Al-Ghazālī’s Mishkát al-Anwār and the Ghazālī-Problem.

By

W. H. T. Gairdner.

The Mishkát al-Anwār, numbered No. 34 in Brockelmann’s (vol. I p. 493), had not been printed when the Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur was issued, but since then has been printed in Cairo in two separate editions). Owing to its great intrinsic interest and the fact that it from the first excited the curiosity and even the suspicion of Mohammedan critics, it would seem to be worthy of particular study at the present time, when G.h.’s works are attracting so much the attention of students of Islam, and when the problems of his peculiar psychology are being investigated with such special interest.

Though we have, as yet, no way of fixing precisely the date of Mishkát al-Anwār, we shall not be wrong in placing it among the works which represent his most developed mystical thought, — therefore among his latest ones). It certainly contains very advanced teaching, — teaching which, as the exordium shows, was not to be given to those unprepared for it. As we shall see indeed, some have believed that the book was never intended for publication at all, but have averred that it represents G.h.’s extorted teaching, and that it even introduces ideas contradictory of his professed beliefs and subversive of Muslim orthodoxy. This one fact renders the special study of the book an important and inevitable task.

The opusculum is a dissertation on the mystical meaning of the word Light (waḥḍ), with special reference to the great Light-verse in the Qurʾān (3:18), and to the Ḥadīth hardly less celebrated, about the

[Notes and references omitted for brevity.]


[7] Max. V.
Seventy (or Seventy Thousand) Veils. It is divided into three sections. The first of these (p. 3) expounds the mystical meaning of light and gradates the divine Lights, whether on the earthly or the heavenly plane, until they culminate in their fountain and creative source, Allah. The second (p. 29) expounds the Qur'anic Light-verse, after an introduction in which the principles of symbolic exegesis are laid down. The third (p. 42) expounds the Veils-tradition.

It is this last section, and more particularly the close of it, that forms the subject of the present study, for it is here that the interest of the book culminates. Here we find a sort of Ghazalian philosophy of religion in brief. Here too we are given some hints as to the lines along which his thought developed after his adoption of the Sufi life. And here, finally, we come upon a passage which excited attention and suspicion within the century which succeeded G.h.’s death.

I.

The Veils-Hadith: al-Ghazali’s Philosophy of Religion.

In expounding the tradition of the Seventy (Thousand) Veils with which Allah has veiled Himself from the vision of man, G.h. finds opportunity to graduate various religions and sects according as they are more, or less, thinly veiled from the light; i.e. according as they more or less nearly approximate to Absolute Truth (al-haqq — the Real, — Allah). The veils which veil the various religions and sects from the Divine Light are conceived of as twofold in character, light veils and dark veils, and the principle of graduation is according as the followers of these religions and sects are veiled (a) by dark veils, (b) by dark and light mixed, or (c) by light veils only. The rendition closes with a short passage which tells us that the Attainers (al-maṣālīk) have had the last veil taken away, and have immediate vision of al-haqq. Here we have the Sufi doctrine of khidżr in its most explicit and striking form.

(a) Those veiled by pure darkness, cited here the multīhā, or those who deny the existence of Allah and of a Last Day. They have two main divisions, those who have enquired for a cause to account for the world and have made Nature that cause; and those who have made no such enquiry. The former are clearly the Naturalists or dakhīya, who were the very abomination of desolation to G.h. It is curious that nothing further is said of their evil conduct, and

1) See Dr. Boden’s Philosophy in Islam p. 80.
it is entirely characteristic of mediaval thought, that the deepest
domination is thus reserved for evil opinio n, rather than for evil
life. Evil-doers form the second division (which however is not de-

definitely said to be higher than the first), composed of those who are
so greedy and selfish so much as to look for a cause, or in fact to think
of anything except their vile selves. These we might style the Egotists;
they are ranged in ascending order into (1) seekers of sensual pleasure,
(2) seekers of dominion, (3) money-grubbers, (4) lovers of vain-glory.
In the first he has the ordinary sensual herd in view, as well as the
philosophers of sensualism; their vices are the vices of the bestial
attributes, while those of the second are the ferocious ones (zab'a'a).
The denotation of the latter class is quaintly given as Ḉarāba'), some
Kurds') and very numerous Fools. The third and fourth subdivi-
sions do not call for comment.

Mounting from these regions of unmitigated darkness we come to
(b) Those veiled by light and darkness mixed.
G his ideas of the dark veils, in general, may be gathered from a com-
parison of this and the previous section. In this section the dark
veils are shown to be the false conceptions of deity, which the human
mind is deflected into making by the gross and limited elements in its
own constitution, namely (in ascending order) by the Senes, the
Phantas or Imagination (parvan, ḳhāyāt), and the Discursive
Reason (ḥukma'). The dark veils of the previous section were the
unmitigated egotism and materialism which employed these faculties
for self and the world alone, without a thought of deity. The light
veils, accordingly, are the true but partial intuitions whereby man
rises to the idea of deity, or to a something at least higher than him-
self. These intuitions are no more than partial, because they fix upon
some one aspect or attribute of deity; — majesty, beauty and so forth,—
and believing it to be all in all proceed to deity all majestic, beautiful
etc., things. Thus they half reveal, half conceal, Allāh, and so are
literally veils of light. — These general remarks will give the clue to
the extremely interesting subdivisions of this section, which begins
with Hellenic polytheism, continues through various degrees of dua-

1) Here speaks G. h. the Persian.
2) What is actually said is Munīyazāt ʿaṣyā, ʿaṣyā 'sylegions of the intellect',
 an expression which interferes with the psychological character of the conception. Pro-
bably he hesitated to say as 'aṣy outright because he has already said (p. 10) that it is pure
light and incapable of error unless it is deceived by the Senes or the Imagination. Perhaps
what he has in mind is the Discursive as opposed to the Intuitive Reason. On p. 40 the
latter is called as-ūd al-ʿaṣy: the former al-ūth al-riyāt. 9
lism and Pantheism, and ends with various sects of Islamism which in their literalizing or their rationalizing went astray.

He divides those who fall under this section into three classes according as their error was occasioned by Sense, Imagination, or Discursive Reason. The first of these subdivisions includes Polytheists and Dualists. He enumerates (4) Image-worshippers, those who do not look outside the world of sense for their deity; who worship beautiful objects of sense, fashioned from the finer metals or stones, their light-veil being the attributes of majesty and beauty. We might identify these with Polytheists of the Hellenic type. (5) Worshippers of animate objects of beauty, whom he identifies with some of the most remote Turks. Their light-veil is also the attribute of beauty. (6) Fire-worshippers pure and simple; their light-veil, glory. (7) Astrologizing stars- and planet-worshippers of various sorts; their light-veil, potency and might. (8) Sun-worshippers; their light-veil, pride. (9) Light-worshippers, and with them we come to the pure Zoroastrians with their dualistic doctrine of Ormuzd (Yazdān) and Ahūmān. The darkness of all of these consist in their taking an object of sense for their god.

In the second subdivision the darkness is occasioned by the Phantas or Imagination, that faculty half-way between gross sense and the intellect according to the old psychology. With this we first arrive at Monotheists (musulim), those who conceived indeed of a one superensible God, but whose conception was vitiated by their imaginings of Him as still spatially limited. The grossest of these he says are (a) the Cenopodsists (misassimis), those extremists who dogmatically asserted that the anthropomorphisms of the Qur'ān must be taken literally. Then (b) various sects of Karrimites the anthropomorphistic sect founded by Ḩan Karrām (d. 286). Then (c) those who asserted that to Allāh must be attributed jāhiz, but only jahāt jamāy in other words He must be conceived as literally above us, for to deny this would be to reduce Him to insubjectivity. — We have here a clear allusion to the Banūhāshāh, not excepting (in this particular matter) their great leader himself (4)

1 See worshippers existed in Mesopotamia well into Islamic times: C. de Vaux, A. h. 23 p. 65.

2 This was the position of all the Qadhābites and of Ahmad ibn al-ʿAbāb: see D. B., Faire 179, note 28, to whom he says that Ḩan ibn Karrām allowed himself to use a ḥabhī for those traditions only, and that he allowed himself greater unadulterated latitude he would have brought in and also has a ḥabhī as asserted of Allāh (i.e. he did not do so). Ḩan Karrām in his opposite to Ḥan Karrām, al-ʿAbāb not only accords this doctrine to the Qur'āns but the early books also and implies that the early authorites alluded to hold it
The third subdivision, he tells us, contains those thinkers the darkness of whose errors he traces to the false inferences of the intellect. They are not named by him and we have again to identify them by his description of their inferences from which it appears that they are various types of mutualallusions. He mentions two classes (a) the extreme literalists, who differ from those mentioned last in the preceding section in that they do not attribute direction (fikah) of any sort to Allah; but err in conceiving His hearing, knowing, and the rest of the Attributes as comparable with ours, and particularly in their doctrine of Allah's kalām, of which some perhaps said outright that it has letters and sounds like ours. We have here another section of the lihanahites and the early Ash'arites (Fordersen pp. 120, 121 and esp. 136). (b) Perhaps higher than these says Gh. tentatively, are those who said that Allah's kalām is not letters and sounds, but is like our mental speech (hadith an-najah). But when challenged to show the reality (jā'īd) of the Attributes, he complains that they virtually reverted to anthropomorphism (ad-ḥakākh), though they disclaimed it with their lips.

This, he says, was because they never (ed. MüLLer p. 65. Cairo ed. p. 54). For he says that it was al-juwaifāt ("Ghiyān al-germa'mān". Gh's teacher) and the later Ash'arites, who denied יהוה ג' to Allah.

The whole passage is quoted by an-Naj'āt on i.b. Tālītayy (in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Cairo 1509 pp. 303 seq.), and affords a view of the portion of later lihanahites, like i.b. T. upon the question. It is true that i.b. Aḥāfīl and the early Ash'arites had i, many more are divested of themselves of all little of their lihanahites (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Fordersen pp. 120, 121), and it is possible that of it is to be therefore the content of the above indication. But it chiefly imparts an hint to notice that Gh. not apparently indulge any 'such action. We are misled, where his mental attitude of Murtazah, lihanahites and Ash'arites is gone into in some detail, no hint is given of it. On p. 1081 he observes that the Ash'arites were nearest to the lihanahites.

In 1249 the eff lāl to the lihanahites in the Arabic al-thawri the, the word that is given or the lām or the lām. But the clear implication of the passage is that they did not follow Aḥāfīl and the other lihanahites, and of his failure to give any indication of this particular matter, which conclusion is borne out by another passage, e.g. p. 5 do. 5 and lihanahite Ḥakākh. (2) The is that they did not follow Aḥāfīl himself (see D. B. MacEwan, qualified Th. pp. 232-279) is silent on the point.

(1) M. p. 33.}

\[\text{[reading:  instead of the, in the printed text.]}\]
understood what was really meant in predicating these *ṣifāt* of Allāh, and their misconception led them to call His will (*iḍāda*) originate (*ādāthun wādīhī iḍādatan*) and mere purpose, like our own.

The passage is a puzzling one, for the allusion to ḥadīth *an-naṣf* (*hadīth an-naṣf*) seems to fix its reference to the Ashʿarīs, while on the contrary the assertion that the doctors in question declared the will of Allāh to be *ḥādīth* does not at all suit the Ashʿarīte theologians. The reference cannot be to the Muʿtaṣilites, for the theologians alluded to throughout the whole section accept the *ṣifāt*, and moreover the doctrine of the ḥadīth *an-naṣf* was especially elaborated by a-ʾIshʿārī and his successors to confound the Muʿtaṣilites.

(c) Those veiled by pure light. In this category we find three classes, of which the first is rather sharply distinguished from the other two. Actual darkness has now disappeared; the conception of Allāh is entirely purged of anthropomorphism. Yet all three classes are represented as falling short of the truth, the shortcoming being their conception of the Deity's relation to the universe of the Spheres. Only a fourth and supreme order have experienced the complete Revelation and have attained unto the Real.

1. The first class is composed of those who, unlike the faulty thinkers of the last division, understand that the characterizing of these *ṣifāt* of Allāh by the expressions Word, Will, Power, Knowledge etc. is unlike the characterizing of mankind by these expressions, and therefore have avoided defining Him (making Him known, *taʿyīfah*) by these attributes; and "made Him known ("urrafilah") by the relation to (His) Creation, as did Moses in answering Pharaoh's question?" "What is the Lord of the Worlds?" and said that "The Lord, whose holiness transcends (al-mugaddas 'an) the connotations (muʿājam) of these Attributes is the mover and orderer of the Heavens". The first half of this paragraph seems to allow that the most careful and orthodox of the Muṣṭakallāms are not excluded from this division; but the second half shows that Gh. has rather in mind those who have steered as clear as possible from ḥalām-theology in every shape and form, and have contented themselves with ascertaining the divine creator-

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[1] Al-Fādi 3:11 in his Kitāb Kifāyat al-Abrāsim fi Dhikr al-Ikhtisār, proof of Attributes no. 15. See M. S. A. Horowitz, Kitāb al-Fādliyya, p. 318 note 1. The reference from Al-Fādi 3:11 shows that the doctrine was not peculiar to the early Ashʿarīs. It finds it necessary however to guard against the very tastyḥām objection advanced here by Gh. It is to be noted that the doctrine was archaic only to the Hashabnaṣir as to the Muʿtaṣilites: see M. S. A. Horowitz, Kitāb al-Fādliyya, p. 318 note 1. This is all about the ḥudūd al-naṣf was started by Al-Ashʿārī Muntazif. Firdausī, p. 139.

hood and provision). But the way in which this is expressed is remarkable. The actual words of the Qur’an, which were kept in the parallel passage of M. 5) are significantly changed, and Allāh’s act in moving the Heavens is made the centre of interest. And in the remaining clauses it is the attitude of such to just this aspect of the divine action that is made not only the centre of interest but also the graduating test. For we might well ask in what point this first class fell short, and why it is not assigned the highest place among the Light-veiled, if not the Unveiled? The sequel gives the answer:

2. "The second class have mounted higher than these (parapettas are), in respect of the fact that they have perceived that there is a plurality in the Heavens, and that the mover of each Heaven severally is another Being called an Angel, and that these make a plurality. Moreover it was perceived by them that these Heavens are enveloped by another Sphere, by whose motion all they are moved once in every day and night; because plurality is negatived of Him (manfīya’ anhu)." 6

In other words, class no. 1 was indiscreet in talking of ṣubharkit as-samawāl. The unity of The Lord was better maintained by class no. 2, which limited His action to the moving of one (namely the outermost Heaven). But this is not all.

(3) The third class who “mount higher than these” again, accept (apparently) the whole of this schematism of Spheres and their angelic Motors, except that they put in a supreme Angel in place of Allāh. The moving of the Spheres must come (such, we are told is what this class alleges, za’ama) "directly" from this Angel acting in obedience to the command of The Lord the Worlds. Evidently, then, he takes the place of The Lord in moving the outermost Sphere, the rest of the celestial mechanism remaining as before. He reflects the full glory of the Sun, the source of light (Allāh), and is compared to the moon which is supreme among the luminaries of the heavens by night. The Lord is thus found to be the "Mover of all, not directly, but by way of command" 7. This matter of this divine motion-creating command contains great obscurity, says G.H., and is "you difficult for most intelligences and beyond the scope of this book" 8.

5) i.e. by a reference to the divine acts rather than the attributes; cf. Moses’ answer to Pharail (Mt. p. 30). 8) لم نيجّلوا أنه بفعله وليا. . . . فحال راح السماوات والأرض. . . . 6) See preceding note, and contrast the phrase quoted here with the significant phrase of the passage بحلوله (الامر لا بحلوله) المبناطة. 7) بحلوله (الامر لا بحلوله) المبناطة. 8)
But not yet have we arrived at a view of the heavenly Spheres in relation to Allah which is free of all objection on the score of trenched on the divine Unity. The absolute Unity has not yet been conserved. And therefore all these classes are said to be light-veiled and only those who Attain (al-musrif) constitute a fourth class to whom the full truth has been revealed.

All the veils have now gone from the visions of these; as the sequel shows, we have here the mystics who see Allah face to face. The consuming of these unveiled periphrastics by the radiance of Allah's countenance, spoken of in the Ithih on which all this is a commentary, is now definitely explained as the fana-experience of the highest grade of these mystic Attainers, whom the "glories of His coeternity consumed", obliterating, annihilating, so that all consciousness of not Allah having disappeared, Allah was found alone.

But most remarkable is the differentia of these Attainers-to-Reality form the preceding class. They in turn accept the whole schematism of the universe ascribed to that class, with the sole exception of the part it assigns to Allah, who was the Obeyed One (al-musul) of that class. "They too have had it revealed to them that according to the previous view there has been attributed to the Obeyed One something incompatible with pure unity and ultimate perfection by reason of a mystery the disclosure of which this book does not admit at all." Not only is Allah now denied to be the immediate efficient cause of the motion of the outermost Sphere, but — and this is startling — it is even denied that that Sphere is moved in obedience to His command. For even this supreme function is explicitly transferred from Allah to a Being whose nature is left obscure, since our only information about him is that he is not (the) Real Being (al-muqadd al-haqq). Allah's relation to this Vice-gerent, the supreme controller of the whole Universe, is compared to the relation of the impalpable lightning to the sun, or of the elemental fire to a glowing coal. Of this Absolute Being nothing is, because nothing can be, predicated. The information we are given about IT is purely negative, as will be seen from the brief but highly significant sentence in which the position of the Initiated, the Attainers, is summed up: "They turn away from the one who moves the heavens, and from the one who commands them to be moved, and arrive at a Being transcending all that is apprehended by the perception or by the conception of all specula-

1) I. e. The Angel who governs the outermost Sphere in obedience to the Being called al-musul.
2) I. e. The Being called al-musrif himself.
tors (nähirat), for they find Him absolutely transcendent of every attribution previously made by us.⁹ Yet, as appears from the closing paragraph of M., these Ent-
zeicke make the mystic leap whereby they know this Unknown, and are consumed by the Glory of this predicateless Being! And even these are divided into those who, in the annihilation of all save Allâh and the contemplating Soul, retain self-consciousness and con-
template the Soul in the beauty of Allâh; and those from whom even this self-consciousness is consumed away, and Allâh is left alone. These are the Élite of the Élite (khawâsîf al-khawâsîf); and of them some attain this experience by degrees, as Abraham, and some by a leap, as Muhammad. And with this the section, and the book itself, closes.

II.

Some deductions.

It will be well, at this point, before going on to consider ibn Rushâd’s criticism of this strange conclusion to this-passage, to glance at this Ghausîâni philosophy of religion and see what light it throws upon the Ghausîâni problem.

1. The philosophic mildness of the tone is to be noted. Only of the naturists and sensualists does he speak severely. Various types of idolators and polytheists are enumerated with calm, and it is allowed that their creeds contain light mixed with their darkness, which is all that is claimed, indeed, for some reputable classes of Muslims. The hard-and-fast line between kifr and imân thus seems somehow to have been softened, and the fierce dogmatism with which in some of his other treatises he speaks of kifr and its deserts is entirely absent.

2. It is curious that he has not placed Jews and Christians in this graduation. Perhaps he found it particularly difficult to do so, for he is here discussing the creeds of men in their relation to Deity, not in their relation to Muhammed and the Prophets. From the former

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⁹ وجعلوا أنهم موجون مرتين: من كل ما ادركه بصر الناظور، ومضيارهم:

9 That Dogma, and even the sects and creeds of the Ghausîâni, are sharply criticized in his treatises; see the conclusion, Al-Îspârâd al-Fîlî, and other works (Cairo edition 1917) pp. 6, 101, 103. From this condemnation which expressly includes the Dâhâliya, the Bâ- rîshîa, the Yashîb, and the Nâshîrî, it is clear that the Ghausîâni was not content to stop at Islam, but wished to include all other creeds, and to the same extent this is denied. From this it is clear that he did not agree with the Ghausîâni of the time, who seems to have been rather a religious reformer, and not a scientist. From this it is clear that the Ghausîâni was not content to stop at Islam, but wished to include all other creeds, and to the same extent this is denied. From this it is clear that he did not agree with the Ghausîâni of the time, who seems to have been rather a religious reformer, and not a scientist.
viewpoint the placing of pre-eminent monothelists other than Muslims probably presented an embarrassing problem. From the latter viewpoint, he has, indeed, given us a graduation in his ḥikmat fil-ṣaḥīḥ, where in we learn the relative depths of the unbelief of non-Muslims, viz. Naturists (most damnable of all), then Brahmins; lastly Jews and Christians. We shall therefore not be far wrong if we place Jews and Christians between the dualists and the anthropomorphizing Muslims in the class of those veiled by light and darkness mixed. Perhaps he could not make up his mind whether to place them in the lowest or the middle division of that class.

5. The low place assigned to the early Ḥadīth is not extant; though the language he employs in details obscure, the reference to them in the last section of the middle division is unmistakable; and, this being so, they, with the Ḥadīth, are given no higher company than that of the Light-and-dark-veiled, which includes Parsees, Christians, Khurānīs, and various types of anthropomorphists.

6. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that all the muṣāhāliyān as such are placed in the class of the Light-and-dark-veiled. For when we pass upwards to the lowest division of the Light-and-dark-veiled we seem to find the muṣāhāliyān as such deliberately excluded by the statement that the pieties of the class this evidently he has in view men of as-h-Sūfī fi 'ilāma type. "avoided characterising Allāh by these Attributes" (ḥadīth 'a mālidī bi ḥadīth-i-ṣaḥīḥ), i. e. avoided that which is was the chief business of the muṣāhāliyān to do. The utmost that can be allowed is that he has in mind men who, though possessed of a correct theology in respect of the Attributes, steadily refused to bring it out in discussion or to use its expressions in characterizing Allāh. Gains disbelieve and suspicion of Allāh, visible even in his earlier treatise al-ṣaḥīḥ, and undeniable in his later work Ḥikmat al-faḍdām, seems here to reach its culminating point. The "science" had probably long ceased to interest him or concern him. He had already narrowed the scope of its possible utility down to vanishing-point; and now, when speaking confidentially with the Khurānīs, he hints that even to use its cherished phrases is to draw a veil of darkness over the soul. He does not seem to have even thought it worth while to place the Muṣāhāliyāt in this grade's scheme, nor to

1) See especially Rüster, lakūn. col. 21, older edition pp. 23-33. The scope allowed to the sciences in the ḥikmat pp. 7, 8, "it is true, hardly if at all wider. But the tone of the limiting passages is very different. See also Tümer al-Qur'ān p. 25.
keep the condemnation allusions to orthodox and heterodox theologians very distinct. It would indeed have been difficult for him, in the very passage where he is emphasizing His dread of limiting Allah through His characterization by the seven pith, to have expressed any special condemnation of the Mu'tazilites, whose peculiar theology was the direct outcome of this very dread. Rationalizing and mystifying sometimes lead to very similar positions 9).

3. Definitely above all these savants come the believers whose worship, like G.h's own, was 'back to the Quran.' The position taken by these corresponds exactly to that ascribed by G.h. in 'Idār al-'A'sāb to the Prophet, the Companions, and the Fathers, and praised accordingly as all-sufficient; namely, the steady refusal to argue, and the steady reference to every question to the text of Qur'an or Sunna 3).

It is not the mere ' lugubriously' believer that G.h. has in mind in this section. For him he had a contempt which to say the least did not diminish with years 4); it is the believer of real and deep religious experience that he means. When this is realised it becomes remarkable not that these are placed so high, but that they are placed so low. For above them come various classes of mystics differentiated on the 'curious basis which we have already seen. Clearly G.h. gives us to understand here that not only the experience but also the theology of the Sufi is on a higher plane than that of the most pious and religious non-Sufi.

6. Fuzzing is it to find that a doctrine exclusively relating to the heavenly Spheres, and the part taken by the Deity in moving them, is made the test by which the highest four classes of saints and doctors are distinguished from each other. In Ta'rikh 4 days this matter had left G.h. perfectly cold 5). We can only infer that his mystic experiences, 6)

1) The 'idārāt and the 'ulūjāt are mentioned together with approval, in the Muh. bi'ād, in connection with the very same subjects discussed in the Section: "And there is none among the people of the land who taught them a way of knowledge except for those who were taught from the Book of God, and that its origin was from the mouth of God." (Bukhari and Muslim).

2) For especially the whole of al-Dhā'ir ad-Dīn of that work.

3) See especially the whole of al-Dhā'ir ad-Dīn of that work.

4) See especially the whole of al-Dhā'ir ad-Dīn of that work.

5) See especially the whole of al-Dhā'ir ad-Dīn of that work.

6) See especially the whole of al-Dhā'ir ad-Dīn of that work.
his meditations and long night-watches, had now invaded the subject
with extraordinary fascination and importance for him.
7. It is the unity of Allah that is the subject of the anxious care
of G.h. and of the high-grade believers to whom he alludes; but very
surprising is it to note what are the dangers which seemed to him
to threaten that unity. The danger of characterizing Allah by the
Attributes has been already mentioned. This was surprising, but more
surprising is it to learn that the belief that Allah moves the Heavens
threatens the Divine unity because of the plurality of those heavens
(p. 54); further, that the substituted doctrine (that Allah moves the
outermost Sphere only) is to be suspected—though G.h. mysteriously
denies to say why this is so 1); finally, that the again-amended
doctrine (that Allah only commands an Angel to move the outermost
Sphere), also threatens the divine unity and perfection 2); and that
these are only preserved by relieving Allah of all describable part or
lot in this function, and making to predicate anything whatever of Him
or attributes anything whatever to Him. So agnostic is the thought-
basin of Gnosticism. The divine unity becomes not to so much the
Light of lights as HEWES's "eight wherein all cows are black".
8. The repeated mysterious allusions to something withheld in
these last paragraphs is significant and suggestive. These allusions
are concluded by the strangeness of them all, namely that Allah must
not be thought of as either Himself moving the Outermost Heavens or
commanding a Vangard to move it, "because of a mystery the dis-
closure of which this book does not admit of" 3). It would go far towards
the solution of the G.h. problem if we could come upon the book
which did "admit of the disclosure of this mystery". Was the key
to the mystery ever written? Was it in that unattractive book of es-
teric teaching which G.h. says he wrote 4), but which I do not know
whether I declare had never come his way 5)? These questions are easier to
ask than to answer. Yet the mere putting before helps to make clear the
nature of the G.h. problem.
10. Attributless and predicateless though the divine Being is,

1 See ibid. sec. 15.
2 ib. D. 50 and 6.
3 لَا يَجِبَ عَلَى الْكِتَابِ كَفَّارَةً
4 lirv. 6.0. OAVISHE p. 15.
the mystics nevertheless make their inexplicable journey to IT, and gaze upon ITS face. On the gnosticism is reared an unintelligible gnosticism. Allah's glory is said to consume and annihilate these uncaptured saints; yet at the very moment when the thought seems about to pass into pure pantheism it recovers itself. Somewhat or otherwise the individualities of these saints are preserved, not destroyed, just as "The Friend" (Abraham) remained himself after his attainment to the paradise's vision, and the "Beloved" (Muhammad) returned to earth after the supreme experience of the Al-Firdaws. It was thought-habits rather than thought-exercises, that saved G.h. from being a pantheist of the pantheists.

III.

Ibn Rushd and the Mishkat al-Anwar.

The passage which has just been discussed attracted the notice of the great G.h.a.l.l.-crine, Ibn Rushd, during the century which followed the publication of M. We must now examine his remarks on the passage, as in the course of them he makes an allegation which is of critical importance in relation to the G.h. question.

In the opuscule entitled "Al-hafīz 'an ma'nawī al-adiliyyah" he says:


The alleged passage reads: "Then he consults with his book as to the knowledge of Allah, and not to the knowledge of the angels, and he called the angels the men who wish to see those who believe in Allah. The angels are the men of the first heaven, who are the men of the first heaven, and in the midst of them."

The allegory thus casually made — that G.h. really held the same metaphysical view as aī-Fāsābī and Ibn Sīnā respecting the emanation of the highest grade of being from the Absolute, is a most serious one; for G.h. in his Tahāfiṣ wrote whole pages (see especially p. 36).


pp. 28-33) to demonstrate not only the inadequacy of the Philosophers' proof of the emanation theory, but also the fallacious falseness of the theory itself. We must therefore ask two questions:

1. Does the doctrine of the Spheres and their Angels which is so clearly approved by G. b. in M. indicate any desertion on his part of the views he held when he wrote the Tahafut?

2. Was G. b. justified in according to G. b. an adherence to the emanation doctrine on the strength of this passage in M. ?

1. The Tahafut al-Falasiya is the book which, as G. b. tells us in one of the last books he ever wrote, al-Maqalih wa al-Dalal" 1), represents the fruit of his special study and criticism of the Philosophers and their doctrines. In this book he made a complete exposition of his views about this matter of the Spheres; and in the Maqalih, which was written within seven years of his death (between 498 and 505), and which must therefore be nearly contemporary with M., he gives us clearly to understand that he stands by every one of the vital findings of the Tahafut.

With regard to the existence of the system of concentric spheres with their Prime Mover, this was to G. b. as to practically all of the ancients a certainty of observation and a mere matter of astronomy (maqalih wa al-Dalal, Tah. of G. b. p. 57) and the fact that two great minds like G. b. and Ibn Rushd regarded this construction of the heavens and earth as axiomatic is a striking instance indeed of human fallibility.

With regard to the further doctrine, clearly visible in this M. passage, that these Spheres were animate beings (hayawan) the perfection of whose spiritual nature was manifested in the perfection of their motions, a belief held by the Philosophers but by no means confined to them, the position of G. b. in Tah. is that this, if true, must be consigned to the province of revelation, (ba'iz), not demonstration (burhan, dalal). Theologically, he says, the belief is harmless, for Allah is able to vouchsaf anybodv with life, and there is no reason why the bodies of some living creatures should not be spherical just as well as the reverse). But, he says, all this cannot be demonstrated by the Aristotelian instrument of dalal, as is claimed by his opponents (al-Farabi and Ibn Sina et al. "Their doctrine is this question

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1) Maqalih, p. 12 note 1, last Caire ed.
2) Tah. of G. b. A. 333, however, criticise this theory.
3) Tah. p. 57.
is one of which neither is the possibility denied nor the impossibility asserted. ... But we do assert that the Philosophers are unable to cognize it by demonstration of the reason; and that if it is true, then only the prophets are given to scan it by inspiration or direct revelation from Allah. But ratiocination does not demonstrate it, though (it is true) some such doctrine might conceivably be demonstrated, if the demonstrative proof existed"). And, "the secrets of the Kingdom of the Heavens are not to be scanned by means of such fantastic imaginations as these; Allah gives none but his nabi's and mali's to scan them, and that by inspiration, not by demonstration. Thus the Philosophers have been to a man unable to explain the cause of the direction of the celestial movements, or of the cause of the direction".  

This position is borne out by the Mun. where he says) that when these matters are treated as a branch of physics there is no reason to deny them absolutely; and that in his Tak. he pointed out the Philosophers' errors in these matters, which may all be reduced to one (a theological, not a physical one), viz.: their denial of the doctrine that Nature is directly constrained to work (mutawakkharah) by Allah, and that it does not act by itself but is set a-working (musta'mafu) by its Creator, and that sun, moon, stars and elements are constrained to work by His command (mutawakkharatin bi'amrih), not one of them having any action in itself (bi-dhā‘ithan ‘an dhā‘ith)."

"Does the Mun. go beyond this position? It goes beyond it in this respect, that the doctrine which in Tak. and Mun. is coldly pronounced not-impossible seems in Mun. to be proclaimed with some enthusiasm, may be made the differentia of the 'irifina billah from the mass of truly spiritual believers. The contrast of his attitude in Mun. with his attitude in its near contemporary the Mun. is particularly striking, as it shows how differently G.h. was to express himself on certain points to the 'anedon and the khawājs.

For we can scarcely doubt that G.h. in Mun. does teach the doctrine of animation of the Spheres, when we consider how he associates them with angelic Intelligences. In this we merely have the theological as distinct from the philosophical way of explaining the doctrine. The assignment of an Angel as the mover of each Sphere, the graduation of these Angels under their mysterious Commander (al-mulūk), is only the theological expression of the philosophic belief in the anima-"

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1) ib. p. 57
2) ib. p. 86
3) ed. ib. p. 11.
tion and the rationality of the Spheres. G. H. himself in the Tás says that it is merely a question of terms how these Spherical-movements are called. "We have called it (i.e. the first of these Beings) the First Intelligence (al-²ajl al-²awwáj), and we need not quarrel about names, because it is called Angel, Intelligence, or whatever you will." (kumma'lli ma'dilakan all-'ajla, all-'awwáj mà wá鞋子).

1) Tás p. 28.

This is borne out by the Masudi as-Saghib and a little treatise on ar-Najj by the same, both of which are preserved: the former in Arabic, the latter in Persian. The two tracts were not written by him. In the unpublished treatise he teaches that the Spheres have bodies and souls, for he says it down that Sphere-najj (kif, wádi, wá)' is finer than human souls (vutub ba'ibari); he has just previously said that the distinguishing mark of the soul ( rá'it) is that it is the faculty of perception (wádi): further, the Angels are Intelligences (wádb) and (Tás, p. 14, Tás, Ság, p. 11) "they are the Heavens. Putting all this together we find that G. H. teaches (a) the corporeity of the Spheres, (b) that they are possessed of souls, (c) that their bodies have souls, (d) that their souls have perception, that they are, therefore, angelic Intelligences; in other words, the full-blooded teaching of the Philosophers, apart from the doctrine of emanation.

It is clear that the title "al-Majdlin al-²a'izí" is magnificent. The book has been known by several different names. Some consider the work itself (Masudis) to be the following passage (which, when compared with the preceding sentences, indicates that the argument is not syntactically complete) that these are the angels who control them (al-mumkin li'ilmun allahu).
It would thus seem that G.h. in his later mystical days gave in private to the doctrine of the Spheres a somewhat startling emphasis and prominence, while in public retaining the old cool, sceptical, reserve in regard to it). The point is of great interest biographically, but though it tells us something about his doctrine of reserve, it is not enough to convey him on any disputation to Iskâm.

The further point—whether G.h.'s, doctrine of the angelic Spheres in M. included also the emanation-theory of the Philosophers—brings us to the second main question: Waši i b. R. uș h d justifies is, his gloss in the M. passage, namely that Allâh was ِ ِاَدَىٍ fudâdî juma'at ِ ِاَدَىٍ (bedhîn l-ma'ârîkh (called al-ma'ârîkh), and that G.h.'s language in this passage amounts to a laqîk mithâ bi ِ ِاَدَىٍ (al-fâlafîz). 2

The point is one of crucial importance, for it goes far to settle the question, one way or the other, as to whether G.h. held any esoteric doctrine which was flat contradiction to his teachings in his other books and which he, in those books, branded as ِ ِاَدَىٍ. 1 If he can be acquitted on the charge so casually brought against him by i b. R., he may probably be acquitted from the general charge, for it is unlikely that a stronger case will be found elsewhere than that created by this passage in M. This great man's fundamental sincerity is, then, the issue of the present discussion.

But preliminarily it must be established that this question of emanation is crucial for the point at issue. Turning to the Tak of G.h. (no cit. pp. 22 seqq.) we find that this is the theory which is definitely and explicitly contrasted with the true doctrine of Allâh as Creator (jâ'la-l-islâm wa şami l-shâb) and condemned as incompatible with it. The full statement of the emanational theory occurs on p. 28 of the work). The word for "emanation" there used is ِ ِاَدَىٍ (inna l-mabda'u l-ardâwa ِ ِاَدَىٍ min wujûd dhi-l-'inâyâ l-awwâl). But the word the uses more generally is the very one used by i.b.R. in his comment on this M. passage, viz. ِ ِاَدَىٍ, e.g. on p. 30 of the Tak where he starts an objection to the above doctrine by the words ِ ِاَدَىٍ (haytâ fadârîn mina'at etc. Evidently the two expressions are practically synonymous, one meaning "flow over", the other "issue forth".

1) In this, it closely teaches the philosophical qâsîn m l. 11 a.m (pp. XLI seqq.; transl. pp. 23 seqq.). So then G.h. von a hypothesis through and through (p. XII). — as very apparent also both the Mahdîa's (tâlîhî, p. 53 note), yet easier the greater Nezâî, an original on p. 127.

2) See also Nezâîî, al-Fâlafîz, Cairo 1st ed. pp. 29, 220. Iskîm. 9.
The two words are brought together in a sentence on p. 319 (last two lines).
And on the next page (32) he explicitly opposes the doctrine of ṣaddūr to the only true and orthodox one of Ishākh. Thus we see that to Gh. the doctrine of ṣaddūr was part and parcel with that of qadam al-ʿalam, which is the first of the three heresies, which alone he definitively damns as subversive of Islam and as meriting the penalty of death. ⁷

We further note that on p. 51, lines 5, the same doctrine is shown to be vitally connected with the second of the said heresies, viz. Allāh's non-cogniscance of the particular. It would be easy to show further, that it underlies the third also, the non-resurrection of the body and the non-materiality of the Garden and the Fire. Trebly damnable, then, was the doctrine of ṣaddūr, — the doctrine, nevertheless, which we are invited by ibn R a s h d to consider as explicitly taught by ⁸ A bū Ḥ a m dī in the Miskūh al-Sawādī ⁹.

There being then no doubt that this accusation respecting ṣaddūr touches the heart of the question, we must now discuss the causes that might lead a reader, as apparently they led ibn R., to find the doctrine in M. in general and this passage in particular.

(a) The word ṣaddūr does not occur in M. But the word ḥidūs, which as we have seen had suspicious associations, is frequent. The angels, Gh. teaches in M. are lights (not have or convey light): the lower lights "emanate (ṣaddūs) one from the other as light emanates from a lamp (p. 22),", forming an emanational light-scale ascending by stages (maqāddim) to Allāh as absolute light source (ibn). At first sight this looks like the naked emanation-theory of the Philosophers: but in fact it is not so. Gh. uses the word ḥidūs not simply ḥidūs min. . . but ḥidūs min. . . ḥidūs. This shows clearly that the image in his mind involves not simply an emanating something, but also a something else, upon (ʿilā), which falls the glory of that emanation, but which is other than it. See M. pp. 4, 14 (twice) and 30, where this point is made explicitly clear. In other words there is presupposed by

⁷ Conclusion (pp. 30, 97) of the Tah. The same explicit condemnation is found in Farāḥ al-Tahāfī, and in the contemporary Mawqīf (pp. 11, 12).
⁸ It should be noted here that ibn R. a s h d was himself quite cold towards the emanation-doctrine, which he says was gouged by al-ʿAṣwāfī and ibn Sīnā on to the tree philosophic (i.e. Aristotelian) doctrine of the heavenly bodies (p. 99 of ibn R., p. 49 of the very passage where he anted G.h.'s doctrine against the emanation-doctrine in his Tah., p. 25). This is one of the many cases in which he complains that our author is condemning the S., condemned philosophy in general. It is therefore all the more surprising to find G.h. countenanced by ibn R., of endorsing ibn S.'s of all people, and the emanation-doctrine of all ages.
this simile a dark body, which becomes clothed, not with the essence of the Light-giver, but with the reflection of His Glory 1). This is the significance of his phrase "as the light emanates from the lamp!", not the flame itself, but the light which is the effect of the flame. Similarly for the expression IfThTh-ar which occurs on p. 22, where he says that the "Spirits Prophetic are lit (muqabala) from the Spirit Supernal as a torch is lit from fire, and that these Supernals are lit the one from the other in an order of ascending stages (muqaddara)"; this expression equally implies some sort of a higher substance which is merely lighted at and from the source of original flame. On pp. 31 and 32 moreover, the entirely harmless use of the word ḥāla is further proved by its being used for the emanation of a Sultan's authority on to his Vizier, so that the latter is invested with it. Obviously this is not to say that the Vizier emanated from the Sultan in its Sinā'ī's sense. This use of the metaphor is made very clear in the Madānīm aš-Šaghrī, where the following passage occurs:

"What is emanation? We cannot understand this metaphorically, what is suggested to us by the overflowing (emanating) ḥayl of water jet a vessel in the hand, for that is suggestive of a separation of a portion of the water from the vessel and its conjunction with the hand. But we must understand that which is suggested to us by the overflowing (emanating) sunlight on to a wall; though here too some have gone wrong, and have supposed that a ray from the body of the sun becomes separated from it and is conjugated with the wall. Rather is it the sunlight (or cause whereby something resembling it is luxuriously created). But the emanation of an image from some object on to a mirror... It is thus that the divine grace (ful) is the cause whereby the light of existence is created in every substance that admits of existence; which is expressed by the word ful.

So far from having here the metaphysics of the Philosophers, we have simply the metaphysics of the orthodox muqaddamaīn served up with an analogy from nature. For this is but a picturesque statement of their theory of Necessary Being (wolfa) and Potential Being (muqaddam) — the latter being in the state of Not-being (iṣām) until the attribute of the divine grace (ful) invests it with the single attribute of Being (mulfa) and thus creates it. The Potential in the State of Not-being is compared to a dark body; necessary Being (Allāh) to the sun; the attribute of ful to the ray, which, alighting on the dark body invests it with the quality of existence, and it fuls into the light of Being. Compare with this a passage in the Madīj just before the one already cited, where the question is: "What is the cause of

1) Of the mixed metaphor, supra p. 15. The passage in Jāhād VIII 30, 496, cited by Khārijn in Ḳārin p. 72, shows the same important attachment of D. B. to this conception of the effecter, especially as a defense against the results of pan-substantialism, consequent on errancy.
this kindling of the wick (i.e. the embryo) by the light (i.e. the spirit)."; and the reply is: "The cause is an attribute in the Maker and an attribute in the potential locus (modadim qabid). The former attribute is the divine grace (fi'd), the well-spring of Being upon (yusul al-awwal 'ad) all that is susceptible (la'ab qabid) of Being (i.e. al-mumkin); for this grace is a self-emanation upon (fayudan bikhari) 'ad) every hypostasis (khafid) which it brings into existence. This attribute is expressed by the term Power and may be compared to the emanating of the sun upon all that is potentially illuminable (qabid al-istinna) when the veil between the two is removed."

With this clear position the allusions in 84 to the divine fayudan are in complete agreement. The metaphysic of G.h. the Sufis was still that of Bahdi, not falsafa, just as much as in his pre-Sufi days. The image of the passing of the divine Light by a series of refractions on to a series of dark objects, each reflecting, but more and more dimly, the light of the one before, is a favourite one with Sufis and is found in an important passage in 84 (pp. 15, 16). If we are right in showing how harmless this doctrine of light-emanation was in itself, we may further conclude from this image of successive refractions, that the graded ranking of human and angelic spirits, up to one highest Being standing next to Allah, was also a doctrine not in the least inconsistent with the orthodox doctrine of the eternal Creator and the contingent creation 1). These successive refractions are in the same section (pp. 15, 16) explicitly identified with these successive ranks of Spirits, the gradations of whom are further said to be a matter of kashf. According to this important section, it is clear that however mysteriously high and nigh the highest and highest of these Beings is, and whether TF be called the Obevy s one (as in our enigma-passage), or the Highest one (al-maghabab p. 16), it nevertheless only differs in degree from all those who are lower down in the series. Thus, on page 16, "These four Lights (in the refraction simile just alluded to) are ranged one above the other and one more perfect than the other; and each one has a certain rank and proper degree which it never passes. I would have you know that it has been revealed to these who have Insight that even so are the Lights of the Spirit-realm ranged in an order;
that the Highest (al-maqsah) is the one who is nearest (al-yaqub) to the Ultimate Light, (and thus the rank of Seraphiel may well be above that of Gabriel)\(^1\); that among them is one who is the Nighest; \(\ldots\) that among them is a Lowest; and finally between the two are grades innumerable.\(^2\) The reflection-smile with which this section begins (p. 15) explains that the Nighest stands to the Light-source, Allah, as the moon to the Sun, i. e. as the most brilliant of reflected lights to the primary, possessing therefore no more unity of essence or nature with the primary than any of the others.

Considering the total absence, then, of the words fala or zadra, or even their idea, from the M. passage under discussion, and the harmlessness of the Ghazalian use of jadaa, zaydaa, zadi, no justification can be found for i b n K.'s gloss on the passage. — But it has other features which made more readers than i b n R. suspicious (see ref. sec. IV).

b) In the schematization of the universe ascribed by G. h. to the highest grade of the Light-veiled, viz. that immediately preceding the Unveiled, Allah is compared with the sun, the source of light, and the Highest in his service with the moon. But in the schematization ascribed to the Unveiled, Allah is compared with pure Light (an-mir al-makhl) and his Viceroy to the sun; or respectively the elemental fire (yakhar an-mir) and live-coal. Are we then, to understand that no longer is the Viceroy a mere reflector of an alien glory, himself essentially dark? but that he is the light-source relationally, and Allah the light-source absolutely? Certainly this does look like the Philosophers' doctrine of the First-cause (al-ilid al-id) and the First-caused (al-ma'rid al-anumal) or al-`abd al-anumal. The Demurje:\(3\)

\(^1\) The allusion to Seraphiel and Gabriel in the above quotation, though introduced in the curious tentative fashion sometimes adopted by our author, tends to confirm the suggestion that G. h. the mystic had taken over very much of the Sufi cosmology and nomenclature which is in a large extent common both to Jewish, Christian, and Muslim mysticism. These two names were not chosen at random. Seraphiel (Seraph) was the Archangel of the highest Heavenly Heaven (Saturn, Zaphkiel and Gabriel (Tubal) that of the lowest (the Moon)—as appears clearly in the myth of the "Semitic" of the Quran from the "Preserved Tablet" to "the Lowest Heaven" (al-Dira al-Donya), and its transference from there by the Angel Gabriel to the prophet Mohammad. Mahab's was the Archangel of the Mercury sphere, Radi' al the Sun sphere, and so forth (J. Lawrence in Die Sechs Coelent XII p. 61; the names were taken over from the Arabic astronomers). The Seven Archangels are not mentioned in M. But in the strange passage about the way of an Exclusivist on p. 30 we have a mention of Seven Stages (al-mahaqas), which in all probability is an allusion to the Seven Spheres. If so, we have here an indication that in G. h. a day fiats's relation their Seraphiel to the Seven Spheres, as the modern Dervish orders do (see "The Way" of a Mohammedan Mystic" by W. H. T. Greenough, Harrowworth 1913).
— the "sun" would then be the actualisation of unrecognisable "light", having emanated therefrom by a transcendental and unintelligible process. Very significant is that G. H. al-majdi is not called an Angel, and is unconnected with any Sphere; the next lower Being, an Angel, moves the fālah al-ālāh. Exactly so the "First Intelect" moved no Sphere, but produced the "Second Intelect" who ruled the Outermost Sphere (javādīhā minākh malāk wa-fālah-i).

But Gh.'s symbolism is not always consistent. On p. 23 of M., for example, he says: "everything in existence is related... to Allah as light to the Sun" 1); but on p. 30 he says that the grades of angelical Light-essences? (created, obviously) may be compared with the (created) sun, moon, and stars in the world of sight 2). No argument therefore can be built on his symbolic comparison of the "Evangelical fālah-i" to the Sun, though under the circumstances it was no unlucky hit.

The passage on p. 30, in fact, which is an uncompromising demonstration of the oneness of Allah and the creativeness of all other beings, even the highest, gives the clue to Gh.'s mind in using this symbolism, and shows that as far as his expressing a singularly close relation between Allah and his Vicegerent, it is intended to express the infinity of the gulf between them. After calling the Archangels Lords (ardabh) and comparing them to the sun, moon and stars, he introduces that artistic and beautiful passage in the Qur'ān where Abraham is depicted as tempted to worship these heavenly bodies successively, ending with the sun the most glorious of them all. As he sees each set and set he exclaims, "I love not those that set", until, when the sun sets also, he exclaims "Oh my people I am innocent of your polytheism. I have turned my face to (ṣawājihā waṣājī ṭīd) Who created the Heavens and the Earth" (Sura VI. 75) 3). The italicised phrase is of first-rate importance in this connection, he is again most significantly in our enigma passage (M. p. 55) where the Unveiled (we are told) "turn their face from (ṣawājihā) him who moves the Universe and him who commands it to be moved" 3), and arrived at (ṣawājih īd) a Being transcending all", etc. — The essential unity of teaching is between the Qur'ān itself and this much debated passage, and between the latter

1) See p. 23
2) See p. 30
3) See p. 75
4) See p. 55
5) Baysari, p. 112
6) Krauss, p. 122
and Gh.'s uniform theological position, would thus seem to be fully established.

3) An apparent contradiction between the teaching of this passage and that of Gh.'s Munqidh, for example, is found in the explicit denial to Allah of the supreme act of moving the external sphere, and the absolution from the function to the Vicegerent. Moreover, even the Vicegerent is too sublime to move that Heaven directly; he is an Obedient One who orders the moving of the Heavens (allahk al-qawmihi li-habibikatu), and under Him is the one (sc. an Archangel) who actually moves them (allahk yaharriru s-sawanih). And as if to lose no opportunity of clothing this Vicegerent with an all-too-ambiguous preeminence he omits to call him either angel or creature (musha'id, 'abid) though in the previous solemnization the supreme Celestial was carefully designated by both of these terms (p. 55 lines 2, 3). Finally, Gh. throws some mystification over the reason which led him to deny this function to Allah: it would, he says "escape the absolute divine unity and perfection because of a mystery, of the disclosure of which this book does not admit."

In the Munqidh on the other hand we find the very opposite function, namely the ordering (yadwm) of the movement of the Heavens, which in this passage is denied to the Attribut Being and handed over to the Vicegerent, assigned to the Creator alone; an assignation which he there makes the test doctrine of orthodoxy, damning the heretic philosophers who denied it. "Nature", he says "is set a working by its Creator, and sun, moon, stars and elements are constrained to work by His command (bi-amrhi)."

What makes the contrast so glaring is the explicit denial of this very bi-amrhi to Allah in the M. passage, and its ascription to the Vicegerent who is for this reason called al-mawdul. The Munqidh position is in fact identical with that of the highest grade of Licht-gelehrten, who ascribes this controlling of the heavenly bodies to the one of Allah and made Him in the musul (p. 55 lines 1, 2). Gh. is here indeed "plus philosophes que les philosophes". The latter, according to ibn R.3 laid down that all oracles issued by whatsoever Commanders must be traced back to this First Principle (al-mawdul al-aswad, i.e. Allah Himself, who is indeed called in this connection al-dinir al-aswad, the First Commander!}

1) M. p. 55.
2) Passage already quoted above: Munqidh, ed. o. t. p. 11.
The matter does not lack in strangeness, and it certainly looks as if G.h.’s esoteric theory of the divine action differed considerably from his exoteric one[1]. It also looks as if we shall never know the whole explanation of the matter. We have his own *fautre linguisit* here; and, as we shall see, there was no key to the puzzle forthcoming in i b n T u f a i l ’s time[2]. The point is of high interest biographically and theologically, but not to the extent of proving G.h.’s infidelity to orthodoxy, as though he taught that this Vicegerent e m a n a t e d from this First Cause.

For the passage itself when closely studied carries the refutation of such a charge. The fact that he does not call to the Vicegerent *shah* or *malab* may be dismissed as an accident; probably G.h. mentally carried on the description of the Vicegerent in the previous schematization. The key to the orthodoxy of the passage we have already seen: --- *tawajjub* in l. 12, when compared with Abraham’s “*waqihatu wahli lilallati jatara-s-samaddal wal-and hantjan wa-n-nara ana nimu-l-masahibin*”, is conclusive. The word *tawajjub* in itself negates the possibility of an emanation theory.

This becomes still clearer when we consider G.h.’s commentatory on the above Qur’ān text (M. p. 32). It is on the strength of it that he justifies the hyper-transcendence of the Allāh of his theology. The relative ‘*Whā*’ (in Kitāb) is, he says, purposely made as vague as possible; it is left without relation or analogue (*muhiḥ*), for Allāh transcends all relation (*taqaddusa *an-n-nisb*). He then goes on to quote Moses’s refusal to define or to describe the quiddity (*maḥāya*) of Allāh to enquiring Pharaoh, simply referring him to Allāh’s w o r k s i n c r e a t i o n and then stopping short (see Sūra XXVI. 74). It is clear that

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[1] Something more will be said later about the extent or limitations of the Ghazalian doctrine of eminence, his “*Nīqab*” or certain teachings from the “*communauté*”.

[2] M. Massignon suggests to me that the figure of the Vicegerent is really an oblique allusion to a high doctrine concerning the *Qud* who rules and orders all things in both heaven and earth. In reference to the name *al-muqadd* he cites the aphorism of Ibrāhīm Ashāmī that *in al-ahmad yan- na* "sīn *al-ahmad*.* The extraordinary passage in M. p. 24 may be another allusion to this *al-muqadd* sovereignty by a supreme (63). It is true that virtual omnipotence, not only in matters earthly but also in matters heavenly, was ascribed by later Shī ṣ i s to the *ṣūrah*. Of the two *Ṣūrah* of the *qub* the “*Ṣūrah of the right*” was definitely assigned to the control of matters celestial; how much more then the *qub* himself. But is this doctrine as old as G.h.? or, if so, was it reputable in his day? I b n K h a l d ū n (III. 72 of Q u r a n - r e r ’ s text) traces it to the influence of I m a m i t i z i n on the l a t e r verses (al-muqadd *al-muqadd* *al-muqadd* *al-muqadd*). Mediated by men like I b n S i n a , in imitation of the *sūrah-theory* of the I m a m i t i z i n . Now Oh, was continually fighting the I m a m i t i z i n . He desired the *sūrah-doctrine* (see M a w d i d i) and he deeply suspected i b n S i n a . In he, then, likely to have adopted a high *qub-doctrine*?
the obliterating transcendentalism of Gh.'s view of Allāh was intended by him to preserve just this cre at orhood of Allāh. He probably clung to this last refuge of the Deist against an all devouring pantheism. Allāh, though "transcending every attribute given previously", including the direct providential governance of the universe, was nevertheless the "one who created the heavens and the earth" and of course all that is therein, including the Viceroy himself. How Gh. the orthodox was able to keep in view so definite an attribution as that of Creaciont asu amid the Syngian darkness of his hyperagnosticism, is a question that can be asked but not answered. We touch here the bottom of the Ghāzalī-problem. Yet it is only the problem of every mystic who, while his philosophy and theology alike are hastening to blot out both subject and object, annihilating the created world and making God unknowable just because He is All, nevertheless clings to the fact that he himself, a creature, has made the mystic leap to God. And in fact, as we have seen, it is just this passage, perhaps the most agnostic one in G h. (M. p. 55), that is closed by his description of the mystic leap taken by the Unveiled, and their ecstasy at the paranal vision (pp. 56, 57). The doctrine of cre ation (īdād) was, then, to G h. the last anchor of faith, thought, and experience. That he should exchange it for the sand-cord of emana tion is inconceivable, and we have shown that in fact he did not do so. I b n R u s h d 's casual accusation must be totally ruled out, and the sincerity of 'A b hā m i d ' to this extent stands vindicated.

IV.

I b n T u f a i l a n d t h e M i s k i t al-Anwār.

But i b n R u s h d was not the only thinker who was puzzled by this passage in M. His contemporary i b n Tu fa i l in the intro duction to his philosophical romance Ḥ a d a t y. Y a q a t e makes an allu sion to the doubts it had occasioned, and takes occasion to make some arresting remarks concerning Gh.'s alleged secret doctrine in his esoteric books (būsūb madīnāt ibn T.).

I b n T.'s verdict, we may say at once, is that G h. is indeed guilty of serious contradictions, but that these contradictions appear in his published books for all to see; that he had on his own showing a secret doctrine, but that in none of the books which had penetrated to the West was anything particularly significant to be found; and he there-

* M. p. 55.
face rejects the dubious interpretations put by certain contemporary readers of Al upon this veiled passage. But, though he seems to recognize its obscurity, he does not favour us with his true interpretation. Here is his allusion to it:

"Some later writers have fancied they have found something tremendous in that passage of his last sermon at the end of al- Maqamat, which (they think) implies al-Qashash on a dilemma which from which he has no escape. I speak when, after speaking of the different kinds of the Lightenets, and then going on to speak of the true Lightenets, he tells us that these Attainers have discovered, and this Existing One possesses an attribute which is negates of unqualified unity: meaning that it necessarily follows from this, that al-Qashash believed that he Attains Being in his Being, some sort of plumpness, which God forbids!"

He goes on to express his emphatic belief that neither in this passage nor elsewhere would A h b w w e n d be found responsible for such a monstrous opinion; though he does not indicate explicitly where these "later writers" err in their exegesis of the passage. A little study enables us surely, to indicate that error in a single word: — it must have been a very superficial reading of the passage that failed to discern that the Attainers deniéd, not asserted, the deity of the Alkahf, and that just on the very ground that his identification with Allah, or even the ascription to Allah of the direct controlling of the Heavens, would lead to a plumping of the Godhead. The critics failed to see, in fact, that the Unveiled a b a n d a n d the

9) ib. G A I T 1 1 (6) pp. 12-13; n o t e d. G A I T E S (6) pp. 75-76. 10) A later writer, for the word j e a x even when followed by singular pronoun is interchangeable. It is very possible the case, the situation is to a single writer, can it be that we have here an allusion to his contemporary y h l s a critique on Al, the very one which we have just been discussing?

11) G a b 1 . The Yamam is conceived as past, either from the point of view of that critic (g a d c a t 1 a h a 2 a 4 5 2 3 b b 1 1 3 ) or from the print of Y.A. of the a h b a t k a s 1 11.

12) Y a k b a n a (p. 127) and o. (p. 10) seem to me to have mistakes in meaning here. It was a 1 - G a b a t 1 1 1 ; but his critic, who was supposed to find that opinion so disastrous in its consequences. The v. 1 a k a t a makes that even clearer.
position of the last of the light-voiced in just this respect, that the latter identified the 
Muḥṣī ‘with Allah, while the perfected Attainers kept al-
Muḥṣī with all his functions unchanged, but denied that he was Allah’, and 
“turned from him” to the predilected Absolute Being. The discovery of those ‘outer-day’ critics thus turns out to be a naive one, as Ibn T. himself clearly deemed it to be.

Ibn T. has so doubt that G h. had an esoteric doctrine, but he evidently considers that it would not be so very alarming, if known (perhaps I bn T. however was not a very capable judge in such matters); if he had ever been committed to writing, then the books to which he has committed had never found their way to Andalūs. Of the books that had come to hand some, he says, were considered by their western readers to be esoteric. But he pooh-poohs the alleged esotericism of all these books, including our M. itself, Muḥṣī and al- 

Ibn T. in his Tafsīr has no doubt that A ibn H. & al- did not contain the true Attainers and that he achieved the highest degree of velocity. This implication of the legitimacy of maintaining an esoteric, “condensed” (madhābi bhi) doctrine is important. G h., says I bn T., made no secret of it himself. In his al-‘Aqāda, he wrote a number of books (madāhi) with three sets of opinion (madhāhi); first, those of the environment in which he was born, brought up, and educated; second, what he teaches to enquirers, adapting and varying the same to their attainment and degree of perception; third, what a man believes in secret between himself and Allah, which he gives to so one to perse 

It is undoubtedly startling to find a doctrine like this so candidly

5) Ibn T. in his Tafsīr (Cairo, 1384) and in his Kitāb al-‘Aqāda (Cairo, 1379).
6) Op. cit. p. 30. But Ibn T. in his Tafsīr has not indexed an important point here: on the following page of the manuscript G h. terms clearly in the Index of the hadith collection, it does not appear to have been called by the name ‘al-Muḥṣī’ in Arabic. The content of the esoteric teaching are defined by G h. to be the Acts of Allah; His Attributes, the Ka‘ba; and the ‘al-Muḥṣī’ which includes the relation of the Attainers to Allah according to his explanation of the term ‘al-Muḥṣī’ as it is defined by knowledge of ‘called by ignorance’ (see the Muḥṣī terminology) (Jama‘ah p. 30.)

7) ibid. p. 214.
stated by G.h. himself, and to the modern mind such an attitude seems suspicious to a degree. Some will no doubt say that anything might be true of the doctrines of a man who confesses to such supeliness as this. Would it (they might ask) be surprising after this to find the doctrine of emanation, or any other doctrine, in that unknown book of esoteric wisdom if we had it?; while as for studying the books which have his imprimatur, this cannot on the face of it, and on his own confession, lead to any certain results in regard to his innermost thought; so why waste time on so futile a proceeding?

It is probable nevertheless that these considerations, while cer-
tainly complicating the G.h.-problem, only lend it a more piquant interest. Our author is not silent on the rationale and method of this economy of teaching. In regard to Kālimād indeed his method of eco-

my, which was substantially that of the older though not more recent mutakallimīn's, is to be found fully expounded in his treatise ʿIlāmm il-ʿawāmir an ʿilmī-ʿKālimād 3). It is true on the other hand that he is nowhere so explicit about his method of economy in regard to his esoteric mysticism, and that here Muslim mystics were indubitably treading on more perilous ground. Time and again in Ṣ. as we shall see, he stops short at some exciting point and somewhat coyly gives the reader to understand that he could tell so much more as he would.

I b n T's position in regard to G.h. is as follows: He considers that G.h.'s confession of his triple mādhabī accounts for the contradic-
tions and inconsistencies to be found in his published works, such as (sic ibn T.) his damning of the doctrine of the immateriality of the resurrection in his Takū and his approval of it in his Mādīn al-ʿAmal 3) where he himself differs from him is over the necessity for such caution. In the very last paragraph of Ḥāṣyi3) he says that the time had come to 'divulge this secret and to tear away the veil', leaving the true doctrine however with 'a thin veil or cover over it, which may be easily rent by those who are worthy of it, but will be so thick to him who is unworthy to pass beyond that he shall be unable to penetrate it’ 4).

The reason for this proceeding is stated to be the danger some were 1) op. cit. passim see also al-Haidārī, Ḥāṣyi pp. 6–8, and Ṣawādir pp. 27. 2) In Ṣawādir pp. 29, 30 he tells us something about the necessary procedure to his reserved teaching. 3) This opens up a tempting subject which is beyond the scope of the present en-
query. The reference in G.h.'s Takū is pp. 90, 91 (the concluding paragraph); in Mūsān, at-Shāmil, pp. 7, 6. I b n R. in his reply to the Takū mentions the same inconsistency (see the section on orthodoxy in his Takū, concluding paragraph, p. 133). 4) Ṣawādir, p. 113, G.h. p. 112. 5) Ṣawādir, p. 65.
in of reading false and corrupt beliefs into the secret and piously guarded by his predecessors; — he is quite aware that he is almost entirely reversing their policy in this matter.

But among the most prominent of these predecessors was G.h. himself. Now it is true that b.n.T. on his own showing had no authentic knowledge of the esoteric teachings of G.h., for he felt sure (he says) that he had never come across the esoteric book or books mentioned by his predecessor in his Jami' il-Hadis. But it is pretty clear from a survey of the whole passage in Happy that b.n.T. believed that G.h.'s esoteric teaching, if it could be put at and unravelled, would not be found to differ from his own position, so candidly set forth in Happy on Jami'. He even says he won his way to that position through his study of G.h.'s "other (published) works and those of Shami's Ab' an' A'I (i.e. Shami), which I read and compared with the opinions of the present philosophers, until at length came to the knowledge of the truth." 4 A. G.h. al-Fil and b.n.T. &; — a truly remarkable juxtaposition!

b.n.T. may of course be wholly wrong, and Happy may be a total misrepresentation of G.h.'s inner teaching. Certainly it strikes me on reading it as having far more A.b. A'I in it than A.b.a. A.m. in it, more, on the whole, of the ideas attached in the Tad, than of the ideas which the Tad was written to contradict. But the speculation suggested by these hints of the b.n.T. cannot be followed out here, though it is far too important a one to be ignored by anyone who purposes to make an exhaustive study of G.h.'s most intemperate theological conceptions. It only comes within the scope of this study to see what light, if any, Happy throws on the ideas set forth in Tad and especially on the esoteric passage at the end; neither defending nor opposing b.n.T.'s claim to be in line with G.h.'s own thought.

We are disappointed indeed at the very point where we most

1) The works of b.n.T. mentioned by b.n.T. as having been studied by him are:
(a) Tadkif, (b) Aqa'id al-Safa', (c) Musulik, (d) Tadkif al-Gurra', (e) al-Ma'salat al-Awwalim, (f) on-Sirad al-Baqii', (g) Hadits, (h) A. Magtab al-Ash', (i) Muhammad al-Fil. Of these all except (g) and (f) are in print. b.n.T. says of (g) and (f) that they contain bases of esoteric teaching, but not otherwise more than is contained in G.h. As-Syafi' al-Ma'salat. b.n.T. identifies the book known as al-Ma'salat al-
Awwalim (al-Ma'salat al-Gurra') with Abu al-Qasim ibn. I. The Jami' il-Hadis. Book. No. 18, sect. 3, pp. 445-450. It is added however that when he is mentioning casting a doubt on whether he calls Firdawsi or not he should adduce no mention of the Jami' il-Hadis but is known as al-Qasim ibn. Tadkif al-Gurra'. A. G.h. al-

2) G. p. 28-
need the most important information, viz. the nature and functions of the Mučī.  Ḥāyy only tells of the Nine Spheres (the Seven Planetary, the Fīned-Star Sphere, and the Primus Mobile) 1). Beyond this he brings us to Absolute Deity. Thus he is silent as to any Intermediate such as the ṣeql el-aswād or the mučīl el-aswād of ʿibn ʿSānā or the Mučī of ʿM. Herein he resembles al-Fārābī rather than ʿibn ʿSānā 2). His description of the immaterial Celestial Essence (dīdī) who indwells, or is, the Highest Sphere has indeed much in common with the Mučī, whose action however has no immediate relation to even the falsah al-asfāl in ʿM.

In this remarkable passage (pp. 98—100) we have a strong reminder of the image of the successive reflectors in ʿM.), the importance of which in determining Gh.’s notion of jāyābāt has been already pointed out. The essence of the Intelligences of the Spheres are represented as the successive reflections of the Divine Essence. The highest of them is not the essence of the One Real nor is he the Sphere itself, nor is he other than them both). It is, as it were, the image of the sun which appears in a polished mirror; for it is neither the sun, nor the mirror, nor other than them both). These reflecting mirrors are the bodies of the Spheres. This well represents Gh.‘s light-emitting idea (fāṣī). And the inimitable ‘hedges’ ‘neither identical with nor different from the One Real’ might very possibly have been welcomed by Gh. himself in his struggles to define the relation of the creatures to the divine Intelligence. Certainly then, in this respect, Ḥāyy is nearer the Ghazalian falsād than the Avicennian waladār. And it is the same when we consider the teaching of Ḥāyy in regard to the nature of the reflectors whether heavenly or subservient; for although he holds the balance quite even as between the theological doctrine of creation-from-nothing and the philosophic theory of mundo-eternity), he nowhere shows any indication for the doctrine of emanation. The position of Ḥāyy is in fact that of ʿibn Ṛ. as opposed to that of ʿibn Ṣ. and a 1 F. ʿibn Ṛ. was also against the emanational theory 3).

Thus we have yet another endorsement of our previous conclusion

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1) Compare the accounts of their respective emanation theories by Dr. Bois, Philosophy of Islam (Engl. trans.), pp. 175, 135.

2) M. p. 15, 1st above section 112.

3) ʿibn ʿS. al-qawl, ʿibn ʿS. al-yawâd. Perhaps ʿibn ʿS. al-wādā. And it should rather be translated the One Itself.

4) Cf. pp. 64—69; this mediating position is worthy of careful note.

5) See Dr. Bois Die Widerspruche des Philosophus nach Gh., p. 87.
that in regard to the charge made by i b n R., on the strength of the passage in M., the Andalusian philosopher can hardly be accused of libel. We imagine that if there was one thing that G.h.'s Tafsīl did, it was to destroy this particular theory of emanation. Even an i b n Tūsī, who has the fully developed doctrine of the Spheres which we find in the earlier Philosopher, is uncontaminated by that particular theory. The strong common-sense and vigorous dialectic of G.h. had simply killed it.

V.

Conclusion.

Whether G.h. in his later days and in M. itself found himself at the Tula'ī'īan position, that the Mutakallīmites and Anistotidian metaphysic really amounted to much the same thing, cannot now be discussed. One would think it very possible, even though he would continue to fight the philosophers as such because of the elements in their teaching which did seem to him to be dangerous and destructive of religion. He himself has taught us not to consider all that he says in controversy as being a sure guide to positive truth. "This science (controversy) has for its end the protection of the ordinary believer from being upset by new theologians (al-muḥādāt al-ḥāfīz); it is not entirely concerned with the disclosure of absolute truths (al-ḥaqq al-ṣāliḥ). A hāzīr of this class is my Tafsīl al-Falasifa if. Work of this sort, essentially rhetorical and academic (1) in character, would naturally partake of the weakness of the very ēdāla which were the objects of its iconoclasm: it communicated neither positive truth nor even the bottom convictions of the teacher (2). Already according to both i b n T. and i b n R., G.h.'s real opinion on certain eschatological

1) Here the identification of Being and Not-Being would have yielded a great deal of this truism. The Anistotidian doctrine of ṭakbīr, "part potency" near akin to nothing (Ibrāhīm G. p. 47), and the Mutakallīmite assertion of the contingent (vibration) — Not-Being only wailing to be invested with the one quality of Being in order to leap into existence — are very nearly near each other.

2) It is noteworthy that in M. we have the same image of the hand and its shadow (the hand prior to, and independent of, andOverstepping the shadow, and yet always accompanied by it) as is used by i b n T. to illustrate the Anistotidian doctrine of the dependences of the world on the Deity and (inversely) the failure of the world. Masba'āt p. 27, Ibrāhīm G. p. 109.

3) Tafsīl p. 57, 76. The earlier holdout tracts of al-Falasifa is included by him in the same category (id. p. 25).

4) the positive hāzīr al-Falasifa. Manual p. 222. I b n R. and i b n T. is always compounding of the controversial, non-demonstrative character of the argument of the Tafsīl.

5) Ibn 213, 214. -
matters had come out in his Mubah, and it contradicted the position so ferociously contended for in the Tahzibiatu'l. The present work, al-Mishkat, gives plenty of indications that 'there was a great deal more behind which he did not care to set forth at that time. The nature of the humani, 'agl, and its peculiar relation to the Divine, are two of such secrets (sipr) (M. pp. 6,7). Of the description of the mystic 'gd (p. 261), which surely comes as close to pantheism as language is capable of, we are told that "behind these truths also lie secrets which it is not lawful to enter upon". The impropriety of making Allah move the outermost where by His Command, the necessity of asserting His transcendence even of this and every other conceivable function or attribute, is another of these secrets (p. 55). The astonishing passage (p. 24), where to the supreme Adon of mysticism is ascribed features and functions of Deity, is introduced with a coy disclaimer (line 1), and it is hazarded that "perhaps" one might think that here we have the true explanation of Adam's being "in the image of the Khoroum"; — but really there is an explanation,—only "I think good to draw rest to my exposition, for I do not think you can bear more of this subject than what I have said!" These hesitations and diffident admissions and "perhapses" and "perchances" from the fierce dogmatist of the Tahzibiatu'l, the perpetual layer-down-of-the-law, are very suggestive. Every Sufi — every adherent of the All in the One,—who goes as far as Gh. evidently had gone in his mystical experiments, must be perpetually trembl

ing at the edge of the pantheistic abyss. He does not pretend to know intellectually. His experimental gnosis is an intellectual agnosticism, and, as a agnosticism which may seem to him continually oscillating between an extreme pantheism and an extreme deism. Now the walking and sober Abū Bakr was and remained by bent and training a theologian. His own thought when not envoicing on the transcendental plane, and the thought of the 'awliyya' who never moved so that plane at all, would inevitably be cast in the theological mould, and would equally inevitably be the thought of the right-centre in Islam. But may we not read certain in some directions, which it may never be wholly possible to define, those ten ecstatic years of spiritual pilgrimage, with the unfolding to him of the 'ism al-mahabab, the world of Elements, and Spheres, and Intellects, and Ineffable Raptures to the dark glory of the Absolutes, did not leave and cannot have left a — Ghazzali's thought without profound changes? May they not well have brought him, in particular, to see that between the Philo-

1) vide supra.
philosophers and the Mystics there was a very essential bond; that though
the claims of the former to demonstrate and therefore profanely to
reveal transcendent mysteries must be lashed, yet the mystical ecstasy
did bring the soul by a leap into a world that was wonderfully like
theirs. The common Neoplatonic basis of both the Súfis' and the
Philosophers' systems makes such a conclusion in fact probable enough,
however conscientiously G.H. may have striven to conceal it from
himself.

We are not finished yet with the Ghazáli-problem. What
was the absolute Islamic truth in his view? Was it the exoterism of
the pious 'asábí? or the exoterism of the mystic khamáyy? Or both
together? And if the two were equally true, have we here to do with
a doppelse Wahheit? And if so, how does it compare with that of the
more notorious Avdades?

Such are some of the questions that will long exercise students of
"Alpanâl". They may ultimately prove insoluble. For are we likely
ever to discover a book of his that enables us to penetrate them further
than does this Mitkhâl al-Awâm? Yet even this "Niche for Lights",
as we have seen, does no more than dimly light our way up a path
which leads up to a fast-closed door.