ward aw al-ward al-murabbā aw sharāb al-kummatrā which is translated "such as a drink of unripe, sour grapes, the two kinds of pomegranates, [different — G.B.] kinds of apples, roses, preserved roses, or plums". (p. 120) A clearer translation would be "such as a potion of verjuice or of the two kinds of pomegranates, or of various kinds of apples, or of roses, or of preserved roses, or of pears." There is inconsistency in the translation of types of preparations, e.g. sharāb is sometimes "drink" (e.g., p. 104), sometimes "syrup" (e.g., p. 117) and sometimes "potion" (e.g., p. 126); maghāsīl is normally "washed" (e.g., pp. 108, 119) but occasionally "boiled" (e.g., p. 117 — the latter translation is possibly to be preferred, in the context of bread pulp). Admittedly, words can have multiple meanings (as in the case of mā', sometimes "water," as in rose-water, and sometimes "juice," as in pomegranate juice), but in many cases it is unclear why a particular translation was chosen. In a very few cases, phrases were not translated at all (l. 532: wa-sharāb al-banāfaj; l. 572: wa-duln banafay) or were completely mistranslated (l. 757: balghamāni, "phlegmatic," translated as bilīins [p. 134]; l. 836: bibnānāj, "chamomile," translated as violets [p. 138]).

The typeface, both in English and in Arabic, is clear and easy to read, and there are almost no typographical errors. Despite the problems noted above, this is both an important project, giving a wide public access to a seminal work, and one sincerely hopes that Gerrit Jos will carry on his good work.

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In latter-day Greek antiquity, Neoplatonic philosophers wrote paraphrases of most of Aristotle's works. Their interpretation of Aristotle in the light of their Neoplatonic views. Manuscripts of these paraphrases survived among the Syrian Christians. In the eighth century the Muslim Caliphs ordered the Christians to render those "Neoplatonic-Aristotelian" works into Arabic. Somewhat later Muslim and other Arabic-speaking individuals philosophized on the basis of these translations, which they thought to be purely Aristotelian works. This is how Islamic philosophy came to be.1 The philosophers asserted that religion is a symbolic representation of the philosophic truths, intended for the masses. The theologians on their part initially ignored the philosophers. Later on they declared them to be unbelievers. In the eleventh century the well known theologian and mystic al-Ghazālī composed a refutation of Islamic philosophy. According to him, the philosophers are unbelievers and deserve to be put to death on account of three of their tenets, namely a) that the world is eternal and uncreated, b) that God knows only the universals of the objects in our world, but not the particulars, c) that there will be no resurrection of human bodies after death.

The purpose of the work under review is to show first that al-Ghazālī's denunciation of Islamic philosophy was one of the main causes of its decline in the Islamic East from the second half of the eleventh century onwards, and also that by restricting his denunciation of Islamic philosophy to the above-mentioned three tenets and by openly discussing other aspects of this philosophy, al-Ghazālī paved the way for the absorption, from that period onwards, of philosophical terms, concepts and methods into Ash'ari kalām, which was, and still is, the mainstream school of Sunni Muslim theology.

To achieve this goal, the author traces the attitudes toward unbelievers and unbelievers from the Qur'ān and the hadith and early Islamic law through the various schools of theology of Sunni Islam during the tenth century to the denunciation of the philosophers in the eleventh century. The last chapters deal with the reaction of the philosophers in twelfth century Muslim Spain to al-Ghazālī. The author also amply describes the events of political history as the background of theological developments. Thus the book may serve as a detailed history of Muslim

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1 On pp. 6-7 the author correctly calls the Islamic philosophers "neoplatonisch-
aristotelisch." Why then does he throughout the book call them "peripatetisch"? If
most strangely on p. 1 he includes Abū Bakr al-Rāfi'i among the "peripatetisch!"
theology from its very beginnings up to the end of the eleventh century and of Muslim philosophy in Spain during the twelfth century.

Griffel examines the attitudes towards unbelievers. There were two pairs of opposites. On the one hand Islam and exclusion from Islam; on the other hand belief and disbelief. As long as a distinction was made between these two pairs of opposites, that is, as long as an unbeliever was not considered to cease being a Muslim, the Muslim unbelievers were tolerated within the Muslim community. Once they were considered to coincide, Muslim law ruled that unbelievers deserved the penalty of death.

The position of the Qurʾān on this question is not altogether unequivocal. At any rate the so-called muṣāfīqīn continued to be members of the Muslim community although they were held to be unbelievers. The Qurʾān rules that only those who actively rebelled against Muhammad and his community are to be killed.

By dint of its very nature, the hadith literature reflects different, sometimes conflicting, opinions. Griffel was able to point out two differences between the Qurʾān and some hadiths. Unlike the Qurʾān, some hadiths declare that if a Muslim reverts to unbelieving and afterwards repents, God will not accept his repentance. Others say that such a person should be killed. Indeed, Griffel assumes on the basis of hadiths that in the first centuries of Islam it was common opinion that a Muslim who reverts to unbelief was to be put to death. But in some of the traditions Griffel quotes, the Prophet is said to have forbidden to kill people who affirm that they believe in one God. Other traditions say that such people should be killed if they refuse to perform the prescribed prayer (ṣalāt) and to pay the so-called “alms tax” (zakāt).

According to early Muslim jurisprudence a Muslim who reverts to another religion is to be put to death unless he repents. But a few lawyers denied him the right of repentance (fažūb). Initially the jurists ruled that no right of repentance was to be granted to a zandūq. But

soon al-Shāfiʿī (died 820) granted the right of repentance to zandūqīya as well.

During the first decades of the eleventh century there were in Baghdad intense feuds between Shiʿa and Sunnis. After the moderately Shiʿa Buwayhi rulers had eased their hold on the city, the caliph al-Qādiri proclaimed a Sunni traditionalist credo (al-ʾṛtaq al-qādiri). It states inter alia that whoever claims that the Qurʾān is created is an unbeliever whose blood may be spilled after he has been called upon to repent. This was aimed of course at the Muʿtazila. Griffel points out that this is the earliest case of a caliph condemning a whole group of theologians as apostates. He argues that this condemnation of staunch Muslim believers (scil. the Muʿtazila) as unbelievers whose blood may be shed did not agree with earlier Muslim legal opinion and must reflect a change of opinion of the jurists. A few pages later Griffel describes what al-Qudurī’s contemporary, the famous Hanafi jurist al-Qudurī laid down in his Muhkaṭas. The “apostate” is to be imprisoned for three days to make him repent. If he repeats he ought to be released. If not, he is to be put to death. Women should not be executed, but kept in prison. This agrees, says Griffel, with the opinion of earlier lawyers, except that al-Qudurī no longer accepted the mere recitation of the shahādā as evidence of repentance. According to Griffel the reason was that whereas the early jurists had to deal with new converts to Islam holding on to their old beliefs, al-Qudurī and his contemporaries and lawyers dealt with Muslims who expressed doubts about some of the principles of the official “orthodox” creed.

In his hieroscopy entitled al-Tanbih, written in 962, the traditionalist al-Malātī classifies a group called al-muʿattila. Griffel identifies them with the Islamic philosophers, and considers this to be the earliest condemnation of these philosophers.

2 The verses referred to on p. 24, note 2, except the last one, speak of God leading men astray. But in none of them does the root ṛ-d-i appear. — On pp. 24-25 the Qurʾānic phrase man qurtālas muskūm ’an dināh is quoted. Since the eight form of the verb is a “Relativuum,” and not a “Passivum” as Griffel claims, the phrase should be rendered “wee von euch sich von seiner Religion abweicht” (pace Paret).

3 On pp. 56-57 a hadith is quoted according to which adultery, homicide and apostasy are to be punished by stoning. Griffel says that the historical context in which this was transmitted is suspect. One may add that the trial of capital sins is suspect of belonging to the ʿird-dīgīt. Cf. Babylonian Talmud, B Makkot 74a: Three sins one is not permitted to commit even if one was going to be killed for avoiding them: bloodshed, idolatry and adultery (also incest).

4 At that early stage zandūqīya or a believer in a similar dualistic religion, or a person suspected of holding such views. Griffel cites Josef van Eers who showed that even then the term sometimes referred to hol-de-ausible beliefs considered by the establishment to be dangerous. In later centuries the word became

5 A general term of abuse for all kinds of heretics, especially intellectualist ones. Griffel for some reason claims that at the early period the word meant “clandestine apostate.” Indeed under Muslim rule people who held dualistic beliefs, especially pastors in the ‘Abbasid period, usually tried to hide these beliefs. But does this justify one in defining zandūqīya as “clandestine apostate”? The passage quoted on page 88 from al-Jahisīyūsī shows that secrecy was not considered a necessary element of zandūqīya.

6 I am not sure whether the phrase “whose blood may be spilled” means that anybody who kills him goes unpunished, or, as Griffel understands, that this is a command to inflict capital punishment on the “unbeliever.”

7 The author uses the terms Apostate and Apostate in the title of his book as well as throughout. An apostate is a person who chooses to disassociate oneself from his community. Griffel applies the term to those persons as well as to those persons to whom judges by others to have left considered themselves to be good Muslims, but were judged by others to have left the fold of Islam.

8 L. e., “those who render [the notion of God] vacant” by denying His attributes.

9 Not “die jemandem etwas wagen.”

10 He anachronistically describes in this context the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā, born 18
During the ninth century traditionalist-Hanbali theologians such as Ahmad b. Hanbali and Abū Sa‘īd al-Dārīrī identified "belief" with "Islam," thus considering the unbeliever to have ceased being a Muslim and to deserve capital punishment unless he repents. Al-Dārīrī only grudgingly allowed the unbeliever the right to perish. But in the tenth century the Ḥanbalī theologians distinguished between "Islam" and "belief" and between those who are unbelievers but still belong to the community and those who are not considered to be Muslims and thus are to be put to death. The new attitude, recorded already in al-As‘ārī’s maqālāt, is explained in Ibn Báṭṭa‘ṣ creed. According to him, only one who associates partners to God or one who denies the necessity to perform one of the religious duties is to be considered to have left the fold. This new opinion is also expressed in the above-mentioned creed of the caliph al-Qādirī.

The Mu‘tazilī theologians al-Nāṣī‘ī al-Kakbār (9th century), al-Qādirī ‘Abd al-Jabbārī (10th-11th century) and the latter’s commentator, MānakDIS, displayed a very tolerant attitude. Whoever prays facing Mecca and seeks to know God is considered a believer. Even the perpetrator of a cardinal sin, whom Mu‘tazilī theory relegates to a status between believer and unbeliever, is to be treated in this world as if he were a believer.

‘Abd al-Jabbārī’s contemporary, and prominent exponent of the As‘ārī school, Abū Bakr al-Baqillānī, ruled that an unbeliever was one who claimed that God’s word is untrue, but even then he was to be considered a Muslim as long as he declared himself to be one and fulfilled the commandments. Grisell adds that since al-Baqillānī has formulated a clear-cut criterion for exclusion from Islam, his lost refutation of the Iṣlāmīs is likely to have included the argument that the Islamic philosophers are not to be considered Muslims.8

At the end of the tenth century the Buwayhī and the Samanī rulers encouraged the spread of philosophy. But at the instigation of the caliph al-Qādirī, Mahmūd of Ghazna conquered Rayy, the capital of Iran, in the year 1018, murdered Ismā‘īlīs, Iskānī Shi‘īs and Mu‘tazīs, and burned their books and those of the philosophers.

The As‘ārī ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Baghdādī in his hagiography, written in 1030 in Nishāpūr, distinguishes clearly between unbelief and exclusion from Islam. Only ʿaḥ ʾal-su‘a wa l-jamā‘a are described by him as believers. The other groups, all of whom he considers to be unbelievers, are catalogued under two headings: 1) ʾaḥ ʾal-ḫawāṣṣ, sectarians such as the Khawārij and the Mu‘tazīs, 2) those who wrongly consider themselves to be Muslims” such as the Iṣlāmīs and other extreme groups. ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Baghdādī seems to have been the first who set up a doctrinal criterion for membership in Islam. According to him, one who believes in the following eight articles is a Muslim: 1) the world has been created; 2) the Creator is One and has non- anthropomorphic attributes; 3) Muhammad is God’s prophet to all mankind; 4) the shari‘a is forever valid; 5) all of Muhammad’s messages are true; 6) the Qur‘ān is the source of the Law; 7) the Ka‘ba in Mecca is the qibla; 8) Muslims are obliged to pay the “alms tax,” to fast during Ramadān and perform the pilgrimage to Mecca. Whoever denies one of these points is to be put to death unless he repents.

During the first half of the eleventh century masses of Turcoman tribesmen invaded the Eastern Islamic world, ravaged it, and soon dominated it. In 1040 they established the Saljuq sultanate with Tughrilbeg as sultan. They embraced Islam and in accordance with the traditionalist Hanbali school.8 When the caliph al-Qa‘īm officially invested Tughrilbeg, he ordered him to fight the dissenters. Not only the last surviving Buwayhī princes and the well-to-do merchants who used to encourage philosophic learning were victims of the ensuing persecution in Iran. Along with the Shi‘īs and the Mu‘tazīs, the As‘ārīs were rounded up as well. Four hundred As‘ārī theologians fled Iran. Grisell argues that the people co-operated with the authorities in persecuting the As‘ārīs, the people co-operated with the authorities in persecuting the As‘ārīs, the people co-operated with the authorities in persecuting the As‘ārīs, the people co-operated with the authorities in persecuting the As‘ārīs.

Alp Arslān, Tughrilbeg’s nephew and successor as sultan, nominated Nizām al-Mulk to be his wazīr. The latter rehabilitated and encouraged the Hanbalīs. On the other hand, the Caliph supported the Hanbalīs. In 1077 fights broke out between these two schools. Each side declared its adversaries to be unbelievers. For the As‘ārīs “unbelief” did not mean exclusion from Islam. According to them, an unbeliever was to be imprisoned, then an unbeliever was to be imprisoned, then an unbeliever was to be imprisoned, then an unbeliever was to be imprisoned, then an unbeliever was to be punished in Hell, not in this world. But the Hanbalīs took “unbelief” to mean exclusion from Islam and that the unbeliever should be deprived of his civil rights or put to death; this is what they thought the As‘ārīs meant when they called them “unbelievers.”

The Hanbali hagiographer Abū Ya‘lā al-Farrā‘ī (died 1096) — who was qādī ‘l-qudā‘ at the Caliph’s palace from 1055 — ruled that all unbelievers have to be called upon three times to repent. If they do not repent they are to be put to death. He equated unbelief with exclusion from Islam. Basing himself on ṣū‘a‘ (consensus), he included the Islamic philosophers among the unbelievers.

8 On p. 227, note 3, read: “EI², iii, 755f.” (not: 76f.).
His contemporary, Abi `l-Hasan al-Mawardi (died 1058), a Shafi'i, held that it was not necessary to ask the unbelievers to repent; one could execute them immediately.\footnote{On p. 241 the author assumes that al-Mawardi considered the philosophers to be sứاد, who deserve to be put to death. But two pages earlier he states that al-Mawardi does not mention the philosophers at all. Al-Mawardi describes the groups to be tolerated as few people dispersed here and there who do not disobey the ruler of the community (quotation on p. 239). Does this description not fit the philosophers perfectly? Al-Mawardi’s interest was law and orner and the security of the realm. The philosophers did not endanger these.}

Al-farabi, as well as Ibn Sinâ and his disciples, taught that religions are systems of symbols, similitudes of the philosophical truths, intended for those who are not able to understand these truths. Nevertheless Ibn Sinâ and his disciples considered themselves to be Muslims.\footnote{It is strange that Griffler writes on p. 292 that in the twelfth century the Ashurîs did not mention the philosophical tradition in Islam. Al-Shahrastâni (died 1153) devotes several pages in the last part of his al-Milad wa l-mihr to Ibn Sinâ and the later philosophers.}\footnote{At the bottom of page 306 Griffler claims that al-Ghazali accuses the philosophers of tâdÃh al-nabi referring to al-Iqtiyâd fi l-taqid and and al-Munqidh min al-dalalât. But there (ed. 1. A. Quburcu and of tâdah al-nabi referring to al-Iqtiyâd fi l-taqid and and al-Munqidh min al-dalalât. But there (ed. 1. A. Quburcu and H. Atay, Ankara 1962, p. 249, line 6) al-Ghazali says of the philosophers: yudâd limas. H. Atay, Ankara 1962, p. 249, line 6) al-Ghazali says of the philosophers: yudâd limas.}

Nizâm al-Mulk, the vizier of the Selçuk sultan Alp Arslân, ruled that only the Hanafis and the Shafi’is’ schools of law should be tolerated. Whoever deviated from them should be hogged and is permitted to shed his blood. In his Siyasaât nâmeh, written about 1071, he laid down that all Shi’is, even the Imamiyya, are unbelievers who should be put to death. This intolerant attitude was triggered off by the danger of the successful Isma’ili da’wa (mission), which catered for all classes of society and was very attractive to intellectuals. Even at the court of Mâlikshâh, Alp Arslân’s successor, its influence was felt. Initially the Isma’ili mission was directed by the Fâtimi caliph in Cairo. It later became independent under Hassân-ı Sâbîh.

In 1091, a year before Nizâm al-Mulk was killed by an Isma’ili assassin, he invited al-Ghazali (died 1111) to teach at the Madrasa Ni’zamiyya in Baghdad. Somewhat later the Caliph ordered him to write refutations of the Isma’iliya. Al-Ghazali wrote several such refutations, the most famous among them being Fadâ’îh al-Bâtinîyya. One of the methods of the Isma’ili missionaries was to arouse doubts about the veracity of the senses. The truth can be known, they claimed, only by way of ta’rîf, the authoritative teaching of the imâm, sci. the Fâtimi caliph. Al-Ghazali refuted this kind of scepticism and discussed the quiddity of knowledge. He argued that ta’rîf, the authoritative teaching of the imâm, was unnecessary if one was to apply a strict methodology in theology. Nevertheless, as a result of his involvement in this argumentation, al-Ghazali’s own thought became deeply affected by scepticism.\footnote{At the bottom of page 305 Griffler claims that al-Ghazali accuses the philosophers of tâdah al-nabi referring to al-Iqtiyâd fi l-taqid and and al-Munqidh min al-dalalât. But there (ed. 1. A. Quburcu and H. Atay, Ankara 1962, p. 249, line 6) al-Ghazali says of the philosophers: yudâd limas. Griffler translates this sentence correctly on p. 301, line 11.}
'A'sha, the Prophet’s wife, did not commit adultery; 2) the obligation to pray five times a day. But if someone produces a really decisive proof that any other verse in the Qur’an or some other hadith cannot be understood literally and must be interpreted metaphorically — he should not be considered an unbeliever.

In the second half of Faysal al-tafriqa bayn al-Islām wa’l-zandaqah, as well as in al-fatāsiṣṣī bā’il-taqād, al-Ghazālī’s criterion for unbelieving involving capital punishment is takdīḥ al-nabi, i. e., “considering the Prophet to be a liar,” that is, disbelieving him. Griffl points out that al-Ghazālī’s use of the terms tasdiq and takdīḥ differs from that of his Ash’arī predecessors in two ways. First, while they speak of believing God to be truthful or holding that He lies, al-Ghazālī speaks of considering the Prophet to be truthful or untruthful. Secondly, al-Ghazālī’s use of tasdiq is influenced by Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical terminology in which hadith denotes “judgement” as against tasdiq, “opinion.” Griffl points out that in several of al-Ghazālī’s works — as well as in the writings of some Ash’arī theologians in his days — notions and terms derived from Ibn Sīnā are to be found. He adds that the fact that al-Ghazālī ruled that the philosophers’ unbelief is restricted to three tenets only made possible the absorption of philosophical notions and terms in Ash’arī kalam from the twelfth century onwards.

The rest of the book deals with the question how the later Islamic philosophers, mainly in Spain, reacted to al-Ghazālī’s teachings. Griffl says that the fact that the Saljuqs supported dualist Islam and that the merchants could no longer afford to support philosophic learning, led to the decline of Islamic philosophy in the East during the second half of the eleventh century. But, he argues, what caused this decline to be so rapid is al-Ghazālī’s condemnation of three tenets of the philosophers (p. 340). On the other hand he tells us that al-Ghazālī’s contemporary, the Persian philosopher Abū ‘l-Abbās al-Lawkārī, a follower of Ibn Sīnā, had many disciples in Iran (pp. 342 and pp. 351–352).16

The next chapter deals with the two religious movements, both of which started among the Berbers of the Maghrib and eventually conquered al-Andalus as well as the Maghrib, one in the second half of the eleventh century, the other in the first half of the twelfth century. The Murābiṭūn (Almoravids) adopted the teaching of the Maliki school of jurisprudence, which based its decisions on legal precedents and on the legal opinion of the jurists, rather than on the tradition of the Prophet. Their jurists concentrated on practical law (futu’ah) and did not deal with the principles underlying it (asā’il al-fiqh). At first they contacted al-Ghazālī, who helped them to get the Caliph’s recognition. This lead to the spread of al-Ghazālī’s books in al-Andalus. But when they found al-Ghazālī’s use of philosophical terms and notions, as well as a condemnation of the exclusive pursuit of practical law (futu’ah) without studying the principles underlying it (asā’il al-fiqh) in these books, they publicly burned them.

The Muwahhidūn (Almohads) on the other hand stressed God’s unity, transcendence and ubiquity in terms derived from Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy. Under the Murābiṭūn the Maliki jurists allowed no distinction between “belief” and “Islam” and excluded from the Muslim community anyone person whom they called an unbeliever. They demanded the death penalty for such persons, and tended not to grant them the chance to repent. They interpreted al-Ghazālī’s works as agreeing with this intolerant attitude.

The Murābiṭ rulers favoured the philosophers, but their courtiers as well as the theologians persecuted them. The philosopher Ibn Bājja (Avempace), died 1139) served at their court. He came to the conclusion that the ideal state, ruled by a philosopher, described by al-Fārābī, is impracticable. Therefore the philosopher living in one of the existing corrupt states should live in solitude, avoiding the society of men, unless they are “men of wisdom,” and strive alone to achieve conjunction with the Active Intellect. Disagreeing with al-Fārābī, Ibn Bājja has no use for religion. He rejects al-Ghazālī’s mysticism. He avoids mentioning the three tenets on account of which al-Ghazālī considered the philosophers to be unbelievers. Griffl finds an affinity between Ibn Bājja and the philosopher in the prologue of Juda ha-Levi’s Cuzari.

The philosopher Ibn Tufayl (1116–1185) started his career as court physician of the Murābiṭ ruler of Granada and ended up as court physician and political counsellor of the Muwahhid caliph Abu Ya’qūb Yusuf. Griffl believes that Ibn Tufayl’s allegory Hayy ibn Yaqẓān not only symbolizes the harmony of philosophy and religion, and the philosopher’s capacity to achieve conjunction with the Active Intellect by himself, but — following W. Montgomery Watt’s interpretation — that it also mirrors the philosopher’s role in Muslim society and the Muwahhidin’s religious policy. The philosophical message of the work is Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy as “corrected” by al-Ghazālī.17

Abū Ya’qūb Yūnus commissioned Ibn Rushd (1126–1198) to write commentaries on the works of Aristotle. In his commentaries Ibn Rushd sought to “purify” Aristotle’s works by omitting not only the interpretations and additions of the commentators, but Aristotle’s own non-apodictic statements as well.

Apart from philosophy Ibn Rushd studied Islamic law and kalam, and eventually became qādi ʿl-qādî to Cordoba. In his Badgīyat al-muṣṭafā he urges those jurists who have attained the highest level of

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16 Is this a sign of decline?

17 It seems that Griffl has disregarded the mystical overtones in Hayy ibn Yaqẓān.
learning to avoid taqfid (reliance on earlier decisions of the school) and base their decisions on the Qur'an, the hadith and the consensus of the jurists. The other jurists will have to rely on taqfid just like the common people. In another book Ibn Rushd paraphrased al-Ghazâlî's law book al-Mustasâfa. But whereas al-Ghazâlî prefaced his book with an introduction to logic in guise of a non-philosophic terminology, Ibn Rushd restored the philosophical terms. Both al-Ghazâlî and Ibn Rushd hold that Muhammad's prophecy is necessarily known to be true. Both agree that if nevertheless a Muslim does not accept it, he is to be killed.

Ibn Rushd mistakenly attributed to al-Ghazâlî the view that not acknowledging the consensus of the jurists is not to be regarded as unbelief, and he ruled accordingly.

For Ibn Rushd revelation had, apart from its religious aspect, a moral and social utilitarian purpose.

Grieff believes that Ibn Rushd played a major role in shaping the religio-philosophical ideology of the Muwahhid movement. In his later works Ibn Rushd sought to refute al-Ghazâlî's condemnation of philosophy and the philosophers. This became necessary because knowledge of al-Ghazâlî's writings had become widespread in al-Andalus, and because of the important role of Aristotle's philosophy in the ideology of the Muwahhid movement. In Tahâfut al-tahâfut, Kashf manâbîh al-udâila, Fasl al-maqâl and a few shorter works Ibn Rushd argued that revelation and philosophy are in harmony with one another. Whereas al-Ghazâlî ruled that the proofs of the philosophers are not apodictic, Ibn Rushd taught that they are apodictic. Ibn Rushd took over al-Ghazâlî's "rule of interpretation" (gâñûn al-ta'wil) with a difference: According to al-Ghazâlî, only a strictly decisive proof justifies the decision that a certain verse is to be understood as a metaphor. Ibn Rushd, on the other hand, permitted the philosopher to interpret any verse of the Qur'an metaphorically on the basis of a simple logical argument.

The work here reviewed is a major contribution to the history of Islamic thought. The argument is presented in a clear way and is easy to follow. The politico-historical background is amply provided. Most welcome is the systematic tracing of the development of the relation between the judgment that a person is an unbeliever and his exclusion from Islam. The work is very well documented by reference to a plethora of sources and secondary literature. It should be on the desk of every student of Islam.

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