UNITY AND VARIETY IN INDO-ISLAMIC AND PERSO-ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION: some ethical and political ideas of Diyā’ al-Dīn Barānī of Delhi, of al-Ghazālī and of Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī compared

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Before the 1940s, Diyā’ al-Dīn Barānī was known only for his Ta’rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī, a major history of the Delhi sultans from Balban (1266–87) to Fīrūz Shāh (1351–88), written probably between 1355 and 1357. Thanks however to Professors A. B. M. Habibullah and Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi,1 attention was drawn in the 1940s to the existence in the India Office Library, London, of a work by Barānī in the Fürstenspiegel tradition, the Fatāwā-i Jahāndārī. As a result of studies of this text in the 1950s by Professor Muhammad Habib, Professor Afsar Salim Khan and the present writer, it has become evident that in any constellation of early mediaeval Muslim writers on the ideal ruler (which would necessarily include al-Ghazālī, Nizām al-Mulk, Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī and Ibn Taimiyya, for example), Barānī can be seen to shine forth as an eastern star.8

As was perhaps to be expected in the circumstances of the 1950s, in the aftermath of the partition of British India, there was intense interest in whether traditions of Muslim political thought could, for example, accommodate conceptions of a common citizenship to embrace a permanent Muslim minority and a permanent non-Muslim majority, or whether those traditions required Muslims and Islamic law to be supreme in any state. Barānī was placed almost wholly in a South Asian context. Although it was realized that some of his ideas were, at the very least, shared with other Muslim thinkers before him outside the sub-continent, there was nevertheless a tendency to suggest a unique quality in other of Barānī’s ideas—as for example his ideas on the character of justice and the role of royal administrative regulations in society—which further consideration of the wider Islamic tradition would have suggested they did not possess.8

Barānī was deeply concerned with the fate of his own world of the Delhi sultanate which, he depicts in his Ta’rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī, as being in the last years of the reign of Muḥammad bin Tughluq (1324–51), a world of weal and woe, dark with misdirected violence and injustice, and strained by uncontrolled tensions. Barānī sought for stability and justice in the society around him and believed (as Nizām al-Mulk, al-Ghazālī and others had believed before him) that this could only be achieved through the ruling institution of the sultanate when managed by a properly instructed sultan. Barānī was in his seventies (by the lunar calendar) when he wrote both the Fatāwā-i Jahāndārī and the Ta’rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī; before that he had been a nadim or favourite of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, that is, a professional royal mentor. He used his well-stocked mind to teach and to preach, and not to build self-consciously upon the work of others in order to produce a work of scholarship. He utilized whatever material came to mind, transmuting the reading and the listening of a lifetime into an intellectual composition all his own in its emphases and resonances, one which belonged to the situation in which he, the Delhi sultan and his Muslim officers found themselves in the middle of the fourteenth (Christian) century in India, and to no other.

To compare and analyse the total composition of Barānī’s thinking on government in the Fatāwā-i Jahāndārī with that of, say al-Ghazālī in one of his analogous works such as the Naṣīḥat al-Mulk, or of Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī in the Akhlaq-i Naṣtrī, would be to point the obvious, in so far as these works are


8 e.g. Habib and Khan, The Political Theory, pp. 168–71.
expressive of a unique combination of elements in their own worlds. For example, Barani living, unlike al-Ghazâli, among Hindu polytheists, is concerned to proclaim the latter’s fate in the ideal temporal order, whereas al-Ghazâli ignores that fate. Barani, an undoubted Sunni, does not share Tusi’s Ismâ’ili-influenced ideas on the teaching function of the imâm. It would be more useful (bearing in mind the tendency hitherto to stress Barani’s South Asian identity) to examine how far he shares a common vocabulary and idiom with Muslim thinkers on ethics and government who lived before him outside South Asia. Or, to put it another way, it would be more instructive to see how different cooks, at different times, prepare different dishes from the same ingredients. But since Barani’s message (or messages) has (have) not been heard among students of Islam outside South Asia, it is necessary first to transmit his main themes as found in the Fatawâ-i Jahândâri. Barani’s expository method in the Fatawâ-i Jahândâri is to put his ideas in the mouth of Maḥmûd of Ghazna or of other, sometimes semi-legendary, jaures from the past. Here, the use of this method is assumed.

fig Barani accepts the proclamation in the Qur’an (LI, 56), “I have not created jinn and mankind except to serve me” as defining servanthood (elsewhere, bundagî) of God as the goal of human existence. God, as the creator of both good an evil, has provided man with guidance as to which acts are to be classified as acts of servanthood (that is “good” acts) and which are to be regarded as acts of (human) lordship or masterdom (that is “evil” acts). God has created everything in yoked pairs (juft), bringing forth from one entity another entity that stands to the first as its corresponding opposite or antithesis. This mode of creation is, in effect, for the moral instruction of man so that he may understand “good” as that defined by its converse “evil”, the “true” as defined by its converse “false”.

Barani holds it to be impossible that in the created temporal world good alone should exist, that all should be Islam and unicity (tawhîd) and that there be no unbelief and polytheism. Only through the continued existence of moral antitheses (though not a continued existence upon an equal footing) does it become evident that this is true and that is false, that this is islam and that is kufr (unbelief).

God does not endow all men with the same capacity for moral action, either in their primal nature (dar asl-i frîrat) or in their specific actions. God has distributed virtues and vices among men from all eternity and made them companions with their souls (arwâdh). The manifestation (zuhûr) of human acts and deeds is created and whenever God constrains a good or a bad deed, he gives the power to bring that good or bad deed into existence. Prophets are born impeccable and saints (auliyâ) are preserved from human wickedness after vilâyât or the state of being under God’s protection. Men have been created mostly with a mixture of virtues and vices and in only a few do virtue, through the favour of God, predominate over vices. However, Barani does hold that God has created men with the capacity for change in their dispositions (akhkât). The Fatawâ-i Jahândâri’s principal purpose is to induce rulers who have not been endowed with innately-virtuous dispositions to take pains (bi-takalluf) to change their dispositions so that they may rule as true Islamic kings. Barani calls upon kings to model themselves upon the qualities of God, in particular to perfect in themselves the homologues of the divine opposing qualities of lutf (benevolence) and qahr (wrath, wrathful force) and to know when and in relation to whom among their subjects to employ one or other of these qualities. Barani does not interest himself in the self-improvement of the dispositions of the generality of men and subjects. His main concern is with establishing a social order where the word and the commandments of God can be seen to be uppermost and where those who deny that word and disobey those commandments are forced to incur punishment or to suffer death or permanent subordination. However, if the ruler acts in accordance with the wisdom of creation and God’s sunna, and if he honours and favours with position those whom God has honoured and favoured with the dignity of virtues and the glory of active skills; and if the ruler disfavours those whom God has disfavoured by fashioning them with vices, then the wisdom of the creator appears in full splendour (jîlva kumad) in the hearts of all classes. The showing forth by the action of the ruler of absolute excellences, those whose integrity has been tested by rational criteria and the mirror of insight, becomes a means of changing the vicious dispositions of others, if
that showing forth is done in imitation of God. It would appear that the excellences of a ruler circulate (as does a contagion, sārī mīshāwad) among the submissive and well-dispositioned people of his realm through the medium of aides who are endowed with the same excellent qualities as himself. So too are the wrathful qualities of the ruler communicated through aides of the same qualities to the rebellious among his subjects.

Baranī limits his concern with the moral health of men’s souls and their fate in the next world to the souls of the rulers who were obliged by the corrupt and rebellious behaviour of the people of Baranī’s time to adopt the imperious manners and the luxurious habits of the kings of Iran before the coming of the Prophet Muḥammad. Ideally, Islamic rulers should follow the sunna of the Prophet, which Baranī regards as calling men to a life of self-abnegation, poverty and humility, the life of a darwiṣ. But, writes Baranī, only the first four caliphs, Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān and ʿAlī, were able to combine darwiṣ and ʿJamshīdī (kingship) and to avoid the ways of pomp and pride. But after their time, it became necessary for the caliphs and sultans of Islam to adopt the customs (rasm) of the Khurasan in order that the elevation of the Word of God, the supremacy of the din-i Muḥammadi and the extirpation of the enemies of that religion may be achieved, if necessary by perpetual jiḥād. As it is impossible for the individual ruler in Baranī’s time (or indeed in any time after the caliphate of ʿAlī) to combine adherence to the sunna of the Prophet, which is the essence and source (sar-muṭaṣma) of religion (din), with the exercise of kingship, in reason he may only in his heart contemplate salvation if he devotes all his efforts to ensuring the dominance of Islam and, while knowingly employing the un-Islamic methods of the Khurasan, humbles himself in his heart before God.

Baranī spells out, with much rhetorical iteration, how the ruler should act in order to be a true khālīfa and deputy of God. He should enforce the shariʿa, suppress misconduct and unorthodoxy and reduce the unbeliever to a dishonourable and subordinate status, presenting the polytheist with the alternatives of accepting Islam or facing war to the death. The ruler must also dispense justice. Baranī is especially insistent upon the necessity to avoid, but not at all costs, putting a Muslim to death for an action not constituting a capital offence according to the shariʿa. He does not absolutely forbid a ruler to execute a rebel (although rebellion is not a capital offence according to Islamic law) if execution is essential to the maintenance of the ruler’s authority and capacity to maintain order. Baranī also spends much space in advising kings to make appointments and promotions strictly in accordance with the wisdom of creation, that is, promoting to office those whom God has created with virtues and of honourable estate and holding at arms’ length those upon whom God as Creator has frowned and created more vicious than virtuous, those of low origin and base stock.

Baranī also gives much practical guidance to kings on the most effective ways of conducting the business of kingship: how to use time to the best advantage, how to manage the army and the treasury, how to intervene in economic life in order to prevent scarcity and to keep prices low, how to take proper counsel, particularly with wise wazirs, how to select truthful and conscientious barāhs, or intelligencers, to keep the ruler informed of what is happening in his kingdom. In whatever the king does, he is to exercise a correct resolve (ʿazm-i durust) and set before himself high aspirations, putting the fulfilment of his obligations towards Islam before the vainglory of the interests of himself and his state. Baranī also warns kings against such evil qualities as lying, deceit, changeableness, which do not mix well with kingship, and advises them to be forbearing wherever possible in their treatment of wayward and transgressing subjects.
Neither al-Ghazâlî nor Barâni identifies ethics with politics in the sense that man's good, his final perfection, is seen as the way that he conducts his life in this world in company with other men and how he decides upon and seeks to achieve purposes together with other men. In the Khimyâ al-Sa'ddat, al-Ghazâlî describes this world as a temporary resting place or stage (manzîl) on the road to the next world where a man may be vouchsafed some sight of God. A similar viewpoint is expressed, for the benefit of kings, in the Naṣîḥât al-Mulûk. Barâni is less specific, but by defining the end of man as servanthood of God and by repeatedly warning rulers not to sacrifice their destiny in eternity for their worldly pride and vainglory, he shows that he and al-Ghazâlî agree on fundamentals—that man's life under government is a preparation for the encounter with God after death. There is, however, some difference of emphasis between al-Ghazâlî and Barâni in the mode of man's servanthood of and obedience towards God. Al-Ghazâlî stresses that man should know God in order the better to obey him, Barâni is silent about any human knowledge of God, other than knowledge of His Commandments. For al-Ghazâlî, knowledge of God embraces faith (imân) in the unity of the divine essence, faith in the divine attributes and faith in the divine works, in the final prophethood of Muḥammad and in the last day.

In expressing their conceptions of man's moral potential, al-Ghazâlî and Barâni use a similar vocabulary, but deliver a rather different message. Both use the term fîrat to denote man's original nature created by God. For al-Ghazâlî, inherent in each man's fîrat is the capacity to seek God, to know Him as Lord and to recognize His Law as His Law. Each man is born morally healthy and in balance; it is by habit and education that he acquires vices. In developing this theme in his Khimyâ al-Sa'ddat, al-Ghazâlî quotes the tradition, "Each man is born in the fîrat (sc. in Islam): then his father and his mother cause him to become a Jew, a Christian or a Zoroastrian." Barâni, however, holds that God has associated excellences (faḍâ'il) and vices (radhâ'il) with men's souls in their basic nature (dar aṣl-i fîrat) and in a passage following shortly after this, he writes of the band (gurûh) of men who in their basic nature have been enwrapped with vices. In a much earlier context, however, Barâni writes of many men having been formed in their basic nature with opposing moral qualities, that is, with a mixture of virtues and vices. Barâni is more pessimistic than al-Ghazâlî about the capacity of man for acquiring excellences of character. As has been noted earlier, Barâni holds that only prophets have been created impeccable (ma'sûm), though saints may be protected by God from human wickedness. Al-Ghazâlî holds too that prophets are good by nature, but other men may be so also. Barâni holds that few are they who have a predominance of virtues over vices. The difference between the two, however, is one of degree rather than of kind.

Both al-Ghazâlî and Barâni hold that man has been created with opposing faculties and that moral improvement comes not through suppressing one faculty in favour of its antithesis, but of managing all the God-given faculties in the service of man's ultimate felicity. Al-Ghazâlî sees the heart (gâlîb) as the theatre or country of two "armies" (lashkar), each in possession of different sets of tendencies or moral dispositions (akhlâq). One set is oriented towards sa'âdat or felicity and the fulfilment of man's "Trust" (in terms of Qur'an XXXIII, 72); the other set is oriented towards the attainment of worldly desires. What is necessary is that such apparently destructive faculties as those of desire (hawâds) and anger (gâshb) must be brought under the control of knowledge and reason. It is true that Barâni is more concerned to encourage rulers to perfect and manage correctly their God-given opposing qualities, but his conception of the human psyche clearly belongs to the same ethical tradition as that of al-Ghazâlî. Barâni's concern is more with public action than with self-improvement among the generality of men.

Al-Ghazâlî and Barâni both accept that men's dispositions (akhlâq) are capable of change and they are broadly in agreement about the "mechanics" of such change. Man may acquire the habits of

19 Khimyâ, pp. 24-5.
20 FJ, fols. 124a, 216b, 217b.
21 Abul Quasem, The Ethics of Al-Ghazâlî, p. 89.
22 Khimyâ, pp. 13-14, 17, 419, 504; Abul Quasem, pp. 83-6.
23 Khimyâ, p. 436; FJ, fol. 198b.
good action by making efforts to do so (bi-takallyf). Al-Ghazālī and Barānī agree that men should endeavour to imitate the qualities of God, though again al-Ghazālī directs his advice more to the generality of mankind, Barānī more to the generality of rulers. A change in dispositions may also be brought about through the example of others and through association with them. Both men stress that subjects take after their rulers. Barānī reluctantly suggests that the royal patronage of persons of lowly and base stock by appointing them to office may confer upon them an adventitious (āridā) excellence which goes beyond other excellences, including that of nobility (aṣpādat). It is clear from the context, however, that Barānī does not regard an excellence acquired by connexion (paivandi) with the ruler as possessing reality (haqīqat).

Al-Ghazālī and Barānī seem to be at one in leaving God “unpledged” to act in a particular way because man acts in a particular way. The divine initiative is seen as free; both al-Ghazālī and Barānī are in the Ash'arite tradition in this respect. In the Kīmāb al-Seʿādat, al-Ghazālī states that man's power, will and knowledge to act are free gifts of God; he gave the key of disobedience to some without any crime of theirs, he gave the key of obedience to others without any service to God from them. He acts entirely of His Grace and not in reward of human good deeds. Acts of worship are the fruits of divine grace; divine grace is not bestowed because a man has performed acts of worship. Barānī describes God as constraining men to good and bad deeds. Moreover, he is careful to state that vices are not necessarily associated with those who choose lowly skills and base professions. Barānī is careful not, so to speak, to commit God necessarily so to act as to support his, Barānī's, own prejudices against the base-born. Men call those who have adopted the less honourable occupations “base-born”, “bazaar-loafers”, “mean fellows”, “inferiors”, and so forth, after they have manifested wicked moral qualities, and this they do volenueur (hargālī), and not necessarily because, vices have been enfolded by God in their natures. Social status follows from moral status, not moral status from social. Elsewhere, Barānī states that it is the favour of God from eternity (išqar-i azāli) that ensures that some men have a predominance of virtue over vice. Those kings in whom the virtues of their dispositions are innate (that is, made innate by God) and constrained (mulfazam) to the din-i hanfī, that is to “the true religion deep rooted in the natural predisposition in every human soul to believe in the One God”, will act ideally as rulers throughout their lives and attain salvation in the next world; their resurrection (baṭh) will be among the prophets. Barānī states that virtues must (mibāyad) be innate so that the world be ruled aright and the king be honoured with a high status of nearness to God in the next world.

As writers on government and kingship, al-Ghazālī and Barānī share many motifs, although the setting in which they are expressed is often very different. Both agree that rulership is a gift bestowed by God and not by man and that rulers are accountable in the next world for their exercise of authority. They agree that the task of rulers is to create the conditions in which subjects can perform their religious duties, in so far as these are expressible in outward actions. There is some call in the Fatwā-i Jahāndārī that rulers should seek knowledge of God's commandments in the sharī'a, but none in the Naṣīḥat al-Mulk. Both writers appear conscious that the rulers of the day will lack that 'ilm or knowledge which would enable them to study the mandates of the sharī'a for themselves and advise generally that they seek the guidance of the 'ulama'. Both are prepared for the ruler to act in certain spheres without recourse or regard to the sharī'a. Barānī however spells out in some detail the limits which the sharī'a places upon the infliction of the death penalty, while al-Ghazālī confines direct reference to the sharī'a to stating that the ruler should never seek to please a subject in a way that contravenes the sharī'a. The Naṣīḥat al-Mulk, however, is not typical of al-Ghazālī in its silence on the place of the sharī'a in the life of the Muslim community. Al-Ghazālī assumes (as does Barānī) that rulers will appoint qādis and that they will judge according to the religious law.

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26 Kīmāb, pp. 621, 620.
27 FJ, fol. 217b–b.
29 FJ, fol. 197b, 201a.
Both al-Ghazâlî and Barańi stress the duty of rulers to accord justice to their subjects, defining justice as impartiality between litigants and equality of treatment of them without regard to their social position. Barańi sees justice as protecting the weak and curbing the strong. Both authors regard justice as a state of mind; the Kímíyá sees justice as the control of the oppression of desire and anger by the faculty of reason. Barańi regards a sense of fellow-feeling with the oppressed and of partiality for the weak as a sign of a ruler’s innate sense of justice.11

Both al-Ghazâlî and Barańi are at one in holding that the ruler’s siyâsat (discipline or punishment) is essential if men are not to oppress each other.12 Al-Ghazâlî and Barańi are in agreement that the wickedness of their respective times demands the ruler’s siyâsat. Other themes that are common to both al-Ghazâlî in the Naṣīḥat and to Barańi in the Fāṭāwā-i Ḥāhāndārī are the need for a wise wazir, the need for the ruler to act after proper consultation and the need for rulers to help their subjects in times of economic distress. Then again, although al-Ghazâlî shows none of the passion of Barańi on the subject, he does recommend that the sultan should employ men of noble origin and avoid unworthy men. But for al-Ghazâlî, nobility seems a quality related more to a man’s moral than to his social status—an assumption that Barańi makes also.13

Al-Ghazâlî and Barańi are not at one in holding the specific doctrine that the following of the ascetically-inspired sunna of the Prophet Muhammad is impossible for Islamic rulers after the time of the first four caliphs. Nevertheless, al-Ghazâlî frequently holds up to emulation the reported practices of the Roman kings before the coming of Islam and indeed advises in the Naṣīḥat al-Mulâk that the sultan collect taxes in the ancient (Iranian) manner. Al-Ghazâlî and Barańi are at one in depicting the bifurcation after Adam’s time of authority into the prophetic and the royal, in the persons of šîth (Seth) and his successors as prophets and Kayūmarth and his successors as kings of Iran. In this way, both al-Ghazâlî and Barańi agree, following a hoary tradition, that religion and kingship are twin brothers.14

Even in the sphere of the status and treatment by rulers of unorthodox belief and behaviour or of outright unbelief and unbelievers, al-Ghazâlî and Barańi remain within touching distance of each other. Al-Ghazâlî confronted unorthodoxy in two principal guises—the bâšînya or Isma’ilis (broadly-speaking), and the philosophers of Islam. He was much concerned with the issue of takfir, of when it was justified to regard another man as a kâfir or unbeliever. Although he did not regard the bâšînya as kâfirs and demand jihâd against them, it seems that he had them in mind when, in the Naṣīḥat al-Mulâk, he called for kings to punish or banish heretics.15 In his attitude towards philosophers he made careful distinctions between them, particularly between the materialists (dahrîyyûn), the naturalists (tabî’îyûn) and the theists. Three of the latter’s doctrines—the denial of the resurrection of the body, the affirmation of the eternity of the world and the doctrine that God does not know individual objects—merit the branding of the holders as infidels.16 Towards the Mu’tazila on the other hand, al-Ghazâlî recommends tolerance. In a classification of the relative degrees of unbelief, al-Ghazâlî places idolators after Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians but before atheistical materialists, on the ground that while the latter deny both the existence of God and the doctrine of prophethood, idolators do not deny the existence of God.17

Now Barańi requires the ideal Islamic ruler to exercise his powers against both heretics and unbelievers. Among the former he numbers philosophers (and indeed the upholders of the rational sciences in general). Among the latter he singles out the Brâhmans. The former should be expelled or suppressed (in one passage he says that had Maḥmûd of Ghazna been able to do so, he would have cut Ibn Sinâ into pieces). The latter were not to be allowed the status of dhimmîs but to be confronted with the choice of Islam or of perpetual war.18 Al-Ghazâlî does not call for suppression of the Mu’tazila, but as a follower of the madhab of al-Shâfi’î, he would not presumably have dissented from the Shâfi’ite

11 Kímíyá, p. 419; FJ, fol. 198b.
17 See the translation of his Fatâjîl in Farîd Jabrê, La notion de certitude selon al-Ghazâlî (Paris 1938), p. 410.
refusal to grant to idolaters the status of dhimms. There is no doubt a contrast to be pointed between the tolerant al-Ghazâlî, living among the recently pagan Turks of Seljuk times, pagans who had showed every sign of willingness to accept Islam, and the intolerant Diyar-al-Din Barani living as a member of a dominant elite among Hindús who continued to show many signs of rejecting Islam; but it is a contrast of situations and of immediate anxieties, not of doctrines for the treatment of non-Muslims.

A comparison between the Akhlâq-i Naṣīr of the Isma‘ili-influenced Naṣîr al-Dîn Ţûsî and the Fatâwâ-i Jakhândîrî of the Sunni Baranî, the one willingly receptive to the philosophical tradition in Islâm and the other hostile to all religious sciences other than those of fiqh, tafsîr, hadîth and tarîqa, is bound to appear arbitrary. Moreover, Ţûsî ignores one of the most important elements in the world that Baranî inhabited, namely the non-Muslim. Baranî’s agenda of concern presented itself to him in a form and with a content very different from that of Naṣîr al-Dîn Ţûsî. Baranî’s point of departure is the will of God and how it may be obeyed, Ţûsî’s the rational structure of reality and who may grasp it. However, on their journey, they both see, if but for a moment, the same scenery, even though their impressions of it vary widely. To change the image, they are as two diameters passing through the centre of the circle of Islam after having started from different points on the circumference on their way to different points of the circumference.

Both Baranî and Ţûsî accept that the political order should show forth the wisdom to be found in reality once the pieces of that reality have been shaken into the places that nature intended. Both Baranî and Ţûsî hold that the political order should be as the macrocosm to the microcosm of the human psyche when it is conscious of its true nature and acts according to it. But for Ţûsî, that psyche appears to have more opportunities of acquiring knowledge and of achieving improvement in its lifetime than Baranî can conceive. God so converts the primary matter of man (hâyiylâ-î insân) that it becomes ready for human shape and passage through the academy of the world in which man may ascend to degrees of perfection and be adorned with righteous deeds before being brought back to the appointed place of “Return to Thy Lord”. There appears for Ţûsî to be a greater moral openness in man as God has fashioned him, by comparison with Baranî, for whom man has been fashioned, as has been seen, with a mixture of virtues and vices in his basic nature. No doubt, man’s nature, left to itself, will tend in Ţûsî’s view towards depravity; nevertheless, the yearning for the attainment of perfection is rooted in man’s nature and the key to self-ennoblement through the employment of reflection, reason, intelligence and will has been placed in his hand. But no one, he says, is innately created in a state of virtue.

For his perfection man should recognize that he possesses a rational, an irascible and an appetitive faculty (respectively denominated the angelic, the savage and the bestial soul). Although the irascible and the appetitive soul are necessary for man’s survival as a physical being, he must ensure that his rational faculty with its quest for the sciences and for universal knowledge must be in control of his behaviour. There must be a state of equilibrium in his soul, one in which his irascible and appetitive faculties are allowed to acquire their proper virtues of courage and continence in obedience to the virtue of wisdom of the Intelligent Soul: “When all these three classes of virtue accrue, all three being blended harmoniously, there comes into being from their compounding a homogeneous state which represents the perfection and completion of those virtues; and that is called the virtue of justice.” Baranî and Ţûsî appear here to share one order of assumptions—that all of man’s faculties and propensities may serve an ethical purpose, provided that they are brought under the control of the intelligence. The person who achieves equilibrium within his soul is obliged to concern himself with the adjustment of friends and family and distant kin and then with strangers. The person who attains this limit in justice is God’s friend and vicegerent. Baranî’s world of kings who perfect their contradictory qualities and employ them under the guidance of reason and in recognition of the wisdom of creation, seems not so far away.

Naṣîr al-Dîn Ţûsî stresses a rational explanation of the existence of society: the day-to-day life of man would not be possible without mutual assistance and mutual adjustment of requirements, nor

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41 Ibid., pp. 47, 111.
42 Ibid., p. 80.
would it be possible if all men betook themselves to the same craft or occupation. It follows that there be a measure of organization and some "disparity of aspirations and opinions so that each desires a different occupation, some noble and some base, in the practice of which they are cheerful and contented." Divine Wisdom (ḥikmat-i ilāhī) has required such a disparity. Baranī likewise informs us that at the first appearance of mankind the children of Adam appeared and became numerous and the world began to be inhabited. The need for everything in regard to their subsistence befell mankind. The Eternal Craftsman inspired the minds of men with the crafts which were necessities of their subsistence(s). Some he inspired with penmanship and reading skills, some with horsemanship, others with weaving, smithcraft and carpentry.43 Although Tūsī classifies some crafts as ignoble and others as noble, those that are ignoble but are necessary, such as cupping, tanning and street-sweeping, should be perfected. Baranī too finds acceptable the perfection of ignoble crafts.44

Tūsī and Baranī both hold that rulers should establish grades and ranks of men in a hierarchy of moral merit. But where Tūsī is concerned with establishing a moral hierarchy among the inhabitants of a polity taken as a collectivity, Baranī is concerned with establishing a moral hierarchy among the notables and the royal officers, aides and courtiers.46 The two do not differ significantly on how the king should determine the rank of each of the inhabitants of the "state". Rank should be determined by the virtue or the evil in each man's nature. Tūsī introduces a distinction between those whose goodness or badness is communicable or incommunicable. He discusses how evil may be removed from society, whether by restraint by banishment or by cutting off the offending member of an evil person. The action to be taken should be in accordance with "the best interest of the constitution of all members" with a bias in favour of attempts to reform the individual concerned. There is a considerable distance here between Baranī's recommended treatment for unbelievers, that is the application of the norms of Shi'ite fiqh, and Tūsī's reformatory penology.

The nuances in the respective author's concepts of the character and role of Divine Commandment in society and the ruler's relationship to it are very different. For Tūsī, Divine Commandment has several facets: it is the determiner of that middle point at which proportion and equivalence between disproportionate and unequal things is achieved. It is the perfection of natural fellowship, the regulator of relationships between men necessarily engaged in the exchange of goods and services. It is enacted by a religious lawgiver who is distinguished from others by divine inspiration.48 (It is in this context that Tūsī uses the term shāri'ī for religious lawgiver and shari'a for religious law in place of his more usual šahīb-i nâmūs and nâmūs.)

In another context, Tūsī hints that the religious law (shari'a) is the form of instruction best suited to those who are not good by nature.49 Baranī does not appear to have been influenced by any conceptions of the divine law as the consummation of perfections partially attainable by the exercise of the human reason, or as a point of equilibrium, or as a rule to fall back on when man's sense of natural fellowship fails him, or as a syllabus for the instruction of the less-well endowed. The Divine Law is for Baranī the Divine specification of that servanthood (bandagi) to which God calls man. Furthermore, this is that specification as understood by the consensus of the scholars, not as by a lawgiver endowed with divine inspiration.

Baranī and Tūsī share a number of similar or similar-sounding motifs in the advice they give on the attitudes rulers should adopt when ruling and on how the affairs of government should be managed. Tūsī advises kings to have royal resolve ('azm al-mulāk). By this he means a compounding of sound opinion and perfect constancy. Baranī warns that royal resolve turns into importunity, tyranny and violence if it is directed towards the welfare of the king himself and not towards the good of religion and subjects.48 Both writers use the term sīyāsat, Tūsī in the more general sense of management of a polity, Baranī in the more specific sense of administering punishment (but not thereby excluding the more general sense).49 Both advise kings to pardon transgressors wherever possible, to avoid risking

43 The Nasirian Ethics, p. 189, F7, fol. 216b.
44 The Nasirian Ethics, p. 151, F7, fol. 217a.
45 Cf. The Nasirian Ethics, pp. 250-1, and F7, fols. 55a-62a.
46 The Nasirian Ethics, pp. 97, 191, 200-1.
48 Ibid., pp. 227-8, and F7, fols. 63b—64b.
49 Cf. The Nasirian Ethics, p. 191, and F7, fols. 141b—142a.
themselves in warfare and to associate with persons of virtue. They both remind their readers that men look to kings and imitate their conduct.

Baranī, al-Ghazālī and Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, then, inhabit the same world of an Islamic culture not bounded by frontiers of time and space. Within that culture, spread over lands where Muslims either faced a minority of non-Muslims long deprived of all political power, or where Muslims were being conquered by Mongols or where Muslims, although politically dominant, nevertheless had to accommodate themselves to the existence of armed non-Muslim chiefs able to deny them considerable resources, it might be expected that priorities in thinking about government would be different. Al-Ghazālī might perhaps be thought better able to take power for granted; he wrote when the Seljuq sultanate was vigorous and strongly Sunnī. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī as a heterodox Muslim living in the period of Mongol conquest was better able, it might be thought, to take powerlessness for granted. Baranī by contrast lived in a place and at a time when Muslims had power but, in his view, not enough power, and not enough power well-directed. Yet for all the fact that Baranī and al-Ghazālī were Sunnīs, believing that revelation must needs validate some and invalidate other modes of the quest for reality and its proper understanding, for all the fact that Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī was (to say the least) greatly influenced by the conviction that man could approach and understand reality through reason direct, the conception of the life of man in society under government held by all three shared much more than that which it did not share. Man was not born to seek his own satisfaction by yielding up as little as he could to others so that he then might pursue his idea of satisfaction in peace. Man must seek a perfection which exists, though none, through blindness, recognizes it. The life of society is a life of peace in obedience to, and in acceptance of, the real nature of things, rather than a striving in fear that there is no such certitude. Once that certitude has been seen by those with eyes to see, whether through the medium of the reason informed by revelation, or through revelation alone, then the life of society must show forth acknowledgment of that certitude. The blind must be coerced, if not into seeing, at least into impotence. All three authors place the responsibility for such coercion upon one potentate, the king, sultan or pādshāh, assisted by perspicacious and virtuous aides. If there is to be stability and peace, then the social order must express the wisdom of creation, that is, of reality. Opinions and emphases might differ as to how much force is necessary to achieve the end, how much man has a natural propensity to seek and find that end for himself (Baranī, with unbelievers much in evidence around him, thought much force was needed in relation to men with very little propensity; al-Ghazālī and Ṭūsī were less inclined to see most men as created for punishment). The end, however, was agreed: the re-integration of man into a reality one and eternal.