

It is quite fitting that Bangura's conclusion (Chapter 8) should end with the identification of the minimum requirements of a critic interested in the study of African literature of Islamic inspiration. These include a rigorous interdisciplinary competence in Islam and the linguistic skills necessary for understanding Islamic doctrines in their original. There is little doubt that Bangura himself meets these criteria very well. Proficient in Arabic, the language of Islamic revelation and ritual (as well as in both English and French), his book is clear evidence of his deep understanding of Islam, its doctrines, history, and sociology. And partly as a result of these credentials, Bangura has produced an original and pioneering study that is likely to define the critical tradition of African literature of Islamic orientation for many years to come.

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Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam: Die Entwicklung zu al-Ghazālī's Urteil gegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen

By FRANK GRIFFEL (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 531 pp. Price HB \$157.00. ISBN 90-04-11566-8.

Apostasy and tolerance are closely linked ideas that, nevertheless, vary according with culture, place, or time. The present work (a slightly revised version of the author's Ph.D. thesis) surveys almost six centuries of Islamic thought on this issue, indicates several important developments, and presents al-Ghazzālī's position as the standard one in Islamic circles. Starting from the Qur'ān itself, especially its distinction between *islām* and *īmān*, passing through *ḥadīth* and *kalām* (both Mu'tazilī and Ash'arī), Griffel comes to al-Ghazzālī and his condemnation of the philosophers as apostates. He shows that al-Ghazzālī rejects the claim that philosophy surpasses religion, and states—more specifically in his *Fayṣal*—that one may not alter the wording of the Revelation, unless one can offer a very convincing rational argument. In the last part of the book, Griffel deals with the influence of and the reactions to al-Ghazzālī's theory in twelfth-century Islamic Andalusia. In all this, one can discern a change from a (comparatively) broad concept of tolerance (exemplified in the fact that in early times the execution of an apostate was only allowed after *istitāba*, i.e. an explicit invitation to repent and recant) to a more limited one (when any public deviation from the official 'dogmatic' line sufficed to declare someone an apostate).

This rudimentary outline of the work does not do justice to the many topics and authors it deals with. To attempt to do that in any serious way would require a review of many pages, and—even then—several interesting matters would perhaps be overlooked. It seems right therefore to advise

scholars to read the book for themselves—specialists in the Qur’ān, *fiqh*, *kalām*, or *falsafa*, will all find worthwhile information and argument. Also, the book has a most impressive bibliography of thirty-six pages.

Such a large-scale project is not without risks, specially for a young scholar. It is hardly surprising that many minor details need improvement or correction. Let me give a few examples: the *Active Intellect*, not God, is most probably to be identified with Avicenna’s notion of the *Dator formarum* (p. 138); the concept of ‘necessary existent’ was not derived by ‘Abd al-Jabbār from Avicenna (p. 152), since it already circulated in *kalām* before Avicenna (Griffel refers to D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition* (Leiden, 1988), pp. 261 ff., but Gutas explicitly states (p. 262) that ‘the concept was very much in circulation in the Eastern parts of the Islamic world during Avicenna’s philosophical formation’); al-Māwardī’s attitude regarding the philosophers cannot be derived solely from a supposed parallel with the thought of Abū Ya‘lā (p. 239), but needs at least a more substantial argumentation; al-Ghazzālī, in his *Mankhūl*, does not examine the *māhiyyat al-‘ulūm* but the *māhiyyat al-‘aql* (p. 264 and n. 18); and so on.

Griffel’s interpretation of al-Ghazzālī’s attitude towards philosophy, and especially the philosophy of Avicenna, seems to be open to a more fundamental questioning:

First of all, there is the delicate problem of the precise nature of *Maqāṣid* and *Tabāfut* and, then (if such exists) their mutual relationship. With E. Graf, Griffel believes (p. 269 and n. 19) that the former work was written after the latter was finished. Al-Ghazzālī’s students would have found the *Tabāfut* (too) difficult to understand; thus the *Maqāṣid* was written in order to facilitate the reading of the *Tabāfut*. But such a hypothesis simply overlooks the fact that the two works are of a quite different nature, and that the Avicennian matter quoted in the *Tabāfut* appears to be from Avicenna’s most ‘Aristotelian’ texts (see my ‘al-Ghazzālī’s *Tabāfut*: Is It a Real Rejection of Ibn Sīnā’s Philosophy?’, *JIS* 12.1, pp. 1–17), contrary to the *Dānesh-Nāmeḥ*, which constitutes the very basis of the *Maqāṣid* (the latter surely not a ‘presentation’ (*Darstellung*) of peripatetic philosophy, as Griffel characterizes it—see p. 324 n. 14).

Secondly, why does al-Ghazzālī (as indicated by Griffel, p. 273) accept, with Avicenna, the interdiction on communicating deeper religious truth to the common people? Even more importantly, why is he as, again, Griffel recognizes (p. 280 n. 49) under Avicenna’s influence in developing a deterministic ontology, which limits God’s power? In both these matters, he clearly deviates from his Ash‘arī *kalām* colleagues and the traditionists. Moreover, the first point seems to imply that al-Ghazzālī not always can and/or will overtly communicate the truth.

Thirdly, Griffel seems to be unaware that al-Ghazzālī copied pages and pages of his predecessors’ works in his different works, as well as of his own earlier works in later works. No serious evaluation of his personal contribution is possible while these sources and copies remain undetermined.

Thus, there is more than a similarity (see p. 425, n. 39) between the *Mihakk* and the introduction to the *Mustaşfā* (pp. i. 10–55); based on the Cairo editions (the former undated, the latter dated 1937), one can indicate the following correspondences:

<u>Mustaşfā</u>	<u>Mihakk</u>
11. 1–12. 3	4. 7–6. 12
12. 4–27. 5	92–115
27. 6–28. 12	130. 6–133. 1
29. 3–30. 6	6. 14–8. 15
30. 7–37. 16	9–29. 9 (with a few small omissions)
37. 17–40. 12	31. 4–37. 17
40. 13–54. 12	39. 4–68. 17
54. 13–55. 9	70. 6–72

In sum, only the section on sophism of the *Mihakk* has not been copied. The rest, except for a few variants and/or smaller omissions, is almost verbatim the same. Now, the *Mihakk* expresses in a *fiqh* terminology what in parts of the *Mi'yār* had been articulated in the classical logical language of philosophy (al-Ghazzālī uses both Avicennian and Farabian texts—see my ‘Al-Ghazzālī’s *Mi'yār al-'ilm fī fann al-mantiq*: Sources avicenniennes et farabiennes’, forthcoming in *Archives Doctrinales et Littéraires du Moyen Age*). From all this it is obvious that al-Ghazzālī accepts Avicenna’s logic as a fundamental tool in *fiqh*. But if such is the case, it becomes doubtful that he would no longer understand *burhān* in its strictest Aristotelian sense, i.e. ‘apodeictic argument’ (see p. 300, n. 24). This is true not only in logical matters, but also in ethical questions (in his *Mizān*, large parts of which are copied in *Ihyā'*, b. XXI, al-Ghazzālī bases himself mainly on an ethical treatise of Avicenna recently discovered by B. Karlīga and on a few pages of the *Najāṭ*) and cosmological questions (see some recent studies of R. Frank, especially his *Creation and the Cosmic System: Al-Ghāzālī and Avicenna* (Heidelberg, 1992)). When one wants to determine al-Ghazzālī’s exact attitude towards philosophy, and—more particularly—Avicennian philosophy, all these derivations need to be examined in the smallest detail.

Fourthly, Griffel is right to indicate a close link between al-Ghazzālī’s criticism of ‘philosophy’ and ‘bāṭinism’. But what, in such contexts, does he mean exactly by ‘philosophy’? The major criticism of the Bāṭīnites is their fundamental attitude of *taqlīd*. Moreover, when mentioning the philosophers in the *Munqidh*, al-Ghazzālī does not refer to al-Fārābī or Avicenna, but to the Ikhwān. Hence, a careful clarification on this point is essential.

Finally, what Griffel presents as al-Ghazzālī’s core doctrine is explicitly so expressed only in his *Fayṣal*. Al-Ghazzālī seems to hold a somewhat different opinion both in the *Ihyā'* (see p. 314, n. 36: ‘Der Glaube an die eschatologischen Verkündigungen ist hier noch kein herausragendes Element der Glaubenslehre’) and in the *Mustaşfā* (see p. 429: ‘Al-Ġazālī betont darüberhinaus, dass nur derjenige bestraft wird, der den Glauben an Gott und

seine Propheten verlässt, nicht wer in der religiösen Spekulation oder in der Beweisführung vom Konsensus der Muslime abweicht’).

If the difference between *Iḥyāʾ* and *Fayṣal* can be explained in terms of doctrinal evolution, that is no longer the case with the *Mustasfā*, unless one accepts a return to an earlier point of view, but then the *Fayṣal* no longer expresses al-Ghazzālī’s final understanding. The way Griffel establishes an agreement between the latter two works, namely by interpreting the so-called vagueness of the *Mustasfā* through the prism of the strong affirmation of the *Fayṣal*, looks rather questionable.

Notwithstanding these fundamental questions, this is an important, most valuable book, a pioneering work that focuses attention on a very difficult issue—a considerable achievement of great value to the scholarly community.

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The Epistle of Sālim Ibn Dhakwān

By PATRICIA CRONE and FRITZ ZIMMERMANN (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 407 pp. HB £65.00. ISBN 0–19–815265–5.

The *Sīrat Sālim b. Dhakwān*, an early Ibādī epistle about the political views of various Khārījī and Sunnī sects and movements, has attracted considerable scholarly attention ever since Michael Cook edited, translated, and discussed the section from it on the Murjīʾa in his book on *Early Muslim Dogma* (Cambridge, 1981). In this volume, P. Crone and F. Zimmermann present a meticulous critical edition of the full text, based on three manuscripts from Oman; a careful, copiously annotated English translation; and a wide-ranging study of the text and its historical background and implications. The question of the authorship, provenance, and date of the epistle, much debated since Cook’s book, is thoroughly re-examined.

Previous suggestions for dating the epistle had ranged from 72/691 to the early ‘Abbāsīd age. Crone and Zimmermann for the first time draw attention to a Sālim b. Dhakwān mentioned in the *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, who was captured by the conquering Arabs at Bust in Sīstān in the year 30/650 and later rose to prominence among the local Muslims. The Ibādīs in the Maghrib preserve the text of a letter of Jābir b. Zayd al-Azdī, the chief of the Ibādī community in Basra from 61/680 to between 93/711 and 104/722, addressed to a Sālim b. Dhakwān in answer to a letter of his concerning some points of religious law. The authors envisage the possibility of Jābir’s correspondent Sālim b. Dhakwān being identical with the Sālim b. Dhakwān of Sīstān, but leave the question open. In discussing the local provenance of the epistle, however, they come out in favour of Khurāsān and Sīstān and suggest that the Sālim b. Dhakwān known to the Sīstānīs is likely to be the same person to whom the epistle is ascribed (p. 286). They discard the possibility that the Sīstānī Sālim b.