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THE STUDY OF AL-ḤAZĀLĪ

by

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The recently published books of Dr. Farid Jabre on al-Ḥazālī, together with the posthumous ‘essay’ of Maurice Bouyges, once again direct the attention of students of Islam to this important Muslim thinker. There has been little detailed work on him since A. J. Wensinck’s La Pensée de Ghazālī (1940) and Dr. Margaret Smith’s Al-Ghazālī the Mystic (1944). The reason is doubtless the somewhat daunting character of such an undertaking. There are few thoroughly reliable texts, and much work to be done on many manuscripts. There are problems about the authenticity of several works. Above all there is the richness, or as Wensinck called it the ‘Protean character’ of al-Ḥazālī’s thought. He was pioneering, constantly exploring the applicability of fresh ideas to a variety of subjects. To use a favourite metaphor of his own, his thought is a vast ocean in which all but the most skilled navigators are liable to lose their way. The present article contains some preliminary considerations about the navigation of this ocean.

§ 1. QUESTIONS OF METHOD

The methodological assumptions underlying Jabre’s work are important, and worthy of fuller consideration than he himself gives them. Out of the large number of books ascribed to al-Ḥazālī he regards a score as constituting a textus receptus, and makes these the basis of his study of al-Ḥazālī’s thought (which, as will be seen in § 2, he holds to be self-consistent throughout). The books included in this textus receptus (and

1 La Notion de Certitude selon Ghazālī dans ses origines psychologiques et historiques (Études Musulmanes, VI), Paris, Vin, 1958; La Notion de la Ma‘rifa chez Ghazālī (Recherches, VIII), Beirut, Lettres Orientales, 1958. (Ref erred to as Certitude and Ma‘rifa). Essai de Chronologie des Œuvres de al-Ghazālī. Beirut, 1959; edited by Michel Allard with notes on subsequent publications. The editor has earned the gratitude of scholars by his competent and painstaking work. This is not affected by one or two small slips; e.g. (p. 59 note) the translation by J. Robson is of the 10th principle of the second part of the Arba‘īn; (p. 80 note) there seems no difficulty in supposing that a falsifier might quote the Iḥyā’, and call it ‘our book’.
placed in chronological order) are those whose authenticity is generally accepted. In thus selecting certain works for primary consideration and neglecting others Jabre intends to leave open the question whether the latter are authentic or not (Certitude 41); and remarks here and there suggest that his inclination is not to reject any work without much more conclusive proof of its falseness than can usually be given.

This method of beginning from a textus receptus appears to be the best way of dealing with the vast and amorphous corpus Gazalianum. A solid foundation is necessary from which to commence operations. If a body of accepted texts such as Jabre uses shows that al-Gazâlî’s thought has a high degree of consistency and, even where it develops, has continuity within the development—and there is good reason for thinking this possible—then this will be a basis for dealing with questions of authenticity. Where a work claims to be by al-Gazâlî it must now be possible to show that the views expressed in it are somehow continuous with those in the textus receptus, even when there are superficial differences. Such a procedure admittedly presupposes consistency and continuity in al-Gazâlî’s thinking, but the more this is shown to be present in the textus receptus, the more justification there is for assuming its existence throughout his genuine writing.

An illustration of this point may be found in Wensinck’s treatment of the conception of cabarût. First he quotes passages from the Īkāya’ and the Imlâ’ where the sphere of the cabarût is described as being intermediate between those of the mulk and the malakût (the worlds of sense and of thought) and corresponding to feeling in man 1. But a few pages later (Pensée 98 f.) he quotes other passages ‘where malakût and cabarût have changed places, so that the latter is the highest’; and he adds that this change in terminology is ‘not surprising since the mutual relation of malakût and cabarût is not constant in al-Fârâbî and Avicenna, authors from whom Gazâlî largely borrowed his cosmological terminology’. This is hardly adequate. If al-Gazâlî has anything approaching the consistency Jabre claims for him, he could not have executed such a volte-face. To maintain Wensinck’s position on this point there would have to be much more discussion of the ideas underlying the terminology, and an attempt to show some continuity in these ideas despite the changes in the words used. If, as seems likely, no such continuity can be found, this would be

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1 Pensée 83-85; there is a much fuller but essentially similar discussion of the point in his article On the Relation between Ghazâlî’s Cosmology and his Mysticism, Mededelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeeling Letterkunde, Deel 75, serie A (Amsterdam, 1933), 183-309 (= no. 6). Al-Gazâlî has a fuller account in Arba‘ūn (Cairo 1344). 49.
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an additional reason for holding that *ad-Durra al-fāṣira*, where the second set of passages is found, is not authentic.

Jabre does the present writer the honour of using an article on ‘The Authenticity of the Works ascribed to al-Gazālī’ to support the details of his *textus receptus* ¹. Since he proceeds, however, to say that questions of authenticity are left open, he is not in fact accepting the main arguments of the article but only the chronological list of works (based mainly on al-Gazālī’s references to previous works). The list has received further general confirmation from Bouyges’ *Essai de Chronologie* ². This work was completed by 1924 but not published, perhaps because the author was not satisfied with it ³. He had, however, made a careful study of many manuscripts, and his conclusions carry more weight than those based only on printed texts. The order of the main generally-accepted works of al-Gazālī is thus fairly well established.

One point of Jabre’s chronology calls for comment. He places the *Mustazhirī* first in the works he considers (*Ceriture* 9), thus rejecting the view of Ignaz Goldziher that it contained a reference to the *Tahāfut* ⁴. A brief justification of his dating of the *Mustazhirī*, though without any reference to Goldziher’s arguments, is given later; but it is based only on subjective impressions of style, and does not give any solid reason for rejecting these arguments or any alternative way of explaining the correspondences between the *Mustazhirī* and the *Tahāfut* noted by Goldziher (*Ceriture* 316, cf. 371). The comparative neglect of this point is unfortunate, for it is one of the chief supports of Jabre’s final conclusions.

It is also strange to find him including a work by al-Cuwayni in the *textus receptus* of al-Gazālī. The reason is that this work, *al-*`Aqida an-Nisāmīya*, was transmitted by al-Gazālī (*Ceriture* 78, note). But this is no justification for including it among al-Gazālī’s own works, however

¹ JRAS 1952, 24-45. In this article there was no mention of *Matīrī al-Quds*, but reasons for holding it to be unauthentic are given by A. S. Tritton in BSOAS, 22/1959, 353.

² The chief difference is the discovery that the *Icām* was apparently completed only a few days before al-Gazālī’s death and must therefore be his latest work. Jabre is aware of this dating and has accepted it (*Ceriture* 374 note, 401), though he has not made the corresponding alteration in his opening list of al-Gazālī’s works. G. F. Hourani, in JAOS, 79/1959, 225-33, is also aware of the date of the *Icām*, but has unfortunately been overtaken by the much fuller work of Bouyges.

³ His dissatisfaction was doubtless due to a realization of the vastness of the total task. This can be seen by comparing the relevant section of Bouyges with Fr. Meier’s full treatment of *Naṣṣat al-mulūk* and *at-Tibr al-masbuk* in ZDMG, 93/1939, 395-408.

close his relation to al-Cuwaynî may be. Actually the treatment of the relation between the distinguished pupil and his chief teacher is one of the weaker parts of Jabre’s study, for once again he argues from subjective impressions; al-Ǧazâ’il ‘is visibly embarrassed by the scholastic presentation ...’ (80), and in the Iqtiṣād he ‘finds himself the prisoner of a terminology and of a complex of ideas which do not satisfy him’ (88; contrast al-Ǧazâ’il’s own favourable view of the Iqtiṣād in Arba’īn, 24; written after Iḥyā’).

Despite these weaknesses in matters of detail and despite the absence of a full justification of the procedure adopted, Jabre’s method is a sound one and ought to lead to a decision of the question between him and the partisans of such a view as Wensinck’s which accepts the existence of serious inconsistencies in the thinking of al-Ǧazâ’il. If Jabre’s method can show the existence of a large measure of consistency, it will be difficult to go on maintaining that al-Ǧazâ’il was a completely inconsistent thinker.

§ 2. Unity and Continuity of Thought

Jabre tends to the view that there is an essential unity in al-Ǧazâ’il’s thought throughout the whole of his textus receptus; and it must be said that he has marshalled a vast amount of evidence to support this view. In the future all scholars who do not accept the unitary character of al-Ǧazâ’il’s thought have the onus laid upon them of demonstrating the contrary. In particular the view of Duncan Black Macdonald (cf. EI1 s.v. al-Ghazzâ’il; also JAS 20/1899, 71-132), the most widely accepted view at the present time, will have to be re-examined. According to this view al-Ǧazâ’il’s career falls into two distinct phases, one where he was a scholastic theologian and one where he was a mystic who had largely rejected scholastic theology. Jabre, after wide researches within the selected limits, gives it as his view that ‘in the sphere of the truths of dogma, properly speaking, the master in his interpretations keeps to the Aṣ’ârite system in its broad lines’ (Certitude 171. Cf. J.-M. Abd-el-Jalîl, Autour de la Sincérité d’al-Ǧazâ’il, Mélanges Louis Massignon, Damascus 1956, 57-72, esp. 70). This is a point which must be taken seriously. It has now received powerful confirmation from the discovery by Bouyges of a date for the Iḥām which makes it the latest of all al-Ǧazâ’il’s works; for the Iḥām is concerned with problems of taḥbîḥ.

1 Chronologie 80-82; there seems no good reason for rejecting this date. It requires a change in the position given to the Iḥām in the list in JRAS 1952, p. 44; but that list is not in strict chronological order, and such a change does not affect the principles on which it is based.

It is important that the crisis immediately after, would have been a decisive modification of Jabre, on the definitions (cf. O. Paschang). It is possible, that in general, of course, it seems to bring character of the closely rowed

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anthropomorphism) which are essentially within the universe of discourse of scholastic theology. Thus, even if al-Gazālī in 1095 abandoned his career to adopt a kind of monastic life, he did not cease to be a jurist and theologian. Though he permitted himself some freedom in speculation, he remained within the broad lines of the central Sunnite tradition.

It is important, however, to go on to ask whether this essential unity of al-Gazālī’s thought rules out all development. It might be expected that the crisis of 1095, not to mention the philosophical studies of the immediately preceding years, and the growth of the inner life in the years after, would lead to modifications in al-Gazālī’s intellectual position. Such modifications might be gradual, but they could hardly fail to come. Jabre, on the other hand, tends to disallow the possibility of such modifications (cf. Certitude 138: ‘à ce point de vue, la pensée de Gazālī n’a pas changé’). His method is to interpret al-Gazālī by himself as far as possible, that is, to compare passages with one another. This is in general, of course, an excellent method, but in his application of it Jabre seems to bring in a dubious assumption about the unitary and unchanging character of al-Gazālī’s thought. This may be illustrated from the conception of ḍawq or immediate experience (sc. of divine things) and from the closely related conception of a faculty above reason.

In the above-mentioned article on The Authenticity of the Works attributed to al-Gazālī it was maintained that in the Munqīd and the Miṣkāt al-Gazālī asserted the existence of a sphere above the sphere of reason, which he called the sphere of ḍawq; this was the characteristic of prophets and saints but was shared in to some extent by ordinary men. In making this point I was primarily putting forward a criterion of authenticity (and not of chronology, though chronology was also involved), and claiming that a work like Miṣrāc as-Sāliḥīn which speaks of reason as the highest faculty could not belong to the closing years of al-Gazālī’s life. At the same time I said that ‘so far as I have been able to discover, the word ḍawq is not used in this special sense in the Ḥiyā’; and that the general view of the Ḥiyā’ was that the results reached by intuition were identical with those reached by reason, and did not belong to a higher sphere. In justification of this statement a passage was quoted from the second-last book of the Ḥiyā’, K. at-Tajākkur: ‘the

1 Ib. 368. A complete understanding, of course, requires also a comparison with earlier Islamic thought. This is particularly illuminating in the case of al-Gazālī, and the discussion of ‘certainty’ would have benefited from a study of the previous use of the word yaqīn. Jabre deliberately neglects the background; cf. his slip (p. 18) in attributing Qat al-qulāb to al-Muhāsibī.

2 iv. 354 (365f.); another passage which might have been quoted is the definition of ‘aqīl in l. 73 f. (75f.), translated in Certitude 449 ff. (In references to the Ḥiyā’...
knowledge of the method of employing and profiting from (sc. such knowledge as one already has) sometimes comes through a Divine light in the heart arising from the natural disposition (fitra), as in the case of the prophets... and sometimes—and this is more usual—comes from study and discipline.

Jabre rightly calls attention to a number of passages prior to the Munqid where dawq is used in the technical sense, and it is very useful to have this further material. Part of the interest of this material lies in the way in which al-Gazâli seems to be working gradually towards the ‘technical sense’ (as found in the Munqid). In several of the passages in the Ihyâ to which Jabre refers, dawq means ‘immediate or actual experience’ but is not restricted to mystical experience. The threefold classification of the Munqid, namely, imân, ʿilm, dawq, may be said to be implied in some passages of the Ihyâ, and is explicitly stated in the Arbaʿîn (esp. Ihyâ iv. 255 (265f.); Arbaʿîn 57; Munqid, Damascus 1939/1358, 135). To the passages listed by Jabre might be added one from the Maqâsid where al-Gazâli says that knowledge by dawq of God’s essence is impossible (Cairo, Ḍâlîma n.d., 20 f.: jann 1, faṣl 4); this shows the complexities of the matter. Despite the existence of these passages, however, the usefulness of dawq (and the conception of a sphere higher than reason), as a criterion of authenticity in respect of books ascribed to al-Gazâli’s closing years, is not impaired. The only adjustment to be made is that the beginning of the ‘dawq period’ has to be placed much earlier, and that there is a greater continuity in al-Gazâli’s thought than had been realized. To say this, however, is not to solve the problem completely, for the passages in the Ihyâ which appear to be contrary to the conception of dawq have still to be explained.

Now Jabre also quotes the above passage from K. at-Tajakkur and agrees that in it no faculty higher than reason is attributed to the prophet; but he then goes on to argue that because of this the passages in the Munqid and the Mishkat which speak of a faculty higher than reason cannot mean what they say—they only mean that prophets know by reason in its state of original purity. He goes so far as to assert that ‘it is a fact that in the Ihyâ al-Gazâli affirms the reality of (types of)

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1 The first figure is that of the edition of Cairo, 1316, the second that of the edition used by Jabre, Cairo 1346 (i), 1352.

2 Certitude 147, note; the second reference to the Ihyâ should probably be to i. 18 of Jabre’s edition (= 16 of that of 1316).

3 E.g. iv. 67 (69)—a man may know by ʿaṣria and dawq that it is possible to become so accustomed to things formerly unpleasant to one that one cannot do without them. Cf. Iqtiṣād (Cairo, Tijâria, n.d.) 102; also Tahâfut 347.6; also Ibn Ruṣd, Tahâfut at-Tahâfut, tr. S. van den Bergh, London 1954, ii. 11 f.

4 He admits 100.
knowledge reserved to prophets without in effect (pou* autant) attributing
to the latter another faculty than that of reason' (Certi†ude 263). Yet
some pages earlier he has quoted a passage from the Ihyā‘ in which
he uses the word ‘faculty’ (though it is only implied by the Arabic):

... reason grasps nothing of the domain of the Lord. What is in this domain
is known by another light, nobler and higher than reason. This light rises in the
world of prophethood and of friendship with God. It is to reason what reason is
to imagination and to the sensuous, estimative faculty (wāhām). (Certi†ude 185;
Ihyā‘ IV 98/100).

It is difficult not to conclude that Jabre has overstated his case and been
carried away by his theories about al-Gazālī to such an extent that he
has failed to notice that there is at least a superficial contradiction which
may perhaps be explained away, but which certainly requires much
fuller discussion.—The matter is further confused by Jabre’s use of the
term ‘raison-instinct’; ‘instinct’ is a modern meaning for ǧaru’a, for
which Lane gives ‘a natural or innate disposition, quality or property’
(cf. A.-M. Goichon, Lexique de la Langue Philosophique d’Ibn Sinā,
Paris 1938, s.v.). Perhaps ‘faculty’ would be a better rendering, but
since al-Gazālī also applies the word to ‘life’, the underlying ma’nā
requires in any case to be discussed.

The root of the trouble appears to be his assumption about the nature of
the consistency to be found in al-Gazālī. He has taken it to be so
absolute a consistency that one passage can be interpreted by another
without regard for chronology 1. Yet this is not the kind of consistency
which Western critics expect to find in great philosophers like Hume
and Kant (cf. Norman Kemp Smith’s distinction between earlier and
later lines of thought in A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’,
London 1923). One of the marks of their greatness is that they do not
reach a facile unified system but, because they are aware of the com-
plexity of their problems, at different times pursue divergent lines of
thought which they never completely reconcile. This would seem to be
the way in which to understand al-Gazālī. The conception of a faculty
above reason was one line of thought which he followed in certain
contexts, and which in his last years was the dominant line. The contrary
conceptions emphasized by Jabre constitute at least one other line of
thought, and it is prominent in many parts of the Ihyā‘, though less
noticeable in later works. The conception of ḍawq seems to have grown
in attraction for al-Gazālī during the composition of the Ihyā‘, which
must have occupied a considerable time, even if there were no breaks in

1 He admits changes in terminology and illustrative material; cf. Ma’rīfa 92,
100.
the course of the work and no later revisions. Little would probably be
obtained by trying to distinguish between earlier and later parts of that
work; but it is worth noting that K. al-Arbâ‘în, which may be taken as
a brief expression of the views held by al-Ġazâlî when he completed the
Ibâyâ, follows mainly the gawq line of thought.

Another point at which Jabre seems to overemphasize al-Ġazâlî’s
earlier thinking and to neglect his later views is the question of the
central problem of his life and thought. For Jabre this is the question of
certitude or how to attain certainty about the main truths of Islam.
Now this was undoubtedly the central problem at the time of his first
intellectual crisis, when for two months he doubted everything. But at
the time of the second crisis in 1095, when he left Baghdâd, the thought
that was uppermost in his mind (according to his own later account in
the Munqîd) was the avoidance of hell and the attainment of everlasting
life. This was recognized by Wensinck: ‘of Saul it was said that he went
out to look for asses and found a kingdom; of Ġazâlî it can be said that
he went out to look for certain knowledge and found God’ 1. The quest
for certainty marks a state of doubt and uncertainty, but when al-Ġazâlî
wrote the Ibâyâ and his later works there was no longer any doubt and
uncertainty in his life. He did not doubt the truths of God, the Last
Day and prophethood; his concern was to avoid God’s condemnation
and to learn how to ‘come near’ to him. On the intellectual side his
concern was how to describe and explain the experiences of the ġufis—
ittihâd (unification) and ġulûl (inheritance) were incorrect descriptions,
but qurb (nearness) was permissible and adequate 2.

In the form, then, in which al-Ġazâlî conceived his central problem
there has been, as was only natural, a development in his thought, and
Jabre has made the earlier thought the basis of his account. Some
recognition of development would have produced a more satisfactory
account of the thinker. In matters of this kind the truth is in the golden
mean between absolute logical consistency and inconsistency without a
trace of continuity. The aim of the scholar and critic should be to show
that beneath differences of expression, of emphasis and even of view
there is a discernible continuity. What was desiderated in the previous
section was such a limited consistency which included the possibility of
development.

1 Semitische Studien uit de Nalatenschap, Leiden 1941, 167; Wensinck thinks
it was not so much fear of hell in the future that moved al-Ġazâlî as a present sense
of being abandoned by God (ib. 169).
2 It is noteworthy that qurb does not occur in Jabre’s ‘Index Lexicographique’
in Certitude.

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§ 3. AL-ĠAZĀLĪ AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

Both in La Notion de Certitude and in his earlier article on ‘La Biographie et l’Oeuvre de Ghazâlî …’ (MIDEO 1/1954, 73-102) Jabre has valuable insights into the importance for al-Ġazâlī’s thought of the contemporary political movement of the Bâṭinites, Ta’lîmîtes or Assassins. In emphasizing how the need for countering this movement has helped to shape al-Ġazâlī’s conception of prophethood, and how he must have been shaken by such events as the assassination of Nizâm al-Mulk in 1094, Jabre has made a real contribution to our understanding. Once again, however, he allows his own ideas to run away with him so that he exaggerates unnecessarily.

One example of this, already mentioned, is the weakness of his justification for dating the Mustâzhirî before the Tahâfut. Another, closely connected, is his contention that the philosophers were merely another facet of the Bâṭinite movement and that it was in order to refute the Bâṭinites that al-Ġazâlī took up the study of philosophy (Certitude 291-3, 316f., etc.; on p. 371 the Tahâfut is said to be directed against a group of Bâṭinites). Now there were links between philosophy and Bâṭinitism, and some persons connected with philosophical groups became Bâṭinites. But the main exponents of each type of thought must have remained distinct from one another. The men against whom the arguments of the Tahâfut were directed (and whose views are summarized in Magāṣid al-jalâsîf) could hardly at the same time have held that ultimate truth was attained by resort to the infallible imâm.

From insisting on the central place of al-Ġazâlī’s reaction to Bâṭinitism Jabre goes on to suggest that his departure from Baghdad in 1095 was not due to ‘an exclusively religious motive’ as he himself claims in the Munâqīd, but to a certain sense of political opportunism; to put it bluntly, he ran away to avoid being assassinated. Even if this hypothesis is to be replaced by another, ‘the religious motive cannot be considered as the sole source of the master’s decision in this situation; the real explanation must be sought elsewhere’ (Certitude 388 f.; cf. La Biographie 89 f.). About this there are two points to be made.

The first point is that to speak of the ‘real’ explanation as being sought elsewhere than in the religious motive alone is to imply that the latter has a certain unreality—a lapse into ‘positivistic interpretation’ which can hardly be Jabre’s considered verdict on the matter. Jabre’s view is

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1 Abd-el-Jalil (Mêlanges Louis Masségnon 72) pleads with scholars not to take away the religious content of al-Ġazâlī’s work by resorting to ‘positivistic’ interpretations.

2 It contradicts his claim that the problem of certainty was central throughout al-Ġazâlī’s life.

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just as one-sided as it would be to say that his own two books may be dismissed as a study of al-Gazālī, since they are ‘really’ a literary expression of Arab nationalism. His work is not free from this political influence, but nevertheless it is worthy of discussion as a contribution to scholarship—indeed it is one of the most distinguished contributions to Islamic scholarship from the pen of an Arab during the last half-century. The truth is that religion permeates the whole of life, even if the modern West tries to think of it as a separate compartment. Every human decision has its religious aspect, though in many cases this may be unimportant and negligible. Sometimes there are grounds for distinguishing between what a man alleges his dominant motive to be and what it ‘really’ is, though to make such a distinction is always a delicate matter. The more a man’s life is an integrated whole, the more he is conscious of all that moves him to act and the more he sees everything in a religious perspective. The religious aspect is not separate from the social, political and economic aspects but is intertwined with them, sometimes as a kind of resultant from the other factors, but at other times exercising control over them.

From this first point follows the second—that it is not possible to single out a small part of the political field and try to explain al-Gazālī’s conversion by this alone. All the Islamic religious movements of previous centuries had political aspects, even if it was only political impotence in the face of ‘Abbāsid, Būyid or Seljuq autocracy. Al-Gazālī must have been influenced by the political attitudes linked with the various movements which went to his formation—theologians, jurists, philosophers, Bāṭinītes, mystics. Was Barthold right in speaking of the Bāṭinīte movement as ‘the last struggle of the Iranian Ritterum’? What was the effect of the support of Aṣ’arism by the Seljuqs? Why was there a growing interest in ṣūfism among Aṣ’arītes and even Ḥanbalītes? Had it something to do with the break-down of the power of the caliph? If we are to understand al-Gazālī’s views in the contemporary social and political setting, an answer has to be attempted to all these questions and many like them ¹.

In the above remarks attention has been concentrated on one or two fundamental points, chiefly of method, in Jabre’s treatment of his subject. There has been no attempt to summarize his argument in detail or even to outline his main conclusions. So much ground is covered that any such undertaking would be difficult. Let it suffice to warn the reader

¹ Jabre does not consider the previous religious movements even in their intellectual aspect. There is no mention of the use of yaṣīn by ṣūfī writers. It is significant that in his Bibliography (p. 18) he ascribes Qūt al-qulūb to al-Muḥāṣibī.
that the treatment has been of this kind. What has been said, however, will make it clear that Jabre’s strength is not in the presentation of a general view of al-Gazālī, for his account is unsatisfactory in various respects. His two books are indeed most valuable, but it is for their collection and discussion of passages linked with the themes of yaqīn and ma’rifa. If there is one point that stands out particularly, it is al-Gazālī’s attachment to orthodox Islam to the end of his life. From now on all students of al-Gazālī will have to pay careful attention to what Jabre says, and will have much to learn from him. They will also look forward to the publication of the Lexique on which he appears to be working.