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THE THEORY OF KINGSHIP IN THE
NAṢĪḤAT UL-MULŪK OF GHAZĀLĪ

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Mirrors for Princes enjoyed considerable popularity in the medieval Islamic world. Written for the edification of rulers and princes, they reflect the practical ethics of the official classes. Although their treatment of questions of political theory is, for the most part, somewhat superficial and the anecdotes which the writers relate are often based on an historical tradition emended to suit the writer’s own point of view, they nevertheless throw some light on the development of political theory, particularly where this is concerned with the position of the ruler. The approach of the authors of these works differs somewhat both from that of the jurists and of the philosophers, and in so far as they aim at an exposition of the administration of the State and the duties of rulers based on experience, their works resemble practical handbooks written for the guidance of rulers.¹ The Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk, written by Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī for the Great Seljūq Sulṭān Muḥammad b. Malikshāh who ruled from 498 to 511/1105 to 1118,² falls into the category of Mirrors for Princes, but it combines with the literary theory something of the theory of the jurists and the philosophers together with traces of the ethic of the Šūfīs.

The political situation in the Islamic world was radically transformed by the Seljūq invasion of the eastern provinces of the ‘Abbasid Empire in the fifth/eleventh century, and this was reflected in works touching upon political theory. The jurists already under the Buyids had found themselves unable to ignore completely the break in continuity; and in so far as they sought to maintain the historic imamate, they were forced to attempt to justify certain irregularities in the light of necessity. The philosophers, on the other hand, restated the constitutional theory ignoring, on the whole, the historic imamate, their conception of sovereignty deriv-

¹ In making this classification and in my approach to the subject generally I have been influenced by Professor H. A. R. Gibb’s lectures on Islamic Political Ideas given at the School of Oriental Studies in 1934–5, and I acknowledge with gratitude my indebtedness to him.
² Jalāl Humā’ī in his preface to the Tebrān edition of the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk (A.H. solar 1315–17) suggests that the date of composition was 499/1105–6. The Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk was translated into Arabic and Turkish. Goldziher discusses briefly the Arabic translation, which is known as at-Tibr al-Masbūk fī Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk in Streitschrift des Gazālī gegen die Batinīyya-sekte (Leiden, 1916), pp. 97 ff.
The Theory of Kingship in the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk of Ghazālī
ing mainly from Sasanian tradition. In this respect their works resemble
the manuals written for the edification of princes. The writers of these
manuals were not concerned with the legal aspect as had been the jurists
and thus they were not limited in the material on which they could draw;
in fact they drew largely on pre-Islamic tradition, which meant in the
eastern part of the Islamic world, where this type of work was especially
popular, Sasanian tradition, and their works were in part inspired by the
old Persian manuals of court etiquette. That this should be so in works
such as the Qābūs Nāma written in the year 475/1082 by Kay Kāʾūs,
the grandson of Qābūs b. Wushmgīr, for his son Ghānshāh is perhaps
natural; Kay Kāʾūs came from the Caspian provinces of Persia which had
never been completely assimilated to the Umayyad or the 'Abbasid
empires. But that this element should also be found in the work of a
theologian such as Ghazālī, in his Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk, is more surprising.

In this work Ghazālī is not concerned with a systemic exposition of
the origin of the ruling institution or with a philosophic justification for its
existence, for which one must refer to various of his other works; he is
concerned rather with the ruler's conduct and the practical results of
kingship. In so far as questions of political theory are touched upon, the
Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk, like the Siyāsat Nāma of Niẓām ul-Mulk, may perhaps
be fairly regarded as representative of certain trends in contemporary
opinion among the bureaucracy. The Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk differs from the
Siyāsat Nāma, however, in one important respect, namely, in that it is
influenced by the Şāfī ethic, which is to be found more fully developed
in later works such as the Mirṣād ul-'Ībād of Najm ud-Dīn Rāzī (d. 654/
1256–7) and the Zhakhīrat ul-Mulūk of 'Alī b. ash-Shihāb al-Hamadānī
(d. 786/1385).

The basis of the theory of the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk, like that of the jurists
and the philosophers, is a metaphysical conception of the world and its
sanctions are ethical sanctions. Ghazālī draws the attention of Muḥam-
mad b. Malikshāh to the high nature of kingship and warns him of the
dangers inherent in it in the following words: 'in government there is great
privilege and whoever carries out its responsibilities acquires a happiness
beyond which there is no greater happiness, but if he falls short he falls
into tribulation which is greater than all tribulation except unbelief; the
greatest proof of the high nature of this privilege is that the Prophet of
God said "the justice of one day of a just sultān is preferable to the worship
of sixty years." '3 'Alī b. ash-Shihāb is somewhat more categorical than
Ghazālī. After pointing out the dangers inherent in the office of kingship
he states that the subjects have certain rights over against the king and

1 Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk, p. 9.
3 N. ul-M., p. 8; see also Kīmiyā-ul-Saʿādat, p. 219.
that if the latter does not fulfil these he will not escape punishment in the
next world. 1 Though here again these ‘rights’ of the subjects are not so
much legal rights as expectations that the ruler should perform certain
duties, mainly of an ethical nature.

Ghazālī quotes the tradition in which the ruler is likened to a shepherd
of his people, 2 but his general conception of the ruler is that, not of a
patriarch, but of a despotic monarch, and his ideal community differs
from the early Islamic community of Madīna, the existence of which was
defined by the shari’a and at the head of which was the imām. Here Ghazālī’s
exposition is closer to that of the philosophers than to that of the jurists.
Like Naṣīr ud-Dīn Ṭūsī he considers the supreme ruler is appointed by
and directly responsible to God. 3 This appears to have been the commonly
accepted theory of the day. Niẓām ul-Mulk writes: ‘God most high in
every age chooses someone from among the people and adorns him with
kingly virtues and relegates to him the affairs of the world and the peace
of his servants.’ 4 A similar point of view is reflected in various contempor-
ary or nearly contemporary documents. 5

Ghazālī is not concerned, as Māwardī was, with a legal exposition of
the theory of government speculatively derived from the basis of theology
and with ‘the application of the classical juristic theory to contemporary
facts’, 6 nor did he, as did Niẓāmī ‘Arūḍī in the Chahār Maqāla, first make
a concession to the historic imamate and then abolish it. 7 Rather like
Shihāb ud-Dīn Suhrāwardī Maqtūl 8 and Najm ud-Dīn Rāzī 9 he ignored
the historic imamate. In this he was, no doubt, influenced by the con-
temporary situation. The early Seljūq sultāns had insisted on receiving
diplomas from the caliphs in order partly to place themselves on a level
with the Ghaznavids and to give their rule legal validity, and partly to
acquire prestige by adopting the role of defenders of orthodox Islam. The
sultāns after Malikshāh, however, although they endeavoured to obtain
the caliph’s recognition did so largely to strengthen themselves against

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1 Zhākhīrat ul-Mulāk, B.M. Add. 7618, f. 99b.
2 N. ul-M., pp. 11–12; see also Kīmīyā uṣ-Sā‘īdat, p. 221, Ya’qūb b. Ibrāhīm (Abū Yūsuf), Kītāb ul-
Khārahī (ed. Bulaq, 1933), p. 3, and Najm ud-Dīn Rāzī. The last named writes: ‘the king is like a shep-
pherd and his subjects like a flock. It is incumbent upon the shepherd to protect the flock from the
wolf and to strive to repel evil from them, and if there are among the flock some tups with horns and
ewes without horns and the former wish to constrain the latter, it is incumbent upon the shepherd to
prevent them’ (Mīrṣād ul-Ibād min al-Mahāb‘ id-lāl Mī‘ād, ed. Īsān al-Husainī un-Ni‘matullāhī,
Tehrān, A.H. solar 1312, p. 248). He then goes on
to interpret the ‘wolf’ which attacks ‘the flock of
Islam’ as ‘the infidels against whom the ruler should
undertake holy war and raids’. In the Naṣīḥat ul-
Mulāk there is no mention of the duty of the ruler
to undertake holy war, perhaps because Syria was
at this time no longer under the effective control of
the Great Seljūq Sultan.
3 Akhlaq-i Naṣīrī (lith. Lahore, 1865), p. 100.
4 Sīyāsāt Nāma (Persian text, ed. Schefer, Paris,
1891–3), p. 5; compare also p. 163.
5 See, for example, various documents issued from the dīwān of Sanjār (‘Abbat al-Kutabat, ed.
‘Abbās Iqbal, ‘Tehrān, A.H. solar 1339, pp. 9, 18,
40, 64, 66).
6 See H. A. R. Gibb, ‘al-Mawardi’s Theory of the
khilāfat’, in Islamic Culture, xi. 3, 293.
7 E. G. Browne (Persian text, Gibb Memorial
Series), p. 10.
8 Mu‘nis al-Ustahq (ed. Otto Spies, Bonner
Orientalischer Studien, Heft vii), p. 15.
9 Mīrṣād ul-Ibād, pp. 232 ff.
rivals. Muhammad b. Malikshāh, for whom the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk was written, had been during the lifetime of his brother, Barkyarūq, virtually independent in the western and north-western provinces, although in Baghdād the khitba had been read in the name of Barkyarūq, apart from certain occasions when Muhammad had been in a state of rebellion.

The sultān in Ghazālī’s exposition in the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk is the ‘shadow of God upon earth’ and obedience to him as the chosen of God is incumbent upon the people. In the Kimiyâ us-Sa‘âdat Ghazālī limits this doctrine and recognizes only the just ruler as the vicegerent of God, regarding the ruler who is devoid of justice and compassion as the vicegerent of Satan. In the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk, however, while he makes justice the only qualification of the true sultān, he does not categorically make a limitation as he does in the Kimiyâ us-Sa‘âdat. ‘Alî b. ash-Shihāb puts this point of view more trenchantly. He states that the ruler when he follows the path of justice and equity and strives to establish the divine law and to execute the decrees of religion is the deputy (naʿīb) and the chosen of God, and the shadow of God and the vicegerent (khalîfâ) of God upon earth, but if he departs from the path of justice and equity and does not treat the servants of God with compassion and follows his lusts and desires and considers negligence in the establishment of the divine law permissible, he is indeed the deputy of Dajjal and the enemy of God and His Prophet and the vicegerent of Satan. Najm ud-Dīn Rāzî also refuses to recognize the tyrannical ruler as the shadow of God.

Ghazālī does not make concessions to the shari‘a in the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk to the extent of those made by some of the philosophers, such as Naṣīr ud-Dīn Tūsī, who interprets the namūs-i ilâhī, or divine institute which he regards as essential for the maintenance of equity among the members of the community, as the shari‘a; nor, like ‘Alî b. ash-Shihāb, does he appear to regard the execution of the decrees of the shari‘a as the main duty of the ruler. ‘Alî b. ash-Shihāb states that God in the perfection of His wisdom made it exigit that there should be among the people a just ruler and a perfectly righteous man who would direct the actions of those of the sons of Adam who held positions of authority into the right path and ‘strive to execute as far as possible the decrees of the shari‘a’. Ghazālī in the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk merely assumes a general conformity with the

1 Ghazālī was not of course the first person to interpret the phrase as-sultān qulūb-ilmī ilâhī fi l-ard ya‘wī ilâhī kullu ma‘żūmin as referring not to the temporal power, as it had originally, but to the person of the ruler. This interpretation had already been made by the early ‘Abbasīds (see Goldziher, Muhammadische Studien, ii, 67–69).
2 Kimiyâ us-Sa‘âdat, p. 218.
3 Zakhīrat ul-Mulūk, f. 98b.
4 Mirād ul-Ibâd, p. 244.
5 Zakhīrat ul-Mulūk, f. 89a. He goes on to point out that since the time of Adam there had only been a limited number of persons such as Joseph, Moses, David, Solomon, Muhammad, and the orthodox caliphs in whose persons the qualities of a righteous ruler had been manifested and who had performed the duties incumbent upon them in a fitting way (f. 90a).
shari'a. Thus the ruler was to seek as far as possible the satisfaction of his subjects, but this was not to be sought contrary to the shari'a.1

Superficially Ghazâlî’s exposition is not unlike the theory of the jurists who maintained that God, because of human weakness, supplemented the law (shari'a) by an imâm to whom He prescribed obedience. They held that God, being the sole head of the community, alone had the power to confer authority, and that the obligation of obedience to the imâm was not limited in the case of a bad imâm: obedience to the imâm, whether he was good or bad, was incumbent upon the Muslim because it was God’s will that the imâm should hold office.2 But on closer examination it will be found that a somewhat different conception underlies Ghazâlî’s exposition in the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulûk, and that it is from Sasanian tradition rather than from Islam that it draws its main inspiration. He attaches to the conception of divine right an emphasis hardly warranted by Islamic tradition, though he nevertheless seeks to give Quranic sanction to his interpretation. ‘It must be understood’, he writes, ‘that God gave him (the king) kingship and the divine light (farr-i ızadî). For this reason he must be obeyed, loved and followed. Opposition to kings is not seemly. One must not have enmity towards them because God most high said “obey God, obey the Prophet and those in authority among you”’.3 Ghazâlî takes farr-i ızadî to comprise wisdom, knowledge, perspicacity, the power to comprehend everything, a perfect appearance, education, horsemanship, skill in bearing arms, manliness, courage, deliberation, good nature, the dispensing of justice to the weak and the strong, the showing of friendship and magnanimity, forbearance and civility, and judgement and planning in the administration of affairs, and to demand much reading of the traditions of righteous men of the past, the observance of the customs of kings and diligent inquiry into their works.4 In actual fact these qualities do not differ materially from the qualities required of a ruler in the Siyāsat Nāma, except that Niẓâm ul-Mulk attempts to combine something of the Islamic ideal with the Sasanian ideal. The ruler in his view should have ‘a comely appearance, good nature, justice, manliness, courage, horsemanship, a knowledge of and ability to wield different kinds of arms, an understanding of crafts and skills, compassion and mercy towards the people, steadfastness in fulfilling vows and promises, and a liking for right (orthodox) religion and right belief, and obedience to God, and he should perform supererogatory prayers and fasts, and should have respect for the

1 pp. 24, 25; see also Kityā o-Sa‘dāt, p. 220, and ‘Alî b. ash-Shihāb, who states that the ruler was not to consider actions contrary to the truth and to the shari’a permissible in order to satisfy this person of that person. He points out that a just ruler could not satisfy all the people. The ruler’s business was to seek the satisfaction of God (f. 100b).

2 See also R. Levy, The Sociology of Islam, i. 306.

3 N. ul-M., p. 40.

4 Ibid., p. 65; Tha‘alibi takes farr-i ızadî to be divine majesty which was from time to time reflected in kings (Histoire des Rois des Perses, Arabic text and translation by H. Zotenberg, Paris, 1900, p. 7).
learned, the devout, the righteous, and the wise, and should give alms continually, treat the poor, his subordinates and servants well, and restrain the tyrannical from ill-treating the subjects.\(^1\)

Ghazâlî interprets the verse ‘obey God, obey the Prophet and those in authority among you’ to mean ‘you should obey God and the prophets [sic] and your amîrs. Thus he to whom God has given religion must love kings and obey them and he should know that it is God most high who gives kingship and He gives it to whomsoever He wills . . . one He makes honoured by (His) grace and another He abases by (His) justice.\(^2\) This exhortation to obey amîrs must be seen against the background of the contemporary situation. The eastern part of the Islamic world had been the scene of disorders during the decline of the ‘Abbasid caliphate. First there had been frequent palace revolutions by the Turkish body-guard of the caliphs, then the Buyid interregnum which, but for the possible exception of the reign of Aḍūd ud-Dawla, had been a period of anarchy, and finally the Seljûq invasion. Order was to some extent achieved under the early Seljûq sultâns, but the balance between stability on the one hand and anarchy on the other was precarious and on the death of Malikshâh the superficial unity imposed towards the end of his reign collapsed. Turkân Khâtûn succeeded in placing her infant son Maḥmûd on the throne,\(^3\) but she was unable ultimately to defeat the opposition which crystallized round Barkyâruq.\(^4\) Tutush, ruler of Syria, also made a determined effort to obtain the sultanate, but was finally defeated by Barkyûruq in 487/1094.\(^5\) The latter meanwhile established himself as sultan and by 490/1097 when he recovered possession of Khurāsân, of which Arslân Arghūn had made himself master on the death of Malikshâh,\(^6\) he was recognized over the whole of Persia with the exception of Kîrmān. But in 492/1098–9 his brother Muḥammad (for whom Ghazâlî wrote the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulûk) rebelled against him and for the next few years he was engaged in a struggle with his brother for the sultanate. Eventually in 497/1103–4 Barkyâruq established a slight superiority, but at the cost of general disorder throughout the country and a decline in the prestige of the sultanate. Moreover, by the terms of the peace Muḥammad’s status was virtually that of an independent ruler in Ažharbâijân Armenia, Diyâr Bakr, al-Jazîra, Mawṣil, and in Şâdaqa’s domains in Irāq.\(^7\) On Barkyâruq’s death in 498/1105 the khutbah was read in Baghdad in the name of his son Malikshâh,\(^8\) but after a short struggle Muḥammad succeeded in establishing himself as sultân.\(^9\)
The Theory of Kingship in the Našīhat ul-Mulūk of Ghazālī

Under Muhammad the rule of the great sultan once more extended over the whole of Persia except Kirmān, but although his reign did something to restore the prestige of the sultanate, the unity of the empire was never again effectively reimposed. Rum and Syria were virtually independent, and Sanjar was in all but name independent in Khurāsān. The Seljuq princes were still in the period immediately following the death of Malikshāh the most important figures in the contemporary political world, but their power relative to that of the amirs was rapidly decreasing. In the early Seljuq period, owing to the greater military strength of the standing army under Alp Arslān and Malikshāh and because of the greater prestige of the sultanate owing to the succession of three leaders such as Tughril Beg, Alp Arslān, and Malikshāh, some measure of control was exerted over the amirs, but on the death of Malikshāh this control was relaxed and the amirs used the relatively large military forces at their disposal to their own personal advantage. Thenceforward the success of the different claimants to the throne largely depended upon the measure of support they received from the amirs, the instability of whose allegiance was an important factor in the chronic insecurity which prevailed. It is significant that one of the reasons which led Barkyaaruq to make peace with Muḥammad in 497/1104 was the fact that the power of the amirs had increased and 'the sultanate was coveted and under the influence of others—the great amirs preferred this state of affairs and betrayed him (Barkyaaruq) to perpetuate their having their own way and to gratify their arrogance and presumption'. It was to these amirs who had arrogated to themselves important offices and governorships to whom, presumably, Ghazālī is referring in the statement quoted above.

In view of the contemporary state of affairs anarchy may have appeared to Ghazālī as the greatest evil of all. He was clearly disturbed at the state of contemporary society. 'Our times', he writes, 'are very bad and the people are bad and the rulers engaged in (the affairs of) the world.' And again, 'this is a time when the opinion of the people is depraved and the people are all evil doers and evil intentioned'. Similarly in the Kimiyā us-Saʿādat he writes: 'the world in these days is full of forbidden things and the people despair of this state of affairs being remedied'. But he nevertheless regarded the evils of submission to an unjust government as less than the risk of disorders. Thus in al-Iqtisād fī-l Iʿtīqād he writes: 'there are those who hold that the imamate is dead, lacking as it does the required qualification. But no substitute can be found for it. What then? Are we to give up obeying the law? Shall we dismiss the qādis, declare all

1 Ibn ul-Athīr, x. 253.
2 N. ul-M., p. 78.
3 Ibid., p. 79.
4 Kimiyā us-Saʿādat, p. 216.
5 See Iḥyāʾu ʿUlām ad-Dīn (Cairo, A.H. 1334), ii. 124.
authority to be valueless, cease marrying and pronounce the acts of those in high places to be invalid at all points, leaving the population to live in sinfulness? Or shall we continue as we are, recognising that the imamate really exists and that all acts of the administration are valid, given the circumstances of the case and the necessities of the actual moment?¹

The only qualification which Ghazâlî lays down in the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulûk for a true sultan is justice. ‘The sultan in truth’, he writes, ‘is he who spreads justice among his servants, who does not commit injustice and depravity; a tyrannical sultan is a disaster and will not last because the Prophet said ‘kingship remains with unbelief but not with tyranny’. It is recorded in histories that for nearly 4,000 years the mughân (i.e. the Persians) held the world and kingship² remained in their family because they spread justice among their subjects and did not permit tyranny and oppression in their religion and they made the world prosperous by justice and equity.’³ ‘The efforts of these (the Persian) kings to make the world prosperous’, he goes on to state, ‘were because they knew that the greater the material prosperity the more extensive their dominions and the more numerous their subjects. They knew the sages had rightly said ‘religion depends on kingship, kingship on the army, the army on wealth, wealth on material prosperity and material prosperity on justice.’⁴ They forgave their subjects much because they feared that the people would not achieve stability with tyranny and injustice and that cities and areas would become ruined and the people flee and go to another kingdom and that material prosperity would be turned into ruin, kingship decay, revenue decline, the treasury become empty, and the livelihood of the people be dried up. The people do not love a tyrannical king and always curse him.’⁵ Similarly he writes: ‘the prosperity and ruin of the world are both from kings. If the king is just the world will be prosperous and the people in security as it was in the time of Ardashîr, Fereidûn, Bahram Gur, and Khosraw Parviz and other such kings. But when the king is tyrannical the world becomes ruined as happened in the time of Dâhhâk, Afrasiyâb, and others like them.’⁶

In this emphasis on the importance of justice the theory of the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulûk closely resembles that of the Siyâsat Nâma, the basis of which is justice rather than right religion. ‘Kingship’, states Nizâm ul-Mulk, quoting the tradition of the Prophet, ‘remains with the unbeliever but not

² mamlakat. Compare the use of this word in the meaning of kingship in the Siyâsat Nâma, p. 151, i. 10, and in the Mîrâj ul-Ibâd, p. 236, i. 11.
³ N. ul-M., p. 40.
⁴ Compare the saying attributed by Tha’âlibî to Ardashîr: ‘no sultan without men (i.e. soldiers), no men without money, no money without prosperity, and no prosperity without justice and good administration’ (Histoire des Rois des Perzes, p. 482).
⁵ N. ul-M., p. 48.
⁶ Ibid., p. 41. Compare Najm ul-Dîn Râzî, who holds that if the ruler is depraved the subjects will be depraved but if he is righteous they will be righteous (p. 245).
with injustice'.

This emphasis on the need for justice for the sake of expediency is also found in contemporary documents. The preamble to a diploma for the governorship of Gurgān issued by Sanjar’s dīwān states ‘the foundation of kingship and the basis of dominion is (agricultural) development and the world will not become populous but through justice and equity’.

Ghazālī in the Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk makes some concession to the religious point of view in that he makes a distinction between the duties of the ruler towards God and towards the people. The ruler is indeed urged to lead the Friday prayers, and his attention is drawn to his duty to pray and to keep the fast. But even here importance is attached rather to the exercise of justice by the sultan in the performance of his duties than to the carrying out of specific religious duties. The main emphasis of the work thus rests on the practical duties of the ruler, which coincide, not with those set out in the juristic theory and based on the shari‘a and the practice of the early Islamic community, but rather with ordinary political moral duties based on grounds of political expediency.

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1 Siyāsat Nāma, p. 8. Elsewhere Nizām ul-Mulk appears to regard right religion and the stability of the State as interdependent, e.g. pp. 55, 140.
3 N. ul-M., p. 8.
4 Ibid., p. 3.
5 Ibid., p. 8.