|
vi.
GÚAZAÚLÈ
AND
THEOLOGY
When
considering
the
theology
of
GÚaza@l^
two
related
questions
immediately
arise.
The
first
is
his
attitude
towards
Islamic
speculative/dialectical
theology
(kala@m).
The
second
is
the
extent
to
which
he
is
committed
to
one
of
its
main
schools,
the
Ash¿arite.
GÚaza@l^
was
trained
both
as
a
Shafi¿ite
lawyer
and
as
an
Ash¿arite
theologian
and
had
as
his
teacher
none
other
than
the
prominent
Ash¿arite
theologian
and
Shafi¿ite
lawyer,
Ema@m-al-H®aramayn
Abu'l-Ma¿a@l^
Z˜^a@÷-al-D^n
¿Abd-al-Malek
Jovayn^
(d.
478/1085).
He
devoted
two
works
to
Ash¿arite
kala@m
and
considered
his
refutation
of
the
philosophers,
Taha@fot
al-fal@a@sefa
(The
incoherence
of
the
philosophers)
as
belonging
to
the
genre
of
kala@m,
even
though
his
declared
task
in
this
work
is
simply
to
refute
the
Islamic
philosophers,
not
to
develop
any
specific
doctrinal
position.
At
the
same
time,
GÚaza@l^
criticized
the
discipline
of
kala@m
in
several
of
his
writings,
for
example,
in
his
major
work,
the
voluminous
Eháya@÷
¿olu@m
al-d^n,
in
his
autobiography,
al-Monqedò
men
al-zµala@l
and
in
the
last
book
he
wrote
shortly
before
his
death,
Elja@m
al-¿awa@mm
¿an
¿elm
al-kala@m.
GÚaza@l^
argued
that
the
main
role
of
kala@m
is
the
preservation
(háefzá)
and
guardianship
(háera@sa)
of
true
religious
belief
(¿aq^da),
that
is,
traditional
belief
guided
by
the
customary
practice
(sonna)
of
the
Prophet.
Kala@m's
task
is
corrective:
to
correct
distortions
in
the
exposition
of
belief
by
the
heretical
innovators
(ahl-al-beda÷).
It
is
intended
to
persuade
the
few,
those
sincere
doubters
who
are
intellectually
capable
of
following
its
arguments.
For
this
persuasive
reason,
each
region
should
have
a
theologian
(motakallem).
The
"commonality,"
however,
must
not
be
exposed
to
kala@m.
For
GÚaza@l^,
kala@m
is
not
an
end
in
itself.
It
is
an
error,
he
maintains,
to
think
that
practicing
the
discipline
of
kala@m
constitutes
what
is
experientially
religious.
Nonetheless,
this
does
not
mean
that
for
GÚaza@l^
the
principles
of
Ash¿arite
kala@m,
that
is,
its
articles
of
faith,
are
not
true
and
that
he
is
not
committed
to
them;
but
it
is
one
thing
to
expound
them
and
argue
for
their
validity
and
another
to
experience
what
these
principles
mean.
The
true
meaning
of
these
principles
is
not
attained
through
rational
argument,
but
through
direct
mystical
experience,
moka@æafa.
GÚaza@l^
devotes
one
of
the
books
of
his
major
mystical
work,
the
Eháya@÷,
to
an
exposition
of
Ash¿arite
theology.
The
book
is
entitled
Qawa@¿ed
al-¿aqa@÷ed.
Its
Ash¿arism
blends,
though
not
always
conspicuously,
with
the
book's
mysticism.
His
main
Ash¿arite
work
is
the
Eqtesáa@d
fi'l-e¿teqa@d,
where
the
exposition
is
more
detailed
and
sustained.
In
the
Eqtesáa@d,
he
affirms
the
Ash¿arite
doctrine
of
a
material
soul.
In
the
Eháya@÷,
while
his
language
sometimes
suggests
an
inclination
towards
a
non-material
doctrine
of
the
soul,
the
theological
world
view
which
GÚaza@l^
develops
remains
basically
Ash¿arite.
He
expands
on
Ash¿arism,
appropriating
for
it
philosophical
ideas
that
derive
largely
from
Avicenna.
These
ideas
are
reinterpreted
so
as
to
accord
with
Ash¿arism.
The
cornerstone
of
Ash¿arism
is
its
doctrine
of
the
divine
attributes,
to
which
GÚaza@l^
fully
subscribes
and
elaborates.
These
attributes
are
not
identical
with
the
divine
essence,
but
are
"additional"
to
it.
This
distinction
is
important.
If
the
attributes
were
identical
with
the
divine
essence,
then
the
divine
act
would
proceed
as
the
necessary
consequence
of
the
divine
essence
or
nature.
This
means
a
negation
of
the
divine
will,
since
then
God
would
have
no
choice
but
to
act,
and
act
in
the
one
way
necessitated
by
His
essence.
Since
His
essence
is
eternal,
His
necessitated
act
would
be
eternal.
The
world,
the
necessitated
effect
of
His
eternal
act,
would
thus
be
eternal.
It
would
not
be
an
existent
temporally
originated
by
God.
It
would
not
be
a
real
creation.
The
eternal
attributes
are
coeternal
with
the
divine
essence.
They
have
a
special
relation
to
each
other.
For
example,
without
the
attribute
of
life
there
can
be
no
attribute
of
knowledge
and
without
the
attribute
of
knowledge
there
can
be
not
attribute
of
will.
Hence
the
attribute
of
life
is
a
necessary
condition
for
the
attribute
of
knowledge,
and
the
attribute
of
knowledge,
a
necessary
condition
for
the
attribute
of
will.
But
this
necessary
condition
does
not
entail
that
the
relation
between
these
attributes
is
causal.
None
of
the
coeternal
divine
attributes
is
a
cause
of
the
other.
Whatever
God
eternally
wills
must
come
to
be.
In
this
sense
it
is
necessary.
But
it
is
not
necessary
because
it
is
the
consequence
of
the
divine
nature.
God
could
have
chosen
not
to
create
at
all.
But
"once,"
so
to
speak
(GÚaza@l^
insists
that
human
language
regarding
the
divine
voluntary
act
is
metaphorical),
He
wills
something,
this
something
must
come
to
be.
It
comes
to
be
through
the
causal
action
of
the
attribute
of
divine
power.
This
eternal
attribute,
which
again
is
"additional"
to
the
divine
essence,
is
one
and
pervasive.
By
this
GÚaza@l^
means
(a)
that
this
attribute
does
not
consist
of
multiplicity
of
powers
and
(b)
that
it
is
the
direct
cause
of
each
and
every
created
existent
and
event.
The
world
and
all
the
events
therein
are
thus
the
direct
effect
of
this
one
cause.
For
GÚaza@l^
the
world
consists
of
contingent
atoms
(substances)
and
accidents.
These
are
created
ex
nihilo,
combined
to
form
bodies
and
sustained
in
temporally
finite
spans
of
existence
by
the
direct
action
of
divine
power.
As
GÚaza@l^
puts
it:
"…all
temporal
events,
their
substances
and
accidents,
those
occurring
in
the
entities
of
the
animate
and
the
inanimate,
come
about
through
the
power
of
God,
exalted
be
He.
He
alone
holds
the
sole
prerogative
of
inventing
them.
No
created
thing
comes
about
through
another
[created
thing].
Rather,
all
come
about
through
[divine]
power
"
(Eqtesáa@d,
p.
99).
In
several
other
places
in
the
Eqtesáa@d,
GÚaza@l^
reaffirms
unequivocally
his
position
that
there
is
only
one
direct
cause,
namely
divine
power,
for
all
created
things
and
for
all
temporal
events.
Causal
efficacy
resides
in
divine
power
alone.
There
is
no
real
evidence
in
his
subsequent
writings
to
indicate
that
he
ever
departed
from
upholding
such
a
view.
But
this
doctrine
of
the
"pervasiveness
of
[divine]
power"
(¿omu@m
al-qodra)
raised
for
GÚaza@l^
two
questions
which
he
strove
to
answer.
The
first
has
to
do
with
scientific
knowledge.
If
there
are
no
natural
causes,
how
is
it
possible
for
us
to
make
scientific
inferences
from
what
is
ordinarily
regarded
as
natural
cause
and
effect?
The
second
is
the
question
of
the
human
act.
Is
it
also
created
by
divine
power,
and
if
so,
how,
in
the
realm
of
moral
action,
are
humans
responsible
for
their
acts?
Regarding
the
first
question,
GÚaza@l^
does
not
deny
that
the
events
in
this
world
have
an
order
which
we
habitually
regard
as
constituting
causes
and
effects.
But
the
connections
between
the
habitually
regarded
causes
and
effects
are
not
necessary.
These
habitual
causes
and
effects
follow
sequences
that
parallel
Avicenna's
conception.
They
behave
as
though
they
are
real
causes
and
their
effects,
allowing
us
ordinarily
to
speak
of
them
as
causes
and
effects
and
to
draw
from
them
scientific
inferences.
But
in
reality
they
are
not
real
causes
and
their
effects.
They
do,
however,
follow
an
order,
invariable
for
the
most
part,
ordained
by
the
divine
will.
This
order
in
itself
is
not
necessary.
Its
disruption
is
hence
possible.
The
divine
will
which
decrees
this
order
also
decrees
its
disruption
at
certain
times
in
history.
The
disruption
constitutes
the
occurrence
of
the
miracle.
When
such
an
occurrence
takes
place,
God
removes
from
us
knowledge
of
nature's
uniformity,
creating
for
us
the
knowledge
of
the
miracle.
Turning
to
the
question
of
the
human
act
in
relation
to
divine
power,
GÚaza@l^'s
position
is
Ash¿arite.
It
has
to
be
understood
in
terms
of
the
Ash¿arite
criticism
of
the
doctrine
of
divine
justice
espoused
by
the
earlier
Mu¿tazilite
school
of
kala@m.
Divine
justice,
according
to
the
Mu¿tazilites,
entails
man's
freedom
of
the
will.
Man
chooses
and
"creates"
those
acts
for
which
he
is
rewarded
or
punished
in
the
hereafter.
The
Mu¿tazilites
held
that
reason
discerns
the
moral
value
of
acts.
These
values
hence
are
objective
qualities
that
inhere
in
the
acts.
An
act
is
not
good
simply
because
God
commands
it.
Rather,
it
is
precisely
because
an
act
is
in
itself
good
that
God
commands
it.
GÚaza@l^
rejects
the
Mu¿tazilite
doctrine
of
the
intrinsic
value
of
the
moral
act.
It
imposes
a
limit
on
divine
power
since
the
divine
act
would
be
conditioned
by
such
intrinsic
objective
values
of
acts.
In
themselves,
he
argues,
acts
are
morally
neutral.
They
are
good
or
bad
simply
because
God
either
commands
or
prohibits
them.
The
just
act
is
the
act
which
God
performs
or
commands.
Hence,
if
God
were
to
torture
an
innocent
child
in
the
hereafter,
this
would
be
good
and
just.
We
know
that
He
does
not
perform
such
acts
because
He
has
so
indicated,
and
God
does
not
utter
any
falsehood.
Turning
to
the
Mu¿tazilite
doctrine
of
the
freedom
of
the
will,
again
for
GÚaza@l^,
it
imposes
a
limitation
on
divine
power.
Creation
belongs
only
to
God.
It
is
blasphemy
to
maintain
that
there
are
acts
which
man
creates.
All
human
acts,
for
GÚaza@l^,
are
the
creation
of
divine
power.
This
brings
us
to
GÚaza@l^'s
full
endorsement
of
the
Ash¿arite
doctrine
of
acquisition
(kasb),
a
doctrine
which
he
argues
for
at
length
in
the
Eqtesáa@d
and
reaffirms
in
the
Eháya@÷.
GÚaza@l^
argues
unequivocally
(a)
that
"power"
in
all
animate
creatures
is
created
directly
by
divine
power
and
(b)
that
there
is
created
with
it
the
object
of
power
(maqdu@r)
ordinarily,
but
erroneously,
regarded
as
the
effect
of
created
power.
The
human
act
is
created
for
the
human
by
divine
power.
The
human
"acquires"
it
as
well
as
the
object
ordinarily
regarded
as
produced
by
the
human
act.
In
other
words,
whatever
humans
are
said
to
deliberately
perform
is
in
reality
created
on
their
behalf
by
divine
power.
Divine
power
creates
human
power
after
it
has
created
human
life,
knowledge,
and
will.
Created
power,
moreover,
never
precedes
the
created
act.
It
is
created
with
it.
To
the
common
objection
that
this
leads
to
utter
determinism
(jabr),
GÚaza@l^
responds
that
with
the
determinists
(mojbera)
there
can
be
no
distinction
between
the
spasmodic
movement
and
the
movement
over
which
we
experience
power.
For
created
power
and
the
movement
that
accompanies
it
are
things
we
in
fact
experience.
The
Mu¿tazilite
belief
that
we
create
our
own
acts
cannot
be
true
because
to
create
something
is
to
have
knowledge
of
all
its
consequential
details.
We
never
can
have
such
knowledge.
Bees
have
no
mathematical
knowledge.
Yet,
their
hexagonal
houses
are
built
to
perfection.
This
is
created
for
them
by
divine
power.
The
bees
are
simply
the
locus
of
divine
action.
So
are
humans.
But
if
will,
power
and
act
are
all
the
direct
creation
of
divine
power,
how
can
humans
be
morally
responsible?
GÚaza@l^
does
not
really
answer
this
question.
His
language
suggests
that
we
are
here
in
the
realm
of
mystery.
In
the
Eháya@÷,
he
indicates
that
the
manner
in
which
the
eternal
divine
power
is
the
cause
of
each
and
every
existent
and
happening,
including
the
human
act,
can
only
be
understood
by
those
well
grounded
in
knowledge
(al-ra@sekòu@n
fi'l-¿elm)
through
kaæf,
direct
mystical
revelation.
For
in
this
experience,
the
mystic
sees
that
God
is
the
only
reality;
all
things
then
fall
into
place.
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¿olu@m
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¿elm
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(MICHAEL
E.
MARMURA)
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