AN APPROACH TO GHAZÂLÎ’S CONVERSION

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I

Notwithstanding that many studies have been done on Abû Hâmid al-Ghazâlî (1058–1111),(1) his overall picture still remains unclear. This is mainly due to the complicate course of his life and thought, and also to the problem of his alleged esoteric writings whose authenticity has been questioned. He was even believed to be a peripatetic philosopher in the medieval Latin Christendom, rather than a criticizer of Islamic philosophy.(2) The myth of “philosopher Algazel” was completely smashed by Salomo Munk as late as the middle of the last century,(3) but the ghost still lingers about Ghazâlî’s extant “esoteric” works.

At the end of the last century, D. B. Macdonald published a monumental work, “The Life of al-Ghazzâlî, with Expecial Reference to His Religious Experiences and Opinions” (1899).(4) He took Ghazâlî’s “autobiography,” al-Munqidh min al-Dalâl, as a genuine and reliable source in its essence, and reconstructed thereupon his biography with minor interpretations and supplementations according to the other available materials. One of these source materials is al-Murtaḍâ al-Zabîdi’s commentary on Ghazâlî’s Ihyâ’ ‘Ulûm al-Dîn, namely, Ithâf al-Sâdah al-Muttaqîn bi-Sharh Asrâr Ihyâ’ ‘Ulûm al-Dîn, which was completed in 1787 and just printed in 1894.(5) Al-Zabîdi’s introduction to this commentary(6) is devoted to Ghazâlî’s life and work, and full of valuable information.

Macdonald, in his afore-mentioned article, divides Ghazâlî’s life into two parts before and after the conversion, and regards the former as this-worldly, irreligious, immoral, sceptic, cynical, impious, and the latter as other-worldly, religious, moral, pious, relying on Ghazâlî’s own words written and spoken after the conversion. Thus the conversion is looked upon as a turning point, or a

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culmination of Ghazâli’s inner personal, psychological development, a matter of pure personal event.

This image of “Ghazâli the Mystic,” or the eminent orthodox doctor (‘âlim) to be reborn as a Sûfî, subsequently became a standard outlook on Ghazâli, and many scholars followed suit, with some variations and differences in description and emphasis, such as Carra de Vaux (1902), Samuel M. Zwemer (1920), Margaret Smith (1944), R. J. McCarthy (1980), and others. And recently W. M. Watt (1963) somewhat revised, but not substantially, this “traditional” view and made an attempt to understand Ghazâli’s life in the background of the social and intellectual history.

Against these “traditional” approaches, there have been some challenges which some way or other explain away Ghazâli’s conversion and retirement, since these authors are all sceptical about the contents of the Munqîdh as a source material. Not to mention ‘Abd al-Dâ’im al-Baqqari (1943) who simply regards the Munqîdh as a fiction, the scholars like Farid Jabra (1954), Abdul-Fattah Sawwaf (1962) and others attribute Ghazâli’s retirement to some other motives. We may possibly include in this latter group Henri Laoust (1970) who clarifies Ghazâli’s political thought in his ʿusûl-works written through his life, and emphasizes his aspect of an orthodox ‘âlim.

II

At this juncture, it is opportune, before expounding my view, to give a brief summary of Ghazâli’s own description of his life up to the conversion in the Munqîdh.

(1) Ghazâli tells about himself in his early youth:

To thirst after a comprehension of things as they really are was my habit and custom from a very early age. It was instinctive with me, a part of my God-given nature, a matter of temperament and not of my choice or contriving. Consequently as I drew near the age of adolescence the bonds of mere authority (tâqlîd) ceased to hold me and inherited beliefs lost their grip upon me, for I saw that Christian youths always grew up to be Christians, Jewish youths to be Jews and Muslim youths to be Muslims. I heard, too, the Tradition related of the Prophet of God according to which he said, “Every one who is born is born with a sound nature; it is his parents who make him a Jew or a Christian.
or a Magian.” (17)

(2) At that time there were many conflicting sects and schools of thought, which were competing with each other. Ghazālī wanted to know for certain, by his own verification, which was true, and the truthfulness of the inherited beliefs and teachings. For this purpose, Ghazālī clarifies, first of all, the meaning of “certain knowledge” (’ilm yaqīn) or “certainty” (yaqīn) in knowledge. He defines it as “that knowledge in which the object is disclosed in such a fashion that no doubt remains along with it, that no possibility of error or illusion accompanies it, and that the mind cannot entertain such a supposition.” (18) And he adds, “Certain knowledge must also be infallible; and this infallibility or security from error is such that no attempt to show the falsity of the knowledge can occasion doubt or denial, even though the attempt is made by someone who turns stones into gold or a rod into a serpent.” (19) For example, he says, ten is more than three. Whatever one cannot know in this fashion and with this certainty is not reliable and infallible knowledge.

(3) Ghazālī then investigates the various kinds of knowledge, and comes to the conclusion that there is no knowledge with such a character except sense-perception (ḥisāb) and necessary truths (darūfiyyāt). Closely examined, however, it is demonstrated by reason (’aql) that sense-perception is not always reliable. This does not, however, necessarily imply that necessary truths or reason are the infallible knowledge that he seeks, for there is no assurance that there is no supra-intellectual apprehension which proves the falsity of reason in the same way as the latter proves the falsity of sense-perception. As a matter of fact, according to Ghazālī, the world which is said to be disclosed to the Sūfīs in the state of fanā’ may be such supra-intellectual knowledge. If so, then reason cannot stand by itself, and reasoning loses its demonstrative power and epistemological basis. Ghazālī thus comes to the conclusion that there is no certain knowledge, nor is there any way to attain to it, and falls into the absolute scepticism. He writes about this “first crisis” as follows:

The disease was baffling, and lasted almost two months, during which I was a sceptic in fact though not in theory nor in outward expression. At length God cured me of the malady; my being was restored to health and an even balance; the necessary truths of the intellect became once more accepted, as I regained confidence in their certain and trustworthy character. (20)

(4) Ghazālī’s recovery of confidence in reason (’aql) was not occasioned
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by the demonstrative proof, but the divine light (nūr ilāhī). This fact evidently shows that reason has a limit and is neither self-sufficient nor absolute by itself. Anyway relying on this reason, he now sets out to examine the teachings and doctrines of the various seekers after truth, that is, Theologians (mutakallīmūn), Philosophers (falāsifah), Bāṭininū and Sūfīs. Ghazālī confesses, as a result of this examination, that he can find no certain and sure knowledge in any of the first three groups in spite of their allegation. Thereupon he turns to the last group or the Sūfīs. And it soon becomes clear to him that there are two aspects in Sūfism: intellectual and practical. Ghazālī obtains with no difficulty the intellectual understanding of Sūfism, but realizes also that the ultimate truth can only be “tasted” experientially and reached by practices, that is, by renouncing and detaching oneself from all worldly things and devoting oneself to God. At this point, he finds himself split in the acute agonizing conflict between the worldly passions and the aspiration toward God and the Hereafter. Finally after six months of inner crisis or “the second crisis,” he leaves Baghdad as a wandering Sūfī. Ghazālī’s own painful description of this process is so well-known by now that I do not think it necessary to quote here.\(^{11}\)

III

The foregoing account by Ghazālī, to my mind, is by and large genuine and reliable. The description of his own scepticism in early youth (Phase (1)) and his endeavor to overcome it (Phase (2)) seems to be true. There is no reason to doubt it. As for the Phases (3) and (4), the accounts are apparently very schematic and logical, not chronological in their sequence, as is often indicated by the scholars.\(^ {11}\) The two crises themselves, however, are historical facts beyond doubt, to my mind, since I do not think that there is any evidence to the contrary.

First of all, Ghazālī’s description of these crises is so vivid and concrete that there seems to be no room for doubt about its genuineness. Secondly, the evidences quoted so far against Ghazālī’s account are not convincing enough. F. Jabre, for instance, attributes Ghazālī’s retirement to his fear of assassination by the Bāṭininū whom Ghazālī attacked in his writings, and cites as the proof Ghazālī’s own words which he told to his friend, ‘Abd al-Ghāfir al-Fārisī: “Then he told us, ‘The door of fear was opened. It was so dreadful that I could not do any work, and finally lost interest completely in all other

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things.\(^{(13)}\) This “fear,” according to Jabre, is not that of Hellfire as Ghazālī tells in the Munqidh,\(^{(14)}\) but a more imminent, threatening physical fear, namely, that of assassination by the Bāṭinīs. I simply do not understand why this “fear” cannot be that of Hellfire as Ghazālī himself confesses. Furthermore, if he had feared the assassination, he would not have dared to criticize the Bāṭinīs. If it is said that Ghazālī was ordered by the Caliph, al-Mustaẓhirī, to do so, then, I would say, how can it be explained that he kept on criticizing them at Hamadhan and Tus after his retirement?\(^{(15)}\)

Thirdly, the following remarks of the same friend, al-Fārisī, about the change of Ghazālī’s personality after the retirement shows the authenticity of his conversion:

I visited him many times, and it was no bare conjecture of mine that he, in spite of what I saw in him in time past of maliciousness and roughness towards people, and how he looked upon them contemptuously through his being led astray by what God had granted him of ease in word and thought and expression, and through the seeking of rank and position, had come to be the very opposite and was purified from these stains. And I used to think that he was wrapping himself in the garment of pretence, but I realized after investigation that the thing was the opposite of what I had thought, and that the man had recovered after being mad.\(^{(16)}\)

Thus I side with the “traditional” approaches, but I do not take the clear-cut division of Ghazālī’s life into two parts: the former is this-worldly, irreligious and the latter other-worldly, religious, as is typically shown in the following words of Macdonald:

It is evident from the whole development of his life and character that his theological and legal studies and labours down to that time were on a purely business basis, and that he thought only of the reputation and wealth which they were bringing him.\(^{(17)}\)

From this point of view, Macdonald explains Ghazālī’s inner development up to “the second crisis” as follows:

In his earliest youth he had given up acceptance of religious truth on authority; that his masters so taught him was no longer a sufficient reason for his belief. Further, when he was under twenty, he began to examine theological questions and quarrels, and the effect upon him must have been very much the same as that which befell Gibbon. So he drifted on,
probably restrained only by the influence of his great teacher, the Imām al-Haramain, a man of the deepest religious character; but at the Camp of Nizām al-Mulk, if not earlier, the strain became too great, and for two months he touched the depths of absolute scepticism. He doubted the evidence of the senses; he could see plainly that they often deceived ... And so he wandered for two months. He saw clearly that no reasoning could help him here; he had no ideas on which he could depend, from which he could begin.\(^{(28)}\)

But he was saved by the mercy of God, and recovered his power to think. Thereupon he turned with this regained power of reasoning to investigate “the seekers after truth” until he finally found the truth in Sūfism.

It is true that this view of two divisions of Ghazālī's life is based on his own remarks such as:

Next I considered the circumstances of my life, and realized that I was caught in a veritable thicket of attachments. I also considered my activities, of which the best was my teaching and lecturing, and realized that in them I was dealing with sciences that were unimportant and contributed nothing to the attainment of eternal life. After that I examined my motive in my work of teaching, and realized that it was not a pure desire for the things of God, but that the impulse moving me was the desire for an influential position and public recognition.\(^{(29)}\)

Referring to his resumption of teaching at the Niẓāmīyah School in Nishapur:

Previously, however, I had been disseminating the knowledge by which worldly success is attained; by word and deed I had called men to it; and that had been my aim and intention. But now I am calling men to the knowledge whereby worldly success is given up and its low position in the scale of real worth is recognized. This is now my intention, my aim, my desire; God knows that this is so.\(^{(30)}\)

Referring also to his early days of study when he and his brother, Ahmad, were enrolled, due to their orphanage and poverty, in the furnished school to continue learning:

We became students for the sake of something else than God, but He was unwilling that it should be for the sake of aught but Himself.\(^{(31)}\)

The problem, however, is whether or not we can take these words at their face value. I believe we cannot, because these words were written or uttered when Ghazālī as a veteran Sūfī looked back upon his non-Sūfī way of life long
after his conversion. It is, therefore, quite natural that he should tend to be
exaggeratingly critical about it. For “conversion” or taubah in Sufism means
to repent of one’s previous (i.e., non-Sufi) life as irreligious, sinful, ungodly
and to make a firm decision to rectify it and to lead a pious (i.e., Sufi) life devoted
to God. At the time of conversion, and a little prior to it also, Ghazali was
convinced that the Sufi way of life were best and therefore the non-Sufi one was
something to be denied or transformed. It is certainly so from the Sufi point
of view. It may not be so, however, from the other non-Sufi points of view.
Islam can be, and has been, meaningful and relevant to the non-Sufi Muslims.
And historically speaking, it was still so even before the appearance of Sufism,
although this classical Islam was getting much less meaningful at the time of
Ghazali. And in fact he was not a Sufi before his conversion, even though he
might have been influenced by Sufism.\(^{83}\) So it is not, to say the least, neces-
sarily true that he was actually leading all the way such an irreligious and im-
moral life as he himself criticized after the conversion. To my mind, he was
not.

IV

In my opinion, what Ghazali describes about his early age in our Phase
(1) is true. In all probability the following confession which Ghazali made
in another later work indicates the same situation:

I have often seen groups of intelligent people deceived by the literal
meanings (jawahir) and at a loss to see differences and contradictions
therein, and finally their basic beliefs collapse. As a result they go so
far as to deny secretly the creeds of Eschatology, the Resurrection, Paradise
and Hell, and the Return to God after death. They express that
in their hearts. The fear of God and piety no longer restrain them.
They thirst after the dream of the worldly happiness, eat forbidden foods,
behave themselves in subordination to the passions, and are eager after
fame, wealth and worldly success. When they meet pious people, they
look down upon them with pride and contempt .... All this is due to
the fact that they only see the external, formal aspect of the things and
do not attempt to look into the inner, real meaning. They consequently
do not understand the relationship between the world of phenomena
and the unseen world. When they, being ignorant of this relationship,
come across the apparent contradictions, they fall into error and lead others astray. Thus they cannot know the spiritual world through their own experience (dhawq) like the religious virtuoso, nor do they believe naively in the unseen world like the common people. They are doomed to perdition because of their smartness. Thus ignorance is nearer to salvation than imperfect cleverness and smartness. We do not think this cannot happen. We actually fell into the depths of error for a while through our intercourse with the wicked friends. But God saved us therefrom and protected us from the danger. (183) (emphasis is mine)

We see in these descriptions a sort of relativism, nihilism, or scepticism about the traditional belief system of Islam. This is personally due to Ghazâlî's critical-mindedness and sharp intellect, and historically due to the conflicting teachings of the variously competing sects and schools and the subsequent intellectual confusion. Thus Ghazâlî comes to think that all one's religious beliefs are determined by the instruction of the parents and teachers, that there is no essential difference in value among them, and that his being a Muslim is not due to the absolute truthfulness of Islam, but a mere accidental result of his environment and education. On the other hand, Ghazâlî cannot remain satisfied with this uneasy scepticism, and begins to overcome it by finding out the convincing proof for the authenticity of his inherited beliefs. In other words, it is a search for the change from the mere given faith to the faith which he has chosen by himself and of his own free will, or what is called a search for identity. This, to my mind, is the meaning of what Ghazâlî expresses by a search for "certain knowledge" in Phase (2).

Thus Ghazâlî devotes himself to the study of the various traditional sciences of Islam, which is nothing but the mastery of the intellectual apparatus of the traditional Islam. He was confident, ambitious, and full of expectation of its consequences. He climbs up successfully the ladder of career as an 'âlim, as he keeps on learning and studying. At this stage, there is no intentional seeking of fame and worldly success, nor is there any serious conflict in his mind of worldly passions and the religious ideal. For his intellectual endeavors do perfectly fit in with the traditional framework of Islam, and are conducted for the sake of its cause. He studies hard under the guidance of Imâm al-Ḥaramain in Nishapur, and is later recognized by the Seljuq wazir, Niẓâm al-Mulk, who appoints him professor at the Niẓâmiyyah School in Baghdad, according to his political program. Possibly Ghazâlî may have cooperated positively
with his patron in his attempt to restore the ideological as well as political unity of the Islamic Community. Ghazālī’s seeking after the truth, however, does not bear fruit, nor is his scepticism cured in spite of his worldly success as an ‘ālim. On the contrary, the more he investigates the sciences, the stronger becomes his scepticism, which turns into despair. And his despair is perhaps deepened by the failure of the reform program of Islam initiated by the wazīr because of his assassination.

As mentioned before, Ghazālī’s description of the inner process till “the first crisis” in Phase (3) is not literally true, nor is the crisis ascribed to the complete collapse of his religious beliefs due to cynicism and scepticism, as suggested by Macdonald. It rather seems to be the result of Ghazālī’s despair after the serious intellectual investigation of the traditional sciences in search for the truth; his despair of reason (‘aql) as the means to attain to the truth. I assume this occurred probably when he intensively studied and refuted Philosophy in the latter part of his stay in Baghdad, because it is really a critique of reason and a proof of its limitation. Now it becomes clear to him that there is no other way to salvation than the Sufi way. Then, and only then for the first time, comes to his serious consciousness from this Sufi point of view a sharp contrast or a deep gap between the ideal (Sufistic) life and his actual way of life. In other words, it is a realization of the inadequacy of the traditional sciences and the role of ‘Ulamā’, including Ghazālī himself, or the classical system of Islam. This leads to the second crisis, or the conflict of the worldly attachment and the yearning for God and the Hereafter.

In my view, therefore, it is not literally true that Ghazālī, after regaining confidence in reason, turns to examine the teachings of “the seekers after truth,” that is, Theologians, Philosophers, Bāṭinīs and Sūfis one by one in this sequence. Nor is it true that he investigated their verity and passed an objective judgement from the rational point of view without any presupposition. It is, in fact, probably after his serious study of Philosophy in Baghdad, as mentioned before, that he falls into the first crisis, since it is not merely an objective study of Philosophy, but also a critique of reason itself, in addition to that of the teachings from the orthodox viewpoint. He was well versed in Islamic Theology by that time, and already knows also that its demonstrations are not rationally convincing enough. With the recovered power of thinking, he sets out, in all probability, to scrutinize the teachings of the Bāṭinīs and the Sūfis. As for the Bāṭinīs, judging from his extant works, what he did actually
was not an objective appraisal, but a refutation of their doctrines as an orthodox 'ālim. On the other hand, he comes to the conclusion, after his intellectual study of Sūfism, that the ultimate truth is not something to be reached by rational demonstration, but to be experientially and intuitively realized with conviction (yaqīn) by way of the Sūfī practices. As a matter of fact, this is already hinted by his saying that he recovered confidence in reason by "the divine light" (nūr ilāhī). His concern is now how to get convinced of the orthodox dogmas.

V

Ghazālī's conversion is not a mere personal event, as is typically presupposed in the "traditional" approaches. My view is that it is a significant turning point in the history of Islam, as well as his individual problem.

To be mentioned at this point is Professor Watt's approach. Taking Ghazālī's description in the Munqīdḥ as essentially true, he also tries to understand Ghazālī's conversion against the social and historical context. Ghazālī's first crisis, according to Watt, was caused by the failure of his intellectual investigation, and the second crisis was the conflict of the ethical imperative and his actual life. This interpretation perfectly agrees with the description of the Munqīdḥ. Watt does not see, on the other hand, Ghazālī's retirement as a simple result of the conversion. He attempts to read a deeper social and historical meaning behind it. According to Watt, Shari'ah and Fiqh lost at that time a positive meaning for human salvation, so that it was a serious problem to reform this religious situation. Ghazālī's crisis came out of his consciousness of the inadequacy of Theology and Philosophy (reason) for this purpose and of the inability of the 'Ulamā', representatives of these sciences. In short, Watt says, "his civilization was facing a crisis and the solution was neither to hand nor obvious." After all, Ghazālī came to think it possible to adapt the Islamic thought to the new situation by reformulating Shari'ah in the Sūfī practices and giving the Sūfistic interpretation to it. For this purpose, Watt says, "freedom from worldly involvements (i.e., retirement) seemed to be a necessary condition for any attempt to bring about a reform."

I agree to Watt in his attempt to understand Ghazālī's life in the social and historical background. Nevertheless, the point is how to interrelate harmoniously what Ghazālī himself says about his inner development up to the
crises and what Prof. Watt calls "the crisis of his civilization" (which means the loss of the positive meaning of Shari'ah and Fiqh, and the inadequacy of Theology and Philosophy?), or in other words, the retirement as a result of his personal inner crisis on one hand and the retirement for "freedom from worldly involvements" on the other. It is also not clear what he means by the positive meaning of Shari'ah and Fiqh.

It is my interpretation that Ghazâlî certainly became sceptical about the traditional dogmas, but it was not merely his own particular problem, but also a general phenomenon of his age. It was not a positive atheism, but a cynicism, to the effect that no one took seriously the creeds one professed. No one spoke it out, nor was it a smart way of life to do so. The only concern was the external form and conformity. The difference is that Ghazâlî was conscious of this malaise of the age and faced it as his own problem and tried to overcome it faithfully. The intellectual tradition of Islam, however, proved to be of no use any longer as a result of Ghazâlî’s close examination. Thereupon the raison d’être of the bearers of the tradition was to be questioned. It was his doubt about his being an ‘âlim that brought about his retirement after his inner crises. The same was true with the other ‘Ulamâ’, too. If so, then it was a serious problem of the whole Islamic Community. Thence Ghazâlî’s severe criticism was directed to those successors of the Prophet, as well as to himself.\(^{411}\)

What, then, is the essence of this general malaise? It is that the traditional or classical system of Islam lost its relevancy for the most Muslims. In other words, it became no more meaningful and real for the Muslims to participate in the holy enterprise to build the ideal community based on Shari'ah, or the "Divine Kingdom" on earth. This general historical situation was attributable to the political disunity and the social disorder of the Islamic Community symbolized by the later Mongol invasion and the collapse of the ‘Abbasid dynasty. In such religions as Christianity and Buddhism for which the mundane world has no positive religious meaning and value, the political and social turmoil does not pose a serious religious problem. In Islam, however, it does. For Islam concerns the mundane, civil life directly, as well as the so-called "religious," private life through Shari'ah, the embodiment of the divine will. Man's salvation in the Hereafter depends upon his efforts to live in obedience to God (that is, "to do islâm") in this world, which means concretely to live according to Shari'ah in all aspects of life and thus to participate in the enterprise to construct the ideal community based on the divine norm in this world.
In such a religion, the significant political and social changes do not fail to produce religious repercussions. In such historical situations as we mentioned before, as a matter of fact, it was getting more and more difficult to have communion with God by working for the ideal community in accordance with Shari'ah in its classical sense. It became rather relevant and meaningful to turn into one's own inner self, to purify one's heart (galb) through devotional practices in seclusion from the external world, and to have direct communion with God in the mystical experience (fanâ'). It was thus a turning point from the classical "community-type" of Islam to the medieval, Sufistic "individual-type" of Islam, or from what Sawwaf calls "le statisme de la Loi" to "la voie du dhawaq."44 Ghazâlî actualized this transformation in his own religious experience, formulated the new form of Islam in the new historical situation, and worked to revivify the traditional sciences in terms of Sufism, as well as to make the Sûfî practices simple and available for all classes of the Muslims in the form of wîrîd.44 And in fact Sufism began to be popularized in the form of Tariqah all over the Muslim world in less than fifty years after Ghazâlî's death in 1111.

Notes


(6) Al-Zabîdî, ibid., I, 2-55.


(8) Samuel M. Zwemer, A Moslem Seeker after God: Showing Islam at Its Best in the Life and

(9) Margaret Smith, Al-Ghazâlî the Mystic. London: Luzac, 1944.
(18) Munqidh (tr. Watt), 21–22.
(19) Ibid., 22.
(20) Ibid., 25.
(21) Ibid., 56–58.
(22) See, for instance, Carra de Vaux, Ghazâlî, 43–44; W. M. Watt, Muslim Intellectual, 50–51.
(23) F. Jabre, “Biographie,” 90.
(24) Ghazâlî says, “I saw for certain that I was on the brink of a crumbling bank of sand and in imminent danger of hell-fire unless I set about to mend my ways” (Munqidh, tr. Watt, 56).
(25) Ghazâlî wrote seven books, big and small, for refutation of the Bâtinîs, two of which were completed during his stay in Baghdad. He wrote two of the rest in Hamadhân on his way back to Tus, and the remaining three were written in Tus. This means that he kept on criticizing the Bâthinîs till the end of his life (See K. Nakamura, “Notes on Ghazâlî’s Refutation of the Bâtinîs” (in Japanese), Religion and Society: Collected Papers in Dedication to Professor Iichi Oguchi for the Seventieth Anniversary of His Birthday (Tokyo: Shunjusha Publishing Co., 1981), 371–82).
(26) Quoted from Macdonald’s translation in his “The Life of al-Ghazzâlî,” 105.
(27) Macdonald, ibid., 75–76.
(29) Munqidh (tr. Watt), 56.
(30) Ibid., 76.
(32) According to al-Zabîdî, Ghazâlî was raised, together with his brother, Ahmad, after his father’s death, by the latter’s Sûfî friend, and then he was initiated into Sûfism at Tus by Yûsuf al-Nassaj and al-Fârmadhî (al-Zabîdî, Ithâf, I, pp. 7–9, 19).
(35) Macdonald places it during Ghazâlî’s stay at the court of Niẓâm al-Mulk, since it, he says, cannot happen under the influence of the pious Imâm al-Ḥâramain (Macdonald, “The Life,” 82). Professor Watt suggests, on the other hand, that “it may well have been about the
time of his move to Baghdad in 1091" (Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*, 51). But since Ghazālī's first crisis, I suppose, is deeply related to his close study of Philosophy, I would like to put it after his study of Philosophy, namely, in the latter part of his four-year stay in Baghdad.

(36) Ghazālī says: "I therefore set out in all earnestness to acquire a knowledge of Philosophy from books, by private study without the help of an instructor. I made progress towards this aim during my hours of free time after teaching in the religious sciences and writing, for at this period I was burdened with the teaching and instruction of three hundred students in Baghdad. By my solitary reading during the hours thus snatched God brought me in less than two years to a complete understanding of the sciences of the Philosophers. Thereafter I continued to reflect assiduously for nearly a year on what I had assimilated, going over it in my mind again and again and probing its tangled depths, until I comprehended surely and certainly how far it was deceitful and confusing and how far true and a representation of reality (Munqidh (tr. Watt), 29–30).

(37) Ghazālī gives two definitions of *yaqīn*. One is for logicians (nuzzār) and theologians (mutakallimān), and the other for jurists, Sūfis and most of the learned men ('ulamā'). According to the former, it is "the true knowledge resulting from the rational proof which leaves no room for doubt, nor any supposition of it" (al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā‘ al-dīn* [4 vols. Cairo: ‘Īsā al-Bābi al-Ḥalabi, n. d.], I, 72). This is exactly what is meant by "certain knowledge" (‘ilm *yaqīn*) mentioned before (supra, p. 51). According to the latter definition, it is that conviction one gets "whenever the soul inclines to accept anything and it prevails over the heart and takes hold of it, and as a result becomes the ruler and controller of the soul either urging it to action or by holding it therefrom" (Ibid., I, 73).

(39) Watt, ibid., 56.
(40) Watt, ibid., 139.