THE RELEVANCE OF THE IBN SINA-GHAZALI DEBATE
AN EVALUATION AND A REASSESSMENT

Alparslan Arıkcan
Fatih University
İstanbul, Turkey

Islamic philosophy has a history that manifests a peculiar process of emergence and
developmental stages.1 First, we can identify a date for the beginning of this process,
610 A.C. for the Prophet’s death, which is the beginning of Revelation. If this stage is referred to as “the
Prophetic Period”, then we can say that at this stage a fundamental Islamic worldview
suitable for the cultivation of philosophic and scientific activities was established. If
analyzed logically it would be possible to identify within this worldview a
sophisticated ‘knowledge structure’ that acted as a framework for all scientific
activities.2 Secondly, we are also able to ascertain a formative stage (650-750) after
the Prophetic Period in which the main characteristics of Islamic thought took a
definite shape and the main cluster of scientific terminology was established. In this
way a conceptual scheme that was to become scientific was thus established. Thirdly,
in the next stage of its development Islamic intellectual tradition gave birth to the
specifically named sciences, such as law, linguistics, history, Qur’anic exegetics and
philosophy, by a specific name ‘kalâm’ (750-950).

In early stages of many intellectual traditions that lead to the emergence of a
scientific tradition we usually observe a characteristic; the members of this
intellectual tradition begin to develop an interest in other past or present intellectual
traditions. In its earlier stages Islamic thought exhibited this characteristic as well and
because of this some members of the learning community, i.e., the ‘ulama’, showed
an interest in the earlier learning of the neighboring civilizations. Moreover, some
of the members of these communities also showed interest in Islamic learning and some
of them converted to Islam and thus they themselves brought their learning tradition
into Islam. Gibb expresses this fact as a ‘Law’: “cultural influences (by which I mean,
of course, not purely superficial adjuncts, but genuinely assimilated elements) are
always preceded by an already existing activity in the related fields which creates the
factor of attraction without which no creative assimilation can take place”.

1 Frequently used names of Muslim Philosophers are spelled the way they are pronounced without any diacritical
marks. I would like to thank Dr. Kiki Kennedy-Day for her suggestions to improve the text and her critical
comments on certain points to revise my ideas.
2 History of Islamic philosophy has been presented with various frameworks. I defined a framework that shows the
way this history unfolded through stages in an article entitled “The Framework for a History of Islamic
3 For a detailed discussion of worldview and its structures acting as the framework for scientific activities see the
present author’s Scientific Thought and its Burdens (İstanbul: Fatih University Publications, 2000).
4 Sir Hamilton Gibb, “The Influence of Islamic Culture on Medieval Europe”, Bulletin of the John Rylands
Library, 38 (1955-6), 85.
The same Law is valid for the Islamic civilization; there was an already existing creative intellectual activity in early Islam, which led to such an interest in earlier scientific and philosophical activities. In this process the most important event that took place was translation of certain scientific works of earlier civilizations, and thus began a translation movement. Among the works translated the Aristotelian corpus stand out as the most problematic one. It is these translations and the Neoplatonic commentaries on these works that cause disturbance in Islamic thought. There are reasons for this and it is one of the main purposes of this paper to examine these in relation to what we call “Ibn Sina-Ghazali Debate”. We shall argue that it is this mutual but unbalanced intellectual and scientific exchange of ideas that led to a severe critique of Greek philosophy, which eventually culminated with Ghazali’s philosophical attack on Aristotelian as well as Neoplatonic philosophy. This philosophical critique of an earlier tradition opened a new tradition in Islamic intellectualism, which we can call ‘Tahāfut Tradition’. Although there was no real debate, taking place between Ibn Sina and Ghazali, it is on the basis of this tradition that I find a justification for calling Ghazali’s critique a “debate”. For it is this critique that started the debate, and later many others, including Ibn Rushd participated in this discussion between the falāsifah and mustakallimūn. Although it may be argued that Ibn Sina’s philosophical system as such is not the primary target of Ghazali’s criticism of the falāsifah in the Tahāfut, we can still defend our thesis that this critique is a debate between Ibn Sina and Ghazali. For the main source for the issues criticized in the Tahāfut is still Ibn Sina’s system. The Tahāfut formulates most of the problems, it attempts to refute, on the basis of Ibn Sina’s works. Therefore, we are justified in formulating the project of the Tahāfut as the “Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate”. We shall then try to examine this debate through a series of questions.

In the whole process of the emergence of philosophical thought in Islam we may ask; in the first place, why was there a reaction to Greek Philosophy? In the second place, what was the nature of this reaction? Finally, why did Ghazali come to represent this reaction? The main purpose of our questioning is to understand the fundamental reasons for Ghazali to launch his critique of the Greek tradition of

---

4 This is because Ghazali opened a philosophical debate on the problems which he criticized in his Tahāfut, and thus followed a series of similar works with the same name. Among them the most important ones are the following: Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, ed. by Maurice Bouyges (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq, 1927), English translation by Simon Van Den Bergh as Averroes’ Tahāfut Al-Tahāfut (London: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial, 1978); Mezafik Muṣlihidin Bursavi Khujazade (d. 1488), Tahāfut al-Falāṣifah (Cairo, 1321, printed on the margins of Ghazali’s and Ibn Rushd’s Tahāfut), for a detailed analysis of these three Tahāfut (together with Ghazali’s) see Mobahat Turker, Uc Tahafut Bakımdan Belgeler ve Din Manasbebi (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Dil ve Tarîh-Çografya Fakultesi Yayınları, 1950); 'Ali al-Din al-Tai, Tahāfut al-Falāṣifah, ed. by Rida Sa'idah (Beyrût: Al-Dâr al-Álamîyyah, 1981); Muhî al-Dîn Muhammed Qaraqâhî (d. 1535), Ta'liqât ‘alâ Sharh Tahāfut al-Falāṣifah îlî-Khujazade (Suleymaniye Library, Hurre Pasha Collection, İstanbul, MS no. 787).

philosophy. It is clear from the way we approach this issue that we shall not dwell upon the arguments of both sides developed in order to refute each other; our main purpose shall remain as an evaluation or even a re-evaluation of the situation and the aftermath of the debate. It is possible, then, to discuss our assessment and re-evaluation of this debate under three headings: The reaction, which represents our explanation of how Muslim intellectuals and thinkers reacted to Hellenized philosophy; the ḥaylasāf (or falsafah), which represents the Muslim conception of philosophy at that time; and finally the aftermath, which shall represent our analysis of the situation after Ghazali’s attack on philosophy.

I

THE REACTION

We need a thorough analysis of the phenomenon, which can be referred to as ‘reaction to the Hellenized thought’ under Islam. This reaction must be analyzed from all perspectives so that we can provide a compelling assessment of Ghazali’s critique and grasp the spirit of the Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate. The purpose of this analysis is to discover the nature of this reaction because, as we shall see, it is the nature of this reaction that determines Ghazali’s motives to launch his attack against the Hellenic philosophical thinking.

First of all, it is possible to argue that this reaction is merely a religious fanaticism against all scientific activities coming from foreign sources to Islam. Considering the Law, concerning the factor of attraction, mentioned above, we can say that any approach of fanaticism of whatever kind it may be, especially at the beginning stage of a scientific tradition, cannot lead to a creative response and therefore fail at that stage to produce any meaningful scientific and philosophical activity within that civilization. This does not mean, however, that there were absolutely no fanatic reactions at that time. As we would conclude, exceptions cannot change a universal law. Therefore, the fanatic reactions should not determine the real nature of this phenomenon. If the reaction did not have a fanatic religious intent, then what kind could it have been? In answering this question we will attempt to demonstrate that this reaction was expressed in a religious framework giving the impression that it is simply a religious phenomenon. Only now it seems to us to be a fanatical or a radical movement to eradicate philosophy. For example, if we look at Ghazali’s Tahāfut we find some accusations on his part that calls the holders of certain theories ‘infidels’ (kāfir). This is only a religious designation to disclose the

\[6\] For some of the earlier evaluations of this debate the following works may be cited: Oliver Leaman, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Michael E. Marmura, “Ghazali and Demonstrative Science”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 3 (1965); Idem.
status of a person. It is not done in the name of fanaticism, although the so-called fanatics may also have used it. If it were not so then Ghazali would not have been able to study Greek philosophy at all and would not have developed philosophical arguments against them; he would have simply called them kāfir and would not have found them worth refuting.

Secondly, we can further examine the religious framework that is used by the reactionaries, or rather, more accurately, by the scholars who launched a scientific attack against the Greek metaphysicians. This framework is definitely found within the Islamic worldview as it emerged out of Revelation during the time period of the early Muslim community. This emergence exhibits a process and within this process we find certain terms acquiring definite technical meaning within the Islamic worldview. Among these terms the ones that specifically concern us here are 'ilm, fiqh, kalām and hikmah. We shall try to evaluate the nature of this reaction through a semantic analysis of these terms within the historical process of early Islamic learning. This process gradually led to the emergence of an Islamic scientific tradition.

It is clear that the Islamic worldview emerged out of the Revelation, viz., the Qur’ān, and the way it was taught to the early Muslim community by the Prophet himself. In this worldview, there are three fundamental elements that are emphasized in such a way that they became the fundamental structure of the worldview of Islam. These fundamental elements are tawḥīd, the idea of the oneness of God and His relationship to us in the first place and to the world in the second; nubūwwah, i.e. the fundamental notion of religion as reflected through the chain of prophets, namely the all-embracing teachers of humanity; and finally hasr, namely the idea of a final judgment, which is intimately connected with the idea of justice and human deeds. As soon as these fundamental elements were clarified, it was also made clear that no one but God is the Authority on these subjects; for when these are in question, then “the true knowledge is with God alone” (46/al-Ahkāf, 23). This meant that the fundamental element cannot be known unless one has ‘knowledge’, namely al-'ilm. But this knowledge is not just any knowledge, which may be true or false, even when one cannot decide whether it is true or false; it is rather the absolute knowledge that cannot be doubted. Many references can be given for this but the following may suffice in this context:

We have given them a book (i.e., Revelation) and explained it with knowledge as a guidance and mercy for people who believe. (7/al-A'rāf, 52; also see 4/al-Nisā', 157; 6/al-Anām, 119; 27/al-Naml, 15-6; 31/Luqman, 20); also: "above all those who possess knowledge is an All-knowing." (12/Yāsīn, 76)

In this way the concept of 'ilm was so emphasized in the Islamic worldview that it became a doctrinal concept forming a major component of the worldview of the early Muslims. 'Ilm meant for them 'absolute knowledge' that was based on Revelation. But what about our understanding of the Revelation? Is it not also 'ilm? If it were 'ilm then it would be absolute, so the question is: How can human knowledge be absolute? In order to distinguish this sensitive variation in meaning, the word fiqh was utilized by both the Revelation and the Teacher of the Revelation. In this usage, fiqh meant 'human knowledge' which is a break from the literal meaning of the term. When there is such a break, it means that the term has already been picked up for a technical meaning. Indeed this is what happened with regard to the term 'fiqh': "If God wants to do good to a person, He makes him a faqih in religion", said the Prophet. Moreover, he also remarked "A faqih is more vehement to the Satan than one thousand devout persons ('abid)". We can speculate about this remark and interpret it in the following way. Since fiqh is not absolute knowledge, someone within an environment in which absolute knowledge is emphasized may be greatly discouraged from using his personal ability to acquire fiqh. For, he will consider himself utterly insignificant in the face of absolute knowledge and ask why he should pursue an element of knowledge that only has the possibility to be correct in contrast to a kind of knowledge that is absolutely correct. This difference between 'ilm and fiqh is clear in the following report by Hishām ibn Muslim:

Do not say that 'ilm will disappear, for it will not disappear as long as the Qur'an is recited; instead you should say that fiqh will disappear.\(^7\)

If we consider this early technical meaning of fiqh we can easily contrast it with the technical meaning of the term 'science' today. In this contrast we can ascertain the close meaning between the two terms. For it is obvious that as soon as the term fiqh has acquired the meaning of scientific knowledge it was immediately picked up by scholars to be utilized for that purpose; such as Abū Ḥanifah's usage of fiqh aκbar (the greater science) and al-Tha'labī's usage in the title of his book, Fiqh al-Lughah (The Science of Lexicography). In contrast to the term fiqh, the term 'ilm meant only 'revelational knowledge'; as such both terms should not have been mixed. In other words, one cannot use fiqh, for example, to interpret the 'ilm, as the Prophet warns:

If one interprets the Qur'an on the basis of his theory, he has committed an error even if he is correct in his interpretation" (man qāla fi'l-Qur'ān bi ra'yih fa aṣaba, fa qad akha'\(^\text{a}\)\(^8\)). (Please note that fiqh, just like

---

\(^1\) Al-Bukhāri, "Kitāb al-'ilm", chapter 14.

\(^2\) Al-Tirmidhī, "'Ilm", 13; also Ibn Mājah, "Muqaddimah", 222.

\(^3\) Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqāt al-Kabīr, ed. by Ihsan 'Abbas (Beirut: n.p., n.d.), 5: 51.

\(^4\) Sunan Abū Daud, trans. by Ahmad Hasan as Sunan Abu Dawud (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1984), 1036.
The early Islamic epistemology which is latent in the style of the Qur'an assigns a specific truth function for the twin words of 'ilm and fiqh. In this epistemology we can ask: how is the truth of 'ilm known? Moreover, how is the truth of the fiqh-knowledge known? We raise these questions because both types of knowledge belong to different ontological realms. 'Ilm belongs to the realm identified in the Qur’an as ghaṣb, whereas fiqh pertains to the realm identified as shahādah. The knowledge of the ghaṣb is acquired and its truth is thus known through the guidance of Revelation. The faculties utilized in this knowledge-acquisition process are mental faculties (such as intellect, imagination, memory, will and intuition) via the experiential faculties represented by the heart (qulb). Now since fiqh can mean rational understanding of any subject including the 'ilm as such, it recognizes its limits and does not speculate on 'ilm; and thus limits itself to the shahādah aspects only. Therefore, faculties utilized in the fiqh-acquisition process are mental faculties as well as sense perception. Although Muslim thinkers never systematically formulated this epistemology it was the main perspective from which they were evaluating philosophical ideas. This means that in a vague sense they had a similar epistemology in mind.

Just as the words, 'ilm-fiqh, the term kalām also acquired a technical meaning in the early Islamic learning. This term already contains in its literal sense ‘logical and reasoned discourse’. Because of this discursive aspect of its meaning, it became an excellent candidate to be used for expressing speculative thought. Among many early usages Hasan al-Basri’s (d. 728) usage is a striking example: “we initiated the speculative study of qadar, just as people initiated the denial of it” (adathnā al-kalām fīhi).11 Besides this all the usages in the kalām books, such as “kalām fī” (speculative study in S) indicates the philosophical character of the term. More examples for similar usage can be given: “Wa'l-nās yatakallamūn fī'l-qadar” (Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad, 2: 178).12 The usage of the word “yatakallam” in relation to a speculative issue expresses the speculative intention of the word. When one considers all such technical meanings one is obliged to translate fiqh as ‘science’, kalām as philosophy, and 'ilm as ‘revelational knowledge. The term ḥikmah is also clarified in this context by al-Ṭabari’s report that ḥikmah was defined by his predecessors as the Qur’an and its (rational) understanding (al-ḥikmah hiya al-Qur’an wa'l-fiqh bihi).13

12 Also “balaghand innaka tatakallam fī ʾashūr in min al-qadar”, (Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad, 2: 90).
This enlightened process also had its community of scholars all the way from the beginning. As an educational process we find early Muslims forming schools and communities of learned men and women until it gives birth to the rise of special sciences in Islamic civilization.\(^4\) However, at one moment of this process the community of the learned almost suddenly came across books loaded with primary translations of Greek philosophical terminology in which terms, such as ‘ilm, fiqh, kalâm and hikmah are used wrongly. For instance, the term ‘ilm is used to mean ‘science’ and the term fiqh is isolated from its original usage; the term kalâm is no longer utilized for speculative thought and so on.\(^5\) Now let us consider ourselves among the members of the early community of scholars active in scientific research at that time; would we react to this wrong usage or not? Moreover, these words are not terms that may be negligible in wrong usages. On the contrary, they belong to the fundamental structure of Islamic worldview. Therefore, any inaccurate usages would damage their outlook on the universe and on the scientific activities of understanding the universe and existence in its entirety. We can say with confidence, on the other hand, that all these kinds of inaccurate usages are found in the Arabic translations of the Greek philosophical literature. For the translators were not Muslims and naturally they were not trained in the Islamic scientific terminology. Thus they were unaware of the terms’ scientific meaning. They were nevertheless Arabs and knew only the literal meanings of these terms. Hence they translated Aristotle’s episteme as ‘ilm, i.e. scientific knowledge, instead of fiqh. Moreover, the term kalâm was not utilized to translate the term philosophia, but first the term itself was used as falsafah and later the term hikmah was utilized. This is again an inaccurate usage because as we have seen in Tabari’s explanation, it is based on earliest usages reported by Mujahid hikmah is fiqh-knowledge but only in relation to the Qur’an, i.e. revelation.\(^6\) The term falsafah, however, is only fiqh-knowledge without any relation to a divine source. We claim that this phenomenon clearly represents the nature of the early reaction against the Greek philosophical works.

It is the same spirit exhibited in the early reaction that determines Ghazali’s reaction as well. However, by the time of Ghazali certain theories in Greek philosophical works became more apparent as contradicting the vital Islamic elements in its worldview, such as the ones cited and criticized in the Tahafut. Thus was written his critique in the spirit of this scientific inquiry; no other motive should be sought for


\(^5\) For these wrong usages more examples can be given, such as the term nazar instead of ra’y to mean ‘theory’ or ‘theoretical’; wujûd in relation to God, whereas in the terminology of the early Islamic learning haqq is used to express God’s existence, and so on.

\(^6\) Al-Tabari, op. cit., 3: 60.
the composition of the *Tahāfut* and thus started the Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate in this spirit of scholarly change of ideas.

II

THE FAYLASūF (AND falsafaH)

Among the terms that are used as incorrect signifiers in the translated books, the most important for the Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate is the Greek term *falsafah* in its Arabized form. Philosophy meant for the Ancient Greeks the "love" or "passion" for learning. But for Aristotle it carried the tone of 'scientific learning' as well. This ancient conception of philosophy continued until it put its impression on the minds of Muslim intellectuals. Farabi, (d.950) for instance, classified sciences in his famous work *Iḥṣā' al-Ullām*, and included in his classification such philosophical disciplines as logic, metaphysics, and ethics. Ibn Sina wholeheartedly supported this classification. Perhaps he also utilized the phrase *al-‘ilm al-ilāhī* for the first time to refer to 'metaphysics'. Kindi, for example, used only 'first philosophy'.14 As it is clear also from his definition of this discipline Ibn Sina regards it as a science. However, Ghazali, opposed this classification of sciences and did not admit metaphysics as a science, namely, *‘ilm* as such, in the Islamic sense. This is in fact the point that is to be emphasized. For the term *al-‘ilm al-ilāhī* already acquired a wide usage by the time of Ghazali.

The early translators found it difficult to translate the Peripatetic jargon such as 'metaphysics' and 'theology', although it was quite easy to translate the term 'First Philosophy' in an Arabized phrase (*al-falsafat al-‘ilāh*). Therefore, they tried to also Arabize these terms as *uthulujja* and *matāfisiqā*. However, later when Muslim philosophers mastered in these disciplines they were able to come up with Arabic equivalents. Alas, this was achieved only by a significant divergence from the mainstream of Islamic scientific terminology. This is because by the time of Ibn Sina when most of this terminology was established, the term *‘ilm* had acquired double meaning: one referring to its original revelational character, the other referring to any scientific inquiry. In fact among the Muslim Aristotelian circles it referred primarily to scientific learning in a sense intimately related to Aristotle's *epistēmē*.

Thus Ghazali was able to launch his attack. In the *Tahāfut* he argued from the epistemological perspective that the human mind tried to reach the sort of certitude in metaphysical subjects, which it reached in formal studies such as logic and mathematics. The nature of metaphysical problems is, however, such that they evade


the mathematical exactitude. This fact is clearly observed in the agreement of philosophers upon the solution of a certain mathematical problem. However, metaphysics has never succeeded in reaching a conclusion upon which all philosophers agree.\(^9\) It is clear that when Ghazali refutes metaphysics to be science, he means ‘ilm; if it were translated as fiqh, his scientific motive would have been much clearer for us today. We do not, however, mean that it had been translated as ‘al-fiqh al-ilāḥi’, namely as ‘the science of metaphysics’, he would have accepted it as such. For he accepts metaphysics neither as ‘ilm nor as fiqh. He thinks that subjects discussed in this discipline are known only through the Revelation (the Qur’an), and as such they are not open for scientific scrutiny. Nevertheless, we are arguing in this context that if al-fiqh al-ilāḥi had been used instead of al-‘ilm al-ilāḥi, Ghazali’s scientific motives would have been more palpable and his remarks concerning the religious dangers of indulging in such issues would be understood also in that sense.

The term *philosophia*, moreover, was not translated properly as *kālam*: but signified in its Arabized form as *falsafah*. Now if we carefully examine this term, we shall see that it was properly applied to only Greek speculative way of thinking and not the *kālam* way of thinking. Therefore, *falsafah* at that time did not signify what we mean by ‘philosophy’ today. Let us utilize the term ‘philosophy’ in today’s sense and try to determine the exact position of the two ancient scientific activities; *falsafah* and *kālam*. For this way of approaching the problem shall clarify the terms and the exact motive of Ghazali’s critique expressed in the Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate. We can say in this respect that *falsafah* and *kālam* are two different modes of philosophy, the former referring to the Greek approach and the latter to the Islamic. Once this is well understood then we can clearly see that Ghazali’s critique is not directed against philosophy and philosophers as understood today, but rather against a particular way of philosophizing that is expressed as *falsafah*. For Ghazali this way of philosophizing is not legitimate, neither in the epistemological sense nor in the Islamic.

We have historical evidence for the use of the term ‘*kālam*’ in the sense of philosophy. Shahristani, for example, refers to Aristotle’s system as ‘the *kālam* of Aristotle’.\(^{20}\) These usages make it clear that *falsafah* means only the kind of philosophical thought found in the Aristotelian Neoplatonic corpus. We can translate accurately the term *faylasūf* as ‘Hellenic philosopher’ and the term *kālam* as ‘Muslim philosopher’. On the other hand, considering the wider meaning attached to the term *kālam* it can be understood today as ‘philosophy’ in the proper sense, namely ‘any speculative thought carried out in any civilization’.

\(^9\) See *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, ed. by Maurice Bouyges, S.J. (Beirut: Al-Ma’ṣūmat al-Kadimātīyyah,1927); especially 39 and the First Introduction.

We must be careful that some of the statements we make here are primarily related to Aristotelian and Neoplatonic metaphysics. As far as the other branches of falsafah is concerned they must be evaluated by the standards of fiqh, i.e. scientific criticism. The rules of 'ilm do not apply to the other branches of falsafah because of the epistemology outlined above. Although Ghazali’s approach to these disciplines differs from the way we have explained it, nevertheless he makes it clear in the Munqidh that his criticism is primarily directed to metaphysics and the other disciplines can be evaluated within their own standards since they are not related to religion.  

When we come to this conclusion we are in a better position to evaluate the claim that Ghazali “did not consider himself a philosopher.” Moreover, his rebuttal against the philosophers has also been interpreted as “his identification with the antiphilosophical party.” Our analysis shows that we must be extremely careful in applying terms that have a different connotation today than what they signified for philosophers in earlier centuries. The same conclusion is valid for the uses of the terms ‘rational’ and ‘rationalism’. Since the rational method is closely linked with philosophical thinking Ghazali’s attitude can easily be interpreted as ‘anti-rational’. This is obviously not the case. Ghazali is a philosopher in today’s sense, but he is not a faqlastif. Moreover, he is a rationalist in fiqh-knowledge (scientific inquiry), but revelationist in the ‘ilm, namely metaphysical subjects.

III

THE AFTERMATH

We have so far tried to analyze the nature of the reaction against falsafah through the development of early Islamic thought and tried to show that this nature also primarily dominated the spirit of the Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate. Now we need to evaluate not only the aftermath of this debate but also the reactions to this reaction itself. Normally looking at the problem today, the first reaction we are inclined to think is that since Ghazali criticized the falsafah approach he would have attempted to develop another philosophical approach that could rival the falsafah. If this was the case then we should be able to talk of a Ghazalian system of philosophy, which is based on an epistemology that is suitable to his approach. The only answer one can give for this is

24 I avoid using the term ‘dogmatist’ because in the Islamic case the dogma can be questioned if there is such a thing as dogma. This term somehow appears to me to be irrelevant in the Islamic case.
his *Ihyā‘*. We can, I think, defend the *Ihyā‘* as his philosophical system especially considering its Introduction which begins with a philosophical classification of sciences and proceeds therefrom. The only objection one can bring against this conclusion is that his methodology may not be entirely philosophical in the *Ihyā‘*.

The question of methodology is a problematic issue in philosophy, which is closely linked with our conception of philosophy. We may raise the following questions: Is there a standard method that is applied alike in every philosophical venture? If there is, then what is the nature of that method? On the other hand, if there is no such universal method, is there then at least (a) some universal characteristic that belongs to all the particular methods applied in different philosophical traditions? This aspect of the Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate is very much relevant to our concern in contemporary philosophical problems. We may approach the problem of methodology by first defining philosophy as a science. Since each science must have a subject matter, a method, and an organized body of knowledge consisting the theories and discoveries in that science, philosophy must also have these characteristics. Its subject matter is *systems* that are investigated and/or constructed by the method of establishing theories. It is clear, therefore, that philosophy as a science must have a method but there is no universal method belonging to all such scientific activities. Empiricism, rationalism, intuitionism, and mysticism all together mark a peculiar method belonging to a specific philosophical tradition. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to ascertain a universal characteristic pertaining to all philosophical methods. Yet the fact that some kind of a method is indispensable for a philosophical activity is a sufficient universal characteristic that belongs to all philosophical traditions. In the same way, Ghazali has his own method which is dictated by his worldview; and it is this methodology that he applies in the *Ihyā‘*. We shall discuss this method briefly below in our concluding remarks.

The generations after Ghazali did not take *Ihyā‘* to be a philosophical venture, either in the falsafah tradition or in today's philosophical sense. Two reactions followed naturally; defending Ghazali as the champion of religion, and attacking him as the enemy of falsafah. On the other hand, philosophers like Ibn Rushd tried to defend that tradition by launching another attack. But among the former reactionaries there were fanatics as well. These fanatics did not understand the purpose of philosophy. They thought that there could only be one type of philosophy which is to say the kind Ghazali criticized, i.e., falsafah. In this sense we will respond to Ghazali's approach. His criticism from the epistemological perspective was weak because he did not develop a systematic theory of knowledge, like, for example, Kant. Some have already claimed that Ghazali like Kant refused the validity of theoretical
reason in matters of belief. In this sense, of course Ghazali is a precursor of Kant. But he did not develop a systematic theory of knowledge as Kant did in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. I think because of this Ghazali was understood as a simple *salafi* rather than a profound philosopher. I am not saying that Ghazali does not have a theory of knowledge; on the contrary, it is possible to make up a theory of knowledge on the basis of Ghazali's works. But this would not be a systematic construction.

Another relevant point we can distinguish from the Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate is Ghazali's role in the wave of the Greek philosophical influence. This issue is also to be evaluated within the framework of the terminological analysis reached above. There is, on the one hand, Ghazali's legitimization of the Aristotelian terminology by his frequent use of these terms in his works. On the other hand, he attempts to invent new terminology in order to avoid legitimizing the Greek philosophical terminology by frequent use. We need to study this nomenclature in his works in order to judge this issue in an accurate way. Are the frequently employed terms the ones that belong to Ghazali's approved philosophical sciences or to the metaphysical sciences that he rejected? In order to understand this correctly we shall try to give two examples. The first is from the *Ihya*, in which he classifies sciences with a completely new terminology based on the *fiqh* methodology. We do not find this terminology in the Greek philosophical works; the other is from the *al-Qishtas al-Mustaqim* in which there is an obvious endeavor to Islamize the Aristotelian logical terminology. For example, the first figure of categorical syllogism is named 'greater balance' (*al-mizân al-akbar*) and is said to have been established by the Prophet Abraham as he used it to refute Nimrod's claim for divinity. In the same manner Ghazali proves in this work that the main logical arguments can be derived from the Qur'an and that all these syllogistic rules are used to perceive the true knowledge. In that case we need to evaluate Ghazali's critique by paying attention to his works as a whole in order to understand the true spirit of his debate with Ibn Sina.

One of the most common reactions brought against the Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate is the claim that Ghazali denies causality in nature. We react to this accusation by

---

22 Cf., for example, M.M. Sharif, "Philosophical Influence from Descartes to Kant" in *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1995), 2: 1385.
23 See the English translation by Nabih Amin Faris as *The Book of Knowledge* (New Delhi: International Islamic Publishers, n.d.).
asking a simple question: Can common sense thinker can deny causality? If Ghazali has any common sense at all he cannot deny this phenomenon. Once we observe his brilliant critique of the falsafiah even without examining his other works one can conclude that Ghazali does not deny causality. After a careful study of his works, however, one can clearly discern that Ghazali denies only the necessary logical connection attached to a cause and its effect by the falsafiah, i.e. the Aristotelian philosophers. This means that in nature there is no inherent necessary connection between a cause and its effect. There is however such a connection as far as we are concerned because there is a regularity in nature thanks to God’s regular creation. Therefore, we always observe God’s regular actions and establish a relationship between them. God acts in this way so that life would be possible for us; for we cannot live in a chaotic nature. This is because human mind works only in an orderly system out of which it is able to infer rules on the basis of which we can live. In that case the necessary connection is only from our point of view not from the side of the natural events. With this theory Ghazali also becomes a precursor of Hume. Strangely enough Hume has never been accused of denying causality in nature.

Concluding Remarks

Most works dealing with Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate do not try to evaluate this issue from a broader perspective within its own historical and scientific setting, as it has been done in this study. They have so far concentrated on the philosophical problems discussed both in the Tahafut and among the later participants of the debate. This approach does not tell us accurately about the actual purpose of the debate. That is why we have avoided approaching the issue from this perspective in this study. We have tried to understand Ghazali’s motive in starting such a debate by first attempting to analyze the nature of the early reaction against the Greek philosophical theories in the Muslim world. Only after this is done we are able to appreciate Ghazali’s scientific approach to the problem.

The weakest point of the debate has been expressed within the aftermath as the need for a systematic theory of knowledge, which is utterly urgent today in the Muslim world. Without a theory of knowledge it is impossible to establish any significant philosophical theory. But we must understand that the Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate should give us a better perspective to understand this need not only as a necessity of partial philosophical theories but also as an urgent need for the

---

29 By emphasizing the urgent need for a systematically constructed theory of knowledge I do not mean that there is no such theory today. Cf. Syed M. N. Al-Atas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental Elements of the Worldview of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995). But such attempts must be studied and critically evaluated so that its full impact in the philosophical circles will be felt.
construction of a philosophical system. Such a system must obviously be based on a theory of knowledge.

One may argue that there is Ghazali's *Ihya' as a system so why look for another? We may reply by saying that scientific knowledge is not static, since systems are organized scientific knowledge based on an epistemology and/or ontology; there is a continual need to update systems. Therefore, we need to revise the old systems according to new scientific developments. This does not mean that knowledge changes according to scientific progress. For, we are merely claiming that theories change according to new scientific discoveries on the basis of which we must revise previous systems. It is clear that since the time of *Ihya' almost a millennium has passed and there is a considerable accumulation of new scientific knowledge. Hence, we have to either revise the *Ihya' today or simply make use of it and other previous systems in the Muslim world in order to construct a new system.

We may raise in this context the methodology utilized in the *Ihya'. For the methodology we establish today may not use the same approach. The method utilized in the *Ihya' can be called 'irshādi approach' as opposed to the discursive approach which is more common in philosophy.26 I would like to translate the *irshādi approach as 'spiritual illumination', which is more a practical philosophy as opposed to the theoretical approach commonly employed in philosophy. Both approaches, that is, the spiritual illumination and the discursive, are useful in their own spheres. For example, in developing a theory of society or a moral theory we can use a more discursive approach. However, in instructing the society of that moral theory, in other words in moral deliberation, we need the spiritual illuminationist approach as applied in the *Ihya'. Closely linked with the issue of methodology is the question whether Ghazali is a philosopher or not. Our terminological analysis has shown that he does not use the Aristotelian philosophical method and thus he is not a *faylasūf, but the fact that he develops his own method qualifies him to be a philosopher.

We, therefore, express the lesson to be drawn from the Ibn Sina-Ghazali debate as an urgent need for scientific philosophical discussions today in the Muslim world. This need cannot be fulfilled unless we try to develop new philosophical theories in order to work our way to a new expression of the Islamic philosophical system.

Hans Daiber
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Main/Germany


The term rationalism originated as a key word of European philosophy in the 17th and 18th century. Later, in the 19th century, the concept of rationalism was propagated by freethinkers and atheists as superior to the superstition of traditional religion. In modern historiography it means scientific knowledge based on unprejudiced cognition, similar to the ideal of the European Enlightenment (17-19th c.), which replaced religion by human rationality.

In view of this definition of rationalism which opposes religion to rationality, one might immediately assume that Islam and rationalism are two contradictory concepts. This conclusion was indeed drawn by the French orientalist Ernest Renan in a well-known paper given at the Sorbonne in Paris on 29 March 1884: he defended the thesis that Islamic religion did not promote the rise of sciences, that science in Islam was in reality Greek science and that rationalism in contrast to religion is the precondition for the development of sciences. Renan was contradicted at that time by Djamālāddīn al-Afghānī who in his plea described Islamic religion as a moral force and as an inspirer of human phantasy which enabled the Muslim to contribute to science.

These remarks by Afghānī surely deserve our attention. Moreover, our knowledge of the history of ideas in Islam, which has grown considerably since the days of Renan and Afghānī, enables us to revise the modern traditional assumption of an opposition of rationalism and Islam, of rationality and Islamic religion. On the contrary, religion in Islam fostered the rise of scientific thought, the Koran became a stimulus of science in early Islam.


In addition, religious ideas of Islam on God and His creation, world and man, became a fertile soil for scientific thought, which influenced European thinkers in the Middle Ages. Here, a key-figure is the famous Ghazâlî from the 11th/12th century A.D. He gave a clear answer to those who tried to replace God, Allâh by another kind of causality, to those people who appear in early Islamic sources under the name dahrites "materialists" and who may be called "atheists", to use a term which originated in the 16th-17th century Europe.

Drawing a contrast between this so-called "atheistic" replacement of God by matter as the only causality and Ghazâlî's doctrine of causality will show us the real starting-point of Ghazâlî's doctrine; it will lead us to a correct understanding of Ghazâlî's concept of causality, which must be understood as a development within the framework of a theocratic religion. This correct understanding presupposes the awareness of the alternative divine cause - non-divine cause, an awareness which stimulated the reflection on causality in a scientific manner. Ghazâlî's contribution to this reflection turns out to be the quintessence of the preceding discussions with those who tried to replace God by another cause. He deserves our attention, as he influenced through his *Tahâfut al-falâsifa* and its refutation by Ibn Rushd, the *Tahâfut at-Tahâfut*, the discussion in medieval Europe, also in: *Journal for the History of Arabic Science* 10/1-2 Aleppo 1992-1994, pp. 119-153.

Footnotes:

the arguments of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Bernard of Arezzo and of Nicolaus of Autrecourt. His originality has even prompted a comparison with similar ideas of the English philosopher David Hume in the 18th century.

Before we discuss Ghazâlî’s forerunners in his reflections on causality, we shall describe Ghazâlî’s concept of causality and extract those key-terms whose previous history throws new light on Ghazâlî’s thought. The starting-point for Ghazâlî is his concept of God as the determining factor against the Aristotelian-Avicennian thesis of the eternity and perpetuity of the world; God created the world from nothing. Consequently - as Ghazâlî criticizes in the 16th question of his Tahâfut al-falâsifa - the Neoplatonic-Avicennian reduction of the movements of the heavens and the effects of nature to “separate intelligences” through the mediation of celestial causes, their knowledge and will, ascribes to things and not to God a determining power. This means that every effect has a contingent cause and is ultimately, via a series of intermediary


Ed./transl. Marmura (as prec.n.) 156ff.
causes, caused by the “eternal heavenly movement”. God as determining factor is denied and replaced by the causality of nature, the laws of generation and corruption, which is ultimately determined by the movement of the heavenly bodies and the volition of the “celestial souls”; there is no place for divine miracles.

Here, the notion of necessity implied in this kind of causality is criticized by Ghazālī as something based purely on the observation that the effect “occurs with the cause, but not (necessarily) by it” (‘indaḥū ʻlā biḥh). Although acting factors of nature (e.g. fire) might possess specific qualities which lead to identical effects, it might happen, for example, that through the intervention of God’s Will, of a free and omnipotent Agent or His angels fire does not lead to combustion. Causes are mere conditions


10Cf. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism (as n. 5), pp. 58fff.


12Ghazālī, Tahāfūt ed./transl. Marmura (as n. 7) p. 171; cf. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism (as n. 9) 61; 63f.; Wolfson, Philosophy of Kalam (as n. 5) pp. 543ff.; M. Marmura, Ghazali and Demonstrative Science, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 3, 1965, pp. 183-204.

13Ghazālī, Tahāfūt ed./transl. Marmura (as n. 7) 77, 15ff.; cf. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism (as n. 5). 66.

14 Cf. Ghazālī, Tahāfūt 17th discussion ed./transl. Marmura (as n. 7) 170ff.; cf. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism (as n. 5) 69.

of the conditioned and do not necessarily imply any effect relatable to it. As in Ash'arite theology God is the sole agent with unlimited activity.\textsuperscript{15}

Ghazālī has modified the Ash'arite concept of God’s all-determining will, by introducing his differentiating doctrine of causality. He assumes mediating causes between the divine First Cause, its “primary planning” (at-tadbīr al-awwal) and “ruling” (al-ḥukm) and the final effects and ascribes to God’s decree (qaḍā’) and predestination (qadar) the arrangement and application of causes to their “numbered and defined effects” (musabbabātuḥā al-ma‘dudā al-maḥḍūda) “according to a determined measure which neither increases nor decreases”. The causes are described as “universal, primary, fixed and stable causes (ashāb), which remain and do not change, like the earth, the seven heavens, the stars and celestial bodies, with their harmonious and constant movements, which neither change nor end”.\textsuperscript{16} This description of the causes shows traces of the Aristotelian (Metaphysics XIII 8) and Avicennian (Kitāb al-Nadjāt [as n. 9] p. 300, 15ff.) doctrine of eternal moving celestial spheres and their unmoved Prime Mover. Ghazālī illustrates it with a water clock, in which a hollow vessel swims on water in a hollow cylinder with a small hole in its bottom. If the water flows out of this hole little by little, the hollow vessel swimming on it sinks and draws through the string connected with it a ball in such a manner that the ball falls after every hour into a bowl and tinkles.\textsuperscript{17}

The water-clock exemplifies the interaction of divine and natural


causality leading to one and the same effect. This co-operation, which reminds us of a similar explanation of causality in Thomas Aquinas\textsuperscript{18}, presupposes a chain of causes between the divine first cause and the effect - of causes which derive from God’s action. His spontaneous will and from the nature of the intermediating causes, the necessity of their essence.

In connection with this theory of intermediary causes between God and final effect Ghazālī explicitly warns against the assumption that a thing does not come into being through God’s power.\textsuperscript{19} Here, he gives the explanation that each one of the intermediating causes derives from the other “in the same way as a conditioned thing (mashruṭ) derives from a condition”.\textsuperscript{20} At the same time God’s power remains present in the things. This is exemplified by Ghazālī with the example of an impure person submerged up to his neck in water: his impurity will only be removed under the condition that he also washes his face. God’s eternal power surrounds the determined things in the same way as the water surrounds the man’s body.\textsuperscript{21} His power is actualized under the condition that the man also washes his face; but the real cause remains God’s eternal power which is actualized under certain conditions. The series of causes or

\textsuperscript{18}Summa contra gentiles ch. 70, 3rd book; → Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism (as n. 5) pp. 148ff.

\textsuperscript{19}Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn (ed. by ʿAbdallāh al-Khālidī, Beirut 1998) IV 334,1ff.; cf. Abrahamov (as n. 16) 89ff. - For this reason Ghazālī cannot be interpreted as maintaining that beings other than God have real causal efficacy - a thesis which is elaborated by R. M. Frank in his monograph Creation and the Cosmic System: al-Ghazālī and Avicenna, Heidelberg 1992 (= Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Jg. 1992, 1. Abhandlung), and which with good reason is criticized by M. Marmura, Ghazālīan Causes and Intermediaries, in: Journal of the American Oriental Society 115, 1995, 89-100. - Here, in the accentuation of God as remaining the real cause acting through intermediaries Ghazālī appears to be an Ashʿarite and not a philosopher following Ibn Sīnā. This observation does of course not exclude the amalgamation of Avicennan rudiments, e.g. the Aristotelian-Avicennian notion of God as prime mover. - On the problem of classifying Ghazālī as Ashʿarite cf. Kojiro Nakamura, Was Ghazālī an Ashʿarite? in: Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 51, Tokyo 1993, 1-24.

\textsuperscript{20}Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ (as prec. n.) IV 334,9. The translation of Abrahamov (as n. 16) p.90 “some of the determined things ... derive from others” is wrong and has seduced the translator to the assumption that “Al-Ghazālī contradicts himself. Above he says that some determined things derive from others, whereas here he says that all that happens in the world come about through a necessary derivation”. The Arabic word baʿd does not mean here “some”, but “one” - “the other”. Consequently, the following discussion of Anabrahmov (90ff.) is superfluous.

\textsuperscript{21}Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ (as n. 19) IV 334,23ff. Cf. Abrahamov (as n. 16) pp. 91f.
conditions constitute a rule or law, called *sunna* or *qāda*. This rule or law, the connection of effects with conditioning causes, which through God’s power can be violated in the case of miracles\(^{22}\), reveals God’s wisdom.\(^{24}\)

The same rule or law of the connection of divine and secondary causality is also valid for the action of man and his free will: on the basis of the Ashʿarite doctrine, which appears modified, Ghazālī develops a differentiating view, in which three kinds of man’s actions are distinguished\(^{25}\): 1) action according to nature (*fiʿl *tabīʿī), e.g. when someone stands on water, he breaks through it; 2) action based on his instinct, his “volition” (*fiʿl *irādī), e.g. when one breathes; 3) action based on choice (*fiʿl *ikhtiyārī), e.g. writing. The kinds of action mentioned remain exposed to necessity, compulsion, i.e. the rule or law imposed by God. Like every effect the kinds of man’s action mentioned are also the result of conditioning causes; the breaking through water is conditioned by the weight of the man, the motion of the throat for breathing is conditioned by the man’s instinct; the volitional action and the man’s choice or motivation are conditioned by his judgement and knowledge; finally, the man’s motivation, his motives, which with good reason have been compared with Naẓzām’s “motive force” (khāṭīr)\(^{26}\) are the condition of man’s power (qudra) to act. All the conditions mentioned of man’s action are ultimately conditioned by the existence of man as living being, by his life.

\(^{22}\)Cf. Wolfson, *Philosophy of Kalam* (as n. 5) pp. 544ff. and on Ibn Rushd’s critique ib. pp. 551ff. - Against Abrahamov (as n. 16) (p. 95) there is no difference between *sunna* (as used in Ghazālī’s *Iḥyāʾ*) and *qāda* (as used in Ghazālī’s *Tahāfut*). This is confirmed by Ghazālī’s statement that miracles occur through God’s power (*fi maqḍūrat Allāh*: s. Ghazālī, *Tahāfut* ed./transl. Marmura [as n. 5] p. 176, 1ff. if “in the habitual course of nature” (*bi-ḥukm al-qāda*) e.g. the change of earth and other elements into a plant does not occur as usual over a long space of time, but “in a time shorter than has been known” (*Tahāfut* ed./transl. Marmura [as n. 7] 176,4ff.). - On Ghazālī’s concept of miracles cf. Barry S. Kogan, The Philosophers Al-Ghazālī and Averroes on Necessary Connection and the Problem of the Miraculous, in: *Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism*, ed. by Parviz Morewedge, New York 1981, pp. 113-132; Edward H. Madden, Averroes and the Case of the Fiery Furnace, ib. pp. 133-150; Jalāl al-Haqq, Al-Ghazālī on Causality, Induction, and Miracles, in: *Al-Tawhīd* III/3, Tehran 1986, 53-62.

\(^{24}\)See the preceding note.

\(^{25}\)Cf. Abrahamov (as n. 16) pp. 80 and 95.

\(^{26}\)Ghazālī, *Iḥyāʾ* (as n. 19) IV332,5ff.; cf. Abrahamov (as n. 16) 86ff.

Ghazâli’s doctrine of man’s will and action follows the same scheme of conditioning causes and conditioned effects. Even man’s choice is compulsory and ultimately determined by God, insofar as it is conditioned by his life, his knowledge and his creation by God.  

My short description so far has revealed the following elements as corner-stones of Ghazâli’s doctrine of causality:

1) God as the all-determining cause;
2) nature implanted by God in the substances, God’s creatures, as the rule or law of things qua chain of causes leading to effects, which appear to be conditioned by a series of causes conditioning each other;
3) man’s choice and action as a result of conditioning power and cognition;
4) the establishment of primary and unchangeable causes, namely earth, seven heavens, stars, celestial sphere and their proportional perpetual motions, which are created by God’s decree (qaḍā’) and which through their proportioned and measured motions were directed by God to their final effects.  

These corner-stones have an interesting history in Islam before Ghazâli, as they mirror a compromise of a dilemma in early Islam and of disputes about divine determination by God and independence of man. Can God be replaced by another kind of causality?

An important starting-point for our discussion is the oldest document of Islam, the Koran. In Sura 45, verse 23 (22)f. we find the following remark about the unbeliever - I quote the translation of Arthur J. Arberry:

Hast thou seen him who has taken his caprice (hawâhu) to be his god, and God has led him astray out of a knowledge, ... They say, ‘There is nothing but our present life; we die, and we live, and nothing but Time (dahr) destroys us’.

Here, we detect the divine cause replaced by the inclination of man (hawâhu), who orientates himself solely towards his life in this world,

---

27 Cf. Abrahamov (as n. 16) 88-90.
28 Cf. note 16.
29 Some of the ideas formulated in the following discussion can be found in my article “Rebellion gegen Gott” (s. n. 3).
who considers himself as perishable, as victim of time.

Apparently, Mohammed is here criticizing his contemporaries who confess the old Arabic, pre-Islamic fatalism and deny any kind of religious predestination. Mohammed is here denouncing people, who prefer to religion the old Arabic virtue of man, the virtue which honours the tribe.

Remarkable in the formulation of the Sura quoted is the assessment of individuality as causal factor equal to God. According to Mohammed this is not compatible with his new belief in one God, to whom everyone must surrender. Moreover, in Sura 26,123ff. Mohammed asks people to fear God and to obey him by referring to the perishability of the world, which he exemplifies with the end of the tribes Ėd and Thamūd, who did not obey God. He who does not surrender to God must assume, according to Sura 45, 24, which I have quoted, that time, dahr in Arabic, lets people perish: there is no God who could promise them paradise in the other world.

Here, we detect the Koranic starting-point of the description of those who deny God as "Dahrites".30 This term, with the same connotations, reappears in the writings of the famous prose-writer Dī̄hīz, who died in about 868 A.D. In his book on animals he demonstrates that even animals hint at God's existence, " at His perfect creation", "His marvellous rule" and "His subtle wisdom".31

According to Dī̄hīz this cosmological and teleological proof of God contradicts the denial of God by the Dahrites. These Dahrites consider, as Dī̄hīz formulates it, "command and prohibition (by God) as something absurd; they deny prophecy and declare matter as something eternal; they deny the existence of reward and punishment; they do not acknowledge the permitted and prohibited things; they do not accept the evidence of a creative act and of created existing in the whole world, of Creator and creation; according to their opinion the stars cannot increase or decrease their movement or circulation; they cannot replace rest by movement, cannot stand still for one moment or deviate from one direction. (Through


the stars) everything is confirmed or refuted, all the small and great things happen... ." 32

These remarks by Djähiz are directed against the so-called Dahrites and aim to explain, that the creation of animals and their wise rule are not due to the unchangeable movement of stars, but to a divine cause.

The critique of the Dahrites is turning into a critique of astrologers. Astrology was rather popular in the time of Djähiz and had reached its first climax at that time. 33 One of their critics was Djähiz, who here refers to discussions of agnostic circles from the 8th/9th century who in the tradition of old sceptic-materialistic traditions of the Sassanians from the 6th century deny the influence of the stars on the sublunar world. 34 According to Djähiz the assumption of any astrological influence on creation means the denial of God. He who asserts the eternal uniformity of the celestial bodies, cannot anymore assume generation and corruption, or the "distinction between Creator and created", but solely "eternal matter".

This conclusion by Djähiz is not new. It takes up an alleged discussion between the theologian Abū Ḥanifa and a Dahrite, which is summarized in the 10th century by Abū 1-Laith as-Samarqandi in his commentary on the oldest Islamic credo, on Abū Ḥanifa's al-Fiqh al-absat. 35

Abū 1-Laith as-Samarqandi polemizes against the "Dahrites, i.e. the atheists, the heretics and astrologians", who "deny the Creator, believe in the eternity of time and trace all things back to the natures, the ūbū'īc".

Abū 1-Laith substantiates his criticism with his explanation that the change of things requires a separate cause, which brings it about. As an illustration Abū 1-Laith adds his report of the discussion between Abū Ḥanifa and a Dahrite, as follows:

32Djähiz, Kišīb al-Hayawān (as prec. n.) VII (Cairo 1968) 12,11ff. Compare, in addition Daiber, Rebellion (as n. 3) p. 25.


34For further details see Daiber, Rebellion (as n. 3) 26f.

35Ed. (with commentary) by H. Daiber, The Islamic Concept of Belief in the 4th/10th Century. Abū 1-Laith as-Samarqandi's Commentary on Abū Ḥanifa (died 150/767), al-Fiqh al-absat, Tokyo 1995 (= Studia culturae islamicae. 52), II. 771-784. Compare for further details Daiber, Rebellion (as n. 3) 28-30.
"People tell about Abū Ḥanīfa, that he disputed with a Dahrite and cornered him with his arguments. The Dahrite answered: Things change from one state into another, because they are based on four natures: on humidity, dryness, cold and heat. As long as these four natures exist in an equal manner, their owner has balance. In case one nature predominates the others, the balance ceases to exist and the balance of their owner too.

Abū Ḥanīfa answered: Herewith you confess in fact the existence of a Creator (sāniṣ) and of the created (maṣnūṣ), of something dominating (al-ghālib) and something which is dominated (al-maghūb), even if you deny that. For you maintain: one of the natures dominates the others and the others are dominated by the one. Herewith it is proven, that the whole world has a dominating cause. And thus we can go beyond your question and maintain: the dominating cause is nothing other than God, the creator."

Although the report seems to be late, we can nevertheless detect old ideas in the report. The thesis of the Dahrite and its refutation by Abū Ḥanīfa, with the argument that contrary qualities like humidity, dryness, cold and heat can only be combined by a superior factor, by God, is among others also found in the older theologian Māturīdī, who died in 944 A.D. In his "Book on the unity of God", his Kitāb at-Tauḥīd, he informs us that he based his information on the Dahrites on their critic Ibn Shabīb, a pupil of the Muʿtazilite Naẓzām, who died between 835 and 845 A.D. Apparently Ibn Shabīb was Māturīdī's source for his own counterarguments and his thesis of the prevailing divine cause.

In addition, we know that Ibn Shabīb, like Māturīdī, follows Naẓzām, whose critical description of the Dahrite principles is preserved. Naẓzām had developed against the Dahrites and dualists the doctrine that all things, even contrary things, are "mixed" by the intervention of God."
Nazzām’s thesis that contrary things are forceably put together through the intervention of a superior divine cause is not new. He himself is inspired by Christian circles of his time, who themselves ultimately follow the doctrine of the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De mundo*, described there in chapters five and six. 42

Remarkable is the effort of the Islamic texts to refute with their proof of God’s existence the Dahrites, who are called “adherents of natures” (*aṣḥāb at-ṭabā‘ī*) , who deny God.

This peculiarity the texts share with Djāhiz, who - as already mentioned - criticized the Dahrites in his *Book of Animals*. This observation leads us to a better assessment of Djāhiz’ text, not only as a critique of contemporary astrology, but also as an echo of Nazzām’s theology, which itself appears to be inspired by Christian circles of his time and is based ultimately on Greek ideas.

At the same time, the idea of God as guarantor of harmony and order in the world is enriched with the Koranic nuance of God as creator.

Djāhiz’s contrasting of God-creator and eternal matter, as well as his deprivation of the stars of their divinity, is very significant; both can be retraced to a revolutionary innovation of John Philoponus in the 6th century. Based on the Christian axiom that God created the whole world, John Philoponus had refused the heathen thesis of the immanence of gods in the world as well as in the stars; he defended the doctrine of a transcendent God, who created the universe from nothing43 und who thereupon leaves the universe to its immanent laws.44

Here, in John Philoponus, we detect the first beginnings of a separation between natural sciences and theology.45 This separation could not yet

---


43 Cf. on this and its afterlife in Islamic and Jewish thinkers Davidson, *Proofs* (as prec. n.) pp. 86ff.


45 Cf. on this S. Sambursky, *The Physical World of Late Antiquity*, Princeton,
gain a foothold in Islam and is confined there primarily to the deprivation of stars and matter of their divinity. God remains active in creation through nature. Thus, the Islamic theologian Dirār Ibn ʿAmr, who lived between 728 and 796 A.D., opposed the so-called “naturalists” by denying the independent “nature” of things and assuming a connection of things, of “parts”, effected by God. Even man’s action is determined by God: man “acquires”, what God has created.46

A contemporary of Dirār, the Shi’ite Hishām Ibn al-Ḥakam, introduced a new factor here, namely the “cause” created by God; this “cause”, Arabic sabab, “necessarily” “calls forth” the acts of man, provided that man wants them.47

This deterministic component appears a little later in a different manner in Naẓẓām’s theology. Naẓẓām replaces the term “cause” by the terms “nature” (khiqqa, ṭabiqa) and “coercion” (idjāb): According to him, God has created in things and imposed on them their “nature” or “coercion”; man has only the potentiality to give the impulse to a causality, which as such is determined by God and is therefore unavoidable.48

His contemporary Muʿsammar Ibn ʿAbbād as-Sulami differed from this. According to him, nature is not something created by God, but a keyterm for causality, which is inherent in things. God determines this causality only indirectly: Here, Muʿsammar offers a unique solution: according to him the determinant cause for its part is determined indirectly, via an endless chain of causes of maʾani, of determinant factors, by God.49

This solution appears to be a promising step in the direction of the revolutionary thesis of John Philoponus: God is a transcendent creator of N. J. 1962 (pb. 1987), pp. 154ff.

46 Cf. van Ess, Theologie (as n. 39) III pp. 38, 41f. and 44ff.


49 Cf. Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System (as n. 48) pp. 222ff.; id., art. Muʿsammar in Encyclopaedia of Islam VIII (2nd ed. Leiden 1993); van Ess, Theologie (as n. 39) III pp. 57ff.
substances; nature which inheres in these substances, determines the causality of things coming into being, the causality of “accidents”. Nature has become independent and has become a causal principle, which is related to the first, divine effective cause, Aristotle’s unmoved prime mover, solely via an endless chain of determinant factors, the ma'āni.

Mu'ammad’s doctrine was not accepted by his pupils, but reminds us of Ghazālī’s assumption of a series of causes and their effects determined by God. Here, John Philoponus’ doctrine became a stimulus, as for Mu’ammad’s forerunners and successors: a stimulus to dispute and refute the ancient Greek thesis of the eternity of matter and the divine influence of stars in the spirit of Islam and on the basis of the Koranic theology of creation.

In spite of Mu’ammad’s starting-point God remains in early Islam an immanent cause of creation. Therefore, God’s existence can be proven in different manners from creation.50 Sometimes, we find associated with it the teleological proof of God: the functionality of creation, in which everything has its function and aim, shows the existence of a wise creator.51

Herewith, we are back to Djāhiṣ’ critique of the Dahrites, the “materialists”. Djāhiṣ had used his critique, in line with his teacher, the Mu’tazilite Nazẓām, as the starting-point for his proof of God’s existence from creation. God did not become a complete transcendent being, but can be conceived in the reasonable order of creation. According to Nazẓām God imposed on all things created by him a nature which determines their causality. God acts indirectly, through nature created by Him in things. Nazẓām adduced the example that “God provided the stone with such a nature that it rolls, if someone pushes it”.52

This explanation forms the basis of Ghazālī’s doctrine of causality: Ghazālī uses the terms tabī‘ī, sunna or ʿāda 53 to describe causality and specifies this by introducing a series of conditioning causes between God

50Cf. Davidson, Proofs (as n. 42) ch. 6ff.
51Cf. Davidson, Proofs (as n. 42) pp. 216ff.
52Ash’ārī, Maqālia (as n. 47) p. 404,7f.; cf. H. Daiber, Das theologisch-
philosophische System (as n. 49), p. 403f.
53Compare above n. 22 and 25.
and the final effect: a cause becomes a condition for the caused, the conditioned, the effect. This appears as further development of Mu'ammar's doctrine of an endless chain of causes, called ma'ānī, between God the first cause and the final effect. Unlike in Mu'ammar, however, and in the spirit of Naẓām, God remains present in the causes in the doctrine of Ghazālī. God determines whether a cause becomes a condition for the effect or not and God determines whether the chain of causes can be shortened and thus can lead to a miracle54. Even man's choice and action are subjected to God's power, which determines their conditions, namely man's cognition and capacity.

Ghazālī's statement about the cognition of man as a condition of his choice preceding his action implies the assumption that man's action causes something, if the conditions do not prevent it. Moreover, it implies the assumption that man can recognize causalities, effects following their causes, if the conditions are fulfilled. This reminds us of modern discussions in the 20th century: a monograph on causality published by the German philosopher Johannes Erich Heyde in 1957, declares that causality means "the condition of change"55 and is not dependent upon "regularity" or "necessity".56 Moreover, he explains, man perceives and reflects causality as he perceives himself, his will and acting as "causes" of changes which he desires.57 Against the "positivists" this reflection on causality, on the relation between cause and effect, forms the basis for a true understanding of "reality" ("Wirklichkeit").58

Ghazālī has contributed to this reflection on causality, not only in classical Islam59 and in European philosophy60. He continues to contribute to this reflection in our age. Our short description of the background of

54Compare above n. 23.
55Heyde, Entwertung (as n. 4) p. 132: 'bei "Kausalität" handelt es sich ... um das "Bedingung sein für Veränderung" selbst'.
56Heyde 133ff.
57Heyde 145.
58Heyde 146.
59Ghazālī was criticized by Ibn Rushd in his Tahāfut at-Tahāfut, whose Latin translation was available since the 14th century: → Daiber, Lateinische Übersetzungen (as n. 4), p. 236f.
60Cf. above n. 4.
Ghazālī's doctrine of causality reveals the correlation of Islam and rationalism. This confirms that religion as stimulus of science was shaping the history of sciences in Islam in a specific manner. In contrast to the statement by Djamāladdin al-Afghānī quoted at the beginning of my paper, Islam was not only a moral force and not only an inspirer of human phantasy. In addition, the contrasting of the "atheistic" replacement of God by matter as the only causality with Ghazālī's doctrine of causality has shown us the real starting-point of Ghazālī's doctrine. He formulated it in the context of contemporary Ash'arite theology and maintaining a critical attitude towards Ibn Sinā's mainly Aristotle-orientated philosophy. Finally, Ghazālī's doctrine must be understood as a development within the framework of a theocratic religion and as a result of discussions in agnostic and Muʿtazilite circles long before Ghazālī, especially of Naẓẓām and Muʿammar.