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form of early Ḵorāsānī court poetry, regained much of its lost territory. However, until the rise of a modern love poetry that was no longer bound to the classical rules, the *ḡazal* remained the most suitable medium for Persian lyricism, and even today it has some notable practitioners.

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ĠAZĀLĪ, ABŪ ḤĀMED MOḤAMMAD b. Moḥammad Ṭusī (450-505/1058-1111), one of the greatest systematic Persian thinkers of medieval Islam and a prolific Sunni author on the religious sciences (Islamic law, philosophy, theology, and mysticism) in Saljuq times.

i. BIOGRAPHY

A man of Persian descent, Ḡazālī (variant name Ḡazzālī; Med. Latin form, Algazel; honorific title, Ḥojjat-al-Eslām "The Proof of Islam"), was born at Ṭūs in Khorasan in 450/1058 and grew up as an orphan together with his younger brother Aḥmad Ḡazālī (d. 520/1126; q.v.). After instruction in Islamic jurisprudence as a teenager in Jorjān, he became a student of the leading Ashʿarite theologian and Shafiʿite jurist Emām-al-Ḥaramayn Abu'l-Maʿālī Żiaʾ-al-Dīn ʿAbd-al-Malek Jovaynī (d. 478/1085) in Nīšāpūr, where he also studied with the Sufi master Abū ʿAlī Fārmaḏī (d. 477/1084-85), a disciple of Abū Saʿīd b. Abi'l-Ḵayr (d. 440/1049, q.v.), Abu'l-Qāsem Qošayrī (d. 465/1072), and Abu'l-Qāsem Korrakānī (d. 469/1076). In 478/1085, after the death of his teachers, Ḡazālī joined the circle of scholars at the camp and court of the Saljuq vizier Kʷāja Neẓām-al-Molk (assassinated in 485/1092, q.v.), the patron of colleges (*madrasas*) he had founded. Appointed by Neẓām-al-Molk in 484/1091, Ḡazālī became an influential professor on Shafiʿite jurisprudence for four years at the Neẓāmīya *madrasa* in Baghdad (Glaasen, pp. 131-75). Overcome by a severe physical illness and plagued by a nagging skepticism born of his intensive self-study of Islamic philosophy, Ḡazālī decided to abandon his teaching position in 488/1095 in favor

of his brother Aḥmad. This year signaled a deep identity crisis in Ḡazālī. Shaken by epistemological doubt, he resolved to seek certitude (*yaqīn*) as the underpinnings of his intellectual knowledge. His crisis occurred only a few years after political rivals, in concert with Nezārī Esmāʿīlī enemies against whom Ḡazālī had written a refutation on the order of caliph al-Mostaẓher (487-512/1094-1118), had engineered his patron's assassination. Using a pilgrimage to Mecca as the pretext to escape Baghdad, Ḡazālī gave up his academic career. He was particularly disillusioned by the corruption affecting the scholarly circles of the college in the aftermath of the political turmoil following Rokn-al-Dīn Barkīāroq's (q.v.) teenage accession to the Saljuq sultanate in 485/1092.

The next eleven years, from 488/1095 until 499/1106, when Ḡazālī returned to his academic career as a professor at the college of Nīšāpūr, were doubtless a period of intense intellectual incubation, although specific details about his life and work in this period remain historically uncertain. According to his autobiography, Ḡazālī first went to Damascus where he taught in the *zāwīa* of Naṣr Maqdesī (d. 490/1097; Makdisi, p. 45). Then he journeyed from Syria to Jerusalem and visited the tomb of Abraham at Hebron in 489/1096, where he made the vow never again to take money from the government, never again to serve a ruler, and never again to enter into scholastic disputations (van Ess, p. 61). He then went to Medina and Mecca, where he performed the pilgrimage in 489/1096, returned to Syria, possibly after a short visit to Alexandria in Egypt, and finally, after a brief stay in Baghdad in 490/1097, settled down at Ṭūs. During this intellectual exile from organized teaching, Ḡazālī lived in great solitude and poverty, engaged in ascetical exercises and mystical prayer, and composed his most famous work, *Eḥyāʾ ʿolūm al-dīn* "The revival of the religious sciences," which advocates Sufi spirituality as the fulcrum of Islamic religion. Although this work bears all the marks of the manual of a great teacher and would thus presuppose Ḡazālī lecturing to students, the sources offer few clues about who his crucial Sufi contacts might have been on his journeys, or, barring a few minor exceptions, who his audience might have been in his hometown.

In 499/1106, Neẓām-al-Molk's son Faḵr-al-Molk (q.v.), who had become the vizier of Sanjar, the Saljuq sultan of Khorasan, invited Ḡazālī to return to lecturing at the Neẓāmīya of Nīšāpūr. Breaking the vow he had made at Abraham's tomb, Ḡazālī accepted the invitation and taught in Nīšāpūr until shortly before his death, animated by his belief that it was God's will for him to function as the renewer of religion (*mojadded*) at the threshold of the new Islamic century. His autobiography, *al-Monqeḏ men al-ẓalāl* "The deliverer from error" (cf. Watt, 1953; tr. McCarthy, pp. 61-143; first translation into French by A. Schmölders, Paris, 1842) dates from this final period of Ḡazālī's teaching, during the last months of which he retired to the Sufi retreat (*ḵānaqāh*) he had established for his disciples earlier in Ṭūs. He died there in Jomādā II 505/December 1111. The chronology of Ḡazālī's biography has been established by Margaret Smith (1944), Maurice Bouyges and Michel Allard, and W. Montgomery Watt, (1963) on the basis of Ḡazālī's autobiography and a great number of biographical accounts found in the Arabic primary sources (listed in Ḏahabī, p. 115).

Ḡazālī was a prolific author whose writings, examined chronologically by Bouyges and Allard (pp. 85-170; Badawī), number about five dozen authentic works, in addition to which some 300 other titles of works of uncertain, doubtful, or spurious authorship, many of them duplicates owing to varying titles, are cited in Muslim bibliographical literature. The charge that books were falsely ascribed to Ḡazālī increased after the dissemination of the large corpus of Ebn ʿArabī's works (d. 638/1240, q.v.). Nevertheless, it is a questionable criterion of authenticity to reject works of Ḡazālī that are highly mystical or esoteric in character as spurious, separating them from works said to be genuine because they are rather rational or exoteric in nature. It is also an all-too simplistic assumption that Ḡazālī's writings move from exoteric topics to mystical ones as he advances in age, though some of the most esoteric writings attributed to Ḡazālī do belong to the last phase of his literary activity. The rule-of-thumb criterion suggested by Watt (1952, pp. 24-45; idem, 1961, pp. 121-31) that Ḡazālī never directly contradicted on "higher" levels what he maintained on lower levels, forces a harmonizing consistency on a highly prolific author who underwent severe personal crises and shifts of intellectual outlook. Already Ebn Ṭofayl (d. 581/1185, q.v.) observed that Ḡazālī wrote for different audiences, ordinary men and the elite (pp. 69-72), and Ḡazālī himself completed the rather moderate theological treatise, *Eljām al-ʿawāmm ʿan ʿelm al-kalām* "The restraining of ordinary men from theology," in the last month before his death (cf. Hourani).

In addition to the aforementioned autobiography, which is the retrospective story of his religious development rather than a historical account of his life curve, the following are considered to be the major works of Ḡazālī, all undisputedly penned by him. The legal writings of Ḡazālī, who followed the Šāfeʿite school of law, include the compendia, known as *al-Basīṭ*, *al-Wasīṭ*, and *al-Wajīz* that still await scholarly analysis and may represent paraphrases of his teachers' works. The first two are treatises on legal applications (*forūʿ al-feqh*) written early in his career, while the third one is an epitome compiled in 495/1101. Ḡazālī's principal treatise on the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence, entitled *al-Mostaṣfā men ʿelm al-oṣūl* "The essential theory of legal thought" was written in 503/1109 at Nīšāpūr (Ebn Ḵallekān, ed. ʿAbbās, IV, p. 217). This last

great treatise, completed two years before his death, examines the rules of law (*aḥkām*) and their foundations (*oṣūl*) with unparalleled methodical acumen (Laoust, pp. 152-82). A generation after Ḡazālī, scholars such as Abū ʿAbd-Allāh Moḥammad b. ʿAlī Mazārī (d. 536/1141-42), praised Ḡazālī for his comprehensive knowledge of the legal applications but criticized his grasp of the legal foundations (Sobkī, *Ṭabaqāt*² VI, p. 241). High praise was expressed also by Ebn ʿAbbād Rondī (d. 792/1390), who, on account of Ḡazālī's first half of his voluminous *Eḥyāʾ*, called Ḡazālī an authority on Islamic jurisprudence (pp. 88-89). Except for Sufism, no other field of the Islamic sciences absorbed so much of Ḡazālī's time and energy as that of jurisprudence (Lazarus-Yafeh, pp. 373-411). He was in the first place a professor of Shafiʿite law.

Ḡazālī's study of Islamic philosophy received initial motivation from his teacher Jovaynī, but benefited mainly from his self-study of the works of Abū Naṣr Fārābī and Avicenna (qq.v.) during his years as professor at the Neẓāmīya of Baghdad. Ḡazālī approached philosophy in three stages. First (pace Graef, *ZDMG* 110, 1961, pp. 162-63), he summarized the principal points of philosophy by compiling a systematic exposition, entitled *Maqāṣed al falāsefa* "The intentions of the philosophers," which became a highly acclaimed treatise in medieval Europe upon its translation into Latin (*Logica et Philosophia Algazelis Arabis*) by Dominic Gundisalvi in the 12th century (Muckle; cf. P. Liechtenstein's Latin edition, Venices, 1506), and into Hebrew in the 13th century (Steinschneider). Second, in the first fortnight of 488/1095, he completed the *Tahāfot al-falāsefa* "The incoherence of the philosophers" (ed. M. Bouyges with a summary in Latin, Beirut, 1927), a controversial work of refutation which provoked the great philosopher of Muslim Spain, Ebn Rošd/Averroes (d. 595/1198) to reply with his own refutation (*Tahāfot al-tahāfot*). In the *Tahāfot al-falāsefa* Ḡazālī enumerated twenty maxims of the philosophers that he found to be objectionable or inconsistent with their own claims, three of them justifying the charge of unbelief: the philosophers' claim of the eternity of the world, their denial of God's knowledge of particulars, and their repudiation of the resurrection of the body. Ḡazālī tended to reject the necessary link of causality since all that can be affirmed is a post-hoc rather than a propter hoc, as shown by his example that the combustion of cotton occurs at the moment of its contact with fire, while it cannot be demonstrated that it occurs because of the contact between cotton and fire. For Ḡazālī human reason alone is unable to attain certitude, though he paradoxically uses his own certain reason to destroy the certitudes of the philosophers by borrowing their method for his arguments! Third, Ḡazālī authored three treatises that prepared the ground for his subsequent systematic writings on theology, his elaborate *Meʿyar al-ʿelm* "The standard of knowledge" and his brief *Meḥakk al-naẓar* "The touchstone of thought," both treatises on logic, as well as his *Mīzān al-ʿamal* "The balance of action," a tract on philosophical ethics.

Ḡazālī's writings on Islamic theology (*ʿelm al-kalām*) signal a significant stage of development for its rational methodology because he used the Aristotelian syllogism and systematically applied it to theological thought. Ḡazālī's influence on theological method, noted in Ebn Ḵaldūn's (d. 808/1406, q.v.) *Moqaddema* (tr., III, p. 52), is evidenced in his principal work on Islamic theology, *al-Eqteṣād fi'l-eʿteqād* "The just mean in belief" (Asín Palacios, 1929) completed in 488/1095, the year of his departure from Baghdad. This work weighs traditional theological maxims (maintained by major scholars of law, e.g., Šāfeʿī, Mālek b. Anas, Abū Ḥanīfa, Ebn Ḥanbal) against Ḡazālī's own opinions and expresses strong reservations about a theology based on faith in authority (*taqlīd*) and marked by polemics. In the *Eḥyāʾ* and the *Monqeḏ* this reserve turns into outright rejection of theology as a reliable way to certain truth and, in the *Eljām*, into a warning against the dangers hidden in its study. Ḡazālī, however, engaged in theological polemics himself, and his more systematic writings on theology were preceded by his polemical treatise against the Bāṭenīya sect of Neẓārī Ismaʿilism. This refutation, *al-Mostaẓherī fī faḍāʾeḥ al-Bāṭenīya* "The abominations of the sectarians" (Goldziher, 1916), was named after the caliph al-Mostaẓher (acceded to the caliphate in 487/1094), on whose order Ḡazālī wrote the work in Baghdad. Two later works that reflect Ḡazālī's intellectual struggle with the principle of hermeneutics (*taʾwīl*), upheld by the authoritative teaching (*taʿlīm*) of the Bāṭenīya, are the *al-Qesṭās al-mostaqīm* "The correct balance" (tr. McCarthy, pp. 287-332) and the *Fayṣal al-tafreqa bayna'l-Eslām wa'l-zandaqa* "The arbiter between Islam and heresy" (tr. McCarthy, pp. 145-74), the latter of which includes an innovative argument for the tolerance of heterodox groups within the Islamic community (Griffel, pp. 34-42). The authenticity of Ḡazālī's *al-Radd al-jamīl ʿala'l-elāhīyat ʿĪsā ṣarīḥ al-Enjīl* "The excellent refutation of the divinity of Jesus from the clear evidence of the Gospel" is maintained by Louis Massignon (pp. 491-536), although questioned by others (Lazarus-Yafeh, pp. 458-87).

Ḡazālī's most important work, the monumental *Eḥyāʾ ʿolūm al-dīn*, written during his years of travel and retreat between his teaching at Baghdad and Nīšāpūr, represents a moderate form of Sufism, one stressing religious knowledge and righteous action (cf. the analysis of Bousquet). The work as a whole reflects Ḡazālī's self-perception as one chosen to revive religion, being a complete guide to Islamic piety, divided into four volumes of ten "books" each (*ʿebādāt* "religious duties," *ʿādāt* "social customs," *mohlekāt* "faults of character," and *monjīyāt* "virtues"). Convinced that in his time the scholars of

law and religion (*ʿolamāʾ*) had debased religious knowledge, making it a business of this-worldly gain, Ḡazālī tried to revive a true religiosity that, in his view, had become moribund. To this end he wrote his work in an eloquent didactic style, addressing himself to the common people yet also adding insights for the mystically attuned elite. A teacher and preacher more than an original thinker, he intended, through clarity of thought rather than brilliance of diction, to convert others to following the path to God. Though Ḡazālī used Abū Ṭāleb Makkī's (d. 386/996) *Qūt al-qolūb* and Qošayrī's *Resāla* as major sources, and even copied pages of Makkī's work wholesale, the work is an independent and freshly organized compendium drawn from his broad knowledge of the Islamic sciences. After the completion of his monumental work Ḡazālī wrote a short summary of it, entitled *Ketāb al-arbaʿīn* "The book of the forty," compiled the *al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥosnā* "The noblest of aims," an exposition of the most beautiful names of God (*al-asmāʾ al-ḥosnā*) and answered the critics of the *Eḥyāʾ* with his *al-Emlāʾ ʿalā moškel al-Eḥyāʾ* (printed in its margin). Among the smaller treatises, written after the *Eḥyāʾ*, mention may be made of the eschatological tract, *al-Dorra al-fāḵera fī kašf ʿolūm al-āḵera*. Finally, an extensive commentary on the *Eḥyāʾ* (*Eṯḥāf al-sādat al-mottaqīn*) was compiled by Moḥammad b. Moḥammad Zabīdī, known as Sayyed Mortażā (d. 1205/1791), while in modern times dozens of the "books" of Ḡazālī's magnum opus have been translated into Western languages (such as, e.g., the annotated translation of Gramlich).

The scholarly analysis of works of Ḡazālī, and his Sufi writings in particular, has been controversial for about a century (Macdonald, pp. 71-132; Carra de Vaux; Asín Palacios, 1931-41; Wensinck; Obermann; Jabre; Watt, 1963; Laoust; Lazarus-Yafeh) because of the predominant emphasis on Ḡazālī as an orthodox rationalist. In addition, his monumental *Eḥyāʾ*, which deals with Sufi topics for only half the work, has overshadowed a number of smaller Sufi treatises Ḡazālī authored especially in the later stages of his life. The crux of the question about the extent to which Ḡazālī may be interpreted as a mystical philosopher is centered on his *Mešḵāt al-anwār* "Niche of lights." The work was first studied and translated by William H. T. Gairdner (1924; 1914, pp. 121-53), whose attribution and analyses were challenged by W. Montgomery Watt (pp. 5-22), and ʿAbd-al-Rāḥmān Badawī (pp. 193-98) added the observation in 1948 that a collective manuscript of Ḡazālī's writings, copied only four years after his death (MS Ṣehit Ali 1712), included the entire *Mešḵāt al-anwār*. In a recent study, Hermann Landolt (pp. 19-72) assembled a series of arguments in favor of the authenticity of the work and of the consistency of its ideas with esoteric passages of the *Eḥyāʾ*. More textual studies on other small Sufi treatises of Ḡazālī, in comparison with the *Eḥyāʾ*, are needed to clarify our understanding of Ḡazālī's mystical philosophy. Such small treatises of disputed authenticity are the *Menhāj al-ʿābedīn* (Bouyges and Allard, pp. 82-84), assumed to have been his last work, and the *al-Maẓnūn* (Cairo, 1303/1885-86; Bouyges and Allard, pp. 51-56), addressed to his brother Aḥmad. Meticulous manuscript study is also required to support the authenticity of the *Resāla al-ladonīya* (M. Smith, 1938, pp. 177-200, 353-74; idem, 1944, p. 212), which is frequently held to be a work of Ebn ʿArabī (Bouyges and Allard, pp. 124-25).

Because the vast majority of Ḡazālī's writings are compiled in Arabic, little scholarly attention is commonly given to the books he wrote in Persian. His *Kīmīā-ye saʿādat* "Alchemy of happiness" is a Persian synopsis of his *Eḥyāʾ* for his disciples, rather than its popularized version (Pretzl, p. 17). Completed shortly before 499/1106 (Bouyges and Allard, p. 60), the work is a well-organized religious ethics (de Fouchécour, pp. 223-52), enriched by mystical reflections on the heart (*qalb*) that is "alchemically" purified and empowered to reach God. Succinctly put, the *Kīmīā-ye saʿādat* finds the solution of Ḡazālī's own original crisis concerning the human heart, held in the physical body, though fashioned from the substance of angels, as being in the image of God. As the organ of intimate union with God and the locus of the inborn nature (*fetra*), it is the seat of the knowledge and love of God as well as the source of moral action. In his brief refutation of the *ebāḥīya* (Islamic freethinkers) written in Persian in 499/1106, Ḡazālī tries to safeguard his moderate mystical synthesis by attacking antinomian Sufi extremism (ed. Pretzl). It may also be noted that Ḡazālī's short *Ayyoha'l-walad* "Oh child" (cf. Hammer-Purgstall), written after the *Eḥyāʾ*, was originally composed in Persian, and only later translated into Arabic under the title *Ḵolāṣat al-taṣānīf* (Bouyges and Allard, pp. 60-61, 97-98).

Another Persian work is the *Naṣīḥat al-molūk* "Counsel for kings" (tr. into Arabic well after Ḡazālī's death by Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Mobārak b. Mawhūb Erbilī as *al-Tebr al-masbūk*; Meier, pp. 395-408), which was compiled about 503/1109 and belongs to the literary genre of "mirrors for princes." Weaving together anecdotes of Sasanian court literature and stories of Muslim lore, the book is written in a pleasing Persian and divided into two parts, a theological part, explaining the beliefs and principles on which a ruler should act, and an ethical part, including counsels and maxims according to which a ruler should administer his charge. It is generally assumed that the *Naṣīḥat al-molūk* was written for the Saljuq sultan Moḥammad b. Malekšāh, whose rule (498-511/1104-17) followed that of his brother Barkīāroq (Meier, p. 395; Gāzālī, tr. Bagley, pp. xvii-xviii). In her dissertation on Ḡazālī's letters and public addresses, however, Dorothea Krawulsky argues (pp. 20-25; Laoust, pp. 144-52) that the book was addressed to the Saljuq sultan Sanjar, the brother

of his two predecessors, who, prior to his own rule (513-52/1119-57), administered the eastern half of the sultanate in his two brothers' stead as "king of the east" (*malek-e mašreq*). Then again, attribution of the second part of the *Naṣīḥat al-molūk* has been seriously questioned by C. H. de Fouchécour (pp. 389-412), while Patricia Crone has rejected its authenticity altogether (pp. 167-91). The compilation of the small treatise, *Serr al-ʿālamayn* "The secret of the two worlds," also in the genre of "mirror for princes" though written in Arabic, is linked with an often repeated, yet doubtful, story about Ebn Tūmart (d. 524/1130). The Mahdi of the Almohads, said to have copied the book while studying with Ḡazālī in Baghdad, informed the master about the public burning of his *Eḥyāʾ* in Cordoba and throughout the Almoravid dominions (Goldziher, 1903, pp. 18-19).

Given the great volume of Ḡazālī's writings, it is difficult to state succinctly the significance and influence of his life and work. Nevertheless, Ḡazālī's own confession, in the opening pages of his *Monqeḏ* (ed. Jabre, pp. 10-11), of a thirst to free his inborn intellectual nature (*feṭra*) from the blind adherence (*taqlīd*) to inherited religion may reflect the core of his religious quest and provide the key to his work. A more balanced interpretation of Gazālī may well lie in the acknowledgment that his manifold ideas evolved over a long career, rather than in the insistence upon either an objectivist or subjectivist approach to his thought. The richness of Ḡazālī's legacy embraces not only a systematic study of law and theology that rejects both legal casuistry and scholastic ingenuity, yet includes a polemical fervor against philosophers and heretics, but it also embodies a high standard of morals and a deep mystical insight. Ḡazālī's influence on the rationalist philosophy of the Islamic West as well as on the scholasticism of Judaism and Christianity in medieval southern Europe has been highlighted for centuries; the study of his impact on the inner life and mystical thought of the Persian-speaking world has barely begun.

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(GERHARD BÖWERING)

ii. THE *EḤYĀʾ ʿOLŪM AL-DĪN*

Rightly regarded as the greatest work of Abū Ḥāmed Ḡazālī (450-505/1058-1111), *Eḥyāʾ ʿolūm al-dīn* was written after his abandonment of his professorship in Baghdad in 488/1095, while he was devoting himself to the study and practice of Sufism (*taṣawwof*). A brief description of it would be to say that it is an attempt to show how the life of a Sufi can be based on the duties prescribed by Islamic holy law (*šarīʿa*). In this way it was opposing the tendency, found in some Sufi circles, of neglecting duties incumbent on ordinary Muslims. The work was composed in Arabic. Another work of the same author, *Kīmīā-ye saʿādat* is mainly an abbreviated Persian version of the *Eḥyāʾ*, though there are some relatively slight differences. The *Eḥyāʾ* is divided into four quarters and each quarter (*robʿ*) into ten books, while each book (*ketāb*) is variously divided according to the subject matter. The four quarters are: (1) Religious duties (*ʿebādāt*), (2) Social duties (*ʿādāt*), (3) What leads to damnation (*mohlekāt*), (4) What leads to salvation (*monjīāt*).

I. *Religious duties (ʿebādāt).* 1. Knowledge (*ʿelm*). This book discusses many aspects of knowledge, but it is probably best understood as an apologia for

Ḡazālī's own preference for the life of a Sufi over that of a professor of jurisprudence. For Muslims the primary form of *ʿelm* was usually knowledge of God and his commands and purposes as prophets had received them by revelation. This might be described as "wisdom" and is contrasted with "instrumental knowledge;" the former is knowledge enabling man to live a good life and to attain to the joy of paradise, whereas the latter (which includes the sciences of nature) gives man control over objects. Within the knowledge of divine things, however, a distinction must be made. The Arabic word *ʿolamāʾ* (men of knowledge), often translated as "scholars" or "jurists" had come to be applied especially to those versed in the legal aspects of the *šarīʿa*. Though they were concerned with divine things, Ḡazālī felt that many of them were using their knowledge to further their own careers. He therefore contrasted worldly-minded and materialistic *ʿolamāʾ* with those he called *ʿolamāʾ al-āḵera* (men of knowledge of the world to come). He tries to define exactly how far religious knowledge is profitable and how far harmful.

2. The Doctrines of the creed (*qawāʿed al-ʿaqāʾed*). The first section is a much fuller exposition of the two assertions of the *šahāda* (profession of faith): There is no deity but God; Moḥammad is the Messenger of God. Section two deals with the stages or degrees of faith, beginning with learning by heart the doctrines of the creed, and then considers how far it is profitable to engage in dialectical argument (*jadal*) and theological discussion (*kalām*). Section three reproduces an earlier work by Ḡazālī, *al-Resāla al-qodsīya*, which is a statement of the doctrines of the creed in forty propositions: ten each on God's essence and unity, his attributes, his actions, and points of eschatology and political order. Section four deals with the distinction and relation between faith (*īmān*) and submission to God (*eslām*).

3. Mysteries of purity (*asrār al-ṭahāra*). After distinguishing external (or ritual) purity from the purity of the members from sin, the purity of the heart, and the purity of the inmost thoughts, Ḡazālī describes in detail all that is involved in ritual purity, including the lesser ablution (*woẓūʾ*), complete ablution (*ḡosl*), and the treatment of hair and nails.

4. Mysteries of ritual worship or prayer (*asrār al-ṣalāt*). After a chapter of quotations from the Koran and Hadith on the merits of various aspects of the worship, the detailed legal requirements of it are explained fully. Then Ḡazālī goes on to speak of the inner attributes that should be cultivated, humility and recollectedness (or presence of the heart). This is the central point in his fusion of Sufism with the religious duties of all Muslims. Other chapters are devoted to recommendations for those acting as imam or leader at the worship, to the Friday worship, and to the supererogatory acts of worship, for those who want to do more than merely fulfill the minimum requirements.

5. The mysteries of almsgiving (*asrār al-zakāt*). This book follows a similar pattern to the previous one. First a statement is given of the precise rules of the *šarīʿa* for the *zakāt* (legal alms) on various classes of property: herds of animals, grain, dates and other agricultural products, precious metals, articles of commerce, mines, etc. Then the inner significance of alms is expounded, especially the need to see almsgiving as a duty towards God and to look upon the recipient of alms as helping the giver to fulfill this duty. The inner attitude of the recipient is also discussed. Finally there is mention of the excellence of almsgiving that is supererogatory or non-obligatory (*ṣadaqāt al-taṭawwoʿ*).

6. The mysteries of fasting (*asrār al-ṣawm*). There is first a statement of the precise rules for the fast of Ramażān, including practices commonly observed though not strictly obligatory. Then comes consideration of inner attitudes, and a distinction is drawn between the fasting of ordinary people, that of the élite, and that of the élite of the élite. Supererogatory fasts are also mentioned.

7. The mysteries of the pilgrimage (*asrār al-ḥajj*). The rules concerning the pilgrimage to Mecca (*ḥajj*) and the lesser pilgrimage (*ʿomra*) are explained in detail. The appropriate "internal acts" are also described.

8. The recitation of the Koran (*ādāb telāwat al-Qorʾān*). The recitation of the Koran is meritorious. There are certain external rules for it, and also appropriate inner thoughts and attitudes. Though some Muslims insist that one must always follow traditional interpretations, no such interpretations exhaust the meaning of the verses, and there is a place for personal exegesis.

9. The remembrance of God and intercessory prayer (*al-aḏkār waʾl-daʿāwāt*). The remembrance of God is commanded in many passages of the Koran and Hadith. The Arabic word *ḏekr* means both "remembrance" and "mention" and so is applied to Sufi assemblies for the remembrance of God. This is achieved in part, both individually and communally, by repeating the name of God or phrases such as "Glory to God!" (*ṣobḥān Allāh*). *Doʿāʾ*, intercessory prayer, is also commended in the Koran and Hadith. Examples are given of *doʿāʾ* attributed to Moḥammad and other persons.

10. Devotions by day and night (*tarīb al-awrād wa tafṣīl eḥyāʾ al-layl*). The first chapter speaks of the seven divisions of the day and four (or five) of the night and describes the appropriate activity of the pious Muslim during each. This varies according to his station in life. The second speaks of the merit of rising by night for devotions and gives practical counsels.

II. *Social duties* (*ʿādāt*). 1. Good customs in eating and drinking (*ādāb al-akl*). Many of the points mentioned in this book belong to what westerners would call social etiquette, but Ḡazālī brings out certain religious aspects, especially when a man is

eating alone. He also speaks of the excellence of hospitality and similar matters.

2. Marriage (*ādāb al-nekāḥ*). The first chapter is a discussion of the reasons for and against marriage, enumerating the advantages (such as having descendants) and the disadvantages (such as incurring heavy financial burdens). Ḡazālī concludes that it depends on an individual's circumstances whether marriage or celibacy is better for him. (This is contrary to the standard Muslim view, but is in accord with Ḡazālī's own practice of celibacy after his retirement from Baghdad). The remaining two chapters deal with legal points and practical counsels.

3. Good customs in acquiring wealth and gaining a living (*ādāb al-kasb wa'l-maʿāš*). Working for a living in this world is a means towards the world to come. A man should not be so engrossed in gaining a living that he neglects useful work. Practical details are given about buying and selling, avoiding usury and the like. Some of the points mentioned are legal requirements, others go far beyond the legal minimum. Advice is given on the choice of occupation.

4. Lawful and unlawful (*al-ḥalāl wa'l-ḥarām*). This book is concerned with *waraʿ*, the pious avoidance of and abstinence from what is unlawful. In Ḡazālī's time some men asserted that it was almost impossible to gain things lawfully, but Ḡazālī held that in general the lawful and the unlawful are obvious, but that there are a number of doubtful cases. He then gives detailed casuistic rules for doubtful matters. Other chapters deal with the disposal of unlawful gains and with rules for relations with princes who are themselves unjust or may gain wealth unlawfully.

5. Friendship, brotherhood, and other social relationships (*ādāb al-olfa wa'l-oḵūwa wa'l-ṣoḥba...*). To live in friendly relations with God is a great good and is blessed by God. Brotherhood (or friendship) in God is to be distinguished from brotherhood with a worldly basis. In the former, someone is loved with a view to an other-worldly end (e.g., the love of a pupil for his religious teacher; or a man may be filled with love for God and love others for God's sake). There may also be hate for God's sake, e.g. of those who disobey God. Chapter two sets out an ideal of mutual conduct between friends, and chapter three an ideal of conduct towards every Muslim, towards neighbors, towards close relatives, and towards slaves.

6. Life in seclusion (*ādāb al-ʿozla*). There are different options about the respective merits of life in seclusion (or retreat) and life in the world among men. The arguments from the Koran and Hadith are not conclusive, and it is necessary to look at the advantages and disadvantages of each form of life. Seclusion enables a man to devote himself more completely to the remembrance and worship of God and to grow in knowledge of him. It also makes it easier for a man to avoid various sins. Life in the world, however, enables a man to grow in knowledge, to be useful to others, to enjoy the society of others, and to acquire certain social virtues.

7. Good customs during travel (*ādāb al-safar*). Travel may be for various purposes, some worldly, some religious (such as pilgrimage); some travel is unlawful, some meritorious. Some practical points are mentioned. A second chapter deals with legal matters, such as permitted modifications in ablutions and times of worship, and the determination of the *qebla* and the exact hours of prayer.

8. Good customs in hearing music and in ecstasy (*ādāb al-samāʿ wa'l-wajd*). Ḡazālī holds that music is a means to discover what is really in a man's heart. Some authorities, such as Mālek b. Anas, said that listening to music was forbidden, but Ḡazālī argues that it is lawful in general, but may be unlawful incidentally. He enumerates seven types of occasion where music is permitted. The last is where a man loves God and seeks to come near to him; in this case music leads to mystical "states" (*aḥwāl*) and ecstasy (*wajd*). These states and ecstasy are further described, and practical counsels are given to those who listen to music in religious assemblies with a view to attaining to ecstasy.

9. The duty of commanding good and forbidding evil (*al-amr be'l-maʿrūf wa'l-nahy ʿan al-monkar*). This is an important principle of the Islamic religion, mentioned in the Koran and Hadith, but in Ḡazālī's view it is imperfectly understood and is neglected in practice. The *moḥtaseb*, the person censuring, should be a mature Muslim known for his uprightness (*ʿadāla*) and capable of censuring effectively. The matter censured should be something generally disapproved of, present, and obvious. There are degrees of censure, beginning with informing the person censured and exhorting him and, in extreme cases, going on to the use of armed force. A list is given of reprehensible acts. With regard to rulers, it is lawful to inform them that an act is disapproved and to exhort them to give it up; but Ḡazālī regrets that in his day men are not prepared to go further and risk martyrdom.

10. The life and character of the Prophet (*ādāb al-maʿīša wa aḵlāq al-nobūwa*). This book is restricted to social matters. Among the qualities of character enumerated and illustrated are generosity, patience, courage, gentleness, chasteness of speech and clothing, magnanimity. Many facts demonstrate the Prophet's sincerity.

III. *What leads to damnation (al-mohlekāt).* 1. Explanation of the mysteries of the heart (*šarḥ ʿajāʾeb al-qalb*). Man differs from other creatures in that he is capable of having knowledge of God, and this comes to him by his heart (*qalb*). Knowledge of the heart is of the highest importance for the Sufi. *Qalb* denotes both the physical organ and a subtle spiritual faculty (*laṭīfa rūḥānīya*). This last is also called *rūḥ* (spirit) and *nafs* (self, soul). *Rūḥ* may also mean a delicate physical body, and *nafs* may also refer to the desire and anger against which man has to struggle.

The "soul at rest" (*moṭmaʾenna*) is that which has overcome the passions; the "blaming soul" (*lawwāma*) is that which is engaged in struggle; the "soul commanding evil" (*ammāra beʾl-sūʾ*) is obeying the passions and the devil. *ʿAql* (reason) may mean either knowledge or that which knows, namely the heart. The heart may be said to have armies (limbs, organs, senses, etc.) through which it carries on the struggle; but it is distinguished from animals by knowledge (*ʿelm*) and will (*erāda*). Four types of attribute may be distinguished in the heart; the predatorial (*saboʿīya*), connected with anger; the bestial (*bahīmīya*), connected with desire; the magisterial or spiritual (*rabbānīya*), connected with leadership and knowledge; and the diabolical (*šayṭānīya*), through which evil and vice are possible. These can be represented by a dog, a pig, a wise man, and a demon. The different kinds of knowledge are then discussed, and the difference between ordinary knowledge and that acquired by divine inspiration (*elhām*). Then the action of the devil on the heart is explained, and the nature of man's responsibility for his actions.

2. Moral education (*rīāżat al-nafs wa taḥḏīb al-aḵlāq wa ʿalājat amrāż al-qalb*). The diseases of the heart are more serious than those of the body, since they lead to an evil and vicious character, and it is important to know how to cure them. In a good man there are four basic virtues: wisdom, courage, moderation, justice (*ḥekma, šajāʿa, ʿeffa, ʿadl*). In this Ġazālī is in the Platonic tradition, and he also speaks of the Aristotelian conception of virtue as a mean. A virtue such as generosity can be gradually acquired by making oneself perform generous acts. The diseases of the soul are due to following desires, and the cure is to renounce the desires. Finally there are descriptions of the moral training of children and of Sufi disciples.

3. The subjugation of the two desires (*kasr al-šahwatayn*). The two desires are those of the belly and genitals. With regard to the first it should be realized that hunger has several advantages over satiety. The practice of abstinence can be gradually increased; but the man who is abstinent to an excessive degree becomes liable to fall into faults. The desire for sexual intercourse is beneficial in that its pleasure gives man an analogy for the pleasures of paradise and that it perpetuates mankind. In respect of this there can be excess (especially infatuation, *ʿešq*, for a single person) and also deficiency; only moderation in accord with reason and revelation is praiseworthy. It is better in general for a Sufi disciple (*morīd*) not to marry; but if he falls into sin, even only through his eyes, he should marry.

4. Faults of the tongue (*āfāt al-lesān*). After quotations about the dangers of the tongue and the excellence of silence, twenty defects are mentioned in order of increasing seriousness: speaking about what does not concern one; speaking too much; engaging in useless topics; disputing and arguing (unfairly); opposing others in hostile fashion; speaking with affectation; indecent talk; cursing; singing and reciting poetry; pleasantries; mocking and making fun of others; divulging secrets; making promises falsely; telling lies (but lies are sometimes permissible); speaking behind people's back (discussed at great length); tale-bearing; being double-tongued; praising others unwisely; using words carelessly especially in respect of God and his attributes; ordinary men's questioning about theological subtleties.

5. The condemnation of anger, hatred, and envy (*ḏamm al-ġażab waʾl-ḥeqd waʾl-ḥasad*). Anger is created in men by God in order that they may repel evils which would destroy or harm them. There is a just mean in respect of anger, and this is praiseworthy; but both excess and deficiency are blamed. Suggestions are given for the control of anger in different cases. Magnanimity is praiseworthy. When anger cannot be expressed it produces hatred, which is entirely blameworthy and leads to other evils. Instead of hating one should pardon wrongs done to one and show compassion. Envy proceeds from hatred and is in respect of benefits God has bestowed on other men. Suggestions are given for overcoming it.

6. The condemnation of this world (*ḏamm al-donyā*). This world is like a woman who attracts men by her beauty and then kills them. Sayings are quoted of Moḥammad, Jesus, and others condemning love of the world. It is important to know what things to avoid in the world and what not to avoid. The just mean here is to take the world for the sake of religion, not for its own sake.

7. The condemnation of avarice and of love of wealth (*ḏamm al-boḵl wa ḏamm ḥobb al-māl*). Wealth and material possessions are both blamed and praised in the Koran and Hadith. Wealth may enable a man to perform his religious duties better, to help others, and to perform services to the community (such as building mosques and hospitals). Poverty is to be praised, provided it is accompanied by contentment and not by cupidity and covetousness of what others have. To avoid these faults one should be content with what is strictly necessary to maintain life, should rely on God's promise, and should be aware of the danger of great wealth. Opposed to avarice is generosity. The highest degree of generosity is to give away what one has need of.

8. The condemnation of (love of) fame and of hypocrisy (*ḏamm al-jāh waʾl-rīāʾ*). Love of fame is like love of wealth; the latter is concerned with worldly goods, the former with gaining control of men's hearts. The man who praises another is his slave. Love of fame is countered by knowledge of the transience of worldly glory and by seeking renown only in the eyes of God, not of men. The pious man hates praise from men. Hypocrisy is essentially the seeking of fame and renown by religious practices (*ʿebādāt*), though there are also other forms of

hypocrisy which are not blameworthy, such as desiring to appear well in people's eyes. Hypocrisy can be practiced by one's body, dress, language, acts, and personal relationships. It may be open or hidden, even from the man himself. This unconscious hypocrisy is greatly feared by the virtuous. To avoid hypocrisy a man must take no pleasure in being praised and feel no pain at being blamed; he must also be aware of the dangers during religious practices and turn away from them.

9. The condemnation of pride and complacency (*ḏamm al-kebr wa'l-ʿojb*). Pride may be expressed in one's gait, clothing, etc.; but this is rather *takabbor* (proud bearing). Properly speaking, pride is a trait of the soul. It consists in regarding oneself as superior to others in some respect, sometimes even as superior to the prophets and to God himself. The opposite is humility (*tawāžoʿ*). Pride may be in respect of one's learning, religious practices, birth, physical beauty and strength, wealth, or the number of one's following. Pride may be combated and humility acquired by reflecting on man's weakness and dependence on God, and then by special considerations according to the basis of one's pride. True humility is a just mean. Complacency (or self-satisfaction) consists in thinking highly of one's learning or achievements or wealth, not as gifts from God but as one's own. It leads to pride and a failure to be aware of one's sins. Since complacency is due to ignorance, its cure is through the relevant knowledge.

10. The condemnation of delusion (*ḏamm al-ḡarūr*). Delusion is a form of ignorance, where the deluded man believes and regards a thing to be different from what it really is and where this false belief coincides with his desires. For example, an unbeliever may hold that certainty is better than doubt and that this world and its pleasures are certain and the world to come doubtful, and so prefer this world to the world to come. Other examples are given, and then there is a detailed account of the forms of delusion or self-deception to which four classes of men are liable: men of learning (*ahl al-ʿelm*), experts in religious practices (*arbāb al-ʿebāda wa'l-ʿamal*), would-be Sufis (*motaṣawwefa*), and wealthy men (*arbāb al-amwāl*).

IV. *What leads to salvation (al-monjīāt).* 1. Repentance (*tawba*). Repentance consists of: (a) the knowledge that sins are harmful and are a veil between man and God, his beloved; (b) the state of being penitent (*nadm*); and (c) the appropriate act, e.g., the decision not to repeat the sin. Repentance is a religious duty in all its parts, to be performed without delay, and by all who seek to come close to God. Sins arise from the four attributes (or instincts) of the heart (mentioned in II/1) and may be in respect to either God or men. They may also be classified as small (*ṣaḡīr*) or great (*kabīr*). Small sins may become great in various ways, e.g., by perseverance in them. Men may draw near to perfection in repentance to a greater or lesser extent; this is in respect to the depth of their repentance and their continuing to be influenced by it. Since sin is like a disease, the physicians of religion, i.e., the prophets and learned men, should endeavor to bring to repentance those who persist in sin.

2. Patience and gratitude (*al-ṣabr wa al-šokr*). Patience is a station (*maqām*) or stage (*manzel*) in the religious life, and like all stations is characterized by (a) knowledge (*maʿāref*), which leads to (b) states (*aḥwāl*), which lead to (c) activity (*aʿmāl*). There are two kinds of patience. One is of the body and consists in enduring pain and suffering. One is of the soul and consists either in enduring natural desires (without sinning)—and this is continence (*ʿeffa*)—or in enduring what one does not want; and this has various names, such as courage and self-control. Gratitude includes the knowledge that all good things are from God, together with a feeling of joy, not merely because of the thing itself nor of the fact that it is an expression of God's love, but because it enables one to serve him. This feeling leads to appropriate acts. There are many types of good gift (*neʿma*). Patience is concerned with the trials sent by God and gratitude with his gifts. Absolutely, patience is more meritorious but there are many grades of both patience and gratitude.

3. Fear and hope (*al-ḵawf wa'l-rajāʾ*). Hope is a station (*maqām*) when a man is established in it, and is a state (*ḥāl*) when it is only for a time. Hope leads to activity, in contrast to its opposite, despair (*yaʾs*). Hope may be increased by certain practices and considerations. Fear of eternal punishment is more effective than hope in the case of most men. Fear also leads to activity. During a man's life, fear is preferable since it leads to an avoidance of sin; but at the time of death, hope is preferable. Higher than the fear of Hell is the fear of God himself and of separation from him.

4. Poverty and asceticism (*al-faqr wa'l-zohd*). Every being is poor compared with God and is dependent on him, but poverty is here discussed in respect of wealth. There are several degrees: to avoid and hate wealth (this is asceticism); not to rejoice in having wealth, yet not to reject it; to prefer to have wealth yet to be content when one has none; to suffer from the absence of wealth. Poverty is more meritorious than wealth. To the poor certain good practices are recommended, and certain rules to be observed when seeking alms. Asceticism consists in renouncing things which are permitted. There are many kinds and degrees of asceticism. The highest degree is to renounce everything except God. The man who renounces everything in this world but seeks the joys of paradise is at a lower level. There is a detailed discussion of asceticism in respect of food, clothing, housing, marriage, money, and influence.

5. The oneness (of God) and confident trust (*al-tawḥīd wa'l-tawakkol*). Confident trust is a stage and

station of those brought near to God (*moqarrabūn*). It is closely linked with *tawḥīd*, and this last is of four degrees. (The word *tawḥīd* is commonly translated "unity [of God]," but it properly means "making God one" or "asserting God's unity.") (1) A man may confess God's unity with his lips without believing in his heart. (2) A man may confess with the lips and believe in the heart, as do ordinary Muslims. (3) A man may, by illumination from above, observe all things as coming from God the One. (4) A man may see in existence only one thing, God. Confident trust is linked with the third meaning. The nature of confident trust is further explained by giving detailed rules and considering particular cases.

6. Love, yearning, familiarity, and approval (*al-maḥabba wa'l-šawq wa'l-ons wa'l-reżā*). Love (for God) is the highest of the stations (*maqāmāt*) in the spiritual life; yearning, familiarity, and approval are its fruits. In general five kinds of love can be distinguished, and all of these find their highest degree in love for God. The most sublime pleasure is in knowledge (*maʿrefa*) of God and contemplation of his face (*al-naẓar elā wajheh*). Yearning is the desire for something partly known and partly unknown; and so yearning for God is desire for a fuller knowledge of him. Familiarity is the joy experienced from nearness to the Beloved and contemplation of Him. Approval, that is, the approval or joyful acceptance of God's decrees, is also a fruit of love, and is itself a station. *Doʿā*, intercessory and petitionary prayer, is not contrary to approval.

7. Intention, single-mindedness, and sincerity (*al-nīya wa'l-eḵlāṣ wa'l-ṣedq*). According to Hadith, acts are judged by the intention of the agent. The relation of intention and act is fully discussed. Single-mindedness or purity of intention is usually restricted to the case where the motive is to draw near to God. There are degrees of single-mindedness, and it can be impaired in various ways, notably by ostentation (*reʾya*). Sincerity may be in respect of speech, intention, resolve, the accomplishment of one's resolve, works, and the stations of religion. Sincerity in the fullest sense has all these aspects.

8. Attentiveness and self-examination (*al-morāqaba wa'l-moḥāsaba*). This book is not fully described by the title. It consists of a description of the six stations (*maqāmāt*) which constitute perseverance or steadfastness (*morābaṭā*). (1) First is *mošāraṭa*, the statement of conditions; reason (*ʿaql*) is conceived as a merchant in partnership with the soul (*nafs*), who before commencing the undertaking states the conditions to which the soul is expected to conform. (2) Next is *morāqaba*, attentiveness, that is to God the Watcher (*raqīb*), as practiced by "those brought near" and "the men of the right hand." (3) Self-examination should be made at the end of each day to discover whether the balance of one's acts is a credit or debit. (4) Self-punishment (*moʿāqabat al-nafs*) follows. (5) Then comes *mojāhada* (engaging in spiritual struggle). (6) Finally there is reproach and reproof of one's self (*tawbīḵ al-nafs wa'l-moʿâtabatohā*).

9. Meditation (*tafakkor*). Meditation or contemplation is described as causing to be present in the heart two thoughts in such a way that from them a third thought arises. The subject of meditation may be either man, with his sins, duties, weaknesses, and strengths, or God with his names and attributes. Many natural phenomena may act as signs.

10. Remembrance of death and what follows it (*ḏekr al-mawt wa mā baʿdah*). It is good that death should be often in one's mind. Not to hope for a long life is meritorious; this includes acting at once and not postponing one's act. The pangs and anguish of death are worse for those who have cause to expect punishment in hell. Accounts are given of death-bed sayings of the Prophet and other Muslims. Seemly deportment at funerals is commended, and then follow descriptions of the experiences of the man between death and the Judgment, and in the world to come, culminating in the vision of God. The final word of the whole work is an assertion of the wideness of God's mercy in the hope that this will be a good augury for the writer.

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(W. MONTGOMERY WATT)

iii. THE *KĪMIA-YE SAʿĀDAT*. SEE *KĪMIĀ-YE SAʿĀDAT*.

iv. MINOR PERSIAN WORKS

In addition to the *Kīmīā-ye saʿādat*, his most important book in Persian, Ḡazālī wrote a number of shorter works in Persian, which for the most part either reiterate or elaborate on the contents of the *Kīmīā*. Written after his return to his birthplace of Ṭūs in 498/1105, these works contain homilies and counsel addressed to the sultan and his ministers, as well as to his own disciples; they stress the necessity of adhering to the provisions of the *šarīʿa* and condemn those who fail to do so.

Apart from the *Kīmīā*, the most celebrated of Ḡazālī's works in Persian is *Naṣīḥat al-molūk*, written most probably for Sultan Sanjar b. Malekšāh (or possibly for Sanjar's brother, Sultan Moḥammad). In the edition published by Jalāl-al-Dīn Homā'ī, this work consists of two parts, of which only the first (pp. 1-79) can reliably be attributed to Ḡazālī. In many parts the language and the contents are strikingly similar to, and in some passages a verbatim copy of, the *Kīmīā* (e.g., cf. pp. 3-5 and 27-46 with *Kīmīā* I, pp. 124-30 and 534-42). In the opening section of the *Naṣīḥat al-molūk*, Ḡazālī, drawing on a koranic verse (14:24), advises the sultan to pursue eternal felicity (*saʿādat-e jāvīdān*), which he likens to a tree growing from the seed of faith (*toḵm-e īmān*) planted in the chest and the heart (ed. Homā'ī, p. 2). The tree should be cultivated and nourished by devoting each Friday to worship. This tree has ten roots and ten branches (pp. 2-5). The roots correspond to essential articles of faith: the knowledge of God, His transcendence, His omnipotence, His omniscience, His will, His attributes of vision and hearing, His attribute of speech, His attribute of acting, judgment and the hereafter, and belief in His prophets. The branches of the tree consist of man's external actions, worship, the observance of justice, and the avoidance of injustice. These themes are illustrated with numerous sayings of the Prophet and anecdotes concerning the great figures of religious tradition (pp. 13 ff.).

The second and longer part of *Naṣīḥat al-molūk* (pp. 81 ff.), differs considerably in content and style from the well-known writings of Ḡazālī. It is replete with stories about the pre-Islamic kings of Persia, especially Anōšīravān and his justice, as well as maxims attributed to Aristotle, Socrates, Alexander, and Bozorgmehr (q.v.). It refers to the concept of the divine glory of kings (*farr-e īzadī*), and quotes many Persian verses, a practice Ḡazālī generally avoided. In the second edition, Homā'ī expresses some ambivalence on the attribution of this part of the book to Ḡazālī (Intro., pp. lxxi-lxxx), and both ʿAbd-al-Ḥosayn Zarrīnkūb (pp. 256-60) and Patricia Crone have presented arguments to prove that Ḡazālī could not be its author. Some Western scholars such as Henri Laoust, A. K. S. Lambton, and F. R. C. Bagley have nonetheless treated it as an authentic work of Ḡazālī in their discussions of the work (see bibliography below). *Naṣīḥat al-molūk* has been translated into Arabic more than once; an early translation entitled *al-Tebr al-masbūk fī naṣīḥat al-molūk* has been published several times.

Pand-nāma, another book of advice attributed to Ḡazālī and probably addressed also to Sultan Sanjar, has received little scholarly attention. In its contents it greatly resembles the first part of *Naṣīḥat al-molūk* as well as some other works of Ḡazālī, such as the *Kīmīā* and *Zād-e āḵerat*. The introduction to the book relates that Ḡazālī wrote the *Pand-nāma* in response to a certain king who had asked him for advice. A great deal of the book is devoted to the necessity of remembering death and the transience of worldly life and seeking true felicity in the hereafter. Its themes are illustrated with stories concerning the prophets and other religious figures. The *Pand-nāma* exists in numerous manuscripts, all of relatively recent transcription. The lack of any early extant manuscripts of the work has led a number of scholars to doubt its ascription to Ḡazālī, although its contents are clearly drawn from his writings.

The attribution to Ḡazālī of a third book of counsel addressed to kings, *Toḥfat al-molūk*, is utterly unfounded, although its section on religious beliefs has been drawn from the first part of *Naṣīḥat al-*

molūk. The celebrated story of Shaikh Ṣanʿān, developed at length by ʿAṭṭār (q.v.) in *Manṭeq al-ṭayr*, appears to have been taken by him from this *Toḥfat al-molūk*, which has led a number of Persian and Western scholars to attribute mistakenly the origin of the story to Ḡazālī (Pūrjawādī, 2000, pp. 4-12).

Ay farzand (O son!) is the book of counsel that Ḡazālī wrote for one of his close disciples. It is frequently punctuated by the address *Ay farzand* (O son!), and this exclamation has come to serve as its common title, although the titles *Ḵolāṣat al-taṣānīf* and *Farzand-nāma* are also encountered. From Ḡazālī's mention in this work of *Eḥyāʾ ʿolūm al-dīn* and the *Kīmīā-ye saʿādat* it can be deduced that he wrote it toward the end of his life. He begins by citing some counsels of the Prophet before answering questions asked of him by his disciple on such matters as the duties of the spiritual wayfarer, the nature of Sufism, servanthood (*ʿobūdīyat*), trust in God (*tawakkol*), and sincerity of devotion. Queries on aspects of direct mystical experience (*ḏawq*) he declines to answer, on the grounds that such topics cannot be expounded verbally. The entirety of this work has a Sufi coloration, in an eloquent and attractive style. As usual, Ḡazālī cites many koranic verses and traditions of the Prophet, which he leaves untranslated. He also quotes a number of verses in Arabic and Persian, and one of the Persian verses appears to be his own composition: *gar mey do hazār raṭl bar peymāʾīṭā mey naḵorī nabāšad-at šeydāʾī* (Even if you measure out two thousand cups of wine/ As long as you do not drink the wine, you will not feel intoxicated). *Ay farzand* has been translated into Arabic more than once, one of which, under the title *Ayyoh al-walad*, has served as the basis for versions in German by Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall and in French by Toufic Sabbagh.

Zād-e āḵerat is a kind of manual of religious observance for those among his followers (*ʿawāmm*) who lacked the intellectual wherewithal to benefit from the *Kīmīā* (*Zād-e āḵerat*, p. 3). This, too, appears to be one of the last works he wrote. The greater part of it consists of the Persian translation of one of his Arabic works, *Bedāyat al-hedāya*; it deals with aspects of everyday life such as waking up, putting on one's clothes, going to the mosque, praying, fasting etc., as well as various forms of supplicatory prayer (*doʿā*, q.v.) and the avoidance of sin. *Zād-e āḵerat* contains in addition the same material on credal matters that is to be found in the first section of *Naṣīḥat al-molūk* as well as the *Kīmīā*. The treatise concludes with a section on "the correct norms of conduct toward the Creator and creature," which is also present in *Bedāyat al-hedāya*. W. Montgomery Watt omitted this section from his English translation of *Bedāyat al-hedāya*, which he included in his book on Ḡazālī (pp. 86-152), under the misapprehension that it had been wrongly attributed to Ḡazālī. Watt apparently was unaware of *Zād-e āḵerat*, which must be taken as confirming Ḡazālī's authorship of the entire *Bedāyat al-hedāya*.

Faẓāʾel al-anām men rasāʾel Ḥojjat al-Eslām is the collection of letters that Ḡazālī wrote to sultans, ministers, military commanders, jurists, and some of his friends after his return to Khorasan. The collection, apparently assembled by one of his grandchildren after his death, contains thirty-four letters of varying length divided into five chapters. The longest letter might also count as a treatise in its own right, being a response to objections raised against some of his statements in *Meškāt al-anwār* and *al-Monqeḏ men al-ẓalāl*. One such objection was that by describing God as true light, Ḡazālī had fallen prey to the dualistic Mazdean belief in light and darkness as forming antithetical realms (ed. Moʾayyad Ṯābetī, p. 9). Some letters include discussion of credal and mystical issues. In the letters to the sultan and military commanders he stresses the necessity of justice and solicitude for the populace, while in letters to ministers, including Faḵr-al-Molk (q.v.), the eldest son of Ḵʿāja Neẓām-al-Molk, he deals with theological questions.

The references made in these letters to events that occurred toward the end of Ḡazālī's life, between the years 499-505/1105-11, endow them with particular interest. His letters to Sultan Sanjar were apparently written between 499/1105, when he left Ṭūs for Nīšāpūr at the request of Faḵr-al-Molk to teach at the Neẓāmīya *madrasa* in that city, and his return to Ṭūs approximately one year later after the murder of Faḵr-al-Molk. In 504/1110, when Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Moḥammad Kīā Harrās, the principal of the Neẓāmīya in Baghdad, died, Neẓām-al-Dīn Aḥmad (Żīāʾ-al-Molk), the other son of Neẓām-al-Molk, who at that time was minister to Sultan Moḥammad b. Malekšāh, asked Ḡazālī to go to Baghdad and replace him, but in a letter included in this collection he declined (ed. Moʾayyad Ṯābetī, pp. 39-46).

Other letters of Ḡazālī comprise the *fatwās* he gave on various theoretical and practical problems pertaining to the Sufis of his age; these are to be distinguished from his relatively brief *fatwās* in Arabic that are on purely legal questions. Nine *fatwās* in Persian and one in Arabic on Sufi topics have been discovered so far in two manuscripts. One such *fatwā* relates to the permissibility of *samāʿ*, the musical sessions of the Sufis. Ḡazālī expresses the same view as in *Eḥyāʾ ʿolūm al-dīn* and *Kīmīā-ye saʿādat*: *Samāʿ* is in itself neither licit nor illicit, its status being dependent on the inner state of the person participating in it (Pūrjawādī, 1990a, pp. 8-17; for text and commentary). The *fatwā* was apparently written for someone ignorant of Arabic, for Ḡazālī translates into Persian the traditions of the Prophet that he cites. Another *fatwā* deals with seven queries about the primordial covenant that was concluded by the descendants of the Children of Adam before their spirits entered this world, as described in the Koran (7:172). The most important

of the queries was whether those descendants had a real and sensory existence when they responded affirmatively to God's question: "Am I not your Lord?"; and if so, whether it was in a world other than the present one. Abu'l-Qāsem Jonayd, Ḥosayn b. Manṣūr Ḥallāj, and Ḡazālī's own younger brother, Aḥmad Ḡazālī, were all convinced that the covenant had indeed been sealed in a separate and distinctive realm, but Ḡazālī's *fatwā* was to the effect that the descendants of Adam did not have some pre-eternal existence in a world other than this present one, and he interpreted the question and answer contained in the koranic verse in a metaphorical sense. A third *fatwā* was delivered in response to a question concerning the relationship between the love of God, which is the eternal and uncreated Love, and that of man, who is created. Ḡazālī explains that the relationship of the two is like that of the sun and its infinitely numerous rays (Pūrjawādī, 1990b; for the text of the three *fatwās*, with a commentary).

Also worthy of mention among Ḡazālī's *fatwās* is one concerning the conditions for making use of the endowments of a Sufi hospice (Pūrjawādī, 1991; for text and commentary). This appears to be the earliest known *fatwā* on the subject, and as such must be taken as an indication of the growing importance of the *ḵānaqāh* as a religious and social institution toward the close of the 11th century. According to Ḡazālī's *fatwā*, only a Sufi is entitled to benefit from the endowments of the *ḵānaqāh*, a Sufi being defined as one who has the morals and comportment of the Sufi and has not committed a sin that would occasion his expulsion from their ranks. In the same *fatwā* he touches on the problem of mendicancy, which he regards as forbidden except in case of dire need. He also has an Arabic *fatwā* on the same subject, which has been included in the *Eḥyā'*, at the end of the relevant section on the lawful and unlawful (*Ketāb al-ḥalāl wa 'l-ḥarām*).

Last among the Persian works of Ḡazālī comes his treatise in condemnation of the antinomians, *Ḥamāqat-e ahl-e ebāḥat* (also known as *Radd-e ebāḥīya*). Illustrated abundantly with koranic verses, traditions of the Prophet, allegorical stories, and the dicta of eminent men of religion, this treatise contains material also found in other works of Ḡazālī, such as the nine squares written on two pieces of pottery that are given to pregnant women, which is mentioned both in *al-Monqeḏ men al-ẓalāl* and in one of the Persian *fatwās*. Ḡazālī's tone in this treatise is harsh and angry; he condemns the antinomians as apostates whose marriages are invalid and whose blood may legitimately be shed. It was probably written after Ḡazālī's return to Ṭūs from Baghdad and Syria but before his composition of *Kīmīā-ye saʿādat*.

This treatise, like the *fatwās*, shows that Ḡazālī chose Persian as his medium whenever he wished to write on the problems of the society in which he lived. The other works discussed in this article also tend to demonstrate that Persian was for him more than the language of daily or familial use. He thought in Persian and used it to examine some of the most profound questions of mysticism and theology. He must, indeed, be accounted one of the earliest and most important writers of religious works in Persian.

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(NASROLLAH POURJAVADY)

V. AS A FAQĪH

Ḡazālī's legal education is said to have began at a young age. As a youth, he had already begun to study Shafiʿite law under Shaikh Aḥmad b. Moḥammad Rādkānī, a prominent jurist of his home city, Ṭūs. He later traveled to Jorjān, where he continued his studies under Imam Abū Naṣr Esmāʿīlī, which resulted in writing his first *taʿlīqa*, in effect a graduate thesis. It must have dealt with the Shafiʿite positive law, for we know that the *taʿlīqa* that he later wrote under Emām-al-Ḥaramayn Abu'l-Maʿālī Jovaynī, is in the field of legal theory (*oṣūl al-feqh*), a work that came to be known under the title *al-Manḵūl men taʿlīqāt al-oṣūl*.

Ḡazālī completed his studies in Jorjān and returned to his home town, but he again left Ṭūs for Nīšāpūr to study with Abu'l-Maʿālī Jovaynī, who was then considered the most distinguished Shafiʿite jurist and Ashʿarite theologian. He received from Jovaynī license (see EJĀZA) in a variety of disciplines at a relatively young age. They included positive law (*forūʿ*), legal disagreement (*ḵelāf*), juridical disputation (*jadal*), legal theory, theology, and logic, all of which were essential for a thorough and comprehensive legal education (Sobkī, IV, p. 103).

In 484/1091, when Ḡazālī was thirty-four years of age, he was appointed by Neẓām-al-Molk as professor of the Neẓāmīya college in Baghdad, where, besides teaching, he issued *fatwās* and wrote a number of legal treatises. This prestigious appointment represented due acknowledgement of his stature as one of the leading scholars of his day.

Four years later, Ḡazālī left Baghdad for Jerusalem via Damascus, stayed there for a while, and then went back to Damascus, where he resumed his activities as a professor and *moftī* for about ten years. Little is reported about his legal activities during the period between his departure from Damascus and his final return to Ṭūs. We know, however, that he stayed in several places, including Egypt, Baghdad, and Nīšāpūr, and in each place he made contact with a number of local legal scholars. In Ṭūs, he lived in relative seclusion and taught law and mysticism in a college adjacent to his house (Sobkī, IV, p. 105).

Ḡazālī authored four works on positive law: *al-Basīṭ*, *al-Wasīṭ*, *al-Wajīz*, and *al-Ḵolāṣa*, the first of which is the most comprehensive and based on Jovaynī's *Nehāyat al-maṭlab*. *Al-Wasīṭ al-moḥīṭ be-aqṭār al-basīṭ* was, as the title indicates, a condensation of *al-Basīṭ*, later abridged as *al-Wajīz*. In the 13th century, Muḥyi-al-Dīn Nawawī (d. 676/1277), could still consider *al-Wasīṭ* and *al-Wajīz* two of the five most recognized works in the Shafiʿite school. ʿAbd-al-Karīm Rāfeʿī (d. 623/1226), another Shafiʿite author, wrote a commentary on *al-Wājīz*, entitled *Fatḥ al-ʿazīz*, which was abridged by Nawawī in a work called *al-Rawża*. The heavy indebtedness of the Shafiʿite positive law to Ḡazālī is mainly due to these two works of Nawawī and Rāfeʿī .

Shafiʿite law in the 12th and 13th centuries depended heavily upon the contributions made during the immediately preceding period. The two most influential jurists who shaped legal developments during the 11th century were Abū Esḥāq Šīrāzī (d. 476/1083) and Ḡazālī. Both Rāfeʿī and Nawawī largely drew on the positive legal works of these two authors. With the final formation of the legal schools after the middle of the 10th century, positive law was multifarious, each legal case having two, three, or as many as six or even seven different solutions. One of the major goals of the legal school was to reduce this variety into one authoritative opinion, this being the ultimate juristic *desideratum*. A jurist's achievement in the field of positive law was measured by his ability to determine which opinion was authoritative and which one was not. It is here that Ḡazālī excelled and ensured that his juristic legacy would persist. In *al-Basīṭ*, as in his two other works that were based on it, Ḡazālī was able to determine the strength of each and any of the opinions that had been formulated with respect to a particular case. His ability to make such determinations certainly established him as an accomplished jurist, for engaging successfully in such an activity meant that the jurist possessed first-rate competence in legal reasoning, the tool of the *mojtahed*. In this sense, Ḡazālī is one of the chief jurists involved in constructing the authoritative positive doctrine (*maḏhab*) of the Shafiʿite school.

As part of his activity as a jurist, Ḡazālī was also heavily involved in the study of legal disagreement, a discipline essential to the task of determining the school's authoritative opinions. In the field of disagreement, he wrote *Bedāyat al-hedāya wa'l-maʿāḵed fi'l-ḵelāfīyāt*, and also *Mofaṣṣal al-ḵelāf fī oṣūl al-qīās*. In addition, he wrote a number of other works dealing with a variety of legal issues, including *Bayān al-qawlayn le'l-Šāfeʿī* (highly relevant to the determination of the school's authoritative doctrine), *Ḡāyat al-ġawr fī derāyat al-dawr*, and a retraction of the latter, *Ḡawr al-dawr f'l-mas'ala al-sorayjīya*, a work of law that depended to a large extent on the logical analysis of infinite regress and *petito principii*.

Aside from his *Fatāwā*, Ġazālī wrote at least three other works, *al-Mostaṣfā*, *al-Manḵūl* and *Šefāʾ al-ġalīl fī bayān al-šabah waʾl-moḵīl wa-masālek al-taʿlīl*, all works of legal theory. Here, as in positive law, Ġazālī made a lasting contribution, albeit more in form than in substance. He was the first jurist in Sunni Islam to integrate logic into legal theory. At the outset of his *al-Mostaṣfā* he provides a manual on logic, it being the shortest in a trilogy of expositions of this topic that includes *Meḥakk al-naẓar* and *Meʿyār al-ʿelm*. Although he makes the study of this introductory treatise entirely voluntary, he asserts most unequivocally that ignorance of logic in effect amounts to ignorance of all sciences. However, when he moves on to the strictly legal portion of *al-Mostaṣfā*, there is, surprisingly, little sign of any formal logical analysis, such that his treatment stands perfectly within the conventions of classical *oṣūl al-feqh*. What Ġazālī obviously intended in this treatise was not to revolutionize legal analysis but rather to insist on the necessity of logic as the only meaningful tool by which all inferences can be tightly moulded according to a rational design.

Apart from a number of brief notes on legal theory, Ġazālī's *Meʿyār* consists largely of illustrations of the three figures of the categorical syllogism, together with their moods, and featuring examples drawn not only from philosophy and theology but also from law. This is also done in the case of conjunctive and disjunctive syllogisms, *reductio ad absurdum* and induction. It is quite obvious that with these examples Ġazālī was merely trying to bring closer to the minds of jurists an understanding of the logical structure of these inferences. There is no attempt at analyzing legal cases through the medium of these arguments. Nor is there any effort at identifying, in terms of standard logic, the distinctive structure of legal logic. The sole exception to this rule, however, is that of analogy, which Ġazālī, following the Aristotelian tradition, insists must be converted to a first figure syllogism in order for it to be logically valid (*Meʿyār al-ʿelm*, p. 165).

Ġazālī regarded legal logic as that part of the field in which legal arguments are subjected to formalization, rather than as a systematic explication of a particular series of arguments (Hallaq, pp. 336 ff.). While discarding most Greek philosophical formulations, he tenaciously clung to formal Aristotelian logic and made it the methodological foundation of all enquiries. His conception of formal logic as an indispensable instrument for all areas of knowledge is evidenced in the fact that the examples that he provides in his logical works extend over a wide range of religious sciences. In these same works, specific legal cases given as examples are often no more than illustrations of how a demonstrative argument must be constructed and validated. For after all, Ġazālī tells us, "reasoning about legal matters does not differ from reasoning about rational sciences ... except in that which concerns the premises" (1961, p. 60). Although for Ġazālī the forms of legal and rational arguments are identical, one looks in vain in his works for an analysis of specifically legal arguments from the standpoint of logic. A noteworthy exception, however, is found in his otherwise traditional legal work *Šefāʾ al-ġalīl*, where in one chapter (pp. 435-55) he analyzes, mostly in terms of syllogistics, three major legal arguments commonly subsumed under juridical *qīās*, namely, causal demonstration (*qīās al-ʿella*), indicative, non-causal demonstration (*qīās al-dalāla*), and *reductio ad absurdum* (*qīās al-ʿaks*).

Ġazālī's conception of the relationship between logic and law as expressed in *al-Mostaṣfā* seems to have put the final stamp on the attitudes of a number of his successors toward the role of logic in law. These successors, however, exercised a great deal of caution in introducing into their *oṣūl* works the principles of logical theory as expounded by Ġazālī. While following his example closely, they have, with remarkable discretion, chosen the most relevant parts of the theory and imported them into their jurisprudence. But the fact remains that Ġazālī's pioneering endeavor left an indelible mark on the jurisprudential thought of many of his successors. Just as he conceived logic as the organon of any inferential procedure, prefaced his *al-Mostaṣfā* with a manual on formal logic, and insisted upon the conversion of analogy into a first figure syllogism, we find many of these successors to have employed logic to ground their theories in what is fundamentally an Aristotelian conception of knowledge (Hallaq, pp. 318 ff.).

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(WAEL B. HALLAQ)

vi. ḠAZĀLĪ AND THEOLOGY

When considering the theology of Ḡazālī two related questions immediately arise. The first is his attitude towards Islamic speculative/dialectical theology (*kalām*). The second is the extent to which he is committed to one of its main schools, the Ashʿarite. Ḡazālī was trained both as a Shafiʿite lawyer and as an Ashʿarite theologian and had as his teacher none other than the prominent Ashʿarite theologian and Shafiʿite lawyer, Emām-al-Ḥaramayn Abu'l-Maʿālī Żīā'-al-Dīn ʿAbd-al-Malek Jovaynī (d. 478/1085). He devoted two works to Ashʿarite *kalām* and considered his refutation of the philosophers, *Tahāfot al-falāsefa* (The incoherence of the philosophers) as belonging to the genre of *kalām*, even though his declared task in this work is simply to refute the Islamic philosophers, not to develop any specific doctrinal position. At the same time, Ḡazālī criticized the discipline of *kalām* in several of his writings, for example, in his major work, the voluminous *Eḥyāʾ ʿolūm al-dīn*, in his autobiography, *al-Monqeḏ men al-ẓalāl* and in the last book he wrote shortly before his death, *Eljām al-ʿawāmm ʿan ʿelm al-kalām*.

Ḡazālī argued that the main role of *kalām* is the preservation (*ḥefẓ*) and guardianship (*ḥerāsa*) of true religious belief (*ʿaqīda*), that is, traditional belief guided by the customary practice (*sonna*) of the Prophet. *Kalām*'s task is corrective: to correct distortions in the exposition of belief by the heretical innovators (*ahl-al-bedaʾ*). It is intended to persuade the few, those sincere doubters who are intellectually capable of following its arguments. For this persuasive reason, each region should have a theologian (*motakallem*). The "commonality," however, must not be exposed to *kalām*. For Ḡazālī, *kalām* is not an end in itself. It is an error, he maintains, to think that practicing the discipline of *kalām* constitutes what is experientially religious.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that for Ḡazālī the principles of Ashʿarite *kalām*, that is, its articles of faith, are not true and that he is not committed to them; but it is one thing to expound them and argue for their validity and another to experience what these principles mean. The true meaning of these principles is not attained through rational argument, but through direct mystical experience, *mokāšafa*. Ḡazālī devotes one of the books of his major mystical work, the *Eḥyāʾ*, to an exposition of Ashʿarite theology. The book is entitled *Qawāʿed al-ʿaqāʾed*. Its Ashʿarism blends, though not always conspicuously, with the book's mysticism. His main Ashʿarite work is the *Eqteṣād fi'l-eʿteqād*, where the exposition is more detailed and sustained. In the *Eqteṣād*, he affirms the Ashʿarite doctrine of a material soul. In the *Eḥyāʾ*, while his language sometimes suggests an inclination towards a non-material doctrine of the soul, the theological world view which Ḡazālī develops remains basically Ashʿarite. He expands on Ashʿarism, appropriating for it philosophical ideas that derive largely from Avicenna. These ideas are reinterpreted so as to accord with Ashʿarism.

The cornerstone of Ashʿarism is its doctrine of the divine attributes, to which Ḡazālī fully subscribes and elaborates. These attributes are not identical with the divine essence, but are "additional" to it. This distinction is important. If the attributes were identical with the divine essence, then the divine act would proceed as the necessary consequence of the divine essence or nature. This means a negation of the divine will, since then God would have no choice but to act, and act in the one way necessitated by His essence. Since His essence is eternal, His necessitated act would be eternal. The world, the necessitated effect of His eternal act, would thus be eternal. It would not be an existent temporally originated by God. It would not be a real creation.

The eternal attributes are coeternal with the divine essence. They have a special relation to each other. For example, without the attribute of life there can be no attribute of knowledge and without the attribute of knowledge there can be not attribute of will. Hence the attribute of life is a necessary condition for the attribute of knowledge, and the attribute of knowledge, a necessary condition for the attribute of will. But this necessary condition does not entail that the relation between these attributes is causal. None of the coeternal divine attributes is a cause of the other.

Whatever God eternally wills must come to be. In this sense it is necessary. But it is not necessary because it is the consequence of the divine nature. God could have chosen not to create at all. But "once," so to speak (Ḡazālī insists that human language regarding the divine voluntary act is metaphorical), He wills something, this something must come to be. It comes to be through the causal action of the attribute of divine power. This eternal attribute, which again is "additional" to the divine essence, is one and pervasive. By this Ḡazālī means (a) that this attribute does not consist of multiplicity of powers and (b) that it is the direct cause of each and every created existent and event. The world and all the events therein are thus the direct effect of this one cause. For Ḡazālī the world consists of contingent atoms (substances) and accidents. These are created *ex nihilo*, combined to form bodies and sustained in temporally finite spans of existence by the direct action of divine power. As Ḡazālī puts it: "...all

temporal events, their substances and accidents, those occurring in the entities of the animate and the inanimate, come about through the power of God, exalted be He. He alone holds the sole prerogative of inventing them. No created thing comes about through another [created thing]. Rather, all come about through [divine] power" (*Eqteṣād*, p. 99).

In several other places in the *Eqteṣād*, Ḡazālī reaffirms unequivocally his position that there is only one direct cause, namely divine power, for all created things and for all temporal events. Causal efficacy resides in divine power alone. There is no real evidence in his subsequent writings to indicate that he ever departed from upholding such a view. But this doctrine of the "pervasiveness of [divine] power" (*ʿomūm al-qodra*) raised for Ḡazālī two questions which he strove to answer. The first has to do with scientific knowledge. If there are no natural causes, how is it possible for us to make scientific inferences from what is ordinarily regarded as natural cause and effect? The second is the question of the human act. Is it also created by divine power, and if so, how, in the realm of moral action, are humans responsible for their acts?

Regarding the first question, Ḡazālī does not deny that the events in this world have an order which we habitually regard as constituting causes and effects. But the connections between the habitually regarded causes and effects are not necessary. These habitual causes and effects follow sequences that parallel Avicenna's conception. They behave as though they are real causes and their effects, allowing us ordinarily to speak of them as causes and effects and to draw from them scientific inferences. But in reality they are not real causes and their effects. They do, however, follow an order, invariable for the most part, ordained by the divine will. This order in itself is not necessary. Its disruption is hence possible. The divine will which decrees this order also decrees its disruption at certain times in history. The disruption constitutes the occurrence of the miracle. When such an occurrence takes place, God removes from us knowledge of nature's uniformity, creating for us the knowledge of the miracle.

Turning to the question of the human act in relation to divine power, Ḡazālī's position is Ashʿarite. It has to be understood in terms of the Ashʿarite criticism of the doctrine of divine justice espoused by the earlier Muʿtazilite school of *kalām*. Divine justice, according to the Muʿtazilites, entails man's freedom of the will. Man chooses and "creates" those acts for which he is rewarded or punished in the hereafter. The Muʿtazilites held that reason discerns the moral value of acts. These values hence are objective qualities that inhere in the acts. An act is not good simply because God commands it. Rather, it is precisely because an act is in itself good that God commands it.

Ḡazālī rejects the Muʿtazilite doctrine of the intrinsic value of the moral act. It imposes a limit on divine power since the divine act would be conditioned by such intrinsic objective values of acts. In themselves, he argues, acts are morally neutral. They are good or bad simply because God either commands or prohibits them. The just act is the act which God performs or commands. Hence, if God were to torture an innocent child in the hereafter, this would be good and just. We know that He does not perform such acts because He has so indicated, and God does not utter any falsehood.

Turning to the Muʿtazilite doctrine of the freedom of the will, again for Ḡazālī, it imposes a limitation on divine power. Creation belongs only to God. It is blasphemy to maintain that there are acts which man creates. All human acts, for Ḡazālī, are the creation of divine power. This brings us to Ḡazālī's full endorsement of the Ashʿarite doctrine of acquisition (*kasb*), a doctrine which he argues for at length in the *Eqteṣād* and reaffirms in the *Eḥyāʾ*.

Ḡazālī argues unequivocally (a) that "power" in all animate creatures is created directly by divine power and (b) that there is created with it the object of power (*maqdūr*) ordinarily, but erroneously, regarded as the effect of created power. The human act is created for the human by divine power. The human "acquires" it as well as the object ordinarily regarded as produced by the human act. In other words, whatever humans are said to deliberately perform is in reality created on their behalf by divine power. Divine power creates human power after it has created human life, knowledge, and will. Created power, moreover, never precedes the created act. It is created with it.

To the common objection that this leads to utter determinism (*jabr*), Ḡazālī responds that with the determinists (*mojbera*) there can be no distinction between the spasmodic movement and the movement over which we experience power. For created power and the movement that accompanies it are things we in fact experience. The Muʿtazilite belief that we create our own acts cannot be true because to create something is to have knowledge of all its consequential details. We never can have such knowledge. Bees have no mathematical knowledge. Yet, their hexagonal houses are built to perfection. This is created for them by divine power. The bees are simply the locus of divine action. So are humans. But if will, power and act are all the direct creation of divine power, how can humans be morally responsible? Ḡazālī does not really answer this question. His language suggests that we are here in the realm of mystery. In the *Eḥyāʾ*, he indicates that the manner in which the eternal divine power is the cause of each and every existent and happening, including the human act, can only be understood by those well grounded in knowledge (*al-rāseḵūn fi'l-ʿelm*) through *kašf*, direct mystical revelation. For in this experience, the mystic sees that God is the only reality; all things then fall into place.

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(MICHAEL E. MARMURA)

vii. GAZĀLĪ AND THE BĀṬENĪS

The Bāṭenīya, or Ismaʿilis, occupied Ḡazālī's mind throughout his writing career. He devoted more space to refuting them than to any other school of Islamic thought. Even in his autobiographical *al-Monqeḏ men al-ẓalāl*, written late in his life, he singled them out for lengthy denunciation after having critically discussed *kalām* theology and philosophy and before endorsing Sufism as the most fulfilling form of Islam. This preoccupation reflected his concern about the reinvigorated Ismaʿili missionary activity in contemporary Persia organized by the *dāʿī*s (q.v.) ʿAbd-al-Malek b. ʿAṭṭāš and Ḥasan-e Ṣabbāḥ. Deeply committed to the Sunnite caliphate and anti-Shiʿite, he saw in the Ismaʿili movement a grave political threat. Although he recognized certain affinities between his own and Ismaʿili religious thought, it is unlikely that he was ever attracted to Ismaʿilism. There is, on the other hand, no sound evidence that he ever felt personally threatened by the Ismaʿilis and that he, as suggested by Farid Jabre (pp. 84-94), gave up his prestigious teaching position in Baghdad and went into hiding afraid for his life because of the assassination of his patron, the vizier Neẓām-al-Molk, by a *fedā'ī* (q.v.) in 485/1092.

The first and most comprehensive refutation of Ismaʿilism by Ḡazālī was his *Ketāb faẓā'eḥ al-Bāṭenīya wa-faẓā'el al-Mostaẓherīya*, often simply called *al-Mostaẓherī*. It was, as the title indicates, commissioned by the ʿAbbasid caliph al-Mostaẓher and was composed in Baghdad between al-Mostaẓher's accession in Moḥarram 487/February 1094 and the death of the Fatimid caliph al-Mostanṣer in Ḏu'l-Ḥejja/December of that year. The refutation was largely based on the earlier tradition of anti-Ismaʿili polemics. In particular Gazālī appears to have relied on the *Ketāb kašf al-asrār wa-hatk al-astār* of the Ashʿarite Abū Bakr Moḥammad b. Ṭayyeb Bāqellānī (d. 403/1013), as noted by himself or a gloss in his *Eḥyā' ʿolūm al-dīn* (see Goldziher, p. 16). Thus he repeated the black legend of the polemicists about Ismaʿilism having been founded by a clique of atheist conspirators seeking to destroy the rule of Islam, quotes Bāqellānī's characterization of Ismaʿilism as "a doctrine whose exterior was Shiʿite rejectionism and whose interior was pure unbelief (*maḏhab ẓāherohu al-rafż wa-bāṭenohu al-kofr al-maḥż*)" (Goldziher, Ar. text, p. 7) and lists among the names under which the Ismaʿilis were said to be known those of Persian Mazdakite heresies such as the Ḵorramīya, Bābakīya, and Moḥammera with whom the polemicists tried to associate them. He describes nine fictitious degrees of initiation, also known from other polemicists, through which the Ismaʿili *dāʿī*s allegedly guided the neophytes from scrutiny (*tafarros*) to the stripping away of all religious belief (*salḵ*), and characterizes Ismaʿilism as moving between doctrines of dualists and the philosophers while distorting both of them to serve their purposes. Ḡazālī, however, does not mention the most notorious pamphlet ascribed by the polemicists, including Bāqellānī, for defamatory purposes to the Ismaʿilis, the *Ketāb al-sīāsa wa'l-balāḡ al-akbar* (see Stern, chap. 4) and admits that the Ismaʿilis in his time universally denied some of the accusations of the polemicists against them, such as their alleged disregard of the *šarīʿa*.

In mentioning their being called Taʿlīmīya, Ḡazālī notes that this name is the most appropriate for the Bāṭenīya of his own age because of their call for reliance on *taʿlīm*, inspired instruction by their infallible (*maʿṣūm*) imam, and their rejection of personal reasoning (*raʾy*). This observation reflects his awareness of the thrust of the propaganda of the new *daʿwa* of Ḥasan-e Ṣabbāḥ. He stresses the need to counter this doctrine and devotes a chapter to

refuting it in particular. In another chapter he discusses the legal status of the Ismaʿilis. While he describes some of their basic Shiʿite beliefs as merely error not constituting unbelief, he considers others as definite unbelief requiring their treatment as apostates subject to the death penalty. In his later *Fayṣal al-tafriqa* (p. 198), he brands the Ismaʿili doctrine that God can only be described as giving existence, knowledge, and unity to others while Himself being above such qualification as manifest unbelief (*kofr ṣorāh*). The final section of the *Mostaẓherī* is devoted to the exaltation of the caliph al-Mostaẓher as the sole legitimate vice-gerent of God (*ḵalīfat Allāh*) on earth and to the functions of the imam according to the Sunnite doctrine (Goldziher, pp. 80-97).

Nowhere in his refutation does Ḡazālī quote or name any Ismaʿili authors. The reason was evidently, as he explains in his *Monqeḏ* (p. 28), his agreement with the opinion of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal that the arguments of heretics should not be quoted in refuting them lest some readers might get attracted by them. Ḡazālī defends himself that he refuted only arguments that were widely known among the public. His reliance on the anti-Ismaʿili polemical literature, however, made it easy for the Yemenite Ismaʿili *dāʿī moṭlaq* ʿAlī b. Moḥammad b. Walīd (d. 612/1215) in his detailed refutation of the *Mostaẓherī*, entitled *Dāmeḡ al-bāṭel*, to point out Ḡazālī's numerous distortions and misrepresentations of Ismaʿili teaching.

In his *Monqeḏ*, Ḡazālī names four other books besides the *Mostaẓherī*, in which he refuted Ismaʿili doctrine. Of these only one is extant, namely the *Ketāb al-qoṣṭās al-mostaqīm*. In this book he describes an imaginary debate between himself and an Ismaʿili about the question of *taʿlīm*, in which his opponent eventually concedes defeat and asks Ḡazālī to become his teacher, which the latter refuses. Ḡazālī accepts the universal human need for an infallible teacher as stipulated by his opponent, but he insists that the sound balance for weighing religious truth is provided by the Koran and the teaching of the Prophet Moḥammad without any need for an infallible imam after him. Also extant is Ḡazālī's *Jawāb al-masāʾel al-arbaʿ allatī saʾalahā al-Bāṭenīya be-Hamadān* (see Badawī, pp. 132-34). It contains brief answers to four questions concerning the compatibility of *taklīf*, the imposition of duties on man, by a God who was believed to be self-sufficient (*ḡanī*). Ḡazālī further wrote a refutation in Persian of the "Four Chapters" (al-Foṣūl al-arbaʿa) in which Ḥasan-e Ṣabbāḥ had set forth his argument for mankind's need of an infallible teacher. The beginning of the refutation is quoted by Faḵr-al-Dīn Rāzī in *Monāẓarāt* and criticized as an inadequate response to Ḥasan-e Ṣabbāḥ's argument (Kholeif, pp. 63-65, Ar. text pp. 40-42).

The question of *taʿlīm* evidently concerned Ḡazālī in his later life more than any other aspect of Ismaʿili thought. In his *Monqeḏ*, too, he speaks of Ismaʿilism only as the *maḏhab al-taʿlīm*. He severely criticizes those opponents of the Ismaʿilis who endeavored to refute their assertion of the need for *taʿlīm* and an infallible teacher, suggesting that they lost the argument and thus strengthened the cause of the heretics. The proper way was to argue that Moḥammad was the infallible teacher of all Muslims and that his death after God had announced the perfection of their religion (Koran 5:3) could not be any more detrimental to them than the inaccessibility of the allegedly infallible imam to most Ismaʿilis.

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(WILFERD MADELUNG)

viii. IMPACT ON ISLAMIC THOUGHT. See Supplement.

ĠAZĀLĪ, MAJD-AL-DĪN Abu'l-Fotūḥ **AḤMAD** b. Moḥammad b. Moḥammad b. Aḥmad, outstanding mystic, writer, and eloquent preacher (b. ca. 453/1061, d. 517/1123 or 520/1126). The younger brother of the celebrated theologian, jurist, and Sufi, Abū Ḥāmed Moḥammad Ḡazālī (q.v.), Aḥmad Ḡazālī was born in Ṭābarān, a village near the city of Ṭūs in Khorasan, and it was in Ṭūs that he received his early education, primarily in jurisprudence. He turned to Sufism while still young, becoming the pupil first of Abū Bakr Nassāj Ṭūsī (d. 487/1094) and then of Abū ʿAlī Fārmaḏī (d. 477/1084). He was thus well advanced in Sufism when in 488/1095 his brother, Abū Ḥāmed, asked him to teach in his place at the

Neẓāmīya in Baghdad and to assume responsibility for his family during his planned absence. Aḥmad Ḡazālī traveled extensively in the capacities both of a Sufi master and of a popular preacher, visiting places such as Nīšāpūr, Marāḡa, Hamadān, and Isfahan. He died and was buried in Qazvīn (biographical notices may be found in Ebn al-Jawzī, *Montaẓam*, IX, p. 260; idem, *Ketāb al-qoṣṣās wa'l-moḏakkerīn*, ed. M. Swartz, Beirut, 1971, text pp. 104-7, tr., pp 184-87, 210; Ebn Ḵallekān, tr. de Slane, I, pp. 79-80; Sobki, *Ṭabaqāt* [Cairo²], IV, p. 54; ʿAbd-al-Karīm Rāfeʿī Qazvīnī, *al-Tadwīn fī aḵbār Qazvīn*, ed. ʿA. ʿOṭāredī, Ḥaydarabad, 1984, repr. Beirut, 1987, IV, p. 251), having initiated and trained many eminent disciples such as ʿAyn-al-Qożāt Hamadānī (q.v.) and Abu'l-Najīb Sohravardī (d. 563/1168). It is because of the latter that the initiatic chains (*selsela*) of the Sohravardī order and its derivatives such as the Kobrawīya, the Mawlawīya, and the Neʿmat-Allāhīya go back to Aḥmad Ḡazālī.

He is best known in the history of Sufism for his ideas on love, expressed primarily in the celebrated work entitled *Sawāneḥ*. This little book, written around 508/1114 and comprising some 77 short chapters, was innovative in form, for at a time when Persian Sufi authors used only prose, Ḡazālī had recourse to verse in order to illustrate in metaphorical fashion the themes he expounded more technically in the prose sections of his work. The same technique was used a century and a half later by Saʿdī in his *Golestān* and by Faḵr-al-Dīn ʿErāqī (q.v.) in his *Lamaʿāt*; the latter author explicitly acknowledges his debt to the *Sawāneḥ*. Aḥmad Ḡazālī relates numerous romantic anecdotes, especially those concerning Laylī and Majnūn and Maḥmūd and Ayāz (q.v.); in contrast, his citations of the Koran or Hadith are relatively infrequent. In the prologue to his work, Aḥmad Ḡazālī states his intention of using the language of allusion (*ešāra*) in order to express his ideas, a choice in which he had been preceded by Sufi masters such as Jonayd Baḡdādī and Abū ʿAlī Rūdbārī; the result is occasional ambiguity and obscurity of meaning.

The *Sawāneḥ* opens with a description of the entry of Love and Spirit into the world of beings and the union between them that gives rise to the Lover, by means of whom Love then aspires to return to its original solitude and oneness. This process of return and the difficulties that accompany it, metaphorically described, form the main theme of the book. Love is depicted as a bird that flies into the world for a brief sojourn before returning to its nest. Transcending in its essence human knowledge and comprehension, Love is experientially accessible to the Lover who, beholding the beauty manifest in the Beloved (q.v.), strives toward union (*weṣāl*). Such union, however, does not end the process, for the duality of Lover and Beloved still remains. Only when the Lover fully transcends the Beloved and becomes totally annihilated is Love's return journey to its origin complete; then Love alone remains, in absolute unity and sanctity.

Aḥmad Ḡazālī employs the metaphor of a bird and its journey in another work, a short Persian treatise entitled *Resālat al-ṭayr* (or *al-ṭoyūr*). Thanks to its reworking by Farīd-al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār (q.v.) in his *Manṭeq al-ṭayr* (which was indeed influenced by Aḥmad Ḡazālī's work or possibly by an Arabic text on the same theme attributed to his elder brother), the frame story of this work has become extremely well known. A group of birds, widely disparate in their habits, natures, and manners of song, agree that they stand in need of a king. They further agree that the ideal candidate for the position is the legendary bird known as Sīmorḡ, and accordingly set out for the island where he resides. The journey is fraught with danger and difficulty, and not all the birds survive to reach their destination. Each of the birds corresponds, obviously enough, to the figure of the Lover in the *Sawāneḥ* and the Sīmorḡ, residing in its primordial nest, to Love in its essence.

Aḥmad Ḡazālī wrote a number of other brief works in Persian. The best known is an epistle given the title *Rāz-nāma* by the author, but commonly known as *ʿAynīya* in view of the belief that was addressed to ʿAyn-al-Qożāt Hamadānī (q.v). Written in an elegant but emotive style, the *ʿAynīya* seems to resemble the sermons Aḥmad Ḡazālī was famous for delivering in mosques. In addition to profuse quotations from the Koran and prophetic tradition, he cites many sayings of the Sufi masters as well as verses, in both Arabic and Persian, some of which he probably composed himself. The central theme of the epistle is the extreme brevity of life and the threatening closeness of death, a predicament which man can sensibly confront only by preparing himself for judgment and the hereafter. Vivid language is used in depicting the dilemma of human existence; the author writes, for example, that "if man eats to satiety, he will be as if drunk, and if he remains hungry, he will be as if mad. If he sleeps, he will be a mere corpse, and if he remains awake, he will be bewildered. Impotence is fastened on him, and weakness is his permanent attribute" (*Majmūʿa*, 1st ed., p. 389, 2nd ed., p. 225). The topic of love is not raised on this occasion, but Aḥmad Ḡazālī does use some of the mystical language associated with it, particularly in the poetry.

Some nine other letters, most of them similarly addressed to ʿAyn-al-Qożāt Hamadānī, have also been discovered and published. They deal with private instructions given by Aḥmad Ḡazālī to his disciples and his interpretations of their visions and dreams.

Aḥmad Ḡazālī's Arabic works also deal with Sufism; he appears not to have written anything on jurisprudence, despite his training in the Shafiʿite school. One such work is the record of the sessions (*majāles*) he conducted in Arabic while in Baghdad, compiled by one of his followers, a certain Saʿīd b. Fāres Labbānī, in several volumes (Sobkī, *Ṭabaqāt*

[Cairo²] VI, p. 60). Only part of the record survives, but it suffices to give a picture of how Aḥmad Ḡazālī conducted his sessions. They corresponded to the established tradition whereby a master would speak extemporaneously on some topic pertaining to Sufism, stimulated by a question from the audience, a letter read out loud, or a verse from the Koran recited at the beginning of the session. In this fashion, Ḡazālī would guide his listeners to the Sufi path, clarify some point of doctrine, or provide the esoteric interpretation of a Koranic verse, drawing on traditions of the Prophet, poetry and anecdotes to illustrate his themes. Among the topics discussed in these sessions were love, the levels and degrees of gnosis, and the quality of Eblīs as a lover of God.

Among his other Arabic works, mention may be made of *al-Tajrīd fī kalemat al-tawḥīd*, a theological and mystical interpretation of the basic creed of Islam; *Lā elāha ellā Allāh*, which reflects his adherence to the Ashʿarite school of theology; *Baḥr al-maḥabba fī asrār al-mawadda*, a Sufi commentary on *Sūrat Yūsof* (Koran 12); and an abridgment of his brother's *Eḥyāʾ ʿolūm al-dīn*, a work he himself taught.

The attribution to Aḥmad Ḡazālī of a number of other works has recently been shown to be spurious (Mojāhed, 1981). These include the Persian *Baḥr al-ḥaqīqa* (ed. N. Pūrjavādī, Tehran, 1356 Š./1977), and the Arabic *Bawāreq al-elmāʿ* (ed. and tr. by J. Robson in *Tracts on Listening to Music*, London, 1938) and *Serr al-asrār fī kašf al-anwār* (ed. ʿA.-Ḥ. Sāleh Hamdān, Cairo, 1988).

Perhaps the most prominent feature of Aḥmad Ḡazālī's writings is his incorporation into his prose of works of poetry, both Arabic and Persian, including verses he composed himself. It is in fact to him, as one of the earliest Sufi poets, that should be attributed some of the otherwise unidentified Persian quatrains that have come down to the present. Some of his poems are to be found in his Persian works, especially the *Sawāneḥ*, while others are scattered in the works of his disciple ʿAyn-al-Qożāt Hamadānī or in old anthologies of Persian poetry such as the *Nozhat al-majāles* of Jamāl Ḵalīl Šarvānī (ed. M. A. Rīāḥī, Tehran, 1366 Š./1987, 2nd ed., Tehran, 1375 Š./1996). By way of example we may cite the following quatrain from the *Sawāneḥ* (ed. Ritter, no. 18, p. 35) composed by the author in his youth: *tā jām-e jahān-nemāy dar dast-e man ast, az rū-ye ḵerad čarḵ-e barīn past-e man ast / tā Kaʿba-ye nīst qebla-ye hast-e man ast, hošyārtarīn ḵalq-e jahān mast-e man ast* (As long as the world-displaying goblet is in my hand, the wheel of heaven on high lowers itself before me / As long as the Kaʿba of non-being is the *qebla* of my being, the most sober man in the world is intoxicated by me).

Aḥmad Ḡazālī's Sufi thought, centered as it was on the idea of love, left a profound mark on the development of Persian mystical literature, especially poetry celebrating love. Many of the topoi (*mażāmīn*) used by later poets such as ʿAṭṭār, Saʿdī, ʿErāqī, and Ḥāfeẓ, to name but a few, can be traced to his works, particularly the *Sawāneḥ*. It is in his writings that one finds a mystical or psychological interpretation for features of the beloved's face, such as the eyes and the eyebrows; the lover enslaved to the dog or the dust in the quarter of the beloved; wine as a symbol of yearning (*šawq*) or love (*ʿešq*); love as a reciprocal relation between man and God, man's love for God being his response to God's love for him; the world-displaying cup (*jām-e jahān-nemā*); the mirror of Alexander (*āʾīna-ye Eskandar*); the fountain of life (*āb-e ḥayāt* or *zendagānī*) hidden in the realm of darkness; the journey of the birds to the homeland of their chosen sovereign, the Sīmorḡ—all these fundamental themes and images occur in the works of Aḥmad Ḡazālī before they find their place in the poems of his celebrated successors.

Some of these topoi had, of course, been used by previous mystics but were revived and popularized by Ḡazālī. He was, in fact, an heir to two traditions: the Malāmatīs of Khorasan and the Sufis of Baghdad. Among his predecessors, he was influenced most strongly by Ḥallāj, and he made of his idea of essential love—fundamentally a neo-Platonic concept that had also been adopted by Muslim philosophers such as Fārābī and Avicenna (qq.v.)—the basis of his own Sufi thought. His belief that all created beauty is an emanation of divine beauty was likewise Hallajian or neo-Platonic in origin. Since God is both absolute beauty and the lover of all phenomenal beauty, Aḥmad Ḡazālī maintained, to adore any object of beauty is to participate in a divine act of love. Hence the practice of *naẓar-bāzī* or *šāhed-bāzī*, gazing on young and beautiful faces, a practice for which he became notorious. He was well acquainted with the poems of Ḥallāj, citing them in both his Arabic and his Persian works, and he derived from the *Tawāsīn* of Ḥallāj themes such as Eblīs being a lover of God; the meeting of Eblīs with Moses; and the moth gradually advancing to immolation in the flame of the candle as a metaphor for the progress of the Sufi.

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(NASROLLAH POURJAVADY)

GAZĀLĪ MAŠHADĪ (b. Mašhad, 933/1526-27, d. Ahmadabad, Gujarat, 27 Rajab 980/3 December 1572), poet laureate in Persian (*malek-al-šoʿarāʾ*) at the court of the Mughal emperor Akbar (q.v.). Nothing is known about his family background, even his real name is unknown. His birthdate is known from a reference in one of his poems (*Dīvān*, fol. 86; ʿAbbāsī, p. 52; Hādī, p. 30). During his youth he went to Qazvīn and joined the court of Shah Ṭahmāsb (r. 930-84/1524-76) for some time. From his poems it appears that Ḡazālī also visited other Persian cities, including Tabrīz and Kermān. In 958/1551-52 he was sent by the shah to Shiraz in order to to satirize Ḵʷāja Amīr Beg Kajajī, keeper of the royal seal, who had earned the shah's displeasure for allegedly claiming in Shiraz that he had power over the stars. Due to his liberal thinking, however, Ḡazālī was soon accused of heresy and, fearing for his life, left his native country for India (Badāʾūnī, *Montaḵab*, tr., Ranking et al., III, p. 239). Traveling by sea, he reached the Deccan, where he tried unsuccessfully to win literary patronage. He was later invited by Ḵān(-e) Zamān ʿAlīqolī Khan Šaybānī, the governor of Jaunpūr, who sent him one thousand rupees and some horses to join his service. Ḡazālī remained in ʿAlīqolī Khan's service until the latter's violent death in his abortive revolt against Akbar (974/1567). Ḡazālī was among the servants of the deceased who fell into the hands of Akbar and who were retained by him in his service. He must have already come to Akbar's attention, since he had in 966/1558-59 dedicated to him a collection of his poetry (*Dīvān*, preface to *Āṯār al-šabāb*, fol. 53a); he may have also enjoyed the support of some trusted dignitaries of the empire whom he had praised in his poems. Whatever the reasons, his fortunes rose speedily, and in 975/1567 he was appointed as the first poet laureate, an institution introduced by Akbar. Subsequently he lived a life of comfort and material well-being until his death in 980/1572 (Badāʾūnī *Montaḵab*, tr., Ranking et al., p. 240). He was buried in Ahmadabad at Sarkhēj in a cemetery reserved for princes and men of rank.

Ḡazālī's relations with fellow-poets were not always pleasant. Both in Persia and in India he engaged in poetical altercations with his contemporaries, exchanging insults. He, however, maintained friendly association with Fayżī Dakanī (*Majmaʿ al-foṣaḥāʾ* IV, p. 47), who succeeded him as Akbar's poet laureate and commemorated his death in a poem (*Kollīyat-e Fayżī*, Aligarh Muslim University ms., fol. 286b; Golčīn-e Maʿānī, *Kārvān* II, p. 937).

Estimates vary as to the extent of Ḡazālī's poetic output, ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 couplets. A rare manuscript of his *Dīvān* in the British Library contains around 12,000 couplets, including *qaṣīdas*, *ġazals*, *maṯnawīs*, *qeṭʿas*, *robāʿīs*, *tarkīb-bands*, and *tarjīʿ-bands*. His *qaṣīdas* are not confined to eulogies of rulers and nobles, but treat other subjects as well, including praise of God and the Prophet, mysticism, and personal experiences and observations. Among the individuals panegyrized are Shah Ṭahmāsb, Khan-e Zamān, and Akbar, who stands out as the poet's principal recipient of praise. Most of the *qaṣīdas* follow the tradition of the 15th and early 16th century poets, but there are also specimens modeled after earlier masters such as Ḵāqānī Šarvānī (d. ca. 595/1198) and Amīr Ḵosrow Dehlavī (d. 725/1325).

Ḡazālī's *ġazals* deal primarily with mystical and philosophical themes. They are characterized by sensitivity of feeling and felicity of expression. Among Ḡazālī's *maṯnawīs* the most important piece is *Naqš-e badīʿ*, a mystical poem of about one thousand couplets composed after the model of