form of early Qajarī court poetry, regained much of its lost territory. However, until the rise of a modern love poetry that was no longer bound to the classical rules, the gāzal remained the most suitable medium for Persian lyricism, and even today it has some notable practitioners.


I. T. P. de BRUIJN

GAZĀL, ABU‘L-ḤAMBĪD MOHAMMAD IBN MOHAMMAD TĀKĪ (485/1095-1111), one of the greatest systematical Persian thinkers of medieval Islam and a prolific Sunni author on the religious sciences (Islamic law, philosophy, theology, and mysticism) in Sāliqī times.

I. Biography.


v. As a faqīḥ.

vi. And theology.

vii. And the Bāliced.


I. Biography.

A man of Persian descent, Gāzāl (variant name Gazzalī; Med. Latin form, Algazzal; honorific title, Hojat-al-Eslām “The Proof of Islam”), was born at Tūs in Khorasan in 450/1058 and grew up as an orphan together with his younger brother Ahmad Gazzālī (d. 520/1126; q.v.). After instruction in Islamic jurisprudence as a teenager in Jorjān, he became a student of the leading Ash‘arite theologian and Shafi‘ite jurist ‘Arslān-Mas‘ūdī at-Mā‘alisī, who also studied with the Sufi master Abu ‘Ali Fārābī (d. 477/1084-85), a disciple of Abu Sa‘īd b. ‘Abī-l-Kāyyr (d. 440/1050, q.v.), Abu‘l-Qāsim Qolayyīn (d. 465/1072), and Abu‘l-Qāsim Karakānī (d. 490/1095). In 478/1085, after the death of his teachers, Gazzāl joined the circle of scholars at the camp and court of Sāliqī vizier Kā‘ba Neẓām-al-Molk (assassinated in 485/1092, q.v.), the patron of colleges (madrasa) he had founded. Appointed by Neẓām-al-Molk in 484/1091, Gazzāl became an influential professor on Shafi‘ite jurisprudence for four years at the Neẓāmiya madrasa in Baghdad (Glassen, pp. 131-75). Overcome by a severe physical illness and plagued by a nagging skepticism born of his intensive self-study of Islamic philosophy, Gazzāl decided to abandon his teaching position in 488/1095 in favor
of his brother Ahmad. This year signaled a deep identity crisis in Gażâlî. Shaken by epistemological doubts, he resolved to seek solitude (ysâpî) as the underpinnings of his intellectual knowledge. His crisis occurred only a few years after political rivals, in concert with Neẓâmi’s enemies against whom Gażâlî had written a refutation on the order of caliph al-Mostazher (487-512/1094-1118), had engineered his patron’s assassination. Using a pilgrimage to Mecca as the pretext to escape Baghdad, Gażâlî gave up his academic career. He was particularly disillusioned by the corruption affecting the scholarly circles of the college in the aftermath of the political turmoil following Rukn-al-Din Barâkî’s (q.v.) teenage accession to the Sağîq sultanate in 485/1092.

The next eleven years, from 488/1095 until 499/
1106, when Gażâlî returned to his academic career as a professor at the college of Naṣîrîpâr, were doubtless a period of intense intellectual incubation, although specific details about his life and work in this period remain historically uncertain. According to his autobiography, Gażâlî first went to Damascus where he taught in the Ǧâmî of Naṣr Maqdisî (d. 490/1097; Mardin, p. 45). Then he journeyed from Syria to Jerusalem and visited the tomb of Abûramî at Hebron in 489/1096, where he made the vow never again to take money from the government, never again to serve a ruler, and never again to enter into scholastic disputations (van Ess, p. 61). He then went to Medina and Mecca, where he performed the pilgrimage in 489/1096, returned to Syria, possibly after a short visit to Alexandria in Egypt, and finally, after a brief stay in Baghdad in 490/1097, settled down at Tûs. During this intellectual exile from organized teaching, Gażâlî lived in great solitude and poverty, engaged in ascetical exercises and mystical prayer, and composed his most famous work, Elyâdî ʿolâm al-dîn: “The revelation of the religious sciences,” which advocates Sufi spirituality as the fulcrum of Islamic religion. Although this work bears all the marks of the manual of a great teacher and would thus presumably Gażâlî lecturing to students, the sources offer few clues about who his crucial Sufi contacts might have been in his journeys, or, barring a few minor exceptions, who his audience might have been in his hometown.

In 499/1106, Neẓâmi-al-Molk’s son Paḫr-al-Molk (q.v.), who had become the vizier of Sanjar, the Sağîq sultan of Khorasan, invited Gażâlî to return to lecturing at the Neẓâmiya of Naṣîrîpâr. Breaking the vow he had made at Abûramî’s tomb, Gażâlî accepted the invitation and taught in Naṣîrîpâr until shortly before his death, animated by his belief that it was God’s will for him to function as the renewer of religion (mojâhid) at the threshold of the new Islamic century. His autobiography, al-Maqâned men al-tâlîl “The deliverer from error” (cf. Watt, 1953; tr. McCarthy, pp. 61-145; first translation into French by A. Schmidler, Paris, 1852) dates from this final period of Gażâlî’s teaching, during the last months of which he retired to the Sufi retreat (3ânîqâkh) he had established for his disciples earlier in Tûs. He died there in Jâmâlî Il 505/December 1111. The chronology of Gażâlî’s biography has been established by Margaret Smith (1944), Maurice Bouyges and Michel Allard, and W. Montgomery Watt (1965) on the basis of Gażâlî’s autobiography and a great number of Biographical accounts found in the Arabic primary sources (listed in Dabâbî, p. 115).

Gażâlî was a prolific author whose writings, examined chronologically by Bouyges and Allard (pp. 89-150; Badawi), number about five dozen authentic works, in addition to which some 300 other titles of works of uncertain, doubtful, or spurious authorship, many of them duplicates owing to varying titles, are cited in Muslim bibliographical literature. The charge that books were falsely ascribed to Gażâlî increased after the dissemination of the large corpus of Ibn ʿArabî’s works (d. 638/1240, q.v.). Nevertheless, it is a questionable criterion of authenticity to reject works of Gażâlî that are highly mythical or esoteric in character as spurious, separating them from works said to be genuine because they are rather rational or esoteric in nature. It is also an all-too-simplistic assumption that Gażâlî’s writings move from esoteric topics to mystical ones as he advances in age, though some of the most esoteric writings attributed to Gażâlî do belong to the last phase of his literary activity. The rule-of-thumb criterion suggested by Smith (pp. 24-43; idem, 1961, pp. 121-31) that Gażâlî never directly contradicted on “higher” levels what he maintained on lower levels, forces a harmonizing consistency on a highly prolific author who underwent severe personal crises and shifts of intellectual outlook. Already Ibn Tocharî (d. 581/1185, q.v.) observed that Gażâlî wrote for different audiences, ordinary men and the elite (pp. 69-72), and Gażâlî himself completed the rather moderate theological treatise, ʾilām al-ʿawànān ʿan ʾilm al-kaʾam “The strengthening of ordinary men from theology,” in the last month before his death (cf. Hourani).

In addition to the aforementioned autobiography, which is the retrospective story of his religious development rather than a history account of his life curve, the following are considered to be the major works of Gażâlî, all undisputedly penned by him. The legal writings of Gażâlî, who followed the Shâfiʿite school of law, include the compendia, known as al-Bâshi, al-Wasiʿ, and al-Wajîf that still await scholarly analysis and may represent paraphrases of his teachers’ works. The first two are treatises on legal applications (jûr al-ṣâhîḥ) written early in his career, while the third one is an epitome compiled in 495/101. Gażâlî’s principal treatise on the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence, entitled al-Mostâfuṣ men ʾāl-ṣâhîḥ “The essential theory of legal thought” was written in 503/1110 at Naṣîrîpâr (Ebn Kallekân, ed. Abbâs, IV, p. 217). This last
great treatise, completed two years before his death, examines the rules of law (ahlākā) and their foundations (aštād) with unparalleled methodical acumen (Laous, pp. 152-83). A generation after Gażal, scholars such as Abū ʿAbd Allāh Mohammad b. Abī Māzar (d. 536/1141-42), praised Gażal for his comprehensive knowledge of the legal applications but criticized his grasp of the legal foundations (Sobki, Taḥqīqat, VI, p. 241). High praise was expressed also by Ibn ʿAbd Allāh Rondi (d. 792/1390), who, on account of Gażal’s first half of his voluminous Ṣaḥīḥ, coined Gażal an authority on Islamic jurisprudence (pp. 88-89). Except for Sufism, no other field of the Islamic sciences absorbed so much of Gażal’s time and energy as that of jurisprudence (Lazarus Yafeh, pp. 373-411). He was in the first place a professor of Shīʿī law.

Gażal’s study of Islamic philosophy received initial motivation from his teacher Javayn, but benefited mainly from his self-study of the works of Abū Nuṣr Fāṭūlāh and Avicenna (q.v.) during his years as professor at the Nizamīyya of Baghdad. Gażal approached philosophy in three stages. First (pace Graef, ZDMG 110, 1961, pp. 162-63), he summarized the principal points of philosophy by compiling a systematic exposition, entitled Ṣaḥīḥ al-ḥikmat “The intentions of the philosophers,” which became a highly acclaimed treatise in medieval Europe upon its translation into Latin (Logica et Philosophia Aegyptis Arabis) by Dominic Gundissalvi in the 12th century (Muckle: Of P. Lichtenstein’s Latin edition, Venice, 1506), and into Hebrew in the 13th century (Soud-Weiser). Second, in the first fortnight of 488/1095, he completed the Taḥqīq al-ḥikmat “The incoherence of the philosophers” (ed. M. Bouygues with a summary in Latin, Beirut, 1927), a controversial work of refutation which provoked the great philosopher of Muslim Spain, Ibn Rokd/Averroes (d. 595/1198) to reply with his own refutation (Taḥqīq al-waḥīf). In the Taḥqīq al-ḥikmat, Gażal enumerated twenty maxims of the philosophers that he found to be objectionable or inconsistent with their own claims, three of them justifying the charge of unbeliev: the philosophers’ claim of the eternity of the world, their denial of God’s knowledge of particulars, and their repudiation of the resurrection of the body. Gażal tended to reject the necessary link of causality since all that can be affirmed is a posterior hoc rather than a propter hoc, as shown by his example that the combustion of cotton occurs at the moment of its contact with fire, while it cannot be demonstrated that it occurs because of the contact between cotton and fire. For Gażal, human reason alone is unable to attain certainty, though he paradoxically uses his own certain reason to destroy the certitudes of the philosophers by borrowing their method for his arguments! Third, Gażal authored three treatises that prepared the ground for his subsequent systematic writings on theology, his elaborate Maʿṣūr al-ʿalm “The standard of knowledge” and his brief Mfeqūr al-nafṣ “The touchstone of thought,” both treatises on logic, as well as his Muṣār al-ʿalā “The balance of action,” a tract on philosophical ethics.

Gażal’s writings on Islamic theology (ʿelm al-kalām) signal a significant stage of development for its rational methodology because he used the Aristotelian syllogism and systematically applied it to theological thought. Gażal’s influence on theological method, noted in Ibn Kaldūn’s (d. 808/1406, q.v.) Māgdūla (tr., III, p. 52), is evidenced in his principal work on Islamic theology, al-ʿEṣāṣdū fī-l-ṭaqālī “The just mean in belief” (Asin Palacios, 1929) completed in 488/1095, the year of his departure from Baghdad. This work weighs traditional theological maxims (maintained by major scholars of law, e.g., Šulṭān Māleḵ b. Anas, Abī Ḥanīfa against Gażal’s own opinions and expresses strong reservations about a theology based on faith in authority (taqlīd) and marked by polemics. In the ʿEṣāṣdū and the Muṣār this reserve turns into outright rejection of theology as a reliable way to certain truth and, in the Eṣāṣdū, into a warning against the dangers hidden in its study. Gażal, however, engaged in theological polemics himself, and his more systematic writings on theology were preceded by his polemical treatise against the Bāṭinīya sect of Neilī ʿIsmāʿīlim. This refutation, al-Mustaqṣīr fī ʿalā fī-ʿalā bi-al-Bāṭinīya “The abominations of the sectarian” (Goldzweber, 1916), was named after the caliph al-Mustārṣer (accused to the caliphate in 487/1094), on whose order Gażal wrote the work in Baghdad. Two later works that reflect Gażal’s intellectual struggle with the principle of hermeneutics (ʿurūf), upheld by the authoritative teaching (ʿulūm) of the Bāṭinīya, are the al-Qāṣīd al-mustaqṣīm “The correct balance” (tr. McCarty, pp. 257-332) and the Fuyūj al-taḥqīq bayna al-ʾIsmāʿīl wa-l-iṣṭiṣbā “The arbitrator between Islam and heresy” (tr. McCarty, pp. 145-74), the latter of which includes an innovative argument for the toleration of heterodox groups within the Islamic community (Griffel, pp. 34-42). The authenticity of Gażal’s al-Radd al-jamīl “A clear elucidation of the Sunna” “The excellent refutation of the divinity of Jesus from the clear evidence of the Gospel” is maintained by Louis Massinon (pp. 491-536), although questioned by others (Lazarus Yafeh, pp. 458-87).

Gażal’s most important work, the monumental ʿEṣāṣdūʾ olām al-din, written during his years of travel and retreat between his teaching at Baghdad and Nīẓāmān, represents a moderate form of Sufism, one stressing religious knowledge and righteous action (cf. the analysis of Bouquat). The work as a whole reflects Gażal’s self-perception as one chosen to revive religion, being a complete guide to Islamic piety, divided into four volumes of ten “books” each (ʿebād “religious duties,” ṣād “social customs,” moḥkāt “faults of character,” and monjīṣāt “vices”). Convinced that in his time the scholars of
Our understanding of Gażali's mystical philosophy.

Such small treatises of disputed authenticity are the Menhdal al-Shebdin (Bouyges and Allard, pp. 82-84), assumed to have been his last work, and the al-Madrani (Cairo, 1303/1883-86; Bouyges and Allard, pp. 51-56), addressed to his brother Ahmad. Meritorious manuscript study is also required to support the authenticity of the Resaía al-ladainiy (M. Smith, 1938, pp. 177-200, 353-74; Idem, 1944, p. 212), which is frequently held to be a work of Ibn 'Arabi (Bouyges and Allard, pp. 124-25).

Because the vast majority of Gażali's writings are compiled in Arabic, little scholarly attention is commonly given to the books he wrote in Persian. His Kitâb-e-saadat al-ni'mah (Necessity of happiness) is a Persian synopsis of his Egyptian discourses, rather than its popularized version (Pretzl, p. 17). Completed shortly before 499/1106 (Bouyges and Allard, p. 60), the work is a well-organized religious ethics (de Pousché, pp. 223-52), enriched by mystical reflections on the heart (qalb) that is "alchemically" purified and empowered to reach God. Sufficiently put, the Khâmil-e-su'dad finds the solution of Gażali's own original crisis concerning the human heart, held in the physical body, though fashioned from the substance of angels, as being in the image of God. As the organ of intimate union with God and the locus of the inborn nature (farda), it is the seat of the knowledge and love of God as well as the source of moral action. In his brief refutation of the ebraïsrm (Islamic freethinkers) written in Persian in 499/1106, Gażali tried to safeguard his moderate mystical synthesis by attacking animomaniacal Sufi extremism (ed. Pretzl). It may also be noted that Gażali's short Ayyubîl-wadld ("Oh child") (cf. Hammer-Purgazzoli, written after the Eşâyîd, was originally composed in Persian, and only later translated into Arabic under the title Khâmil al-tayyab (Bouyges and Allard, pp. 60-61, 97-98).

Another Persian work is the Nashīhat al-motâlik ("Counsel for kings") (tr. into Arabic well after Gażali's death by Abu'l-Ma'amun Ali b. Muhammed b. Mawfikl Erbilîl as al-Tehe al-motâlik; Meier, pp. 395-408), which was compiled about 503/1109 and belongs to the literary genre of "mirrors for princes." Weaving together anecdotes of Sassanian court literature and stories of Muslim lore, the book is written in a pleasing Persian and divided into two parts, a theological part, explaining the beliefs and principles on which a ruler should act, and an ethical part, including counsels and maxims according to which a ruler should administer his charge. It is generally assumed that the Nashīhat al-motâlik was written for the Saljuq sultan Muhammad b. Malekšâh, whose rule (498-511/1104-17) followed that of his brother Barkâkî (Meier, p. 395; Gażali, tr. Bagley, p. xvii-xviii). In her dissertation on Gażali's letters and public addresses, however, Dorothy Krawalsky argues (pp. 20-25; Laoust, pp. 144-52) that the book was addressed to the Saljuq sultan Sanjar, the brother
of his two predecessors, who, prior to his own rule (513-52/119-57), administered the eastern half of the sultanate in his two brothers' stead as "King of the east" (malkēr-e ma'terē). Then again, attribution of the second part of the Našābat al-mollēš has been seriously questioned by C. H. de Ponscœur (pp. 389-412), while Patricia Crone has rejected its authenticity altogether (pp. 167-91). The compilation of the small treatise, Surr al-šāmā'ayn "The secret of the two worlds," also in the genre of "mirror for princes" though written in Arabic, is linked with an often repeated, yet doubtful, story about Ebn Tūmār (d. 524/1130). The Mabdi of the Almohads, said to have copied the book while studying with Gūzālī in a Baghdad, informed the master about the public burning of his Etyād in Cordoba and throughout the Almoravids dominions (Goldzweig, 1903, pp. 18-19). Given the great volume of Gūzālī's writings, it is difficult to state succinctly the significance and influence of his life and work. Nevertheless, Gūzālī's own confession, in the opening pages of his Monqēd (ed. Jabr, pp. 10-11), of a thirst to free his inborn intellectual nature (fisra) from the blind adherence (taglīd) to inherited religion may reflect the core of his religious quest and provide the key to his work. A more balanced interpretation of Gūzālī may well lie in the acknowledgment that his manifold ideas evolved over a long career, rather than in the insistence upon either an objective or subjectivist approach to his thought. The richness of Gūzālī's legacy embraces not only a systematic study of law and theology that rejects both legal causality and scholastic ingenuity, yet includes a polemical fervor against philosophers and heretics, but also embodies a high standard of morals and a deep mystical insight. Gūzālī's influence on the rationalist philosophy of the Islamic West as well as on the scholasticism of Judaism and Christianity in medieval southern Europe has been highlighted for centuries; the study of his impact on the inner life and mystical thought of the Persian-speaking world has barely begun. 


(Gerhard Böwering)

ii. THE EKHAĐA/OLAM AL-DIN

Rightly regarded as the greatest work of Abī Ḥamīd Ghazālī (450/1059-505/1111), Ekhād ‘olām al-dīn was written after his abandonment of his professorship in Baghdad in 488/1095, while he was devoting himself to the study and practice of Sufism (taṣawwuf). A brief description of this work is to be said that it is an attempt to show how the life of a Sufi can be based on the duties prescribed by Islamic holy law (Jārī‘a). In this way it was opposing the tendency, found in some Sufi circles, of neglecting duties incumbent on ordinary Muslims. The work was composed in Arabic. Another work of the same author, Khimār-yek sa‘āda (is mainly an abbreviated Persian version of the Ekhād), though there are some relatively slight differences. The Ekhād is divided into four quarters and each quarter (rūb) into ten books, while each book (kutub) is variously divided according to the subject matter. The four quarters are: (1) Religious duties (‘ehbād), (2) Social duties (‘Addar), (3) What leads to damnation (mohākērāt), (4) What leads to salvation (mokātib). 1. Religious duties (‘ehbād). 1. Knowledge (‘ilm). This book discusses many aspects of knowledge, but it is probably best understood as an apologia for
Gazali's own preference for the life of a Sufi over that of a professor of jurisprudence. For Muslims the primary form of 'ilm was usually knowledge of God and his commands and purposes as prophets had received them by revelation. This might be described as "wisdom" and is contrasted with "instrumental knowledge:" the former is knowledge enabling man to live a good life and to attain to the joy of paradise, whereas the latter (which includes the sciences of nature) gives man control over objects. Within the knowledge of divine things, however, a distinction must be made. The Arabic word 'alamâd (men of knowledge), often translated as "scholars" or "jurists," had come to be applied especially to those versed in the legal aspects of the šari'â. Though they were concerned with divine things, Gazali felt that many of them were using their knowledge to further their own careers. He therefore contrasted worldly-minded and materialistic 'alamâd with those he called 'olamâd al-ğbera (men of knowledge of the world to come). He tries to define exactly how far religious knowledge is profitable and how far harmful.

2. The Doctrines of the creed (qawâ'id al-'ugâ'id). The first section is a much fuller exposition of the two assertions of the šahâda (profession of faith): There is no deity but God; Mohammad is the Messenger of God. Section two deals with the stages or degrees of faith, beginning with learning by heart the doctrines of the creed, and then considers how far it is profitable to engage in dialectical argument (jadâl) and theological discussion (kâtâm). Section three reproduces an earlier work by Gazali, al-Resâla al-qâdîya, which is a statement of the doctrines of the creed in forty propositions: ten each on God's essence and unity, his attributes, his actions, and points of eschatology and political order. Section four deals with the distinction and relation between faith (iman) and submission to God (issâm).

3. Mysteries of purity (asrâr al-tahâara). After distinguishing external (or ritual) purity from the purity of the members from sin, the purity of the heart, and the purity of the inmost thoughts, Gazali describes in detail all that is involved in ritual purity, including the lesser ablution (wudâ'î), complete ablution (ghasîb), and the treatment of hair and nails.

4. Mysteries of ritual worship or prayer (asrâr al-salât). After a chapter of quotations from the Koran and Hadith on the merits of various aspects of the worship, the detailed legal requirements of it are explained fully. Then Gazali goes on to speak of the inner attributes that should be cultivated, humility and recollection (or presence of the heart). This is the central point in his fusion of Sufism with the religious duties of all Muslims. Other chapters are devoted to recommendations for those acting as imam or leader at the worship, to the Friday worship, and to the supererogatory acts of worship, for those who want to do more than merely fulfill the minimum requirements.

5. The mysteries of almsgiving (asrâr al-zakât). This book follows a similar pattern to the previous one. First a statement is given of the precise rules of the šari'â for the zakât (legal alms) on various classes of property: herds of animals, grain, dates and other agricultural products, precious metals, articles of commerce, mines, etc. Then the inner significance of alms is expanded, especially the need to see almsgiving as a duty toward God and to look upon the recipient of alms as helping the giver (to fulfill this duty). The inner attitude of the recipient is also discussed. Finally there is mention of the excellence of almsgiving that is supererogatory or non-obligatory (ṣâdiqât al-tâjâwûrîn).

6. The mysteries of fasting (asrâr al-sawm). There is first a statement of the precise rules for the fast of Ramadan, including practices commonly observed though not strictly obligatory. Then comes consideration of inner attitudes, and a distinction is drawn between the fasting of ordinary people, that of the élite, and that of the élite of the élite. Supererogatory fasts are also mentioned.

7. The mysteries of the pilgrimage (asrâr al-hajj). The rules concerning the pilgrimage to Mecca (hâj) and the lesser pilgrimage (umrâ) are explained in detail. The appropriate "internal acts" are also described.

8. The recitation of the Koran (âdâb thulwât al-Qur'ân). The recitation of the Koran is meritorious. There are certain external rules for it, and also appropriate inner thoughts and attitudes. Though some Muslims insist that one must always follow traditional interpretations, no such interpretations exhaust the meaning of the verses, and there is a place for personal exegesis.

9. The remembrance of God and intercessory prayer (al-'aqāf al-wâl'dal-dâwât). The remembrance of God is commanded in many passages of the Koran and Hadith. The Arabic word âkr means both "remembrance" and "mention" and so is applied to Sufi assemblies for the remembrance of God. This is achieved in part, both individually and communally, by repeating the name of God or phrases such as "Glory to God!" (sobhân Allâh, Dâ'a), intercessory prayer, is also commended in the Koran and Hadith. Examples are given of do'a attributed to Mohammad and other persons.

10. Devotions by day and night (asrâr al-awrâd wa tâjîf al-salâf al-tâjîf). The first chapter speaks of the seven divisions of the day and four (or five) of the night and describes the appropriate activity of the pious Muslim during each. This varies according to his station in life. The second speaks of the merit of rising by night for devotions and gives practical counsels.

II. Social duties (âdâb). 1. Good customs in eating and drinking (âdâb al-âðâb). Many of the points mentioned in this book belong to what westerners would call social etiquette, but Gazali brings out certain religious aspects, especially when a man is
GAZĀLĪ II. THE EHYA‘-ULŪM AL-DIN

eating alone. He also speaks of the excellence of hospitality and similar matters.
2. Marriage (addāl al-nekāh). The first chapter is a discussion of the reasons for and against marriage, enumerating the advantages (such as having descendants) and the disadvantages (such as incurring heavy financial burden). Gazālī concludes that it depends on an individual’s circumstances whether marriage or celibacy is better for him. This is contrary to the standard Muslim view, but is in accord with Gazālī’s own practice of celibacy after his retirement from Baghdad. The remaining two chapters deal with legal points and practical counsels.
3. Good customs in acquiring wealth and gaining a living (addāl al-khāṣa wa-l-ma‘ālī). Working for a living in this world is a means towards the world to come. A man should not be so engrossed in gaining a living that he neglects useful work. Practical details are given about buying and selling, avoiding usury and the like. Some of the points mentioned are legal requirements, others go far beyond the legal minimum. Advice is given on the choice of occupation.
4. Lawful and unlawful (al-halāl wa-l-hārīm). This book is concerned with wara‘, the pious avoidance of and abstinence from what is unlawful. In Gazālī’s time some men asserted that it was almost impossible to gain things lawfully, but Gazālī held that in general the lawful and the unlawful are obvious, but that there are a number of doubtful cases. He then gives detailed cassistic rates for doubtful matters. Other chapters deal with the disposal of unlawful gains and with rules for relations with princes who are themselves unjust or may gain wealth unlawfully.
5. Friendship, brotherhood, and other social relationships (addāl al-‘iffa wa-l-‘akāwī wa-l-‘isbā‘). To live in friendly relations with God is a great good and is blessed by God. Brotherhood (friendship) in God is to be distinguished from brotherhood with a worldly basis. In the former, someone is loved with a view to an other-worldly end (e.g., the love of a pupil for his religious teacher; or a man may be filled with love for God and love others for God’s sake). There may also be hate for God’s sake, e.g. of those who disobey God. Chapter two sets out an ideal of mutual conduct between friends, and chapter three an ideal of conduct towards every Muslim, towards neighbors, towards close relatives, and towards slaves.
6. Life in seclusion (addāl al-‘ozā‘). There are different options about the respective merits of life in seclusion (or retreat) and life in the world among men. The arguments from the Koran and Hadith are not conclusive, and it is necessary to look at the advantages and disadvantages of each form of life. Seclusion enables a man to devote himself more completely to the remembrance and worship of God and to grow in knowledge of him. It also makes it easier for a man to avoid various sins. Life in the world, however, enables a man to grow in knowledge, to be useful to others, to enjoy the society of others, and to acquire certain social virtues.
7. Good customs during travel (addāl al-safār). Travel may be for various purposes, some worldly, some religious (such as pilgrimage). Some travel is unlawful, some meritorious. Some practical points are mentioned. A second chapter deals with legal matters, such as permitted modifications in ablutions and times of worship, and the determination of the qibla and the exact hours of prayer.
8. Good customs in hearing music and in ecstasy (addāl al-samā‘ wa-l-wujūf). Gazālī holds that music is a means to discover what is really in a man’s heart. Some authorities, such as Mālek b. Anas, said that listening to music was forbidden, but Gazālī argues that it is lawful in general, but may be unlawful incidentally. He enumerates seven types of occasion where music is permissible. The last is where a man loves God and seeks to come near to him; in this case music leads to mystical “states” (azwāj) and ecstasy (wujūf). These states and ecstasy are further described, and practical counsels are given to those who listen to music in religious assemblies with a view to attaining to ecstasy.
9. The duty of commanding good and forbidding evil (al-amr bi-l-ma‘ṣūf wa-l-na‘ām bi-l-ma‘nir). This is an important principle of the Islamic religion, mentioned in the Koran and Hadith, but in Gazālī’s view it is imperfectly understood and is neglected in practice. The mohkazeb, the person censuring, should be a more expert Muslim known for his uprightness (‘adlāt) and capable of censuring effectively. The matter censured should be something generally disapproved of, present, and obvious. There are degrees of censure, beginning with informing the person censured and exhorting him and, in extreme cases, going on to the use of armed force. A list is given of reprehensible acts. With regard to rulers, it is lawful to inform them that an act is disapproved and to exhort them to give it up; but Gazālī regrets that in his day men are not prepared to go further and risk martyrdom.
10. The life and character of the Prophet (addāl al-ma‘līa wa-l-‘akhaqāt al-nabīwah). This book is restricted to social matters. Among the qualities of character enumerated and illustrated are generosity, patience, courage, gentleness, chasteness of speech and clothing, magnanimity. Many facts demonstrate the Prophet’s sincerity.
II. WHAT LEADS TO DOMINATION (AL-MOHKEČED). 1. Explanation of the mysteries of the heart (lābī ā‘d‘eb al-qalb). Man differs from other creatures in that he is capable of having knowledge of God, and this comes to him by his heart (qalb). Knowledge of the heart is of the highest importance for the Sufi. Qalb denotes both the physical organ and a subtle spiritual faculty (la‘lifl rāhānī). This last is called ṭalī (spirit) and nafs (self, soul). Ṭalī may also mean a delicate physical body, and nafs may also refer to the desire and anger against which man has to struggle.
The "soul at rest" (maw'na 'ama) is that which has overcome the passions; the "blaming soul" (lawdīma) is that which is engaged in struggle; the "soul commanding evil" (amūdī bu'l-sād) is obeying the passions and the devil. 'Aqīf (reason) may mean either knowledge or that which knows, namely the heart. The heart may be said to have seven nerves (limbs, organs, senses, etc.) through which it carries on the struggle; but it is distinguished from animals by knowledge ('ilm) and will (irada). Four types of attribute may be distinguished in the heart: the predatorial (saho'ya), connected with anger; the bestial (bahlīmīya), connected with desire; the magisterial or spiritual (rubhīhīya), connected with knowledge and leadership; and the diabolical (zayyāngiya), through which evil and vice are possible. These can be represented by a dog, a pig, a wise man, and a demon. The different kinds of knowledge are then discussed, and the difference between ordinary knowledge and that acquired by divine inspiration (ękhdān). Then the action of the devil on the soul is explained, and the nature of man's responsibility for his actions.

2. Moral education (rīlatat al-nafī wā tabḥīl al-ādkāq wā al-ādām al-qālī). The diseases of the heart are more serious than those of the body, since they lead to an evil and vicious character, and it is important to know how to cure them. In a good man there are four basic virtues: wisdom, courage, moderation, justification (hikma, ṣa'īda, 'aṣfa, 'adl). In this Gażālī is in the Platonist tradition, and he also speaks of the Aristotelian conception of virtue as a mean. A virtue such as generosity can be gradually acquired by making oneself perform generous acts. The diseases of the soul are due to following desires, and the cure is to renounce the desires. Finally there are descriptions of the moral training of children and of Sufi disciples.

3. The subjugation of the two desires (kās al-šabhsayyĩn). The two desires are those of the belly and genitals. With regard to the first it should be realized that hunger has several advantages over satiety. The practice of abstinence can be gradually increased; but the man who is abstinent to an excessive degree becomes liable to fall into faults. The desire for sexual intercourse is beneficial in that it is a necessity for the pleasures of paradise and that it perpetuates mankind. In respect of the second there can be excess (especially infatuation, 'aqīf, for a single person) and also deficiency; only moderation in accord with reason and revelation is praiseworthy. It is better in general for a Sufi disciple (mawīl) not to marry; but if he falls into sin, even only through his eyes, he should marry.

4. Faults of the tongue (ḏīli al-ʿebās). After quotations about the dangers of the tongue and the excellence of silence, twenty defects are mentioned in order of increasing seriousness: speaking about what does not concern one; speaking too much; engaging in useless topics; disputing and arguing (unfairly); opposing others in hostile fashion; speaking with affectation; indecent talk; cursing; singing and reciting poetry; pleasantries; mocking and making fun of others; divulging secrets; making promises falsely; telling lies (but lies are sometimes permissible); speaking behind people's back (discussed at great length); tale-bearing; being double-tongued; praising others unwisely; using words carelessly especially in respect of God and his attributes; ordinary men's questioning about theological subtleties.

5. The condemnation of anger, hatred, and envy (damm al-ṣalāb wā l-hawī l-ḥasād). Anger is created in men by God in order that they may repel evils which would destroy or harm them. There is just a mean in respect of anger, and this is praiseworthy; but both excess and deficiency are blamed. Suggestively are given for the control of anger in different contexts. Magnanimity is praiseworthy. When anger cannot be expressed it produces hatred, which is entirely blameworthy and leads to other evils. Instead of hating one should pardon wrongs done to one and show compassion. Envy proceeds from hatred and is in respect of benefits God has bestowed on other men. Suggestions are given for overcoming it.

6. The condemnation of this world (damm al-al-dunyā). This world is like a woman who attracts men by her beauty and then kills them. Sayings are quoted of Mohammed, Jesus, and others condemning love of the world. It is important to know what things to avoid in the world and what not to avoid. The just man is here to take the world for the sake of religion, not for its own sake.

7. The condemnation of avarice and of love of wealth (damm al-bāqī wā damm bāb al-māl). Wealth and material possessions are both blamed and praised in the Koran and Hadith. Wealth may enable a man to perform his religious duties better, to help others, and to perform services to the community (such as building mosques and hospitals). Poverty is to be praised, provided it is accompanied by contentment and not by cupidity and covetousness of what others have. To avoid these faults one should be content with what is strictly necessary to maintain life, should rely on God's promise, and should be aware of the danger of great wealth. Opposed to avarice is generosity. The highest degree of generosity is to give away what one has need of.

8. The condemnation of (love of) fame and of hypocrisy (damm al-ṣalāb wā l-mālīl). Love of fame is like love of wealth; the latter is concerned with worldly goods, the former with gaining control of men's hearts. The man who praises another is his slave. Love of fame is countered by knowledge of the transience of worldly glory and by seeking renown only in the eyes of God, not of men. The pious man hates praise from men. Hypocrisy is essentially the seeking of fame and renown by religious practices (ʿebālāt), though there are also other forms of
hypocrisy which are not blameworthy, such as desiring to appear well in people's eyes. Hypocrisy can be practiced by one's body; dress, language, acts, and personal relationships. It may be open or hidden, even from the man himself. This unconscious hypocrisy is greatly feared by the virtuous. To avoid hypocrisy a man must take no pleasure in being praised and feel no pain at being blamed; he must also be aware of the dangers during religious practices and turn away from them.

9. The condemnation of pride and complacency (damūn al-khāf wa-l-qiblā). Pride may be expressed in one's gait, clothing, etc.; but this is rather takabbūr (proud bearing). Properly speaking, pride is a trait of the soul. It consists in regarding oneself as superior to others in some respect, sometimes even as superior to the prophets and to God himself. The opposite is humility (tawālī'). Pride may be in respect of one's learning, religious practices, birth, physical beauty and strength, wealth, or the number of one's following. Pride may be combated and humility acquired by reflecting on man's weakness and dependence on God, and then by special considerations according to the basis of one's pride. True humility is a just mean. Complacency (or self-satisfaction) consists in thinking highly of one's learning or achievements or wealth, not as gifts from God but as one's own. It leads to pride and a failure to be aware of one's sins. Since complacency is due to ignorance, its cure is through the relevant knowledge.

10. The condemnation of delusion (damūn al-fājr). Delusion is a form of ignorance, where the deluded man believes and regards a thing to be different from what it really is and where this false belief coincides with his desires. For example, an unbeliever may hold that certainty is better than doubt and that this world and its pleasures are certain and the world to come doubtful, and so prefer this world to the world to come. Other examples are given, and then there is a detailed account of the forms of delusion or self-deception which four classes of men are liable: men of learning (ahl al-'ilm), experts in religious practices (arbūb al-‘ibāda wa-l-amāl), would-be Sufis (motaqawwālīs), and wealthy men (arbūb al-amāl).

IV. What leads to salvation (al-munjibj).

1. Repentance (taqwā). Repentance consists of: (a) the knowledge that sins are harmful and are a veil between man and God, his beloved; (b) the state of being repentent (nasi‘); and (c) the appropriate act, e.g., the decision not to repeat the sin. Repentance is a religious duty in all its parts, to be performed without delay, and by all who seek to come close to God. Sins arise from the four attributes (or instincts) of the heart (mentioned in II:1) and may be in respect to either God or men. They may also be classified as small (qālī) or great (khabīr). Small sins may become great in various ways, e.g., by perseverance in them. Men may draw near to perfection in repentance to a greater or lesser extent; this is in respect to the depth of their repentance and their continuing to be influenced by it. Since sin is like a disease, the physicians of religion, i.e., the prophets and learned men, should endeavor to bring to repentance those who persist in sin.

2. Patience and gratitude (al-yāhur wa al-fakr). Patience is a station (maqām) or stage (manazil) in the religious life, and like all stations is characterized by (a) knowledge (mu‘ārif), which leads to (b) states (awwāl), which lead to (c) activity (‘amāl). There are two kinds of patience. One is of the body and consists in enduring pain and suffering. One is of the soul and consists either in enduring natural desires (without sinning)—and this is continence (‘īfāf)—or in enduring what one does not want; and this has various names, such as courage and self-control. Gratitude includes the knowledge that all good things are from God, together with a feeling of joy, not merely because of the thing itself but also because of the fact that it is an expression of God's love, but because it enables one to serve him. This feeling leads to appropriate acts. There are many types of good gift (ne‘ma). Patience is concerned with the trials sent by God and gratitude with his gifts. Absolutely, patience is more meritorious but there are many grades of both patience and gratitude.

3. Fear and hope (al-kawf wa-l-rasād). Hope is a station (maqām) when a man is established in it, and is a state (bāl) when it is only for a time. Hope leads to activity, in contrast to its opposite, despair (wa‘). Hope may be increased by certain practices and considerations. Fear of eternal punishment is more effective than hope in the case of most men. Fear also leads to activity. During a man's life, fear is preferable since it leads to an avoidance of sin; but at the time of death, hope is preferable. Higher than the fear of Hell is the fear of God himself and of separation from him.

4. Poverty and asceticism (al-faqr wa-l-zahhād). Every being is poor compared with God and is dependent on him, but poverty is more discussed in respect of wealth. There are several degrees: to avoid and hate wealth (this is asceticism); not to rejoice in having wealth, yet not to reject it; to prefer to have wealth yet to be content when one has none; to suffer from the absence of wealth. Poverty is more meritorious than wealth. To the poor certain good practices are recommended, and certain rules to be observed when seeking alms. Asceticism consists in renouncing things which are permitted. There are many kinds and degrees of asceticism. The highest degree is to renounce everything except God. The man who renounces everything in this world but seeks the joys of paradise is at a lower level. There is a detailed discussion of asceticism in respect of food, clothing, housing, marriage, money, and influence.

5. The oneness (of God) and confidant trust (al-tawwāl bi-l-tawakkul). Confident trust is a stage and
station of those brought near to God (muqarrabat). It is closely linked with awjihd, and this last is of four degrees. (The word awjihd is commonly translated "unity of God," but it is properly meant "making God one" or "asserting God's unity.") (1) A man may confess God's unity with his lips without believing in it in his heart. Confession of its flesh is true, but of its heart, only divinity in the heart, as do ordinary Muslims. (3) A man may, by illumination from above, observe all things as coming from God the One. (4) A man may see in existence only one God. Confident trust is linked with the third meaning. The nature of confident trust is further explained by giving detailed rules and considering particular cases.

6. Love, yearning, familiarity, and approval (al-mahabbah wal-lajw wal-ons wal-remz). Love for God (rashid) is the highest of the stations (maqāmāt) in the spiritual life; yearning, familiarity, and approval are its fruits. In general five kinds of love can be distinguished, and all of these find their highest degree in love for God. The most sublime pleasure is in knowledge (ma'rifah) of God and contemplation of his face (al-nasr el-ba wajheh). Yearning is the desire for something partly known and partly unknown; and to yearning for God is desire for a fuller knowledge of him. Familiarity is the joy experienced from nearness to the Beloved and contemplation of him. Approval, that is, the approval or joyful acceptance of God's decrees, is also a fruit of love, and it is itself a station. Daud's, intermediary and petitionary prayer, is not contrary to approval.

7. Intention, single-mindedness, and sincerity (al-ni'ma wal-sitaj wal-hayd). According to hadith, acts are judged by the intention of the agent. The relation of intention and act is fully discussed. Single-mindedness or purity of intention is usually restricted to the case where the motive is to draw near to God. There are degrees of single-mindedness, and it can be impaired in various ways, notably by ostentation (reya). Sincerity may be in respect of speech, intention, resolution, the accomplishment of one's resolve, works, and the stations of religion. Sincerity in the fullest sense has all these aspects.

8. Attentiveness and self-examination (al-muraqabat wal-ijla wal-nilah). This book is not fully described by the title. It consists of a description of the six stations (maqāmāt) which constitute perseverance or steadfastness (mawāhid). (1) First is mawāhid, the statement of conditions; reason (al-fa'iq) is conceived as a merchant in partnership with the soul (al-nafs), who before commencing the undertaking states the conditions to which the soul is expected to conform. (2) Next is mawāhid, attentiveness, that is to God the Watcher (ra'iq), as practiced by "those brought near" and "the men of the right hand." (3) Self-examination should be made at the end of each day to discover whether the balance of one's acts is a credit or debit. (4) Self-punishment (muraqabat al-nafs) follows. (5) Then comes mawāhid (engaging in spiritual struggle).

(6) Finally there is reproach and reproo of one's self (tawbih al-nafs wal-mawāhid). (6) Meditation (tafakkur). Meditation or contemplation is described as an essential to be present in the heart two thoughts in such a way that from them a third thought arises. The subject of meditation may be either man, with his sins, duties, weaknesses, and strengths, or God with his names and attributes. Many natural phenomena may act as signs.

10. Remembrance of death and what follows it (fikr al-maut wa mab bu'ad). It is good that death should be often in one's mind. Not to hope for a long life is meritorious; this includes acting at once and not postponing one's act. The pangs and anguish of death are worse for those who have cause to expect punishment in hell. Accounts are given of death-bed sayings of the Prophet and other Muslims. Seemly deportment f is generally commended, and then follow descriptions of the experiences of the man between death and the Judgment, and in the world to come, culminating in the vision of God. The final word of the whole work is an assertion of the wideness of God's mercy in the hope that this will be a good augury for the writer.


In addition to the Kīmā-ye za‘ādat, his most important book in Persian, Gāzālī wrote a number of shorter works in Persian, which for the most part either reiterate or elaborate on the contents of the Kīmā. Written after his return to his birthplace of Tūs in 498/1010, these works contain homilies and counsel addressed to the sultan and his ministers, as well as to his own disciples; they stress the necessity of adhering to the provisions of the ṣarāʾ and condemn those who fail to do so.

Apart from the Kīmā, the most celebrated of Gāzālī’s works in Persian is Nāṣīḥat al-molūk, written most probably for Sultan Sanjar b. Malekkāb (or possibly for Sanjar’s brother, Sultan Mohammad). In the edition published by Jalāl-al-Dīn Homā‘ī, this work consists of two parts, of which only the first (pp. 1-79) can reliably be attributed to Gāzālī. In many parts the language and the contents are strikingly similar to, and in some passages a verbatim copy of, the Kīmā (e.g., cf. pp. 3-5 and 27-46 with Kīmā I, pp. 124-30 and 534-42). In the opening section of the Nāṣīḥat al-molūk, Gāzālī, drawing on a kūrānic verse (14:24), advises the sultan to pursue eternal felicity (zād-e ājārāt), which he likens to a tree growing from the seed of faith (tažer-e imān) planted in the chest and the heart (ed. Homā‘ī, p. 2).

The tree should be cultivated and nourished by devoting each Friday to worship. This tree has ten roots and ten branches (pp. 2-3). The roots correspond to essential articles of faith: the knowledge of God, His transcendence, His omnipotence, His omniscience, His will, His attributes of vision and hearing, His attribute of speech, His attribute of acting, judging and the hereafter, and belief in His prophets. The branches of the tree consist of man’s external actions, worship, the observance of justice, and the avoidance of injustice. These themes are illustrated with numerous sayings of the Prophet and anecdotes concerning the great figures of religious tradition (pp. 13 ff.).

The second and longer part of Nāṣīḥat al-molūk (pp. 81 ff.), differs considerably in content and style from the well-known writings of Gāzālī. It is replete with stories about the pre-Islamic kings of Persia, especially Anūrān, his justice, as well as maxims attributed to Aristotle, Socrates, Alexander, and Boccegrum (or the. It refers to the concept of the divine glory of kings (farār-e shadī), and quotes many Persian verses, a practice Gāzālī generally avoided. In the second edition, Homā‘ī expresses some ambivalence on the attribution of this part of the book to Gāzālī (intro., pp. 11x-1xx), and both Abūd- al-Hosayn Zarīrākāb (pp. 256-SO and Patricia Crone have presented arguments to prove that Gāzālī could not be its author. Some Western scholars such as Henri Laoust, A. K. S. Lambton, and F. R. C. Bagley have nonetheless treated it as an authentic work of Gāzālī in their discussions of the work (see bibliography below). Nāṣīḥat al-molūk has been translated into Arabic more than once; an early translation entitled al-Tahr al-mashīh fi nāṣīḥat al- molūk has been published several times.

Pand-nāma, another book of advice attributed to Gāzālī and probably addressed also to Sultan Sanjar, has received little scholarly attention. In its contents it greatly resembles the first part of Nāṣīḥat al-molūk as well as some other works of Gāzālī, such as the Kīmā and Zād-e ājārāt. The introduction to the book relates that Gāzālī wrote the Pand-nāma in response to a certain king who had asked him for advice. A great deal of the book is devoted to the necessity of remembering death and the transience of worldly life and seeking true felicity in the hereafter. Its themes are illuminated with stories concerning the prophets and other religious figures. The Pand-nāma exists in numerous manuscripts, all of relatively recent transcription. The lack of any early extant manuscripts of the work has led to a number of scholars to doubt its ascription to Gāzālī, although its contents are clearly drawn from his writings.

The attribution to Gāzālī of a third book of counsel addressed to kings, Tohfat al-molūk, is utterly unfounded, although its section on religious beliefs has been drawn from the first part of Nāṣīḥat al-
moluk. The celebrated story of Shabiz San'atn, developed at length by 'Ajār (q.v.) in Montaq at-
īsay, appears to have been taken by him from this
Tohfat al-moluk, which has led a number of Persian
and Western scholars to attribute mistakenly the
origin of the story to Gazzali (Pirjáwâdī, 2000, pp. 4-
12).

Ay farzand (O son!) is the book of counsel that
Gazzali wrote for one of his close disciples. It is
frequently punctuated by the address Ay farzand (O
son!), and this exclamation has come to serve as its
common title, although the titles Gazzalli al-taqāṣīf
and Farzand-nāma are also encountered. From
Gazzali’s mention of this work in Ehtijā ṣālim al-din
and the Kīma'īye sjūdāt it can be deduced that he
wrote it toward the end of his life. He begins by
citing some counsel of the Prophet before answering
questions asked of him by his disciple on such matters
as the duties of the spiritual wayfarer, the nature of
Sufism, servanthood (tāhiyyat), trust in God
(tawakkīl), and sincerity of devotion. Queries on
aspects of direct mystical experience (daww) he
decides to answer, on the grounds that such topics
cannot be expounded verbally. The entirety of this
work has a Sufi coloring, in an eloquent and
attractive style. As usual, Gazzali cites many kroranic
verses and traditions of the Prophet, which he leaves
untranslated. He also quotes a number of verses in
Arabic and Persian, and one of the Persian verses
appears to be his own composition: garm mey do khaq-
ratīl bar peymā'nāt mēy nāqorī nāhābāt-at tēyədət
(‘Even if you measure out two thousand cups of wine/
As long as you do not drink the wine, you will not
feel intoxicated’). Ay farzand has been translated into
Arabic more than once, one of which, under the title
Ayyub al-walad, has served as the basis for versions
in German by Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall and in
French by Toufiek Sabbagh.

Zād-e ākerat is a kind of manual of religious
observance for those among his followers (‘awāmen)
who lacked the intellectual wherewithal to benefit
from the Kīma'ī (Zād-e ākerat, p. 3). This, too,
appears to be one of the last works he wrote. The
greater part of it consists of the Persian translation
of one of his Arabic works, Beduayat al-hedaya; it deals
with aspects of everyday life such as waking up,
putting on one’s clothes, going to the mosque,
prayer, fasting etc., as well as various forms of
supplementary prayer (do'ā, q.v.), and the avoidance
of sin. Zād-e ākerat contains in addition the same
material on credal matters that is to be found in the
first section of Nazīlat al-moluk as well as the
Kīma'ī. The treatise concludes with a section on
the "correct norms of conduct toward the Creator and
creature," which is also present in Beduayat al-hedaya.
W. Montgomery Watt omitted this section from his
English translation of Beduayat al-hedaya, which he
included in his book on Gazzali (pp. 88-152), under
the misapprehension that it had been wrongly
attributed to Gazzali. Watt apparently was unaware
of Zād-e ākerat, which must be taken as confirming
Gazzali’s authorship of the entire Beduayat al-hedaya.
Fātūl al-anām men mutaq al-Hijjat al-Esalīn is the
collection of letters that Gazzali wrote to sultans,
ministers, military commanders, jurists, and some of
his friends after his return to Khurasan. The
collection, apparently assembled by one of his
grandchildren after his death, contains thirty-four
letters of varying length divided into five chapters.
The longest letter might also count as a treatise in its
own right, being a response to objections raised
against some of his statements in Mekātī al-awār
and Al-Moqūf men al-zālīl. One such objection was
that by describing God as true light, Gazzali had
fallen prey to the dualistic Maghribi belief in light
and darkness as forming antithetical realities (ed.
Mo'ayyad Tābītī, p. 9). Some letters include
discussion of credal and mystical issues. In the
letters to the sultan and military commanders he
presses the necessity of justice and solicitude for
the populace, while in letters to ministers, including
Fakhr al-Molk (q.v.), the eldest son of ʿAja' Neẓām-
al-Molk, he deals with theological questions.

The references made in these letters to events that
occurred toward the end of Gazzali’s life, between
the years 496-505/1105-11, endow them with particular
interest. His letters to Sultan Sanjar were apparently
written between 499/1105, when he left Tūs for
Nishāpūr at the request of Fakhr al-Molk to teach at the
Neẓāmīya madrasa in that city, and his return to Tūs,
approximately one year later after the murder of
Fakhr al-Molk. In 504/1110, when Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī
b. Mohammad Kīz Harrās, the principal of the
Neẓāmīya in Baghdad, died, Neẓām-al-Dīn Ahmad
(Zānī-al-Molk), the other son of Neẓām-al-Molk, who
at that time was minister to Sultan Mohammad
b. MalekKhāk, asked, Gazzali to go to Baghdad and
replace him, but in a letter included in this collection
he declined (ed. Mo'ayyad Tābītī, pp. 39-46).

Other letters of Gazzali comprise the fatwās he gave
on various theoretical and practical problems
pertaining to the Sufis of his age; these are to be
distinguished from his relatively brief fatwās in
Arabic that are on purely legal questions. Nine
fatwās in Persian and one in Arabic on Sufi topics
have been discovered so far in two manuscripts.
One such fatwā relates to the permissibility of samā',
the musical sessions of the Sufis. Gazzali expresses
the same view as in Ehtijā ṣālim al-din and Kīma'īye
ṣūdāt. Samā' is in itself neither licit nor illicit, its
status being dependent on the inner state of the
person participating in it (Pirjāwādī, 1996a, pp. 8-
17; for text and commentary). The fatwā was
apparently written for someone ignorant of Arabic,
for Gazzali translates into Persian the traditions of the
Prophet that he cites. Another fatwā deals with
seven queries about the primordial covenant that was
concluded by the descendants of the Children of
Adam before their spirits entered this world, as
described in the Koran (7:172). The most important
of the queries was whether those descendants had a real and sensory existence when they responded affirmatively to God's question: "Am I not your Lord?"; and if so, whether it was in a world other than the present one. Abu 'l-Qasim Jonayd, Husayn b. Mansur Hallaj, and Gazzali's own younger brother, Ahmad Gazzali, were all convinced that the covenant had indeed been sealed in a separate and distinctive realm, but Gazzali's fatwa was to the effect that the descendants of Adam did not have some pre-eternal existence in a world other than this present one, and he interpreted the question and answer contained in the koranic verse in a metaphorical sense. A third fatwa was delivered in response to a question concerning the relationship between the love of God, which is the eternal and uncreated Love, and that of man, who is created. Gazzali explains that the relationship of the two is like that of the sun and its infinitely numerous rays (Pirjavid, 1980c; for the text of the three fatwas, see a commentary).

Also worthy of mention among Gazzali's fatwas is one concerning the conditions for making use of the endowments of a Sufi hospice (Pirjavid, 1991; for text and commentary). This appears to be the earliest known fatwa on the subject, and as such must be taken as an indication of the growing importance of the kanaqah as a religious and social institution toward the close of the 11th century. According to Gazzali's fatwa, only a Sufi is entitled to benefit from the endowments of the kanaqah, a Suf being defined as one who has the morals and comportment of the Sufi and has not committed a sin that would occasion his expulsion from their ranks. In the same fatwa he touches on the problem of mendicancy, which he regards as forbidden except in case of dire need. He also has an Arabic fatwa on the same subject, which has been included in the Ihya', at the end of the relevant section on the lawful and unlawful (Kesar al-baladi wa't-bara").

Last among the Persian works of Gazzali comes his treatise in condemnation of the antinomians, Hayyatu-ahil-e ehbhat (also known as Radd-e ehbhat). Illustrated abundantly with koranic verses, traditions of the Prophet, allegorical stories, and the dicta of eminent men of religion, this treatise contains material also found in other works of Gazzali, such as the nine squares written on two pieces of pottery that are given to pregnant women, which is mentioned both in al-Muqaddam men al-talal and in one of the Persian fatwas. Gazzali's tone in this treatise is harsh and angry; he condemns the antinomians as apostates whose marriages are invalid and whose blood legitimately be shed. It was probably written after Gazzali's return to Tus from Baghdad and Syria before his composition of Kima'ye sada'at.

This treatise, like the fatwas, shows that Gazzali chose Persian as his medium whenever he wished to write on the problems of the society in which he lived. The other works discussed in this article also tend to demonstrate that Persia was for him more than the language of daily or familial use. He thought in Persian and used it to examine some of the most profound questions of mysticism and theology. He must, indeed, be accounted one of the earliest and most important writers of religious works in Persian.


GAZÁLI IV.—V. AS A FAQHI


V. AS A FAQHI

Gazáli’s legal education is said to have begun at a young age. As a youth, he had already begun to study Sháfi‘í law under Sháh Khámid b. Muhammad Ráddání, a prominent jurist of his home city, Túsh. He later traveled to Jéríján, where he continued his studies under Imam Ábú Náṣr Esmá‘íl, which resulted in writing his first ta‘lísq, in effect a graduate thesis. It must have dealt with the Sháfi‘í positive law, for we know that the ta‘lísq that he later wrote under Imám al-Harámány Ábú al-Má‘dií Jováyní, is in the field of legal theory (şúl al-farqá), a work that came to be known under the title al-Má‘dlí men ta‘lísqát al-şúl.

Gazáli completed his studies in Jéríján and returned to his home town, but he again left Túsh for Níshápúr to study with Ábú l-Má‘dlí Jováyní, who was then considered the most distinguished Sháfi‘í jurist and Ash‘arite theologian. He received from Jováyní license (see BÁSA) in a variety of disciplines at a relatively young age. They included positive law (farq), legal disagreement (şélíf), juridical dispositio (šuqút), legal theory, theology, and logic, all of which were essential for a thorough and comprehensive legal education (Sokbi, IV, p. 103).

In 484/1091, when Gazáli was thirty-four years of age, he was appointed by Nézám al-Molk as professor of the Negánníyá college in Baghdad, where, besides teaching, he issued fárváw and wrote a number of legal treatises. This prestigious appointment represented due acknowledgement of his stature as one of the leading scholars of his day. Four years later, Gazáli left Baghdad for Jerusalem via Damascus, stayed there for a while, and then went back to Damascus, where he resumed his activities as a professor and left for about ten years. Little is reported about his legal activities during the period between his departure from Damascus and his final return to Túsh. We know, however, that he stayed in several places, including Egypt, Baghdad, and Níshápúr, and in each place he made contact with a number of local legal scholars. In Túsh, he lived in relative seclusion and taught law and mysticism in a college adjacent to his house (Sokbi, IV, p. 105).

Gazáli authored four works on positive law: al-Bástí, al-Wáṣif, al-Wáṣif, and al-Kálész, the first of which is the most encyclopedic and based on Jováyní’s Néshádát al-maláb. Al-Wáṣif, al-maláb be-agáf al-bástí was, as the title indicates, a condensation of al-Bástí, later abridged as al-Wáṣif. In the 13th century, Músíl al-Dín Náwáwi (d. 676/1277), could still consider al-Wáṣif and al-Wáṣif two of the most recognized works in the Sháfi‘í school. ‘Abá al-Káltí í Ráfi’í (d. 623/1226), another Sháfi‘í author, wrote a commentary on al-Wáṣif, entitled Fárár al-şúl, which was abridged by Náwáwi in a work called al-Rawá. The heavy indebtedness of the Sháfi‘í positive text to Gazáli is mainly due to these two works of Náwáwi and Ráfi’í.

Sháfi‘í law in the 12th and 13th centuries depended heavily upon the contributions made during the immediately preceding period. The two most influential jurists who shaped legal developments during the 11th century were Abú Ėsáb Strád (d. 476/1083) and Gazáli. Both Ráfi’í and Náwáwi largely drew on the positive legal works of these two authors. With the final formation of the legal schools after the middle of the 10th century, positive law was multiform, each legal case having two, three, or as many as six or even seven different solutions. One of the major goals of the legal school was to reduce this variety into one authoritative opinion, this being the ultimate juristic criterion of the jurist’s achievement in the field of positive law was measured by his ability to determine which opinion was authoritative and which one was not. It is here that Gazáli excelled and ensured that his juristic legacy would persist. In al-Bástí, as in his two other works that were based on it, Gazáli was able to determine the strength of each and any of the opinions that had been formulated with respect to a particular case. His ability to make such determinations certainly established him as an accomplished jurist, for engaging successfully in such an activity meant that the jurist possessed first-rate competence in legal reasoning, the tool of the maqáṣíd. In this sense, Gazáli is one of the chief jurists involved in constructing the authoritative positive doctrine (maqáṣídat) of the Sháfi‘í school.

As part of his activity as a jurist, Gazáli was also heavily involved in the study of legal disagreement, a discipline essential to the task of determining the school’s authoritative opinions. In the field of disagreement, he wrote Bedáyat al-hedáya wa-l-má‘áksh f’l-šélíf, and also Maqáṣídat al-şélí f’l-şúl al-ṣúl. In addition, he wrote a number of other works dealing with a variety of legal issues, including Bayán al-qawáyní wa-l-šáfí (highly relevant to the determination of the school’s authoritative doctrine), Qáyát al-Šúl al-wáṣif dí rádiqát al-shúl, and a reaction to the latter, Qáyát al-Šúl al-wáṣif f’l-ma‘á’ a al-qawáyní, a work of law that depended to a large extent on the logical analysis of infinite regress and petitio principii.
Aside from his Fatāwā, Gażālī wrote at least three other works, al-Maṣṣafāt, al-Manṣūḥī and Sefā' al-ğallī fi baḥr al-tahab wa-maṣālik al-taṭlīlī, all works of legal theory. Here, in positive law, Gażālī made a lasting contribution, albeit more in form than substance. He was the first jurist in Sunni Islam to integrate logic into legal theory. At the outset of his al-Maṣṣafāt he provides a manual on logic, it being the shortest in a trilogy of expositions of this topic that includes Meḥbūk al-nāṣar and Me’yār al-ʿilm. Although he makes the study of this introductory treatise entirely voluntary, he asserts most unequivocally that ignorance of logic in effect amounts to ignorance of all sciences. However, when he moves on to the strictly legal portion of al-Maṣṣafāt, there is, surprisingly, little sign of any formal logical analysis, such that his treatment stands perfectly within the conventions of classical ʿaṣīl al-ğallī. What Gażālī obviously intended in this treatise was not to revolutionize legal analysis but rather to insist on the necessity of logic as the only meaningful tool by which all inferences can be tightly moulded according to a rational design.

Apart from a number of brief notes on legal theory, Gażālī's Me’yār consists largely of illustrations of the three figures of the categorical syllogism, together with their moods, and featuring examples drawn not only from philosophy and theology but also from law. This is also done in the case of conjunctive and disjunctive syllogisms, reductio ad absurdum and induction. It is quite obvious that with these examples Gażālī was merely trying to bring closer to the minds of jurists an understanding of the logical structure of these inferences. There is no attempt at analyzing legal cases through the medium of these arguments. Nor is there any effort at identifying, in terms of standard logic, the distinctive structure of legal logic. The sole exception to this rule, however, is that of analogy, which Gażālī, following the Aristotelian tradition, insists must be converted to a first figure syllogism in order for it to be logically valid (Me’yār al-ʿilm, p. 165).

Gażālī regarded legal logic as that part of the field in which legal arguments are subjected to formalization, rather than as a systematic exposition of a particular series of arguments (Hallaq, pp. 336 ff.). While discounting most Greek philosophical formulations, he tenaciously clung to formal Aristotelian logic and made it the methodological foundation of all inquiries. His concept of formal logic as an indispensable instrument for all areas of knowledge is evidenced in the fact that the examples that he provides in his logical works extend over a wide range of religious sciences. In such works, specific legal cases given as examples are often no more than illustrations of how a demonstrative argument must be constructed and validated. For after all, Gażālī tells us, "reasoning about legal matters does not differ from reasoning about rational sciences ... except in that which concerns the premises." (1961, p. 60). Although for Gażālī the forms of legal and rational arguments are identical, one looks in vain in his works for an analysis of specifically legal arguments from the standpoint of logic. A noteworthy exception, however, is found in his otherwise traditional legal work Sefā' al-ğallī, where in one chapter (pp. 435-55) he analyzes, mostly in terms of syllogistics, three major legal arguments commonly subsumed under juridical ʿaṣīl, namely, causal demonstration (qāla al-ʿeśā), indicative, non-causal demonstration (qāla al-maḏallā), and reductio ad absurdum (qāla al-ʿadd).

Gażālī's conception of the relationship between logic and law as expressed in al-Maṣṣafāt seems to have put the final stamp on the attitudes of a number of his successors toward the role of logic in law. These successors, however, exercised a great deal of caution in interpreting their own ʿaṣīl works the principles of legal logic as expounded by Gażālī. While following his example closely, they have, with remarkable discretion, chosen the most relevant parts of the theory and imported them into their jurisprudence. But the fact remains that Gażālī's pioneering endeavor left an indelible mark on the jurisprudential thought of many of his successors. Just as he conceived logic as the organ of any inferential procedure, prefaced his al-Maṣṣafāt with a manual on formal logic, and insisted upon the conversion of analogy into a first figure syllogism, we find many of these successors to have employed logic to ground their theories in what is after all fundamentally an Aristotelian conception of knowledge (Hallaq, pp. 318 ff.).


(Wael B. Hallaq)

VI. GÂZÂLÎ AND THEOLOGY

When considering the theology of Gâzâlî two related questions immediately arise. The first is his attitude towards Islamic speculative/dialectical theology (kalâm). The second is the extent to which he is committed to one of its main schools, the Ash'ârîte. Gâzâlî was trained both as a Shafi'ite lawyer and as an Ash'ârîte theologian and had as his teacher none other than the prominent Ash'ârîte theologian and Shafi'ite lawyer, Emâm al-Haramayn Abû l-Mâlik al-Zî`î al-Dîn Abî al-Mâlek Jawâyîni (d. 478/1085). He devoted two works to Ash'ârîte kalâm and considered his refutation of the philosophers, Tahâfût ul-falâsîf (The incoherence of the philosophers), as belonging to the genre of kalâm, even though his declared task in this work is simply to refute the Islamic philosophers, not to develop any specific doctrinal position. At the same time, Gâzâlî criticized the discipline of kalâm in several of his writings, for example, in his major work, the voluminous Ehyâ' ul-ilm al-dîn, in his autobiography, al-Mas'ûl men al-`âlîm and in the last book he wrote shortly before his death, Ehyâ' al-`awâm 'an `elm al-`ulûm.

Gâzâlî argued that the main role of kalâm is the preservation (kalaam) and guardianship (hurâsâ) of true religious beliefs (qâ'ida), that is, traditional belief guided by the customary practice (sunnah) of the Prophet. Kalâm's task is corrective: to correct distortions in the exposition of belief by the heretical innovators (ashârî-beda'î), i.e., it is intended to persuade the few, those sincere doubters who are intellectually capable of following its arguments. For this reason, each faith should have a theologian (muqaddima). The "commonality," however, must not be exposed to kalâm. For Gâzâlî, kalâm is not an end in itself. It is an error, he maintains, to think that practicing the discipline of kalâm constitutes what is experientially religious.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that for Gâzâlî the principles of Ash'ârîte kalâm, that is, its articles of faith, are not true and that he is not committed to them; but it is one thing to expound them and argue for their validity and another to experience what these principles mean. The true meaning of these principles is not attained through rational argument, but through direct mystical experience, mukâhala. Gâzâlî devotes one of the books of his major mystical work, the Ehyâ', to an exposition of Ash'ârîte theology. The book is entitled Qawâ'ed al-`aqîdât.

Its Ash'ârism blends, though not always conspicuously, with the book's mysticism. His main Ash'ârîte work is the Ehyâ', while his language sometimes suggests an inclination towards a non-mystical doctrine of the soul, the theological world view which Gâzâlî develops remains basically Ash'ârîte.

He expands on Ash'ârism, appropriating for it philosophical ideas that derive largely from Avicenna. These ideas are reinterpreted so as to accord with Ash'ârism.

The cornerstone of Ash'ârism is its doctrine of the divine attributes, to which Gâzâlî fully subscribes and elaborates. These attributes are not identical with the divine essence, but are "additional" to it. This distinction is important. If the attributes were identical with the divine essence, then the divine act would proceed as the necessary consequence of the divine essence or nature. This means a negation of the divine will, since then God would have no choice but to act, and act in the one way necessary by His essence. Since His essence is eternal, His necessitated act would be eternal. The world, the necessitated effect of His eternal act, would thus be eternal. It would not be an existent temporally originated by God. It would not be a real creation.

The eternal attributes are coeternal with the divine essence. They have a special and sustained. In the Ehyâ', he affirms the Ash'ârîte doctrine of a material soul. In the Ehyâ', while his language sometimes suggests an inclination towards a non-mystical doctrine of the soul, the theological world view which Gâzâlî develops remains basically Ash'ârîte. He expands on Ash'ârism, appropriating for it philosophical ideas that derive largely from Avicenna. These ideas are reinterpreted so as to accord with Ash'ârism.

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temporal events, their substances and accidents, those occurring in the entities of the animate and the inanimate, come about through the power of God, exalted be He. He alone holds the sole prerogative of inventing them. No created thing comes about through another [created thing]. Rather, all come about through [divine] power” (Eṣṣayda, p. 99).

In several other places in the Eṣṣayda, Gazālī reaffirms unequivocally his position that there is only one direct cause, namely divine power, for all created things and for all temporal events. Causal efficacy resides in divine power alone. There is no real evidence in his subsequent writings to indicate that he ever departed from upholding such a view. But this doctrine of the “pervasiveness of [divine] power” (omām al-qadr) raised for Gazālī two questions which he strove to answer. The first has to do with scientific knowledge. If there are no natural causes, how is it possible for us to make scientific inferences from what is ordinarily regarded as natural cause and effect? The second is the question of the human act. Is it also created by divine power, and if so, how, in the realm of moral action, are humans responsible for their acts?

Regarding the first question, Gazālī does not deny that the events in this world have an order which we habitually regard as constituting causes and effects. But the connections between the habitually regarded causes and effects are not necessary. These habitual causes and effects follow sequences that parallel Avicenna’s conception. They behave as though they are real causes and their effects, allowing us ordinarily to speak of them as causes and effects and to draw from them scientific inferences. But in reality they are not real causes and their effects. They do, however, follow an order, invariable for the most part, ordained by the divine will. This order in itself is not necessary. Its disruption is hence possible. The divine will which decrees this order also decrees its disruption at certain times in history. The disruption constitutes the occurrence of the miracle. When such an occurrence takes place, God removes from us knowledge of nature’s uniformity, creating for us the knowledge of the miracle.

Turning to the question of the human act in relation to divine power, Gazālī’s position is Ash’arite. It has to be understood in terms of the Ash’arite criticism of the doctrine of divine justice espoused by the earlier Mu’tazilite school of kalām. Divine justice, according to the Mu’tazilites, entails man’s freedom of the will. Man chooses and “creates” those acts for which he is rewarded or punished in the hereafter. The Mu’tazilites held that reason discerns the moral value of acts. These values hence are objective qualities that inhere in the acts. An act is not good simply because God commands it. Rather, it is precisely because an act is in itself good that God commands it. Gazālī rejects the Mu’tazilite doctrine of the intrinsic value of the moral act. It imposes a limit on divine power since the divine act would be conditioned by such intrinsic objective values of acts. In themselves, he argues, acts are morally neutral. They are good or bad simply because God either commands or prohibits them. The just act is the act which God performs or commands. Hence, if God were to torture an innocent child in the hereafter, this would be good and just. We know that He does not perform such acts because He has so indicated, and God does not utter any falsehood.

Turning to the Mu’tazilite doctrine of the freedom of the will, again for Gazālī, it imposes a limitation on divine power. Creation belongs only to God. It is blasphemy to maintain that there are acts which man creates. All human acts, for Gazālī, are the creation of divine power. This brings us to Gazālī’s full endorsement of the Ash’arite doctrine of acquisition (kazbi), a doctrine which he argues for at length in the Eṣṣayda and reaffirms in the Eṣṣayda. Gazālī argues obliquely (a) that “power” in all animate creatures is created directly by divine power and (b) that there is created with it the object of power (maqāla) ordinarily, but erroneously, regarded as the effect of created power. The human act is created for the human by divine power. The human “acquires” it as well as the object ordinarily regarded as produced by the human act. In other words, whatever humans are said to deliberately perform is in reality created on their behalf by divine power. Divine power creates human power after it has created human life, knowledge, and will. Created power, moreover, never precedes the created act. It is created with it.

To the common objection that this leads to utter determinism (ijār), Gazālī responds that with the determinists (mustafara) there can be no distinction between the spasmodic movement and the movement over which we experience power. For created power and the movement that accompanies it are things we in fact experience. The Mu’tazilite belief that we create our own acts cannot be true because to create something is to have knowledge of all its consequential details. We never can have such knowledge. Bees have no mathematical knowledge. Yet, their hexagonal houses are built to perfection. This is created for them by divine power. The bees are simply the locus of divine action. So are humans. But if will, power and act are all the direct creation of divine power, how can humans be morally responsible? Gazālī does not really answer this question. His language suggests that we are here in the realm of mystery. In the Eṣṣayda he indicates that the manner in which the eternal divine power is the cause of each and every existent and happening, including the human act, can only be understood by those well grounded in knowledge (al-risāla fī ’l-‘ilm) through kafr, direct mystical revelation. For in this experience, the mystic sees that God is the only reality: all things then fall into place.

Bibliography: Texts: Eṣṣayda’ī alam al-dīn, 4 vols., Cairo, 1377/1957 (there are various printings of
affinities between his own and Isma‘ili religious thought, it is unlikely that he was ever attracted to Isma‘iliism. There is, on the other hand, no sound evidence that he ever felt seriously threatened by the Isma‘ilis and that he, as suggested by Farid Jabre (pp. 84-94), gave up his prestigious teaching position in Baghdad and went into hiding afraid for his life because of the assassination of his patron, the vizier Neẓām-al-Mulk, by a fêdî’s (q.v.) in 485/1092.

The first and most comprehensive refutation of Isma‘iliism by Gazâlî was his Ketâb jâflâ‘ih al-Bântenî wa-fâdâ‘ih al-Mostashīrî, often simply called al-Mostashīrî. It was, as the title indicates, commissioned by the Abbasid caliph al-Mostârî and was composed in Baghdad between al-Mostârî’s accession in Moḥarram 487/Feburary 1094 and the death of the Fatimid caliph al-Mostanjîr in Du‘ā’-Reyhâ’î December of that year. This refutation was largely based on the earlier tradition of anti-Isma‘ili polemics. In particular Gazâlî appears to have relied on the Ketâb ḫâfī al-asrâr wa-hâlî‘î al-asrâr of the Ash‘arî Abû Ȣabî Muhammad b. Tayyib Bâqâllâhî (d. 403/1013), as noted by himself or his gloss in his Eḥyâ‘ al-dîn (see Goldziher, p. 16). Thus he repeated the black legend of the polemicists about Isma‘iliism having been founded by a clique of atheist conspirators seeking to destroy the rule of Islam, quotes Bâqâllânî’s characterization of Isma‘iliism as “a doctrine whose exterior was Shi‘ite rejectionism and whose interior was pure unbelief (maqâhīb zâhiratuma al-râfî‘ wa-bâdâ‘ihun al-kofî‘ al-ma‘lûk)” (Goldziher, Ar. text, p. 7) and lists among the names under which the Isma‘lis were said to be known those of Persian Muhammad, who is called a historian of the Isma‘ilis, by which the polemicists tried to associate them. He describes nine fictitious degrees of initiation, also known from other polemicists, through which the Isma‘ilîs dâ‘îs allegedly guided the neophytes from scrutiny (ṣafarîz) to the stripping away of all religious belief (ṣâ‘îl), and characterizes Isma‘iliism as moving between doctrines of dualists and the philosophers while distorting both of them to serve their purposes. Gazâlî, however, does not mention the most notorious pamphlet ascribed by the polemicists, including Bâqâllânî, for defamatory purposes to the Isma‘ilîs, the Ketâb al-sîda wa-l-bâdâ‘î al-ṣâbîr (see Stern, chap. 4) and admits that the Isma‘ilîs in his time universally denied some of the accusations of the polemicists against them, such as their alleged disregard of the sâ‘îl. In mentioning their being called Ta‘limiyâ, Gazâlî notes that this name is the most appropriate for the Bântenî of his own age because of their call for reliance on ta‘lim, inspired instruction by their infallible (ma‘ṣûm) imam, and their rejection of personal reasoning (rat‘î). This observation reflects his awareness of the thrust of the propaganda of the new da‘wâ of Hasan-e Šâbbâh. He stresses the need to counter this doctrine and devotes a chapter to
refuting it in particular. In another chapter he discusses the legal status of the Isma'ili. While he describes some of their basic Shi'i beliefs as merely error not constituting unbelief, he considers others as definite unbelief requiring their treatment as apostates subject to the death penalty. In his later Faṣyal al-ṣafra (p. 198), he brands the Isma'ili doctrine that God can only be described as giving existence, knowledge, and unity to others while Himself being above such qualification as manifest unbelief (kafr ʿurūd). The final section of the Mastaʿer al-ḥaqq is devoted to the exaltation of the caliph al-Mustaʿṣer as the sole legitimate vice-gerent of God (qālīs-i Allāh) on earth and to the functions of the Imam according to the Sunnite doctrine (Goldziher, pp. 80-97).

Nowhere in his refutation does Gażâlī quote or name any Isma'ili authors. The reason was evidently, as he explains in his Monqeq (p. 26), his agreement with the opinion of Ahmad b. Hanbal that the arguments of heretics should not be quoted in refuting them lest some readers might get attracted by them. Gażâlî defends himself that he refused only arguments that were widely known among the public. His reliance on the anti-Isma'ili polemical literature, however, made it easy for the Yemenite Isma'ili dīf muraqā' Allāh b. Muhammad b. Walīd (d. 612/1215) in his detailed refutation of the Mastaʿer al-ḥaqq, entitled Dâmeq al-bâlî, to point out Gażâlî's numerous distortions and misrepresentations of Isma'ili teaching.

In his Monqeq, Gażâlî names four other books besides the Mastaʿer, in which he refuted Isma'ili doctrine. Of these only one is extant, namely the Ketâb al-qâlîs-xâlîs al-mastaqîm. In this book he describes an imaginary debate between himself and an Isma'ili about the question of taʾlîm, in which his opponent eventually concedes defeat and asks Gażâlî to become his teacher, which the latter refuses. Gażâlî accepts the universal human need for an infallible teacher as stipulated by his opponent, but he insists that the sound balance for weighing religious truth is provided by the Koran and the teaching of the Prophet Mohammad without any need for an infallible Imam after him. Also extant is Gażâlî's Jawâl al-maṣâlʾ al-arbaʾa al-ʿalâʾi al-ʿašârâh al-Bāyāniyya be-Hamadān (see Badawi, pp. 132-34). It contains brief answers to four questions concerning the compatibility of taʾlîm; the imposition of duties on man, by a God who was believed to be self-sufficient (jâhid). Gażâlî further wrote a refutation in Persian of the "Four Chapters" (al-Faṣyîl al-arba) in which Ḥasan-e Šâhîd had set forth his argument for mankind's need of an infallible teacher. The beginning of the refutation is quoted by Faqîr-al-Dîn Rizâlî in Mâmâzâr and criticized as an inadequate response to Ḥasan-e Šâhîd's argument (Kholeifî, pp. 63-65, Az. text pp. 63-64).

The question of taʾlîm evidently concerned Gażâlî in his later life more than any other aspect of Isma'ili thought. In his Monqeq, too, he speaks of Isma'iliism only as the naqâfah al-taʾlîm. He severely criticizes those opponents of the Isma'ili who endeavored to refute their assertion of the need for taʾlîm and an infallible teacher, suggesting that they lost the argument and thus strengthened the cause of the heretics. The proper way was to argue that Mohammad was the infallible teacher of all Muslims and that his death after God had announced the perfection of their religion (Koran 5:3) could not be any more detrimental to them than the inaccessibility of the allegedly infallible Imam to most Isma'ili's.


GAŻĀLĪ, MAJID-AL-DIN Abû-l-Fâhih AHMAD b. Mohammad b. Mohammad b. Ahmad, outstanding mystic, writer, and eloquent preacher (b. ca. 453/1061, d. 517/1122 or 520/1126). The younger brother of the celebrated theologian, jurist, and Sufi, Abû Hâmed Mohammad Gażâlî (q.v.), Abûl Gażâlî was born in Tâbriz, a village near the city of Tâb in Khurasan, and it was in Tâb that he received his early education, primarily in jurisprudence. He turned to Sufism while still young, becoming the pupil first of Abî Bakr Nasâ'î Tâbî (d. 487/1094) and then of Abî Ali Fārâbî (d. 477/1084). He was thus well advanced in Sufism when in 488/1095 his brother, Abû Hâmed, asked him to teach in his place at the
Neẓāmiya in Baghdad and to assume responsibility for his family during his prolonged absence. Ahmad Gazālī traveled extensively in the capacities both of a Sufi master and of a popular preacher, visiting places such as Nīṣapur, Marāğah, Hamadān, and Isfahān. He died there and was buried in Qazvin (biographical notices may be found in Ebn al-Jawzī, Monasām, IX, p. 260; idem, Ketāb al-qasās wa-l-madājārān, ed. M. Swartz, Beirut, 1971, text pp. 104-7, ir., pp. 184-87, 210; Ebn Šālekh, tr. de Slane, I, pp. 79-80; Sokki, Tahādār [Cairo], IV, p. 54; Aḥmad al-Kurānī Ṣafī al-Qazvīnī, al-Tahāwīf al-kabīr Qazvīnī, ed. A. ‘Ozāfī, Haydarābād, 1984, repr. Beirut, 1987, IV, p. 251). He had initiated and trained many eminent disciples such as ‘Ayn-al-Ṣaḥābī Hamadānī (q.v.) and Aḥmad al-Tājīrī Suhrawārdī (d. 563/1168). It is because of the latter that the initiatic chains (selēya) of the Suhrawārdī order and its derivatives such as the Khowrāvī, the Mawlawīya, and the Naṣīr-al-Dīn go back to Ahmad Gazālī.

He is best known in the history of Sufism for his ideas on love, expressed primarily in the celebrated work entitled Sawānīh. This little book, written around 508/1114 and comprising some 77 short chapters, was innovative in form, for at a time when Persian Sufi authors used only prose, Gazālī had recourse to verse in order to illustrate in metaphorical fashion the themes he expounded more technically in the prose sections of his work. The same technique was used a century and a half later by Saʿdi in his Golosīnān and by Fakhr-al-Dīn ‘Erīqī (q.v.) in his Lāmu’āt; the latter author explicitly acknowledges his debt to the Sawānīh. Ahmad Gazālī relates numerous romantic anecdotes, especially those concerning Laylī and Majnūn and Mahmūdī and Ayyāq (q.v.), in contrast, his citations of the Koran or hadith are relatively infrequent. In the prologue to his work, Ahmad Gazālī states his intention of using the language of allusion (elīra) in order to express his ideas, a choice in which he had been preceded by Sufi masters such as Jonayd Bāḏgārī and Aḥmad al-Rūhānī; the result is occasional ambiguity and obscurity of meaning.

The Sawānīh opens with a description of the entry of Love and Spirit into the world of beings and the union between them that gives rise to the Lover, by means of which Love then aspires to return to its original solitude and oneness. This process of return and the difficulties that accompany it, metaphorically described, form the main theme of the book. Love is depicted as a bird that flies into the world for a brief sojourn before returning to its nest. Transcending in its essence human knowledge and comprehension, Love is experientially accessible to the Lover who, beholding the beauty manifest in the Beloved (q.v.), strives toward union (wujūd). Such union, however, does not end the process, for the duality of Lover and Beloved still remains. Only when the Lover fully transcends the Beloved and becomes totally annihilated is Love’s return journey to its origin complete; then Love alone remains, in absolute unity and sanctity.

Ahmad Gazālī employs the metaphor of a bird and its journey in another work, a short Persian treatise entitled Resāłat al-tayr (or al-tayr). Thanks to its reworking by Fakhr-al-Dīn ‘Erīqī (q.v.) in his Manaqī al-tayr (which was indeed influenced by Ahmad Gazālī’s work or possibly by an Arabic text on the same theme attributed to his elder brother), the frame story of this work has become extremely well known. A group of birds, widely dispersed in time, space, and environments, and of different varieties and sizes, assemble in a grove in a large island where they reside. The journey is fraught with danger and difficulty, and not all the birds survive to reach their destination. Each of the birds corresponds, obviously Enough, to the figure of the Lover in the Sawānīh and the Simorgh, residing in its primordial nest, to Love in its essence.

Ahmad Gazālī wrote a number of other brief works in Persian. The best known is an epitome given the title Rāh-nāma by the author, but commonly known as Ayniyā in view of the belief that was addressed to ‘Ayn-al-Ṣaḥābī Hamadānī (q.v.). Written in an elegant and emotive style, the Ayniyā seems to resemble the sermons Ahmad Gazālī was famous for delivering in mosques. In addition to profits quotations from the Koran and prophetic tradition, he cites many sayings of the Sufi masters as well as verses, in both Arabic and Persian, some of which he probably composed himself. The central theme of the epitome is the extreme brevity of life and the threatening closeness of death, a predicament which man can sensibly confront only by preparing himself for judgment and the hereafter. Vivid language is used in depicting the dilemma of human existence; the author writes, for example, that “if man eats to satiety, he will be as if drunk, and if he remains hungry, he will be as if mad. If he sleeps, he will be a mere corpse, and if he remains awake, he will be bewildered. Impotence is fastened on him, and weakness is his permanent attribute.” (Majmū’ā, 1st ed., p. 389, 2nd ed., p. 225). The topic of love is not raised on this occasion, but Ahmad Gazālī does use some of the mystical language associated with it, particularly in the poetry.

Some nine other letters, most of them similarly addressed to ‘Ayn-al-Ṣaḥābī Hamadānī, have also been discovered and published. They deal with private instructions given by Ahmad Gazālī to his disciples and his interpretations of their visions and dreams.

Ahmad Gazālī’s Arabic works also deal with Sufism; he appears not to have written anything on jurisprudence, despite his teaching in the Shaf‘ī school. One such work is the record of the sessions (majdal) he conducted in Arabic while in Baghdad, compiled by one of his followers, a certain Saʿd ib. Ḥāfiz Labbādī, in several volumes (Sukkī, Tahādār).
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[Caïro] VI, p. 60). Only part of the record survives, but it suffices to give a picture of how Ahmad Gazzali conducted his sessions. They corresponded to the traditional methodology by which a master would speak extemporaneously on some topic pertaining to Sufism, stimulated by a question from the audience, a letter read out loud, or a verse from the Koran recited at the beginning of the session. In this fashion, Gazzali would guide his listeners to the Sufi path, clarify some point of doctrine, or illustrate the esoteric interpretation of a Koranic verse, drawing on traditions of the Prophet, poetry and anecdotes to illustrate his themes. Among the topics discussed in those sessions were love, the levels and degrees of gnosis, and the quality of Eblis as a lover of God.

Among his other Arabic works, mention may be made of al-Ta'rikh al-kalim al-anwa‘ih, a theological and mystical interpretation of the basic creed of Islam; Lā elāha ellsā Allāh, which reflects his adherence to the Ash‘arite school of theology; Bahyr al-mahabbah fa‘ṣl al-mawadda, a Sufi commentary on Sūrat Yāsa‘ (Koran 12); and an abridgment of his brother’s Eyyād ‘ilām al-dīn, a work he himself taught.

The attribution to Ahmad Gazzali of a number of other works has recently been shown to be spurious (Mojahe, 1981). These include the Persian Bahyr al-buqūṣ qaṣīda (ed. N. Pārjamān, Tehran, 1356 S./1977), and the Arabic Ra`wā‘ī al-‘ilmī (ed. and tr. by J. Robson in Tracts on Listening to Music, London, 1938), and Sarr al-asrā‘ fī kaff al-umwar (ed. ‘A.-H. Sāleḥ Hamdan, Caïro, 1988).

Perhaps the most prominent feature of Ahmad Gazzali’s writings is his incorporation into his prose of works of poetry, both Arabic and Persian, including verses he composed himself. It is in fact to him, as one of the earliest Sufi poets, that should be attributed some of the otherwise unidentified Persian quatrains that have come down to the present. Some of his poems are to be found in his Persian works, especially the Sawānāb, while others are scattered in the works of his disciple ‘Ayn-al-Qozūl Hamū’āf in or old anthologies of Persian poetry such as the Nizārat al-majāliyya of Jamāl Kāshī Sāvār, (ed. M. A. Rihāl, Tehran, 1366 S./1987, 2nd ed., Tehran, 1375 S./1996). By way of example we may cite the following quatrain from the Sawānāb (ed. Ritter, no. 18, p. 35) composed by the author in his youth: tā jāhān- nemāy dar dast-e man ast, et rāy-e kerād čerq-e barin past-e man ast / tā Ka’ba-yey nist qehlā-ye hast-e man ast, kelīyārārāt kelāp-e jāhān mast-e man ast (As long as the world-displaying goblet is in my hand, the wheel of heaven on high lowers itself before me / As long as the Ka’ba of non-being is the qehlā of my being, the most sober man in the world is intoxicated by me).

Ahmad Gazzali’s Sufi thought, centered as it was on the idea of love, left a profound mark on the development of Persian mystical literature, especially poetry celebrating love. Many of the topois (matāzmin) used by later poets such as ‘Attār, Ṣafī, ‘Erāqī, and Ḥafiz, to name but a few, can be traced to his works, particularly the Sawānāb. It is in his writings that one finds a mystical or psychological interpretation for features of the beloved’s face, such as the eyes and the eyewbrows; the lover enveloped in the fog or the dust in the quarter of the beloved; wine as a symbol of yearning (jazwa) or love (‘ezā; love as a reciprocal relation between man and God, man’s love for God being his response to God’s love for him; the world-displaying cup (jām-e jāhān-nemā); the mirror of Alexander (dīnā ‘e Eskandār); the fountain of life (dī-er hayat-e zendegānī) hidden in the realm of darkness; the journey of the birds to the homeland of their chosen sovereign, the Simūr— all these fundamental themes and images occur in the works of Ahmad Gazzali before they find their place in the poems qāḥis celebrated successors.

Some of these topois had, of course, been used by previous mystics but were revived and popularized by Gazzali. He was, in fact, an heir to two traditions: the Malāmats of Khorasan and the Sufis of Baghdad. Among his predecessors, he was influenced most strongly by Ḥallāj, and he made of his idea of essential love—fundamentally a neo-Platonic concept that had also been adopted by Muslim philosophers such as Fārābī and Avicenna (q.v.)—the basis of his own Sufi thought. His belief that all created beauty is an emanation of divine beauty was likewise Hallājian or neo-Platonic in origin. Since God is both absolute beauty and the lover of all phenomenal beauty, Ahmad Gazzali maintained, to adore any object of beauty is to participate in a divine act of love. Hence the practice of nazar-bāz or kāhād-bīzī, gazing on young and beautiful faces, a practice for which he became notorious. He was well acquainted with the poems of Hallāj, citing them in both his Arabic and his Persian works, and he derived from the Tawāsīn of Hallāj themes such as Eblis being a lover of God; the meeting of Eblis with Moses; and the moth gradually advancing to immolation in the flame of the candle as a metaphor for the progress of the Sufi.


GAZĂLI, AHMAD—GAZĂLI MAŠĐAH


(NASROLLAH POURJAVADI)