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ISLAMIC ORTHODOXY OR REALPOLITIK? AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S VIEWS ON GOVERNMENT

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I INTRODUCTION

It may be argued that the subject of al-Ghazālī's political theory has been aired sufficiently and that there is little point in reworking such familiar material. The aims of this article will be to examine certain facets of this topic which have perhaps not yet been studied with sufficient attention and to stimulate further debate on this area of al-Ghazālī's work. In particular, an attempt will be made, through translation and analysis of crucial passages of al-Ghazālī's major works on Islamic government, to consider the thorny question of the consistency of his views and the extent to which they were modified during his lifetime by particular historical circumstances. Oddly enough, this has not yet been done in the requisite detail, largely because the scholars who have devoted themselves to the study of al-Ghazālī have had their point of departure in theology and philosophy rather than in political history.

A few words of background will serve to locate the discussion which follows in its appropriate intellectual context. According to the classical theory of Islamic law, the only legitimate political authority in Islam is that of the caliphate. In reality, however, the situation of the Sunnī ʿAbbāsid caliphate by the time of Būyid hegemony in the fourth/tenth century had sunk to one of total dependence on the military power wielded by the Būyid military *amīrs*. It was with these men, therefore, that all temporal power lay. Even the rôle of the ʿAbbāsid caliph as the religious and legal figurehead of the Muslim community had not gone unchallenged by this time. The establishment in the fourth/tenth century of the "heretical" Ismāʿīlī caliphate of the Fāṭimids in Cairo threatened to remove even notional authority from the Sunnī caliphate in Baghdad. That counter-caliphate, moreover, was vigorously expanding its influence at a time when the prestige, to say nothing of the actual power, of the ʿAbbāsid caliph in Baghdad had sunk dangerously low.

When the nomadic Saljuq Turks, recently converted to Islam, took Baghdad in 447/1055, they made great play of elevating the status of the ʿAbbāsid caliph and of being the champions of Sunnī Islam. To a disinterested observer, this pose may well smack of self-justification, all the more so since, in reality, the heyday of the Saljuq empire (447–85/1055–92) saw the political situation remaining much the same as it had been under the Būyids.

Al-Ghazālī came to prominence during the reign of the third Saljuq sultan Malikshāh (465–85/1072–92), a period which saw the power of the great vizier Niẓām al-Mulk reach its apogee. The latter set about the revitalization of Sunnī Islam through a network of *madrasa*s, the Niẓāmiyyas—institutions of Shāfiʿī law which were to produce a class of *ʿulamāʾ* able to confront the internal and external threat posed by Ismāʿīlī missionary activities. As is well known, al-Ghazālī was appointed to a prestigious teaching post at the premier Niẓāmiyya, that of Baghdad, in 484/1091, where he remained until he experienced a profound spiritual crisis in 488/1095. This resulted in his resignation from his post to become a wandering Ṣūfī. The last years of his life (493–505/1100–11) he spent in his homeland of Khurāsān, engaged above all in writing his major works.

The present discussion will be based on a range of works generally attributed to al-Ghazālī, written in Arabic and Persian, both before and after his crisis in 488/1095.

II AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE *KITĀB AL-MUSTAẒHIRĪ*

(*a*) *Introductory comments*

The full title of this work of al-Ghazālī is the *Kitāb Faḍāʾiḥ al-Bāṭiniyya wa-faḍāʾil al-Mustaẓhiriyya*.[1] It has long been accepted as an authentic work of al-Ghazālī,[2] and its contents were outlined and discussed by Goldziher as early as 1916.[3] The treatise, its title usually abbreviated to *Kitāb al-Mustaẓhirī*,[4] was written in response to a request from the young ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Mustaẓhir, who had asked al-Ghazālī to compose a work by means of which the errors of the Ismāʿīlīs would be exposed. According to his own account in his autobiography, *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, al-Ghazālī studied the writings of the Ismāʿīlīs (the *Taʿlīmiyya*) in order to be able to refute their claims in polemical fashion:

> The heresy of the *Taʿlīmiyya* had already appeared, and everyone was speaking about their talk of gaining knowledge of the meaning of things from an infallible Imām who has

charge of the truth. It had already occurred to me to study their views and become acquainted with what is in their books, when it happened that I received a definite command from His Majesty the Caliph to write a book showing what their religious system really is . . . I began to search for their books and collect their doctrines.[5]

The *Mustaẓhirī* can be dated to the short period between the accession of al-Mustaẓhir (18 Muḥarram 487/7 February 1094) and al-Ghazālī's famous departure from Baghdad at the time of his spiritual crisis (Dhu 'l-Qaʿda 488/November 1095).[6] There is disagreement as to whether al-Ghazālī wrote the work before or after the death of the Fāṭimid caliph al-Mustanṣir (18 Dhu 'l-Ḥijja 487/29 December 1094).[7] In any case, it is significant that the *Mustaẓhirī* probably appeared during the year 488 (11 January–30 December 1095).

As Goldziher points out, there were a number of earlier Sunnī writers who had composed polemical works against the Ismāʿīlīs.[8] Nor is the *Mustaẓhirī* the only attempt made by al-Ghazālī to refute the doctrines of the Ismāʿīlīs. In his autobiography he mentions five such works,[9] including the *Mustaẓhirī*. Only one other of these, the *Qiṣṭās al-mustaqīm*, is extant.[10] Al-Ghazālī also attacks the Ismāʿīlīs in the *Miʿyār al-ʿilm*, a treatise on logic also apparently written in 488/1095, which Bouyges believes to pre-date the *Mustaẓhirī*,[11] and also in the *Mustaṣfā*.[12]

The *Mustaẓhirī* is, however, the first work by al-Ghazālī which has as its central aim a refutation of Ismāʿīlī beliefs. As is well known, the timing of its appearance may be seen as the result of an increasing preoccupation, both in Saljuq and caliphal circles, with the political threat posed by the Ismāʿīlīs. Al-Ghazāli's mentor, the great Saljuq vizier Niẓām al-Mulk, whose own work—the *Siyāsat-nāma*—reveals an obsessive zeal against the Ismāʿīlīs,[13] and in whose entourage al-Ghazālī had spent some time,[14] had been assassinated allegedly by the Ismāʿīlīs in 485/1092. Within Saljuq territory, moreover, Ismaʿīlīs under the leadership of Ḥasan-i Sabbāḥ had seized the fortress of Alamūt in north-west Iran and now threatened the centre of Saljuq power from within. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the first actions of al-Mustaẓhir after becoming caliph was to commission from al-Ghazālī, as one of the leading theologians of the age, a work of polemic against these Ismāʿīlīs whose sophisticated propaganda was exerting growing appeal amongst the intelligentsia and common people alike.

(b) *The subject-matter of the* Kitāb al-Mustaẓhirī

One of the two principal aims of al-Ghazālī in this work is a refutation of the Ismāʿīlīs (the *Bāṭiniyya* or *Taʿlīmiyya*). This part of the work, which broadly speaking covers Chapters 2 to 8, has been extensively described by Goldziher[15] and Laoust.[16] Only a few additional points, therefore, will be raised here. Although Goldziher performed a valuable service in focusing scholarly interest on this particular work, his approach is heavily biased in favour of al-Ghazālī and the Sunnīs. All too often he makes no distinction between his description of the highly-charged polemical text of al-Ghazālī and his own comments on the material, which are emotional and hostile to the Ismāʿīlīs.[17] Corbin rightly takes Goldziher to task for selecting only certain passages of the *Mustaẓhirī* and for passing unfavourable remarks about the Ismāʿīlīs.[18] Corbin also points out that the response of the Ismāʿīlīs to al-Ghazālī's attack was to express surprise that a scholar of his stature should censure them without reference "to any authentic Ismāʿīlī source".[19] Not for the first time, al-Ghazālī stands accused of too great an involvement in the politics of his own time.[20]

Nevertheless, between them, Goldziher and (to a lesser extent) Laoust provide a valuable digest of the arguments adduced by al-Ghazālī in his attack on the doctrines of the Ismāʿīlīs. He calls his adversaries the *Taʿlīmiyya*, those who follow *taʿlīm*—a word which Corbin defines as "initiatic knowledge"[21] and which is dispensed by the infallible Imām. According to al-Ghazālī, the Ismāʿīlīs believe that salvation lies in accepting what is transmitted to them by the Imām and in imitating him.[22] For the Ismāʿīlīs, the impeccable Imām is the deputy (*khalīfa*) of the Prophet and after his death the only person qualified to interpret God's revelation. Every age must have an immaculate Imām and it is inconceivable that there should be two such Imāms at any one time.[23] The *Sharīʿa*, for the Ismāʿīlīs, is different from what Sunnīs believe it to be. Although following the *Sharīʿa* is an obligation for the Ismāʿīlīs, such an obligation is based on the *Sharīʿa* as interpreted solely by their Imām and not in accordance with the views of the orthodox Sunnī *madhhabs*.[24] The Ismāʿīlīs claim that the true Imām is the one who occupies the imāmate in Egypt and that all mankind owes him obedience.[25]

The other aim of the *Mustaẓhirī*—which is in fact inextricably linked to the refutation of the Ismāʿīlī imāmate—is to prove the legitimacy of the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Mustaẓhir. This aim is realized in Chapters 9 and 10 of the work.[26] Al-Ghazālī begins in Chapter 9 by clearly stating his aim, namely to demonstrate that the imāmate of al-Mustaẓhir is in conformity with Islamic law, that he is God's caliph (*khalīfa*) over mankind and that obedience to him is a religious obligation (*farḍ*) incumbent on all mankind.[27] According to al-Ghazālī, the existence of the caliph at the head of the community is an obligation based on the *Sharīʿa*. The caliph is, in short, the mainspring of all legitimacy. Public functions are valid only if they spring from the wish of the caliph, whose existence is the very foundation of the continuity of the *Sharīʿa*. If there were no caliphate, all religious institutions would

be suspended and the *Sharīᶜa* itself would be threatened with extinction.[28]

Al-Ghazālī adduces three arguments to support his assertion that the Imām is the source of all legitimacy, the principle from which all other public functions spring. The first is based on the consensus of the community (*ijmāᶜ*). Whilst there is disagreement only on a suitable method of appointing the Imām, there is unanimity on the necessity for such an Imām. The second argument is the valuable precedent of the Companions who, in order to preserve the unity of the *umma* and the survival of Islam, acted speedily after the death of the Prophet to elect an Imām. The third argument is the necessity for authority to be vested solely in one man and not in a consultative council (*shūrā*), since the rule of a single Imām is the only way of preventing disunity and disorder.[29]

Al-Ghazālī then moves on to a discussion of the right method of appointing the Imām. For the Ismāᶜīlīs, the Imām is appointed by divine *naṣṣ*,[30] and this method has nothing to do with the number of people who may or may not support such an appointment. If appointment by *naṣṣ* is invalid, there only remains election (*ikhtiyār*) by the Muslims.[31] This is not a foolproof method, since election may be variously defined as the consensus (*ijmāᶜ*) of all Muslims; or only that of the people of "loosing and binding" in every land; or that of the inhabitants of the city where the caliph lives; or the consensus of a small number of people, or only one. Al-Ghazālī dismisses as impossible the idea of universal consensus and that of the people of "loosing and binding" and of a specified small number of people.[32] The only remaining viable solution is that of one person making the *bayᶜa*. Al-Ghazālī states categorically, "We would say: 'Yes, there is no source for the imāmate except *naṣṣ* or election. Since *naṣṣ* is invalid, election holds good'."[33]

The ensuing passage is the core of his whole argument. He says that election of the Imām by one person making the oath of allegiance is sufficient if that one person is obeyed and possesses unsurpassed military strength (*shawka*), since his compliance is the compliance of the masses.[34] If this cannot be achieved by one person, then two or three should come to an agreement; but what is important here is not the number of those making the oath of allegiance but the establishing of a power base (*shawka*) for the Imām. That can be achieved by means of anyone who seizes power (*mustawlin*) and who is obeyed.[35] The desired object in setting up the Imām is the establishment of unity. The only way that this can be achieved is by a manifestation of force (*shawka*), and *shawka* can only be accomplished by the compliance of the majority of the respected people of every period. Election, al-Ghazālī alleges, is not a human stratagem but a God-given blessing.[36] In contrast to the Ismāᶜīlī (and Shīᶜī) view that the Imām is designated by God, for al-Ghazālī God is also involved in his theory: the imāmate is, so to speak, ratified by *shawka*, and *shawka* undertakes the act of allegiance. The act of allegiance in turn is obtained only when Almighty God by force turns hearts to obedience and loyalty, and this cannot be done by humankind.[37]

According to al-Ghazālī, ten qualities are necessary for an Imām if he is to be fit for his office; six are natural or innate (*khilqiyya*) and cannot be acquired, whilst four may be acquired.[38] In the first category are adult status, sound intellect, freedom, maleness, descent from Quraysh and good hearing and sight.[39] In each case, al-Ghazālī outlines his arguments for the presence of these qualities in an Imām. In the second category are four so-called "acquired" attributes: *najda*, *kifāya*, *ᶜilm* and *waraᶜ*. Al-Ghazālī then states that the requisite attributes, both innate and acquired, are to be found in the person of al-Mustaẓhir, that his imāmate is in accordance with the *Sharīᶜa*, that it is incumbent on all *ᶜulamāᵓ* to pronounce *fatwā*s under his overall authority, and that they are to execute his judgments.[40] In the remainder of the chapter, al-Ghazālī goes on to explain and justify the four "acquired" attributes.[41]

In his discussion of the first "acquired" quality, *najda*,[42] al-Ghazālī embarks on a long excursus about the Turks.[43] This is of considerable interest, yet it has not received the attention it deserves in the context of scholarship on al-Ghazālī's political theory. He begins as follows:

> Our view is that what is meant by *najda* in the case of Imāms is a show (*ẓuhūr*) of strength (*shawka*), a plentiful supply of equipment, seeking the help (*istiẓhār*) of armies, the tying of banners and standards, possessing the ability—through the help of parties and followers—to subdue rebels and wrongdoers, to fight against infidels and those who are inordinately proud, to still the manifestation of discords and to stop the flow (*ḥasm*) of the accumulated swell of trying afflictions, before their evil (*sharar*)[44] becomes apparent (*yastaẓhira*) and the harm (*ḍarar*) they cause becomes widespread. This is what is meant by *najda*.[45]

The above passage, which has been translated literally, is written in a high-flown style with verbal conceits and rhetorical devices which cannot be reproduced in English. To take only a single example, the appearance in quick succession of three words (*ẓuhūr*, *istiẓhār* and *yastaẓhira*) which are formed from the same root as the name al-Mustaẓhir is probably deliberate.

Al-Ghazālī then turns his attention to the Turks:

> In this age of ours, from amongst the (various) kinds of human beings it is the Turks who possess force (*shawka*). Almighty God has given them the good fortune to befriend and love him (sc. the caliph) to such an extent that they draw near to God by helping him (sc. the caliph) and by suppressing the enemies of his state (*dawla*). They yield themselves to belief in his caliphate and imāmate and in the necessity (*wujūb*) of obedience to him, just as they submit themselves to

the (religious) obligations of God's commands and the confirmation of the truth (*taṣdīq*) of His message by His messengers.[46] So this is a *najda*, the like of which has not (ever) been established for anyone but him, so how can there be any dispute about his *najda*?

It is conceivable that in the phrases "befriend and love him" and "his caliphate and imāmate" al-Ghazālī is referring to God; but in view of the subsequent sentences, which speak more clearly of the parallel between obedience to the caliphate (on earth) and obedience to God and Islam, it seems more likely that these are references to the caliph, namely al-Mustaẓhir. The last sentence is a clear allusion to the caliph, who has not been mentioned by name or office anywhere in this section of the text.[47]

Al-Ghazālī continues, using the format of question and answer which occurs so frequently in his work:

If it is argued, "How can his (i.e. the caliph's)[48] *najda* be achieved by them (sc. the Turks) when we see them venturing[49] to oppose his commands and prohibitions and exceeding the limits laid down for them in his regard—for *shawka* is achieved only by those who as far as possible show unswerving obedience, whereas these (sc. the Turks) are unswerving only in pursuit of their passions,[50] and whenever they are aroused by anger or stirred by lust, or violent rancour inflames their breasts, they do not care about obedience and they can only revert to the bonds of their innate bestial nature. So how can *shawka* be achieved by them?"[51]

We would reply, "This is an extremely invalid question, seeing that the obedience required of mankind for the providing of (military) support (*shawka*) for the Imām is no more than the obedience required of slaves and bondsmen in respect of their masters, and no more than the obedience imposed on those who have a religious obligation to God and His prophet. Neither the conditions of bondsmen in the matter of submission to their master nor the conditions of mankind in the matter of submission to their Lord are loosened by being divided into obedience and disobedience, for (just as) when Muslims[52] are divided into those who obey and those who disobey and are not thus divested of the covering[53] of Islam, nor excused (lit. "removed") thereby from being subservient to it, as long as they continue to believe that obedience to God is an obligation and disobedience is forbidden and abominable, (so also) that is the situation when one strives to obey whoever holds (temporal) power.[54] For even if they (sc. the Turks) disobey one of the commands which it is incumbent (upon them) to obey, they believe that disobedience is a sinful act and that obedience is a virtuous one. For this reason you would not see them violating their commitment[55] to offer friendship (to the caliph) even if they were to be cut up limb by limb.[56] Nobody can oppose him in one of his commands unless that person, when reaching the noble threshold, himself stoops down to the ground, rubs his cheek in the dust in token of abasement, stands in the position of the most abject slave at his door and rises to his feet again on hearing his (sc. the caliph's) discourse. Moreover, if there should be an insurrection in any region of the earth against this resplendent state (*dawla*) there is not one amongst them (sc. the Turks) who on seeing strife beyond its frontiers would not fight in the way of God, waging *jihād* against the infidels. What obedience in God's world (*ʿālam*) exceeds this obedience? What *shawka* in this world matches this *shawka*?"[57]

Al-Ghazālī then asks why the Bāṭiniyya in answering this question do not remember what disturbances and dissensions befell ʿAlī. Al-Ghazālī argues that the same mistakes must not be made in his own time as in the case of ʿAlī. It would have been better for ʿAlī to have come to an accommodation with Muʿāwiya, who had greater military strength, than to launch himself into a course of action which could only culminate in disaster.

Great emphasis has been laid in the present discussion of this section on *najda*, not only because it has been given scant attention by Goldziher and Laoust but also because, as will be shown later, al-Ghazālī's discussion here is central to an understanding of his political theory.

It is perhaps appropriate here to discuss the question of the authenticity of this section. It has never before been called into question, although possible insertions and tampering by later authors in other parts of al-Ghazālī's works have been brought to light by scholars before now. The spirit of the passage on *najda* is entirely in accord with al-Ghazālī's arguments elsewhere in the *Mustaẓhirī*; so too is the question-and-answer device used for the exposition of al-Ghazālī's viewpoint. The high-flown epistolary style of the first paragraph may be unusually intricate and more typical of the Arabic of al-Bundārī[58] than that of al-Ghazālī, but the *Mustaẓhirī* is a work of panegyric, and similar stylistic techniques are found in other parts of a book whose authorship is not in dispute. Suspicion may be aroused by the accolades showered on the Turks; perhaps some later member of a Saljuq chancery added and embellished the original text of al-Ghazālī here. Yet the spirit of the passage remains consistent with the main argument. On balance it seems probable that it was indeed written by al-Ghazālī.

Al-Ghazālī now turns to a discussion of the remaining "acquired" attributes which should be present in the Imām. The second of these is *kifāya*,[59] the meaning of which is "competence to govern" and the aim of which is to order "religious and temporal matters". Al-Ghazali stresses the deeply disturbed nature of his own time, which he describes as one of *fatra*,[60] effacement of the signs of religion, a time overflowing with afflictions and strife. In the accomplishment of *kifāya*, al-Ghazālī sets great store by the powers of discrimination possessed by the Imām himself but also by the need for consultation with good counsellors and especially the Imām's vizier.[61] There follows a long panegyric of the caliph in the same style as the preceding one devoted to the Turks.[62]

The third "acquired" quality is *waraʿ* "piety",[63] which al-Ghazālī views as the most splendid of the attributes. It is a quality which can only be exercised personally by the caliph; it cannot be acquired through

outside help.[64] It is the very foundation of authority. It is difficult to reconcile *waraʿ* with the exercise of power, but the basis of this is strict adherence to justice.[65] It is noteworthy that al-Ghazālī does not demand that the *imām* be sinless.[66]

The fourth "acquired" attribute is *ʿilm* "knowledge".[67] This denotes a knowledge of religion but does not necessitate that the caliph should be a qualified *mujtahid*. In order to establish the imāmate in accordance with the *Sharīʿa*, it is not important whether the caliph knows about the Law through his own knowledge or through the help of the best advisers of his age.[68]

(c) *Chapter 9 of the* Kitāb al-Mustaẓhirī

The *Mustaẓhirī* has long attracted the attention of scholars of mediaeval Islamic political thought. Apart from the detailed treatment accorded to this work by Goldziher and Laoust, it is not surprising to note that Rosenthal devotes some space to a discussion of this work, which he says reveals "political realism and preparedness to make concessions to expediency".[69] What is surprising, however, is that Binder, in his oft-cited article "Al-Ghazālī's theory of Islamic government", makes only one reference to the *Kitāb al-Mustaẓhirī*.[70] The purpose of the remarks which follow is to avoid rehearsing familiar arguments and instead to raise some new questions, thereby moving the discussion forward.

The *Mustaẓhirī* is a work on the imāmate. It does not cover other aspects of Islamic government. In many ways it follows the standard, indeed classical, Islamic theory on the imāmate and covers much the same ground as al-Ghazālī's predecessors had done, even using similar arguments.[71] Yet it is much more than that. It is written against a background of unusual political turbulence in the period which immediately followed the deaths (in quick succession) of the famous vizier Niẓām al-Mulk and his master the Saljuq sultan Malikshāh in 485/1092, both of whom had enjoyed a long tenure of power. With the death in 487/1094 of the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Muqtadī, who had himself ruled for 19 years, there was in a period of no more than two years a clean sweep of the major political figures in the eastern Sunnī world. In this situation of political flux, the accession of a new ʿAbbāsid caliph, al-Mustaẓhir, took on an unwanted importance.

It is possible that al-Ghazālī's high-flown panegyric of the new caliph should be attributed to the desire to please his patron, who had after all personally commissioned the *Mustaẓhirī*. But such a view is unduly harsh and cynical. Moreover, it ignores al-Ghazālī's subsequent works on government, which were apparently not written for any specific patron and which nevertheless reveal views consistent with those expressed in the *Mustaẓhirī*. It would appear, therefore, that al-Ghazālī was writing out of personal conviction in the latter work.

A significant dimension is, of course, the attack on the Ismāʿīlī imāmate of Cairo. It is to counter the grandiose claims of the Ismāʿīlīs, who assert that their infallible Imām is the only person qualified to interpret the *Sharīʿa* and that all mankind owes him obedience,[72] that al-Ghazālī is emboldened to pronounce that it is the ʿAbbāsid caliph, al-Mustaẓhir, who is God's caliph over mankind and that obedience to him is a religious duty incumbent on all men.[73] It seems legitimate to assume that al-Ghazālī is motivated here by Sunnī zeal. Moreover, like must be countered by like. It is inconceivable that, whatever the real status of the ʿAbbāsid caliph within the Saljuq empire, al-Ghazālī—with his deep commitment to the Shāfiʿī *madhhab* and with his knowledge of the views on government held by his predecessors, especially his teacher al-Juwaynī—could so break out of the traditional Sunnī mould as to elevate the temporal authority, the sultanate, to serve as the institution through which to refute the Ismāʿīlī imāmate of Cairo. So it is the ʿAbbāsid caliphate which is deemed, once again and according to precedent, to be the sole institution worthy of representing orthodox Islam in the tussle with the Ismāʿīlīs. Moreover, the linchpin of al-Ghazālī's argument justifying the ʿAbbāsid caliphate is that it is the very foundation of the continuity of the *Sharīʿa*. The ʿAbbāsid caliph himself, however, is not the sole interpreter of the *Sharīʿa*, as is the case with the Ismāʿīlī Imām; for he is advised by competent *ʿulamāʾ*. It is important to stress that al-Ghazālī does not say that the ʿAbbāsid caliph is infallible.

There are, however, certain puzzling aspects to the *Mustaẓhirī*. Above all, the passage on the Turks raises certain questions which are worth discussing further. Why does al-Ghazālī, while writing a polemical work refuting the Ismāʿīlīs and arguing for the legitimacy of the ʿAbbāsid caliph, al-Mustaẓhir, feel constrained to include a long excursus on the virtues of the Turks? Why does he go to the trouble of justifying and exonerating the Turkish invaders who have seized military supremacy within the eastern Islamic world, and why does he address this apologia for the Turks to the ʿAbbāsid caliph, who is without any real power at all?

Al-Ghazālī is in a serious dilemma here. To ignore the existence of the Turkish military authority altogether and to write, instead, a blueprint for Islamic government based on the ʿAbbāsid caliphate would have no basis in reality. It is clear that al-Ghazālī's contacts with the prominent political figures of the age—he spent time both in the entourage of Niẓām al-Mulk and in al-Mustaẓhir's circle, even before the latter's accession to the caliphal office—would not have predisposed him to write such a manifestly

redundant treatise. Instead, al-Ghazālī attempts to accommodate the political *status quo* into his own system of beliefs on Islamic government. The result is pious dishonesty.

The idea of symbiosis between the caliphate and the temporal authority was not of course new by al-Ghazālī's time. Moreover, earlier scholarship on al-Ghazālī has rightly stressed that his ideas are motivated by an overriding desire for stability and unity within the Sunnī world. Here in the *Mustaẓhirī* al-Ghazālī views unity of purpose between the caliphate and the secular Turkish authority as the best defence against the Ismāʿīlī threat. It is for this reason that he praises the Turks, emphasizing their zeal as warriors for the faith, and deflects attention away from the reality, namely that they have usurped power. To depict them as insubordinate, wayward creatures whose fundamental loyalty to Islam is nevertheless unswerving constitutes a plea for some kind of accommodation with this alien implant into the Islamic body politic; but it cannot of course possibly reflect a true picture of how turbulent must have been the daily contact between the Persian–Arab bureaucracy and religious élite on the one hand and the Turkish military leadership and their nomadic followers on the other. Nor is it likely that the rank-and-file Turcomans were anything other than superficially Islamized. The audience to whom al-Ghazālī addresses the work was small and select; only the caliph and the *ʿulamāʾ* would have had the intellectual and linguistic ability to understand al-Ghazālī's argumentation and the flowery Arabic style which he used. So the panegyric of the Turks is directed at those who have to deal at ceremonial, legal and bureaucratic level with this alien power group. The panegyric, patronizing in tone and insulting to the Turks in content, will not be understood by the Turks but will flatter the caliph and his entourage. More fundamentally, however, al-Ghazālī is trying by his insistence on the innate and consistent devotion to Islam which he attributes to the Turks to consolidate the working relationship between the temporal and spiritual authorities which he knows to be more important than ever to the stability of the realm. That stability, as he often argues elsewhere in his works, is a prerequisite for stability of religion.

Is there a more specific and less lofty aim behind the *Mustaẓhirī*? It is well known that al-Ghazālī left Baghdad and its highly-charged political atmosphere shortly after the composition of this work. Here is not the place to discuss in detail the complex causes of al-Ghazālī's spiritual crisis.[74] The evidence from his "autobiography" should be treated with caution, however, not only because of the obvious problems of veracity inherent in this literary genre, but also because—as Van Ess has pointed out[75]—the *Munqidh* is full of *topoi* and clichés and is intended as a work of guidance and instruction.

One component of al-Ghazālī's complex decision is worth discussing further here in the context of the *Mustaẓhirī*. Leaving aside Jabre's assertion that al-Ghazālī left Baghdad because he was afraid of being assassinated by the Ismāʿīlīs[76]—a claim that can obviously be linked in particular to the material in the *Mustaẓhirī* but which is argued in too simplistic a fashion by Jabre—there is quite another possible motive to be considered, and this too smacks of expediency. Macdonald alleges that al-Ghazālī withdrew from the Niẓāmiyya at Baghdad because the caliph al-Mustaẓhir had backed Tutush, the unsuccessful Saljuq claimant to the sultanate after the death of Malikshāh in 485/1092.[77] Al-Ghazālī had been involved in the recognition of Tutush by the caliph al-Mustaẓhir in 487/1094. Tutush was subsequently defeated and killed by Barkyāruq in Ṣafar 488/February 1095. The latter then became sultan. Al-Ghazali left Baghdad in Dhuʿ l-Qaʿda 488/November 1095.

Al-Ghazālī's close involvement with the entourage of the Saljuq sultan Malikshāh, and more especially with Niẓām al-Mulk and his son Fakhr al-Mulk, is well known. Although the work under discussion was commissioned by the caliph, it seems that al-Ghazālī was loth to lose this opportunity of pressing the case of the Saljuqs, and of arguing—by whatever means, honest or "dishonest"—that a *modus vivendi* with the Turks was vital for the continuing stability of Sunnī Islam.

But is there more to it than this? Does the *Mustaẓhirī* contain in veiled terms an appeal to the caliph to accept a particular Saljuq claimant to the sultanate? This is improbable. More likely is the hypothesis that al-Ghazālī feels the need to issue a warning to the caliph, who was after all young and inexperienced and who may well have had ideas of exploiting Saljuq disunity after the death of Malikshāh and of reasserting caliphal authority. Certainly, such a caliphal revanche, namely a full military involvement by the caliph as one warring element amongst many, was to occur later, after al-Mustaẓhir's own death in 518/1118, with the activities of his successor al-Mustarshid.[77a]

To summarize, then, it would appear that behind the device of addressing his praise of the *de facto* military rulers to the powerless ʿAbbāsid caliph, as illustrated by the passage translated above, al-Ghazālī may well have wished to emphasize to the caliph that his role should not be to interfere with the sphere of operations of the temporal authorities, the Saljuq sultans. At the same time, al-Ghazālī—prompted to a large extent by the polemic edge of his attacks on the Ismāʿīlīs—makes truly grandiose claims for his patron, the ʿAbbāsid caliph, whom he describes as God's caliph to whom all mankind owes obedience. Political opportunism may be apparent in the *Mustaẓhirī*, but it is more slanted towards supporting the Saljuqs than the caliph.

This is not to say that al-Ghazālī is necessarily

espousing wholeheartedly the interests of the Turks. This is a time of crisis, both politically and theologically, when it behoves the new caliph to tread warily and not to come into collision with the Turks. Al-Ghazālī makes it clear that he disapproves of their insubordinate ways; indeed, he views them as an inferior species of human being. Nevertheless, he argues implicitly that their continuing presence is an inevitable fact and even a necessity.

III THE *KITĀB AL-IQTIṢĀD FI 'L-IʿTIQĀD*[78]

This treatise has been called al-Ghazālī's "chief theological work"[79] and has received considerable scholarly attention, forming the basis of many of the generalizations made about al-Ghazālī's political theory. Bouyges dates the composition of this work to the year 488/1095, before al-Ghazālī's departure from Baghdad, although Bouyges also concedes that it could have been written just after that event.[80] What is certain is that the *Iqtiṣād* follows the *Mustaẓhirī*[81] and precedes the *Iḥyāʾ*.[82] It would appear likely that al-Ghazālī did not write this work with any particular patron in mind. In view of the short interval between the composition of the *Mustaẓhirī* and the *Iqtiṣād* (they were written within a year or so of each other) it would, at first glance, seem improbable that al-Ghazālī would have expressed in the second of these two works views very different from those already expounded at greater length in the *Mustaẓhirī*. The absence of a patron for the *Iqtiṣād* might, however, have freed him from the particular constraints imposed on him by the *Mustaẓhirī* in which he focused on one particular caliph.

(a) *Al-Ghazālī's views on the caliphate in the* Kitāb al-Iqtiṣād: *the content*

This subject is discussed in Chapter 3, "On the imāmate."[83] Al-Ghazālī begins by saying that a consideration of the imāmate is not a matter of great moment,[84] nor is it the stuff of rational speculation. It is a matter of *fiqh*. Moreover, such a discussion excites factions and is better avoided if one's views are right—and even more so if they are wrong. Since, however, such discussions are customary at the end of works on dogmatic theology (*muʿtaqidāt*), al-Ghazālī says that he too will treat the subject of the imāmate, but in summary form.[85]

He divides his discussion into three parts. The first is an exposition of why it is necessary to appoint an Imām. The necessity for an Imām is not deduced from reason (*ʿaql*) but from revealed Law (*sharʿ*). In establishing decisive legal proof for the necessity of an Imām, al-Ghazālī is not satisfied merely to use the argument of the consensus of the community. He goes further, analysing the basis of such an *ijmāʿ*, and says that the establishment of the good ordering of religion was an aim of the Prophet himself, whom he calls the "Lord of Revealed Law" (*ṣāḥib al-sharʿ*). This, he states, is his first irrefutable premiss. He then adds a second premiss, namely, that the good ordering of religion is achieved only by an Imām who is obeyed. From these two premisses it is proved that the appointment of an Imām is necessary.[86]

Al-Ghazālī then challenges anyone who might argue that his second premiss—that good order in religion is achieved only by an Imām who is obeyed—is not Islamic. He then demonstrates the proof of this second premiss, arguing that the good ordering of religion is achieved only by the good ordering of this world, and that the good ordering of this world is in turn achieved only by an Imām who is obeyed. These two premises are, he maintains, irrefutable.

He then examines the first of these two premisses more closely. To those who would allege that religion (*dīn*) and this world (*dunyā*) are two opposites and that preoccupation with promoting one of them leads to the destruction of the other, al-Ghazālī defends himself by developing a clear definition of *dunyā*. This term does not denote excessive enjoyment of this world's pleasures—a definition which would indeed be the antithesis of *dīn*—but rather means what one needs in this life. This latter definition of *dunyā*, al-Ghazālī argues, is a necessary condition for the accomplishment of *dīn*.[87] Above all, security in this world is essential, for if one has to spend one's time in defending oneself against tyranny and in searching for food, one cannot devote oneself to knowledge and good works which are the means of acquiring happiness in the next world. Al-Ghazālī therefore concludes that the good ordering of this world is a prerequisite for the good ordering of religion.[58]

Turning to his second premiss, which he expressed a few lines earlier as the good ordering of this world being dependent on an Imām who is obeyed (*imām muṭāʿ*), al-Ghazālī continues as follows:

> As for the second premiss, namely, that this world and security for oneself and one's property can only be ordered by an authority which is obeyed (or: a *sulṭān* who is obeyed, *sulṭān muṭāʿ*), seeing the periods of strife on the death of sultans (*salāṭīn*) and Imāms testifies to it (sc. the truth of the premiss) and (the fact) that if that (situation) should last and if another authority which is obeyed (*sulṭān muṭāʿ*) were not appointed immediately, discord would continue, the sword would be everywhere, drought all-embracing, beasts would perish, crafts would become ineffective and all who conquered would seize (the property of others) by force and nobody would be able to apply himself exclusively to worship (sc. of God, *ʿibāda*) and knowledge if he remained alive, and otherwise many would die under the shades of the swords.[89] For this reason, it is said that "Religion and (temporal) authority (*sulṭān*) are twins" and for this reason, it is said that "Religion is a foundation and (temporal)

authority (*sulṭān*) a guardian. That which has no foundation falls into ruins, and that which has no guardian is destroyed." In sum, the reasonable person cannot dispute the fact that human beings—because of the difference of their natures, the inherent diversity of their passions and the divergence of their opinions—would perish to the last man if they were left to their own devices and if there were not an obeyed opinion to reconcile their differences. This is an illness whose sole remedy is by means of a powerful authority (*sulṭān*) who is obeyed (and) who unites diversities of opinions. So it has been demonstrated that authority (*sulṭān*) is necessary for the good ordering of this world, and the good ordering of this world is necessary for the good ordering of religion, and the good ordering of religion is necessary for the acquisition of happiness in the hereafter. That is undoubtedly the aim of prophets. So the necessity of appointing the Imām is one of the necessities of the *shar*ᶜ which must not be abandoned, so take heed of that![90]

The second section of Chapter 3 tackles two questions: the qualities which the Imām must possess and the right method of designating him. Al-Ghazālī asserts that the person to be appointed Imām must possess special attributes which differentiate him from the rest of humanity. These attributes are either personal or are connected with other people (*min jihat ghayrihi*). In the first category, al-Ghazālī states that in order to be able to govern the people and keep them on the right path the imām must possess *kifāya*, *ʿilm*, *waraʿ*, and descent from Quraysh.[91]

It may be, however, that there are a number of suitable people of Quraysh descent. The decisive factor—and here al-Ghazālī introduces his second category of attributes—is being appointed to govern (*tawliya*) or being entrusted with authority (*tafwīḍ*) by other people. This bestowal of authority may be achieved in one of three ways: through designation (*tanṣīṣ*) by the Prophet himself; by the appointment of a suitable successor from amongst his sons by the ruling Imām; or, thirdly, by the entrusting of authority (*tafwīḍ*) to a suitable person by a man who wields military power (*dhū shawka*). This last method would require that other people should follow suit and pay allegiance to the Imām. At certain times this may be achieved by one person who is well respected and enjoys the support of the people and the total authority, since his act of allegiance and his entrusting of authority (to the Imām) dispense with the necessity for others to do so. The aim, after all, is to reconcile differences of opinion under one "obeyed person" (*shakhṣ muṭāʿ*). The Imām is also obeyed by virtue of the oath of allegiance made to him by the "obeyed person". Should there be more than one person possessed of military strength, the men concerned must pay allegiance and agree on the person to whom they should entrust authority, so that obedience may be achieved.

Al-Ghazālī goes on to say that if, on the death of an Imām, there is only one Qurashī who can command obedience and who possesses *shawka*, a following amongst the people by virtue of his *shawka* and his competence to govern, and the necessary attributes of an Imām, then his imāmate is valid and obedience to him is incumbent on the people. Such a person will certainly be able to have the oath of allegiance paid to him by the important men (*akābir*) of the age, and by the *ʿulamāʿ*.[92]

Al-Ghazālī then turns to the case of an Imām who possesses all the necessary attributes except that of legal knowledge, but who after consultation with the *ʿulamāʾ* acts upon their advice. Should such an Imām be deposed or obeyed? Al-Ghazālī argues that he should be replaced by someone who fulfils all the necessary conditions only if such action does not engender strife. Otherwise, such an Imām should be obeyed and his imāmate is valid.[93]

Al-Ghazālī defends himself against those who would accuse him of making compromises by saying that these views which he has expressed are forced on him by necessity: "This is not a voluntary concession. Necessities, however, make prohibitions allowable. We know that taking carrion (*mayta*)[94] is prohibited, but death (from starvation) is worse than that." He then presents two possible situations to anyone in his own time who might deem the imāmate to be invalid because its conditions are not fulfilled. First, there is the following possibility. If there is no Imām, then judges are dismissed from their office, all public functions (*wilāyāt*) are null and void, marriages are not legal, the activities of provincial governors are invalid and the whole of mankind are perpetrating forbidden deeds. Alternatively, one may say that the imāmate is valid and that its activities and functions are effective by virtue of the present situation and necessity. In view of this there are three options. First, people must be prevented from contracting marriages and engaging in other activities connected with the Law. This would be an absurd, divisive and destructive course of action. Second, one may say that people do contract marriages and engage in other legal activities but that they are perpetrating what is forbidden. Nevertheless, they should not be condemned as disobedient because of the exigencies of the moment. The third possibility is that, in view of the contemporary necessity, the imāmate should be considered as valid in spite of the fact that its conditions are not fulfilled. This is the choice for which the reasonable person must opt.[95]

(b) *Analysis of al-Ghazālī's discussion of the imāmate in the* Kitāb al-Iqtiṣād

It is noteworthy that at the beginning of this chapter, al-Ghazālī expresses reluctance to discuss the question of the imāmate, which he describes as contentious. Although this stance of his may well in fact be a literary device—he has in any case dealt with the imāmate *in*

extenso in the *Mustaẓhirī*—there is a clear note of disillusionment here. Such a sentiment may spring from the reception accorded to the *Mustaẓhirī*, about which the sources are silent, or—more generally—it may indicate a wider disenchantment with the political circles of Baghdad, which he was soon to leave (if, indeed, he had not already left the city at this time).

The concepts expressed here in Chapter 3 are very similar to those set out in Chapter 9 of the *Mustaẓhirī*. Once again the main emphasis is on the need for political stability, on the unifying force of the Imām and the necessity for his existence so that he can reconcile diversity within the *dār al-Islām* and create conditions suitable for religion to thrive. Once again, too, al-Ghazālī seeks a basis in the *Sharīʿa* when arguing for the necessity of the imāmate.

There are, however, certain differences in approach and emphasis which distinguish the *Iqtiṣād* from the *Mustaẓhirī*. The whole tone of the opening of the third chapter of the *Iqtiṣād* is decisive and succinct. It is devoid of the verbal conceits of the *Mustaẓhirī*. The aim is to argue a case convincingly, and for this purpose al-Ghazālī employs a series of syllogisms.

His extended treatment of his second premiss, namely, that the good ordering of this world is achieved only by an Imām who is obeyed, deserves further discussion at this point.[96] Here he uses terms to denote "rulers" with apparent imprecision and ambiguity. At the beginning of Chapter 3, the word *imām* is used five times and seems to follow the practice to which he adheres firmly in the *Mustaẓhirī*. Thereafter, however, the phrase *Imām muṭāʿ* is replaced, when the premiss is repeated, by *sulṭān muṭaʿ*. In the next sentence, moreover, the phrase "on the death of sultans (*salāṭīn*) and Imāms" appears. At the end of the discussion of the second premiss, al-Ghazali reverts to the use of the term *imām*.

Various questions are raised by these usages. Does al-Ghazālī deliberately employ *imām* and *sulṭān* to denote different concepts, or do they have the same meaning here? Alternatively, is his terminology unintentionally loose? The word *sulṭān* is of course problematic, representing as it does both the concept of "authority", "ruling power", and the holder of such power. The first example of *sulṭān* (*bi-sulṭān*^{in} *muṭāʿ*^{in}) could have both meanings but probably refers to the actual holder of power, in view of the fact that it is a repetition of the premiss *niẓām al-dīn lā yuḥṣalu ilā bi-imām*^{in} *muṭāʿ*^{in}. This also holds good for the second example: *bi-sulṭān*^{in} *ākhar*^{a} *muṭāʿ*^{in}. When he cites the well-known saying "Religion and *sulṭān* are twins", however, *sulṭān* obviously refers to the abstract concept of authority. The remaining two examples of *sulṭān*—the phrase *bi-sulṭān*^{in} *qāhir*^{in} *muṭāʿ*^{in} and *al-sulṭān ḍarūrī*—could denote either the abstract concept or the actual holder of authority.[97]

As for the use of the term *imām*, this too is sometimes imprecise. When it occurs in a discussion of the institution of the imāmate,[98] it is relatively unambiguous. In the phrase "on the death of Imāms and sultans" the juxtaposition of the two seems to "devalue" the Imām, or at any rate to suggest that al-Ghazālī may be aware of little actual distinction between them. In his concluding statement *fa-kāna naṣb al-imām min ḍarūriyyāt al-sharʿ*,[99] al-Ghazālī quasi-automatically reverts to the term *imām*, probably because of the mention of *sharʿ* in the same sentence.

A few tentative conclusions may be drawn here. The *Iqtiṣād* is of course a work on the articles of faith. It is not a treatise on Islamic government. Nor is Chapter 3 the central part of the *Iqtiṣād*. In it, al-Ghazālī emphasizes the need to create the conditions conducive to the maintenance of good religion in this world, but he is not intent on creating a blueprint for Islamic government. In the *Mustaẓhirī*, where the central theme is that of the imāmate, al-Ghazālī does not fail to use the term *imām* or, less frequently, *khalīfa*. In this short passage of the *Iqtiṣād*, the term *khalīfa* does not appear at all and there is no apparent consistency in the use of *imām* and *sulṭān*. It would be unduly bold to interpret this shift as a fundamental change of attitude on the part of al-Ghazālī towards the imāmate. This would be an unlikely development in the short interval of time between the two works. It would seem more reasonable to attribute this looseness of terminology to a conscious or unconscious lapse on al-Ghazālī's part from the theoretical plane of the *Mustaẓhirī* to the practical level of the reality of Saljuq rule revealed in this discussion in the *Iqtiṣād*.

It may well be that the turbulent events which followed the completion of the *Mustaẓhirī* only enhanced al-Ghazālī's conviction that what mattered were political stability and the existence of a strong government in order to produce the right conditions for the conduct of good religion. Here, at any rate, he may well be indifferent as to whether these conditions are to be achieved with the imāmate or without it.

At the beginning of the second section of Chapter 3, in which the attributes necessary in the Imām and the method of appointing him are discussed, al-Ghazālī is back on the conventional path, making a clear distinction between the Imām and the holder of military power, whom he calls "an obeyed person" (*shakhṣ muṭāʿ*). Of the three so-called methods of appointing the Imām, only the third really interests al-Ghazālī. This is the situation in which the possessor of military force (*dhū shawka*) entrusts authority (*tafwīḍ*) to a suitable person as Imām. The act of allegiance paid to the Imām by the holder (or several holders) of power symbolizes the allegiance of all those under his (or their) authority, and assures unity.

It is interesting to speculate on the nature of al-Ghazālī's formula here and to ask whether such an arrangement corresponded to the political realities of

the relationship between the Saljuq sultans and the 'Abbāsid caliph—a relationship to which al-Ghazālī is attempting to accord legitimacy—or whether he is here describing an idealized scheme whereby to ensure unity. It is also relevant to ask whether al-Ghazālī sees any justification for dispensing with either caliph or sultan at any time.

In the arrangement outlined by al-Ghazālī, it is the sultan who appoints the caliph. This act validates the government of the sultan. Such an emphasis on the sultan is of course an accurate reflection of the contemporary balance of power between the two institutions in the heyday of Saljuq power. Yet even then the sultans felt the need to link themselves with the 'Abbāsid caliph by marriage ties and public ceremonies. After the death of Malikshāh in 485/1092 and the ensuing disarray among his successors, many Saljuq pretenders saw the need to seek caliphal approval in their bids for power.[100] As already mentioned, the caliph al-Mustaẓhir himself may well have nurtured the ambition of profiting from this fragmented situation and of trying to reassert caliphal authority not as an arbitrator but as a participant in the struggle for political power. This is of course not mentioned in the sources, as it is in the case of his successor al-Mustarshid, but al-Ghazālī certainly leaves such an option open by conceding that a suitably qualified candidate for the imāmate may appoint himself if he possesses competence to govern and (more important) the necessary *shawka* to impose his rule upon the people. In other words, it is conceivable for an Imām to dispense with a sultan.

There is an unusually strong element of compromise in al-Ghazālī's ideas as presented here. He himself puts up a strong defence of this position in his forceful analogy that eating carrion is prohibited but that starvation is worse. There is also an element of compromise over the question of the necessity for the Imām to possess knowledge of the *Sharīʿa*. Here al-Ghazālī suggests that deposition should only occur if it does not cause civil strife. Otherwise it is preferable for such an Imām to seek the advice of the *ʿulamāʾ* and to act upon it. This emphasis on the role of the *ʿulamāʾ* is a consistent preoccupation of al-Ghazālī.

Binder argues, mostly on the basis of the arguments in the *Iqtiṣād*, that al-Ghazālī has a "tripartite concept of the caliphate".[101] A close examination of the text does not support his unwieldy theory. Certainly the three elements of caliph, sultan and *ʿulamāʾ* are present in al-Ghazālī's argument, but Binder stretches the evidence too far by postulating a definition of the caliphate itself as being "composed" of these three elements. Laoust propounds a rather similar theory, claiming that al-Ghazālī is aiming at a mixed theory of the caliphate and that he combines the caliphate and the sultanate in the same institution.[102]

Above all, it is important to note that, despite the exigencies of the disturbed times in which he lived, al-Ghazālī was not prepared to dispense with the caliphal institution altogether.

IV THE *IḤYĀʾ ʿULŪM AL-DĪN*

(a) *Introductory comments*

This, the most monumental work produced by al-Ghazālī, was written in the period of his retreat from public life, probably between the years 489/1096 and 495/1102.[103] Its authenticity is beyond doubt and need not be discussed here. The *Book of what is licit and what is forbidden* (Book 14, Chapter 5) contains a short section which deals once again with the imāmate and its relationship with the military warlords.[104]

(b) *Content*

Al-Ghazālī argues that in the case of an unjust, ignorant sultan who is sustained by military force (*shawka*), and whom it would be difficult to dislodge without stirring up violent strife, he must be left in office and obedience is due to him, just as it is due to *amīr*s. Indeed, there are traditions which enjoin obedience to *amīr*s. Al-Ghazālī continues,

> Our view is that the caliphate (*khilāfa*) is given contractually to that person from the ʿAbbāsid family who has taken it (sc. the office) upon himself and that sovereignty (*wilāya*) is legally exercised (*nāfidha*) in the case of sultans (*salāṭīn*) in the (different) regions of the lands who pay allegiance to the caliph.[105]

There then follows a succinct summary of al-Ghazālī's mature view on the relationship between sultans and the caliph:

> In short, we consider attributes and conditions in sultans with a view to (deriving) the optimum advantages.[106] If we decreed that public functions (*wilāyāt*) are now invalid, the interests (of the common weal) would also be invalid. Why lose one's capital by seeking (to gain) interest? No indeed, sovereignty nowadays is possible only through force (*shawka*). The caliph is the person to whom the possessor of force (*ṣāḥib al-shawka*) pays allegiance. Anyone who seizes power by force (*shawka*) and is obedient to the caliph in respect of the *khuṭba* and the *sikka* is a sultan wielding valid jurisdiction (*ḥukm*) and judgment (*qaḍāʾ*) in the (different) regions of the earth by virtue of a sovereignty (*wilāya*) whose decisions (*aḥkām*) are legally valid (*nāfidha*).

Al-Ghazālī concludes by referring the reader to his discussion of the imāmate in the *Iqtiṣād*.

(c) *Analysis*

This passage reveals a remarkable consistency with the earlier remarks of al-Ghazālī on this subject. There is, however, some development. The tone is now more pessimistic than ever before. Obedience is incumbent on the people even when they are ruled by an unjust sultan who is ignorant of how to rule or of how to

conduct himself according to the precepts of the *Sharīʿa*. The use of such terminology as *khalīfa* and *sulṭān* is clear, but it is noteworthy that this passage implies the existence of a number of sultans wielding power at the same time (again, a true reflection of the historical reality in the first decade of the sixth/twelfth century). Even so, al-Ghazālī still adheres to the beliefs that the caliphate is a legal necessity and that there should be only one holder of that office.

V AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S "MIRRORS FOR PRINCES"

No discussion of al-Ghazālī's views on government would be complete without reference to those of his books, or parts of his books, written within the *Fürstenspiegel* genre. Three works of al-Ghazālī will be discussed here in chronological order.

(1) *Chapter 10 of the* Kitāb al-Mustaẓhirī[107]

As has already been mentioned, Chapter 10 contains material which places it firmly within the *Fürstenspiegel* genre. The *Mustaẓhirī* is a work commissioned by a caliph, and it deals with the caliphate as its central theme. Al-Ghazālī therefore addresses his counsels to the caliph, who is enjoined to observe strict personal piety and self-discipline. There is an emphasis on justice on the part of the caliph, who is in duty bound to observe the *Sharīʿa* strictly. If he deviates from the path of justice, his subjects may regard him as a ruler who has usurped power. Obedience to him is incumbent upon them only as long as he rules in accordance with the *Sharīʿa*.[108] Al-Ghazālī stresses the need for the ruler to consult the *ʿulamāʾ*, and illustrates this point with numerous examples from an Islamic context.[109]

Al-Ghazālī's approach here is the same as elsewhere in his writings. He supports his arguments with quotations from *ḥadīth* and with anecdotes from the lifes of the caliphs ʿUmar I and ʿUmar II. The material is exclusively Islamic. There is one isolated reference to Yazdagird, the last of the Sasanian rulers, but it is made in connection with ʿUmar I.

Chapter 10 begins with a section which is strongly Ṣūfī in tone.[110] In it, al-Ghazālī stresses the transitory nature of this world, which is merely a staging-post on the route to the after-life. The leitmotif of man sharing attributes both with beasts and with angels—a theme which recurs in al-Ghazālī's later works—is also found here.[111] The same ideas and images also recur in the section of his later work written in Persian, the *Kīmiyā-yi saʿādat*, which is discussed next.

(2) *The* Kīmiyā-yi saʿādat[112]

As is well known, this work is a long summary in Persian of the *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, and it is addressed to the common people. A close examination of this work reveals that it is not just a summary of the *Iḥyāʾ*.[113] More especially, the *Kīmiyā* contains, in Section 10, Pillar 2, a complete section entitled "On government and exercising authority"—a *Fürstenspiegel* which is not found in the *Iḥyāʾ*.[114] Much of this material is identical, or at any rate similar, to Chapter 10 of the *Mustaẓhirī*. Moreover, the same subject-matter, as Bagley has already pointed out, recurs in Part I of the *Naṣīḥat al-mulūk*.[115] Indeed, it would appear that this section of the *Kīmiyā* is the prototype of Part I of the *Naṣīḥa*, which has almost identical material. It is, however, presented in a different order.

In this section of the *Kīmiyā*, al-Ghazālī urges that the ruler should constantly keep in mind the transience of this earthly life. Thus he will be able to govern justly, removed from a preoccupation with the passions of this world.[116] Although the section begins with a reference to the caliphate of God (*khilāfat-i khudā*), the term used for the person who governs is *wālī*, which can be applied to either caliph or sultan. Yet the tone is strongly Ṣūfī and is far removed from a preoccupation with demarcation disputes between the authority of the caliph and that of the sultan. The instructions to the ruler are given in the form of ten rules which stress the need for justice and the dangers of injustice. As elsewhere in his work, al-Ghazālī exhorts the ruler to frequent the pious *ʿulamāʾ*, for whose company he should thirst, and to eschew the counsels of the worldly *ʿulamāʾ*.[117] The activities of the ruler are seen as symbolic and exemplary. His punishment for injustice will be greater than the punishment of the ordinary man.[118] The ruler must see to it that his entourage also follows the path of justice.[119] The symbolic value of the ruler's actions is shown by means of imagery exploiting the associations of light:

> The sun of justice appears first in the breast (of the ruler). Then its light falls on the people of the (royal) house. Then it penetrates to the entourage (of the ruler). Then its rays reach the subjects. Anyone who hopes for rays without sun is seeking the impossible.[120]

As is usual in al-Ghazālī's writings, the material supporting his precepts is drawn from the Qurʾān, the *ḥadīth* and anecdotes of the early Muslims.

(3) *The* Naṣīḥat al-mulūk

A work of this name has long been attributed to al-Ghazālī and was allegedly written by him towards the end of his life, probably just before his death in the years 503–5/1109–11.[121] The work was originally written in Persian and was dedicated either to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh or to Sanjar.[122] A work by al-Ghazālī with this title is mentioned by Ibn Khallikān, who says that it was translated from Persian into Arabic by al-Irbīlī at the request of his patron Alp Qutlugh Beg Qaymaz (d. 595/1199).[123]

A short discussion of the authenticity of this treatise is highly relevant to the general theme of this article. As early as 1956, Isaacs cast doubt on the authenticity of parts of the *Naṣīḥa*,[124] but Bagley did not find grounds for undue concern.[125] More recently, Patricia Crone has taken up the problem.[126]

It is clear that Part I of the *Naṣīḥat al-mulūk* can be attributed with confidence to al-Ghazālī. As already noted, it contains material which is also found in the *Mustaẓhirī*, the *Kīmiyā-yi saʿādat*, the *Iḥyāʾ* and the *Bidāya*, all of which can safely be said to have been written by al-Ghazālī.[127] Part I is not addressed to the caliph. It begins with a short sermon to the sultan urging him to behave in accordance with the precepts of religion.

It is, however, very difficult to argue that Part II of the *Naṣīḥa* was also written by al-Ghazālī. Its approach is at variance with that demonstrated by al-Ghazālī in the rest of his writings, both in Arabic and in Persian, and in general it clashes with the ethos of Part I of the very same work. Here is not the place to try to pinpoint in detail those sections (if any) of Part II of the *Naṣīḥa* which might or might not have been written by al-Ghazālī. A few general remarks must suffice. In his authentic works, it is not his wont to draw on non-Islamic material to support his arguments, nor to express the ethos of the Sasanian Persian heritage of statecraft as explicitly as it appears in Part II of the *Naṣīḥa*.

This is not to say that Islamic material in the form of quotations and anecdotes is absent from Part II of the *Naṣīḥa*. On the contrary, as is customary in al-Ghazāli's genuine works such as the *Kīmiyā* and the *Iḥyāʾ*, there is frequent reference here as well to the Prophet, the caliphs ʿUmar I and ʿUmar II, ʿAlī, Hārūn al-Rashīd and al-Manṣūr, as well as sayings attributed to Jesus. It is not, however, al-Ghazālī's usual practice to draw on anecdotes from Sasanian or other non-Islamic sources, as happens repeatedly in Part II of the *Naṣīḥa*. A detailed examination of a number of al-Ghazālī's works in both Arabic and Persian reveals a common approach: the statement of an argument followed by Qurʾanic corroboration and examples from the *ḥadīth*, the Companions or the early Ṣūfīs. This approach, which can be discerned in al-Ghazālī's Persian letters and in the *Kīmiyā* as well as in the Arabic writings discussed in this article, is a far cry from Chapters II to VII of Part II of the *Naṣīḥa* which deal with topics such as viziers, secretaries, women and aphorisms, and which obviously emanate from a milieu very different from that of al-Ghazālī the Shāfiʿī lawyer and Ṣūfī Muslim.

It is of course conceivable that there is a primitive core of Part II of the *Naṣīḥa* which may also have been composed by al-Ghazālī. It is, however, more likely that two works, the indisputably authentic Ghazālī work which survives as Part I of the *Naṣīḥa* and another *Fürstenspiegel* written by an unknown author who moved in official Saljuq circles, had been uneasily yoked together by the time that al-Irbīlī translated the composite piece into Arabic.

It is now time to consider the implications of this finding for an assessment of his political theory. It could be argued by those eager to include the entire *Naṣīḥat al-mulūk* in the canon of al-Ghazālī's authentic works, that in this part of the work al-Ghazālī bypasses the caliphate and instead emphasizes the divinely ordained sultanate. The sultan is seen as the "shadow of God on earth" and is imbued with the Sasanian concept of the divine effulgence (*farr-i īzādī*).[128] By virtue of his God-given position he must be obeyed. In other words, al-Ghazālī—if indeed he was responsible for this section of the work—would have made a significant move away from the central theme of his earlier writings, i.e. the tightly-argued concept of the dual government of caliph and military warlord. Now that it appears clear, however, that al-Ghazālī did not write the second part of the *Naṣīḥa*, such a hypothesis cannot stand.

VI GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The preceding discussion has focused on a certain number of well-known works by al-Ghazālī which shed light on his views about government. Other works of his have been omitted, either because they yield disappointing results[129] or because they merely corroborate the ideas expressed in his major works.

It seems reasonable to argue from the evidence presented above that there is a considerable degree of consistency in al-Ghazālī's views on government.[130] The same themes and the same preoccupation with political and social stability are found in his early and his mature works alike. The ideas which he expresses so forcefully in the *Mustaẓhirī* are repeated time and again in his subsequent works.

At no point can al-Ghazālī shake off his training as a *faqīh*. There is a constant emphasis in his writings on the necessity for a *Sharīʿa*-based solution to the problems of Islamic government. However much he may try to bend in order to accommodate the imperfections of the political *status quo*, he always seeks to produce a theory of government which involves the imāmate. Indeed, he cannot envisage a solution without it. Quite simply, without the imāmate the *umma* would cease to function or even to exist. For this reason, an indissoluble link must be forged between the caliph and the most powerful military warlord, the sultan.

If it is argued that al-Ghazālī did not write the controversial Part II of the *Naṣīḥat al-mulūk*, there is no evidence at all in his later writings that he was moving towards a theory of government which elevates the sultanate and bypasses the caliphate. Within the harsh

political realities of Saljuq disarray, in-fighting and outright civil war, al-Ghazālī still holds fast to the legal necessity of retaining the caliphate. Moreover, like his contemporaries—including the Saljuq sultans—he was probably incapable of divesting himself of the inbuilt emotional attachment which he obviously felt towards the caliphal institution.[131] The sultan cannot yet fulfil the role of the caliph, even if the reverse is true.

Within this framework of overall consistency in al-Ghazālī's *œuvre*, slight changes of emphasis may be discerned. It is perhaps possible to trace his increasing disillusionment with the political systems of his time in the years after his crisis and his departure from Baghdad. Indeed, one may even detect him adopting a quietist stance, and thus emphasizing personal piety and the transitory nature of this world. Given the turbulent times in which his lot was cast, that response had much to recommend it.

[1] Ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Cairo, 1382/1964).
[2] M. Bouyges, *Essai de chronologie des œuvres de al-Ghazālī* Beirut, 1959), pp. 30–2; W. M. Watt, "The Authenticity of the Works Attributed to al-Ghazālī", *JRAS* (1952), pp. 24–45; C. Brockelmann, *GAL* SI (Leiden, 1937), 747.
[3] I. Goldziher, *Streitschrift des Ġazālī gegen die Bāṭinijja-Sekte* (Leiden, 1916), pp. 1–112. Goldziher also edited extracts of the Arabic text.
[4] This is not the only work commissioned by the caliph al-Mustaẓhir and called the *Mustaẓhirī*. Ibn Khallikān mentions another work of the same name, a compendium of Shāfiʿī law composed by Abū Bakr al-Shāshī who, like al-Ghazālī, was a pupil of al-Juwaynī and who was also appointed to the Niẓāmiyya in Baghdad (in 504/1110–11). Cf. Brockelmann S I, p. 489; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-aʿyān*, tr. Baron M. de Slane (Paris, 1842–71), II, pp. 625–6.
[5] Translated by W. M. Watt in *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazālī* (London, 1953), p. 44.
[6] For a detailed discussion of the different views on the exact date of the composition of this work, cf. Bouyges, *op. cit.*, 31–2. Bouyges concludes with good reason that the *Mustaẓhirī* was written in 488 (11 January–30 December 1095).
[7] Cf. H. Laoust, *La politique de Ġazālī* (Paris, 1970), pp. 77–8.
[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 14.
[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 52.
[10] Ed. V. Chelhot (Beirut, 1959).
[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 25; al-Ghazālī, *Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq* (Cairo, 1346/1927).
[12] *Idem.*, *Kitāb al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl* (Cairo, 1333/1914).
[13] Tr. H. Darke, *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings* (London, 1960).
[14] *EI*², s.v. "al-Ghazālī."
[15] *Op. cit.*, pp. 36–80.
[16] *Op. cit.*, pp. 78–82.
[17] Terms such as "insinuate" and "cunning" are inappropriate in Goldziher's own comments on the Ismāʿīlī threat (*op. cit.*, p. 23).
[18] H. Corbin, "The Ismāʿīlī Response to the Polemic of al-Ghazālī", in *Ismāʿīlī Contributions to Islamic Culture*, ed. S. H. Naṣr (Tehran, 1977), pp. 67–99.
[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 70.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 73.
[22] Goldziher, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 42.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[26] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 80–97; Laoust, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–3, 234–5; A. K. S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (Oxford, 1981), p. 110.
[27] *Mustaẓhirī*, p. 169.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 171–2.
[30] "Revealed text": *ibid.*, p. 174.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 175.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 176.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 176–7.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 177.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 178.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 179.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 180.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 180–1.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 181. The definitions of *najda*, *kifāya*, *ʿilm* and *waraʿ* are discussed below.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 182–94.
[42] *Najda*, "courage and sharpness, or vigour and effectiveness, in those affairs which others lack the power or ability to accomplish" (E. W. Lane, *An Arabic–English Lexicon* (repr. Beirut, 1980), Part 8, p. 2788).
[43] *Mustaẓhirī*, pp. 182–4.
[44] It seems preferable to take *sharar* as the *maṣdar* of *sharra* rather than as *sharar* meaning "sparks".
[45] *Mustaẓhirī*, p. 182.
[46] Literally, "the confirming of the truth of His messengers in the matter of His message".
[47] This seems to be Laoust's interpretation of this passage. He states briefly that *najda* belongs to the Turks—i.e. to the Saljuq *amīrs*—who by recognizing the authority of the caliph and rallying to him bring him the power indispensable for his protection (*op. cit.*, p. 249).
[48] *Kayfa tuḥṣalu najdatuh bi-him* (*Mustaẓhirī*, p. 182). Goldziher's edition has *yuḥṣil* (*op. cit.*, p. 68).
[49] *Yatahajjamūn*. Goldziher's edition has *yatamallahūn* (*loc. cit.*). This is not satisfactory.
[50] Literally, "Those who go repeatedly in obedience according to ability while those in their movements go repeatedly only after their passions".
[51] Literally, "they know only the reverting to that to which they have been tied consisting of the natural constitution of predatory animals".
[52] *al-mukallafūn*, those on whom is imposed the duty (of serving God); a fully responsible Muslim who is free, adult and sane.
[53] Literally, "skin".
[54] *Ṣāḥib al-amr*.
[55] Literally, "firm belief".
[56] *Irb* (*Mustaẓhiri*, p. 183); Goldziher has the plural *arāb* (*op. cit.*, p. 69).
[57] *Mustaẓhirī*, p. 183.
[58] al-Bundārī, *Ẕubdat al-nuṣra wa-nukhbat al-ʿuṣra*, ed. M. T. Houtsma (Leiden, 1889).
[59] *Mustaẓhirī*, pp. 185–7.
[60] Cf. Qurʾān, V, 19.
[61] *Mustaẓhirī*, p. 186.
[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 186–7.
[63] Personal piety.
[64] *Mustaẓhirī*, p. 189.
[65] *Ibid.*, pp. 187–91.
[66] *Ibid.*, p. 190.
[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 191–4.
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 191. Chapter 10, which follows, contains counsels to the ruler and is an early version of material which will reappear in al-Ghazālī's later works, the *Kīmiyā-yi saʿādat* and Part I of the

Naṣīḥat al-mulūk. This chapter will be discussed later under the category of al-Ghazālī's *Fürstenspiegel*.

[69] E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge, 1962), p. 38.

[70] L. Binder, "Al-Ghazālī and Islamic Government", in *MW*, XIV (1955), pp. 228–41.

[71] Al-Ghazālī stands in a long line of Ashʿarī thinkers. Cf. al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn* (Istanbul, 1928); al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya* (Cairo, 1966); and al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, ed. J.-D. Luciani (Paris, 1938).

[72] *Mustaẓhirī*, pp. 46, 73.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[74] Cf. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual, a Study of al-Ghazālī* (Edinburgh, 1963), pp. 133–43; D. B. Macdonald, "The Life of al-Ghazzālī, with Especial Reference to His Religious Experiences and Opinions", *JAOS*, XX (1899), pp. 71–132; Laoust, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–4; F. Jabre, "La biographie et l'œuvre de Ghazālī réconsidérées à la lumière des *Ṭabaqāt* de Subkī". *MIDEO*, I (1954), pp. 91–4.

[75] Cf. J. van Ess, "Neuere Literatur zu Ġazzālī", *Oriens*, XX (1967), pp. 299–308.

[76] "Biographie", 91–4.

[77] *Op. cit.*, 80.

[77a] Cf. Ibn al-Azraq al-Fāriqī, *Tārīkh Mayyāfāriqīn*, BM. Ms. Or. 5803, ff. 165a–b; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntaẓam* (Hyderabad, 1940), X, pp. 41–50; Ibn al-Athīr, *al- Kāmil*, ed. C. J. Tornberg (Leiden and Uppsala, 1851–76), XI, pp. 14–17.

[78] The edition of Cairo, n.d., is used here.

[79] Watt, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

[80] *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

[81] There is in the *Iqtiṣād* a reference to the *Mustaẓhirī* which al-Ghazālī describes as a refutation of the Bāṭiniyya (*op. cit.*, p. 107).

[82] The *Iqtiṣād* is mentioned in the *Iḥyāʾ* on a number of occasions (e.g. II, p. 179).

[83] *Iqtiṣād*, pp. 105–10.

[84] *Laysa min al-muhimmāt* (*ibid.*, p. 105).

[85] *Ibid.*

[86] *Ibid.* The terms used in this part of the chapter are *imāma* and *imām*.

[87] Al-Ghazālī expounds his definition of the necessities of life to embrace health, survival, adequate clothing, housing, food and above all security (*ibid.*).

[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 105–6.

[89] Cf. the tradition *al-janna taḥta ẓilāl al-suyūf* ("Paradise is beneath the shades of the swords"), i.e. fighting unbelievers is a means of attaining Paradise. Cf. Lane, *Lexicon*, 1, p. 1915.

[90] *Iqtiṣād*, p. 106.

[91] *Ibid.*

[92] *Ibid.*, pp. 106–7.

[93] *Ibid.* Al-Ghazālī goes on to say that what is lost by having such an Imām is less than what is lost by following another and stirring up discord, with untold consequences.

[94] That which has not been slaughtered in the way prescribed by the Law.

[95] *Iqtiṣād*, pp. 107–8. The third part of the chapter is concerned with the Companions and the order of precedence of the first four caliphs, and is not directly relevant to the present discussion. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 108–10.

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 105, line 13 onwards. Cf. the translation given above.

[97] Cf. Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, II, ed. S. M. Stern, tr. C. R. Barber and Stern (London, 1971), p. 143.

[98] *Iqtiṣād*, p. 105.

[99] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[100] In his biography of the Saljuq sultan Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, Ibn Khallikān gives a detailed account of the visit of Muḥammad and his brother Sanjar to Baghdad in 495/1101–2. The caliph al-Mustaẓhir received them with great pomp and placed insignia of power upon the two of them. Shortly afterwards, the *khuṭba* was said in Baghdad, naming Muḥammad as sultan instead of his half-brother Barkiyāruq.

Such events as these would of course have been familiar to al-Ghazālī. A sermon of his addressed to sultan Muḥammad is mentioned in the same biography (de Slane, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 232–4).

[101] According to Binder, the caliph represents "institutional" authority, the sultan "constitutional" authority, and the *ʿulamāʾ* "functional" authority (*op. cit.*, p. 240).

[102] *Ibid.*, pp. 237–9.

[103] Jabre, *La notion de la maʾarifa chez Ghazali* (Beirut, 1958), p. 141; Laoust, *op. cit.*, p. 115; Bouyges, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–4.

[104] *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, II (Cairo, 1387/1967), p. 179.

[105] *liʾl-salāṭīn fī aqṭār al-bilād wa ʾl-mubāʿīn li ʾl-khalīfa*. This makes better sense if the *wāw* is interpreted as introducing a concept which qualifies *salāṭīn* rather than denoting a second category of people.

[106] Literally, "the excellent qualities of good affairs".

[107] *Mustaẓhirī*, pp. 195–224.

[108] *Ibid.*, pp. 205–12.

[109] *Ibid.*, pp. 212–24.

[110] *Ibid.*, pp. 195–9.

[111] *Ibid.*, p. 201.

[112] Ed. H. Khedivjam, 2 vols. (Tehran, 1361 A.S.H.).

[113] This will be apparent in my forthcoming translation of and commentary on the *Kīmiyā-yi saʿādat*.

[114] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 525–42. This replaces the section in the *Iḥyāʾ* on the *Sīra* of the Prophet.

[115] F. R. C. Bagley, *Ghazālī's Book of Counsel for Kings* (Oxford, 1971), pp. xxiv–xxv.

[116] *Kīmiyā-yi saʿādat*, I, pp. 525–7.

[117] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 533–4.

[118] *Ibid.*, I, p. 537.

[119] *Ibid.*, I, p. 538.

[120] *Ibid.*

[121] For a discussion of the date of this work, cf. Bouyges, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–3; Laoust, *op. cit.*, pp. 144–5.

[122] On the question of the identity of the "king of the east" (Bagley, *op. cit.*, p. 3) to whom this work is addressed, cf. Lambton, "The Theory of Kingship in the *Naṣīḥat al-mulūk* by Ghazālī", *IQ*, I (1954), pp. 47–55; *eadem*, "Justice in the Medieval Persian Theory of Kingship", in *SI* XVII (1962), pp. 91–119; *Naṣīḥat al-mulūk*, ed. J. Humāʾī (Tehran, 1351 A.S.H./1972), pp. 119 ff.

[123] Tr. de Slane, II, pp. 556–61.

[124] In the introduction to his unpublished M.A. thesis (Manchester, 1956), in which he translated Part I of the *Naṣīḥat al-mulūk*, H. D. Isaacs concludes that Part I is authentic but that Part II "may contain spurious material".

[125] *Ghazālī's Book of Counsel for Kings*, pp. xxvi, xli, xlix.

[126] There is a reference to a forthcoming article "Did al-Ghazālī write a Mirror for Princes?" to be published in *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, VI, in P. Crone and M. Hinds, *God's Caliph* (Cambridge, 1986), p. 18, n. 67. I have not seen this article.

[127] Watt, *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali*, pp. 88, 110.

[128] Bagley, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[129] This is particularly true of his letters (nearly all of which are in Persian) addressed to rulers and prominent people of the time (these letters were probably written over a period extending from the year 489/1096 until his death). These might be expected to contain revealing insights but instead, as Wickens rightly observes, they are sometimes dull, verbose, repetitive homilies ("The Persian letters attributed to al-Ghazālī", *IQ*, III (1956), pp. 109–16). Cf. D. Krawulsky, *Briefe und Reden des Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ġazzālī* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1971).

[130] Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 239, cites Ibn Rushd's condemnation of al-Ghazālī as "being all things to all men" (*Faṣl al-maqāl*, ed. L. Gauthier (Algiers, 1948), p. 21). Other scholars, such as Watt, have held that al-Ghazālī's thought is consistent "The Study of al-Ġazālī", *Oriens*, XIII–XIV (1961), p. 122; *idem*, "The authenticity of the works attributed to al-Ghazāli", p. 31).

[131] As Goldziher puts it, "Even the mighty vassals who in reality held the caliph a prisoner, seem to have attached to the latter's person some sort of awe" (*Muslim Studies*, II, pp. 69–70).