Munqidh (Damascus, 1358/1939): mentions Tahāfut (95 f.); Faysal (98); Qīṭās (115 f., 119, 154); Mustazhirī (119); Iḥyāʿ (153).

Mishkat (Cairo, 1323): Ihyāʿ (9); Miʿyār, Miḥākh (10); Maṣnad (19).

The list of citations shows that for the most part only comparatively slight changes are possible in this chronological table. The "Later Dogmatic Works" must be later than nearly all the works of the "Ihyāʿ Period" since Qīṭās mentions Jawāhir, but one cannot state definitely that they are prior to those of the "Dhawq Period" (apart from the Munqidh). The citations leave a wide margin for the Mishkat, but its contents indicate a later date.

APPENDIX C. RECONSTRUCTION OF "MIZĀN AL-ʿAMAL"

The studies on which this article is based have led to the conclusion that the existing Mizān al-ʿAmal consists of a great deal of non-Ghazālīan matter built into a genuine framework. Moreover, in principle it looks as if it should be possible to effect the separation, in principle it looks as if it should be possible to effect the separation, in principle it looks as if it should be possible to effect the separation, in principle it looks as if it should be possible to effect the separation, in principle it looks as if it should be possible to effect the separation, in principle it looks as if it should be possible to effect the separation, in principle it looks as if it should be possible to effect the separation.

The Preamble (p. 2 f.) gives what may be regarded as the plan of the original work. The problem is therefore out of the mass of material of the original work. The problem is therefore out of the mass of material of the original work. The problem is therefore out of the mass of material of the original work. The problem is therefore out of the mass of material of the original work.

It is conceivable that some part of the original has been omitted, as in the printed Arabic text of Kimiyāʾ as-Saʿīdah, though perhaps not much. The following is a provisional list of genuine passages.

pp. 2–3: Introduction; states what the four chapters are.

I. Slackness in seeking happiness is folly. 3–5: wisdom causes men to make sacrifices for lesser goods, how much more for eternal happiness; but there is a lack of belief in its existence. 5–17 (except 8, lines 10–16): lack of belief only leads to slackness in pursuing happiness where one is negligent; different groups are considered.

II. The way of happiness is knowledge and action. 17–19, 1; 20, 7–21, 4: the above proposition is to be accepted because of the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as in the agreement of the first three groups on it.

(21, 5–22, 9; 23, 12–14; 27, 10–31, 13, are perhaps genuine: the knowledge required is of the soul and its purification; the soul has practical and reflective powers.)

III. Knowledge and the attainment of it. 53, 2–55, 11: knowledge is either reflective or practical; the latter is threefold. (67–70 perhaps: it is possible to change a person's moral character.)

IV. The action which leads to happiness. 74–77: the virtues which lead to happiness. 77–82: the method of improving one's character. 83–103 (probably): the cardinal virtues. 103–109: conclusion; the highest happiness is closestness to God.