ON THE RELATION BETWEEN
GHAZALI'S COSMOLOGY
AND HIS MYSTICISM

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BY

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In several of his works Ghazali makes use of the terms malakat and fazilat in a way which merits the attention of every reader. Professor D. B. Macdonald has tentatively compared this tries with ḫalīṣ, ḥumāʿ, khati in the dictionary of our Father in some Max. and translations of Matthew vi. 13. Professor J. de Boer has compared these terms with the ḥumāʿ, ḫalīṣ, ḥumāʿ mentioned in Colossians i. 16. The divergency of opinion between no distinguished authorities would in itself prove the necessity of an enquiry into the provenance, the meaning, and the use of these terms.

Investigation at the outset is facilitated by the fact that malakat and malakat are used in the Qur'an. Here malakat denotes human as well as divine sovereignty, malakat divine sovereignty alone. In accordance with this it is stated by the commentators7) that malakat is the more 'lefty of the two terms, just as ḥalīṣ and ḫalīṣ are holier than ḥalīṣ and ḫalīṣ. But further malakat and malakat are synonyms7), as appears from sura xxii. 94 and sura xxxvi. 83: "In His hand is the malakat of all things". In this phrase malakat may, however, also mean "treasure"

9) Tabet, Talha, p. 117.
10) Bukhari, Istaurant, b. 8: hadīth ad sura vii. 76.
11) Tabet, Talha, vol. 33 ad sura xxii. 90.
The meaning sovereignty suits also the two other passages of the Qurʾān where malakūt occurs, viz. sūra ii: 75: "In this way we showed Thyth to the malakūt of the heavens and the earth"; and sūra vii. 84: "Have they not looked on the malakūt of the heavens and the earth"? Yet Geiger \(^1\) goes too far by saying that malakūt applies exclusively to the divine government. For the context admits also the interpretation of the phrase by "the visible wonders of heaven and earth", as the commentators remark. \(^2\)

Side by side with the phrase "the malakūt of heaven and earth" the Qurʾān frequently uses "the malakūt of heaven and earth" \(^3\), or "the malakūt of heaven and earth and what is between them". \(^4\)

The commentators have further rightly noticed that the term malakūt is Nabatean, i.e. Aramaic. \(^5\) Dalman has carefully collected the passages in Jewish-Aramaic literature where malakūt in several combinations is used in the sense of "the kingdom of God" or, what is the same, "the kingdom of heaven", for "heaven" is a substrate for "God". \(^6\) Apparently it was not the term malakūt itself that was picked up by Muhammad, but the combination malakūt shemā'it which he took in its literal sense, as appears from the addition "and the earth".

It seems impossible to decide whether Muhammad heard the expressions in Jewish or in Christian circles. At any rate Jewish literature contains such expressions in a cosmic sense, as appears from Ṣeraḥot 58 a: "The kingdom of the earth resembles the kingdom of heaven". This is nearer to the Qurʾānic expressions than the terminology of the Gospel is. Moreover the Qurʾān shows no trace of the eschatological or of the mystic sense which the expression "the kingdom of God" possesses in the New Testament and which appears, though rarely, in later Arab literature. \(^7\)

The term ḥukmūrāt appears for the first time, as far as I can see, in Tradition; wherever it occurs it is combined with malakūt and other terms denoting the sovereignty of Almighty. The formulas are the following: "Siehe an die Herrschaft und Macht des Gottes und der Könige"; "Siehe an die Herrschaft und Macht des Herrn Gottes und der Könige"; the phraseology "glory to the Lord of Power, Sovereignty, Majesty and Greatness"; "Siehe an die Herrschaft des Herrn Gottes und der Könige". It is more frequent in this literature than the term malakūt, especially in the formulae "Herrschaft und Macht des Herrn Gottes" ("to Him [Thee] belongs the glory and to Him [Thee] belongs the kingship") and "Siehe an die Herrschaft und Macht des Herrn Gottes" ("verily the glory and the bounty belong to Thee, and the kingship")

Evidently these expressions have no direct connection with the terminology of the Qurʾān; moreover ḥukmūrāt is new. \(^8\)

\(^1\) Was hat Mohammed von der judischen mitwesen? p. 59.
\(^2\) Tabari, Tal'is, vili. 147; Budhāyī ad sūra vii. 75.
\(^3\) Sūra ii. 110; ili. 186; v. 20, 44, 120; vili. 158; xi. 117; xiv. 42; xiv. 2; xxiii. 45; xili. 48; xiv. 26.
\(^4\) Sūra v. 21; xiii. 9; xiii. 85.
\(^5\) Tabari, Tal'is, vili. 147; Geiger, loc. cit.; S. Frendel, in voceslev. 22.
\(^6\) Die Vier Zeiten, p. 75 seq.
\(^7\) See 2. Horowitz, Jewish proper names and derivatives in the Koran, in Hebrew Union Yearbook, ii. 222.
\(^8\) "Who shall have combined knowledge, work and teaching, he shall be called great in the Kingdom of Heaven" is a well known tradition (Tiranidh, Ḥud, bāb 19): cf. Ante Pael竞技. Lexica in apographe hebraica minus esse, Memor, No. 1.
\(^9\) Nasrī, Tafsīr, Sāq 12, 26, 72, 95; Ahmad b. Manṣūr, vi. 24.
\(^10\) Ahmad b. Ḥanbal, v. 288, 297, 598, 600, 901.
\(^11\) Bukhārī, Albu, b. 152; Abu Dāwūd, Ḥudāib, b. 158 seq.
\(^12\) Duʿârī, Māwī, b. 53, 535; Ahmad b. Ḥanbal, vii. 52, 181.
\(^13\) Cf. Gare de Vaux in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.vs."
This term is, without any doubt, borrowed from Aramaic, just as matzah. We can even indicate its origin with greater precision, in so far as it must be provenient from Christian circles; for the Jews used the deviating form מַתּוֹמֹל, whereas the form used in Syriac, מַזָּהַד, bears a close resemblance to the Arabic one.\footnote{Cf. Payne Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacum*, s.v.; and Furst, *De aramæischen Formenwörter im Arabischen*, p. 178, who mentions מַזָּהַד as a loanword from Christian Aramaic.}

Further it can be stated that neither in Syriac nor in Arabic translations of the Bible the terms מַזָּהַד, מַזְזַהַד, מַזָּהַד of Matthew vi. 13 are rendered by terms corresponding to the triad מַזָּהַד, מַזְזַהַד, מַזָּהַד.

II

The above evidence, however helpful to elucidate the place these terms occupy in Gharzî’s thought, is far from accounting for the special and comprehensive cosmological and mystic notions he connects with them. We must therefore extend our survey to the philosophers and mystics which Gharzî has studied, such as al-Fârâbî († 950), Abu Ṭâlib al-Mašhâ († 996) and Ibn Sīnâ (Avicenna, † 1037).

As is well known the cosmology of the philosophers is based upon the Neo-platonic system of emanation which consists of four chief phases:\footnote{Article Neoplatonism in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*; cf. also M. Horton, *Das Buch der Regierungen Fowreti*, p. 169 sqq., and the *Theologiae de Aristotelis*, p. 104 sqq., 136 sqq.}

1. The One
2. The Spirit (ru’ah)
3. The Soul
4. The material world.

al-Fârâbî has expounded his cosmological system or alluded to it several times in his works. The table printed overleaf may facilitate a survey of the terms used as by him.
It is clear at first sight that the registers i-iii are mere reproductions of the Neo-Platonic cosmology. More interesting is register iv, as it shows the influence of the doctrine of the signs, and chiefly because it introduces specifically Muhammadan notions into the Neo-Platonic system.

For our present purpose the chief question is to know whether the terms malakāt, malākūt and jihārāt occupy a place in the system of al-Farābī. At the outset it may be stated that, as far as I can see, the term malakāt does not occur in his system nor in that of Ibn Sīnā or the Brothers of Bāṣra. As regards the other terms we have some, if scarce, evidence:

al-Farābī identifies the malakāt with the Active Mind in the following passage: "Of the Active Mind it must be said that it is the ‘reliable Spirit’ and the ‘Holy Ghost’ . . . and its rank may be called the malakūt.

It cannot be doubted that al-Farābī uses the term ‘Holy Ghost’ in the Kūr‘i‘ānic sense, so that it would mean one of the highest angels. So the malakūt in the system of al-Farābī is the realm of the highest angels. The lower angels usually belong in the realm of the amēr.

The second passage touching upon the present subject is the following: "The spirit thou possessest is from the substance of the world of the amēr; it does not assume a shape in any form . . . therefore thou art able to perceive what is absent in the past and what is expected in the future, and

1) Cf. sūra xxvii. 192.
2) Cf. sūra xvi. 194.
3) Ms. Leiden, vol. 1803/3, fol. 22r.
4) "We will swim in the world of the malakāt and receive the stamp of the jihārāt."

We shall meet similar expressions several times in the course of our enquiry. The question which must be asked at present is whether al-Farābī uses malakūt and jihārāt in this passage as synonyms. In Fāṣṣ No. 42 he says that the spirit receives impressions from the highest malakāt. Does this mean that in his opinion there exist two malakāt? We cannot decide this question by means of the data to be found in the works of al-Farābī; they are too scarce.

We turn therefore to Ibn Sīnā. The first of the passages we must pay attention to is the following: "When it is the spirit looses itself from the body and its accidents, it may become united to the Active Mind in a perfect union. There it will find eternal beauty and everlasting delight."

This is a close parallel to al-Farābī’s Fāṣṣ No. 26 as cited above. In Ibn Sīnā’s Kātib al-ibārāt there is a passage of this tenor: "Nay, those who are free from all impediments, will obtain, while in the body, a large portion of this delight." From a comparison of this sentence with the foregoing one there ensues the identity, in Ibn Sīnā’s terminology, of the Active Mind and the jihārāt.

1) With this of al-Ghazālī, Mawārif al-taḥqīq, p. 3, where he says that the mind may travel in "the highest malakūt.

2) Cf. also Hurren, Der Buch der Ringen, p. 175 sqq. of the 500 stadia. If an angel’s sphere (majlis) is large enough, it may include other angels’ spheres, or even the earth itself. In the Qur’an we read: "The earth is the dwelling place of angels and of men." (35:38) Thus the angels can visit the earth if they wish. In the same way, the angels can visit the heavenly realms, which are described in various passages of the Qur’an as being similar to the earth, as we shall see later. (p. 190)

The conclusion is that the angels are able to visit the earth, as they are free from all impediments. However, they are not able to alter the course of events, as they are not eternal beings. (p. 191)
Further Ibn Sīnā uses the terms ḍiyārātū and kudā al-ḍiyārātū in the sense of 'the higher worlds'. The latter of the terms reminds us of the fact that al-Fārābī identifies the Active Mind with the rūḥ al-kudūs and the mālaḳātī. In other passages Ibn Sīnā uses the terms al-ʿalām al-dīnā in "the highest world" and ṣawālim al-ḍiyārātū as synonyms of malaḳātī.

The evidence gathered from the works of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā does not appear to be conclusive for the question regarding the mutual relation between malaḳātī and ḍiyārātū. It affords the notion, which will recur in the fundamental idea of Ḥūṣainī, that the human spirit belongs to the realm of the Logos or malaḳātī, that it may elevate itself unto this realm and, perhaps, to the still higher realm of God Himself. In the works of the Brethren of Ḍayr, the term ḍiyārātū does not occur, as far as I can see. Malaḳātī, on the other hand, is frequently used in association with heaven in order to denote the spiritual Paradise to which the human spirit may ascend on the Day of Resurrection or, at moments, even during this life.

Here may follow the translation of a passage which is characteristic for this conception: "Wake up, o brother, from the sleep of abandonment... possibly thou wilt be quickened on the Day of Resurrection amidst the blessed, and ascend to the malaḳātī of heaven and enter into the host of the angels".

This passage is the first to show the eschatological side of the malaḳātī, a connection of ideas which may be due to the influence of Neo-platonism as well as to that of Christianity. As to Neo-platonism I may remind readers of the fact that the Muslim Platonists, who reject the resurrection of the body, emphasize the idea of the immortality of the soul and its entering the spiritual Paradise after the separation from

the body. As to Christianity it is less known, but nevertheless of some importance for our enquiry, that in Syriac malaḳātī may denote heavenly Paradise.

The eschatological meaning of malaḳātī is prominent in the work of Abu Ṭālib al-Makhtī, one of the chief sources of information. This may be illustrated by the translation of some passages from his Kitāb al-bulūb. "The facial eye belongs to the malaḳātī and is turned towards the world, but the eye of the heart belongs to the malaḳātī and is turned towards the world-to-be". And: "The malaḳātī, the world-to-be, in the heart", or "the world of the malaḳātī i.e., the knowledge (maʿrāfa) of the reals and the mysteries", as compared with the expression "the heart is the treasury of the malaḳātī", which is also found in Ḥūṣainī's works.

The first of the passages just cited shows that Abu Ṭālib makes a distinction between the Kur'ānic terms malaḳātī and malaḳātī, in this way that he applies malaḳātī to the visible world. As far as I can see he is the first to do so and it is apparent that Ḥūṣainī, who makes a frequent use of this term, is indebted for it to him.

Finally the two following passages from the Kitāb al-bulūb may be translated as illustrations of the moral relation existing between the three realms in the terminology of Abu Ṭālib: "The preeminence of inward before outward knowledge is like the preeminence of the malaḳātī before the malaḳātī". And: "The malaḳātī is perceived by the intellectual light, the malaḳātī, which is the world-to-be, by the light light, the malaḳātī".

1) Bremkhausen, Lexicon Syriacum, refers to Jobak of Sogd (Völ. Grundr., ed. Assmann, i, 315; cf. also the adjective malaḳātī. p. 314). The treatment is "preeminent". Brandelius, loc. cit.
2) Kt., i, 235.
3) Kt., ii, 32.
4) M. Šuriyāl, p. 104.
5) Kt., l, 156.
6) İb., p. 14, 18.
7) İb., l, 156.
of faith, the divine majesty by the light of certainty and the 
djibrilāt, which is the divine unity, by the light of the higher 
knowledge” 1).

Here the djibrilāt occupies the highest place, that of the 
godhead itself; elsewhere 2) the djibrilāt denotes the divine at-
tributes.

The evidence discussed in the foregoing pages may have 
sufficiently cleared the way for an enquiry into and an under-
standing of Ghazālī’s use of the triad arān, malakāt, and 
djibrilāt.

First of all we shall pay attention to his cosmology. 
Before going into details, in so far as these are of im-
portance for the mutual relation between Ghazālī’s cosmology 
and his mysticism, we must remember, that the former shows 

1) Faqār, i. 245: وُحِّبَ المَلَكُ بِنَبُوَّةِ الْإِنْسَانِ يَسَعِينَ 
المكولون هو الآخرة ونورُ الأmins يفيد العَرَة وهو السفان 
نورُ المعرفة يفيد الحبروت وهو الوحدانية

2) Fāqār, infra, p. 11.
3) ‘Arān corresponds to ‘aib, ‘wār, terms which are also rendered 
by marān.
4) e.g. Murwād, al-ind, p. 124, 136, 159, 203.
5) Murwād, p. 39, 139.
6) Murwād, p. 149.

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Turning now to Ghazālī’s cosmology we shall not be sur-
priised to find that in his works the mutual relation between 
malakāt and djibrilāt appears not to be always the same. 
In his Durra the highest degree is occupied by the djibrilāt, 
as may be seen from the opening passage: “God says: ‘Every 

1) Stra xvi. 36; xix. 16; xxii. 57.
2) Men, animals and birds, according to Gauvin.
4) p. 108 sq.
this high rank, therefore, belongs to the diyahart. Djerdi'1 mentions the identity of the diyahart and the divine attributes and Ghaziili, in another passage, calls God "His Majesty of the diyahart."

The high place attributed to the diyahart in the passages mentioned is not in accord with the mutual relation between malakat and diyahart which appears in Ghaziili's older works. Here may follow the translation of a passage from the Ifri' which does not leave any doubt as to this point. Here personified knowledge in explaining the relation between liberty and determination: "Thou must know" it says, "that the worlds thy way has to cross, are three in number. The first is the world of ma'kh and sensual apprehension), . . . this stage thou wilt pass without difficulty. The second is the world of the malakat; this is beyond me, and when thou hast passed beyond me, thou wilt have reached the stations of that world. In the malakat there are vast deserts, steep mountains and deep seas, so that I do not know how thou wilt be saved in them. The third is the world of the diyahart; it is between the world of the ma'kh and that of the malakat, and thou hast already passed through three of its initial stations, viz. power, will and knowledge. It lies in the middle between the world of ma'kh and sensual apprehension, and the world of the malakat. For the world of the ma'kh has a smoother path, whereas that of the malakat is a rougher track."

"Now the world of the malakat, between that of the ma'kh and that of the malakat, resembles a ship which is moving between the beach and the water; it has neither the inner fluidity of the water nor the outer stability and slowness of

the beach. Everyone who walks on the earth walks in the world of the ma'kh and of sensual apprehension. And when he has sufficient power to sail on a ship, he is as one who walks in the world of the diyahart. And when he has reached such a stage that he can walk on the water without a ship, he walks in the world of the malakat without sinking. But when thou art not able to walk on the water, then go away, for thou hast left the beach behind thee and desolated the ship, and there is nothing before thee but mere water... And everyone who has passed the world of the diyahart and knocks at one of the gates of the malakat, receives revelations through the Pen."

With this passage from the Ifri' we may compare the interesting explanation of it in the Imidi, which runs as follows: "The domain of the world of the malakat is what God has caused to originate in the eternal aim, without graduation, remaining in one and the same state, without increase or decrease. The realm of the world of the diyahart lies between the two worlds; partly it may become visible in the world of the ma'kh, partly it is related to the eternal Power and belongs to the world of the malakat."

The following is to the same effect: "The world is divided

1) Jari'i, p. 71; cf. also the art. diyahart by Cézere de Vaux in the Encycl. of Islam.
2) RIshdr ar-riawfi, p. 148. جابا الجروان
3) Jshdhib.
into the world of the mašākāt, that of the mašalakāt and that of the ḥisbanāt. The world of the mašākāt is that which is apparent to the senses. The world of the mašalakāt is inward, in the minds. The world of the ḥisbanāt is the middle one; it touches on an extremity of each of the two. And so it is man". 8

The last enunciation is explained in the following passage from Ghazālī’s Kitāb al-arba‘ām: “Thou must know that the pure light of knowledge (ma‘rifa) shines from the world of the mašalakāt into the inner heart, for the latter also belongs to the mašalakāt. The other states, such as anxiety, fear, joy, awe etc. descend from the world of the ḥisbanāt, and their abode is the breast, which is the world of the ḥisbanāt. The breast is another world of things, we call it breast, whereas we call the other heart. For the world of the ḥisbanāt lies between the world of the mašalakāt and the sensual world, just as the breast is between the heart and the limbs” 9.

This idea of the relation between man and the super-world — an idea we have already found in the philosophers and which is favorite with the Brethren of Bāṣra" 10 — is essential for Ghazālī’s views; the heart belongs to the mašalakāt. 11

IV

The ḥisbanāt cannot be said to occupy a prominent place in the works of Ghazālī. Full light, on the other hand is

1) Iniż, p. 222: وللذي أن عالم قد أقسم العالم إلى عالم الأمل وهو الذي ينير نوراً على العالم الكوكب وهو الباطن في الزين والعالم الآخر وهو الذي ينظر في كل علم منها والإنسان كذلك.
2) p. 56. On the relation between psychic functions and the ḥisbanāt, cf. also Ḥayy, iv. 225.
3) Ḥayy, i. 91; ii. 33 sq.; iii. 3; iv. 275 sq.
4) Ḥayy, iv. 23; Jihād, p. 61; Mutāḥ, p. 17.

shed on the mašalakāt, which he also calls the amrū, the realm of the ideas. Just as the Muslim Neoplatonism and Ḡazālī places the centre of this world the Preserved Table. The following passage from the Ḥayy 12 enlights this statement: “All that God has decreed from the beginning of the world up to its end is recorded on and fixed in one of the objects created by Him, which is sometimes described by the term ‘The Table’, sometimes by ‘The Perspicuous Book’, sometimes by ‘The Perspicuous Inscription’, as the Kūra expresses it” 13.

“All that has happened and shall happen in the world is written and represented on it in a way which is not discerned by the eyes. Do not think that this Table is from wood or iron or bone that the Book is from paper or parchment. But thou must understand once for all, that the Table does not resemble a material table and that the Book of God does not resemble a material book, just as His essence and qualities do not resemble the essence and qualities of created beings. If thou wantest a comparison to make this clear to thee, take the following: The way in which the decrees are fixed in the Table resembles the way in which the words and letters of the Kūra‘an are fixed in the brain of him who knows this book by heart. It is recorded in his brain, so that is as if he sees it when he recites it. Yet, if thou shouldst examine his brain bit by bit, thou wouldst not find a single letter of this script. In the same way thou must
understood that all that God has decreed is represented on the Table. The Table may also be compared to a mirror in which the forms are reflected. Now if another mirror be placed opposite it, the form of this second mirror will be reflected in the first, except if there should be a veil between the two. Now the heart is a mirror which receives the data of knowledge, and the Table is the mirror in which all the data of knowledge are found. When the heart is occupied by its lusts and the exigencies of the senses, a veil is dropped, which screens it from the sight of the Table that belongs to the world of the malakātā. But when a breeze moves this veil and lifts it up, there flashes in the mirror or the heart something from the world of the malakātā, like a flash of lightning. Sometimes it is constant and lasting, usually, however, it does not last etc.

This world of the malakātā is the only reality; persons as little as shadows possess no real existence. Real existence possesses only the world of the amr and the malakātā; the material world is no more than a shadow, a reflex, an image, a copy of the malakātā, and in the latter there is nothing that has not its likeness on the earth.

It is clear that all this is Platonic or Neo-platonic. In his popular writings Ghazālī does not use the term ideas. In his Muhkamāt, on the other hand, and, though to a smaller extent, also in his Ma‘ārifi, he goes far into the relation between the ideas (malakātā) and their material manifestations (malakātā). God is above all relation, and He has made the

human spirit able to observe the relation between the spiritual and the visible world. This relation, which is an outflow of God’s mercy, makes the visible world (the offprint of the ideas), Nobody can give a complete description of this doctrine of the ideas. Therefore Ghazālī will give a few instances only.

In the malakātā there exist light-substances (fāwāshīrt, ma‘āmara), which are denoted by the name of angels and genies which light is emanated into the hearts of men. Their ranks vary according to their luminous intensity. Their mithāl in the visible world are the sun, the moon and the stars. Other visible things which are symbols of ideas are e.g. writing-table, book and paper. The highest symbol on earth is the human form, for Adam was created as the mithāl of the godhead. For this reason man is a microcosm, and he is able to know his Lord; nobody knows his Lord, who does not know his self.

This relation between the visible world and its heavenly prototypes is general enables man to elevate himself to the super-world. A classical instance of this ascent is that of Abraham, who, according to the Korān, adored successively the stars, the moon and the sun and finally turned to the Creator of heaven and earth: “So we showed Abraham the malakātā of the heavens and the earth.” This is a special charismō of the prophet. But also dreams are a revelation of the super-world, and there is a symbol of dreams.

V

Ghazālī uses malakātā and amr as synonyms. An instance of this identification is found in a passage in which he says that essential being does not belong to the world of shadows,
but "to the world of the amr and the ma'ālûkîn. The heart belongs to the world of the amr. God says: 'Say, the spirit belongs to the amr of my Lord'. The forms of existence, on the other hand, belong to the created world'. "Forms of existence' is the translation of al-‘ilm, the plural of al-‘ilm, i.e. the mould into which metal is cast.

In his Ḥusnī, Ghazâlî gives the following explanation of the verse from the Kūfâni just cited and of the term amr: "Amr does not mean here the opposite of prohibition; for amr in that sense is speech, and the spirit is no speech. Nor does amr mean here thing, so that the sense would simply be that it belongs to the creation of Allah, for this is true for all things created. But the meaning is this: the world is twofold, the world of the amr and the created world, which both belong to God. Now the bodies which possess quantity and dimension belong to the created world, for creating, according to the use of the language, means 'to procure dimensions'. Every being, on the other hand, which is bare of quantity and dimensions, belongs to the world of the amr'.

(The identity of ma'ālûkîn and amr appears also from the fact that in the Lāsimār al-burûrîn, p. 12 sq., it is said that to the ma'ālûkîn belong the angels, the spiritual beings, the spirit, the heart, the ear, the angels, the heavenly angels, and the Cherubim. "The explanation of this is the mystery of the spirit, which may not be divulged, for this would be obnoxious to the large majority of men'.

As to the literal meaning of the term amr, Ghazâlî explains it in the sense of "the world which is predominant (amir) over the created world' '. In this connection it must not be forgotten

1) Risâla xv, 17.
2) Kāfî al-‘arbîn, p. 60 sq.
3) This term is also found in Ḥusnī al-burûrîn, p. 39 sq.
4) ll. 256 sq.; cf. Miskîn’s Kitâb, ii, 86.
5) Ḥusnī iv, 23.

that, also in the opinion of the Arabic philologists, ma'ālûkîn has the meaning of sovereignty', and that Ghazâlî looks upon the ma'ālûkîn as the abode of the angels'.

Ghazâlî has entered into the details of the part of the angels in moving the heavenly spheres in his Ma'ālûkîn and in his Ma'ālûkîn. Each of the heavens is put into motion by an angel especially entrusted with that task; the whole of the spheres is moved by God himself. Yet this view, so he goes on in the Miskîn, supposes a connection between God and celestial motion, which is too direct for abstract thought. According to the latter God has entrusted with this function an angel whom he calls "the obeyed one"'.

This highest angel is identical with him, whom Ghazâlî elsewhere' calls "the high of the divine spirits" and who, as such, is opposed to the whole heavenly host, even to Dżibhi, this angel is also called "the spirit" or Irsâbîn, the Active Mind' and the first being brought forth'. This has been rightly observed by W. H. T. Gairdner' who, however,

1) Vade supra, p. 1.
2) Ḥusnī ii, 21: عالم المخلوق وهو اللوح المحفوظ ومحله البسيطة.
3) p. 54.
4) p. 149.
5) Cf. the description of al-Fażûl’s ideas in de Boer, Geschichte der Phil. in Islam, p. 105 sq.
6) The term is from the Kūfâni (see lxii, 21): " ... سول كرم ... " which, where it also denotes one of the highest angels. The term attâr occurs also Ma'ālûkîn, p. 149.
7) Ma'ālûkîn, p. 15.
8) Ma'ālûkîn, p. 136.
9) Ma'ālûkîn, p. 136, 138, 162.
10) Miskîn, p. 11, 124, 145.
11) p. 20.
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to some extent has obscured this fact by mixing up into
his discussion two questions which ought to be detached
from it. The first is, whether the “obeyed one” may be
identified with the mystic whose ascent and descent is
described in the Makhātī. I cannot now explain my reasons
for keeping this question apart from the one which interests
us presently. I may justify my doing so by saying that in
my opinion it belongs to a different train of thought, as well
as by pointing to the fact that the passages from the Ma‘āriţāj
referred to in the foregoing note, plainly identify the “obeyed
one” with the angel who was the first of the beings brought
forth. It may be added that the Ma‘āriţāj was not yet
published when Gānidār wrote his study referred to abo-

The second question discussed by Gānidār is that of the
spirit mentioned in sūra xii. 87. We have seen1) that, ac-

1) Sura, p. 18.
2) Kūh al-farāsh, Nos. 12, 47.
3) Cf. also Husain, Essai du Ûrmāne, p. 174 sqq.
4) Ma‘āriţāj al-farāsh, p. 7, 10, 59 and the passages referred to in the
 foregoing lines.

VI

The form the Platonian doctrine of the ideas takes in the
mind of Ghaţ kullan, has been seen to encompass the duplicity
of the world.

This duplicity extends also to the sacred texts and it explains
Ghaţ kullan’s attitude towards them. We know this attitude practi-
cially very well from the first book of the Ziyār, where the di-
verse cult, though obligatory, is shown to point to a higher reality.
In his Makhātī Ghaţ kullan has plainly spoken his ideas on this
point. “Do not think,” he says,1) “on account of the examples
given,2) that I should authorize anyone to apply an evapo-
rating method to the plain sense of the texts, or that I should
believe that they may be abrogated, so that I should say e.g.,
there were no sandals with Moses, nor did he hear the com-
mand: put off thy sandals? Beware. Abrogating the plain
sense of the texts is the method of the Batūlīyā, who, single-
eyed as they are, look towards one of the two worlds only,
without thinking of paying attention to both of them. The
Hašwīrī, on the other hand, neglect the hidden sense on
purpose. So he who clings to the plain sense is a hašwīrī,
and he who confines himself to the inward meaning, is a
batūlī; but he who combines the two, is complete. Therefore
the Prophet has said: The Ka‘ārūn has an outward and an
inward sense, an earthly and a heavenly meaning — a tradition
which is also ascribed to ‘Uū. But I say: Moses took the
commandment to put off his sandals in the sense of rejecting
the two worlds1) and he obeyed to its plain sense by putting
off his sandals, to the hidden by rejecting the two worlds2).

As a matter of fact in a few cases only Ghaţ kullan admits an
interpretation of the sacred texts which evaporates their
literal meaning, and which he calls ma‘ārīţāj.
The first instance is the idea of the scales connected with the last judgment, in which either men or their acts will be weighed. Ghazali declares \(^1\) that he rejects the allegorical and the symbolical interpretations. "But I," he goes on, "relegated the scales to the world of the malakūt. For good and evil deeds are accidentia, and the weighing of accidentia can only take place in scales belonging to the world of the malakūt." In the Ḥawā' \(^2\) he calls the scales "spiritual" (rukhsati).

It is clear that this function of the malakūt means an important increase of its value, also in relation with the doctrine of the ideas.

Another instance is to be found in the Ḥawā' \(^3\), where Ghazali speaks of the nature of the punishment in the tomb.

The idea that the infidels are bit and tortured by a host of snakes and scorpions in accordance with the number of their evil properties and the vices produced thereby may be interpreted, he says, in three ways. The first and soundest is to believe that these animals exist and bite the infidels, but invisibly, the eye being unable to perceive what belongs to the malakūt, viz. all the things of the world-to-be. The Companions also believed that Gabriel descended, though they did not see him. Thus the snakes and the scorpions are not of the same kind as those in our world, but of a different kind which is perceived by different senses.

The second way is to think of one who dreams that he is bit by a snake and this causes him such a pain, that he screams in his sleep and sweat drops appear on his forehead and he leaps up. The snake exists for him subjectively \(^4\) and punishment takes place without being perceived objectively.

\(^1\) Darro, p. 69 sq.
\(^2\) p. 28.
\(^3\) Jr. 453.
\(^4\) في على

The third way is to rethink the fact that the torture is the effect of the poison. So the evil properties of the infidel may cause him pains which are equal to the pain caused by the biting of snakes, though the latter do not exist.

The interest of this passage for our present purpose lies in the fact that Ghazali reckons the whole eschatology to belong to the malakūt, a reality which is above the senses. Although this is not the common orthodox view, it is akin to the method of tanzik or hadith as applied to the anthropomorphic statements regarding the godhead. The latter method is of purely Muslim origin, its genesis being the necessity to maintain the orthodox dogma without clinging either to the sensuality of anthropomorphism or to the evaporating methods of Metzilism. Ghazali's method, on the other hand, is based on the doctrine of the ideas and the reality attributed to them.

VII

The essence of the relation between the cosmology of Ghazali and his mysticism is the conception already mentioned \(^5\), according to which the highest organ of man, his heart or spirit, belongs to the world of the malakūt or the amr. Ghazali has worked out this conception in the following way: "Whoever knoweth the mystery of the spirit knoweth his self and whoknoweth his self knoweth his Lord. And who knoweth his self as well as his Lord knoweth that he is a divine being, as to his nature and mood, and a stranger in the corporeal world, and that his descent into this world is not in accordance with his essential nature, but that it is

\(^5\) Cf. the view of al-Makki, as referred to, supra, p. 9.
\(^6\) Vide supra, p. 14.
\(^7\) Ḥawā', iii. 337.
\(^8\) أدرو رآیـ
due to an external cause foreign to its essence. This external cause came upon Adam; it is denoted by the term ‘fall’. It was this that expelled him from Paradise, to which he belonged as to his essence, for Paradise was due to the Lord and he, as a divine being, longed after being near to the Lord, in accordance with his nature and essence. So external causes, from the world that was foreign to his essence, made him turn away from what was congenial to his nature, so that he forgot thereby his self and his Lord.”

This passage is characteristic for Ghazâlî, in so far as it contains Semitic and Neoplatonic elements. Often Ghazâlî mentions Status as the things which occupy man’s heart; but for them, his sight would reach as far as the malakût. So men’s hearts have two gates; one is opened towards the senses, the other towards the malakût and the contemplation of the Preserved Table. The latter is the aim of his life. How can he reach it?

For one part, it is hardly necessary to say, through ascension. “The Prophet has said: Dress yourself in wool, turn up your sleeves and eat so much only as to satisfy half of your appetite, then you will enter the malakût of the heavens.” Jesus has said: O, my disciples, let your stomach be hungry and your body poorly clad; then your hearts may see God.”

For another part, through meditation. “In this period”, viz. when the mystic has cut off the bonds with the world, the heart becomes lucid; reflection becomes easy to him; at these times God’s mysteries in the malakût of the heavens and the earth are revealed to him, a hundred times more

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than during a long period in which his heart is bound by earthly bonds.”

This meditation grants the mystic the highest delight: “Whenever man becomes to meditating upon God’s majesty and greatness and on the malakût of His earth and heavens, findeth therein a delight greater than any other.”

“The delight caused to them by the perpetual contemplation of the wonders of the malakût is greater than the delight of those who direct their gaze towards the trees of Paradise.”

Ghazâlî speaks repeatedly of the way in which the mysteries of the malakût are revealed. A remarkable instance has been translated above; one more specimen may follow here:

“The mysteries receive revelations of the mysteries of the malakût in several ways. Sometimes in the way of inspiration (fiqhân), so that revelation reaches them without their knowing how or whence. Sometimes, while they are awake, in the way of the revelation of ideas (ma’dîn), through the contemplation of parables, just as takes place in dreams. This is the highest degree, which belongs to the degrees of prophecy.”

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1) **Ibîd.,** iv. 70.
2) **Ibîd.,** iii. 169.
3) **Hâfiz.**
4) **Ibîd.** l. 357; ii. 352; li. 18 sect.
5) **Sura.** p. 16.
6) **Ibîd.,** l. 77.
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